The Cambridge History of Turkey

Volume 2: The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453–1603

Edited by Suraiya N. Faroqhi, Kate Fleet
With the conquest of Constantinople and the extinguishing of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the Ottoman Empire moved into a new phase of expansion during which it emerged in the sixteenth century as a dominant political player on the world scene. With territory stretching around the Mediterranean from the Adriatic Sea to Morocco, and from the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea, the Ottomans reached the apogee of their military might in a period seen by many later Ottomans, and much later historians, as a golden age in which the state was strong, the sultan’s might unquestionable, and intellectual life and the arts flourishing.

Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of Turkey examines this period from the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 to the accession of Ahmed I in 1603. The essays, written by leading scholars in the field, assess the considerable expansion of Ottoman power and the effervescence of the Ottoman intellectual and cultural world through literature, art and architecture. They also investigate the challenges that faced the Ottoman state, particularly in the later period, as the empire experienced economic crises, revolts and long, drawn-out wars.

Suraiya N. Faroqhi is Professor of History at Istanbul Bilgi University. Her publications include The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (2004); The Ottoman Empire: A Short History (2008); Artisans of Empire: Crafts and Craftspeople under the Ottomans (2009); and, as editor, The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839 (2006).

Kate Fleet is Director of the Skilliter Centre for Ottoman Studies, Newnham College, University of Cambridge. Her publications include European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey (2006); A Social History of Istanbul, co-authored with Ebru Boyar (2010); and, as editor, The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume 1: Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453 (2009).
The Cambridge History of Turkey represents a monumental enterprise. The History, comprising four volumes, covers the period from the end of the eleventh century, with the arrival of the Turks in Anatolia, through the emergence of the early Ottoman state, and its development into a powerful empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, encompassing a massive territory from the borders of Iran in the east, to Hungary in the west, and North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula in the south. The last volume covers its destruction in the aftermath of the First World War, and the history of the modern state of Turkey which arose from the ashes of empire. Chapters from an international team of contributors reflect the very significant advances that have taken place in Ottoman history and Turkish studies in recent years.

VOLUME 1
Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453
Edited by Kate Fleet

VOLUME 2
The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453–1603
Edited by Suraiya N. Faroqhi and Kate Fleet

VOLUME 3
The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839
Edited by Suraiya N. Faroqhi

VOLUME 4
Turkey in the Modern World
Edited by Reşat Kasaba
Contents

- List of Illustrations   ix
- List of Maps   xi
- List of Contributors  xiii
- Chronology   xvii
- A note on transliteration   xxi

I. Introduction  1
SuraIyA n. fARoqHI

Part I
AN EXPANDING EMPIRE

2. The Ottomans, 1451–1603: A political history introduction  19
KATe fLEET

3. Ottoman expansion in Europe, ca. 1453–1606  44
PAlmIRA bRUMMett

4. Ottoman expansion in the East  74
EBRu bOYAR

5. Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean  141
KATe fLEET

6. Ottoman expansion in the Red Sea  173
SALIh ÖZbARAN
Contents

PART II
GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC LIFE AND SOCIETY

- 7. Government, administration and law 205
   Colin Imber

- 8. The Ottoman government and economic life: Taxation, public finance and trade controls 241
   Murat Çığaçka

- 9. Ottoman armies and warfare, 1453–1603 276
   Géza Dávid

- 10. Religious institutions, policies and lives 320
   Gilles Veinstein

- 11. Ottoman population 356
   Suraiya N. Faroqhi

PART III
CULTURE AND THE ARTS

- 12. The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order: Intellectual life 407
   Gottfried Hagen

- 13. The visual arts 457
   Cığdem Kafescioğlu

- 14. The literature of Rum: The making of a literary tradition (1450–1600) 548
   Selim S. Kuru

- Glossary 593
- Bibliography 599
- Index 665
13.1 The Topkapı Palace, Istanbul, aerial view  
13.2a The mosque complex of Mehmed II, Istanbul: (a) aerial view  
13.2b The mosque complex of Mehmed II, Istanbul: (b) plan  
13.3 Gedik Ahmed Paşa mosque-convent, Afyon, 1477: (a) exterior view with side iwans; (b) plan  
13.4a Bayezid II complex, Edirne, 1488  
13.4b Bayezid II complex, Edirne, 1488: plan of complex (1, mosque; 2, soup kitchen; 3, caravansary; 4, hospital; 5, medrese)  
13.5 Page from the “Baba Nakkaş” album, ca. 1470  
13.6 Calligraphic album of Şeyh Hamdullah; page with naskh and thuluth scripts  
13.7a–b Underglaze ceramic plates: (a) dish with rumî and Baba Nakkaş–style ornament and pseudo-Kufic inscription, ca. 1480; (b) dish with tuğraş spiral design, ca. 1530–40  
13.7c–d Underglaze ceramic plates: (c) dish with rosettes, lotus flowers and saz leaves, ca. 1545–50; (d) dish with tulips and hyacinths, ca. 1560–75  
13.8 Velvet with an ogival pattern, attributed to Bursa or Italy, fifteenth century  
13.9 Portrait of Mehmed II, attributed to Sinan Bey. Album, 1460–80  
13.10 Bayezid II meeting with vezirs, Malik Ummi, Şehname, ca. 1495  
13.11 The courts of Solomon and Bilqis, Uzun Firdevsi, Süleymanname, ca. 1480  
13.12 Découpage garden from the “Nishaburi” album F. 1426  
13.13 The “Nishaburi” album, ink drawings of dragon and lotus blossom in saz leaves  
13.14 Frontispiece of Qur’an transcribed by Ahmed Karahisari, partly attributed to Hasan Çelebi, ca. 1550, 1584, illuminations 1584–96  
13.15 Ceremonial kaftan with ogival pattern, featuring tulips and rumîs, mid-sixteenth century  
13.16 Detail of tile panel from the mihrab, Piyale Paşa mosque, Istanbul, 1573  
13.17 Jewelled gold book binding, last quarter of the sixteenth century  
13.18 Şehr-i İskenderiyye-i ‘Arab (Alexandria), in Piri Reis, Kitab-i Bahriye  
13.19 View of Genoa, Matrakçı Nasuh, Tarih-i Feth-i Siklos, Estergon, ve İstolbelgrad, ca. 1545
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustrations</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.20 Süleyman I presented with the legendary cup of Jamshid, Arifi,</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.21a Süleymaniye mosque and mausoleum, Istanbul, 1550–7,</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>architect Sinan: aerial view from the south</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.21b Süleymaniye mosque and mausoleum, Istanbul, 1550–7,</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>architect Sinan: interior view towards the mihrab</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.21c Süleymaniye mosque and mausoleum, Istanbul, 1550–7,</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>architect Sinan: plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.22 The mausoleum of Süleyman I: (a) interior; (b) section</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.23 Haseki Hürrem public bath, 1550s, Istanbul, architect Sinan: (a) aerial</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>view from the south; (b) plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.24a Rüstem Paşa mosque, Istanbul, ca. 1563, architect Sinan, interior</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>view towards the south</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.24b Ismihan Sultan and Sokollu Mehmed Paşa mosque, Istanbul,</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1571–2, architect Sinan, interior view towards the south</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.25 (a) Köse Hürev Paşa mosque and mausoleum, Van, 1567–8, 1587–8,</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>architect Sinan (Photograph: Boğaziçi University Aptullah Kuran Archive);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Khan al-Gumruk, Aleppo, interior facade of courtyard, 1560s or 1570s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.26 Sinan Paşa medrese, mausoleum and sebil complex Istanbul, 1593,</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>architect Davud Ağa: (a) view from the west; (b) plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.27 Mehmed III returns from the Eger campaign, Ta’likizade, Egresi</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fetihnamesi, 1596–1600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.28 Cairo and the Nile; men enjoying coffee in boats, Şerif bin Seyyid</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammed, Tercüme-i Miftah-i Cifri’l-Cami, 1595–1600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.29 Group portrait of Ahmet Karabag, Seyyid Lokman, Ahmed Feridun</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the painters Ustad Osman and Nakkaş Ali; Seyyid Lokman,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şehname-i Selim Han</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maps

I  Ottoman expansion in Europe  
II  Ottoman expansion in the East  
III  Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean  
IV  Ottoman expansion in the Red Sea  

page xxii  
xxiii  
xxiv  
xxv
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Contributors

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Ascension: Cross-cultural Encounters with the Islamic Mi’raj Tales, ed. Christiane Gruber and Frederick Colby (Bloomington, Ind., 2010).

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Chronology

1444–6, 1451–81

**Mehmed II Fatih**

1451
Campaign against Karaman

1453
Ottoman conquest of Constantinople

1454–5
Ottoman campaigns in Serbia

1455
Fall of the Genoese settlements of Old and New Phokaea

1456
Conquest of Lemnos and Enez

1456
Unsuccessful Ottoman siege of Belgrade

1456
Capture of Athens

1456
Death of George Branković

1457
Papal fleet active in the Aegean

1459
Conquest of Serbia

1459
Fall of Genoese colony of Amasra

1460
Ottoman conquest of the Peloponnese

1461
Conquest of Sinop

1461
Ottoman capture of the Byzantine empire of Trebizond (Trabzon)

1462
Submission of Wallachia

1462
Conquest of Lesbos (Midilli)

1463
Conquest of Bosnia

1463–79
Ottoman–Venetian war

1466
Conquest of Herzegovina

1468
Death of George Kastriote (Scanderbeg)

1468, 1469
Campaigns against Karaman

1470
Conquest of Negroponte

1471, 1472
Campaigns against Karaman

1473
Ottoman defeat of Uzun Hasan at the battle of Otlukbeli (Başkent)

1474
End of the principality of Karaman

1475
Ottoman conquest of Caffa (Kefe) and Tana (Azov)

1476
Submission of Crimea

1480
Ottoman conquest of Wallachia

1480
Unsuccessful Ottoman siege of Rhodes

1480
Ottoman conquest of Otranto
### Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1481–1512</th>
<th><strong>Bayezid II</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1481</td>
<td>Ottoman withdrawal from Otranto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1482</td>
<td>Flight of Cem to the Hospitallers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1484</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Kilia and Akkerman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1485–91</td>
<td>Ottoman–Mamluk war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1495</td>
<td>Death of Cem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1497</td>
<td>Consolidation of Ottoman control of Moldavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1499–1503</td>
<td>Ottoman–Venetian war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Modon conquered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Conquest of Coron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Durrës (Durazzo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501</td>
<td>Isma‘il’s conquest of Tabriz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1508</td>
<td>Isma‘il’s conquest of Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1511</td>
<td>Şah Kulu revolt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1512–20</th>
<th><strong>Selim I</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1514</td>
<td>Ottoman defeat of Shah Isma‘il at the battle of Çaldıran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1516</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1517</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Egypt and destruction of the Mamluk sultanate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1517</td>
<td>Ottoman victory over the Portuguese off Jeddah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1520–66</th>
<th><strong>Süleyman I</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1521</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Belgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1522</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Rhodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1524</td>
<td>Revolt of Ahmed Paşa, governor of Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1526</td>
<td>Ottoman victory at the battle of Mohács</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1526</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Zabid and Aden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1526</td>
<td>Revolt in Anatolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1528</td>
<td>Revolt of Kalender in Anatolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1529</td>
<td>Unsuccessful Ottoman siege of Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1534</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Tabriz and Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1535</td>
<td>Habsburg capture of Tunis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1536</td>
<td>Ottoman–French alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1537–40</td>
<td>Ottoman–Venetian war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1537</td>
<td>Unsuccessful Ottoman attack on Corfu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1538</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Naxos, Andros, Paros and Santorini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1538</td>
<td>Ottoman defeat of the naval forces of the Holy League at the battle of Prevesa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1538</td>
<td>Ottoman campaign to Diu, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1540</td>
<td>Establishment of the Ottoman beylerbeylik of Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1541</td>
<td>Unsuccessful Habsburg attack on Algiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1541</td>
<td>Ottoman conquest of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1541</td>
<td>Portuguese campaign against the Ottomans in the Red Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1543</td>
<td>Renewal of the Ottoman–French alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1543–4</td>
<td>Ottoman navy wintered off Toulon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chronology

1546 Ottoman conquest of Basra
1547 Ottoman–Habsburg peace
1549 Ottoman conquest of Van
1551 Ottoman conquest of Tripoli
1551 Ottoman–French alliance
1552 Incorporation of Temesvar under direct Ottoman control
1552 Ottoman campaign in the Persian Gulf
1553 Death of Şehzade Mustafa
1553–5 Ottoman–Safavid war
1554–5 Ottoman conquest of Ethiopia
1555 Peace of Amasya
1559 Defeat of Şehzade Bayezid
1562 Death of Şehzade Bayezid
1562 Ottoman–Habsburg treaty
1565 Unsuccessful Ottoman siege of Malta
1566 Ottoman conquest of Chios

1566–74 Selim II
1567 Suppression of revolt in Iraq
1568 Ottoman–Habsburg treaty
1569 Ottoman grant of capitulations to the French
1569 Ottoman expedition against Russia, siege of Astrakhan
1569–71 Ottoman campaign in Yemen
1570–3 Ottoman–Venetian war
1570 Ottoman conquest of Nicosia
1571 Ottoman conquest of Famagusta
1571 Ottoman defeat at the battle of Lepanto by the naval forces of the Holy League
1574 Ottoman conquest of Tunis

1574–95 Murad III
1578–90 Ottoman–Safavid war; annexation of Azerbaijan
1580 Ottoman–English capitulations
1583 Battle of Meşale
1585 Ottoman conquest of Tabriz
1593–1606 Ottoman–Habsburg war

1595–1603 Mehmed III
1596 (before and after) Military (Celali) rebellions in Anatolia
1596 Battle of Mesző-Keresztes
1600 Ottoman conquest of Kanizsa
1603–39 Ottoman–Safavid wars
1606 Peace of Zsitvatorok
Ottoman Turkish has been transliterated using modern Turkish orthography, and diacritical marking of long vowels has not been used for Arabic and Persian terms or names. Names have been given in their Turkish form except when in common usage in English. Where figures are more familiar under a different form, both forms are given.
1 Ottoman expansion in Europe.
II  Ottoman expansion in the East.
III Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean.
IV  Ottoman expansion in the Red Sea.
Of the Ottoman Empire we can say what Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) once wrote about the seventeenth-century military commander and entrepreneur Albrecht von Wallenstein (in Czech, Albrecht Václav Eusebius z Valdštejna, 1583–1634). According to Schiller’s verse, the favour and hate of conflicting parties had caused confusion, producing a highly variable image of Wallenstein’s character in history. Put differently, it was the diverging perspectives of the beholders that gave rise to this instability. Admittedly, being a poet, Schiller made his point far more concisely than the present author is able to do.¹

In certain traditions of historiography in the Balkans and elsewhere as well, denigrating the Ottoman Empire and making it responsible for all manner of “backwardness” is still widespread, although challenges to this view have been mounting during the last 30 years. On the other hand, romanticising the images of Mehmed the Conqueror (r. 1451–81) or Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66) is also quite a popular enterprise: witness the statue of Mehmed II in downtown Istanbul – a new one is in the planning stage – and the double monument to Zrínyi Miklós and Sultan Süleyman in a park of Szigetvar, Hungary.

To claim “objectivity” means to deceive oneself and others, but the authors of the present volume, whatever their views, have all clearly tried to distinguish the points made by the primary sources from the interpretations that they propose as historians of the twenty-first century. Readers will notice that in spite of wide areas of consensus on certain topics specialists do not necessarily agree, and indeed it has been a major concern of the present editors to demonstrate the variety of approaches current among Ottomanist historians.

Paradoxically, this book, the second of the four-volume series *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, is the last to appear in print. While nobody had planned such an outcome, it is perhaps appropriate, for we will be dealing with what an eminent Ottomanist historian has called the “classical age”, a period of significance if ever there was one. Thus we are in the happy position of presenting, at the end of our project, what many readers will consider the most interesting part of our story. Certainly most contributors to this series believe that it is a mistake to subsume everything that happened after 1600 under the blanket term “decline”. Yet during the period between the 1450s and 1600, more than before or afterwards, the Ottoman elite and its subjects made their mark in a variety of different fields, achievements which the contributors to this volume will discuss.

Ottoman writing about the Ottoman world

To the historian, sources are primordial, and the period between the mid-fifteenth and the early seventeenth century is special not only because of the significance of the events that occurred and the more long-term processes that played themselves out but also because for the first time Ottoman sources become reasonably abundant. Under the early sultans, before the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror, both Ottoman chronicles and archival documents were extremely rare. As a result, we can approach the image of Ottoman history as it may have appeared to contemporaries of Sultan Murad I (r. 1362–89) or Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402) only in an indirect fashion: by the study of buildings and inscriptions, which, however, survive in their original shapes only in exceptional cases, or by a careful analysis of later narrative and documentary sources.

With the 1450s, however, matters begin to change: there survives the work of an Ottoman author who has written about the battle for Constantinople, and we also possess fragments of a tax register of newly conquered Istanbul (1455). When Mehmed II finally incorporated the Karaman principality into his domain, his officials produced a careful list of the pious foundations of Konya, including the rich and precious library of Sadreddin-i Konevi (1207–74), son-in-law to the mystic Muhyi al-Din Ibn ʿArabi (1165–1240) and an important intellectual figure in his own right. Moreover, under the Conqueror’s son Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512), we encounter what may well have been the first

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2 Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600*, trans. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (London, 1973). This work has been reprinted several times.
dissenting voices from the Ottoman world that have come down to us, in the shape of certain anonymous texts describing the calamities that had befallen pre-Islamic Constantinople. Probably this fifteenth-century Cassandra, if indeed the author was a single person, intended to warn Bayezid II against making this accursed site into the seat of his sultanate.3

About the background of this author – or these authors – we know nothing. But they were by no means the only writers active at this time, for Mehmed the Conqueror and Bayezid II sponsored scholarly and literary activity, filling the palace libraries with books and sending largesse to poets. Certain works produced by these men – and women, for a few female poets were also active – have survived, and after 1520, when Süleyman the Lawgiver, also known as the Magnificent, had ascended the throne, the number of works preserved increased exponentially. During the second half of the sixteenth century, Ottoman divan poetry developed its own special character and was no longer just an offshoot of the Iranian tradition, Timurid style. An encyclopaedia of Ottoman poets, which contained short biographies and poetry samples, also appeared for the first time in 1538; afterwards the genre became popular, and some of these texts had claims to literary merit.

During the same period, Ottoman chronicles, which before 1450 had mostly consisted of brief sketches, emerged as a genre in their own right. One of the most interesting is surely the collection of heroic stories put together by Aşıkpaşazade, the descendant of a line of dervish şeyhs and authors from Central Anatolia. An old man in the 1470s and 1480s, he celebrated the conquests of the sultans from Osman I (d. ca. 1324) and Orhan (r. ca. 1324–62) down to his contemporary Mehmed the Conqueror. The works of Aşıkpaşazade and his colleagues have caused some disagreement among modern scholars. Very few historians have accepted the legends recounted in them just as they stand, but there is a real dispute between people who prefer to ignore these tales as so many meaningless inventions and those who ever since the days of Fuat Köprülü have tried to interpret them with the help of the social anthropology and literary theories current in the researchers’ own

time.  Whichever approach a given historian may favour, it is quite obvious that sixteenth-century authors tried hard to collect information about the earlier years of the Ottoman principality yet had a great deal of trouble in doing so. One of them, the chancery head (nişancı) Feridun Ahmed (d. 1583), apparently was so frustrated at not being able to find any documents issued by the earliest Ottoman sultans that he simply invented them; his deception was only discovered in the early twentieth century and has much damaged the reputation of his otherwise very valuable writings.

In the sixteenth century, a number of high officials wrote historical works which are of special interest because these men had access not only to oral information current in the palaces of sultans and vezirs but also to archival documents. Thus Celâlâdâd Mustâfa (ca. 1490–1567), another head of the sixteenth-century Ottoman chancery, produced what is still regarded as the standard Ottoman source on Süleyman the Magnificent. Slightly later, the historian and litterateur Mustâfa Ali (1541–1600) set the standard that many chroniclers working in the sultans’ realm were to follow down to the 1800s. But as the author could not know about his posthumous fame, he spent much of his energy during his later years lamenting the injustices of a system that had failed to promote him according to his merits.

Ottoman officials and literary men – who often played both roles simultaneously – from the late fifteenth century onwards also created a novel language. While the grammatical base remained Turkish, authors of the time imported Arabic and especially Persian words, and to some extent Persian grammatical constructions as well, to the point that in some works only the sentence endings indicate that we are not dealing with a Persian text. Unintelligible to the uninitiated, this language served only in written and not in oral communication. While it has fallen from favour during the last 150 years, and certain authors of earlier periods also preferred to write in a language closer to educated speech, the historian does need to keep in mind that many sophisticated subjects of the Ottoman sultans regarded this hybrid language as a major cultural achievement.

Furthermore, the sixteenth century was the period in which Ottoman geographers came into their own: Piri Reis (ca. 1465–1554/55) produced two world maps remarkable for the accuracy with which he had calculated the distances between continents. Dealing with realms closer to home, this scholarly admiral produced a collection of maps showing the Mediterranean, and especially its eastern sections, which by his time were a possession of the sultans. The author had intended his work as a handbook for sailors; however, many scribes rather seem to have produced richly decorated copies meant for the libraries of Ottoman gentlemen. Piri Reis’s work thus served as a vehicle of elite geographical education as well.

Quantitatively speaking, however, the sultans’ administration was the greatest producer of written texts. The activities of this bureaucracy, which had begun in the mid-1400s but gathered speed a century later, necessitated the institution of government archives, which are still our major source in spite of losses due to accidents, neglect and also malice aforethought. Especially the great tax registers of this period, which contain the names of taxpayers and the dues payable by villagers and townsmen while listing also pious foundations and their beneficiaries, allow us to write social histories at least of certain towns and regions. Or, to be exact, this enterprise becomes fruitful if we can compare the information contained in the tax registers with documents recorded by the scribes of urban judges, for since the late fifteenth century in the Bursa case and since the 1500s in many other Ottoman towns, a number of scribes recorded not only court cases but also sultanic commands emanating from Istanbul. In addition, these men served as notaries. Since having one’s writing preserved was very much an elite privilege, even with this material at hand we cannot claim to write “history from below”. But at least these works do convey an image of society as it appeared to Ottoman elites.

The taxpaying subjects: Peasants and nomads

Like the governing classes of other empires from the Ancient Near East to the nineteenth century, the Ottoman elite drew its resources largely from peasant taxes. The vast majority of the Ottoman population in the Balkans as well as Anatolia and the Arab provinces tilled the land; in certain regions, such as the dry steppe of Inner Anatolia and Syria, nomads and semi-nomads also were common. Due to the population increase which occurred in the entire

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Mediterranean world during the 1500s, a certain number of former nomads settled down, and the Ottoman administration, which generally preferred villagers because they were better taxpayers and did not pose any military threat, was more than eager to record them as settled folk. In reality, people in some regions seem to have had a foot in both worlds: peasants pastured their animals on summer pastures, where they might move with their entire households for the duration, while certain Anatolian nomads practiced small-scale agriculture in their winter quarters. Presumably such people could be villagers or nomads according to circumstances, especially if they had relatives among the migrant population.

About the lives of Ottoman villagers we know very little, as the tax registers of the time only record the names of adult men and the villages or tribal units to which they belonged. Due to the lack of surnames, we cannot say anything about the number of families that remained on a given site for generations compared to those who left and settled elsewhere. Certainly the Ottoman administration ordered peasants to stay put unless they could get permission from their local administrators to move away, or unless the sultan decided on wholesale resettlement of certain groups of the population to consolidate new conquests. But the government’s power of enforcement in the more outlying regions must surely have been limited.

Yields from dry-field agriculture tended to be low, and villagers were vulnerable to droughts, which were especially disastrous during the 1590s. At least in Anatolia, where navigable rivers were few, the authorities probably could enforce the rule that every administrative district should only feed the local town, and any reserves should be at the disposal of armies that might cross the area on their way to the front. The only exception was the coastal regions, from which the owners of surpluses could export grain. Down to the mid-1500s, the sultans in peacetime permitted sales to Venice, but once the population increase of the sixteenth century had become obvious, they strictly forbade such exportation. However, since merchants from outside the realm often paid better prices, there always was a certain amount of smuggling not only of grain but also of raw materials such as cotton.

Trade and artisan production

At the same time, urbanisation was an ongoing process: cities such as Bursa, Aleppo, Damascus and Cairo expanded in the sixteenth century as the population gradually recovered from the plague epidemics of the 1300s and 1400s.
Istanbul newly emerged as a major centre with a population of several hundred thousand in the sixteenth century. Inter-empire trade focused on these cities: although the Genoese withdrew from the eastern Mediterranean during the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror, Florentines and especially Venetians frequented Istanbul and Bursa, while Muslim, Christian and Jewish subjects of the sultan all traded in Venice. French commerce by contrast remained limited: the often discussed *ahidname* (capitulations) of 1536 remained a draft and were never implemented, and while the sultan did grant such a document to the king of France in 1569, the French civil wars of the period prevented merchants from making full use of them. By contrast, during the last quarter of the sixteenth century, English merchants began to import woollen cloth into Ottoman ports and exported Iranian raw silk that they purchased in the same venues.⁹

However, the Ottomans traded with Eastern as well as Western countries. Iran was a major source of raw silk, converted into cloth by weavers in Bursa and Istanbul; however, Selim I briefly interrupted the trade in the early 1500s when he attempted to reduce the revenues of his Safavid rival by declaring an embargo on silk.¹⁰ Spices from India and South-east Asia found avid consumers in the Ottoman Empire, too, with pepper a special favourite. Moreover, in this period the products of certain manufacturers found outlets beyond the borders of the empire, traders from Poland and Venice for instance purchasing camlets in Ankara.¹¹ During the years covered by this volume, for a brief period it seemed as if members of the Ottoman elite might find the gains from interregional and inter-empire trade so attractive that they would be willing to allow long-distance traders a certain amount of leeway and loosen the constraints of the “command economy”. Attractive possibilities opened up especially in Aleppo and Cairo, where traders with India typically established their businesses.¹² However, around 1600, economic and financial difficulties, doubtless in part due to war on both the western and eastern fronts, tended to make life far more difficult for aspiring merchants.

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Florescence of the arts

In art and architecture as well, it is the period covered by this volume that stands out, for the 1400s and 1500s were the time when Mehmed the Conqueror, Bayezid II, Süleyman the Magnificent and Selim II (r. 1566–75) had great foundation complexes built, usually in Istanbul but sometimes also in cities like Damascus or Edirne. Moreover, vezirs also founded more modest but still impressive complexes, and by the second half of the sixteenth century there came the time when female members of the Ottoman dynasty were able to sponsor major charities as well. The town of Üsküdar, opposite Istanbul on the other side of the Bosporus, owed its growth and development at least in part to the religious and charitable constructions of Süleyman’s daughter Mihrimah (d. 1578) and the latter’s sister-in-law Nurbanu (ca. 1530–83), mother of Murad III (r. 1574–95). Although claiming to be of noble Venetian descent, Nurbanu had entered the imperial harem as a slave; yet, contrary to Ottoman dynastic tradition, she ultimately became the lawful wedded wife of Selim II and used her position to become a major patroness.¹³

In many of these projects, the architect Sinan (ca. 1490–1588) had a hand, either because he had designed them and later supervised their construction on site or because he approved – and perhaps revised – the projects of his students. While Sinan outlived Sultan Süleyman by over 20 years and his relationship to this ruler had often been tense, in death the two were united: as a gesture unique in the history of Ottoman building, Sinan’s mausoleum was set close to an outer wall of the Süleymaniye complex.¹⁴

While architecture was the art form for which the Ottoman world has become famous, the history of miniature painting was also significant, albeit much shorter; to a very significant extent, major achievements occurred during the period under review. As for the potters of Iznik (Nicaea), in the period covered by our volume, they produced splendid examples of faience as decorative panels for mosques and palaces but also as tableware for the well-to-do.¹⁵


Introduction

While today’s connoisseurs have learned to appreciate the art of the painter Levni (d. 1730) and eighteenth-century architecture as well, it remains true that some of the most memorable items that a visitor to Istanbul will retain are the work of artists and architects who flourished in the sixteenth century.

Military and political successes

For us denizens of the 2000s, the Ottoman legacy in art and architecture tends to take centre stage. But for contemporaries both within and outside the sultans’ realm, the rapid expansion of the latter was far more important. Reactions varied according to time, place and the social position of the people concerned. As a result, contemporary texts reflect fear and rejection, but also acceptance and even anticipation.16

Our period begins with the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and the small principalities into which the Byzantine Empire had split after the “Latin” campaign of 1204, also known as the Fourth Crusade. Venice had become a major power in the eastern Mediterranean due to its territorial acquisitions upon that occasion, which for about half a century even included a share of formerly Byzantine Constantinople. However, in the reign of Mehmed II, Venice lost Euboa (Negroponte) as well as the ports which the Signoria had held on the Peloponnesian. In the early 1500s, when Venice and the Ottoman Empire were once again at war, the terrified inhabitants of the lagoon could see the smoke rising from villages in Friuli, in today’s north-eastern Italy, which had been burned by the advance guards of Sultan Bayezid’s army.17

With the occupation of Akkerman and Kilia (1484), today in Ukraine, the Black Sea became an Ottoman lake, closed to Genoese and Venetian merchants. As for the hanate of Crimea, in 1475 Mehmed the Conqueror made it into a dependent principality. While the established dynasty remained in place, the sultan could now depose a han and place one of the latter’s relatives on the throne. This arrangement remained in place until the late eighteenth century.

In the Balkans, Mehmed the Conqueror repressed the uprising of Skanderbeg (1405–68) in Albania.18 At the same time, the Bosnian kingdom

16 Nevra Necipoğlu, Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins: Politics and Society in the Late Empire (Cambridge, 2009).
18 One of the most recent additions to the long bibliography on this subject is Oliver Jens Schmitt, Skanderbeg: Der neue Alexander auf dem Balkan (Ratisbon, 2009).
also came to an end, and Saraybosna (Sarajevo), previously an insignificant village, became an important Islamic town and a showcase of Ottoman power. In 1480, the forces of Mehmed II also took Otranto in southern Italy; probably it was due only to the Conqueror’s death the next year and the long, drawn-out struggle for the throne between his sons Bayezid and Cem that the Ottomans attempted no further Italian campaigns.

With the – not altogether peaceful – accession of Selim I (r. 1512–20), the empire expanded to the east and south. In a campaign against the newly formed polity of the Safavids, whose founder Shah Isma’il I (r. 1501–24) had taken over the defunct empire of the Akkoyunlu, Sultan Selim conquered eastern Anatolia, including the cities of Erzurum and Erzincan in 1514. In 1516–17, there followed a victorious campaign against the Mamluk sultanate of Syria and Egypt, which Selim I incorporated into his territory as a set of directly ruled provinces. Given the dependence of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina on Egyptian food supplies, the şerif of Mecca voluntarily submitted to the Ottoman ruler. From 1517 to the end of the empire, the şerifs were to form a subordinate princely dynasty.

With the conquest of the Mamluk Empire, the character and composition of the Ottoman polity changed dramatically. Until 1517, it had been first a principality and then a regional empire on the margins of the Islamic world, albeit with considerable prestige for having conquered Constantinople. But with the acquisition of Egypt, Syria and – after a campaign in 1533–4 – Iraq as well, the sultans no longer governed a largely non-Muslim population but controlled the historic heartlands of the Islamic world, which had been largely Muslim for centuries. In addition, the Ottoman rulers became the protectors of the pilgrimage to Mecca, an essential requirement for all Muslims who can afford the expense. But at the same time the sultans also came under considerable pressure to legitimise their rule, for now they needed to compete, in terms of “magnificence” and good government, with the Mamluk sultans, who after all had been the only rulers capable of keeping the Mongol armies at bay. As the Mamluk sultans were Sunni Muslims, scholar officials called upon to legitimise the Ottoman conquest in religious terms were in a delicate position, and it is impossible to say how many people were willing to accept Sultan Selim’s claim that the Mamluks had deserved deposition because of the support they had given to the “heretic” Shah Isma’il. Be that as it may, throughout the sixteenth century, Istanbul’s control over Cairo, Aleppo, Damascus and Mecca remained on the whole quite solid.

19 Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Egypt’s Adjustment to Ottoman Rule: Institutions, Waqf and Architecture in Cairo, 16th and 17th Centuries* (Leiden, 1994).
By contrast, Sultan Selim’s defeat of Shah Isma’il in 1514 meant not the end but the beginning of a long series of Ottoman–Iranian confrontations. While the armies of the sultans repeatedly conquered the long-standing Safavid capital of Tabriz, causing the shahs to move their royal seat to Qazvin, and at the very end of our period even to Isfahan, Ottoman conquests in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan proved to be quite ephemeral. In addition, the conflict between sultans and shahs had a significant religious component, and in the 1500s both sides began to define their Islamic character in opposition to that of their respective opponent. The early Ottoman sultans had accommodated quite a few holy men, seemingly without worrying very much about whether the practices of these personages were acceptable to religious scholars. But from the time of Bayezid II, sometimes called “the Pious” or even “the Saintly”, Ottoman sultans began to define their role as defenders of Sunni right belief vis-à-vis the “heretic” shahs of Iran. Under Bayezid’s successors Selim and Süleyman, this tendency was even more marked. In similar fashion, the shahs of Iran and the religious scholars working in the realm of the latter regarded their polity as representing the pure community of the Prophet’s descendants. They upheld this claim even though, especially under Shah Isma’il I, the warriors that had brought him to power and venerated him as their almost-divine leader espoused a set of syncretistic beliefs that did not endear them to Shi’ite men of religion. Both Ottoman and Safavid religious scholars upon occasion declared that their opponents had lost any claim to being regarded as Muslims.

Further Ottoman expansion took place in conflict not with Muslim but with Christian powers. During the years preceding the conquest of Egypt, the Mamluk sultans, who did not possess a navy, had asked for Ottoman support against the Portuguese, who threatened the Red Sea and thereby Mecca and Medina. The resulting disputes between the two sultanates contributed to the deterioration of relations that led to the war of 1516–17. Once the Mamluk Empire had become part of the Ottoman domain, the protection of the two holy cities against Portuguese attack became a major responsibility of the sultans. In addition, the latter also were concerned about keeping Muslim maritime traffic through the Indian Ocean viable, so as to ensure that spices reached the Ottoman realm and customs officials could collect dues from this valuable commodity just like their Mamluk predecessors had done.20

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From the South-east Asian and Indian perspective as well, the Portuguese appeared as a major threat. Especially the princes of Acheh on northern Sumatra sought and obtained Ottoman aid against their Christian enemies, in the form of guns and gunners. However, the Ottoman navy was unable to make decisive conquests in the Indian Ocean region and in the second half of the sixteenth century largely withdrew from the scene. However, once again in the context of this Ottoman–Portuguese conflict, the sultans’ forces in eastern Africa established the province of Habeş, which was the responsibility of the governors of Jeddah. Presumably holding this province also permitted Ottoman governors to tax the local slave trade.

In the western Mediterranean and North Africa, freebooters who were Ottoman subjects and later on official representatives of the empire confronted the Spanish attempt to take the struggle against Muslim princes into Africa after the emirate of Granada had fallen in 1492. Hayreddin (ca. 1466–1546), known in European sources and also in modern Turkish as Barbarossa or Barbaros, together with his brother, had been leading troops that he had brought from the sultans’ domains, in addition to local warriors, in the fight against the Spaniards. His stronghold was Algiers, which first came to prominence at this time. In 1519, Hayreddin submitted to Sultan Selim, later becoming Sultan Süleyman’s governor in North Africa and ultimately the grand admiral of the Ottoman navy, which he led to victory over a combined Christian fleet at Prevesa in 1538.

In Tunis, the confrontation with Spanish power represented by Charles V (1500–58) was even more direct: after Hayreddin had taken the city from a local ruler in 1534, the latter persuaded Charles V to reinstate him, promising to become his vassal. As a result, between 1535 and the Ottoman conquest of 1574, Tunis was a Spanish possession. In the mid-1500s, the sultans also acquired Tripoli in North Africa and thus controlled the entire southern Mediterranean littoral all the way to the Moroccan border. However, as these provinces were accessible from Istanbul only by ship, already by the late 1500s local garrisons and sea captains came to run Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli more or less autonomously. However, these military men always declared their allegiance to the sultan and found acceptance in Istanbul.

Furthermore, the Ottomans took the dismantling of what remained of the Venetian trade empire yet one step further when in the 1570s the vezir Lala Mustafa Paşa conquered Cyprus. Thereafter Venice controlled no more than

21 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Güney Siyaseti, Habeş Eyaleti (Istanbul, 1974).
a stretch of Dalmatian coastline and the island of Crete, which the Ottomans were to take in the mid-1600s, shortly after the end of the period that concerns us here.

Given this record of almost constant expansion, Ottoman sultans and vezirs of the time placed only limited importance on established borders. Certainly they occasionally agreed on such delimitations, for instance in negotiations with Venice or the king of Poland. However, according to Islamic law, Muslim rulers could make treaties with “unbelievers” for only a limited time, and thus such border agreements also were temporary. Once a major prize such as Constantinople was in the sultans’ hands, the next “Kızıl elma” (“red apple”), the term that Ottoman authors sometimes used for projected conquests, might be Rome or Vienna. Only after 1606, when even a long and exhausting war against the Habsburgs had only led to minor gains, do we encounter a border that both sides recognised, albeit with a great deal of raiding even in peacetime, for almost 60 years.

Ordinary people: The struggle for survival

For sultans and vezirs of the period, war was legitimate in religious terms because in this way they expanded the rule of Sunni Islam; it was also of practical importance because warfare kept the soldiers busy at the frontiers, where hopefully they would acquire booty and not challenge the central government. Nobody has recorded the opinions of artisans, merchants, peasants, slaves and women of all social groups on these matters, and it is a truism yet bears repeating that the mass of sources which we do possess were written by a small number of elite men.

However, we should at least briefly refer to the costs of war and conquest. To begin with an example beyond the Ottoman borders, campaigns against the Safavids and the earthquakes so frequent in this part of the world combined to destroy most of the historical monuments that in the time of the Ilkhanids and Akkoyunlu had adorned the city of Tabriz. As for Ottoman territories, already in the time of Mehmed the Conqueror, armies did not finance themselves and taxes increased accordingly. Even though quite a few


border fighters subsisted largely on booty and – if they were lucky – ransom, the famously efficient Ottoman supply system needed large deliveries of grain and other foodstuffs, and these had to come from the sultans’ subjects. Draught animals and camels being expensive to feed and breed, when the army demanded that these animals be used to supply the soldiers on campaign, peasants and townsmen must have suffered severely, particularly since many of these creatures probably perished while providing campaign services. We may also conjecture that the *avarız*, which implied not only cash payments but also deliveries in kind and corvée, for instance in building and repairing fortifications, must have made survival in wartime difficult for Ottoman subjects. This observation especially applies to the late 1500s, when the *avarız*, originally demanded only in wartime, became an annual tax. In addition, the Ottoman government often forced its subjects to migrate in order to secure control of newly conquered territories or enhance the capital city of Istanbul, which in 1453 was but a shadow of its former self. We know more about the migrations that resulted from the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1570–3: the composition of the local population changed significantly as large numbers of enslaved captives were taken away from the island and immigrants from Anatolia were brought in to fill the gaps, often against their will.

Ottoman commanders routinely drafted artisans, who had to show up in the camp with their tools and materials ready for service. If they adhered to sultanic law, these craftsmen made very small profits, and outfitting one of their number to follow the army must have been a major sacrifice, to say nothing of the risk to the family of the mobilised artisan: what happened to his wife and children if he succumbed to illness while in the army camp or was taken prisoner?

Other Ottoman subjects also risked captivity; while it is well known that the sultans and their subjects enslaved their prisoners, we read less often about the fates of Ottoman subjects taken in wartime or else by pirates, even in times of peace. Yet such captives were numerous: a historian working on early modern Italy has estimated that there were over ten thousand Muslim slaves in Italy, and the overwhelming majority had started life as Ottoman subjects. When the sultans and Venice were at war, their number should have


been even greater, for the Venetian government only held Ottoman prisoners as long as hostilities continued. At the conclusion of peace, the Signoria normally sent these men home, apart from those considered too dangerous, who were quietly executed. In addition, the knights of Malta, who considered themselves permanently at war with the sultan, took numerous prisoners; many of them wound up rowing the galleys of the order or those of the pope. By the early 1500s, the kingdom of Naples had become a Spanish possession, and given the Ottoman–Spanish conflict, quite a few Ottoman subjects must have rowed on Spanish galleys as well. In the second half of the sixteenth century, moreover, the Austrian Habsburgs sponsored a pirate community established in Senj (today in Croatia) on a cliff overlooking the Adriatic. These Uskoks, who also claimed to be permanently at war with the sultan preyed on peaceful Ottoman merchants on their way to Venice. As the complaints surviving in the Venetian archives amply testify, there were numerous victims, to say nothing of the material damage.

On the land borders of the empire as well, Ottoman subjects, belligerents or not, risked captivity and enslavement. Given pay that was typically in arrears on the Hungarian frontier, both sides had established a peculiar form of “violent business”: captives that were able to find ransom money could avoid enslavement, but securing the money was a risky as well as a costly affair. In a cash-poor environment, material goods, including valuable textiles, might make up part of the ransom; presumably the Ottoman captives who needed to supply these goods turned to traders who could find them in Istanbul or elsewhere in the Ottoman core lands. It is not easy to imagine the cost and effort involved in such transactions, but they all feature among the costs of war, paid by military men and especially by members of the Ottoman subject population.

Conclusion

Many if not most of the questions concerning the costs of war and expansion which easily occur to present-day historians and their readers still are impossible to answer, for even if we contextualise our sources and use them creatively, we cannot produce documentary evidence which just is not there.

27 Salvatore Bono, Schiavi musulmani nell’Italia moderna, Galeotti, vu’ cumprià, domestici (Naples, 1999).
29 Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (eds.), Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders (Early Fifteenth–Early Eighteenth Centuries) (Leiden, 2007).
However, there is some hope for the future: once archaeology and the attendant scientific discipline now known as archaeometry become better known among Ottomanists, we will be able to say something about health and nutrition, the age at death or the continuities and discontinuities of rural settlement and link these matters to the economic conjunctures determined by warfare and peace.

 Needless to say, in many cases archaeology is also our only hope of accessing the general layouts of Ottoman building complexes, of which only scanty remainders have survived to our day. Salvage excavations of Istanbul sites in preparation for the underground railway have already yielded a mass of material for archaeological investigation.30 We hope that these finds will encourage further studies on Ottoman society and its links to the material environment.

30 From Byzantion to Istanbul: 8000 Years of a Capital, exhibition catalogue, coordinated by Koray Durak (Istanbul, 2010).
PART I

* AN EXPANDING EMPIRE
The period from the second accession of Mehmed II in 1451 to the accession of Ahmed III in 1603 was one in which the Ottoman Empire was to reach the limits of its territorial expansion, stretching from Iran in the east to Hungary in the west, from the Crimea in the north to the borders of Morocco in the south. The empire truly became a world power, one of the major players in the politics of Europe (see Brummett, Chapter 3, this volume) and a dominant naval power in the Mediterranean (see Fleet, Chapter 5, this volume).

With the conquest of Egypt and Syria, the Ottomans took control of the Red Sea and entered the Indian Ocean, where they clashed with the Portuguese for control of the lucrative trade routes from the east (see Özbaren, Chapter 6, this volume). From the early sixteenth century onwards, the Ottomans were constantly challenged by the Safavid state of Iran, which effectively undermined the Ottomans’ ability to control their territory and secure the loyalty of their population in eastern Anatolia, and with whom warfare was particularly exacting as, after the calamity of Çaldıran in 1514, they avoided direct military confrontation, preferring retreat and scorched-earth tactics. Ottoman victories against the Safavids were thus often pyrrhic ones (see Boyar, Chapter 4, this volume).

The reigns of Mehmed II, Bayezid II and Selim I and the first half of the reign of Süleyman I represent a period of rapid conquest with an expanding state pursuing generally lucrative wars. By the middle of the sixteenth century, however, warfare had become more demanding and less rewarding, and the state became increasingly faced with the need to secure borders rather than extend them. The period was thus one in which the empire, as Géza Dávid (Chapter 9, this volume) notes, “reached the apogee of its military potential” but also one in which its effective military strength, although still formidable, began to decline. In part as a result of the greater military demands of warfare towards the end of the sixteenth century, and the increasing failure of military campaigns to produce lucrative returns, the empire faced, from the
mid-sixteenth century onwards, and particularly from the 1580s, increasing financial difficulties, the influx of silver from the New World, the difficulty of stabilising the currency and chronic financial deficits (for the economy of the period, see Çizakça, Chapter 8, this volume).

The period was also one of great transformation, in which the makeup of the population changed dramatically (Faroqhi, Chapter 11, this volume), and, in the words of Gilles Veinstein (Chapter 10, this volume), the sultan “unambiguously appeared as the champion of Sunni Islam”. These were transformations to which, “despite its apparent conservatism”, the government of the empire responded (Imber, Chapter 7, this volume), and the legal and administrative innovations of this period “provided the solid foundation to Ottoman government which allowed the Empire, first to absorb and stabilise the territories conquered during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and later to survive the multiple political, fiscal and social crises which were to beset it in the decades after the 1580s”.

An age for Çiğdem Kafescioğlu (Chapter 13, this volume), unified by “visual articulations of an imperial identity, as well as its dynamic encounters and reformulations beyond the imperial locus”, the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries also constituted, in the words of Selim Kuru (Chapter 14, this volume), “the moment of origin of a literary tradition” which saw “the creation of a distinct written language of Anatolian Turkish, the appearance of new forms, genres and themes based on this language, the development of a literary archive and literary tools that defined norms and conventions, and finally the genesis of a biographical and an autobiographical tradition that made models available for literary production”. It was in this period, too, that “Ottoman intellectual life gain[ed] breadth and splendour as well as regularity and order” (Hagen, Chapter 12, this volume), with the birth of “a new, coherent system of knowledge production and dissemination” and an Ottoman canon of knowledge, which, Gottfried Hagen argues, “fully deserves to be called classical in itself”.

While thus an intellectually productive period and often regarded as a golden age, and certainly one which Ottomans from the late sixteenth century on held up as the epitome of excellence, an age to which return would secure escape from all the ills of the modern declining and decadent world, the period was not one of consistent splendour. The first years of Süleyman’s rule continued the expansion and triumph of the previous decades. He took Rhodes, marched successfully into Hungary and reached the gates of Vienna in 1529. The latter part of his reign, however, was less triumphal, and the campaigns against the Safavids and the Habsburgs both showed the limits of
Ottoman military ability. Süleyman’s final campaign, in which he died while besieging Sigetvar, has been described as “a foolish venture”.¹

Any attempt to divide the long sixteenth century, which can be taken to have run from 1453, with the conquest of Constantinople, to 1606 and the treaty of Zsitvatorok which ended the long war with Hungary, is dependent, not surprisingly, on what one is focusing on, as Palmira Brummett shows in her discussion of periodisation (Brummett, Chapter 3, this volume). In the Mediterranean, 1574 can be taken as the date marking the turn from an aggressive to a defensive policy, although the seeds of this change can perhaps be seen in the Ottoman failure to take Malta in 1565 (Fleet, Chapter 5, this volume). When looking at the campaigns against the Safavids, the second campaign of 1548 was much more defensive than offensive (Boyar, Chapter 4, this volume), and, in Europe, the campaigns against the Habsburgs took on a defensive quality from the 1550s and were not the success of the campaigns earlier in Süleyman’s reign. In economic terms, the problems facing the state were clear from the 1580s, but the seeds of economic concern were evident in the middle of the century, when campaigns began to be less productive, or even, Akdağ has argued, in the early decades of the 1500s.² The middle of the sixteenth century thus can be seen in many ways as marking a shift in fortune. Indeed, Colin Imber (Chapter 7, this volume) divides the period into two, the first period running from 1453 to about 1540 and the second from about 1540 to 1603, arguing that before around 1540 the Ottoman government had to deal with problems “attendant on conquest” but that from the mid-sixteenth century the problems it faced were “those of how to maintain intact vastly expanded territories within stable borders, and how to manage periods of prolonged and no longer profitable warfare”.

For the purposes of a general overview therefore, this chapter will take the period in two parts, the first, from 1451 to the mid-sixteenth century, in which the empire was on the rise, becoming a world power, conquering and dealing with the effects of success, and the second period, the mid-sixteenth century to 1603, in which the empire had rather to deal with the consequences of its earlier successes, to fight to defend rather than conquer, to establish, and keep, frontiers, and to grapple with the economic and social effects of a decline in conquest and of the impact of the outside world. However one divides the period, it is important to remember that although it is commonly

called the classical age, it does not contain the cohesion or continuity that such an epithet implies but is far more complex, shifting and fluid.

1451 to the mid-sixteenth century

Mehmed II (r. 1444–1446, 1451–1481)

In February 1451, Mehmed II ascended the throne for the second time, for he had occupied it briefly, and unsuccessfully, between 1444 and 1446, after his father’s abdication. His second reign was to be a very different affair and was to see considerable expansion of Ottoman territory, the conquest of Constantinople and the end of the Byzantine Empire, the rising power of the Ottomans as a naval force in the Aegean and the landing of Ottoman troops in southern Italy with Gedik Ahmed Paşa’s capture of Otranto in 1480. One of the best known of Ottoman sultans, Mehmed II ran his state both effectively and firmly, indeed with a firmness which was to leave his successor, Bayezid II, certain difficulties as he faced discontent over his father’s fiscal and land policies and found himself forced to backpeddle somewhat over the more unpopular of Mehmed’s methods.

In the first couple of years of his reign, Mehmed stabilised his position, having perhaps learned from his previous experience on the throne, and his initial actions were peaceful and reassuring. Constantine XI, the Byzantine emperor who had received the throne, a rather poisoned chalice, in 1448, was assured of continued Ottoman friendship; the emissary from Venice was well received, as were the various representatives of the Latin-held Aegean islands. Mehmed made treaties with John Hunyadi of Transylvania and George Branković of Serbia and established cordial relations with the representatives from Wallachia. The loathed grand vezir Çandarlı Halil, who had apparently been instrumental in his removal from the throne in 1446, remained in place.

Other areas required a more forceful approach, and in autumn 1452 Mehmed despatched a force to the Peloponnese (the Morea, Mora) under Turahan against Constantine XI’s obstreperous brothers, the despots Thomas and Demetrios. To the east, in Anatolia, Mehmed faced a far more annoying problem, that of Karaman, the unruly and powerful Turkish state centred on Konya. On his accession, İbrahim, the ruler of Karaman, instigated uprisings in the regions of Menteşe, Aydın and Germiyan, in western Anatolia, while he himself attacked Antalya on the southern coast. Initially unsuccessful, Mehmed then defeated İbrahim, forcing him to sue for peace. With Karaman now back under control, and having secured peaceful relations with
his neighbours in the west, Mehmed was free to turn his attention to the conquest of the Byzantine capital, Constantinople, an ambition which occupied his every moment and "never left his tongue". The motivation for the conquest was both strategic and economic, and after the fall of the city, "an island in the midst of an Ottoman ocean"," in May 1453, he invested much time and energy in restoring the prosperity of his new capital. He began the building of a great imperial palace, Topkapı, which was to be the palace of the sultans until it was replaced by Dolmabahçe in the nineteenth century. Mehmed also divested himself of his grand vezir, Çandarlı Halil, whom he executed in 1453 after the capture of Constantinople, which Çandarlı Halil had opposed, replacing him with Zaganos Paşa, who had not. Istanbul would remain the capital of the empire until the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

From his new capital, Mehmed turned his attention to the west, where a string of military expeditions would lead to the conquest of Serbia, the Peloponnese, Bosnia, where King Stefan Tomašević was defeated in 1463, Herzegovina and much of Albania. In 1462, the revolt of Vlad III Drakul, the voivoda of Wallachia who had come to power in 1456 and had switched allegiance to the Hungarians, was put down, Vlad being replaced by his brother Radu, and the vassal status of Wallachia was restored. Moldavia, too, was a vassal state, though not always an obedient one.

Mehmed’s main enemy in Rumeli, the European section of Ottoman territory, was Hungary, with whom the initial bone of contention was Serbia. In 1454 and 1455, Mehmed campaigned there, taking in 1455 the important region of Novo Brdo, whose rich silver mines made it a prime target. By the summer of that year, George Branković, the despot of Serbia, was forced to come to an arrangement with Mehmed under which he paid tribute and ceded Novo Brdo. Mehmed’s siege of Belgrade the following year, however, was unsuccessful.

In December 1456, several months after the abortive siege of Belgrade, the elderly George Branković died. His son and successor, Lazar, died shortly afterwards, in January 1458, without leaving a male heir, a situation which resulted in a succession problem. Two factions emerged, one pro-Hungarian

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3 Tursun Bey, The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Beg, ed. Halil İnalcık and Rhoads Murphey (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1978), fol. 31a.
4 Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet, A Social History of Ottoman Istanbul (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 6–27.
and one pro-Ottoman. The latter was headed by Mikhail Angelović, the brother of the grand vezir Mahmud Paşa, who had replaced Zaganos Paşa in 1457. In March 1458, Mahmud Paşa marched towards Smederevo (Semendire), but a revolt there in the same month saw the fall of Angelović and the rise of the pro-Hungarian faction. Mahmud Paşa decided against a long siege of Smederevo but forced the surrender of Golubac (Golubats) on the Danube in summer 1458 by cutting off its water supply. With Hungarian backing, the despotate of Serbia went to Stefan Tomašević, the son of the king of Bosnia, who, in return, recognised Hungarian sovereignty. He ascended the throne in March 1459 and the following month married Jelena, the daughter of the now dead Lazar Branković, George Branković’s son and heir, thus giving his position legitimacy. This was not a situation which Mehmed was likely to find acceptable. Smederevo fell to the Ottomans in June 1459, “as crushing a blow to the spirits of the Hungarians as the loss of Constantinople had been” according to Pope Pius II. Stefan Tomašević fled, and Serbia became an Ottoman province.

At the beginning of Mehmed’s reign, the Peloponnese was under the somewhat ineffective control of the Byzantine despots Thomas, based at Patras, and Demetrios, at Mistra. In 1453, there had been revolts against them during which both the despots and the rebels had appealed to the Ottomans for help. Mehmed backed the despots, despatching a force into the Peloponnese at the end of 1453. Putting down the revolt, he re-established the despots, who, already tribute-paying, were now obliged to pay a higher tribute to Istanbul for their positions.

The Ottoman policy of conquest was what a later European observer was to call “progression by degrees”, whereby Mehmed, as had his predecessors, advanced by stages, first through vassalage and then, when the moment was right, to outright conquest. Here, for the moment, the Byzantine despots remained in place, as did, for example, the various Latin rulers in the Aegean islands or the voyvoda of Wallachia. In 1458, however, Mehmed, most unwilling to see any Latin power extending control in the region, invaded the Peloponnese, taking much of the region, including Corinth and Athens. While Demetrios was prepared to accept the loss of territory and to seek accommodation with the Ottomans, his brother Thomas was not. After launching an attack on Patras, Thomas then turned his attention to his brother, who

7 Castlemaine, Earl of, An Account of the Present War between the Venetians and Turk; with the State of Candie (in a Letter to the King of Venice) (London, 1666), p. 75.
promptly appealed to Mehmed for help. Realising at this point the danger of the situation, the brothers patched up their relations, but only temporarily, for by the end of 1459 they were once again fighting each other. As the Peloponnese spiralled into anarchy, the Ottomans moved in and Mehmed conquered it in 1460.

Farther to the west, Mehmed sought control of Albania, then under the rule of the wily and efficient Scanderbeg (George Kastriote). Conquest here would give him an outlet to the Adriatic and position him very close to Italy. For the same reasons, Ottoman success in Albania was extremely unwelcome to Venice, positioned at the top of the Adriatic, a sea which they regarded as their own domain. Despite Mehmed’s tactics of “terror and deportation”, Scanderbeg survived undefeated until he died in January 1468, leaving Krujë to Venice and Albania disunited. Several years later, in 1474, Mehmed initiated a campaign against Venetian possessions in Albania, but his assault on Shkodër (Scutari) failed.

By this time, the Ottomans were at war with Venice, war having broken out in 1463. In its relations with the Ottoman state, Venice had always sought to balance with difficulty on a tightrope suspended between commercial realism and political expediency. Its ability to forestall conflict, however, was limited, as both sides were in direct competition for economic and strategic control in the eastern Mediterranean. Mehmed’s conquests in the Aegean early in his reign were not encouraging signs for Venice. With the Ottomans now threatening the Venetians in the Aegean, in the Peloponnese, where its possessions of Coron and Modon were surrounded by a sea of Ottoman territory, and in Albania, war became inevitable. In 1464, the Venetians pillaged the island of Lesbos but failed to take it; they did, however, capture Lemnos and Imbros. As a result of the devastating plundering of the Ottoman port of Enez by Nicolò da Canale, Mehmed launched an attack on Venetian-held Negroponte (Eubeoa), an essential possession for Venetian commerce, and captured it in 1470. In 1477, the Ottomans laid siege to Lepanto (Navpaktos, İnebahtı) and to Krujë, which fell the following year, as did Zhabljak, Drisht (Drivasto) and Lezhë (Alessio). The war came to an end in 1479 when Venice sued for peace. It had not been a good war for Venice, which now lost Shkodër, Lemnos and lands in the Peloponnese and was forced to pay an annual sum of 10,000 florins.

Mehmed’s success in the west was mirrored by his progress in the east, where he extended his control along the southern shores of the Black Sea,

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taking the Genoese trading colony of Amasra in 1459 and Sinop in 1461. Trabzon (Trebizond), the last remaining Byzantine state, tributary to the Ottomans since 1456, fell in 1461. With almost the entire Black Sea coast of Anatolia under his control, Mehmed now shifted his sights across the water, and in 1475 he despatched a fleet under Gedik Ahmed Paşa, which took the major Genoese trading settlement of Caffa (Feodosiya, Kefe) in the Crimea. The han of the Crimea, Mengli Girey, who had called on Ottoman support in a family feud, was restored to his position, but as an Ottoman vassal. Mehmed’s dominant position in the Black Sea was thus confirmed.

While Mehmed controlled much of northern Anatolia, his position in the southeast was less secure, for here he was faced with two powerful enemies, the Akkoyunlu under Uzun Hasan, who had built up a powerful state in southeastern Anatolia, Iraq and Iran, and the Mamluks, who either controlled or were influential in areas of Anatolia bordering their own state in Syria and Egypt. The bone of contention between Mehmed and the Mamluk sultan Quaytby was the state of Dulgadir, which both sought to control by backing various contenders for the throne, and that between Mehmed and Uzun Hasan was the state of Karaman, centred round Konya. In 1465, Mehmed removed Ishak, the ruler of Karaman, who had come to the throne the year before with Akkoyunlu backing, replacing him with Pir Ahmed, whose mother was Mehmed’s aunt. In 1468, after Pir Ahmed had failed to provide troops for an Ottoman campaign, Mehmed attacked Karaman, occupied much of its territory, and put in his son Mustafa as governor. The position was by no means secure, however, and it was only after Uzun Hasan was crushingly defeated at the battle of Otlukbeli, near Başkent, in August 1473 that Ottoman control was assured. With the campaign the following year under Gedik Ahmed Paşa, now grand vezir, the state of Karaman was extinguished.

At the end of his reign, Mehmed undertook two naval campaigns. In 1480, Mesih Paşa attacked Rhodes, the Hospitaller stronghold which lay on the route between Egypt and Istanbul, but was unsuccessful and withdrew after a long and gruelling siege. Mehmed’s other naval campaign that year, however, was a triumph. Ottoman forces under Gedik Ahmed Paşa, who had taken the islands of Levkas, Cephalonia and Zante the year before, sailed across the Adriatic from Albania and took Otranto in southern Italy. The Ottomans now had a base on Italian soil and seemed poised for expansion across the peninsula.

In 1481, Mehmed set out eastwards on yet another campaign, possibly directed against the Mamluks, on which, shortly after its departure from Istanbul, he died.
Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512)

Bayezid II was credited with being a very different man from his father, peace-loving and religiously inclined. Not a man of action for Marino Sanudo, he had, according to Alvixe Sagudino, a peaceful nature. This may, however, have owed more to political necessity than to natural inclination: for almost half his reign, he was to be handicapped by the existence of his brother Cem.

On his death, Mehmed had left two sons, Cem, the younger, favoured by the grand vezir Nişancı Mehmed Paşa and, according to some, his father, and Bayezid, the older, who was reputed to have loathed his father and was favoured by the janissaries. While Bayezid emerged successfully onto the throne, Cem proclaimed himself sultan in Bursa. Defeated by Bayezid’s forces at Yenişehir in June 1481, he fled to the Mamluks. The following year he reappeared in Anatolia but was once more forced to flee, this time into the willing arms of the grand master of the Hospitallers, who welcomed him “with joy” and promptly whisked him off to the distant, and safer, France. For the rest of his life, Cem remained a useful hostage, first in the hands of the Hospitallers and then of the popes Innocent VIII and his successor, Alexander VI, until he was handed over in January 1495 to the French king Charles VIII on his way to Naples to begin his anti-Ottoman crusade. A month later, Cem was dead (his body finally returned to Bayezid in 1499), and the crusade foundered.

For the first 15 years of his reign, Bayezid’s political horizon was circumscribed by Cem’s captivity, and his relations with the states to the west were initially more cautious and less aggressive than those of his father. While Mehmed seemed poised for expansion in Italy, one of Bayezid’s first acts as sultan was to withdraw Ottoman forces from southern Italy, leaving the small Ottoman garrison in Otranto to its fate. In November 1481, he made a truce with the Hospitallers, and in 1485 presented the grand master with the hand of John the Baptist and assured him that the Ottoman fleet would not sail out into the Mediterranean. In January 1482, he confirmed the peace with Venice, renewed in 1485, and in 1483 made a five-year treaty with Matthias Corvinus of Hungary, which was then extended to 1491.

Although cautious, Bayezid was not completely inactive. In 1484, he set out against the important commercial cities of Kilia, “Moldavia’s gateway to the

10 Ibid., p. 398.
Black Sea”, and Akkerman (Cetatea Alba), at the mouth of the Dniester on the Black Sea coast. Kilia surrendered in July, and Akkerman, where Ottoman forces were joined by the Crimean han, Mengli Giray, fell in August. These losses were keenly felt by the ruler of Moldavia, Stefan III, who, however, was forced to flee before an Ottoman army under Hadım Ali Pașa which advanced into Moldavia in July 1485, and took refuge with the Polish king Kazimierz IV. After another failed attempt to retake Kilia and Akkerman, which prompted another Ottoman strike, this time under Malkoçoğlu Bali Bey, Stefan submitted, paying an annual tribute until his death in 1504. With the conquest of Akkerman and the submission of Moldavia and the Crimean hanate, Poland opted for peaceful relations with its Ottoman neighbour, signing a peace in March 1489, renewed in 1492 by Kazimierz’s son and successor Jan Olbracht, and renewed again in 1494 for three years.

In 1490, the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus died, resulting in a dispute among the Hungarians over the choice of a new king. This dissension was viewed as an opportunity by the Ottomans, and in spring 1492 Bayezid set out on campaign. The succession dispute was, however, settled by the selection of the son of the king of Poland as the new king of Hungary, and Bayezid turned his attention instead to Albania, where he took various castles in Venetian hands. At the same time, raids were conducted against Hungary and Transylvania. Peace was restored in 1495 for three years, when Charles VIII’s advance, accompanied by Cem, seemed threatening.

Although Bayezid did conduct some campaigns in the west, his most serious encounter in the first years of his reign was in the east. Here he had the perennial problem of controlling the territories in Anatolia, where he was faced with unruly Turcomans, the vacillating allegiance of the state of Dulgadir, the smouldering disloyalty of members of the Karaman dynasty and the dangerous presence of the Mamluk state, which offered a refuge to opponents of the Ottoman sultan, Cem having fled to Egypt in 1481. In 1485, war with the Mamluks broke out, and in May Karagöz Paşa, the beylerbeyi of Karaman, captured Tarsus and Adana, prompting the Mamluk sultan to despatch a force which inflicted a major defeat on the Ottoman army in spring 1486, in which the beylerbeyi of Anatolia, Hersekzade Ahmed Paşa, was captured. In response, the grand vezir Davud Paşa repelled the Mamluks and then moved against the Turgutoğulları and Varsak Turcomans. The following year, in August 1488, a large Ottoman force under Ali Paşa suffered a humiliating

defeat at the hands of the Mamluks at Ağâ Çayırı, near Adana, and Alaüddevle, the ruler of Dulgadir, calculating that the Ottomans were not the force to ally with, now defected to the Mamluks. Bayezid transferred his support to Alaüddevle’s brother, Şahbudak, who took refuge at the Ottoman court. In 1489, supported by Ottoman troops, Şahbudak attempted to take the throne but was defeated, captured and despatched to Cairo. In 1490, Alaüddevle, supported by Mamluk forces, attacked and besieged Kayseri but was unable to take it, contenting himself with extensive ravaging of the region instead. Bayezid began to prepare a large army to march into Anatolia.

By this time, both sides were running out of steam, both ground down by an inconclusive war in which the Mamluks, though victorious, were unable to achieve a decisive victory or to profit from their successes in a conflict which was costing them dearly. For the Ottomans, peace was attractive, both because of the losses they were sustaining and because of the opportunity which had presented itself in Hungary with the death of Matthias Corvinus. Peace was therefore concluded in May 1491, with the Ottomans giving up claims to Çukurova (Cilicia) and losing Tarsus and Adana.

For the rest of Bayezid’s reign, Ottoman–Mamluk relations improved. When Bayezid’s son Korkud fled to Cairo in 1509, Qansuh al-Ghuri, who had come to the throne in 1501, was very careful in his handling of the situation, eventually sending Korkud back to Istanbul. By this time, the Mamluks had their own problems and were in need of Ottoman help rather than enmity. As the sixteenth-century historian Abdüssamed Diyarbekri expressed it, “there is a famous saying that to speak you need lips, and so to fight you need arms and munitions suitable for your enemy”. For this the Mamluks turned to the Ottomans, who contributed towards the construction of a Mamluk navy in the Red Sea for operations against the Portuguese.

Shortly after the end of the war with the Mamluks and immediately after the peace concluded with Hungary, Cem died and the political game changed. Bayezid was at last free to pursue a more aggressive policy in the west. His target was Venice. In May 1499, the Ottoman fleet set sail from Istanbul under Davud Paşa, thought by many, including the Venetians, who were presumably misled by Bayezid’s letter assuring them that the “good peace” between them would be maintained, to be headed for Rhodes, Corfu or Apulia. In fact, the target was Lepanto, which fell to Bayezid in August. The next to fall were Modon (Methone), taken by siege, Navarino (Navarin) and Coron (Korone),

which surrendered shortly afterwards. Durrës (Durazzo) fell in 1501. By 1502, Venice, having sued unsuccessfully for peace in 1500, had had enough. Under the peace concluded in May 1503, Venice lost Modon, Coron, Lepanto, Durrës and Lefkas. It was a singular success for Bayezid. The Ottomans now dominated the eastern Mediterranean, their position as a significant naval power was established, and their control of the commerce of the region assured.

With the conclusion of the war with Venice, Vladislas II, king of Bohemia and Hungary and son of the Polish king Kazimierz IV, concluded a seven-year treaty with Bayezid in February 1503, to be renewed in 1510 and 1511.

While the beginning of the sixteenth century saw Ottoman victory over Venice, it also saw the rise to power of a very threatening new state, that of the Safavids in Iran. In spring 1501, Shah Isma‘il I, who had come to the head of the Safavi order in 1494, captured Tabriz and made it his capital. In 1508, he took Baghdad. The state Isma‘il founded rested to a great extent on the support of the Turcoman tribes in Anatolia, over whom the Ottomans struggled to impose their authority. The Varsaklar and the Turgutoğulları, for example, had supported Cem and in 1500 backed a claimant to descent from the Karamanoğulları in a revolt which was only put down with difficulty by the grand vezir Mesih Paşa in 1501. In 1511, a serious revolt broke out in Teke in south-western Anatolia led by Şah Kulu, whose allegiance lay with the Safavids. He took Antalya, marched on Kütahya, defeating the troops of the beylerbeyi Karagöz Paşa en route, and reached Bursa. The Ottoman army under the grand vezir Hadım Ali Paşa and Şehzade Ahmed forced Şah Kulu into retreat. Shortly afterwards, both Hadım Ali Paşa and Şah Kulu lost their lives in an encounter near Sivas. Now leaderless, the followers of Şah Kulu fled into Iran.

By this time, the Ottoman Empire was embroiled in a power struggle between Bayezid’s three sons: Ahmed, the eldest and apparently Bayezid’s choice, Korkud, and the youngest, Selim. This instability within the Ottoman Empire was clearly advantageous to Shah Isma‘il, who, at the beginning of 1512, instigated another rebellion, supported by Ahmed’s son, Murad. Selim, backed by the janissaries, emerged victorious from the succession struggle, and Bayezid was forced to abdicate, dying shortly afterwards on his way into exile in Dimoteka (Didymoteichon).

Selim I (r. 1512–1520)

Having come to the throne in a power struggle, Selim’s first move as sultan was to eliminate his brothers. Korkud was disposed of in 1512 and Ahmed, after defeat in battle at Yenişehir, in 1513. Selim’s reign, one of rapid expansion
in which the territory of the empire was to double, was dominated by conflict with the Safavids and the Mamluks. His first target was the Safavids. Announcing, according to the contemporary Arab chronicler Ibn Iyas, that “nothing could deter him from wiping off Isma‘il Shah from the face of the earth”, Selim marched against him and in August 1514 inflicted a crushing defeat on Isma‘il’s forces at the battle of Çaldiran, to the north-east of Lake Van. As the shah fled, the Ottomans moved on to take Tabriz. Conquest was a comparatively easy matter. To keep possession of the city, however, was not, and shortly afterwards Selim withdrew to winter in Amasya. This set the pattern for future Ottoman–Safavid encounters, in which the Safavids, having learnt the bitter lesson of Çaldiran, avoided direct confrontation with Ottoman forces, choosing instead to employ scorched-earth tactics which left the Ottomans without supplies in enemy terrain. Ottoman advance and victory were thus generally followed by retreat and Safavid return, and it was to become increasingly difficult later on in the century to turn conquest into permanent control.

For the moment, however, the Safavids had been satisfactorily dealt with at Çaldiran, and Selim now turned his attention to south-eastern Anatolia. In November 1514, he appointed as governor of Kayseri Şehsuvaroğlu Ali, nephew of Alaüddevle, the ruler of Dulgadir, and sent him off to raid into his uncle’s territories, Alaüddevle having failed to provide whole-hearted support to the Ottomans at the time of Çaldiran. In June 1515, the grand vezir Sinan Paşa defeated and killed Alaüddevle and his four sons in battle, and Dulgadir was put under Şehsuvaroğlu Ali, who ruled as an Ottoman vassal. Selim also actively sought the alliance of Kurdish lords disgruntled with the Safavid shah, and by 1516 Ottoman forces under Mehmed Paşa, the governor of Erzincan, had driven the Safavids out of south-eastern Anatolia. The Ottomans now controlled Urfa, Mardin and Mosul.

The other factor undermining Ottoman authority in south-eastern Anatolia was the Mamluks, who regarded Dulgadir as their own domain. In 1516, Selim set off on campaign against them, careful to conceal its true target and to persuade the Mamluks that the destination was Iran. That the campaign was in fact aimed at the Mamluks became clear with the Ottoman arrest and humiliation of an envoy from Qansuh al-Ghawri and the conquest of Malatya. Advancing into Syria, the Ottomans defeated the Mamluks in August 1516 at Marj Dabiq, near Aleppo, a catastrophe such as “to turn an

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infant’s hair white, and to melt iron in its fury.” 16 With Qansuh al-Ghawri dead and the Mamluks put to flight, Selim entered Aleppo unopposed. By September, he was in Damascus. Advancing into Egypt, a logistically challenging operation, he defeated the Mamluks under the new sultan Tumanbay at al-Raydaniyya in January 1517 in an encounter at which the grand vezir Sinan Paşa was killed. Despite continued resistance, Tumanbay was eventually defeated, captured and executed in Cairo in April. The Mamluk sultanate was at an end. The conquest brought religious prestige, the Ottoman sultan now master of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, and great economic gain, the region being both productive in its own right and a major, lucrative transit market for luxury goods, in particular spices, from the east. The way was now open for Ottoman expansion into the Red Sea and beyond into the Indian Ocean, leading to an inevitable clash with the Portuguese for control of trade routes.

Süleyman I (r. 1520–1566)

Süleyman began his reign at breakneck speed, putting down revolts in Egypt and Anatolia, capturing Rhodes and invading Hungary three times, all in the first decade of his rule.

Although Selim had taken Egypt and Syria, the territory was not entirely secure. On Selim’s death, the governor of Syria, Janbirdi al-Ghazali, revolted and declared himself sultan at the beginning of 1521. Further unrest occurred on the death of Khayrbay, the governor of Egypt, in 1522, to be followed by a serious rebellion in 1524 when the new governor of Egypt, Ahmed Paşa, revolted and proclaimed himself sultan. After the elimination of Ahmed Paşa, Süleyman despatched İbrahim Paşa, his grand vezir and brother-in-law, who left Istanbul in September 1524, reaching Cairo at the beginning of April 1525, where he stayed until June, establishing Ottoman authority.

While Egypt and Syria were being brought under control, Süleyman himself set off in 1521 on a campaign against Hungary during which he took Belgrade, thus opening up Hungary to further Ottoman penetration. The following year he took Rhodes, and the Hospitallers were expelled to the west. Four years later, Süleyman again invaded Hungary, defeated and killed Lajos II, king of Hungary and Bohemia, at the battle of Mohács at the end of August, and in September entered the Hungarian capital, Buda. Further Ottoman advance was prevented by a serious rebellion which broke out in Anatolia, forcing Süleyman to withdraw from the west in order to deal with it.

16 Ibid., p. 45.
With Süleyman engaged in his eastern territories, the Hungarians occupied themselves with the succession to the Hungarian throne, for King Lajos had died at Mohács without leaving an heir. Lajos’s wife was Maria, the sister of the Habsburg Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and king of Spain, while his brother-in-law twice over was Maria’s other brother, Ferdinand, the archduke of Austria, who had married Lajos’s sister Anna. The Hungarian estates elected John (János) Szápolyai as king in November 1526, and he was crowned at Székesféhérvár. Ferdinand, however, laid claim to Hungary and Bohemia through his wife and had himself elected in December and crowned the following year. Fleeing to the Polish border, Szápolyai appealed to the Ottomans. Süleyman backed John Szápolyai, and Ferdinand occupied Buda.

The struggle with the Habsburgs, with Ferdinand for control of Hungary and Charles in the western Mediterranean, dominated much of Süleyman’s reign and resulted in a series of anti-Habsburg Ottoman–French alliances, the first of which was signed in 1536. The Ottomans became intricately involved in European politics, well informed about the complex web of matrimonial and political alliances and acting as astute puppet masters or shrewd and calculating allies, sought after by the major powers of the day. The next Ottoman campaign to Hungary, the third in less than a decade, began in 1529 in response to Ferdinand’s occupation of Buda and removal of the newly elected Hungarian king, John Szápolyai. Süleyman reoccupied Buda in September and re-established Szápolyai back on the throne. He then moved on to lay siege to Vienna before withdrawing, unsuccessful, in mid-October. Undaunted by his earlier failure, Ferdinand again attacked Buda in 1530, without success, but did manage to occupy the western part of the kingdom of Hungary, prompting yet another Ottoman–Hungarian campaign. The sultan left Istanbul in April 1532, but the campaign did not achieve any notable success. In June 1533, an agreement was reached under which Szápolyai remained in place but the kingdom was divided between him and Ferdinand, both of whom ruled as Ottoman vassals. This opportune truce left Süleyman free to deal with the east.

Several years later, Süleyman was back campaigning in the west. In 1538, he removed Petru Rareș, the voivoda of Moldavia, suspected of entering into relations with the Habsburgs, and annexed south-east Moldavia. Two years later, the situation in Hungary deteriorated when, in July 1540, Szápolyai died. Under the terms of an agreement between Szápolyai and Ferdinand concluded in 1538, the pact of Nagyvárad (Grosswardein, Oradea), one of whose architects was George Martinuzzi, then bishop of Nagyvárad, John Szápolyai, who was in a weak position sandwiched between the Ottomans on the one
hand and the Habsburgs on the other, or “between the victim and the knife”, had agreed that on his death his lands would pass to Ferdinand. One year later, Szápolyai married Isabella, daughter of King Sigismund of Poland, and, at the time of his death in 1540, had an infant son, John Sigismund (János Zsigmond Szápolyai). Süleyman recognised John Sigismund as king of Hungary, John paying tribute to Istanbul. Ferdinand, in pursuit of his claims to Hungary, attacked. Süleyman invaded Hungary in summer 1541 and took Buda. John Sigismund was despatched to Transylvania with George Martinuzzi as regent. In 1542, Ferdinand launched yet another attack on Buda, and the following year Süleyman marched again into Hungary, taking Esztergom (Gran) and Székesfehervár. There were further conquests under the beylerbeyi of Buda in 1544. By now peace was becoming an attractive option to both Ferdinand and Charles, who sued for peace in 1545. An agreement was concluded in 1547 under which Ferdinand paid tribute for the Hungarian lands he held. Once again, this peace was opportune for the Ottomans, for Süleyman was again faced with problems in the east.

As was the case with all sultans, Süleyman’s expansion was conducted on a see-saw swaying between the eastern and western sections of his large empire. This was a situation which the western states were keen to exploit, seeking alliances with powers such as Uzun Hasan or the Safavids, who could be encouraged into joint military action aimed at crushing the Ottomans between two fronts, a policy which in fact never effectively materialised. For the Ottomans, the regions to the east were in many ways far more threatening than their enemies to the west ever were. The Safavids and the unruly and largely uncontrollable Anatolian Turcomans not merely threatened the Ottomans militarily but also challenged Ottoman political and religious legitimacy and forced the Ottomans constantly onto the back foot. In comparison to the dangerous and undermining influence of the Safavids, the encounter with the west was much more straightforward, devoid as it was of any challenge to the legitimacy of Ottoman existence.

In 1526, Süleyman had been forced to cut short his campaigning in the west because of a rebellion in Anatolia. In 1533, too, having settled the situation in the west with the signing of a truce in that year, he again turned towards the east and to the Safavids. In 1524, Shah Isma‘il had died. His successor was his very young son Tahmasp, the first years of whose reign were very unstable. Regardless of any internal upheavals, Safavid influence in Anatolia

continued. In 1526, a serious revolt had broken out in Anatolia, followed by a major rebellion under Kalenderoğlu. Both were thought to have been instigated or encouraged by the Safavids. Having been unable to benefit directly from the defection of the Safavid governor of Baghdad in 1528 or that of the Safavid governor of Azerbaijan two years later, due to the Hungarian campaign, Süleyman now, in 1533, launched a campaign against Iran. The following year, in July 1534, the grand vezir, İbrahim Paşa, occupied the Safavid capital Tabriz, which offered no resistance, and at the end of November the sultan entered Baghdad. Once again, the problem for the Ottomans was less the taking of Tabriz than the holding of it, and, in 1535, they again withdrew from the Safavid capital. The campaign had, however, led to the formation of the new province of Erzurum and the conquest of Iraq, a conquest which gave the Ottomans an outlet onto the Persian Gulf, an asset with considerable commercial advantages.

It was also a conquest which created a further area of conflict with the Portuguese, who were out to control the entrance to and exit from the Red Sea and to redirect the lucrative trade from the east round the Cape of Good Hope off southern Africa and away from the traditional route through Egypt and Syria to the ports of the Mediterranean. In the Persian Gulf, they controlled Hormuz, captured in 1515, Maskat and Bahrain. In 1538, an expedition was sent from Suez under Hadım Süleyman Paşa, the beylerbeyi of Egypt, against the Portuguese. In August, Hadım Süleyman Paşa took Aden and then set sail across the Indian Ocean. In September, together with forces of Gujarat, he tried to take Diu, but abandoned the siege in November and withdrew to Yemen, where he concentrated on organising Ottoman administration. The Portuguese attack on Suez in 1541 was unsuccessful. Five years later, the Ottomans conquered Basra, and in 1552 Piri Reis took Muscat from the Portuguese and laid siege, unsuccessfully, to Hormuz. On the African coast of the Red Sea, the Ottomans, who already held Sawakin, occupied Massawa and conquered Ethiopia in 1554–5.

While Süleyman had been occupied with the Safavids, Charles V had been busy in the western Mediterranean and in 1535 had captured Tunis, a conquest which was most advantageous for Habsburg prestige and strategically annoying for the Ottomans. The Ottomans had, at least nominally, controlled Algiers and Tunis since 1519, when Hayreddin, known as Barbarossa in the west, had submitted to Selim I. In 1533, realising the need to improve his navy, Süleyman had summoned Hayreddin from the Maghreb and made him admiral of the Ottoman fleet. Hayreddin promptly set about business, raiding the Italian coastline in 1537 and attacking Corfu. With the Ottomans now
at war with Venice, he took the Venetian islands of Naxos, Andros, Paros and Santorini in 1538 and, in the same year, defeated the forces of the Holy League of Venice, Pope Paul III, Charles V and Ferdinand of Austria in the famous battle of Prevesa. In 1540, the war with Venice ended, yet another triumph for the Ottomans and a costly failure for Venice, which this time lost Monemvasia and Nafplio (Nauplia, Napoli di Romania) and ceded the Aegean islands it had lost to Hayreddin as well as paying a considerable indemnity.

In 1541, Charles V attacked Algiers, this time with less success, for almost his entire fleet was wiped out in a dramatic storm, a disaster which encouraged François I and Süleyman into another alliance, concluded in 1543. As a result of this alliance, Hayreddin took part in an attack on Nice in 1543 and wintered his fleet in 1543–4 at Toulon, a city “without parallel among the Franks” according to an anonymous sixteenth-century Ottoman account of Hayreddin’s exploits.18 In 1550, Charles V’s admiral Andrea Doria attacked Mahdia and Monastir on the North African coast, and, in the following year, Jerba, prompting an unsuccessful Ottoman attack on Malta. In 1551, Ottoman forces scored a significant victory with the capture of Tripoli, held by the Hospitallers since 1530. In the same year, they concluded another alliance with the French and, in 1555, conducted a joint naval attack on Naples. In 1556, they took the Spanish fortress of Wahran (Oran), west of Algiers, and Bizerta, near Tunis, in 1557. Malta, however, continued to elude them, and despite bitter fighting they failed to capture the island in 1565, though they did take the Genoese island of Chios in the following year.

The mid-sixteenth century to 1603

Süleyman I (r. 1520–1566)

While the first part of Süleyman’s reign was marked by military success, both in the west against the Habsburgs and in the east against the Safavids, the latter part of his reign was less spectacular; his successes declined and campaigns resulted in less conquest, less booty and more expense.

In 1548, Süleyman was once more campaigning against Shah Tahmasp, whose brother, Alkas Mirza, had revolted against him and fled the year before to Istanbul. Once again the Ottomans occupied Tabriz, and once again,

18 From an anonymous account of Hayreddin’s voyage, in J. Deny and J. Laroche, ‘L’expedition en Provence de l’armée de mer du sultan Suleyman sous le commandement de l’amiral Hayreddin Pacha dit Barberousse (1543–1544)’, *Turcica* 1 (1969), 161–211 at p. 171. Laroche dates the manuscript to the second half of the sixteenth or perhaps the beginning of the seventeenth century (p. 163).
following a by now familiar pattern, they withdrew. Having wintered in Aleppo, Süleyman took Van, which he had taken in 1534 but lost to the Safavids in 1535, in August 1549. Stymied by the Safavid scorched-earth tactics and frustrated by Tahmasp’s persistent refusal to come out and fight, Süleyman withdrew in December 1549 without a great deal achieved. Two years later, the Safavids laid waste to the region around the northern shores of Lake Van and defeated the troops of İskender Paşa, the beylerbeyi of Erzurum. Süleyman ordered the grand vezir, Rüstem Paşa, and Mehmed Sokollu, the beylerbeyi of Rumeli, to recover the lost territory. The campaign was planned for 1552, but before it could occur a crisis broke out between Süleyman and his son Mustafa.

While the Safavids were raiding round Lake Van, intrigues erupted over the Transylvanian throne. Martinuzzi, hostile to Isabella and her minister Peter Petrović, who were “thorns in Martinuzzi’s flesh”, was in contact with Ferdinand but anxious not to have a total break with Süleyman, at least not until he could be sure of Habsburg backing. Isabella, whose hostility to Martinuzzi stemmed from the agreement of 1538 which excluded her son’s accession, turned, if somewhat indecisively, to the Ottomans. In July 1551, Martinuzzi forced Isabella to accept the treaty of Alba Iulia under which, in accordance with the 1538 treaty and acting on behalf of her son, Isabella gave up the throne of Transylvania, which then went to Ferdinand. Throughout this period, Martinuzzi was in communication with both Ferdinand and Süleyman, a dangerous double game which was likely to win him no friends. Indeed, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa described him in August 1551 as “mendacious”. Isabella, who heartily detested him, even suspected that he had personal ambitions to be king of Hungary, while Ferdinand’s commander Giovan Battista Castaldo, also no fan of Martinuzzi’s, was convinced that he was out for the rule of Transylvania. Süleyman was distinctly annoyed by the treaty of Alba Iulia, and Ottoman troops under Sokollu Mehmed Paşa advanced into Hungary in autumn 1551, took Lippa (Lipova), and laid siege to Temesvár (Timișoara) in October. By December, however, Lippa was under siege by Castaldo and Martinuzzi. By this time, Castaldo’s mistrust of Martinuzzi was total and, with Ferdinand, too, wanting him removed, Castaldo had him murdered at the end of December. Fighting continued in 1552. The Ottomans took Temesvár and re-occupied Lippa in spring 1552, and in August inflicted a major defeat on Ferdinand’s forces. In September, they took the fortress of

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20 Ibid., p. 568.
Szolnok but failed to take Eger (Erlau). Ferdinand continued to pursue his claims to Transylvania until, with the Ottoman siege of Szigetvár in 1556, he was finally forced to abandon them. John Sigismund and Isabella were put back on the throne. Although the struggle between Ferdinand and Süleyman continued until 1562, there was no real change in the situation, for Ferdinand did not have the means to conduct a sustained offensive and Süleyman could not do so because of the situation with the Safavids and a dangerous conflict among his sons.

Süleyman’s eldest son, Mustafa, held the sancak of Amasya. Strongly opposed by Hürrem Sultan, Süleyman’s extremely influential wife, who wanted the succession for one of her own sons, and by Rüstem Paşa, married to her daughter Mihrimah and grand vezir almost without interruption from 1544 until his death in 1561, Mustafa set out to build up his own power base and to garner support. His success fed into Süleyman’s suspicion of him, encouraged by Hürrem Sultan and Rüstem Paşa. His concern was heightened by the discontent among the soldiers when, in 1552, Rüstem Paşa set out with the army for a campaign against the Safavids. Claiming that the sultan was too old for active military service, the soldiers muttered ominously about the need to put a young and vigorous sultan on the throne. Forced to assume command of the army himself, Süleyman set out in August 1553, summoning Mustafa to join him. When Mustafa appeared before him in October near Ereğli, he was instantly put to death. Mustafa’s execution, described by the Habsburg ambassador Busbecq as a “somewhat precipitate action”, produced a very hostile reaction, forcing Süleyman to remove Rüstem Paşa, seen as being behind the execution, from his position as grand vezir.

With Mustafa removed, Süleyman pursued his campaign, destroying Persian border defences, particularly at Erivan (Yerevan) and Nakhchivan, and devastating the rich lands round Karabakh. Süleyman could not get at the Safavid army, which retreated, leaving him with only one option, that of destroying the forward zone which Safavid forces used for raids into Anatolia. Süleyman then withdrew to Erzurum. In September, he agreed to a truce with the shah, and a formal peace, the peace of Amasya, was signed in May 1555. Under this treaty, Süleyman abandoned all claim to Tabriz, Erivan and Nakhchivan but kept Iraq and regions in eastern Anatolia. The frontier between the two states was now, at least theoretically, fixed.

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No sooner had the situation with the Safavids been stabilised than a second succession struggle broke out between Süleyman’s two remaining sons, Selim, the elder, and Bayezid. After a period of jostling in which the brothers intrigued against each other and tracked each other’s moves by means of spies, Bayezid, not disposed to wait for his father’s death before making his move, went into open revolt, thus propelling his father into backing his non-revolting son, Selim. Defeated in battle near Konya in 1559, Bayezid fled to Iran. In an earlier period, the arrival of such an advantageous hostage might have led to open conflict, but the situation had now changed and neither Tahmasp nor Süleyman were keen to go to war over the issue. Instead, in 1562, after much diplomatic to and fro, money changed hands, the treaty of Amasya was renewed and Tahmasp handed Bayezid over to Ottoman officials, who promptly strangled him.

In the same year, Süleyman signed an agreement with Ferdinand, in essence a renewal of that of 1547. By this time, the international scene had changed, for in 1559 Philip II, who had become king of Spain on his father Charles V’s abdication in 1556 though not Holy Roman Emperor, and the French king Henri II had signed the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, which signalled the end of the period of Ottoman–French political alliance.

The peace signed between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs in 1562 was not destined to last long, for in 1564 Ferdinand, Holy Roman Emperor since 1558, died and hostilities broke out between his son and successor, the new emperor Maximillian II, and John Sigismund of Transylvania. In 1566, an elderly and infirm Süleyman set out on what was to be his final campaign. The Ottoman army encamped before Szigetvár, where, two days before its fall, Süleyman died.

*Selim II (r. 1566–1574)*

Selim II, Süleyman’s only surviving son, was faced in the first years of his reign by a war and two rebellions. The war, that with Hungary during which his father had died, was brought to a conclusion in 1568 by an eight-year peace treaty with the emperor Maximillian under which Maximillian agreed to pay an annual tribute of 30,000 *ducats*. The revolts were in the south of his territories, one among the Arabs in Iraq under Ibn ‘Ulayyan, which resulted in the cutting of communications between Baghdad and Basra, and the other, the Zaydi revolt in Yemen, which had resulted in the loss of Ottoman control of the province and of the entrance to the Red Sea. The revolt of the Arabs was

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put down in 1567 by a river campaign, and Yemen was brought back under
Ottoman control after a difficult campaign between 1569 and 1571 under the
command of Sinan Paşa, the beylerbeyi of Egypt.

The great military success of Selim’s reign took place in the Mediterranean
with the conquest of the Venetian island of Cyprus, whose loss was offi-
cially recognised by Venice under the treaty of 1573, and the capture of La
Goletta and Tunis in 1574. Cyprus was one of the only two island strong-
holds left to Venice in the eastern Mediterranean. Strategically located on
the route between Egypt and Istanbul and in the midst of Ottoman terri-
tory, its conquest by the Ottomans was only a matter of time. Selim, sup-
ported by Piyale Paşa and Lala Mustafa Paşa but opposed by the grand vezir
Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, decided on an attack, despite the existing peace with
Venice. Nicosia fell in 1570, Famagusta in 1571. The Ottoman assault pro-
voked a response from the Holy League, whose naval force encountered
the Ottoman fleet in the famous battle of Lepanto. A resounding defeat for
the Ottomans, who lost most of their ships and the majority of their com-
manders, the battle was noisily heralded as a great victory by the European
states. It was not, however, the crushing blow the West would have wished,
and a new, large Ottoman fleet was constructed in time to sail out into the
Mediterranean the next spring. In summer 1574, an Ottoman naval expedi-
tion under Kılıç Ali Paşa and Koca Sinan Paşa captured La Goletta and
Tunis. Much of the North African coast to the east of Wahran was now
under Ottoman control.

One of the interesting, if unsuccessful, projects of Selim’s reign was the
planned construction of two canals, one to link Suez to the Mediterranean
and one to connect the Don with the Volga. In both cases, the aim was
to facilitate Ottoman military operations. The Suez-Mediterranean canal,
ordered by Sokollu Mehmed Paşa in 1568, was to facilitate Ottoman opera-
tions in Yemen and against the Portuguese, for the canal would have allowed
the transportation of men and munitions directly from the Mediterranean
to the Red Sea. The Don–Volga canal would have given direct access from
the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and facilitated the movement of men and
munitions into the Caucasus and northern Iran. In the end, neither of these
constructions was successful, though concerted work on the Don–Volga
channel, whose attempted construction was prompted by the Russian occupa-
tion of Astrakhan, was begun in August 1569. However, cold weather and
the failure of Ottoman forces under Kasim Paşa to take Astrakhan forced
the Ottomans to abandon the canal after only one-third of it had been
evacuated.
Murad III (r. 1574–1595)

By the time of Murad III’s reign, the strains in the economic fabric of the state were becoming apparent. From the 1580s onwards, the empire suffered the effects of severe inflation, and the constant warfare of the period drained the state’s resources. Lawlessness and brigandage increased, and the deficit in the treasury became chronic. The response of the government was to debase the coinage. In 1589, the janissaries, who, as the contemporary historian Selaniki noted, were given to getting what they wanted, revolted when they received their pay in the new, debased currency, and in 1592 the sipahis of the Porte rebelled because their pay was not issued to them in full. Later, in 1603, there would be a more serious revolt of the sipahis of the Porte, which was crushed by the janissaries.

One of the factors contributing to the economic difficulties was the long war with Iran, which was to dominate most of Murad III’s reign, breaking out in 1578 and ending in 1590. The opportunity for an Ottoman attack was provided by the descent of the Safavid state into intertribal and internecine feuding following the death of Shah Tahmasp in 1576 and the Uzbek invasion from the east which this instability provoked. Claiming that continued Safavid propaganda activities within Ottoman territories and the defection to the Safavids of Kurdish leaders on the Ottoman frontier constituted a breach of the Amasya treaty of 1555, Murad declared war in 1578. The Ottoman army under Lala Mustafa Paşa set out to subjugate Georgia and conquer Shirvan. In August, Ottoman forces occupied Tbilisi and had, by the end of the year, taken Shirvan. As always, however, the problem that faced the Ottomans in their campaigns against the Safavids was less conquest than retention, and on this occasion, too, although they had conquered the region, they had problems holding it. In 1578–9, Lala Mustafa Paşa withdrew, with great difficulty, to Erzurum. For the next couple of years, the Ottoman position was under severe pressure from Safavid counter-attacks, but with the major Ottoman victory at the battle of Meşale, the situation improved. In 1583, Ferhad Paşa occupied Erivan, followed two years later by Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa’s occupation of Tabriz. By 1587, Georgia had become effectively an Ottoman dependency.

In the same year, the Safavid ruler Khudabanda had been forced to abdicate, and was succeeded by Shah Abbas I (1587–1629). Abbas soon found himself

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facing war on two fronts, the Ottomans on one side and the Uzbeks, who invaded from the east, took Herat in 1589 and advanced to Mashhad, on the other. Threatened also by internal strife, Abbas was forced to sue for peace with the Ottomans. Under the treaty concluded between them in 1590, the Ottomans retained their conquests in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus, together with Luhristan, Nihavend, and Shehrizor in western Iran. These territorial gains were only temporary, however, for between 1603 and 1606 Abbas was to take them all back.

No sooner had Murad emerged from war with the Safavids than he plunged into one with the Habsburgs. Although officially at peace since 1568, there had been much tension, with raiding and counter-raiding in the border zones between Ottoman and Habsburg territory, and in 1593 war with Hungary broke out. Although initially successful, Koca Sinan Paşa capturing Veszprem and Paluta in 1593, the campaign was soon struggling. The Ottoman conquest in 1594 of Tata and Györ (Yanık), whose fall was more down to luck than military ability, Peçevi describing the conquest of Györ as “nothing other than a miracle”,24 were more important for boosting morale than symbolic of any effective Ottoman victory. In 1595, the situation deteriorated even further with the defection of Stephen Bathori, king of Transylvania, who transferred his allegiance to the Habsburgs, and the revolt of the voyvodas of Moldavia and Wallachia. Defeated by both Wallachian and Moldavian forces, and struggling to defeat the voyvoda Michael of Wallachia, the Ottomans lost Esztergom to the Habsburgs in August 1595.

*Mehmed III (r. 1595–1603)*

By this time, Mehmed III had come to the throne, in the midst of a Hungarian campaign that was going badly. In response to the deteriorating situation, the new sultan himself set out for Hungary in 1596 at the head of the army. In October, he took Eger, and in the same month the Ottomans, rather fortuitously, won a major victory at the battle of Mező-Keresztes, to the west of the Tisza River, when the Ottoman troops, who had initially fled, returned to the attack against Austrian forces distracted by plundering the Ottoman encampment. The campaign in the following year under Satıcı Mehmed Paşa did not, however, meet with success, and in 1598 Habsburg forces besieged Buda, though unsuccessfully. In 1600, Ottoman fortunes changed when Mehmed Paşa, the governor-general of Buda, captured Kanizsa in south-western Hungary, a rather fortuitous conquest which owed much to the descent of

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an all-enveloping mist. In reply, the Austrians laid siege, unsuccessfully, to Kanizsa in 1601, but did take Pest, opposite Buda, in 1602 and laid siege to Buda, but were repelled by Lala Mehmed Paşa, who later re-conquered Pest. This war eventually ended inconclusively in 1606 with the conclusion of the peace of Zsitvatorok during the reign of Mehmed’s successor, Ahmed I (r. 1603–17).

The increasing economic difficulties of the later sixteenth century contributed to a wave of social unrest which was expressed in a series of revolts, known as the celali revolts, which broke out in Anatolia in 1596. Sipahi disposessed after their poor performance at the battle of Mező-Keresztes and landless or dispossessed peasants gathered under the leadership of Kara Yazıcı, who, in 1596, defeated the beylerbeyi of Karaman, sent by Mehmed III to put down the rebellion. Having failed to crush Kara Yazıcı militarily, Mehmed changed tactics, making him governor first of Amasya and then Çorum. This new position made no difference, for Kara Yazıcı continued to plunder Anatolia as he had before. He was finally defeated by Sokollu Mehmed Paşa’s son Hasan Paşa in 1601 and died the following year.

Kara Yazıcı’s death did not, however, mean the end of the revolt, for command of the rebellion was taken up by his brother Deli Hasan, who killed Hasan Paşa at Tokat in 1602 before defeating an Ottoman force in August and besieging Ankara. Mehmed’s response to Deli Hasan was the same as it had been to his brother, and Hasan was made beylerbeyi of Bosnia. His departure from Anatolia did not result in the end of the revolts, which continued on into the reign of Mehmed’s successor, Ahmed I.

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman state had reached its territorial limits and had established itself as a world power. It was now, however, faced with economic challenges with the influx of silver from the new world and the difficulties of maintaining the value of its currency, a warfare which was less for lucrative conquest than expensive defence, new commercial competitors in the form of the Dutch and the English, who were to dominate maritime trade, and an increasing wave of smouldering social discontent, which exploded in the violent and uncontrollable celali rebellions.

25 Ibid., p. 220.
The Ottoman Empire is often imagined in terms of major conquests and major reigns, those that are expansive.¹ Thus, the sixteenth century, in the context of Ottoman “activity” in Europe, tends to be framed by the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and by the conclusion of the “long” Ottoman–Habsburg war of 1593–1606, respectively, or by the reigns of Mehmed II (r. 1444–6, 1451–81) and Murad III (r. 1574–95), with that of Süleyman the Lawgiver (1520–66) as a focal point of consolidation and triumph. The sixteenth century is also circumscribed by the emergence of the Shi’ite Shah Isma’il Safavi in Iran in 1501 and by the launching of the “long” Ottoman war of 1603–18 against the Safavid regime. That state problematised Ottoman expansion in Europe through the creation of an aggressive enemy on the Ottoman eastern borders, one which actively recruited Ottoman subordinates, especially in the mountainous areas of eastern Anatolia, fought the Ottomans for control of Iraq and the outlets to the Persian Gulf, and rhetorically challenged the sultans’ claims to sacred hegemony in the Islamic world. The existence of a powerful Muslim challenger in Iran meant that Ottoman military investment in Europe was always subject to the demands of the eastern frontier. Another important idea affecting the conceptualisation of the sixteenth century is the notion of a resurgence and re-configuration of European powers in the Mediterranean associated with the Christian forces’ victory at the naval battle of Lepanto in 1571 and the emergence of the English as a rising commercial force in the Levant. That re-configuration in the last three decades of the century presented both limitations and opportunities for the Ottomans. While such periods and events suggest an outline of Ottoman expansion in Europe, as with all such historical markers, they do not suffice to convey the continuities, processes and universal rhetorics which transcend the constraints of reigns, state-formation, battles and periods of war.

¹ Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914, vol. 1: 1300–1600 (Cambridge, 1994), pp. xv–xvii.
In many ways, the long sixteenth century (the time period comprising roughly the years 1453 to 1606) is the century in which the Ottoman polity and its governing classes articulated the state as empire. It is the period in which the Ottomans secured and developed two imperial capitals, Constantinople and Cairo, symbolising their power in the west (Rum) and in the east, an arena which encompassed the three holy Islamic cities, Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. Each of these “ends” of empire is associated with a series of trading spheres over which the Ottomans achieved dominance, as well as with a series of rich, taxable lands. The Ottomans, in this era, defined themselves militarily and ideologically in confrontation with the Catholic Habsburg Empire to the north and west and the Shi’ite Muslim Safavid Empire to the east. This was the century of the Muslim millennium, a millennium which for Sultan Süleyman certified his own long reign as the embodiment of Islamic kingly and spiritual might.\(^2\) In the Afro/Asian sphere, the conquest of Cairo and its attendant territories gave the Ottomans control over the access points to the eastern trade and avenues for sea-borne incursions into the Indian Ocean. In Europe, the conquest of Constantinople and the development of expansive Ottoman territories (and claims), along with expansive military and commercial agendas, meant that the Ottomans became invested in a complex set of political, economic and religious relationships. The nature of those relationships changed significantly over the course of the century, one in which European familiarity with the Ottomans broadened significantly. At the beginning of the period, the captivity of Cem Sultan, Sultan Bayezid II’s (r. 1481–1512) brother and a pretender to the throne, under various Christian powers, and the Ottoman attempts to retrieve him, signified an extended endeavour by rulers on both sides of the European frontier to assess the relative power of their rivals.\(^3\) By the end of the period under consideration here, that understanding of relative power was well advanced; it was embodied in a set of treaty agreements, tested in warfare, and enhanced through the activities of a vast network of commercial, political and intellectual intermediaries.\(^4\)


Defining “Europe” and “expansion”

Before one determines the relative significance of battles, sovereigns, ideologies and entrepôts, it is worthwhile to examine the concepts of “Europe” and “expansion”. The Ottoman Empire, after all, was inextricably European. Its capital, Istanbul, spanned the two continents of Europe and Asia. Rumeli, in the Graeco-Balkan peninsula, constituted a central core of Ottoman land, one-half of the two major provinces (beylerbeylik) of the empire (the other being Anatolia) and the homeland of many of those taken in the devşirme (state levy of non-Muslim subject boys), who served the empire as its elite military/administrative class. Also, as Şevket Pamuk has pointed out, “The Balkans, together with western and central Anatolia including the capital and its environs, constituted the core region of the Ottoman monetary system”.  

That notion of a Eurasian fiscal core helps transcend the notion of an empire divided into continental “halves”. The Ottomans ruled what in the seventeenth century was labelled, on European maps, “Turkey in Europe” and “Turkey in Asia”. But despite either contemporary or Ptolemaic notions of a continental divide, in the sixteenth century the boundaries of Europe were ideologically and visually negotiable. For some observers, the boundaries of “Europe” were those circumscribing the land ruled by Christian kings; for others the boundaries of Europe extended well east of Istanbul. Indeed, the sixteenth century is particularly notable for its explorations, in text and image, of the boundaries of Europe. However the “limits” of Europe were imagined, a basic premise of this chapter is that the Ottoman Empire was a European empire – its identity, ethos and ambitions defined by its possession of European capitals and its investment in European economies and affairs. Well before the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottomans had occupied Europe and established their rule at Edirne. Thus the division of the empire into continental western and eastern, or “Christian” and “Muslim” halves, while roughly reflective of administrative divisions and general demographic realities, is not reflective of the nature of Ottoman sovereign identity. That

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identity combined “the two lands and the two seas” into one imperial reality which exploited the layers and evolution of regional geographic, political, religious and “national” identities rather than enforcing their “essential” differences. In order to understand the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, one must appreciate both its location in Europe and its participation in what one scholar has called the “shared discourse” and “shared rhythms” of the Ottoman and European worlds.\(^7\)

Expansion is also a term which encompasses an array of meanings and interpretations. In its simplest sense, “expansion” often means the movement of conquering armies into neutral or enemy territory. But true “expansion” requires some level of political, economic and socio-cultural occupation, integration and control over time, something which the Ottomans achieved in Europe. How that control worked and its nature in any given area of conquered territory are the subject of considerable debate in contemporary historiographies. Ottoman expansion has been read, historiographically, as the Ottoman “yoke”, an occupation by a foreign, heretical and despotic power whose rule constituted a dark era in the history of eastern Europe (what one scholar has called “catastrophe” or “coercion” theory).\(^8\) In other readings, the Ottomans provided their European territories with a period of multi-cultural, tolerant, coherent and prosperous rule from Istanbul which was replaced, beginning in the seventeenth century, by a long process of violent ethno-national and religious factionalism that ultimately forced the expulsion of the Ottomans from the Graeco-Balkan peninsula. In Ottomanist historiography, expansion into Europe is often presented as a logical step in the process through which the Ottomans established themselves as an imperial power, supplanting the Byzantines, and gaining access to important agricultural, timber, mining and commercial resources. “Europe” in this paradigm constitutes one end of an uneven tripartite division of the empire into European, Anatolian and Arab provinces, with island territories such as Cyprus occupying a separate and somewhat undefined fourth category. World historical models provide an alternative vision, with the Ottoman Empire serving as one in a succession of exploitative, trans-regional, imperial entities that survived into the modern


The Ottoman Empire controlled so much territory that, like Rome, it does not readily fit into regional and civilizational paradigms. Such models highlight the dilemma of what to do with “Europe” when it becomes Ottoman space. Part of this dilemma derives from the fact that the sixteenth century, historiographically, often serves as a prelude to spatial divisions based on the nation-states of the modern world. The Ottoman Empire, however, echoes in its expansiveness both the trans-continental, multi-cultural, imperial entities of the medieval world and the blue-water, Western European imperial powers of the early modern age. None of the available characterisations provide a full and nuanced image of Ottoman expansion in Europe, which proceeded in surges and lulls; operated differently for coastal and inland areas; engaged a diverse set of socio-political, legal, economic and institutional structures; and met with greater or lesser resistance depending on the hierarchies of power and culture in each conquered or partially conquered area.

While expansion cannot be comprehended through conquest alone, conquest itself is a vexed notion. Generally, conquest in the sixteenth century took place along a limited number of routes and affected a limited number of settlement centres. Any given segment of a conquered region might not know or accept that it had been conquered. Conversely, the idea of Ottoman conquest could serve to manipulate the sensibilities of communities that anticipated its effects and ramifications and shaped their behaviours accordingly. Certainly the “news” of Ottoman advances in Europe spread quickly, and Ottoman successes and failures were commemorated in broad-sheets and embedded in the maps and sermon literature of Europe within days, weeks or months after individual acts of conquest. Yet beyond the image of conquest and the physical marching of armies along routes and into or past cities and fortresses, it took time for territory, that is urban settlements and their surrounding (revenue producing, mostly agricultural) lands, to be recognised and acknowledged as “conquered” and moving from the “possession” of one sovereign to another – from the possession of “Christian princes”, as they were often deemed in the source materials, to the possession of the “padişah” or “Grand Turk”.

Conquest could, and often did, mean that designated local or regional leaders were compelled to perform acts of submission to recognise publicly the authority of the sultan and to commit themselves to providing taxes, goods and sometimes men to the Ottomans to certify their obedience, however long that obedience might or might not last. Viorel Panaite has referred to such submission as a measure of “collective homage”, which the Ottomans
demanded and then acknowledged. That collective homage was more or less enduring and representative. The Ottomans certified their conquests through the garrisoning of troops, the taking of censuses, the inscribing of tax registers, the creation of sancaks (sub-provinces), the assignment of judges (kadis), the levying of tribute, the taking of hostages, the granting of treaties and the allocation of offices to local notables. Yet sancaks could be altered, treaties broken, hostages absorbed into the Ottoman government and householders flee the land, thereby escaping levies of taxes and goods. Some areas achieved a modus vivendi with the conquerors, and others remained fractious, their documents of “incorporation” requiring chronic negotiation and re-negotiation. Taxpayers in frontier areas might find themselves counted on the tax rolls of two masters. Some conquests were tenuous, some temporary and periodic; others endured throughout the period in question. Some societies, especially on the edges of the frontier, endured conditions of chronic warfare; others settled into Ottoman rule, absorbed Muslim migrants and experienced significant levels of conversion and inter-marriage. So expansion must be measured in terms of tranquillity, conversions or settled tax status as much as in terms of force of arms.

Events and periodisation: The long sixteenth century

The aftermath of 1453

To begin the long sixteenth century, Ottoman expansion into European territory combined the conquest of the de-populated imperial capital of Constantinople with campaigns against Serbia in 1454–5 and, in 1456, the failed siege of Belgrade, a crucial step in the Danubian march to Vienna. By 1460, the Ottomans had made significant advances on both land and sea salients, conquering the Peloponnese and incorporating the kingdom of Serbia into the empire. In 1463, the Ottomans invaded Bosnia, a key segment of the contested trans-imperial zone shared with Venice and the Habsburgs, and became embroiled in a naval war with Venice that would last for 16 years. In 1475, they annexed the long-established Genoese colony of Caffa on the Black Sea.

Ottomans had declared their intentions as a sea power, determined to seize bases in the Aegean and Adriatic and challenge Venetian hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean. They briefly took Otranto, on the eastern Italian coast, in 1480, sending shock waves of alarm throughout the peninsula, and launched a failed attack on the island fortress of Rhodes, just off the Anatolian coast. By the death of Mehmed the Conqueror in 1481, the Porte had taken the territories of the Graeco-Balkan peninsula, including Wallachia (in 1476), up to the borders of Hungary, except for a set of coastal enclaves controlled by Venice. Croatia and Transylvania remained autonomous, key areas of opportunity and resistance on the western and east-central sides of the frontier. Before the turn of the sixteenth century, the Ottomans had not only revived the ancient imperial capital of Byzantium but had pushed Ottoman armies, claims and administration well into a broad land- and sea-based European frontier zone stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. That expansion enhanced the Ottoman reputation for power, wealth and imperial patronage, attracting mercenaries, entrepreneurs, technicians and artists like Gentile Bellini to the newly flourishing imperial capital at Istanbul. From 1492 on, in the aftermath of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, the empire also became a haven for the displaced of Europe, granting refuge and tax breaks to these desirable, commercially oriented “settlers” from the west. The empire thus drew “Europe” in at the same time as it ventured into European territory.

Bayezid II, Selim I and Süleyman I: 1481–1566

When Bayezid II ascended the throne in 1481, his authority was compromised by factional politics and by the machinations of a pretender to the throne, his brother Cem Sultan. Cem mobilised a revolt in Anatolia in 1482 but was defeated and forced to flee to Rhodes; Bayezid paid the Knights Hospitallers annually to keep him there under wraps. The sultan then launched a military campaign (in conjunction with his Crimean vassals) against Moldavia in 1484, establishing his reputation by taking Kilia and Akkerman in the corridor of conquest along the north-western coast of the Black Sea. These victories were followed by an extended war, from 1485 to 1491, with the Mamluks who ruled Egypt and Syria. In 1497, Ottoman forces were once again drawn to Moldavia to ward off a Polish invasion; the army of the Porte was victorious, and Ottoman control over the region was consolidated.

12 Caroline Campbell and Alan Chong, Bellini and the East (London and Boston, 2005).
Cem Sultan died in 1495 after sojourns in Rhodes, France and Italy. His body, however, was returned to Istanbul only in 1499. This posthumous return coincided with the Ottoman Porte’s renewing its naval war (1499–1502) against the Signoria of Venice, and it signalled a new era in Ottoman–European relations. For the duration of the ensuing century, the Ottoman, Venetian and Habsburg empires would confront each other in a long and intermittent struggle to assert territorial and commercial dominance and to establish a mode of co-existence in the Aegean, the Adriatic and the Graeco-Balkan peninsula. That adjustment was necessitated by the emergence of the Ottomans as a world power. Their claims to that status were based on a combination of Islamic, Byzantine, Persian and Turkish traditions of imperial grandeur, freely adapted to the exigencies of day-to-day rule. The historian Kemalpaşazade (d. 1536), writing for Bayezid II, proclaimed the Ottoman polity “superior” to those of all the previous Muslim dynasties; it was more powerful, rich, authoritative and, unlike its predecessors, was established through the conquest of the territories of the “infidel world”.14 The imperial ethos of the empire was thus well advanced by the beginning of the sixteenth century.

While Bayezid’s reign was marked by consolidation and reorganisation, that of his son Selim was marked by dramatic conquest on the Ottomans’ eastern frontier. Selim II did not wait until the death of his ailing father to seize the throne; after defeating his brothers in a protracted succession struggle, in 1512 he forced Bayezid II to abdicate. Once in power, he devoted himself to defeating Shah Isma’il, the newly emergent Safavid ruler in Iran (1514), overwhelming the Mamluk kingdoms in Syria, Palestine and Egypt (1516–17), and gaining control of the holy cities (Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem). Those conquests cemented Ottoman hegemony in the Muslim world. But with Selim’s energies during his short reign focused in the east, Ottoman expansion in Europe stalled.

That period of containment on the western frontier, however, would end with the reign of Süleyman I, who turned his attention to consolidating power over a more expansive European empire. Charles V was elected Holy Roman Emperor in 1521, and in that same year Süleyman launched a new campaign against Belgrade. It fell to the armies of the new sultan, and the following year Rhodes, too, succumbed, displacing the Knights Hospitallers, who had plagued Ottoman shipping in the eastern Mediterranean. The sultan then pressed his advantage, allying with the French (at their request) and confronting

the Habsburgs on their south-eastern frontier. The battle of Mohács in 1526 opened Hungary to the Ottomans, placing them in direct confrontation with the Habsburg kingdom, with Buda serving as the focal point of the struggle. By 1541, Süleyman had annexed Buda and could claim sovereignty over most of Croatia and Hungary, leaving the narrow crescent of “Royal Hungary” as a buffer between Ottoman lands and the Habsburg stronghold of Vienna, a European outpost which remained beyond the Ottoman grasp despite determined sieges in 1529 and, later, in 1683. For roughly four decades, Süleyman faced off against Charles V’s brother, Ferdinand I (r. 1526–64, archduke of Austria, king of Hungary, and later emperor), along the shifting border of Hungary, which was marked by a landscape of defensive fortresses. There were intermittent armistices, but notable among them was that of August 1547, which included France and the Habsburg realm and obligated Ferdinand to pay the Ottomans an annual tribute of the princely sum of 30,000 ducats.

In the second half of the century, the Ottomans expanded their European territories marginally while waging an off-again, on-again struggle against the Cossacks on the Black Sea salient and launching campaigns against the Habsburgs in 1551–2 and 1566–7. Responding to renewed Habsburg aggression, in 1552 Süleyman incorporated Temesvar, part of Transylvania, into the territories governed directly by the Ottoman Porte. On the Black Sea side of the Balkans, the Ottomans held sway over Wallachia and Moldavia, which served as dependent though not always quiescent principalities. The Crimean hanate remained a vassal state. Other coastal territories of the western end of the Black Sea were part of the great province of Rumeli, much of which was already under Ottoman control by the turn of the sixteenth century.

During Süleyman’s long reign, the limits of Ottoman sea-based expansion were also explored and defined (see Fleet, Chapter 2, this volume). Ottoman bases in the Aegean and Adriatic multiplied, plans to acquire similar bases in the Indian Ocean seem to have been relinquished, and Süleyman’s fleets played an episodic but opportunistic role in the struggle for ports and trade in the western Mediterranean. Perhaps emblematic of this definition of limits is the fact that while Süleyman’s reign began with the conquest of Rhodes, an Ottoman attempt to expel the Hospitallers from Malta failed in 1565, near the end of the Lawgiver’s reign.

16 Donald Pitcher, An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire (Leiden, 1972), with the relevant maps for this era shown in plates 16–24 and 26–29; Paul Magocsi, Historical Atlas of Central Europe, rev. ed. (Seattle, 2002), esp. plates 9, 10, 14 and 19.
Selim II, Murad III and Mehmed III (1595–1603): 1566–1603

Süleyman’s death in 1566 while on campaign in Hungary brought his less able son Selim II to the Ottoman throne. Although the 1566 campaign was successful in its conquest of Szigetvár, the loss of the long-reigning Süleyman signalled possibilities (both naval and military) for the Christian princes of Europe. The Ottomans had to keep a wary eye on the Russian tsar Ivan IV (r. 1547–84), who had an expansionist agenda of his own in Europe. During the reign of Süleyman, the tsar had advanced his armies into the northern Caucasus and had meddled in the affairs of Moldavia (an Ottoman vassal state). Under Selim II, in order to address the Russian threat on their north-eastern frontier, the Ottomans launched a plan to construct a Don–Volga canal that would enable a joint naval and military attack on the Russians; but that endeavour failed in 1569. While the tsar negotiated with the Safavids in Iran to promote an alliance against the Porte, the Ottomans engaged in extensive diplomacy with Poland and Lithuania (joined in a commonwealth in 1569) in order to contain Russian expansion. In 1572, when the tsar stood for election to the Polish throne, the Ottomans thwarted his designs, ultimately succeeding in having their Transylvanian vassal, Stephen Bathori, elevated to the Polish kingship (r. 1575–86).

Such negotiations and machinations illustrate the complex matrix of Euro-Asian alliances which in the sixteenth century linked powers from western Europe to Central Asia in a set of relationships that were determined, at least in part, by the expansive agenda of the Ottoman state.

A direct threat to Selim’s rule also emerged on the Ottomans’ western frontier. A “Holy League” allying Venice to Don Juan of Austria and other European contenders was formed and accomplished its signal naval victory over the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto (off western Greece) in 1571. This victory was celebrated across Christian Europe as a sign of divine favour in the context of the many portents of doom and destruction that characterised the Reformation era. Indeed, the successes of the Ottomans and their rapid expansion into European territory were viewed as a sign of divine displeasure and the need for Christians and their rulers to repent and prepare for the


Last Days. But, despite the stunning victory at Lepanto, the Holy League was ephemeral, and in the same year that their fleet was decimated and their banners dragged through the sea, the Ottomans finished the conquest of the Venetian stronghold of Cyprus, thus consolidating their control over the territories of the eastern Mediterranean.

When Murad III came to the throne in 1574, the Ottomans were at peace with both Venice and the Habsburgs. The sultan was thus free to embark, in 1578, on a series of Persian campaigns in a war which would last until 1590. Once that conflict ended and a truce was secured on their eastern frontier, the Ottomans reopened hostilities with the Habsburgs. In the broad Balkan frontier zone, negotiation, accommodation and intimidation of local warlords substituted for warfare in the periods of formal peace. But raiding activities continued on both sides, and in 1591 Ottoman forces took offensive action in Bosnia. During the subsequent long war of 1593–1606, the Ottomans lost control of the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania, which were returned to the Ottoman fold only through a combination of force, brokered negotiation and circumstance. This long war spanned the reigns of Murad III and Mehmed III and sputtered into the reign of Ahmed I (r. 1603–17). Mehmed III won a dramatic victory at Mesző-Keresztes (just west of the Tisza River, near the western border of Transylvania in October 1596, the last major battle directed by the sultan himself at a time when Ottoman monarchs were preparing to withdraw into the palace. Although the sultan marched back to Istanbul in triumph and his victory was celebrated in Ottoman chronicles, the results of the long war were inconclusive. The burdens of the war and an attack by the Safavid shah Abbas I (r. 1588–1629) in 1603 made the Ottomans anxious to secure peace with the Habsburgs. That peace, of Zsitvatorok, in November 1606, which included a lump sum payment to the Ottomans of 200,000 florins, brought to an end half a century of annual “tribute” payments which the Habsburg ruler had undertaken as part of the 1547 armistice with Sultan Süleyman.

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Periodisation

Ottomanist historians have dealt with the periodisation of the sixteenth century in a variety of ways. Halil İnalcık argues that the conquests of Belgrade in 1521 and Rhodes in 1522 signalled a “new stage in East-West relations” and a new attitude towards *cihad* (“holy” war) as the Ottoman state acted “as the protector of the Moslem world”. But he emphasises that the role of protector also extended to the conquered territories in Europe. There the Ottomans administered a system in which “land tenure, the tax system and the military organization formed an integrated whole”. For İnalcık, this integrated system was broken at the end of the sixteenth century by a combination of factors, including the flow of cheap silver from the New World after 1580, the halting of the tide of conquest which disrupted the *timar* system of land tenure, and the *celali* rebellions, which peaked in the years 1595–1610, all contributing to a period of crisis. That experience of crisis, with its internal disorders and desertions, was shared by the Habsburg administration, which ruled from a distance and never managed firmly to secure the allegiance of the Hungarian estates and the notables of Transylvania. There seems to be general historiographic agreement regarding the coincidence of this apparently era-ending crisis and the 1593–1606 Ottoman–Habsburg war. Interpretations of this periodisation, however, vary according to the factors emphasised. Suraiya Faroqhi, for example, examines the concept of “crisis” but offers a periodisation oriented towards Ottoman relationships with the major trading partners of the empire.

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23 İnalcık, ‘Periods in Ottoman History’, p. 17.

24 See also Viorel Panaite, ‘The Re’ayas of the Tributary-Protected Principalities: The Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries’, in Karpat and Zens, *Ottoman Borderlands*, p. 84, on processes of incorporation for the tributary principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania.

25 İnalcık, ‘Periods in Ottoman History’, pp. 19–21; also İnalcık and Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 15–31.

26 Ibid., pp. 20–1.


It is clear that the long Ottoman–Habsburg war had significant impacts on the military-administrative castes on both sides, their armies, the frontier populations who directly bore the brunt of the conflict and the imperial governments faced with maintaining order at home while mobilising money and supplies to support the war. Yet, if one focuses on trans-Adriatic trade, for example, or on Ottoman investment in European commercial sectors, the last quarter of the sixteenth century represents the augmentation of opportunity rather than a set of territorial stopping points to expansion. The conquest of towns and the levying of taxes on agriculture are part of the imperial project, the spoils over which empires struggle. Trade, however, is a force that transcends empires and their wars. Thus, one might imagine Ottoman expansion in Europe as a measure of the Ottoman polity’s success in exploiting networks of trade that functioned both within and beyond the reach of imperial centres. In fact, the sixteenth century is critical for the Ottoman polity’s simultaneous investment in a wider set of European trans-national relationships and in the exploitation of a broader and more highly developed network of commercial operations. Ottoman capitulations with England in 1580 signalled a new set of trading relationships just at a time when the economies of the Balkans were being transformed. Ottoman expansion is also measured by the penetration of Ottoman goods into the Graeco-Balkan peninsula and the lands beyond and the extent to which the Ottomans became an essential part of the Afro-Eurasian commercial system, both inheriting the mechanisms of trade utilised by their predecessors, like the Byzantines, the Serbs, and the Genoese, and devising and implementing their own contributions (for example, in the silk trade). Thus the Ottomans incorporated commercial personnel, space and goods into their empire and sent their own goods and personnel into the conquered European territories, where Ottoman commodities, luxury items and literary and artistic conventions and motifs were integrated into broader social and cultural landscapes across Europe.

*Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 467, points out that the long war led to "economic contraction". Leslie Peirce, ‘Changing Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire: The Early Centuries’, *Mediterranean Historical Review* 19, 1 (June 2004), 6–28, emphasises the reorganisation “of the eastern Mediterranean by the Ottomans between 1453 and 1555” (p. 23).


networks and habits of consumption. The Ottoman linking of European and Asian commercial centres provided an infrastructure within which commercial opportunities could flourish.

The zones, stages and contexts of Ottoman expansion

The historiographic approach to Ottoman space in Europe tends to follow three general conventions. Beyond the generic categories of Christendom and Islam, territories are characterised either by their ethno-linguistic identities (Greek, Hungarian, Albanian), their imperial affiliations (Venetian, Habsburg, Ottoman), or their degree of incorporation into the Ottoman state (sancaks, principalities, contested borderlands). These are all useful and important categories, particularly when they do not anticipate the national identities of a later era, and yet they do not fully comprise the geographic, logistic and representational realities of the sixteenth century. Ottoman Europe can be viewed as consisting of a set of land and sea salients approached on the basis of their degree of accessibility. These, in turn, were marked by an enduring set of routes which linked urban commercial nodes (much like those described by Janet Abu-Lughod in her version of the thirteenth-century world system) and defensive fortresses.33 The land part of this region consisted of a broad peninsula transected by a formidable riverine system which drew the sea salients into the land, impeded the march of armies, facilitated communication and loomed large in the geographic and historic imagination of sixteenth-century peoples. This land was imagined as attached indelibly to the history of Christendom and to the imperial ambitions of prospective Eurasian lords. It was a central core of the commercial (and cultural) pathways connecting the Mediterranean to the systems of north–south and east–west trade. To understand Ottoman expansion in Europe, one must thus consider this land and sea space not only in terms of its ethno-political zones but in terms of its geographic constraints, its role in early modern conceptualisations of space and its evolutionary patterns of imperial and extra-imperial identities.

Geographic configurations and zones of operation

Ottoman ambitions and presence in Europe tend to be divided politically and geographically into discrete but overlapping territories: a zone of islands and port bases spanning the Aegean and Adriatic coasts; the southern

Graeco-Balkan peninsula (Rumeli and Greece); the north-western Balkan peninsula (Hungary, Bosnia, Croatia); the principalities of the north-east (Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia); and a strip of Black Sea coast (Silistre) that was incorporated into the Ottoman system early on. Rule in these zones took several major forms: direct incorporation into the Ottoman sancak system; rule by acknowledged princes who had considerable leeway in running the internal affairs of their principalities as long as they submitted militarily and conceded to demands for money and goods; autonomous tributaries such as Ragusa (Dubrovnik), a city-state on the Adriatic; a mixed combination of governance by tribute-paying warlords and Ottoman garrison commanders; and lawlessness in the frontier zones (and in many territories not directly accessible to local or imperial security forces). Banditry (including raiding by regular military forces and piracy) must be considered one element of governance, as it conditioned the relations between imperial powers and those between local and regional lords and their subjects.

Ottoman expansion can also be divided into inland and coastal forms. Thus the Ottomans achieved dominance over an island-coast zone in which territories were not contiguous and access might be interrupted or periodic. A map of the Adriatic region in 1570, for example, shows a series of Venetian bases (islands and city-state ports) embedded in a large body of Balkan territory that had already been incorporated directly into Ottoman sancaks. Zara, Sebenico, Cattaro, the Ionian islands and, to the south and east of the Morea, Candia (Crete) suggest the distinctive nature of islands and coastal spaces, particularly those separated from inland provinces by mountainous terrain. Such places were contested space; they required consistent seaborne support and defence. They might change hands as naval forces approached or withdrew. They reveal the limits that geography and sea power place on expansion. They also reveal the limitations of the notion of Europe as a coherent continental space. This latter point is clearly illustrated by the case of Cyprus, which despite its location and incorporation into the Ottoman Empire is often counted as the easternmost outpost of “Europe”. The Black Sea presents a somewhat different type of sea space. Along its coasts, Ottoman expansion could not be complete because the empire was never able to control the highly mobile Cossacks and other peoples whose livelihood was rooted in the river tributaries and the occupations of coastal raiding. And because regular “supervision” of the coasts was not possible, pirates (and colluding notables) tended to create autonomous zones of authority that were resistant to Ottoman (or any imperial) control.

Magocsi, Historical Atlas of Central Europe, map 14.
Such a zone was created by the Uskoks in the upper Adriatic. A different type of autonomous zone was created by established city-state ports like Ragusa, which made use of their coastal positions, thick walls, commercial successes and trans-cultural expertise to ward off incorporation (though not tributary status) by the big states in this trans-imperial zone.

Another delimiter of expansion, and perhaps the most significant measurable boundary between the Ottomans and their primary imperial rivals in Europe, is the Danube River and its tributaries. The Danube served both to facilitate and to impede (but more often the latter) the movement of armies of expansion. Military conflicts were decided on the banks and in the waters of these rivers, where animals and equipment became mired and stranded, fleeing armies were trapped and slaughtered by their pursuers, and inventive commanders became expert in the arts of bridge building and the commandeering of boats. Managing the Danubian space was a primary element of conquest and control. To the east, the Danube separated the incorporated sancaks of Rumeli from the tributary principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. To the north and west, the Danube led to Buda, the Ottomans’ frontier command post, and to Vienna, the enemy capital that their armies approached but could not seize. The Danube was thus a primary yardstick by which Ottoman expansion and the movement of peoples and goods were measured out. Narrating space meant narrating which side of the Danube one was on. This mighty river also served as a unique type of intermediate riverine space that functioned differently from either coastal or inland territories. It required boats for navigation, provisioning and the transport of troops. In the Ottoman system, it had its own “admiral”, the “Tuna kapudanı”, who was in charge of the river’s flexible fleet of transports, ferries and armed vessels (which were built, restored, commandeered and staffed as need required).

Empires and frontiers

Beyond the physical intersections and divisions of land and sea, Ottoman expansion functioned in a trans-imperial zone, one in which three major contenders


strove for territory, influence and control of commerce. As the Ottomans extended their reach into Europe, they encountered the claims, armies and sovereign institutions of the Habsburg and Venetian empires in a tripartite zone sometimes called the Triplex Confinium (Triple Border) region. Those empires, in turn, were embedded in a complex system of rivalries which linked and divided the powerful states of Europe and Asia. One might argue that Venice was not a large territorial empire armed with military capabilities equivalent to those of the Ottomans and Habsburgs. Yet Venice was a prominent naval and commercial power in the sixteenth century, one with far-flung bases and clients in the eastern Mediterranean, an old hegemon in the region, whose authority and power extended well beyond that of an autonomous city-state. Venice served as a primary mediator between the Ottoman Porte and the royal powers of Europe, and it functioned as a European model for interaction, diplomacy and trade with the sovereign powerhouse that was the House of Osman. The designation Triplex Confinium thus captures the nature of both the European zone into which the Ottomans expanded and the diverse and complex matrix of state relations which affected that expansion. Beyond the frontier, the empire became a determining factor in the rivalries of France, England and the Habsburgs to the west and of Russia, Poland and Lithuania to the north; it was one among the kingdoms in Europe competing for dominance, territory, religious authority and control of the flow of goods.

**Fortresses**

Within this trans-imperial zone, one must focus on fortresses as points of conquest and administration. The Ottoman expansion into Europe moved along specific routes linking those fortress points, both in the interior of the Balkan peninsula and along the coasts. Such urban-military-commercial nodes faced off against each other, changed hands periodically and acted as centres for the establishment of new elites and the diffusion of information and culture. There, garrison commanders established themselves as local notables and

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38 This designation applies to a project of Professors Drago Roksandić and Karl Kaser in cooperation with the Institute for Croatian History at the University of Zagreb, Abteilung für Südost-Europäische Geschichte, University of Graz, and the Institute for Southeastern Europe at Central European University, Budapest.


garrison troops were integrated into the surrounding communities.⁴¹ If one visualises Ottoman expansion in terms of such fortress points, the notion of imperial borders is problematised. Fortresses might be in the hands of local warlords who submitted to the Ottomans or Habsburgs when it was expedient to do so but who otherwise acted autonomously. The situation of individual frontier fortresses also evolved over the course of the century.⁴² For example, “in the 1570s, the revenue of the province of Buda covered 89 per cent of the payments made to the salaried troops in the Ottoman fortresses as opposed to 28 per cent in 1558–9 and 38 per cent in 1559–60.”⁴³ Such variations could affect deeply both the nature of imperial relationships and the ways in which an individual fortress functioned in the Triplex Confinium. The critical point, however, is that fortresses, ranging in size from major cities to much less complex structures, were the stopping and staging points for Ottoman expansion. They linked the pathways of military mobilisation and communication. They sheltered subjects, migrants and occupation forces. They were the focal points of imperial strategy formation. And, in the texts and images of the early modern era, they served as icons of possessed space.⁴⁴

**Intermediaries**

While the physical structures of routes and fortresses delineated the frontier, so too did the activities of intermediaries and the transmission of information. The trans-national zone of expansion was one that was crafted and occupied by an intriguing set of intermediaries whose operational fields, identities and allegiances were also trans-national. These intermediaries were of two major types: soldiers of fortune, merchants and entrepreneurs who moved from one region of opportunity to another, serving multiple masters in order to advance their own wealth and station, and those who were caught


up in the processes of conquest and accepted a new master under whose patronage they could exercise their linguistic, military, administrative or commercial abilities. Military, transport and communication technologies flowed in multiple directions across the porous boundaries among empires, just as did the techniques and tropes of literature, art and material culture. As the Ottomans expanded their rule into Europe, they capitalised upon the expertise of artisans, mercenaries, technicians, clergymen, physicians, merchants, diplomats and dragomen, who in turn benefited from Ottoman wealth, prestige and power. The scope of their operations cannot be examined here, but, particularly given the early modern and contemporary rhetorics of unbending religious devotion and divide, it is crucial to keep in mind the complex system of individuals who moved between state capitals, conversed in multiple tongues and participated in multicultural, cross-communal and inter-ethnic networks of exchange. Despite their conflicts, sovereign states that aspired to rule in the region shared these networks of exchange and the personnel that served them. Bishop Antal Verancsics, the Habsburg envoy and a Dalmatian, for example, could communicate directly in Slavonic with the grand vezir Sokollu Mehmed Paşa when they were negotiating the Ottoman–Habsburg peace treaty of 1567. Such communications were not unusual, but when a common language could not be found, translation was a standard of the day—an important mode of interaction and existence in Ottoman Europe, where Venetians and Ragusans, in particular, served as expert translators of ways and things Ottoman, and where multi-lingualism, at least in commercial centres, had become a way of life. The translated word, text and image served to bridge and violate the physical, imperial, religious and ethno-linguistic barriers of the trans-imperial zone.

The nature of expansion

The effects of Ottoman expansion on the populations and prosperity of European territories are the subject of considerable historiographic debate. What can be clearly stated is that the nature and form of Ottoman expansion

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were manifested differently from region to region and within regions. The factors which affected that differential nature included the longevity and stability of occupation; status as incorporated, tributary or frontier territory; proximity to the frontier; the extent of flight, migration, settlement and conversion of populations; the success of local (and imported) leaders in securing relative autonomy and privileges; and variations in customary and Ottoman-imposed administrative practice. Warfare and the machinations of surrounding states provided a basic frame within which these factors operated.48

**Conquest and administration**

Halil İnalcık has delineated the basic stages of Ottoman conquest (physical conquest, institutional penetration, reorganisation, resistance, assimilation and legitimation) and the attempts to standardise imperial rule, particularly under Sultan Süleyman.49 As the conquered territories were surveyed (for example, Rumeli in 1528 and Hungary in 1545–6), sancak beys (sub-province governors) and kadıs (judges) assigned, and sources of revenue recorded, the Ottoman government attempted to identify, visualise and gain control over lands and their occupants. It was an onerous process. Ottoman policy was thus conscious of circumstance and conditions when making the decision to incorporate territories.50 In the broad frontier zone, Ottoman administrative practice was flexible and opportunistic, responding to economic and military exigency as well as to the evolving demands and personalities of its imperial rivals and the local leaders on the ground to whom the Ottomans ceded power. Much of the conquered European territory was already accustomed to evolving rule, with a combination of local strongmen, assemblies of notables, and larger princes ruling from a distance and launching periodic invasions.51 The Ottomans did not break that mode of existence; rather they adapted it to their own system, manipulating local rule through backing or withdrawing support from notables and princes. It can be argued, at least

for the sixteenth century, that the Ottomans were more adept than their Habsburg rivals at enticing, threatening and mollifying the warlords. There is no irony in the fact that Stephen Bocskai, the Calvinist magnate who was elected prince of Transylvania and Hungary in 1605, joined the Ottomans in their war against the Habsburg monarchy to advance his own political and religious agendas and served as a mediator between the two imperial adversaries when the peace of 1606 was negotiated.\(^5\) In the trans-imperial zone, the threat of an Ottoman alliance secured important leverage for regional warlords, who could rescind those affinities once the situation altered.\(^5\)

**Moving people**

Both sixteenth-century witnesses and modern historians differ significantly on the extent to which certain areas of Europe were de-populated and devastated by the Ottoman conquests. Certainly some of the reports by contemporary Christian observers are motivated by the desire to show the destructive nature of the Ottoman regime, but Ottoman documents, too, confirm some areas of de-population.\(^5\) In Ottoman Hungary, the cadre of ruling elites led the occupied territories, along with many of the priests.\(^5\) Economic and social structures were radically altered by the flight of the nobility and wealthier citizens, shifts in the nature of agricultural production and the ascent of the cattle merchants of the prairie towns to elite status under Ottoman rule.\(^5\)

That outcome distinguishes Hungary from many of the Graeco-Balkan territories, where local power brokers preserved their positions under Ottoman rule, populations remained stable or even increased, and gradual or precipitous conversion bolstered the Muslim population of garrison troops and immigrants. Ottoman expansion also entailed the movement of significant numbers of people in the form of prisoners taken in battle.\(^5\) Such prisoners might become slaves, freemen or hostages in territories not their own. Captives constituted part of the booty permitted to soldiers after battle, a

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potentially rich source of money, although, as Barbara Flemming has pointed out, the price of slaves could fall dramatically after major military operations which flooded the market.\textsuperscript{58} This forced “migration” was complemented by semi-voluntary and voluntary forms of migration, those in which migrants responded grudgingly or opportunistically to changes in ground-level political, commercial and social realities effected by the Ottoman conquests. Expansion, in terms of its impacts, was thus a relative term. And, as new scholarship on specific locales and situations reveals variations in the causes (forced or voluntary migration, economic hardship, political pressure, conversion) and timing of the transformation of populations under Ottoman rule, the differential effects of expansion are becoming increasingly apparent.\textsuperscript{59}

\textbf{Islamisation}

This region of intensive rivalries included a component of religious struggle that transcends the notion of confrontation between Christianity and Islam. There is no conclusive answer to the question of the scope of religious motivation for Ottoman expansion in Europe. The terms “\textit{cihad}” or “holy war” often mask a complex set of objectives and rationales for conquest or conversion.\textsuperscript{60} Yet the sixteenth century does seem to have been an era marked by an intensive confrontation of apocalyptic religious ideologies and their accompanying rhetorics and structural changes.\textsuperscript{61} While the Reformation is not a subject that will be treated here, it is important to keep in mind that the Islamisation of Ottoman Europe in the sixteenth century took place in the context of that ferocious ideological struggle.\textsuperscript{62} The Ottomans were aware of both the political and rhetorical opportunities contingent upon the Reformation, a confrontation which affected the ordering of alliances, the

\textsuperscript{58} Flemming, ‘Public Opinion under Sultan Süleyman’, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{59} For example, Nenad Moačanin, \textit{Town and Country on the Middle Danube, 1526–1690} (Leiden, 2006).


\textsuperscript{62} Ferenc Szakály, ‘The Early Ottoman Period, Including Royal Hungary, 1526–1606’, notes that the population of Hungary was 90 per cent Protestant by 1660. See also Peter Sugar, \textit{Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804} (Seattle, 1977), pp. 153–5.
movement of peoples and the interpretation of their own role in European history. In the context of the Reformation, the Ottoman conquests made the possibilities for religious identity in Europe even more expansive.

The Christian identity of Ottoman Europe is something that was taken for granted in early modern sermon literature and literary sources from the lands ruled by Christian kings. Such sources often viewed the Ottoman occupation as temporary, even after a hundred years. But with Ottoman expansion came Islamisation, a process which challenged the presumption of Christian identity for this part of Europe. In the fifteenth century, members of the military gentry and warrior castes in the conquered European territories were assimilated into the Ottoman military administrative class (askeri). The Ottomans also used forced deportation and settlement to consolidate their power over newly conquered lands. Muslim immigrants (besides garrison troops) arrived with the conquerors, making their presence felt in the cities and along the routes where Ottoman administration was most direct and consistent. Recent scholarship has illuminated the complex processes by which European populations in the sixteenth century were made “Ottoman”, including the differential, temporary, tangential and gendered nature of many conversions. Islamisation took place in part through the “diffusion of Islamic institutions” such as pious endowments (vakıf) and dervish convents. It included transformations of political, national, local, occupational and ethno-linguistic as well as religious identity. “Conversion”, literally the process of “turning”, might reflect conviction, secure financial advantage, be an attendant effect of marriage, indicate a change of masters or follow upon enslavement, captivity and hostage taking (as was the case with the Ottoman devşirme, the state levy

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63 See Ronald Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571–1640 (New York, 1993); Machiel Kiel, ‘Ottoman Sources for the Demographic History and the Process of Islamisation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Bulgaria in the Fifteenth–Seventeenth Centuries: Old Sources, New Methodology’, International Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (2004), 93–119. Halil Inalcık, ‘State, Sovereignty, and Law During the Reign of Süleyman’, pp. 85–6, using the work of Barkan, estimates the Muslim population of the Balkans between 1520 and 1533 as approximately one-fifth of the population. See also Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, pp. 50–2; Dávid, ‘Administration in Ottoman Europe’, p. 76.


of non-Muslim subject boys). Through such variant forms of conversion, the long sixteenth century served as an era of singular transformation, at least for some of the conquered territories of Europe.

Despite the climate of religious transformation and Ottoman policies of settlement, however, Islamisation was hardly the primary motive for Ottoman expansion in Europe. Rhoads Murphey has noted, for example, that the Ottoman annexation of Hungary in 1541 was “fully intelligible … as a case-specific adjustment to the new realities that had begun to typify the changing political order of sixteenth-century Europe”. Murphey characterises Süleyman’s reign as a time of both “change and changing perspectives” spurred on, after the Habsburg emperor Charles V’s 1535 expedition against Tunis, by the increasingly pressing need to confront “the new European Habsburg superpower”.

That change was rooted in an appreciation for the rhetorics of religious legitimation, but it was forged in the context of imperial competition. The historian Alfonso Ulloa, in his *Le Historie di Europa*, published in Venice in 1570, explained Süleyman’s 1566 invasion of Hungary in terms similar to Murphey’s. Ulloa notes that the sultan had pondered the conquest of Hungary for many years. More specifically, he cites the following reasons for the invasion: Süleyman had lost at sea by failing to take Malta and thus turned his attention to the land; the emperor, Maximilian II (r. 1564–76), had both denied the sultan the tribute that was due him and occupied certain territories of Hungary and Transylvania; and finally, Süleyman was not accustomed to abandoning those to whom he had commitments, like his tributary John Sigismund Zapolya (r. 1540–71) in Transylvania. Thus, the situation compelled military action; the sultan’s “dignity and grandeur” were at stake.

Ulloa does not dispense with the language of religion in his history, but, for

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him, honour, loyalty and the urge to conquest sufficed to explain Ottoman expansion under Süleyman.

Certainly the ideology of religious confrontation cannot be ignored as a significant factor in the legitimation of empire. The language of darʾalislam versus darʾulharb (the realm of Islam versus the realm of war) was consistently present in Ottoman rhetorical constructions and celebrations of self, as the chronicler Nešri (d. ca. 1520) illustrated for the conquests of Smederevo (Semendire) and Lesbos (Midilli) in 1460 and 1462, respectively. Nešri wrote that: “the churches were turned into mosques” and “the deserted houses of the infidels were shared out among the Muslims”.71 But eastern Europe did not fit neatly into that polarised division of space. In fact, in the sixteenth century one might even suggest that the Ottomans in Europe were an inherent political and cultural element of “Christendom”. Ottoman expansion in the Balkans was a measure of the economic imperative to secure more and better resources (cities, customs posts, agricultural lands, mines, forests) and of the imperial imperative (enshrined in Ottoman origin myths) to acquire for the dynasty and its peoples a rich and determinedly Islamic empire embracing many lands and peoples. The success of that imperial endeavour was supported by powerful religious institutions and by the actions of individuals and groups whose piety, communal allegiance and sophistication of religious belief are often difficult to measure. More readily apprehensible are the ways in which the Ottomans articulated and deployed the rhetorics of Islamic glory to intimidate their enemies, inspire their armies and mobilise support among the empire’s Muslim subjects.

Rhetorics: The narratives and visuals of expansion

One critical element of Ottoman expansion is its narration and reception – the ways in which conquering, settling and integrating (or not integrating) were told and visualised. This is an area of study which still requires much elaboration, but there exist a set of what one might call artefacts of expansion that tell, read and translate the process for victors, vanquished and those viewing at a distance. Such artefacts include campaign chronicles and other celebrations of sovereignty, appeals for conversion, treaties, sermons, maps, broadsheets, “news” pamphlets and other ephemera.72 Such sources reflect


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the perspectives of a set of interested audiences for whom narratives of the
Ottoman conquest, occupation and incorporation were shaped to fit a series
of objectives or ideological positions. They convey the “memory” and the
“experience”, direct or indirect, of Ottoman expansion.

Memory, reputation and the projection of power

In a 1493 letter to Pope Alexander VI, the bishop of Nin (in Croatia, near
Zadar), Juraj Divnić, wrote of the nature of Ottoman expansion:

Thus the first and chief reason for the Turks’ sorties into the region, in my opinion,
is this: an insatiable appetite for the slaughter of the faithful and the avid desire to
seize power over the entire world. And then, the abundance of estates and men
nurtured and fed by fertile Bosnia. Bosnia, I say, is the best of all regions and can be
measured against any in human memory, a rich country with an abundance of all
that human life requires.73

Divnić’s ordering of Ottoman motives is in line with European rhetorics of
the time, stressing *cihad* over ambitions for world power and the desire to con-
trol economically prosperous regions. The bishop employed fear, citing the
“appetite for slaughter”, to catch the imagination of his audience as Christian
Europe confronted the Ottoman advance.

Divnić also invoked “human memory”, an essential element of the
“telling” of Ottoman expansion in Europe which was linked to the depreda-
tions of earlier conquerors like the “Scythians”. For the historians and spir-
itual advisors of the Christian kings, the territories the Ottomans seized in
Europe were an indelible part of the Christendom of both recent and dis-
tant memory and of a “classical” history which they claimed as their own.
These were the lands where Alexander set his gaze towards Persia and where
the church took shape. European texts and images stamped the memories of
Christendom (and of Greece and Rome) onto their maps of eastern Europe,
insisting that the conquests of the Ottomans were temporary or disregarding
them entirely.74

For the Ottomans, the projection of power was also rooted in the claims
of history and memory. The conquest of Rumeli and its hinterlands was part
of a prophetic vision of Islamic conquest reaching for the “golden apples”

73 Quoted in Snježana Buzov, ‘Ottoman Perceptions of Bosnia as Reflected in the Works of
Ottoman Authors Who Visited or Lived in Bosnia’, in *Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril*, ed.
Marcus Koller and Kemal Karpat (Madison, Wis., 2004), p. 89.

74 Palmira Brummett, ‘“Turks” and “Christians”: The Iconography of Possession in the
Depiction of the Ottoman-Venetian-Habsburg Frontiers, 1550–1689’, in *The Religions of
the Book: Christian Perceptions, 1400–1660*, ed. Matthew Dimmock and Andrew Hadfield
of Vienna and Rome. The Greek chronicler turned servant of the sultan, Kritoboulos, began the dedication of his history of Mehmed the Conqueror by invoking human memory and the “everlasting remembrance” that accrued to kings through the writing of histories. He proposed to address the injustice done to his Ottoman master’s name by the fact that:

.... the deeds of others, petty as they are in comparison to yours, should be better known and more famed before men because done by Greeks and in Greek history, while your accomplishments, vast as they are, and in no way inferior to those of Alexander the Macedonian ... should not be set forth in Greek to the Greeks, nor passed on to posterity for the undying praise and glory of your deeds.75

Kritoboulos here refers to the ongoing Eurasian competition for place in the memories of the people, the sagas of the poets and the chronicles of the historians. He goes on to point out different kinds of expansion, accomplished through new territory taken in battle (Istanbul), through peaceful transfer (the islands of Imbros, Lemnos and Thasos, formerly subject to the Byzantine emperor) or through the forced submission of rebellious tributaries.76 In the latter case, conciliation might be accepted or retribution demanded, depending on the recalcitrance of the tributary. While the forms of conquest might differ, Kritoboulos’s ultimate message, unsurprisingly, is that expansion is the prerogative of emperors; it aggrandizes their empires and guarantees, or should guarantee, their place in the recorded histories of the world.

**Spheres of operation and imagination**

One can thus view Ottoman expansion in terms of spheres of operation and spheres of imagination. For Ottoman chroniclers, the spheres of operation are the realms of foreign kings (outside the empire), regional lords, and local authorities. Expansion is counted fortress by fortress.77 And while territory is often crafted in terms of generic religious blocks, such as the land of the infidels (diyar-ı küffar), within that broad classification there are many designations, including the land of the Franks (diyar-ı Firenc) or the Venetian land (diyar-ı Venedik).78 Chroniclers also emphasise the divisions

75 Kritoboulos, History of Mehmed the Conqueror, p. 3.
between land and sea, with the land as the default and the sea as a separate category.79

The Ottomans, like other conquerors before them, participated in the rhetorics of intimidation. They wished, as the chronicler Celalzade Mustafa (ca. 1490–1567) put it, to inspire “fear and awe” (korku ve dehşet) among the “kings of Europe and the Christian countries” (Avrupa kraları ve hristiyan ülkeleri).80 Celalzade, who served the Ottoman regime for over half of the sixteenth century, does not simply incorporate these tropes of dominance into his history of Sultan Selim I but provides a glimpse into the Ottoman conception of Europe and its categories of territorial space. When Selim conquered his archenemy, the Safavid Shah Isma’il, the news of conquest had to be delivered to all the relevant rulers. Letters were written:

… to the kâds of the capital cities (hükmet merkezî), Constantinople, Edirne and prosperous Bursa and to other governors (hâkimleri) of the Muslims; to the sancaks of Mora, Bosna, Semendire and Hersek, on the borders (serhad) of Islam; to the attendant tributaries (matyyet hizmetlileri) who pay the haraç, the Wallachian and Moldavian beys; and among the mighty and fortunate sovereigns (sultanlardan), to the fortunate han of the Tatar country; and among the Christian kings, to those of the Polish, Czech, Russian and Hungarian countries (vilayetleri); and among the island kingdoms of Europe, to the beys of Chios and Venice.81

This passage places those who wield power in Europe in a hierarchy defined first and foremost by their relationship to the Ottoman Porte, then by their faith, their functioning as border territories and, finally, their island nature. Celalzade neatly summarised the possibilities for articulating space and status. Edirne, notably, is one of the “capital cities of Islam”; its location in Europe does not differentiate it from Bursa in Anatolia or the continent-spanning Istanbul. The Tatar Han enjoys special status as a Muslim, separate from that of other tributaries, while Hungary is just one among several Christian kingdoms, undistinguished by its role as pre-eminent rival in the west or by its


proximity to the Ottoman frontier. Interestingly, Chios and Venice are both mentioned as significant island territories despite the radical differences in their power and location vis-à-vis the imperial centre. Addressing events of the early sixteenth century but crafted at a time when the Ottomans had consolidated their hold over the Graeco-Balkan peninsula, Celalzade’s history reinforces the notion that religion-of-state was only one category among several employed for the classification of space. It also reinforces the notion that the sea salient was a category inherently distinct from the default category of inland space (or space approached from the land). 82

Proclaiming conquest was an official act, designed to consolidate allegiances, moderate resistance, legitimise rule, confirm the hierarchy of status and secure one’s coveted place in historical consciousness and memory. To accomplish the latter task, such proclamations had to be set down and illustrated in text and image. Thus, for example, the famous Hünername (Book of Accomplishments) of Lokman ibn Seyyid Hüseyin (d. 1601 or 1602) may be viewed as an elaborate and celebratory presentation of conquest and its attendant chain of submission rituals, from “accession ceremonies to battlefield acts of fidelity”. 83 But elaborate books took time to compose and decorate, so in the aftermath of conquest more expeditious notications were sent out, as Celalzade suggests, to friend and foe alike. The historian Kemalpaşazade notes that in 1526 concise and detailed conquest announcements (fethnames) were written and couriers were sent far and wide with the good news “to Bogdan, Eflak, Deşti-Kıpçak, East and West, to the people of Islam, the Arabs, the Persians and the Turks”. 84 The news, of course, might be construed as good or bad, depending on the audience. Beyond such official missives, however, news travelled even more swiftly through informal channels, borne on

the lips of merchants, spies, clergymen and other travellers. News signalled the approach of armies and conditioned the conduct of diplomacy. And once news arrived, via whatever source, people talked, and new versions of the Ottoman expansion were created.

Conclusion

The end of the sixteenth century does not signal the end of Ottoman expansion but rather an advanced integration of the Ottoman Empire into a European state system that had itself undergone intense political and ideological transformation. That integration must be understood in the context of contemporary conceptualisations of territory. Just as sixteenth-century texts visualised regional spaces, both coastal and inland, as a system of routes and city-nodes negotiated through stages of travel, conquest and legitimation, so must historiographic approaches take into account those rhetorical and referential frames. The Ottomans and their rivals envisioned the trans-imperial zone as one crafted in terms of accessibility, resources and opportunities for optimal glory achieved preferably at containable costs. The documentation for this Ottoman imperial venture may focus primarily on the mundane (census and tax records) and the thrilling (accounts of battle confrontation and holy war), but expansion was a process of negotiation populated by sometimes remote rulers, local wielders of power, and trans-imperial subjects, all of whom had to exercise flexibility in order to ensure success. Islamisation in this context must be considered not only as a question of communal or “national” allegiance but as a question of spatial identity, conditioned by the nature of cross-cultural contacts, levels of imperial and institutional intervention, and access to mobility. Ottoman expansion is also a question of translation: the modes by which imperial power was projected, allegiances forged and news disseminated.

In contrast to the lands to the west, what surrounded the Ottoman state to the north, south and east were political structures which had the same religious, ethnic and/or cultural roots. Thus eastward expansion was not for the Ottomans merely a territorial or economic matter but was, more importantly, a struggle to establish and strengthen their own existence and legitimacy.

**Expansion and control in Anatolia**

Once he became master of Istanbul, Mehmed II turned his eyes to the prosperous regions of Anatolia, whose production and wealth were described by his contemporary Tursun Bey as beyond calculation. Motivated by the need to ensure the security of his newly conquered capital and the desire to control the trade routes, as well as other economic resources of the region, Mehmed’s initial target was the Black Sea coast, and in 1460 he attacked the strongly fortified Genoese colony of Amasra. Surprised, according to Aşıkpaşazade, that neither his father nor grandfather had taken it before, for the town was a refuge for runaway slaves and a centre for piracy which caused much damage to the surrounding population, he laid siege to it by land and sea. Realising that if they were to resist, the Ottomans would “enslave our wives and daughters, possess them, crumble our arrows in their hands, flatten our bows, cut off our heads with our own swords, and hang their own swords round our necks”, the Genoese acknowledged the wisdom of handing over the castle before any of this happened to them.

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4 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlığulları’nın Tarihi, bab 131, p. 503.
After the conquest of Amasra, Mehmed informed his grand vezir Mahmud Paşa that he had three aims in mind, the fulfilment of which he hoped that God would grant him: the conquest of territory of the İsfendiyaroğulları, which included Kastamonu and Sinop; of Koylu Hisar; and of Trabzon (Trebizond). These aims, he explained, “really trouble me, their image is always before my eyes and they remain engraved on my heart”. Quite when Mehmed intended to attack these territories is not, however, clear, for he was not given to revealing such details, replying on one occasion when asked about the destination of his land and sea forces, “if I knew that one of the hairs of my beard had learned my secret [i.e., this information], I would pull it out and consign it to the flames”.

“Secretive and irascible” in Doukas’s words, Mehmed in fact launched his next campaign eastwards in 1461 against İsmail Bey, the ruler of the İsfendiyaroğulları, whose lands included the rich copper mines of Sinop and Kastamonu. Although İsmail assumed that the campaign’s target was Trabzon, the last remaining Byzantine state ruled by the Komnenos family, Mehmed’s aim, before attacking Trabzon, was in fact Sinop. Situated, as Kritoboulos noted, “at the favorable point on the Asiatic coast of the Euxine Sea”, it had secure harbours that would form a good base for his fleet for the projected attack on Trabzon and the eastern Black Sea coast. Further, its position “in the midst of the territory of the Sultan” but not under Ottoman control was, in Mehmed’s estimation, dangerous “from many standpoints”.

Mahmud Paşa thus despatched a fleet of 100 ships to Sinop. While the fleet was en route, he sent a letter to İsmail Bey informing him that the fleet’s destination was Trabzon and requesting troops. İsmail, unaware of the danger to his own territory, sent soldiers under the command of his son Hasan Bey, who, on his arrival at the Ottoman camp, was seized and his sancak of Kastamonu granted to Kızıl Ahmed Bey, İsmail’s brother, who had fled to the Ottomans when İsmail had become bey of İsfendiyar and had received Bolu

5 Ibid., bab 132, p. 504. Mehmed’s intention of conquering Koylu Hisar before the campaign against Trabzon, as related by Aşıkpaşazade, has been questioned by Yaşar Yücel, who argues that Mehmed II made his decision to attack the Akkoyunlu territories while en route to Trabzon. See Yaşar Yücel, ‘Fatih’in Trabzon’u Fethi Öncesinde Osmanlı-Trabzon-Akkoyunlu İlişkileri’, Belleten 49, 194 (1986), 287–311 at pp. 304–9.
6 Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, ed. and trans. Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit, 1975), p. 258.
7 Ibid., p. 258.
9 Kritoboulos, History, p. 168.
10 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlı’nın Tarihi, bab 132, p. 505.
as his sancak. Kızıl Ahmed Bey was not, however, to remain in this position for long, for Mehmed, wanting direct control of these strategically important lands, removed him and appointed him instead as sancak beyi of Mora, thus effectively distancing him from Anatolia. Kızıl Ahmed did not comply with this arrangement and instead took refuge with Uzun Hasan, the ruler of the Akkoyunlu state and the main Ottoman rival in Anatolia. With the Ottoman seizure of Kastamonu, İsmail escaped to Sinop but was forced to surrender to Ottoman forces which laid siege to the city by land and sea and was granted, on his request, the sancak of Yenişehir, İnegöl and Yarhisar in the vilayet of Bursa. After the defection of Kızıl Ahmed to Uzun Hasan, Mehmed, wishing to ensure that İsmail would not behave as his brother had, moved him from Yenişehir to Filibe (Plovdiv), in modern Bulgaria, where he died of natural causes.

With the economically and strategically important İsfendiyar territory under his direct control, Mehmed moved on towards Trabzon, taking the strategically important castle of Koylu Hisar, near Sivas, en route. The Ottomans had earlier attempted to take the castle from the Akkoyunlu and, having failed to do so, had, following Mehmed’s orders, plundered the lands around, devastating the region and burning the villages in order “to prevent any productivity for many years to come”.

In October 1461, Mehmed laid siege to Trabzon, the capital city of the Komnenoi, whose state stretched from Giresun to Batum and its hinterland. This was not the first Ottoman attempt to take Trabzon, that during the reign of Murad II having failed when a storm at sea forced the fleet to abandon the attempt. As a result of an Ottoman attack under Hızır Bey, the lala (tutor) of Bayezid II, in 1456 the emperor John IV was forced to pay tribute of 2,000 gold pieces to the Ottomans, a sum increased to 3,000 in 1458. At the same time, John married his daughter Katherine, later known as Despina Hatun, to Uzun Hasan, with the expectation of using his new son-in-law against the Ottomans if necessary.

John’s brother and successor, David, who came to power in 1458, ceased paying the tribute in 1460, relying on the support of Uzun Hasan, who saw

11 Ibid., bab 132, pp. 505–6.
12 Ibid., bab 135, p. 511.
Trabzon as part of his sphere of influence, and even, using Uzun Hasan as his spokesman, went as far as to demand that Mehmed return what had previously been paid.\(^{17}\) In this period when David was attempting to build a formidable block against the Ottomans, Ludovico da Bologna was sent by Pope Pius II to Trabzon and Georgia in search of an alliance against the Ottomans in the east.\(^{18}\) In a letter dated 22 April 1459 to the Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good, Uzun Hasan and the lords of Karaman and Sinop, as well as David of Trabzon, who was said to be willing to provide 30 biremes and 20,000 men, appear together in a list of Christian princes of the region who were ready to form a bloc against the Ottomans.\(^{19}\) Although purported to have been written by David, the letter was probably not in fact by him.\(^{20}\) Nevertheless, negotiations of some sort clearly were taking place, for Kritoboulos noted that as long as the rulers of Trabzon remained peaceful and paid tribute, they had no problem with the sultan. Once they became rebellious, however, refusing to pay tribute and allying themselves with other rulers of the region, such as the Armenians, the Akkoyunlu and the Georgians, and began plotting against the Ottomans, then the sultan determined to forestall them and gain mastery over them before they could start a rebellion.\(^{21}\)

For the Komnenoi, the outcome was disastrous, and David surrendered Trabzon to Mehmed after a short siege, other territory east of Trabzon falling at the same time. David and his family were transferred to lands granted them by Mehmed in Rumeli.\(^{22}\) Two years later, David, his sons and his nephew were executed for intriguing, an accusation supported by a letter attributed to Uzun Hasan’s wife, David’s niece Despina Hatun.\(^{23}\)

Mehmed, praised by Aşıkpaşazade as the sultan who had conquered three vilayets in one campaign,\(^{24}\) had thus, by placing the Black Sea coast of Anatolia under Ottoman control, gained a dominant position in Black Sea trade. As a continuation of his policy of controlling the Black Sea, Mehmed, who had made Caffa a tribute-paying city in 1454, took the city from the Genoese in

17 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, II, p. 53; Miller, Trebizond, pp. 99–100.
22 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nun Tarihi, bab 135, pp. 510–12; Tursun Bey, Târîh-i Ebül-Feth, p. 110.
23 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, II, p. 56.
25 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nun Tarihi, bab 136, p. 512.
1475, conquered the Genoese castles of Azov (Azak) and Mangub (Menküb)\(^{26}\) and placed the Crimean hanate under Ottoman vassalage,\(^{27}\) thus achieving both strategic control of the northern shores of the Black Sea and economic dominance of the trade routes of the region.\(^{28}\) The Crimean hans were to have a vital role in Ottoman expansion in the Caucasus at the expense of Muscovy and Iran at the end of the following century.

Mehmed was also interested in control of the eastern Black Sea region and had, as early as 1451, conducted operations against the Georgian petty state of Mingreli (Dadyan) and Abkhazia (Apkaz-eli). In 1454, he took the important coastal city of Sukhumi (Sokum), under Mingrelian control, where there was a strong Genoese presence.\(^{29}\) Later in his reign, Mehmed sought to extend Ottoman control in the region, and in 1479 Ottoman forces conquered the Circassian lands of Anapa and Kuban (Kuba), whose people occupied themselves “day and night with hatred and enmity” of the Muslim Tatars,\(^{30}\) and these lands were annexed to the Crimean hanate. In the same year, three castles in today’s Gümüşhane in Anatolia were taken from local Georgian rulers who threatened the security of the merchants trading with Iran.\(^{31}\)

With the Black Sea coast of Anatolia securely under his control, Mehmed had now to deal with his main obstacle in Anatolia, Uzun Hasan, whose removal was necessary both for the consolidation of Ottoman control in the newly conquered Anatolian lands and for further Ottoman conquests in the region. For those who opposed a strong Ottoman presence in Anatolia – Turcoman beys, who perceived him as a second Timur who would return to them the territory they had lost to the Ottomans, as well as the Christians, who saw him as a potential ally in a pincer movement against Mehmed – Uzun Hasan was a figure of hope.\(^{32}\) For Mehmed, however, he was “a little snake” to be hunted down before he grew into a dragon.\(^{33}\)

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33 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlıcular’ın Tarihi, bab 142, p. 523.
By accepting Kızıl Ahmed when he fled from Mehmed to the Akkoyunlu court, Uzun Hasan clearly allied himself with the İsfendiyaroğulları, and was known by Mehmed to be plotting to take Sinop. By the same time, he laid claim to Trabzon through his marriage to the Komnenain princess Despina Hatun, sending his mother, Sara Hatun, as an envoy to Mehmed both to inform him that Trabzon was his legitimate territory and to attempt to prevent an Ottoman attack on his lands.

The main bone of contention between the Ottomans and the Akkoyunlu was Karaman. The ruler of Karaman, İbrahim Bey, who was married to the sister of Murad II, came to the throne with Murad’s assistance in 1424. İbrahim Bey was not, however, a loyal ally, for at every opportunity, when the Ottomans were occupied in the European section of their territory, İbrahim campaigned against Ottoman possessions in Anatolia. While Murad was engaged in a campaign against Hungary, İbrahim once more went into action and attacked Ottoman cities, forcing Murad to despatch troops against him. Having signed a peace treaty with Hungary in 1444, Murad organised a campaign designed to settle the matter of Karaman permanently. The result was an agreement under which İbrahim, well and truly beaten, agreed to cease entirely from hostile action against Murad or his son Mehmed and to send one of his sons every year together with troops to serve Murad. The agreement did not last long, for in 1451 İbrahim seized the opportunity of Murad’s death to organise an uprising in the beyliks which had recently come under Ottoman control. In retaliation, the new sultan Mehmed II campaigned against Karaman. As Mehmed reached Akşehir, İbrahim Bey sent him “coins [filori] inside parrots”, asking for his forgiveness, agreeing to marry his daughter to him and to provide soldiers for his campaigns. For İbrahim such an agreement was clearly not considered binding, for he was soon searching for allies against his new overlord. In 1454, he signed an agreement with Venice. Although the agreement itself was entirely related to trade, İbrahim refers in the letter accompanying it to “the affection between us” and states that he is ready “to act against your enemy over matters that will be useful to

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us and to you”. Although he sent soldiers under the command of his son to join the Ottoman campaigns against the İsfendiyaroğullan and Trabzon, his name appears at the same time in the 1459 letter to Philip of Burgundy listing potential allies against the Ottomans. For Aşıkpaşazade, the “devilishness of Karaman” was evident in İbrahim’s attempt to incite İsmail Bey not to go to Yenişehir, as ordered by Mehmed, but instead to join an alliance of Karaman and Uzun Hasan in order to catch Mehmed, then on campaign against Trabzon, in a pincer movement. İsmail Bey rejected this offer and accused İbrahim of irreligious behaviour and double-dealing.

During the last years of his reign, İbrahim Bey favoured İshak, his eldest son by a concubine, who became the de facto ruler of the beylik during İbrahim’s illness. His six other sons, whose mother was Mehmed II’s aunt and were thus regarded by İbrahim as being “stained by Ottoman blood”, revolted. Attacking Konya, they forced İshak and İbrahim to flee to the castle of Gevele, where İbrahim died. İshak initially appealed to the Mamluks for help, sending an ambassador to Cairo from his headquarters in Silifke. For the Mamluks, Karaman’s strategic position as a buffer zone on the borders of Mamluk-controlled territory meant that it was in Mamluk interests to prevent any move by the Ottomans, who supported İshak’s brothers, to gain control of the beylik. The Mamluk sultan thus responded favourably to İshak’s appeal for help. When the promised help failed, however, to materialise, İshak sent an embassy to Uzun Hasan. According to Ottoman sources, it was as a result of this embassy that Uzun Hasan attacked Karaman, although it has also been argued that Uzun Hasan actually initiated his campaign before the arrival of İshak’s envoy since possession of Karaman, regardless of any provocation by İshak, would have facilitated his progress westwards and given him the possibility of extending his control to the Mediterranean coastline.

41 Fallmerayer, Geschichte, p. 267.
44 Ibid., pp. 770–3.
Whether or not as a direct result of İshak’s appeal, Uzun Hasan did attack Karaman, expel İshak’s brothers and return İshak to the Karaman throne, Pir Ahmed, the eldest of the rebelling brothers, fleeing to Ottoman protection in Istanbul. Despite this, it is clear that İshak was not entirely trusting of Uzun Hasan, for he sent an envoy to Mehmed offering him Akşehir and Beyşehir in return for Mehmed’s not releasing Pir Ahmed. Mehmed, however, found this offer insufficient and instead released Pir Ahmed, who, with Ottoman military assistance, retook Karaman and surrendered Sıklanhisar, Kayseri, Akşehir, Beyşehir and İlgin to Mehmed. Leaving his wife and son in Silifke, İshak took refuge with Uzun Hasan, where he died.

According to Ottoman sources, Pir Ahmed had, in return for Ottoman support, promised not to oppose Mehmed and to send him troops whenever and wherever requested to do so. However, in 1468, when Mehmed reached Afyonkarahisar on a campaign against Egypt, according to Tursun Bey and Kemalpaşazade, or against Uzun Hasan, according to Aşıkpaşazade and Neşri, or even the Hexamillion, the defensive wall built across the isthmus of Corinth, according to Angiolello, Pir Ahmed failed, despite Mehmed’s order, to join the army with his troops and to act as a guide for Ottoman forces.

Well aware of the level of Pir Ahmed’s trust in him, Mehmed expected such disobedience, for Pir Ahmed was known to have no intention of waiting on Mehmed with presents as was the custom for all Mehmed’s “barons”. The fickleness of Karaman was well known to Aşıkpaşazade, who wrote, “if you go to Karaman and say let’s abide by our treaty, they will either kill you or expel you from their land”. Pir Ahmed, more Karamani than Ottoman according to Hoca Sadeddin, plundered Ottoman land and showed his insolence by

53 Tansel, Fatih Sultan Mehmed, p. 288.
54 Tursun Bey, Târih-i Ebü’l-Feth, p. 145.
55 Tursun Bey notes that Mehmed repeatedly asked Mahmud Paşa whether Pir Ahmed would or would not abide by the agreement, thus implying that Mehmed did not trust Pir Ahmed. See Tursun Bey, Târih-i Ebü’l-Feth, p. 146.
56 Giovan Maria Angiolello [Donado da Lezze], Historia Turchesca (1300–1514), ed. I. Ursu (Bucharest, 1999), p. 40.
57 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’lun Tarihi, bab 140, p. 521.
58 Hoca Sadettin Efendi, Tacü’t-Tevarih, vol. 3, p. 94.
demanding from Mehmed Ilgın and the natural springs of the region.\textsuperscript{59} While Mehmed was on campaign in Albania, Pir Ahmed’s campaign of pillage and rape against the Ottoman subjects of Anatolia was so vicious, according to Neşri, that the people appealed to their “just” sultan, Mehmed, complaining that the constant plundering had turned them into poverty-stricken beggars and threatening that if he did not expel the Karamanoğulları and take control of the territory, they would leave, taking their “shitty infants” with them, and settle elsewhere.\textsuperscript{60}

In consequence, Mehmed embarked on a crushing campaign against Karaman, taking Konya, Larende, Gevele and Ereğli, and despatching troops against the Turgutoğulları Turcomans, driving them into the region of the plain of Tarsus, which was under Mamluk control.\textsuperscript{61} With these lands in his possession, Mehmed next ordered the forced expulsion of the population, a task which Mahmud Paşa failed to carry out to Mehmed’s satisfaction. Mahmud Paşa was replaced by Rum Mehmed Paşa, who oversaw a destructive operation involving wholesale plunder and the forced transfer of much of the population to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{62} Thus, in the words of the fifteenth-century Ottoman historian Kemal, “the han [Mehmed II] razed Karaman to the ground, and took and placed [its population] in Istanbul”.\textsuperscript{63}

The result of this harsh campaign was not, as might have been expected, the removal of any tie between the population and the beys of Karaman but rather the strengthening of such ties, and Mehmed proved unable completely to remove the Karamanoğulları. Using İçel and Taşeli as a base, and with support from the Varsaklar, Turgutoğulları and other tribes of the region, Pir Ahmed and his brother Kasım conducted damaging operations against the newly acquired Ottoman territory, while another bey of Karaman, the son of İshak Bey, had control of the castle of Silifke.\textsuperscript{64}

In order to prevent the continued influence of the Karamanoğulları in Karaman and to destroy the loyalty of the population to them, Rum Mehmed Paşa plundered Larende and Ereğli. A campaign was also organised against

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\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., pp. 80–1; Aşıkpaşaazade, Osmanlılar'ın Tarihi, \textit{bab} 140, p. 521.

\textsuperscript{60} Neşri, \textit{Kitâb-i Cihan-nüma}, vol. 2, pp. 778–81.

\textsuperscript{61} Tansel, \textit{Fatih Sultan Mehmed}, p. 288.


Karaman’s most important supporters, the Varsaklar, but without success, thus propelling Mehmed into a new campaign against Karaman in 1471 when he despatched the army under the command of İshak Paşa. As a result of this campaign, Ottoman control was once more established in the territories and Silifke was surrendered to them. Gedik Ahmed Paşa also took Alanya, which had been held by Lütfi Beyoğlu Kilç Arslan and was under Mamluk influence. Kilç Arslan was known to have supported the Karamanoğulları in their struggle against the Ottomans and had cooperated with the Venetians on Cyprus.

As a result of these Ottoman operations, both Pir Ahmed and Kasım fled to Uzun Hasan. While, on the one hand, Uzun Hasan’s mother, Sara Hatun, wrote to Mehmed requesting him to forgive his cousins, Pir Ahmed and Kasım, Uzun Hasan himself, prey to “an ignorant anger” and “stupid mistake”, dreamed of seizing Mehmed’s lands and, feeling stronger due to the arrival of Pir Ahmed and Kasım, believed that now was the right moment to confront Mehmed, whom he regarded as “a good warrior”. Uzun Hasan sent Pir Ahmed and Kasım, together with Akkoyunlu soldiers, to take Karaman. En route this force plundered Tokat and acted “in an infidel manner”. According to Neşri, these forces were more tyrannical than Timur had been in Sivas. Taking a large portion of Karamanid territory, they forced Mehmed’s son Şehzade Mustafa, who had ruled the territory since the Ottoman conquest, to flee Konya. In response, Mehmed despatched reinforcements which defeated the Akkoyunlu forces, whose commander, Yusufça Mirza, was taken prisoner and, a rope tied round his neck, “was led around like a dog”. Pir Ahmed and İsfendiyaroğlu Kızıl Ahmed, who had joined the campaign, fled

70 Tansel, Fatih Sultan Mehmed, pp. 292–3.
71 ‘Tihrani, Kitab-ı Diyarbekriyye, p. 343.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., pp. 800–1.
to Uzun Hasan, only Kasım Bey withdrawing to İcel and being able to hold Silifke, which he took with the help of a fleet under the command of Pietro Mocenigo and made up of Venetian, Neapolitan, Papal, Rhodian and Cypriot ships.

While Uzun Hasan represented a dangerous enemy for Mehmed, he was, precisely because of this, a most attractive ally for the states to the west. Pope Pius II apparently had high hopes of Uzun Hasan, whom he described in a letter he sent in January 1460 to Philip the Good, a most ardent supporter of crusade, as one of the “friends of the Christians”, and whom he counted among those powers “expressing support for the destruction of the most arrogant Turk”. Although Pius, who relied entirely on the dubious information given by Ludovico concerning the possibility of a ready and strong eastern alliance against the Ottomans, was probably misled, this did not deter the Venetians from seeking an alliance with Uzun Hasan. Following a decision to this effect taken in the Venetian Senate in 1463, various missions were sent to Uzun Hasan, who was himself clearly much attracted by this possibility.

In 1473, Giosafatte Barbaro was sent as ambassador to Uzun Hasan, together with men and munitions, which according to Barbaro were worth 4,000 ducats but which actually never reached him. While the Venetian weapons and munitions were sitting in Cyprus, Mehmed sent a large force, recruited from every part of the empire, against Uzun Hasan and the two armies met at Otlukbeli (or Başkent), near Tercan, in August 1473. Despite his initial victories, Uzun Hasan, deprived of these firearms, lost the battle to the Ottoman army, which was technologically superior to that of the Akkoyunlu, Uzun Hasan having, as Neşri noted, “not seen battle with guns and cannon”.

79 Fallmerayer, Geschichte von Trapezunt, p. 268.
80 Ibid., p. 269.
85 Ibid., pp. 818–19. See also Tihranî, Kitab-ı Diyarbekriyye, pp. 350–2, for the importance of the use of guns and cannon in the battlefield.
With the effective removal of Uzun Hasan, who, after the defeat at Otlukbeli, undertook not to attack Ottoman territory, Mehmed’s son Şehzade Mustafa and Gedik Ahmed Paşa strengthened the Ottoman presence in Karaman. The castles of Minan, the residence of Pir Ahmed’s family, Silifke and Lüle (Lülve) were captured and Pir Ahmed, who had fallen ill during the hostilities and fled after Otlukbeli, died while his brother Kasım, unable to resist further, had taken refuge with the Mamluk sultan by 1476.

Despite this crushing defeat of Uzun Hasan, which, according to Neşri, left him so dispirited that he instructed that those who succeeded him should never go to war with the Ottomans, an injunction which they apparently took to heart, Venice nevertheless remained hopeful of concluding an anti-Ottoman alliance with him. This search for an alliance, however, never produced a concrete result. For the remaining five years of his life, Uzun Hasan was occupied with the revolts of his sons and brother and consumed his remaining energy on a campaign against Georgia.

Mehmed, who, according to Neşri, could have conquered Uzun Hasan’s territory and reduced Uzun Hasan himself to nothing had he so wished, remained wary of the Akkoyunlu ruler and refrained from continued conquest of Akkoyunlu territories. However, he did not miss any opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of the Akkoyunlu state. In this he was helped by the revolt of Uzun Hasan’s very able and popular son,UGHURLU MEHMET, who had shown great courage and success at Otlukbeli. Uzun Hasan was under the influence of his favourite wife, Selçuksah Hanım, described unflatteringly as a “hyena” by the Akkoyunlu historian Tihrani, who wished to put her own son Halil on the Akkoyunlu throne. Uğurlu Mehmed fled to the Ottoman court, where Mehmed welcomed him as his “son”, married him to his daughter and granted him the vilayet of Sivas near the Akkoyunlu border. Receiving from his father’s beys the false news of his father’s death, a
fabrication intended to lure him back, Uğurlu Mehmed, without the sultan’s permission, returned to Akkoyunlu territory, where he was killed in a battle with his father’s forces a short time before Uzun Hasan’s own death in 1478. Uğurlu Mehmed’s son, Göde Ahmed Bey, escaped to Mehmed II’s court after the murder of his father and there married Bayezid II’s daughter in 1490.

Several years later, in 1496, envoys from leading Akkoyunlu arrived at the Ottoman court requesting the return of Göde Ahmed in order to oppose the current ruler, Rüstem, who had arrived on the throne by murdering the previous incumbent, Baysungur, who had succeeded Uzun Hasan’s son Yakub (r. 1478–90). What exactly happened at this point is not clear. While some sources present Bayezid as unsure of how to respond to this request, others state that he rejected it. Ahmed either fled from Istanbul, joined those who had come to collect him, defeated Rüstem and took the throne or, according to Rumlu Hasan, was despatched by Bayezid with Ottoman troops, since this suited Bayezid’s purpose, Bayezid apparently thinking that he would be able easily to take Azerbaijan and Iraq, which were in internal chaos.

On the night that the news arrived that Ahmed had taken the Akkoyunlu throne, his wife, Bayezid’s daughter, produced a son, two events which brought much joy to Bayezid. Giving “great thanks to almighty God” for now “the Persian vilayet, too, is ours”, he sent the news to “all states”, and the cities were accordingly decked out in celebration. He also despatched a messenger to Venice, which had long sought an anti-Ottoman alliance with the Akkoyunlu, to pass on the good news of his son-in-law’s accession to the Akkoyunlu throne. Bayezid’s joy was short lived, for Ahmed was unable to remain long on the throne and was killed in 1497 during a power struggle with Hibe Sultan.

Although Ottoman–Akkoyunlu relations in the aftermath of Otlukbeli were calm on a diplomatic level, with the despatch to the Akkoyunlu court of Ottoman ambassadors bearing costly gifts, such relations were not

100 Rumlu Hasan, Ahsenü’t Tevârîh, pp. 21–2; Oruç, Tarihi, p. 174, facsimile 118b.
grounded on any secure feeling of trust, and whenever the opportunity arose, the Ottomans endeavoured to provoke internal agitation within the Akkoyunlu state. The Akkoyunlu, too, sought to utilise any Ottoman weakness and adopted a pro-Mamluk, rather than a pro-Ottoman, stance during the Ottoman–Mamluk war of 1485–91. According to an intelligence report received by Bayezid, the Ottoman defeat in this war was seen by at least one member of the entourage of the Akkoyunlu ruler Yakub as a golden opportunity not to be missed. This individual proposed that Yakub should attack the Ottomans, and not merely retake Şebinkarahisar, captured by Mehmed en route to Otlukbeli, but, most ambitiously, even conquer Anatolia up to the straits at Gelibolu, a suggestion oddly not dismissed by Yakub, who enquired “[and] how many days will it take us to arrive there?” Such ambitions, or even more modest ones, were in reality unrealisable due to the internal instability in the Akkoyunlu state.

The removal of the Akkoyunlu threat did not mean that the Ottoman position in the east was now secure, for the region of eastern Anatolia was regarded by the rulers of the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt and Syria, too, as their sphere of influence. During Mehmed II’s campaigns against Karaman, the Mamluks had indirectly supported İshak Bey and aided Pir Ahmed. When a power struggle broke out among the sons of Süleyman Bey (1442–54), the ruler of the principality of Dulgadiroğlu, which controlled territory in the region of Maras and Elbistan, the Mamluks and the Ottomans conducted a proxy war by backing rival claimants to the throne. In 1465, Süleyman’s son and successor, Melik Arslan, was murdered. The Mamluks promptly despatched his brother, Şahbudak, who was in Cairo, with a document of appointment to assume the throne of the beylik, which had in fact been established under Mamluk protection. However, according to Ottoman sources, Şahbudak was not accepted by the beys of Dulgadir, who wanted Melik Arslan’s other brother, Şehsuvar, then at the Ottoman court, as ruler. Mehmed was related to the Dulgadiroğulları through his marriage in 1450 to Süleyman Bey’s daughter Sitti Hatun.

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105 Tansel, Fatih Sultan Mehmed, pp. 290–1.
107 Aşıkaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nun Tarihi, bab 171, p. 573.
108 Ibid., bab 120, p. 481.

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not his equal in either power or wealth, the location of his state between Karaman and Iran made him a potentially useful ally worth securing through a marriage alliance. For Mehmed, this turmoil in the Dulgadir state presented him with the opportunity of taking a region which posed a threat to Karaman, now an Ottoman vassal. It had been Dulgadiroğlu plundering of Karaman during the power struggle among Ibrahim’s sons which had provided a pretext for Uzun Hasan’s intervention. Control of Dulgadir was further made attractive because of its location on the route for any southward Ottoman expansion against the Mamluks.

Backed by the Ottoman sultan and provided with Ottoman troops, Şehsuvar Bey defeated his brother and took the Dulgadir throne, a position he owed to Mehmed’s “grace and favour”. Once in power, Şehsuvar adopted an openly aggressive stance towards the Mamluks, occupying various Mamluk towns on his borders, attacking the beylik of the Ramazanoğulları, which included Adana, Sis, Misis, Ayas and Payas and was under Mamluk influence, and defeating a Mamluk force sent against him.

Boosted by these successes, Şehsuvar, who had “a brain full of intrigue” and was “filled with the passion of pride”, “entrusted himself to the devil, put aside the path of righteousness, and gave himself over to the occupation of deadly revolt”, a revolt which led him into collision not just with the Mamluks but, perhaps more dangerously given his position, also with the Ottomans. Arrogantly announcing, according to Kemalpaşazade, “like the Ottomans, I, too, have my sultanate, my land, my tribe, my country is prosperous and my army victorious, what have I to fear from anyone and to whom should I feel inferior?”, Şehsuvar destroyed the drum and standard presented to him by the Ottomans, an act of treachery for which Kemalpaşazade presents him as being punished by God, his defiance of the Ottomans being in effect a defiance of the Almighty. Kemalpaşazade recounts how, after his destruction of the drum and standard, Şehsuvar had a vision in which a man appeared before him and put a chain around his, Şehsuvar’s, neck. For the next three years, Şehsuvar was accompanied wherever he went by the man

109 Doukas, Decline, p. 186.
110 Tihrani, Kitabi Diyarbekriyye, p. 223.
111 Tansel, Fatih Sultan Mehmed, p. 331.
112 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nn Tarihi, bab 171, p. 573.
114 Uzunçaşılı, Anadolu Beylikleri, pp. 176–8.
115 Yinanç, Dulkadir Beyliği, pp. 63–71.
116 Kemalpaşazade, Tevârih VII, p. 393.
who held the end of the chain in his hands, a clear allusion to the fate which was to befall him in 1472.¹¹⁷

Şehsuvar’s failure to send troops to join Mehmed’s Karaman campaign as promised, together with the negative impact on this campaign of Şehsuvar’s attacks on territory under Mamluk influence and his cooperation with Pir Ahmed, who fled to Dulgadir after his defeat by the Ottomans,¹¹⁸ were sufficient reasons for Mehmed to accept the Mamluk proposal in 1471 that Mehmed, while retaining his influence over the beylik, should withdraw his support from Şehsuvar.¹¹⁹ With this guarantee secured, the Mamluks moved against Şehsuvar, sending a force against him and detaching the Turcoman bey’s support from him by a combination of bribery and reference to their agreement with the Ottoman sultan.¹²⁰ In 1472, Şehsuvar was captured and taken to Cairo, where, with a chain round his neck, he was paraded before the populace.¹²¹

Not content merely with the removal of Şehsuvar, the Mamluks, who perceived Mehmed’s support for Şehsuvar as a direct sign of hostility,¹²² now put their own man, Şahbudak, back on the throne, provoking Mehmed to complain to the Mamluk sultan Quaytbay that the Mamluks had not kept their word that the beylik was to remain under Ottoman control. The Mamluk response did nothing to improve relations between the two states, for Quaytbay simply pointed out that what had been said had only been for pragmatic necessity, laconically commenting “whatever we said, we said, and we tricked the enemy”.¹²³

Mehmed had no intention of abandoning his control over Dulgadir, and for this purpose he made use of Şahbudak’s brother Alaüdevle, who had, after Şehsuvar’s execution in Cairo, taken refuge at the court in Amasya of Mehmed’s son, and Alaüdevle’s son-in-law, Bayezid, the future Bayezid II, who had married Alaüdevle’s daughter Ayşe Hatun, mother of the future Selim I.¹²⁴ Alaüdevle was initially unsuccessful in his attack on Dulgadir, for he was defeated by Şahbudak’s forces, and the heads of the Ottoman soldiers fighting with him were sent to Egypt, where, on the sultan’s order, they were used in games of polo, news which, when it reached Mehmed, was most

¹¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 395–6.
¹¹⁸ Yinanç, Dulkadir Beyliği, pp. 70–2.
¹¹⁹ Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlı’ların Tarihi, bab 174, p. 577.
¹²⁰ Ibid.
¹²¹ Yinanç, Dulkadir Beyliği, pp. 72–6.
¹²² Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlı’ların Tarihi, bab 171, p. 573.
¹²³ Ibid., bab 174, p. 577.
¹²⁴ Yinanç, Dulkadir Beyliği, pp. 77–8.
displeasing to him.\textsuperscript{125} Alaüeddvel's second attack, however, this time with increased Ottoman military support, was a success. Şahbudak fled to Egypt, and Alaüeddve took over the beylik.\textsuperscript{126}

The confrontation between the Ottomans and the Mamluks over Dulgadir was only one of the fault lines between the two states, and given Mehmed's determination to stamp his control over Anatolia, demanding the instant appearance before him at the beginning of his reign of representatives from all in his territories, from the “Arabs, Persians, Bulgars and Indians”;\textsuperscript{127} conflict with the Mamluks, despite initial cordial relations,\textsuperscript{128} was inevitable. The cooling of relations was clear in the failure of the Mamluks to send an envoy to congratulate Mehmed on his successful campaign against the Îsfendiyaroğullan and Trabzon, something other states did not neglect to do and which Mehmed interpreted as a breach of etiquette among allies. In response, Mehmed did not send an envoy to congratulate Khushqadam when he ascended the Mamluk throne in 1461.\textsuperscript{129} Mehmed’s perceived interference over the pilgrimage route further served to sour relations. Responding to a report that the wells on the road to Mecca were in a total state of collapse, Mehmed sent men and money for their repair together with letters addressed to Mamluk officials in which he demanded that assistance be given to his men,\textsuperscript{130} an approach not received well by the Mamluks, who, regarding Mehmed’s offer as a “trick”, replied “are we powerless that he [Mehmed] should repair our wells?”\textsuperscript{131} Although Aşıkpaşazade reported that the Mamluks were influenced by the claim of the ruler of Karaman that Mehmed was simply using the issue of the wells as a pretext for inciting the emir of Mecca against them,\textsuperscript{132} they were in any case touchy over any perceived infringement of their control of the holy places, a source of considerable prestige for them, and responded later in a similar vein to Uzun Hasan’s attempt to gain influence in the same region.\textsuperscript{133}

Despite the increasing hostility caused by the struggle for influence in Karaman and Dulgadir, diplomatic contacts and exchanges of ambassadors continued between the Ottomans and the Mamluks, but rather than serving to normalise relations, they fed into further tension. Mehmed addressed the

\textsuperscript{125} Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nu n Tarihi, bab 175, p. 578; Yinanç, Dulkadir Beyliği, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{126} Yinanç, Dulkadir Beyliği, pp. 79–80.
\textsuperscript{127} Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nun Tarihi, bab 12, p. 485.
\textsuperscript{128} Shai Har-el, Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War, 1485–1491 (Leiden, New York and Cologne, 1995), pp. 77–8.
\textsuperscript{129} Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nun Tarihi, bab 171, p. 572–3.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., p. 572; Tansel, Fatih Sultan Mehmed, p. 330.
\textsuperscript{131} Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nun Tarihi, bab 171, p. 574.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} Har-el, Struggle, pp. 96–8.
Mamluk sultan as “my brother” rather than “my father” in a letter he sent him, and his envoy refused to kiss the ground before the sultan; the Mamluk sultan in turn insulted Mehmed by sending a mere low-level official to his court. Such strained relations continued until Mehmed’s death in 1481.\textsuperscript{134}

In view of such rifts between the two states, some Ottoman sources argued that the initial destination of Mehmed’s campaign which resulted in the expulsion of Pir Ahmed from Karaman was in fact Egypt. Tursun Bey describes Mehmed’s aim as being the forcible removal of the Circassians, that is the Mamluks, from the sultanate of Egypt and the taking of “the throne of the prophet Joseph”.\textsuperscript{135} In 1481, Mehmed prepared another long-distance campaign, the destination of which was unclear, for although its general direction was known, whether it was aimed at the Iranians or the Arabs was not,\textsuperscript{136} it being Mehmed’s custom that “when he organised a campaign he would tell no one where he was going”.\textsuperscript{137} Tursun Bey implies that its target was the Mamluks, for he states that Mehmed Paşa, in seeking to comfort the ill Mehmed, who was to die shortly into this campaign, said, “All bounteous God willing, you will be sultan of Egypt”.\textsuperscript{138}

Upon his death, Mehmed was succeeded by his son Bayezid, who immediately found himself in a power struggle with his brother Cem, a struggle from which the Mamluks sought to benefit. Defeated by Bayezid, Cem fled to the protection of the Mamluk sultan Quaytbay, who received him with great enthusiasm, saying, "you are my son, do not be sad",\textsuperscript{139} and gave him permission to go on pilgrimage.\textsuperscript{140} This was not the first time the Mamluks had received members of the Ottoman royal family. In the first years of Murad II’s reign, the grandchildren of Süleyman Çelebi, one of the unsuccessful contenders for the throne in the succession struggle after 1402 and brother of Mehmed I, took refuge with the Mamluk sultan, who refused to hand them over to Murad.\textsuperscript{141} In 1482, Cem returned to Anatolia, supported by the Mamluk sultan, who provided troops according to Cam-i Cem Ayin, and again attacked his brother. Defeated in battle near Ankara, Cem fled and boarded

\textsuperscript{134} Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nun Tarihi, babs 172–6, pp. 575–9; Har-el, Struggle, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{135} Tursun Bey, Tarih-i Ebü’l-Feth, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p. 181.
\textsuperscript{137} Neşri, Kitab-i Cihan-nümâ, vol. 2, pp. 842–3.
\textsuperscript{138} Tursun Bey, Tarih-i Ebü’l-Feth, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p. 133.
\textsuperscript{141} Ismail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, ‘Memlük Sultanları Yanına İltica Etmiş Olan奥斯mani Hanedanına Mensup Şehzadeler’, Belleten 17, 68 (1953), 519–35 at pp. 525–6.
a boat at Antalya. Unable to reach Egypt, he landed instead at Rhodes and disappeared into the hands of the Hospitallers. Bayezid was not to forget this Mamluk support of Cem, which he perceived as evidence of continued Mamluk hostility, commenting, in Aşıkpaşazade’s account, “how strange are these Egyptians. They did not conclude a friendship with my father, and with me, too, they began with enmity. And what is more, my brother became a prisoner of the infidel because of them”.

The hostility occasioned by Mamluk support of Cem was increased by Mamluk seizures of envoys on their way to Istanbul from the Bahmani ruler of the Deccan in India. This increasing rift in relations was perceived by Alâüeddâve, who had shown his loyalty to his son-in-law during the Cem affair, as an opportunity to attack and, in 1483, he besieged the Mamluk-held castle of Malatya. In response, Quaytbay despatched troops against him. Realising that he would be unable to resist, Alâüeddâve appealed to Bayezid in 1484 for military aid, saying, “give me troops, let me conquer the Arab vilayet and let it be my sultan’s [i.e., Bayezid’s]”. Ottoman military support was despatched, but despite initial success, the Ottoman-Dulgâdiroğu forces were defeated. The warning, however, was clear, and the threat of a direct conflict with the Ottomans caused Quaytbay, for whom covert operations were desirable but not open warfare, to backpeddle. Adding “inestimable gifts” to those he had seized from the Bahmani envoys, he despatched both his own ambassador and the Bahmanis to Istanbul.

But, in the words of Kemâlpaşâzade, “the matter of enmity was not removed”, and Bayezid prepared to take the offensive in Çukurova (Cilicia) against the Mamluks. Bayezid’s determination to attack was encouraged by an intelligence report that the Mamluks were occupied with a Bedouin revolt and that the Turcomans were ravaging the Syrian countryside. He therefore sent forces under Karagöz Paşa, then in Konya, to Çukurova. Aşıkpaşazade justifies this

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144 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlıoğlu’nun Tarihi, bab 179, p. 581.
146 Kemâlpaşazade, Tevarîh VIII, pp. 35–7.
147 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlıoğlu’nun Tarihi, bab 177, p. 580.
148 Kemâlpaşazade, Tevarîh VIII, pp. 82–3; Yinanç, Dulkadir Beyliği, pp. 80–2.
149 Kemâlpaşazade, Tevarîh VIII, p. 85; Oruç, Tarihi, p. 136, facsimile 94b.
150 Kemâlpaşazade, Tevarîh VIII, p. 85.
151 Har-el, Struggle, pp. 133–4.
attack by claiming that the inhabitants of Çukurova requested Ottoman help against the tyranny of the Mamluks and because of continuous Mamluk support for the Varsaklar and Turgutoğulları, who were constantly attacking the Ottoman vilayet of Karaman. During this successful attack, the Ottomans occupied the castles of Tarsus, Adana and Gülek. Responding immediately, the Mamluks inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Ottomans at Adana in 1486, and the beylerbeyi of Anadolu, Hersekoğlu Ahmed Paşa, was captured. Although the climate of the region had proved a problem for the Ottoman soldiers and, in an attempt to rescue the honour of the defeated troops, Oruç had described the Ottomans as “left powerless” before the unstoppable might of the “Arab bandits”, the humiliation was clear. The Mamluks, in the words of Aşıkpaşazade, took them prisoner, they lined them up, hungry, barefoot, naked, and some they sent to Aleppo, some to Damascus and some to Egypt. In every city they reached they had an infidel cross hung insultingly round their necks, those who could not walk and who remained on the road, they decapitated, they martyred them … they drove Hersekoğlu with insults to Egypt, and they made him kiss the feet of the throne of the sultan of Egypt.

The day on which the Ottoman captives were brought into the presence of the Mamluk sultan was defined in a Mamluk inscription from 1496 as “a day the like of which had not been seen in the history of the kings”.

The Mamluks were busy not merely on the military front, for Quaytbay, according to a rumour in a letter received by Bayezid II in 1487, was in pursuit of Cem, offering the grand master of Rhodes, Pierre d’Aubusson, money to secure possession of the Ottoman sultan’s brother while at the same time investigating the possibility of an anti-Ottoman alliance with the West. Faced with military defeat and political intrigue, Bayezid once more sent Ottoman forces with “cannons, guns and a great quantity of equipment.”

152 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğulları’nın Tarihi, bab 178, p. 555 and bab 179, p. 581.
154 Oruç, Tarihi, pp. 137–9, facsimile 95a–97a.
155 Tursun Bey, Tarih-i Ebü’l-Feth, p. 213.
156 Oruç, Tarihi, p. 138, facsimile 95b.
under the command of Davud Paşa against the Varsaklar and Turgutoğulları, whom the Ottomans had been unable to subjugate and who had supported Cem against Bayezid, collaborating with the Mamluks and choosing “the route of rebellion”. Although inflicting a severe defeat on the Varsaklar and the Turgutoğulları, Davud Paşa, following the orders of the sultan, did not extend the campaign but withdrew. A few months later, the Ottoman army entered Çukurova to capture various castles.

In despatching troops against the Varsaklar and the Turgutoğulları, the Ottomans had been aware of the possibility of a clash with Mamluk forces and had even despatched an Ottoman fleet into the Mediterranean with this in mind. When they entered Mamluk-controlled territory, they were defeated by the Mamluks in battle in 1488 at Ağa Çayır, near Adana. Davud Paşa had earlier, during the Varsak campaign, called for a widening of operations and for a direct war with the Mamluks, arguing that all eyes were focused on events in the region and if the Ottomans did not go for war then all their enemies there would revolt. The observing eyes were not merely those of their enemies but also of friends who were made uneasy by the poor Ottoman performance. The defeat at Ağa Çayır led Alaüeddvel, who had until this point given open support to the Ottomans, to change sides. In reality, Alaüeddvel had, since his ascent to the throne, tried to play both sides, displaying an attachment also to the Mamluks, but the Mamluks had not trusted him, regarding him as hostile because of his connection with the Ottomans. Wishing to prove his loyalty to the Mamluks, Alaüeddvel sent one of his sons as a hostage to Quaytby and married his daughter to the son of Özbe, the commander of the Mamluk army. The Ottoman response to this shift in allegiance was to support Alaüeddvel’s brother Şahbudak, who had fled from the Mamluks to Ottoman protection. With Ottoman support, Şahbudak attacked in 1489 but was defeated by Alaüeddvel, and during the encounter the sancak beyi of Kayseri, Mihailoğlu İskender Bey, was captured.

Despite these setbacks, the Ottomans managed to hold various castles, including Sis (Kozan) and Tarsus. Quaytby sent an ambassador to Bayezid,
who demanded, “Give back the castles that you have taken in Çukurova, otherwise be it on your own head.” Bayezid, already greatly enraged by the Mamluks, rejected the ambassador’s proposal and imprisoned him. In response, Mamluk forces, together with troops from Dulgadir, laid siege to Kayseri but, upon hearing that an Ottoman force was approaching, abandoned the siege and instead plundered the surrounding region. Although Ottoman control was thus far from secure, Bayezid did not himself set out on campaign. According to Tursun Bey, the reason for this was Bayezid’s perception of his own superiority over the Mamluks, who were “slaves [kul]”, and thus he despatched his own “slaves” against them. Haniwaldanus, however, explained this failure as being due to the rumour that Cem would come to Istanbul, Bayezid therefore not wishing to leave the capital. That Haniwaldanus may well have been correct is indicated by Quaytbay’s request to the pope for Cem. Intending to lead a campaign with Cem against Bayezid, Quaytbay promised that he would return the cities which had previously been in Christian hands, including Istanbul, to the Christians.

By 1491, Bayezid was preparing for a campaign against the Mamluks under his own command, but both sides were by this time exhausted and both were inclined to come to a settlement. The Ottomans had been defeated in most of the encounters of the war, their resources drained and their prestige severely dented. The Mamluks had expended much manpower and money in order to secure the existing status quo but were not in a position to pursue the war further. This mutual exhaustion forced peace on both, and, after an exchange of ambassadors, peace was arranged. The Ottomans returned Tarsus, Adana and their other conquests to the Mamluks and accepted the former frontier between them. This was in reality a humiliating conclusion to the war for the Ottomans, and one which Ottoman sources sought to justify. Thus, Bayezid, the “gazi sultan”, was presented as agreeing to these terms

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169 Ali, Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, p. 239.
171 Ali, Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, p. 239.
172 Tursun Bey, Tarih-i Ebü’l-Feth, p. 209.
173 Kreutel, Haniwaldanus, p. 20.
175 Tansel, Sultan II. Bayezit, p. 113.
177 Oruç, Tarihi, p. 146, facsimile 101a.
because the income of the region of Çukurova, which he was returning to the Mamluks, was in any case used for Mecca and Medina, holy sites for both states, thus making the ownership of the area, from a religious point of view, immaterial.\footnote{178} Further, the war had closed the pilgrimage route, which would now be open, while the end of the conflict would free Bayezid to devote his energies to fighting the Christian infidels.\footnote{179} Regardless of any justification, “the world found peace and security”, in the words of Oruç, and communication and travel between the two states recommenced.\footnote{180}

From this period on, there was no direct clash between the Ottomans and Mamluks, but nor was there an environment of total security.\footnote{181} However, there were apparently attempts to cement a sound relationship. After Quaytbay’s death in 1496, his son Mansur requested Bayezid’s daughter in marriage in 1498. This request was accepted in order, according to Oruç, to create a kinship between them.\footnote{182} The relations, which were in any case improving, were made tighter because of the Safavid threat.\footnote{183} In 1502, the Ottomans sent an envoy to Cairo to propose joint cooperation against the Safavids.\footnote{184} In this climate, although no actual agreement was reached, the Ottomans and the Mamluks were very careful over their relations, to the extent that when Bayezid’s son, Korkud, fled in 1509 to the Mamluk court, the sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri was most cautious in his handling of the situation and refused to grant him permission to go on pilgrimage without Bayezid’s consent, stressing “there is no division between us and the sultan of Rum”.\footnote{185} Upon Bayezid’s not agreeing to Korkud’s pilgrimage, Korkud was returned to Ottoman territory.\footnote{186} In 1511, Bayezid, on the request of Qansuh al-Ghawri, sent both men and construction material for the building of ships to be used against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean.\footnote{187}
The rise of the Safavids

While Bayezid, freed of Cem, who died in 1495, and of the Mamluks, the war with whom had ended in 1491, occupied himself with affairs in the west, a new political power centre was rising beyond the eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire. The turmoil round the Akkoyunlu throne created a power vacuum in the region which was not filled by the Ottomans but by Isma‘il, the son of Haydar, the şeyh of the Safavids of Ardabil, a Sufi order which was established in Ardabil in Azerbaijan at the beginning of the fourteenth century and came to attract followers in Azerbaijan, Syria and Anatolia,188 where the order had many followers in Teke, Hamit and among the Karamanoğulları.189

The Safavid order’s popularity was not limited to the common people, for the şeyhs of the order had established close connections with the political powers of the region in which they functioned. The reputation of the order reached the Ottoman sultans in Bursa and every year they sent “çerağ akçesi” (money given by a mürid to a şeyh) to Ardabil.190 With the coming to the head of the order of Cüneyd in 1447, its political nature became more pronounced. Cüneyd’s political ambition, together with his growing number of followers, alarmed the Karakoyunlu ruler, Şah Cihan, then ruler of Azerbaijan. Pressured by Şah Cihan and with the consent of his uncle Şeyh Cafer, Cüneyd, accompanied by his closest followers, left Ardabil for Ottoman territory. Presenting prayer beads, a prayer mat and a Qur’an to Murad II, Cüneyd requested permission to settle in Ottoman territory in order “to occupy himself with prayer”. After consultation with his vezir Halil Paşa, Murad, suspicious that Cüneyd’s aims were political, not religious, rejected his request, commenting that “there cannot be two sultans on one throne”. Presenting Cüneyd with 200 florins, he expelled him from Ottoman territory.191 Wandering through Anatolia and Syria, Cüneyd sought a location in which to settle, even undertaking a gaza from Canik against Trabzon in 1456, but without success.192 Finally Cüneyd found protection in 1456 at the court of the Karakoyunlus’ main rival, the Akkoyunlu Uzun Hasan. Uzun Hasan’s motivation for his support of Cüneyd was political rather than religious and, “hoping to catch from his shirt the aura

189 Hinz, Uzun Hasan, p. 8.
190 Ibid., p. 7.
of sanctity of his ancestors, he married him to his sister. This matrimonial connection strengthened Cüneyd’s hand. News of his marriage reached “even . . . the farthest corners of Rûm and Syria” and attracted halîfes of other şeyhs to him. Cüneyd’s connection with Uzun Hasan was not satisfactory from an Ottoman point of view and, according to Haniwaldanus, it was at this time that Mehmed II, in contrast to the practice of his father, ceased sending the “çerağ akçesi” to the Safavid order.

After only three years in Akkoyunlu territory, Cüneyd returned to Ardabil, where he was, however, unable to settle. From then on until his death in 1460, he became involved in various conflicts until he was killed fighting Sultan Halil, the ruler of Shirvan. His position was later taken up by his son Haydar, who was brought up by his uncle Uzun Hasan and then married to his cousin, the daughter of Uzun Hasan and Despina Hatun, a marriage which produced Isma’îl, the future founder of the Safavid state.

Haydar’s ambition when he assumed leadership of the order in Ardabil was, according to Fadullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji, to change “the (dervish) cap of poverty for a crown of world domination”. Putting religious considerations to one side, he focused his energies on the capture of Shirvan. Haydar’s campaigns against Shirvan and against the Circassians greatly concerned the Akkoyunlu ruler Yakub, as well as Bayezid, for, as Khunji pointed out in 1487, the Ottoman sultan, “despite all his army and dominions, was afraid of the turbulence of the subjects of the shaykh”. Haydar’s success would have had serious implications for the Ottomans as it would have attracted and incited trouble among his followers within Ottoman territory. The Ottomans were, however, rescued from this possibility by the removal of Haydar from the scene by Sultan Halil’s son, who had secured assistance from Yakub, during a campaign against Shirvan in 1488. Under Haydar, the order had thus gained a more military outlook, and it was during the period of Haydar’s leadership that the order’s followers had adopted the distinctive 12-pleated red headgear from which they, and later Safavid subjects and Ottoman subjects

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References:

193 Minorsky, Persia, p. 63.
195 Minorsky, Persia, p. 64.
196 Kreutel, Haniwaldanus, pp. 35–6.
198 Minorsky, Persia, p. 61.
200 Minorsky, Persia, p. 69.
201 Hinz, Uzun Hasan, pp. 65–6.
loyal to the Safavid state, got their name “red crowned”, “red-headed” and “red head”.202

In 1494, Haydar’s young son Isma‘îl became head of the Safavid order in place of his older brother Sultan Ali, who had been killed by the Akkoyunlu. Following his father and grandfather, Isma‘îl set out to establish a state. As a result of a rapid series of military successes, the initially limited number of Isma‘îl’s followers quickly increased and were joined by the Ustacalu, Şamlu and Rumlu populations of Sivas, Amasya and Tokat, the Tekelüli from Antalya, and the Turgutoğulları and Varsaklar from the Karaman region.203 In 1500, Isma‘îl appeared on the Ottoman frontier at Erzincan to be joined by his followers who were Ottoman reaya204 and who “began to sell up lock, stock and barrel, to leave [their homeland] and to help their şeyhs”.205 The dramatic nature of this migration of Turcomans from Teke is graphically illustrated by Kemalpaşazade’s account: “[A]ll was in turmoil and they all wanted to leave. The Turks left their territories, selling their houses for nothing”.206 These Anatolian Turcoman tribes provided the military force upon which Isma‘îl’s state largely relied for its power,207 and it was with their support that he took the Akkoyunlu capital, Tabriz, in 1501 and made it the capital of his own state.

The regions in Anatolia where Isma‘îl was popular were territories in which the Ottomans had so far been unable to consolidate their hold. Apart from the perennial problem of the Turcoman tribes such as the Varsaklar and the Turgutoğulları, the Ottomans had still to contend with descendants of the Karamanoğulları, even though the state itself had been extinguished by Mehmed II in 1474. In 1501, a Karamani pretender, Mustafa Bey, attracted the support of the Varsaklar in Taşeli and pillaged Larende. Although defeated by the Ottomans, the pretender escaped.208 According to Aşıkpaşazade, corruption in the system of registering timars drove the sipahis in Karaman to support Mustafa.209 Allouche has argued that the main reason for Isma‘îl coming

202 See, for example, Oruç, Tarihi, p. 219, facsimile 148b; Öztürk, Anonim, pp. 139–40, facsimile 129–30.
204 Rumlu Hasan, Ahsenî‘t Tevârîh, p. 51.
205 Oruç, Tarihi, p. 219, facsimile 148b.
206 Kemalpaşazade, Tevârîh VIII, p. 233.
207 Morgan, Medieval Persia, pp. 118–19. See also Masashi Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbâš: Le système militaire safavide (Berlin, 1987).
208 Oruç, Tarihi, pp. 207–9, facsimile 142a–143a.
in person to Erzincan at this date was to ally with this pretender, whose support was considerable, and to infiltrate Ottoman territory.  

Ottoman structural reforms aimed at strengthening the state’s control and imposing firm authority alienated large elements of the population, and even if Bayezid II reversed some of his father’s more unpopular land reforms, existing structures had sustained considerable damage. An administrative crisis which had made itself felt at the beginning of the sixteenth century deepened as a result of rising financial problems. There were complaints of Bayezid’s withdrawal from the day-to-day running of the state, leaving the administration in the hands of incompetent vezirs, and of the subsequent bribery and corruption, timars which had previously been distributed according to military competence now being sold for money. Many sipahis were thus driven into opposing the state, while the state itself, unable to increase income through campaigns, sought to raise revenue by means of high taxation.

In such an environment, Isma’îl became, according to Celalzade, author of a eulogy for Selim I, a source of salvation for the Anatolian population. Those who had earlier left Anatolia to join Isma’îl and who now heard about the “tyranny and terror” there sent news to their relations telling them that Isma’îl “is just to the reaya and gives dirliks to useful and courageous men”. Much of the Ottoman population thus turned to the Safavids, for their prospects in Iran, where Isma’îl promised them a central role in the construction of his state, were good, something that was not the case in the Ottoman Empire.

Apart from word-of-mouth reports among family members, friends and acquaintances, Isma’îl used his representatives, known as halife (khulafa), to spread propaganda among his followers in Ottoman territory, or, as the sixteenth-century historian Hadidi expressed it, to commit “treachery and deceit in Rum and the Arab lands”, where they “led astray the ignorant populace”.

213 Celalzade Mustafa, Selim-Nâme, p. 59.
214 Morgan, Medieval Persia, p. 116.
Unable to prevent such propaganda, the Ottomans further failed to secure the loyalty of their population in these regions by use either of political or economic means, and although the Ottomans were militarily stronger, “Persian propaganda was more subtle and penetrating”. The order, which was in tune with a folk understanding of Islam and appealed in particular to the nomadic Turcomans, secured an even stronger allegiance during the leadership of Câneyd and Haydar. Seyfi Çelebi, writing at the end of the sixteenth century, relates a conversation between Şeyh Câneyd and the Karakoyunlu Şah Cihan during which Şah Cihan asked if it was his army which was greater or the followers of Câneyd, to which Câneyd replied, “both your army and the Iranian reaya are my followers”. This conversation, according to Seyfi Çelebi, resulted in Câneyd’s expulsion. Isma‘îl now further strengthened loyalty to him by the use of poems which he wrote in Turkmen Turkish under the pseudonym Hatayi/Khatai. Even when Isma‘îl moved to a more Orthodox Twelver Imam understanding as the state religion, this close link between him and the population of Anatolia was not weakened. The şeyhülislam, Hoca Sadeddin, whose father was a member of the ulema and who came to Istanbul after the taking of Tabriz by Selim I, condemned this excessive devotion of Isma‘îl’s followers who “on merely hearing his name, prostrate themselves”.

For the Ottomans, the Safavid threat went far beyond the economic one of Ottoman reaya abandoning their land and migrating to Safavid territory, for Isma‘îl stated his intentions clearly in a line in the Mathnavi, written probably in his youth, in which he stated, “I shall conquer Anatolia and Syria, and then

220 Josef Matuz (ed.), L’ouvrage de Seyfî Çelebi, historien ottoman du xve siècle (Paris, 1968), pp. 147, 208. For a different version of this conversation said to have occurred between Şeyh Sâfi al-Din, the founder of the Safavid order, and Abu Said, the Ilkhanid sultan, see Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids, p. 71.
223 Hoca Sadettin Efendi, Tacû’t-Tevarîh, ed. İsmet Parmaksizoğlu (Ankara, 1999), vol. 4, p. 171.
think of conquering the Franks". While he looked for an opportunity to enter Ottoman territory, the Ottoman reaya transferred their allegiance to him, “wave[ing] their swords on every side, being traitors to the sultan and committing treason”.

As Marino Sanudo noted in his diary, the rising power of Isma‘il had for years “given much thought” to Bayezid, who followed Isma‘il’s every movement closely. In 1501, aware that Isma‘il’s strength came from his Anatolian followers, he forbade their movement from his own territory to Iran, orders he later renewed, instructing that those who disobeyed were to be hanged and their goods seized, their names registered and the sultan informed. These measures failed to staunch the flow of followers to Isma‘il, and Bayezid therefore ordered the enforced migration of all Sufis and “red crowned” in Anatolia and Rumeli, together with their children, to the vilayet of Mora and the castles of Coron and Modon, and according to the consul on Chios, to İnebahtı (Lepanto, Naupaktos) and Albania. The pitiful condition of those who were the victims of these enforced migrations is clear from the consul’s letter of 27 July 1502, where he notes, “It is moving to see the exhausted condition of these people and their wives and children”, adding that “there is never a day in which 100 or 200 families do not pass from Anatolia to Greece”. In an attempt to legitimise such measures, Oruç commented that this was “the command of the sultan, it is the policy of the sultan, this enforced migration was imposed before. It is the custom of the sultans”.

Bayezid’s attempt to isolate Isma‘il from his followers is also evident in his conduct of diplomatic relations, where again he was at pains to minimise any potential Safavid influence among his own population. Thus, while he received Isma‘il’s envoys as envoys of a sultan, he forbade their approaching

224 For the original of this line, see Minorsky, ‘Shâh Ismâ‘îl I’, pp. 1041a, 1051a, 1025a.
226 Oruç, Tarihi, p. 219, facsimile 148b.
228 See, for example, Ilhan Şahin and Feridun Emecen (eds.), Osmanlılarda Divân-Bürokrasi-Ahkâm. II. Bayezid Döneminde Ait 906/1501 Tarihli Ahkâm Defteri (İstanbul, 1994), hûkûm 453, p. 125.
229 Ibid., hûkûm 27, p. 8; hûkûm 71, p. 21; hûkûm 281, pp. 78–9.
230 Ibid., hûkûm 454, p. 126.
231 Oruç, Tarihi, p. 219, facsimile 148b; Kreutel, Haniwaldanus, p. 45.
232 Amoretti, Šâh Ismâ‘îl, 12, p. 12.
233 Ibid.
234 Oruç, Tarihi, p. 219, facsimile 148b.
235 Ibid., facsimile 148b–149a.
the people along their routes.236 Isma’il, in turn, was at pains to reassure Bayezid that he had no territorial ambitions over Ottoman lands,237 requesting that permission be granted for his followers to join him.238 Not all his messages were of reassurance, however. In 1510, he informed Istanbul of his victory over the Uzbekbs by sending Bayezid the straw-filled skin of the head of Muhammad Shaybani Han, the han of the Sunni Uzbek state.239

Although Venetian observers, from the moment they became aware of the rising power of Isma’il, had been expecting a clash between the Ottomans and the Safavids,240 neither Bayezid nor Isma’il were yet ready for war, and Bayezid contented himself with following Isma’il’s struggle with the Dulgadıroğlu and the Kurdish beys of the region.241 In 1507, when Isma’il advanced as far as Sivas within Ottoman territory in order to attack the Dulgadıroğulları, Bayezid assembled a large army which, in the end, remained idle in Ankara, observing the movements of Isma’il’s forces.242 Şehzade Ahmed’s control of the routes between Tokat and Amasya effectively prevented Isma’il’s followers in Ottoman territory from joining him on this occasion.243 Bayezid’s other son, Şehzade Selim, based at Trabzon, conducted raids around Bayburt and Erzincan, both under Isma’il’s control, and campaigns against Georgia.244 Selim, convinced of the danger posed by the Safavids, adopted a more aggressive response than his father, who was anxious about Selim’s activities. Warning him that “I will not consent to increasing our enemies”,245 he ordered him to withdraw from Isma’il’s territory, the result, according to some sources, of complaints from Isma’il about Selim’s activities.246

Towards the end of his reign, the elderly Bayezid, who supported his son Ahmed, was unable to prevent a succession struggle among his sons which was fought out in Anatolia, where they held their governorships, and which further deepened the power vacuum in the region, Hadidi commenting that “Anatolia remained under foot, if there is no head, does the foot walk the

238 Allouche, Ottoman-Safavid, pp. 75–6.
239 Rumlu Hasan, Ahsen‘î’t Tevârih, p. 150.
240 Amoretti, Şâh Isma‘îl, 3, p. 7; 6, p. 8; 12, p. 12.
241 Yinanç, Dulkadir Beyliği, pp. 90–1.
243 Kemalpaşazade, Tevârih VIII, pp. 231–2.
road.”

In 1511, a major revolt broke out under the leadership of a dervish known as Şah Kulu Baba Tekeli, the son of Hasan Halife, who was in the service of Şeyh Haydar. Bayezid had sent an annual sum as a gift both to the leader of the revolt, described in Ottoman sources as “Şeytan Kulu” (Devil’s Slave), and to his father. Thousands of sipahis, caught up in the power vacuum and the general collapse of authority in Anatolia, joined the movement and gathered round Şah Kulu, who was convinced that “now an opportunity has come for us”. The revolt was immensely destructive; according to one contemporary source, even if “the Kızılbaş [i.e., Isma’il] had come himself, there would not have been this much disaster”. It exploded as a result of internal Ottoman problems, there being no proof of direct Safavid involvement, but when the Ottomans ultimately began to put it down, the followers of Şah Kulu, who died in battle with the Ottomans, fled to Isma’il. Isma’il’s reception was not entirely warm, for he punished the commanders of Şah Kulu’s followers, who had killed 500 merchants going from Tabriz to Ottoman territory and pillaged their goods, and divided the followers among his emirs. Amidst this confusion and chaos, Şehzade Selim seized the throne.

Eastern expansion and consolidation

Instructed by Bayezid to “take revenge for the Ottomans on the Mamluks and on the Kızılbaş for the people of Islam”, according to Süleyman I’s grand vezir Lütfi Paşa, Selim first turned his sights on Isma’il, who had rapidly extended the borders of his state from the Euphrates to Herat and to Iraq, taken control of the regions of Erzurum, Erzincan and Kemah on the Ottoman frontier, and reached the shores of the eastern Black Sea, where only Rize and Hopa remained Ottoman possessions. “How”, Selim asked, “can I turn a blind eye to that tyrant, for otherwise the lands of Rum will be engulfed in sedition”.

247 Hadidi, Tevârih, p. 363.
248 Rumlu Hasan, Ahşenî’i Tevârih, pp. 154–5, 157–8. Hasan Halife was also said to have served Cüneyd; see Allouche, Ottoman-Safavid, p. 94.
249 Şahabettin Tekindağ, ‘Şah Kulu Baba Tekeli İsyani’, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi 3 (1967), 34–9 at p. 36.
250 Ibid., pp. 35–6, 39; Kreutel, Haniwaldanus, pp. 48–9.
Although not directly involved in the Şah Kulu rebellion, Isma‘il had nevertheless exploited the ensuing chaos, in 1512 sending his halife Nur Ali Rumlu to the region, where he gathered many followers. Şehzade Ahmed’s son Murad even “girded the Kızılbâş crown” and joined this revolt, unswayed by his father’s efforts to dissuade him. Murad took refuge with Isma‘il, thus providing him with a useful royal Ottoman pawn against Selim, while Nur Ali’s successes mounted, Nur Ali even having the hutbe (sermon) read in Isma‘il’s name in Tokat. According to intelligence which Selim received from spies in December 1512 or January 1513, Isma‘il’s aim was to conquer Anatolia with the help of Rumlu Dev Ali, to give the Rum beylerbeylik to Murad and to divide the remaining territory among the Kızılbâş.

Before his accession, Selim had been well aware of the major challenges posed to Ottoman authority and legitimacy by the Safavids. The basic aim of the campaigns organised by Selim against Georgia in 1508–9 and 1511 was to prevent the movement from Ottoman territory to Isma‘il. Selim conducted propaganda among his Anatolian troops, whom he had collected for these campaigns and who returned home content with the booty gained, promising them that when he became sultan dirlik (land holdings) and high offices would be given to those who deserved them, and instructing that this message should be spread among the “brave and courageous” in the home regions to which the soldiers were returning, thus encouraging the Anatolian population to “abandon their inclination for friendship towards the Kızılbâş”.

The Safavid threat was not confined to the eastern part of the empire, for a section of the population in Rumeli, some of whom were there as a result of the forced transfer under Bayezid, was sympathetic to Isma‘il. The states in the west, too, were interested in Isma‘il. As early as 1502, Venice, at war with the Ottomans, had established contact with Isma‘il and attempted to

256 Rumlu Hasan, Ahsenü‘t Tevârih, p. 164.
260 Rumlu Hasan, Ahsenü‘t Tevârih, p. 165.
262 Celalzade Mustafa, Selim-Nâme, pp. 60–1.
incite him to support the revolt of the Karamani pretender. The constant failure of the policy pursued by Bayezid against Isma‘il led the West to overestimate Isma‘il and underestimate the Ottomans. The situation towards the end of Bayezid’s reign, with the succession struggle among Bayezid’s sons, the Şah Kulu revolt and, in the middle of 1511, the circulation of rumours of Bayezid’s severe illness, seemed to confirm their views. In May, the grand master of Rhodes, Emery d’Amboise, wrote to the English king Henry VIII that, according to intelligence he had received, “last winter the Sophi [Isma‘il] cut to pieces a whole army of the Turks” and concluded that Isma‘il “is able to drive the Turks and Sultan from their dominions”.  

A conflict between Isma‘il and Selim was, at least from Selim’s point of view, inevitable. Although presented in religious terms as a Sunni–Shii clash, it was in reality a struggle for political supremacy, as shrewdly noted by the Protestant priest Schweigger, at the Habsburg embassy in Istanbul from 1578 to 1581, who commented that the two states concealed the hatred they felt for each other “in a very masterly way behind problems of religion”. If one accepts Mazzaoui’s explanation of the Safavid order’s leaning to Shii practices as “religious change for political ends”, the same must be said of Selim’s appropriation of a more orthodox Sunniism. Defining the religious belief of the Turcomans, who remained outside the orthodox Sunni belief and identified themselves with a heterodox belief system, as Shiism and “Rafizilik” (heresy) prepared the ground for a counter-propaganda campaign against the Safavids, while the war against the Safavids was legitimised by designating it a “cihad”.  

Before the Çaldıran campaign of 1514, Selim mobilised backing. He requested support from the leading military men, explaining the Safavid threat not merely as one undermining the allegiance of the population but

266 Mazzaoui, Origins of the Safavids, p. 73.
as being behind sedition in the Ottoman army.\textsuperscript{269} Despite hesitancy among some of the men of state about the wisdom of such a campaign, Selim was determined,\textsuperscript{270} and sought support also among the religious scholars.\textsuperscript{271} Müftü Hamza Saru Görez, one of the eminent religious scholars of the period, issued a \textit{fetva} defining the supporters of Isma‘il as “infidels and heretics”, a description also applied to those who supported them, declaring it a duty and an obligatory act “to destroy and disperse them”. This \textit{fetva} permitted the killing of such men and the division of their goods, women and children “among the gazis of Islam”.\textsuperscript{272} Kemalpaşazade, another leading religious scholar, expressed a similar viewpoint and described the war against the Safavids as a “cihad”.\textsuperscript{273} Armed with such religious pronouncements, Selim set out on a campaign, justified by the desire of Sunnis in Iranian territory for his help and by Isma‘il’s ruination of mosques and \textit{mescits}, oppression and murder of Sunnis, contempt for religious books, and the Safavid practice of denigrating the first three rightly guided caliphs and the companions of the Prophet.\textsuperscript{274}

Apart from providing justification for the campaign against the Safavids, Hamza Saru Görez’s \textit{fetva} also created legitimacy for Selim’s actions against his own subjects in Anatolia. According to the \textit{fetva}, “if there is someone in this \textit{vilayet} [i.e., Ottoman territory] who is known as one of them [i.e., a Kızılbaş] and/or is captured when going to Kızılbaş territory, let him be killed. This entire group consists of people who are both infidels and heretics, and people of sedition. Their killing is legitimate on both counts”.\textsuperscript{275} Before setting out on campaign, Selim ordered the registration of known Safavid sympathisers in Anatolia and had a large number of Turkomans killed. Various Ottoman sources give the number of those registered and killed as 40,000,\textsuperscript{276} a figure some historians have argued is improbably high in view of the total population of Anatolia at that time, although, given the circumstances, it is probable that Selim would have neutralised known and active supporters of Isma‘il within Ottoman territory.\textsuperscript{277}

\textsuperscript{270} Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, II, pp. 259–60.
\textsuperscript{272} Nos. 6401 and 12077, Topkapı Palace Archives, in Tekindağ, ‘Yeni Kaynak’, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{273} Tekindağ, ‘Yeni Kaynak’, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{275} Nos. 6401 and 12077, Topkapı Palace Archives, in Tekindağ, ‘Yeni Kaynak’, p. 55.
According to Rumlu Hasan, there were two immediate causes for the outbreak of the war: the insulting letter sent to Selim by Ustajalu Muhammad Han, Isma’îl’s governor of Diyarbakîr, and halîfe Nur Ali’s destructive campaign in Anatolia.  

Added to this were the continuing relations between the Safavids and groups of the Anatolian population, such as the Turgutoğullar, whom the Ottomans were unable to control, and Isma’îl’s failure to congratulate Selim on his assumption of the Ottoman throne.  

In March 1514, Selim set out from Edirne. His advance was hampered by problems over provisioning, increased considerably by Alaüddevle’s announcement that he would not join the campaign. Instead, Selim secured provisions from the Georgian Mirza Çabuk, the atabeg of Samtskhe-Saatboga, a buffer state between the Ottomans and Safavids, although these were insufficient. Isma’îl’s policy of destruction along Selim’s route and forcible migration of the population created major problems over feeding a very large Ottoman army on the march and forced Selim to bring provisions from Trabzon. Conscious of the insecurity in Anatolia, Selim left a reserve force behind him as he advanced eastwards to ensure that any uprising would be put down.

The difficulties of terrain, the problem over provisioning and the failure of Isma’îl’s army to face the Ottomans in battle led to discontent among the janissaries, whose tie to Bektaşi belief created suspicion about their attitude towards Selim. With the support of some of their commanders, they began to demand that the campaign be abandoned. Selim, not of the same opinion, had the bearer of this demand, the beylerbeyi of Karaman, Hemden Paşa, killed. The demands, however, continued, the janissaries even attempting to force the sultan’s hand by firing on his imperial tent. Incensed, Selim compared their loyalty to that of Isma’îl’s soldiers, who went willingly to meet death, happy “to slice their own children to pieces with their own hands” for their shah. The janissaries, showing no similar inclination, were even hindering their sultan in the conduct of the campaign.

Selim’s campaign was further undermined by Isma’îl’s failure to engage in battle, leading to an exchange of increasingly insulting letters between them.
In language similar to that used by his grandfather to Uzun Hasan, Selim sent letters and gifts, including a dervish cloak, a staff and a cloak, symbols of dervishness, and even wine barrels, implying that “it more becomes the son of the Sufi to sit in the tekke”. In response, Isma‘il despatched a letter together with opium paste and a golden opium pot, commenting that Selim’s letters could only have been written by scribes lost in the oblivion of opium. Some historians have argued that the opium and opium pot were sent in order to imply that Selim, like his father, was an opium addict. Stressing his own friendship with the Ottomans, Isma‘il made it clear that if Selim did not wish such friendship, then he was ready for war. Enraged by these gifts and the tone of the letter, Selim had Isma‘il’s envoy killed and sent a return missive accusing Isma‘il of cowardice for failing to enter battle. The letter, accompanied by a set of female garments, including a veil, advised Isma‘il to dress in women’s clothing for “masculinity is illegitimate [haram] for you”.

What eventually lured Isma‘il into battle was, according to some Ottoman sources, a trick perpetrated by Selim’s spy, Şeyh Ahmed, who informed Isma‘il that various Turcoman, Kurdish beys loyal to the Ottomans and men of Rumeli would change sides during the battle. Relying on this false intelligence, Isma‘il decided to fight. In August 1514, the two armies met in the plain of Çaldıran, 80 kilometres to the south-east of Doğubeyazıt. The Safavids were defeated, and Isma‘il, deserting his wife, or favourite, Taclu Hanım, and his treasury, fled from the battlefield. Selim’s army entered the Safavid capital, Tabriz, without opposition, and there the hutbe was read in the name of the Ottoman sultan. Apparently met with joy, Selim, who adopted a merciful policy towards its inhabitants, only remained in Tabriz a few days for, despite his joyful reception, he did not feel secure surrounded by Kızılbaş. His intention was to winter in Karabakh, but the commanders and the janissaries wanted to return to Amasya, where they argued provisions

286 Ibid., p. 185; Tekindağ, ‘Yeni Kaynak’, pp. 60–1.
287 See, for example, Uzuńcaşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, II, p. 263.
289 Ibid.
290 Hoca Sadettin Efendi, Tacii‘-Tevarih, vol. 4, pp. 190–1; Lütfi Paşa, Tevārih, p. 205.
were both more plentiful and cheaper. Left with no choice, Selim was forced to pass the winter in Amasya. A short while after Selim had left Tabriz, Isma’il returned to the city.

Despite the victory of Çaldıran, Selim’s work in the east remained unfinished, and Isma’il’s capital, although captured, did not stay in Ottoman hands. The lands on the western borders of the state did, however, pass under Ottoman control. Taking Erzincan en route to Çaldıran, the Ottomans also took Bayburt (1514) and Kemah (1515), and, after hard fighting, Diyarbakır, Mardin and the surrounding area were added to Ottoman territory. Selim was also successful in winning over some local Kurdish, Turcoman and Arab rulers with the help of İdris-i Bitlisi, a respected member of the ulema and a man of high standing among the Kurdish tribes. Regarding “the protected lands of Rum” as the only place among the lands of Islam where there was security, he had moved from Tabriz to Istanbul after Isma’il’s conquest of Tabriz in 1501 and had entered Bayezid’s service. In return for the loyalty and collaboration of these tribes, Selim permitted them to continue to rule their traditional lands, which included Bitlis, Hasan-Keyf and Imadiyye.

In the aftermath of Çaldıran, Selim also campaigned against the beylik of Dulgadir, a region the Mamluks considered under their own authority. In 1514, Selim ordered Şehsuvaroğlu Ali, son of Şehsuvar, the brother of Alaüdevle, to attack the sancak of Bozok, which was under the Dulgadiroğulları. Şehsuvaroğlu Ali had taken refuge with the Ottomans during Bayezid’s reign and had been made sancak beyi of Kayseri by Selim, whom he had served well during the Çaldıran campaign. Şehsuvaroğlu Ali now attacked Bozok and killed Alaüdevle’s son Süleyman, sending his head to Selim. In response, Alaüdevle attacked the Ottoman supply lines during Selim’s campaign against Kemah. After the taking of Kemah, Selim despatched the beylerbeyi of Rumeli, Sinan Paşa, against Elbistan. The beylik of Dulgadır was conquered in June 1515 and Şehsuvaroğlu Ali put in as ruler under Ottoman control.

According to the Fetihname of the beylik of Dulgadır and of Kemah which Selim presented to his son, the reason for the attack on Alaüdevle was his failure to join the Ottomans during the Çaldıran campaign and, more
significantly, his agreement to give help to the Safavids.301 Alaüddevle, who had earlier stabilised his relations with Shah Isma’îl, had not joined the Çaldıran campaign, using his advanced age as an excuse, had forbidden the selling of foodstuffs and animal fodder to the Ottoman forces in his territories and even, according to some sources, plundered Ottoman provisions and supplies.302 According to Kemalpaşaçazade, Alaüddevle was inconsistent in his allegiance, floating like the wind between the Ottomans and the Mamluks, and it was his incitement which had brought the two sultans into conflict.303 Selim was credited with claiming, when still a prince in Trabzon, that Alaüddevle had profited from the rift in relations between the Ottomans and the Mamluks,304 a view supported by Alaüddevle’s remark about the two states: “I have two hens, one lays gold, the other silver”.305

Unhappy with the Ottoman conquest of Dulgadir, which he had sought through diplomatic channels to prevent, Qansuh al-Ghawri, the Mamluk sultan, now came under intense pressure. Sending him the decapitated head of Alaüddevle’s son and vezir,306 Selim announced, according to Lütfi Paşa, that, in effect, his head was next.307 Such a threat was not unexpected, for Qansuh al-Ghawri thought that whoever emerged victorious from Çaldıran would then invade Egypt.308 Selim was in fact merely waiting for an opportunity to invade. Bayezid’s defeat had not been forgotten, and Selim’s countenance “was etched by the lines of revenge”.309 The chance for revenge, according to Ottoman sources, came with Shah Isma’îl’s anti-Ottoman agreement with Qansuh al-Ghawri after his rout at Çaldıran.310 The existence of such an agreement is disputable, for although it is known that after his defeat Isma’il approached the Mamluks for an anti-Ottoman alliance, as he did with states in Europe, there is no convincing proof that Qansuh al-Ghawri accepted this.311 In any case,
this claim gave Selim the necessary legitimacy for his campaign, a campaign justified, according to Hoca Sadeddin, because “those who help the enemy, are enemies”. 312

Concealing the true destination of the campaign, Selim acted as though the assault was aimed at Iran. When the advance force under Sinan Paşa, bypassing the Mamluk city of Malatya on Selim’s orders, requested permission to proceed to Diyarbakır, the Mamluk governor of Malatya refused. 313 This suited Selim well and was interpreted as proof of an agreement between the Mamluks and the Safavids. 314 Still concealing his intentions, however, Selim sent an envoy with a letter and valuable presents to Qansuh al-Ghawri. 315 The tone of this letter was misleading, for he addressed him as “my father” and explained that he had conducted his campaign against Alâüdddevle with his, Qansuh al-Ghawri’s, permission. 316 If the Mamluks wanted, he assured him, he would remove Şehsuvaroğlu Ali. Selim also noted that he had put no impediment in the way of merchants bringing slaves to Qansuh al-Ghawri 317 and that the Arabic, Iranian and Ottoman merchants who did not have Safavid goods on them had not been touched. 318 Despite such reassuring words, Selim had in fact, a few months earlier, forbidden merchants and slave traders from entering Mamluk territory. 319 Qansuh al-Ghawri, who did not believe in the genuineness of the friendly tone of Selim’s letter, which Ibn Iyas described as “a piece of trickery and deception”, 320 advanced into Syria. Sending a further letter to the sultan, now at Aleppo, and requesting sugar and sweetmeats from him, Selim made it clear once again that his target was the Safavids. 321 Qansuh al-Ghawri, however, remained unconvinced. In August 1516, the two armies met at Marj Dabiq in Syria. The battle left the Mamluks defeated and Qansuh al-Ghawri dead. The Ottomans took over control of greater Syria and of the territory of the Ramazanoğulları, previously under the Mamluks but who now switched to the Ottomans. At first considering leaving the new sultan Tumanbay in place in Egypt as an Ottoman vassal, an offer in any

312 Hoca Sadettin Efendi, Tacü’i-tevarih, vol. 4, p. 278.
315 Ibid., pp. 278–9.
317 Ibn Iyas, Conquest, p. 16.
320 Ibn Iyas, Conquest, p. 17.
321 Ibid., pp. 32–3.
Ottoman expansion in the East

case rejected by the Mamluk ruler, Ottoman forces defeated the Mamluks under Janbirdi al-Ghazali, who had been governor of Hamah under Qansuh al-Ghawri and was now Tumanbay’s governor of Damascus at Khan Yunus, near Gaza, which was followed by the defeat of the Mamluk army by Selim at al-Ridaniyya, near Cairo, in January 1517. Tumanbay fled, Selim entered Cairo and the hutbe was read in his name. Permission was granted for three days of pillaging and “Not a horse, nor mule, nor clothing, not anything great or small was left untouched”. Tumanbay, however, continued to resist, and there was fighting between Mamluk and Ottoman forces in the streets of Cairo. Although the Ottomans put down such conflicts, Tumanbay escaped, and so long as he remained alive, the total submission of Cairo proved impossible. After a concerted pursuit, he was eventually captured and was handed over to Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey, who hanged him at the Zuwayla Gate, the place at which the Mamluks had hanged his father, Şehsuvar.

With the surrender of the keys of Mecca and Medina, brought by the son of the şerif of these cities to Selim in Cairo, Aşıkpaşazade’s prayer for Bayezid II that “May God grant that his hutbe be read at the Kabe [Ka’aba]” was now realised by Selim. Selim, who remained in Egypt for eight months, appointed Khayrbak to the governorship of Egypt. Former governor of Aleppo, his bad relations with Qansuh al-Ghawri had led him to provide intelligence to Selim, and after Selim’s victory he had openly sworn allegiance to the Ottoman sultan. Passing from Egypt through Syria on his return to Istanbul, Selim appointed another Mamluk, Janbirdi al-Ghazali, whom he had pardoned, to the governorship of Syria.

The conquests of Selim’s reign had turned the Ottoman state into a large Asian empire. The fall of the Mamluks had brought the Ottomans control over important trade routes and had, even if only temporarily, weakened the contacts between Iran and the West. After Selim’s death in 1520, his son and successor Süleyman set out both to consolidate Ottoman control in the areas his father had captured in the east and, following in his father’s footsteps, to expand Ottoman territory still further.

One of Süleyman’s first moves once on the throne was to dismantle various of his father’s measures which had had negative economic and political

323 Ibn Iyas, Conquest, p. 114.
326 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nün Tarihi, bab 163, p. 556.
effects. He gave permission for the return to Cairo of families whom Selim had forced to move to Istanbul, where they had been living under miserable conditions. He also reversed his father’s policy on trade with Iran and normalised trade relations between the two states. Before the Çaldıran campaign, Selim had banned Ottoman trade with the Safavid state. In consequence, merchants had had their goods seized, and some had received harsh punishment. After Çaldıran, Selim ordered that those who ignored this prohibition should be put to death and all their goods and possessions, their provisions and their slaves seized for the state. In compliance with Selim’s order, the seized goods were included in the imperial treasury and kept in Bursa and other places. As Ottoman territory expanded, so did the area to which this strictly enforced trade ban applied. What lay behind this ban was, according to Celalzade Mustafa, the fact that the Kızılbaş owed their power to Anatolia, for it was from here that all their arms and equipment came. The effect, however, was economically damaging for the Ottomans, the famous Gelinçik market of Bursa, for example, being turned into “the ruined abode of the destitute”, and, because silk could not be found and cloth not produced, the workshops became “withered rose gardens, water mills without water”. Application of the ban also resulted in the punishment of innocent merchants, whose goods were unjustly seized. Complaints to Selim had no effect, for he merely advised patience. Süleyman, in contrast, both overturned the ban and, in cases where Ottoman or Iranian merchants proved that goods seized were theirs, the goods were either returned or the merchants compensated. While this policy was an important step in his drive to consolidate his power within his territories, it also represented the restoration of an important source of income for Süleyman, who needed money.

Süleyman’s task was initially made more difficult due to suspicions that he would be unable to fill the place of a sultan as powerful as his father. At

328 Kemalpaşazade, Tevarih X, p. 44.
330 An entry from Edremit Seriye Sicili, beginning of Sevval 921; see Su, ‘Yavuz Selim ve Seferleri’, p. 262; Tansel, Yavuz, p. 84.
333 Celalzade, Tabakât, 27a.
334 Kemalpaşazade, Tevarih X, p. 43.
335 Celalzade, Tabakât, p. 27b.
336 Kemalpaşazade, Tevarih X, p. 44 and note 38; Celalzade, Tabakât, pp. 27b–28a.
the head of such doubters was Janbirdi al-Ghazali, who sprang into action as soon as he heard of Selim’s death. Janbirdi al-Ghazali, who had a considerable level of support among the Mamluks and the populace, was defeated by the Ottomans in February 1521. Despite Janbirdi al-Ghazali’s invitation to join the revolt, Khayrbak, the governor of Egypt, remained loyal to the Ottomans. Further revolts broke out after his death, in 1523 and 1524. A series of revolts erupted among local Mamluk office holders on the arrival from Istanbul of Mustafa Paşa, who had been appointed as governor on Khayrbak’s death in 1522, but were put down without difficulty. Mustafa Paşa was replaced by Kasım Paşa, and in 1523 the second vezir Ahmed Paşa became governor. He promptly revolted, relying on the local forces he had gathered round him, and proclaimed himself sultan. Remembered as a “traitor”, Ahmed Paşa was finally captured and executed in 1524. Süleyman then despatched his grand vezir İbrahim Paşa to Egypt. İbrahim established firm Ottoman control, hanging the Arab şeyh who had supported Ahmed Paşa and bringing in a new law code, the Kanunname-i Mısır.

While revolts broke out in the new, and distant, province of Egypt, revolts also occurred nearer to the centre, in Anatolia. At the beginning of 1520, a major revolt broke out under Şah Veli bin Celal in the region of Tokat. The Ottomans successfully put down the revolt, killing Şah Veli and massacring many of his followers, but suffered heavy casualties in the process. The revolt had been provoked among followers of Isma‘il who wished to prevent another campaign against the Safavids by keeping Ottoman forces occupied in Anatolia. Even if one accepts that Safavid provocation played a part in the revolt, Selim’s oppression and exclusion of the non-Sunni population, together

343 Although this dervish’s name appears in some sources as Celal, Celal was, according to Jean-Louis Bacquê-Grammont, the name of the revoler’s father. See Jean-Louis Bacquê-Grammont, ‘Études turco-safavides, III. Notes et documents sur la révolte de Şah Veli B. Şeyh Celâl’, Archivum Ottomanicum 7 (1982), 5–69 at pp. 17–23.
344 Ibid., pp. 27–67.
with the increasing economic difficulties in the region brought about by his policies, alienated the population from the state and created an environment ripe for rebellion.

According to Akdağ, whose argument is contrary to the normally accepted view, the Ottoman treasury on Selim’s death was almost empty. Revenue was thus needed for new campaigns. Süleyman’s response was to order new land surveys, with the intention of increasing the income from the land. Officials were sent to the provinces, where they re-registered certain sipahi holdings and increased the registered yield of certain lands. They thus both ensured a large income for the treasury and, by registering the population, further strengthened central authority in these regions. However much the aim of this new registration was said to be “to register completely and to protect the possessions of the sultan and to bind the reaya and the sipahis together”, the result was a breakdown in social order. In 1526, widespread agitation among the Bozok Turcomans against the increased tax registered by the officials turned into a revolt, followed by the outbreak of revolts one after the other across south and inner Anatolia. One of these was led by Kalender, a descendant of Haçı Bektaş-ı Veli, in the Ankara-Kırşehir region, which erupted in 1528. Kalender attracted an enormous following, including sipahis who had been dispossessed of their timars. Although ultimately successful in suppressing these revolts, the Ottoman state did so only with great difficulty and with much loss of life. Even if the Safavid state was not directly involved in these revolts, it offered an attractive alternative power centre, and it is highly likely that the Safavids were influential in these events. Indeed, the rebels’ turning frequently towards “the eastern country”, meaning “the Kızılbaş”, shows clearly the indirect influence of the Safavid state in these events.

These revolts once more highlighted the dangerous influence of the Safavids within Ottoman territory. As the Şah Veli revolt clearly showed, Isma’il, even after his defeat at Çaldıran, still held high prestige in Anatolia, and even his death did not bring any decrease in his spiritual power. Even 30 years on, Süleyman was still worried about Isma’il’s influence among the

345 Akdağ, Dirlik ve Düzenlik, pp. 118–20; Akdağ, Tarihi, pp. 687–8.
350 Ibid., p. 165.
351 Kemalpaşazade, Tervarih X, p. 346.
populace, ordering the pursuit of a man who claimed that a leather shoe which had once belonged to Shah Isma’il cured barren women and the seizure of the shoe itself.352 The belief in, and loyalty to, the spiritual power of the Safavid leader was evident also with Isma’il’s son and successor Tahmasp. Michele Membré, the Venetian envoy sent to Iran in search of an alliance with Tahmasp against the Ottomans during the Ottoman–Venetian war of 1537–40, recounted how a Turcoman from Adana had managed with great difficulty to obtain one of the shah’s kerciefs, giving a horse in exchange. He believed that his sick father, who had seen the shah in a dream and had wanted a cloth belonging to him, would recover when he received it.353

Süleyman thus, like his father and grandfather before him, regarded the Safavid state as a major threat to order in his own territories. Like his father, Süleyman, too, from the time he ascended the throne, gave great importance to intelligence about the Safavid state and sought to follow Isma’il’s movements closely.354 The intelligence that Isma’il had ordered the Şah Veli revolt, together with that which showed Isma’il’s direct involvement in the revolt of Janbirdi al-Ghazali, made these events more than mere internal affairs.355 Although Ayalon has argued that there is no proof of a connection between Isma’il and Janbirdi al-Ghazali,356 intelligence had earlier reached Selim that Janbirdi al-Ghazali was in contact with Isma’il.357 It was the suspicion that he was working with Isma’il that in 1522 cost Şehsuvaroğlu Ali, prominent in the suppression of both the Şah Veli and Janbirdi al-Ghazali revolts,358 his head. Gossip that he wanted independence359 and had thus entered into relations with Isma’il reached Süleyman,360 who had Şehsuvaroğlu Ali and his sons killed and his territory turned into an eyalet (province).

For Süleyman, peace in the east was essential for the success of his campaigning in the west, which was undermined by problems in Anatolia. This

353 Membré, Mission, p. 41.
354 Allouche, Ottoman-Safavid, p. 132.
358 Lütfi Paşa, Tevârih, p. 244.
was the case, for example, in 1526, when Süleyman hastily returned from his campaign in Hungary on the outbreak of a major revolt in Anatolia.361 Receiving an envoy from Isma’i’l,362 Süleyman was not entirely inclined to making peace but was also not attracted by the idea of immediately entering into a campaign against him.363 In 1525, however, after the death of Isma’i’l and the accession of his ten-year-old son Tahmasp, who was caught up in a power struggle with dissident Kızılbaş elements whom he finally brought under control in 1533,364 Süleyman sent a letter to the new Safavid ruler threatening that he would set up his “imperial tent” in Safavid territory, and if Tahmasp did not become a şeyh like his forefathers, then he would find him “even if you became an ant and burrowed into the ground, even if you became a bird and flew up into the sky” and would destroy him.365

Despite such belligerent language, Süleyman in fact did not campaign in the east, unable to fight on two fronts simultaneously, and focused instead on the west. It was thus not the Ottomans but the Uzbeks who benefited from the internal confusion within the Safavid state. Nor was Süleyman, occupied in Hungary, able to use the opportunity offered by the anti-Safavid revolt of the ruler of Baghdad, Zülfikar (Zu’l-Faqar Sultan Mausillu), who presented Süleyman with the keys of the city and had the hutbe read in his name. Without Ottoman support, Zülfikar was killed by his brothers, who supported Tahmasp.366

In 1530, Süleyman gave permission for the governor of Azerbaijan, Ulama Han, one of the leading figures in the Safavid government, to take refuge with the Ottomans. Ulama Han was a member of the Tekelü tribe from Anatolia, which had played a major role in the establishment of Isma’i’l’s state. As a result of the confiscation of his dirlik, he had joined the Şah Kulu revolt and had then been among those who had fled to Isma’i’l.367 The reason for Ulama Han’s flight now to the Ottomans was the devastating attack launched by other tribes against the Tekelü, the most powerful tribe in the Safavid state, and the subsequent loss of the Tekelü tribe’s influence in the

362 Allouche, Ottoman-Safavid, p. 132.
367 Sümer, Sefevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 32.
Safavid administration. By giving him a “useful” sancak in Diyarbakır on the Safavid border, Süleyman made his intentions towards the Safavids plain. While Ulama Han defected to the Ottomans, Şeref Han (IV), the head of the hanate of Bitlis, who had accepted Ottoman authority during the reign of Selim, defected to the Safavids. According to Lütfi Paşa, Şeref Han’s loyalty was always questionable. The grandson of Şeref Han and writer of the Şerefname, however, blames Şeref Han’s defection not on any lack of loyalty to the Ottomans, as implied by Lütfi Paşa, but on Ulama Paşa’s intrigues against him. According to the Şerefname, Ulama Han, on his arrival in Istanbul, claimed that Şeref Han had pro-Safavid sympathies. In consequence, orders were given for the direct incorporation of the hanate of Bitlis into the Ottoman state, leaving the han without any option but to request help from Tahmasp. Tahmasp then took Bitlis under his protection. In 1532, Süleyman appointed Ulama Paşa to the beylerbeylik of Bitlis and sent him, together with the beylerbeyi of Diyarbakır Fil Yakup Paşa, against Şeref Han, who, with Safavid help, survived this first attack. Claiming that other Kızılbaş emirs would join the Ottomans, Ulama Han worked to persuade Süleyman to send a campaign against Tahmasp. He constantly sent news to Süleyman that Tahmasp was busy with the Uzbeks, Mongols and Tatars, and claimed that “Azerbaijan and Persian Iraq lie undefended”. Once again despatched against Şeref Han, Ulama Han and Fil Yakub were this time successful. Şeref Han was killed and Bitlis taken in September 1532. Instead of incorporating the hanate directly into the Ottoman state, Süleyman gave the sancak as an ocaklık to Şemseddin III, the son of Şeref Han, who submitted to the Ottomans.

With the end of yet another Hungarian campaign in June 1533, Süleyman decided on an eastern campaign. While Tahmasp was still involved in clashes with the Uzbeks, the Ottoman army marched eastwards in October 1533
under the command of the grand vezir İbrahim Paşa, taking the castles of Adilcevaz, Erciş, Van and Ahlat, and passed the winter of 1533–4 at Aleppo. İbrahim gathered intelligence about Tahmasp which he forwarded to Süleyman in Istanbul. The presence of Süleyman in Istanbul rather than at the head of the army caused mutterings among the soldiers, who wanted Süleyman to lead them, for “a shah was necessary for a shah”. İbrahim reported this disquiet to Süleyman but, without waiting for him, set off in the spring to Tabriz, and, without encountering Tahmasp’s forces, entered the city in July 1534. Azerbaijan was added to the empire as a province.

In the autumn of 1534, Süleyman joined the army under İbrahim Paşa but, since the Safavid forces persistently avoided any direct conflict, finally left for Baghdad, which he reached after an extremely difficult march in December 1534. Offering no resistance, the city fell. Producing an adaletname as the basis for Ottoman administration of the new province of Iraq, Süleyman revoked the heavy taxation imposed by the Safavids. During his stay in the city, he visited the tombs of various figures holy both for Sunnis and Shiis, both in Baghdad and elsewhere, had such sites repaired and alms given to the poor.

While Süleyman was in Baghdad, news arrived that Tahmasp had re-taken Tabriz and that Ulama Paşa, who was responsible for the protection of Tabriz and the Van region, had taken refuge in the castle of Van. Tahmasp, who saw Ulama as “a mortal foe”, besieged the castle. Süleyman sent relief forces, but, hampered by the winter weather, the campaign ended without any engagement. In 1538, the ruler of Basra, Rasid ibn Makamis, sent his son to Edirne and announced his acceptance of Ottoman overlordship. Appointing him as beylerbeyi, Süleyman recognised the local administration. Süleyman’s campaign in the east ended without any decisive victory over Tahmasp, despite İbrahim Paşa’s letter to Şehzade Mustafa announcing that Iran “had been completely conquered and subjugated”. However, by taking Baghdad,

378 Ibid., doc. III, p. 466.
382 Sümer, Safavi Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 64.
the Ottomans had extended their control southwards, and by conquering Georgian territory, they had established the beylerbeylik of Erzurum.

The Iranian campaigns had cost the Ottomans dearly, particularly in economic terms, and even if the Ottoman army remained undefeated, it had gained very little from the war. The climatic conditions and difficult terrain had created major problems, soldiers freezing to death and equipment destroyed, for example, when the army was caught in a snowstorm at Sultaniyya on the way to Baghdad, an event described in a couplet quoted by Eskandar Beg Monshi:

When I went to Soltāniya, that splendid pasturage / I saw two thousand corpses lying there without grave or burial shroud / I said, “Who slew all these Ottomans?” / The morning breeze replied, “It was I”.

What did most damage to the Ottomans, however, were the scorched-earth tactics employed by Tahmasp, adopted also to great advantage by his father. For Tahmasp, the best way to render the Ottomans ineffective was to prevent them obtaining provisions, a tactic he was to use with success in later wars. Thus, in the campaign of 1548–9, Tahmasp instructed men to lay waste to the land between Tabriz and the Ottoman borders “so that no trace of grain or grass remained”. Aware of this, the Ottomans set off on the Iranian campaigns having made extensive preparations beforehand. In the middle of the sixteenth century, the Habsburg ambassador, Busbecq, noting that in the campaign that the Ottomans conducted in Iran, in contrast to other campaigns, beasts of burden were loaded with “cereals of every kind, especially rice”, commented that the reason for this, apart from being that the country of the Safavids was less productive than Busbecq’s own, was related to the fact that “it is the custom of the inhabitants, when their land is invaded, to lay waste and burn everything, and so force the enemy to retire through lack of food”. This need to transport all food supplies imposed a costly burden on the campaign, and on the population: in 1534, a nüzül (collection) was imposed on the population of Larende to pay for the hiring of the many camels necessary for the campaign.

386 Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, pp. 62–3.
388 Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 65, note 28.
After the campaign of 1533–5, relations between the two states remained tense. Clashes occurred throughout the border zone, and even though Ottoman–Safavid trade continued, it did so under very difficult conditions. Süleyman sought to avoid needlessly exhausting his troops and ordered commanders along the frontier to avoid unnecessary clashes. Süleyman, however, was aware of the limits of Ottoman power on the borders but was still irritated by his commanders’ failure to cope effectively with the situation. Annoyed at the insufficient response of the beylerbeyi of Diyarbakır to a Safavid attack on a castle under construction at Ahtamar, whose stones the Safavid troops had thrown into “the sea”, meaning Lake Van, Süleyman demanded, “[I]s this any way to protect the frontier?”

Despite all Süleyman’s attempts to seal the frontier, it remained totally porous: smuggling and the flight of the population continued regardless. Michele Membré speaks of a group of 800 households of Turcoman families who, in 1539, migrated together with their animals from Erzincan to Tahmasp’s territory and swore allegiance to him. When news reached Süleyman of the movement of “useful” horses and mules from Ottoman territory to “the defeated enemy”, as the Safavids were, rather hopefully, known, he instructed the beylerbeyi of Baghdad that this must be prevented. If one accepts the account of Lütfi Paşa, Tahmasp’s threat to the Ottomans had an international dimension. Before the Hungarian campaigns of 1541, according to Lütfi Paşa, the Hungarian king John Szápolyai, under Ottoman protection, had contacted Tahmasp, who had proposed an attack on the Ottomans on two fronts. Upon hearing this, Süleyman had sent soldiers to both fronts and had himself waited ready in Istanbul. When Tahmasp remained inactive and the situation became more pressing in Hungary, Süleyman had turned his attention to the west.

With the situation stabilised in the west, Süleyman now planned a new campaign against the Safavids. In March 1545, he wrote to leading figures

393 Membré, Mission, p. 11; Sahillioğlu, E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme, no. 381 (Muharrem 952/March–April 1545).
394 Sahillioğlu, E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme, no. 151 (Şevval 951 December-January 1544–5); no. 294 (Zilhicce 951 February–March 1545).
395 Membré, Mission, p. 18.
396 Membré, Mission, p. 18.
397 Sahillioğlu, E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme, no. 381 (Muharrem 952/March–April 1545).
398 Lütfi Paşa, Tevârîh, p. 292.
in Shirvan, which had been taken by the Safavids in 1538, claiming that the “Kızılbaş ... were being more treacherous than before and were conducting oppression and seizing goods”\(^{399}\) in Shirvan, informing them that he was resolved on a campaign against the Safavids and requesting that the necessary aid be given to the Ottoman official Maksud Ali Bey.\(^{400}\) The opportunity for which Süleyman was waiting occurred when in 1547 Alkas Mirza, Tahmasp’s brother and, since the Safavid conquest, the governor of Shirvan and thus, ironically, the figure responsible for the oppression referred to by Süleyman,\(^{401}\) fled to the Ottomans after the failure of his revolt against his brother.\(^{402}\) Alkas Mirza’s arrival gave “much delight and joy”\(^{403}\) to Süleyman, who received him so well\(^{404}\) that, according to Lütfi Paşa, “Alkas could not have seen in the vilayet of Persia such a high and honourable position even in his dreams”.\(^{405}\) Alkas Mirza was not merely received in splendour but also drowned in very valuable gifts.\(^{406}\) Süleyman’s display of such great interest in Alkas Mirza did not please everyone. In a letter which he sent to the grand vezir and Süleyman’s son-in-law, Rüstem Paşa, Şeyh Bali Efendi, one of the leading religious scholars of the period, openly criticised Süleyman’s behaviour. Asking “if on our part, we shower honours and favours on Alqās, or someone else, what will be the profit?” Şeyh Bali Efendi added that “they [the Kızılbaş] are the seeds of error and sparks ... of the infernal fire.... Alive or dead, in the Islamic territory they are nothing but harm, and their removal from it is very happiness”.\(^{407}\) The people of Istanbul, too, criticised such expense lavished by the sultan on someone like Alkas Mirza, who was a traitor and an infidel in origin and who had taken refuge with the Ottomans in order to save his own skin. Süleyman was forced to defend himself from such criticism by saying that he had done this for the honour of the state.\(^{408}\)

Alkas Mirza’s taking refuge with the Ottomans was for Süleyman “an invaluable piece of good fortune as presenting him with the means of subjugating Iran”.\(^{409}\) Süleyman calculated that, using Alkas Mirza, it would be

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399 Sahillioğlu, *E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme*, no. 451 (Muharrem 952/March–April 1545).
400 Sahillioğlu, *E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme*, no. 452 (Muharrem 952/March–April 1545).
possible to remove Tahmasp and put Alkas Mirza on the throne as an Ottoman puppet.\footnote{Walsh, ‘Alqas Mirza’, p. 77.} According to a Venetian ambassador’s report, Alkas Mirza’s aim was to persuade Süleyman to undertake a campaign against his brother Tahmasp,\footnote{Relazione di Alvise Renier, in Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato, vol. 14: Costantinopoli. Relazioni inedite (1512–1789), ed. Maria Pia Pedani-Fabris (Padua, 1996), pp. 72–3.} which he in fact succeeded in doing,\footnote{Peçevi, Tarih, vol. 1, p. 268; Eskandar Beg Monshi, History of Shah ’Abbas, vol. 1, pp. 115–17.} although Süleyman had had such a campaign in mind for some time. Having sent Alkas Mirza and Ulama Paşa off with an advance force, Süleyman set off in haste at the head of the army, even before the campaign season had started.\footnote{Lütfi Paşa, Tevârîh, p. 301.} In summer 1548, he reached Tabriz and entered the city unopposed, the shah’s army having retreated. It was impossible to stay in Tabriz for more than four days, however, as the city had been plundered and the Ottomans “could find nothing edible for either man or beast”, resulting in the death from hunger of several thousand Ottoman horses and mules.\footnote{Lütfi Paşa, Tevârîh, pp. 303–4.} Withdrawing from Tabriz, the army took the castle of Van, defined as “the frontier and castle of the kingdom of Tahmasp”,\footnote{Ibid.} whose possession had been constantly in dispute between the two states.

Adopting their usual tactics of devastation, the Safavids raided extensively in the border regions round Adilcevaz, Muş, Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt and Kars\footnote{Peçevi, Tarih, vol. 1, pp. 274–5; Eskandar Beg Monshi, History of Shah ’Abbas, vol. 1, p. 119.} and set out to reduce the zone to a wasteland in which survival would be impossible, thus preventing Ottoman movement eastwards.\footnote{Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 67.} Although Süleyman wished to pursue Tahmasp, this scorched-earth tactic and Süleyman’s desire to preserve the strength of his troops left him with no option but to remain in Diyarbakur while Tahmasp continued to devastate Ottoman territory.\footnote{Lütfi Paşa, Tevârîh, p. 303.}

In revenge for Tahmasp’s actions, Süleyman ordered Alkas Mirza to plunder Iranian territory. Süleyman accepted Alkas Mirza’s claims that the majority of beys on the Iranian border and the sipahıs would rise in his support, but this did not in fact happen.\footnote{Lütfi Paşa, Tevârîh, p. 303.} Alkas Mirza’s repeated assurances that “in their hearts [the Kızılbaş tribes] support me. I have only to set foot on Persian soil, and they will flock to me”, together with his promise to return with large quantities of booty, encouraged Süleyman to despatch him to raid Tahmasp’s
Alkas Mirza did not prove the asset Süleyman had hoped. Escaping from Ottoman anger, he fled back to Iran and begged for Tahmasp’s forgiveness. With Süleyman back in Istanbul, the war of attrition continued, and in 1551 the Safavids took the castles of Adilcevaz, Erşiş and Ahlat. The forces under the command of İskender Paşa, the beylerbeyi of Erzurum, were defeated by the forces of Tahmasp’s son Isma’il, and the region was “plundered and burned” by the Safavids, who returned “laden with booty”. In response, Süleyman sent the grand vezir Rüstem Paşa with an army to the east. Rüstem’s target was Şehzade Mustafa rather than Tahmasp. Mustafa, Süleyman’s eldest son and considered heir apparent, whose court was at Amasya, was much in favour of a new campaign against Iran. In the politics of the capital, he was opposed by Rüstem Paşa and Süleyman’s wife Hürrem Sultan, whose ambition was for one of her own sons to ascend the throne. Rüstem spread rumours that Mustafa was preparing to revolt against his father and that he was even in contact with Shah Tahmasp. In consequence, Süleyman became suspicious of his son. He recalled Rüstem and prepared to set out on campaign himself. His initial aim was to solve the problem of Mustafa, whom he had strangled when he joined the campaign near Ereğli. After wintering in Aleppo, he set off once more on campaign in the spring of 1554. From Kars he sent Tahmasp a letter in an attempt to provoke him into battle, something which Tahmasp had no intention of doing. Süleyman plundered Revan, Nakhchivan and Karabakh, seizing much booty and many slaves, but was forced to withdraw without encountering the Safavid ruler.

422 Lütfi Paşa, Tevârîh, p. 306.
The treaty of Amasya (1555): A precarious peace

Although the last two Iranian campaigns may have been planned as campaigns of expansion, they can, in view of their outcome, be defined as defensive wars. Gaining very little, the Ottomans had instead exhausted their military at a time of breakdown in the socio-economic order of the empire, evident particularly in the revolts of the levênds and softas (theological students). The unattractiveness of service in the east and the inability of the state to control this region were highlighted by janissary complaints about being sent to Erzurum, a location they did not wish to go to and from where they fled, with their weapons, to the Safavids. Discontent was felt even in the most remote corners of the empire, the representative of the şerif of Mecca complaining to Şehzade Bayezid, then governor of Kütahya, that the Arab regions “had become a wasteland”.

In these circumstances, concluding a treaty with the Safavids was imperative for the Ottomans. Thus, when Tahmasp sent envoys to Süleyman, then wintering in Amasya, with an offer of peace, discussions were begun and in June 1555 peace was agreed. Under this agreement, the region of Lake Van and Şehrizor remained Ottoman and the frontier was fixed at Arpaçay. Both sides undertook to refrain from attack and to ensure the security of the frontier, the Ottomans thus securing their border and Tahmasp rescuing his territory from continuous attack and ensuring that Azerbaijan would be safe from further Ottoman aggression. Süleyman also demanded that the Safavids desist from their traditional denigration of the first three rightly guided caliphs and Muhammad’s wife Aysha but was reassured by the Safavid ambassador that this tradition had already been banned. Süleyman gave permission for Iranian subjects to visit the Ka’aba in Mecca, the tomb of the prophet Muhammad in Medina and various other holy sites in Iraq, such as the shrines of Ali in Najaf and Husayn in Karbala, and promised that these visits would be undertaken in safety.

435 Remzi Kılıç, XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı-Iran Siyası Anlaşmaları (İstanbul, 2001), p. 73; Sümer, Safavi Devletinin Kurtuluşu, p. 68.
Ottoman expansion in the East

The result of realpolitik rather than any genuine desire for enduring peace, the Ottomans were nevertheless anxious to display the treaty as a strong and lasting one. Busbecq, the Habsburg ambassador, who was in Amasya at the same time as the Persian ambassador, commented that, “No possible honour towards the Persian was omitted, that we might have no doubt about the genuineness of the peace which had been made with him”. In the period following the conclusion of the treaty, both Süleyman and his successor, Selim II, took care to conform to its terms. Tahmasp’s desire, as expressed in a letter he wrote to Süleyman, that there should be open exchange of information between the two states was put in place, and requests and complaints coming from Iran were dealt with carefully by the Ottomans. Ottoman border officials were repeatedly ordered to be vigilant over the application of the clause requiring that “anyone from either side who might seek sanctuary with the other side should be returned and not given any support”, regardless of Safavid contravention in accepting, for example, Ottoman subjects from Erzurum in 1557. The Ottomans also abided by the agreement over permitting entry to those from Iran who wished to go on pilgrimage and to visit the holy sites in Iraq. This applied equally to Iranians who were no longer alive, for the dead, too, were accepted into Ottoman territory for burial in the holy places.

An event which occurred only four years after the signing of the Amasya peace proved a serious test for the relations between the two states. In 1559, a succession struggle broke out between Süleyman’s sons Bayezid and Selim. Defeated, Bayezid, together with his sons and a large, armed group of supporters, fled to Iran. Tahmasp, thus presented with the opportunity to take revenge for the reverse flight of his own brother some years before, received Bayezid with great honour, as Süleyman had Alkas Mirza.

437 Busbecq, Letters, p. 63.
440 For example, see 7 Mühimme, no. 1242 (Şevval 975/March–April 1568).
441 For example, see 7 Mühimme, no. 147, no. 153 (27 Muharrem 973/24 August 1565), no. 618 (10 Cemaziyülevvel 973/3 December 1565), no. 690 (Cemaziyülahir 973/21 November 1568); 7 Mühimme, no. 1797 (17 Safer 976/11 August 1568).
443 Turan, Taht Kavgaları, p. 112.
445 See, for example, 6 Numaralı Mühimme, no. 354 (4 Rebiülhur 972/9 November 1564).
447 Ibid., p. 114.
Although Tahmasp’s receiving of Bayezid in contravention of the Amasya treaty was a reason for war, Ottoman territories were in a state of near complete disorder and Süleyman therefore sought to solve the crisis through diplomatic channels. He immediately despatched a letter to Tahmasp, before Bayezid had reached the frontier, pointing out that if Tahmasp were to accept Bayezid, he would be obliged, in accordance with the treaty, to send him back. Süleyman also noted that Ottoman forces were massed on the border to intercept him. Tahmasp was unmoved. Next, Süleyman, in a move to get Bayezid and his sons back, sent ambassadors with expensive gifts, as did Selim, the one remaining son and now clear heir to the throne, who also had a vested interest in Bayezid’s return. In 1560, Iranian ambassadors to Süleyman and Selim, sent to conduct negotiations over Bayezid’s release, werelavishly received with their expenses, and those of their entourage, in Ottoman territory paid by the Ottomans, down to those for clothes and fees for the public baths. Tahmasp, aware that Süleyman was prepared to make enormous concessions to secure Bayezid, was keen to use his uninvited guest to the best possible advantage and drew out the negotiations. With the bargaining dragging on, Süleyman threatened Tahmasp with war. Tahmasp, aware that this was not possible, promptly threatened Süleyman with sending Bayezid to Anatolia. Tahmasp, whose demands included the castle of Kars and Baghdad, eventually agreed in 1562 to hand Bayezid and his sons over to Ottoman representatives in return for a large quantity of valuable gifts and the renewal of the Amasya treaty. Bayezid and his sons were immediately strangled and their bodies brought to Sivas for burial.

Despite this major crisis, peace was preserved between the two states. This did not mean, however, that there was any great trust in relations with the Safavids or sense of security among the Ottoman population in the border zones. The mere phrase “the Kızılbaş have come” was sufficient to cause the

449 3 Mühimme, no. 144 (18 Şevval 966/24 July 1559).
Ottoman expansion in the East

reaya to descend into “agitation and terror”. While the Ottomans abided by the terms of the treaty, they did so keeping their own interests firmly in mind. Although permission was granted for Safavid subjects to enter Ottoman territory in order to visit the holy places, their movements were closely monitored, they were forbidden to move away from fixed routes and not permitted to stay any longer than necessary. Any contacts with Ottoman subjects were strictly controlled. Although permission was granted for burial, the exact location was decided by the Ottomans. Flight of population into Ottoman territory continued, and these people were not necessarily immediately returned to Iran. While trade between the two states continued, the export of war materials, horses, silver, copper and iron to Iran was banned, a ban which the Ottomans wished to be strictly enforced, and goods in contravention of the prohibition were seized, but smuggling went on. Continuing to collect intelligence on the Safavid state, the Ottomans closely observed Safavid internal and external affairs, for as Selim II commented, “it is not permissible to be heedless of the upper lands [i.e., Iran]”. He ordered the beylerbeyi of Erzurum to remain on guard regardless of the peace, to be in a constant state of military preparedness, to keep a very tight watch on the region and to provide Istanbul with a constant flow of reliable intelligence.

Ever anxious to know what was happening in Iran, the Ottomans also made sure that the Safavids should be very well aware of the might of the

453 7 Mühimme, no. 2257 (24 Cemaziülah 976/14 December 1568).
454 See, for example, 6 Mühimme, no. 39 (16 Muharrem 972/9 August 1564), no. 1432 (20 Zilhicce 972/19 July 1565); 7 Mühimme, no. 2491 (24 Cemaziülah 976/14 December 1568), no. 2717 (9 Receb 976/28 December 1568); 12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (978–979/1570–1572), Özet–Transkriptiyon ve İndeks, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1998), nos. 896 and 897 (7 Rebiülevvel 979/30 July 1571).
455 6 Numaralı Mühimme, no. 39 (16 Muharrem 972/24 August 1564), no. 354 (4 Rebiülevvel 972/9 November 1564).
456 See, for example, 12 Mühimme, nos. 144 and 145 (12 Şevval 978/9 March 1571), no. 874 (Rebiülevvel 979/August–September 1571), no. 928 (7 Rebiülevvel 979/30 July 1571).
457 See, for example, 5 Mühimme, no. 217 (12 Safer 973/8 September 1565); 6 Mühimme, no. 233 (6 Rebiülevvel 972/12 November 1564), no. 346 (5 Rebiülevvel 972/10 November 1564); 7 Mühimme, no. 479 (27 Cemaziülevvel 975/29 November 1567), no. 1939 (24 Safer 976/18 August 1568).
458 See, for example, 5 Mühimme, no. 217 (12 Safer 973/8 September 1565).
459 See, for example, 6 Mühimme, no. 233 (6 Rebiülevvel 972/12 November 1564); 7 Mühimme, no. 2086 (26 Rebiülevvel 976/18 September 1568), no. 2548 (8 Cemaziülah 976/28 November 1568).
460 See, for example, 7 Mühimme, no. 1939 (24 Safer 976/18 August 1568), no. 2021 (14 Rebiülevvel 976/6 September 1568).
461 See, for example, 5 Mühimme, no. 938 (6 Receb 973/27 January 1566); no. 1000 (19 Receb 973/9 February 1566); no. 1081 (27 Receb 973/17 February 1566); no. 1613 (25 Şevval 973/15 May 1566); 7 Mühimme, no. 1560 (19 Zilhicce 975/15 June 1568); 12 Mühimme, no. 118 (13 Şevval 978/10 March 1571).
462 12 Mühimme, no. 118 (13 Şevval 978/10 March 1571).
463 7 Mühimme, no. 2703 (6 Receb 976/25 December 1568).
Ottoman state, missing no opportunity to display magnificence and power. In 1567, when Şah Kulu Han, the ruler of Revan and Nakhchivan and Safavid ambassador, came to congratulate Selim on his accession to the throne, he was received with great pomp and circumstance. Before leaving for Edirne, where Selim was in residence, he was first taken round Istanbul to see all the important sites of the city. Selim personally interested himself in the preparations for the visit and gave instructions about everything, from the number of boats to be used for the ambassador’s crossing of the Bosphorus to the quantity of sugar and wax he was to be given. However, when it came to the letter which was to be sent back to Tahmasp, Selim simply ordered Piyale Paşa to write whatever was suitable, it thus being clear that what was important was the pomp of the reception rather than the words on paper.

In this insecure environment, the reception of Shah Tahmasp’s “great favourite” and vezir Masum Sultan Safavi, who wished to enter Ottoman territory to go on pilgrimage, was an important issue for Selim. He ordered the beylerbeyi of Van “to adorn his men and troops with weapons and armour so that [Masum] should be conquered by fear and terror and so that it should be made clear that the soldiers of victory . . . were always present and ready on the frontier”. Ottoman concern in this matter did not stem merely from a desire to display power but was also connected to the Ottoman belief that Masum Sultan’s aim in entering Ottoman territory was not an innocent one and that he in fact had a secret mission to stir up revolt in Anatolia. As Masum Sultan and his son advanced with the pilgrimage caravan, dressed as pilgrims, they were attacked by Bedouin and killed. According to Abbas I’s historian, Eskandar Beg Monshi, even if the Ottomans denied it, the Ottoman administration lay behind this attack and the attackers of Masum Sultan’s caravan were Ottoman soldiers dressed as Bedouin.

Immediately before Masum Sultan set off on pilgrimage, news reached Selim that Gilan, whose population was Sunni and was under Safavid influence, had been taken over by Tahmasp and a Safavid governor appointed. Selim ordered the beylerbeyi of Erzurum to ensure that any military deficiencies were made up and preparations for a campaign begun. This was to be

465 7 Mühimme, no. 733 (16 Receb 975/16 January 1568).
466 7 Mühimme, no. 1158 (Şevval 975/March–April 1568).
468 7 Mühimme, no. 2491 (24 Cemaziülevvel 976/14 November 1568).
470 Eskandar Beg Monshi, History of Shah ‘Abbas, vol. 1, pp. 253, 192–3. This accusation is supported by several Ottoman sources; see Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-Iran, p. 12, note 39.
done without alerting the Safavids to what was going on. Despite any peace that might exist, the Ottomans were thus not prepared to back away from any direct conflict with the Safavids if they considered it necessary.

While using every opportunity to display their own strength, both Süleyman and Selim did everything possible to prevent any similar display of prestige by the Safavids within Ottoman territory. When the Süleymaniye mosque was completed, Tahmasp sent an ambassador with a letter of congratulation and three Qur’ans to Süleyman, and requested the measurements of the mosque so that he might present a suitably sized Iranian carpet. Not wishing any such carpets to ornament his mosque, Süleyman rejected the offer, saying that all the needs of the mosque had already been met.

Likewise, Selim ordered the removal of the Iranian carpets, decorated with writing, from the shrines of Ali and Husayn in Iraq, and their replacement with carpets from Anatolia.

Selim’s response to Tahmasp’s proposal that alms be distributed to the poor throughout Ottoman territories for the soul of Süleyman was equally firm: “if they [the Safavids] have money to be given as alms to the poor, then let it be distributed to the poor of their own lands”.

Despite all Ottoman precautions, however, it proved impossible to prevent Safavid influence seeping into Ottoman territories. As the Venetian bailo Giovanni Correr noted in 1578, the sultan could make very little progress against the shah, who, in contrast, was in a position easily to stir up “very great revolutions” in Ottoman territory due to the hostility of the population, the majority of whom “even within sight of Constantinople” shared the religion of the shah. Fully aware of this, the Ottoman sultans kept the relations of their own population with Iran under strict surveillance. Even in times of official peace, the Ottoman administration, from the very beginnings of the Safavid state onwards, always regarded their own subjects in Anatolia as a potential fifth column for the Safavid state. Views outside the understanding of Islam imposed by the state were perceived as a threat to central authority

471 7 Mühimme, no. 1476 (14 Muharrem 976/9 July 1568).
472 7 Mühimme, no. 321 (8 Rebiülahir 975/12 October 1567).
475 Ahmet Refik, Rafizilik ve Bektaşılık, no. 24 (17 Şevval 975/15 April 1568), p. 24.
476 Relazione di Giovanni Correr, in Pedani-Fabris, Relazioni, p. 236.
477 See, for example, 5 Mühimme, no. 1105 (4 Şaban 973/24 February 1566); no. 1142 (14 Şaban 973/6 March 1566); 7 Mühimme, no. 2617 (22 Cemaziülahir 976/18 December 1568); Ahmet Refik, Rafizilik ve Bektaşılık, no. 52 (28 Şaban 978/20 October 1579), pp. 39–40; C. H. Imber, ‘The Persecution of Ottoman Shi’ites According to the Mühimme Defterleri, 1565–1585’, Der Islam 56 (1979), 245–73 at p. 250.
and thus to “the order of the world”. One aspect of such Safavid influence among the Ottoman population had economic implications for the state: the halifes collected alms and donations among the followers of Isma’il in Anatolia, and these were sent to Iran. Even though the Safavid shah was not the leader of a tarikat but rather a head of state, this practice continued and the treaty of Amasya was unable to put a stop to it. Ottoman sources show that this practice continued on into the new period of war under Murad III, the sultan being informed in 1579, for example, of the collection of 1,500 florins being handed to Emir Ali Halife, who had arrived from Iran.

From the reign of Selim II, the methods of control imposed on sections of the population in suspect locations from the time of Bayezid II began to be inserted into a legal framework, further elaborated between 1545 and 1574 by the şeyhüislam Ebussuud Efendi. Ruling that “the killing of this group [i.e., the kızılbaş] is more important than the killing of other infidels”, Ebussuud stipulated that it was unlawful to try anyone who “was righteous” or punish them without evidence. To what extent such dictates were put into practice is not known, but it is clear that in both times of peace and war with Iran, the Ottomans continued to persecute their own subjects who were defined as kızılbaş, even exiling them to Cyprus. Particularly in times of campaigns to the east, before the 1569 Ejderhan (Astrakhan) campaign and in particular in 1577, and during the preparations for the campaign which Murad III conducted against Iran, surveillance, punishment and persecution increased.

Long Iranian wars and Pyrrhic victories

In 1576, Tahmasp sent an ambassador to Istanbul to congratulate Murad III on his accession to the throne. The ambassador was Tokmak Han, the ruler of Erivan (Yerevan) and Nakhchivan and son of Şah Kulu, who had previously been sent as ambassador to congratulate Selim on his accession. The

478 Ocak, Zindiklar ve Mülhidler, p. 84.
485 12 Mühimme, no. 674 (3 Safer 979/27 June 1571).
ambassadorial party was denied permission to enter the towns and villages on its route and was forced to make stops out in the open and to pass the nights in tents, measures designed to prevent any exchange of information with the local population.\textsuperscript{487} The group’s reception in the capital, in contrast, was one full of pomp and circumstance, intended to dazzle the Iranians with Ottoman magnificence and power.\textsuperscript{488} According to Murad’s doctor, Domenico, the sultan’s crossing the city accompanied by a magnificently dressed company of 10,000 to 12,000 men\textsuperscript{489} was an act intended “to terrify” the Iranian ambassador, Murad instructing one of his paşas to say to Tokmak Han that “all this cavalry which he had seen were only the chickens in the coop and that he should consider how infinite a number remained (outside) in so many fields”.\textsuperscript{490} Before Tokmak Han had left Ottoman territory, however, he had other things on his mind, for news arrived that Tahmasp had died, his son Haydar had been murdered and his other son, Isma’il, described as “mad” by Selaniki, had come to the throne. A massacre had followed and, renouncing Shi’ism, Isma’il had become Sunni.\textsuperscript{491}

At the beginning of 1578, the Ottoman state, always attentive to intelligence gathering, redoubled its efforts, instructing the beylerbeyis and emirs on the Iranian border to be even more attentive over providing information to the centre.\textsuperscript{492} Forwarding the news that Isma’il had died and been succeeded by his nearly blind brother Muhammad Hudabanda, Hüsrev Paşa, the beylerbeyi of Van, stressed that this was an opportunity for attacking Iran.\textsuperscript{493} Murad was in fact in no need of such encouragement, for “following his natural instinct to occupy that of others”, in the words of Soranzo, he had already perceived the Iranian situation as an opportunity for occupying Shirvan and thus Iran.\textsuperscript{494}

From the beginning of his reign, Murad had displayed an approach to the Safavids which was not entirely friendly. On his accession, he had sent ambassadors in all directions to announce the good news of his assumption


\textsuperscript{489} Gerlach, Türkiye, vol. 1, p. 339.


\textsuperscript{491} Selaniki, Tarih, vol. 1, pp. 115–16.

\textsuperscript{492} Ibid., p. 116.


\textsuperscript{494} Relazione di Giacomo Soranzo, in Pedani-Fabris, Relazioni, p. 292.
of the Ottoman throne. The one ruler to whom an ambassador was not sent was Tahmasp, for Murad wished to see how the Safavid ruler would react.\textsuperscript{495} Tahmasp had thus received the news not from Murad but from merchants and travellers, and had then despatched a large ambassadorial party with very valuable goods to Istanbul, thus denying Murad the opportunity to exploit any failure to offer congratulations to make a hostile move against the Safavids. Murad’s father, Selim, had, at the time of Bayezid’s revolt, promised that he and his descendants would abide by the Amasya treaty,\textsuperscript{496} and had not undertaken any direct military attack against the Safavid state. This had not, however, prevented him from using other means to attack Safavid interests. While the 1569 Ejderhan campaign was directed at curbing the rising Russian power to the south of the Black Sea, it was also aimed at weakening the Safavid state. The Ottomans claimed rights over Kazan and Astrakhan through the Crimean hanate. The Kazan hanate had been occupied in 1552 and Astrakhan in the mid-1550s by the Russians, and thus these hanates, important for north–south trade, had passed into Russian hands.\textsuperscript{497} Although the Ottomans had wished from 1562 on to campaign against Astrakhan, this had proved impossible in the last years of Süleyman’s reign.\textsuperscript{498} But in 1569 Selim decided on an offensive. The architect of the campaign, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, advocated the construction of a canal between the Don and the Volga which would allow the Ottomans to transport grain directly from the Black Sea into Georgia and from there to Shirvan, Karabakh and Azerbaijan, thus solving one of the main obstacles to Ottoman military penetration, lack of food supplies. The canal would further allow transportation of men and munitions directly into the Caucasus, thus facilitating and consolidating Ottoman control.\textsuperscript{499} Selim’s positive response to a letter from the han of Khorasan, requesting the rescue of Khorasanian pilgrims imprisoned in Iran on their return from pilgrimage, concerning the opening of an alternative route through Astrakhan for pilgrims and merchants clearly indicates that the basic target of Selim’s campaign was the Safavids.\textsuperscript{500} Selim’s intention was to control Iranian trade, his ambassador threatening the shah that the Ottomans “would not permit any

\textsuperscript{495} Kütükoğlu, ‘Cülus Tebriki’, pp. 1–2 and note 1.
\textsuperscript{496} Turan, \textit{Taht Kavgaları}, doc. 15, pp. 190–1, pp. 132–3.
\textsuperscript{498} Halil İnalçık, ‘Osmanlı-Rus Rekabetinin Menşei ve Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü (1569)’, \textit{Belleten} 12 (1948), 349–402 at pp. 366–8.
\textsuperscript{500} 7 Mühimme, no. 2723 (10 Receb 976/29 December 1568).
Ottoman expansion in the East

cloth to be brought into his country”, regardless of any apparent “policy of friendship” or “father-son relationship” between the two states. The campaign was not, however, successful, the Ottomans instead suffering considerable hardship and expense, while the aim of preventing Iranian trade finding alternative routes out of Ottoman control was undermined by the development of closer relations between the Russians and the Safavids during the reign of Abbas I.

When in 1578 Murad took the decision to launch a campaign against the Safavids, the grand vezir Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, according to Peçevi, sought to dissuade him, pointing out that if war was declared on Iran, the soldiers would be obstreperous, salaries and expenses would increase, the reaya would be crushed by taxes and ravages of the troops, and provincial income would not be sufficient to cover the campaign expenses. Even if Iran were conquered, the reaya would not accept Ottoman overlordship. In short, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa argued, those who were pushing for the campaign had no experience of fighting against the Safavids. Soranzo confirms Peçevi’s account, for he informed the Venetian Senate in 1584 that Murad, despite the paşas’ warnings, had decided on war.

Claiming that Isma’il was conducting activities in contravention of the peace, the Ottomans began raiding within the Iranian borders in the period immediately after Isma’il’s death. Emirs on the border, who had been unable to change allegiance to the Ottomans due to the Amasya peace terms, were now told by the Ottomans that their allegiance would be accepted and their help requested. While an army was being prepared under the command of Lala Mustafa Paşa, who had been appointed serdar (commander) at the beginning of 1578, for a campaign via Georgia against Shirvan, conquest of which, in the sultan’s estimation, would “open a major route for the acquisition of the

503 Selaniki, Tarih, vol. 1, p. 190.
507 Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-Iran, pp. 24–6.
whole of the kingdom of Persia”. Lala Mustafa Paşa himself sent letters to various beys in the Caucasus and even to rulers of regions under Safavid influence, ordering them to provide assistance to the Ottomans. Setting out in the spring, the army’s first target was Georgia, an object of campaigns under both Selim and Süleyman. In 1546, defeating an army made up of soldiers from the small Georgian kingdoms of Imereti, Kartli and Meskheti (Samtskhe), Süleyman had succeeded in establishing control over the Caucasian mountains in the north and as far as Kakheti in the east. As a result of Ottoman raids there in 1550 and 1552, Süleyman had established his influence over Guria on the Black Sea coast. Under the Amasya peace, these territories, a natural region for Safavid expansion, had been split into spheres of influence, Meskheti, Kartli (Gori and Tbilisi) and Kakheti being left to the Safavid state and Imereti (Başçaçık), Guria (Güriyan), Mingreli (Dadyan) and the lands of Ardahan, Ardanuç, Tortum and Oltu (Dav-Eli) to the Ottomans. When, at the beginning of 1578, the Ottoman army had crossed over the border from Ardahan into Georgian territory, Tokmak Han, governor of Çukur-Saad, the commander of the Safavid forces, immediately went into action, clearly uninterested in the Rumeli beylerbeyi’s letter warning him that any assistance to the “infidel” Georgians would be contrary to the peace treaty. Defeating the Safavids and the Georgian forces with them in August 1578 on the plain of Çıldır, the Ottomans advanced on as far as Tbilisi and added this important city to Ottoman territory. In September 1578, the Ottomans advanced to Shirvan, where they again defeated the Safavids in battle at Koyun-Geçidi (near the river Kur). Having taken the area of Sheki, the army moved on, capturing the cities of Shirvan one by one and turning the region into an eyalet with Demirkapı (Derbent) on the Caspian Sea as its capital. Before the onset of winter, Lala Mustafa Paşa led the army under very difficult circumstances to Erzurum, leaving behind a force under Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa, who had been made a vezir. Faced with the perennial Ottoman problem of holding the territory they had captured, Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa was soon under severe pressure from Safavid attack and was saved only by the arrival of Crimean forces under Kalgay Adil Giray, who then fell prisoner to the Safavids.

509 Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-Iran, pp. 39–42; Kirzegoğlu, Kafkas, pp. 278–81.
Ottoman expansion in the East

and was later put to death. The Crimean han Mehmed Giray now came to the Ottomans’ aid.

Despite such reinforcements and the subsequent improvement of the Ottoman position, the Safavids refused to abandon the territory. In 1583, Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa defeated the troops of the governor of Gence, Imam Kulu, at Baştepe, outside Derbent, in a battle which continued into the night and was fought under torch light, for which it became known as the battle of Meşale (lantern, torch). Two years later, in 1585, Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa, now grand vezir, was once more in Iran. In command of the Ottoman forces, he took Tabriz but died in subsequent fighting. Tabriz, now under great pressure, was rescued by the newly arrived commander, Ferhad Paşa, who also took Gence and Karabakh. In the same period, Cığalazade Sinan Paşa entered Iran from Iraq and took Nihavand.

Having achieved these military victories through the mobilisation of large military forces, the Ottomans were most anxious to secure the allegiance of local rulers in order to be able to sustain their hold on these areas, a strategy they had adopted earlier, particularly in their relations with petty Sunni states, and had seen as useful in their military strategy against Iran. Although Ottoman success did win over some Georgian rulers, the Ottomans had to work both to ensure continued success and to keep such rulers allied to them. In 1583, Murad III thus sent 21 hilats (robes of honour) to the Circassian beys and rulers of Daghestan. The need to prove powerful enough to attract and maintain the support of local rulers had been graphically demonstrated in an earlier period. During the campaign of 1533–5, the han of Gilan Mozaffar and the han of Khorasan Gazi had sworn allegiance to the Ottomans. When the Ottomans had proved unable to hold the region, the han of Khorasan had returned again to the Safavids, but Mozaffar Han had paid for his changing sides in the most appalling way, strung up between two minarets and set on fire. The Ottomans established relations with the Uzbeks, another important competitor and enemy of the Safavids, encouraging them to attack the Safavids at times when the

512 Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-İran, pp. 57–107; Sümer, Safavi, pp. 121–4.
Ottomans themselves were at war with Iran and on occasion providing them with men and arms.  

From the beginning of the Ottoman campaign, the Safavids had sought to make peace through diplomatic channels and had several times despatched ambassadors with peace overtures. The Ottoman troops, too, were inclined to peace, for, according to Selaniki, the soldiers taking part in the eastern campaign in 1581–2 were unwilling to continue fighting and, muttering “peace is a blessing”, wanted the Iranian offer of peace accepted. According to the Venetian bailo Soranzo, the Ottomans suffered considerably during this campaign, losing “150,000 people, a huge quantity of horses, of goods, of soldiers and spend[ing] a vast amount of money”. Despite this, however, Murad was not interested in the peace offered by the Safavids, for he desired “to make himself at least equal to the glory of his ancestors”. In this he was to be helped not by the Ottomans but by Iranian military difficulties, for when Shah Abbas came to the throne in 1588 he was faced by war on two fronts, with the Ottomans and the Uzbeks, a situation which forced him to seek peace with the Ottomans at almost any cost. In 1590, he sent an embassy to Istanbul and accepted Murad’s crushing peace terms. Under the treaty between Murad and Abbas, the Ottomans took the important states of Georgia, Shirvan, Gence, Tabriz, Revan and Nihavand; the frontier now reached the Caspian. As in the Amasya treaty, the Ottomans here, too, demanded the cessation of the denigration of the first three rightly guided caliphs and the Prophet’s wife Aysha, as well as the retention of Shah Abbas’s nephew Haydar Mirza as a hostage in Istanbul. With this long war, the Ottomans had extended their territories, but, according to Gelibolu Mustafa Ali, who had taken part in the campaigns, they paid heavily for this: “Rich became poor. The powerful fell into the ranks of the weak and endless blood flowed on both sides. . . . Full treasuries became empty. The land of Rum . . . changed from one of justice and fairness into a land of tyranny and oppression and many thousands of towns and villages were deserted by the reaya.” This costly and exhausting expansion did not mean that the Ottomans were the effective rulers of

520 Ibid., p. 130.
522 Ibid.
these newly conquered regions. War between the two states would begin again in 1603, and Shah Abbas would not merely recapture the lands which the Ottomans had now taken but would also occupy Baghdad.

Conclusion

From the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman position in the east was dominated by the Ottoman–Safavid clash. This vicious conflict cost the Ottomans as dearly as it did the Safavids. With the foundation of the Safavid state by Isma’il, the West had sought to establish relations with it and had sent ambassadors proposing anti-Ottoman alliances.\textsuperscript{527} Even if no official agreement materialised, the Ottoman–Iranian wars caused the Ottomans to divert their energy and attention from the West, and Western observers who visited Ottoman territory all carefully followed Ottoman relations with Iran.\textsuperscript{528} For Schweigger, the Ottoman–Iranian wars benefited only the Christians, God ensuring a balance by “causing the Turks to clash with the Iranians…. In order for the poor innocent Christians not to be completely destroyed and for them to be able to take a few peaceful breaths, the community of Muhammad must fight amongst itself”.\textsuperscript{529}

By the end of the century, the Iranian campaigns had brought the empire great expense and very little gain. This constant warfare, the increasing expense and the failure of the state’s income to meet it was, Gelibolu Mustafa Ali noted, a major factor in the increasing economic and social chaos,\textsuperscript{530} epitomised by the \textit{celali} revolts which broke out in Anatolia in 1596.\textsuperscript{531} Ottoman state policy towards its own population further contributed to this deteriorating situation, and the pressure applied to sections of its own population as a result of this ongoing conflict with the Safavids alienated such people, who in turn saw the Safavid state, as long as the Safavids themselves wished to preserve their close connection with the Anatolian population, as an alternative power centre. This pressure and alienation within a section of Ottoman Anatolian society was graphically captured by the famous sixteenth-century


\textsuperscript{529} Schweigger, \textit{Sultanlar}, p. 81.


Anatolian poet Pir Sultan Abdal, who openly proclaimed that “the religion of Muhammad is our religion”\textsuperscript{532} and complained that, although Muslims, they were not accepted as such by the rulers of the state:

If they [the Ottoman rulers] make me do ablutions which I have already done
If they make me say prayers which I have already said
If you Ottomans kill those who pronounce the name Shah
Then this year we will go from the summer pastures to the Shah.\textsuperscript{533}

\textsuperscript{533} Pir Sultan Abdal, \textit{Bütün Şiirleri}, ed. Cahit Öztelli (Istanbul, 1974), 72, p. 149.
Although traditionally considered more of a land than a sea power, maritime affairs, in the words of Katip Çelebi, mattered to the Ottomans,¹ and by the later sixteenth century, they had become a major power in the Mediterranean, dominating the east, active in the west and with at least a level of authority over the North African coast to Morocco.

1451–1481: Expansion in the eastern Mediterranean

For Mehmed II, sea power was “a great thing”, domination of the sea “essential” and naval operations “of the first importance”.² Without control of the Aegean, his territories, and his ships, remained vulnerable to attack from the sea. Latin-controlled islands such as Rhodes, a “source of evil and sedition and a gathering point for the people of immorality”,³ represented hostile bases within Ottoman territory from where effective enemies such as the Hospitallers, so skilful that they could attack a galley with a row-boat,⁴ and the hordes of pirates and corsairs who infested the waters of the Aegean, could operate. Certain territories represented strategic locations for Ottoman advance, the Peloponnese being conquered in 1460 in part because of its situation on the route of Mehmed’s planned expedition against Italy,⁵ and Rhodes being attacked unsuccessfully in 1480 because of the island’s

⁴ Kemalpaşazade, Tevârih, VII, p. 501.
⁵ Kritoboulos, History, p. 126.
location, which made it an ideal naval base from which to attack, and control, lands to the east.6

Apart from any strategic considerations, Mehmed also had economic considerations in mind in his plans for maritime conquest. The Aegean was a rich trading zone, linking the West to the luxury markets of Cairo and Istanbul, and beyond to the northern commerce via the Black Sea. Istanbul, captured in 1453, was a major market, whose economic importance had been a motivating factor in its conquest.7 Continually served by the encircling sea,8 maritime commerce was vital for its wealth and prosperity, just as ensuring regular shipments of food provisions, in particular grain, was essential for the survival and contentment of its population, and thus for the political stability of the state. Mehmed was keen to control trade routes through the Aegean, to capture the lucrative mainland and island ports rich in customs revenue and to secure the safety of commercial shipping. The prosperity of coastal ports such as Enez, with its harbour and rich salt mines,9 the major alum mines and customs revenues of Old and New Phokaea (Foça and Yeni Foça) and the major market of Negroponte (Ağrıboz, Eubea),10 made such locations targets for Ottoman acquisition. Not content merely with conquest, Mehmed was also anxious to ensure the economic prosperity of the islands once he had conquered them, offering tax exemptions, for example, to those wishing to settle on Samos (Sisam),11 Lemnos (Limnos, Limni) or Bozcaada (Tenedos); on the latter, he also built a castle to protect Ottoman commercial vessels.12

Early in his reign, Mehmed set out on a campaign of maritime conquest. Despatching two expeditions in 1455, one under the “conscientious” Hamza13

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7 Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet, A Social History of Ottoman Istanbul (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 11–14.
9 Kemalpaşazade, Tevārīh, VII, p. 105; Kritoboulos, History, pp. 107, 108, 159. There were also other economic reasons for the conquest: the seizing of Muslim slaves, attacks on surrounding villages and the selling of salt to foreigners that was supposed to be sent to the Ottomans. See Aşıkpaşazade, Aşık Paşazade Osmanoğlu’nun Tarihi, ed. Kemal Yavuz and M. A. Yekta Sarac (Istanbul, 2003), pp. 490–1, 221–2; Aşıkpaşazade, Die Altsomanische Chronik des Aşıkpaşazade, ed. Fredrich Giese (Leipzig, 1929, reprinted Osnabrück, 1972), pp. 135–6; Tursun Bey, Tārīh-i Ebűl-Feth, ed. Mertol Tulum (Istanbul, 1977), pp. 76–7; Tansel, Mehmed, p. 232.
13 Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, trans. and ed. Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit, 1975), p. 246.
and the other led by the “handsome” Yunus,\(^{14}\) Mehmed attacked various islands, including Kos, clashed with the Genoese on Chios and took the Genoese settlements of Old and New Phokaea. Lemnos was captured in 1456 and Enez, where “fire fell on the soul of the Tekfur [local ruler] . . . and the power of fear dried his blood”\(^{15}\), in the same year, the inhabitants suing for peace “before the explosion of cannon had even had time to deafen the ears of the effete infidels”\(^{16}\).

Mehmed’s aggressive policy resulted in the despatch of a papal fleet, which took Lemnos, Samothrace and Thasos in 1457. Although temporarily disruptive, the impact of the papal intervention was negligible, and, largely undisturbed, Mehmed turned his attention to the Peloponnese, where Ottoman forces had already taken Athens and conquered it in 1460; Lesbos fell in 1462, its ruler, Nicolò Gattilusio, “drawn into the chain of subjection”\(^{17}\) and “the clanging and echoing of bells rendered silent by the call to prayer”\(^{18}\).

Ottoman success in the Aegean and the Peloponnese was viewed with alarm from Venice, whose commercial interests in the region were threatened by these developments. In 1463, the Senate declared war, which was to last for the next 16 years. While some in the Peloponnese supported the Venetians, who had occupied the isthmus of Corinth, many were more cautious, waiting to see what would happen,\(^{19}\) an approach justified by the rapid re-establishment of Ottoman control over the isthmus and the successful defence of Corinth. The following summer, the Venetians attacked Lesbos, pillaging the island (though not excessively so, as they hoped to gain possession of it)\(^{20}\) but failing to take the city. They were, however, more successful with Lemnos and Imbros, both of which fell to them. In December 1466, perhaps alarmed by their recent failure at Patras,\(^{21}\) the Venetians sued for peace on the basis of the status quo, an offer rejected by the Ottomans, who demanded the return of Imbros and Lemnos and annual tribute. The war therefore continued. The Venetians attacked and plundered Enez, taking many of the population, including the kadi and the hatib, back to “their nest”, as Kemalpaşazade

\(^{14}\) Doukas, *Decline and Fall*, p. 252; Kritoboulos, *History*, p. 96.

\(^{15}\) Kemalpaşazade, *Tevárih*, p. 108. The ruler himself was actually in Samothrace for the winter at the time. See Kritoboulos, *History*, p. 110; Doukas, *Decline and Fall*, p. 254.

\(^{16}\) Tursun Bey, *Târih*, p. 77.

\(^{17}\) Kemalpaşazade, *Tevárih*, VII, p. 222.

\(^{18}\) Tursun Bey, *Târih*, p. 120.

\(^{19}\) Kritoboulos, *History*, pp. 189–91, quotation at p. 191.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., pp. 204–6.

described Negroponte.\textsuperscript{22} In response,\textsuperscript{23} Mehmed attacked Negroponte, the “country of the evil one [i.e., the Venetians]”,\textsuperscript{24} where the hand-to-hand fighting was so close that Muslim and infidel were “hair to hair, beard to beard”.\textsuperscript{25} Negroponte fell in 1470, the Ottomans killing the “boorish infidels”, leaving no male alive\textsuperscript{26} and enslaving their wives and daughters.\textsuperscript{27} Venice had thus lost one of its possessions which, together with Coron, Modon and Crete, it had described a century before as places which “can well be called the right eye and hand of the Venetian commune”.\textsuperscript{28}

The year after the fall of Negroponte, Mehmed took Alanya during his campaign against Karaman in Anatolia, followed in 1472 by the capture of Silifke, giving him control of the Mediterranean coastline of Anatolia. It was on this coast where the Venetians next struck when in 1472 the Venetian captain-general Piero Mocenigo, together with forces from King Ferrante of Naples, the Hospitallers and the pope, attacked Antalya, “the greatest and most famous seaport in Asia”.\textsuperscript{29} Although unsuccessful, the attack was very lucrative in terms of spoils. Next, Mocenigo attacked İzmir, inflicting damage and sailing away with a considerable quantity of booty.

By 1475, however, the Venetians were again seeking peace, an offer again rejected by the Ottomans. For the next couple of years, Ottoman attention was not on the war with Venice but on the Black Sea campaign, which resulted in the capture of the Genoese trading settlement of Caffa (Kepe) and attacks against Moldavia and Hungary. Two years later, their focus had shifted and they were attacking Lepanto (Navpaktos, İnebahti), laying siege to Krkjenë and even raiding Venetian territory close to Venice itself. In the following year, Venice opened negotiations for peace, unsuccessfully, while the Ottomans took Krkjenë, Drişte and Lezhe and laid siege to Shkodër. Finally, in 1479, the Venetians, “showing inferiority and shame” in the words of the

\textsuperscript{22} Kemalpaşazade, \textit{Tevârîh}, VII, p. 284; Giovan Maria Angiolello [Donado da Lesze], \textit{Historia Turchesca} (1300–1514), ed. I. Ursu (Bucharest, 1909), p. 34.

\textsuperscript{23} According to Giovan Maria Angiolello, who was himself captured at the fall of Negroponte, Mehmed’s attack was in revenge for Nicolò da Canale’s sacking and burning of Enez. See Giovan Maria Angiolello, \textit{Viaggio di Negroponte} (Vicenza, 1982), pp. 1–2.

\textsuperscript{24} Kemalpaşazade, \textit{Tevârîh}, VII, p. 284.

\textsuperscript{25} Tursun Bey, \textit{Târîh}, p. 148.


\textsuperscript{29} Domenico Malipiero, \textit{Annali veneti dal MCCCLVII ad MD}, in \textit{Archivio Storico Italiano} (Florence, 1843), vol. 7, pt. 1, p. 74.
Ottoman grand vezir Karamanlı Nişancı Mehmed Paşa, sent an ambassador to Istanbul and “threw themselves on the mercy of the sultan”. Venice lost Shkodër, Lemnos and lands in the Peloponnese, and was forced to pay an annual sum of 10,000 florins, the significance of which was not, according to Mehmed Paşa, the money itself, for the sum was “less than a simple, salty drop in the great sweet water oceans”, but the fact of forcing the Venetians “to bow their heads” before the might of the sultan. The new bailo, Battista Gritti, duly handed over the “gift” of money, which Mehmed “graciously and with great pleasure” accepted. The outcome of the war with Venice was thus, for the Ottomans, a most satisfactory victory over the pre-eminent naval power of the region.

The year after the defeat of Venice, Mehmed despatched two naval expeditions, one to Italy, which was successful, and one against Rhodes, which was not. Despite the use of spies, propaganda campaigns, threats of sacking, slaughter and enslavement, and a cannon which produced smoke like a great cloud and a huge roar like a clap of thunder heard 100 miles away, the Ottoman siege of Rhodes failed. The Ottoman fleet sailed away after 89 days, taking with it “defeat and shame”, the failure, according to Tursun Bey, due to Mesih Paşa’s hesitant and mistaken strategy, an estimation supported by another contemporary, Angiolello, who commented that in everyone’s opinion the enterprise would have been a success had it been led not by Mesih Paşa but by Gedik Ahmed Paşa, the commander of the successful siege of Otranto. Katip Çelebi, too, blamed Mesih Paşa, whose meanness in prohibiting plundering, as well as the soldiers’ greed for booty, lay behind the failure of the siege.

The other major expedition of that year was much more successful. Having earlier taken the Ionian islands of Lefkas (Lefkada, Santa Maura, Ayamavra), Cephalonia and Zakynthos (Zante), Gedik Ahmed Paşa was now despatched with a “magnificent” fleet which looked like “a 1000-handed giant.” Crossing

32 Karamanlı Nişancı Mehmed Paşa, Osmanlı Sultanları Tarihi, p. 360.
33 Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Documenti Turchi, Busta 1, doc. 9 b, letter from Mehmed to Giovanni Mocenigo, doge of Venice, 17 September 6988 [1479].
34 Caoursin, L’assedio, pp. 26–7, 30, 32, 33–4, 42, 44–6.
35 Ibid., p. 56.
37 Angiolello, Historia, p. 114.
38 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-Kibar, p. 244 (facsimile), p. 35.
39 Kemalpaşazade, Tevârih, VII, p. 507.
over from the Albanian coast to southern Italy, he captured Otranto, quickly re-fortifying it. For some, the Ottoman attack had been instigated or encouraged by the Venetians, Sigismondo de’Conti noting that while he could not himself confirm this suspicion, it was certainly true that the Ottomans would never have attempted this had they not been at peace with Venice. From Otranto, the Ottomans conducted raids against Brindisi, Lecce and Taranto. They imposed a 1 ducat tax on every family, melted down the church bells to make cannon, and sent 8,000 captives off to Albania, measures, as Tansel remarks, that were “inconvenient” from the point of view of winning over the population. As people began to migrate away, the Ottoman policy changed to one more adapted to appeasement, offering a ten-year tax break and religious freedom in an attempt to defuse the situation and ensure a calm and settled population.

The fall of Otranto was seen as merely the first step in a wider campaign of conquest, and many now feared for the fate of Italy. Gedik Ahmed Paşa was regarded as seeking to enflame Mehmed’s desire to conquer Italy, and it was generally felt that it was only Mehmed’s death which prevented the spread of “that plague” over Italian territory. Had Otranto not been re-captured, in the words of the humanist Galateo, “we would not be in Bari today, nor the Pope in Rome, nor would this kingdom [i.e., Calabria] be in the Christian faith, nor Sicily, nor Lombardy”.

By 1480, therefore, Mehmed had not only captured many of the Aegean islands and the Peloponnese but had also established a base in Italy, believed to presage the conquest of a far greater area of Italian territory. Various factors account for his success. Apart from access to the considerable manpower and resources of his ever-expanding territories, Mehmed was also served by expert seamen such as the grand vezir Mahmud Paşa, “an intelligent and skilful sea bey”, whose construction and organisation of the fleet sent against Negroponte in 1470 was such as to have drawn the sound of congratulation.

40 According to Angiolello, his original target had been Brindisi, but a contrary wind had blown the Ottoman ships to the west. See Angiolello, Historia, p. 110.
44 Tansel, Mehmed, p. 133.
45 Ibid.
from the soul of the legendary naval hero Gazi Umur Bey. Mehmed also benefited from foreign expertise, for the Ottoman arsenal and fleet offered an alternative source of employment for skilled mariners from the West, and Venetian master mariners such as Georgio de Tragurio could move from the Venetian navy to Ottoman service. Corsairs, too, could change sides, for example, Zuan Monaco Corsaro falling out in 1467 with the Venetians with whom he had been cooperating in harassing the Ottomans in the archipelago. Insulted by the “strange words” the Venetian captain-general had addressed to him, he promptly moved over to the Ottomans.

Mehmed’s tactics also played a considerable role in his success. He adopted what might be called a policy of progressive conquest, attaching the Aegean islands and the coastal regions to the empire in stages, first through tribute and then outright conquest, Dorino Gattilusio for example holding Enez by paying tax and two-tenths of the annual salt production to the Ottomans, and the Gattilusio of Lesbos paying tribute until finally, after a rather up-and-down relationship, Mehmed conquered the island in 1462.

Mehmed also sought to use inter-Latin rivalry or Latin–Greek divisions among the inhabitants of the Aegean islands. Lemnos fell as a result of the Lemnians’ request that the Ottomans take the island from its ruler, Nicolò Gattilusio, and in a dispute between Dorino Gattilusio and his brother’s widow in Enez, the widow appealed through her uncle to Mehmed. That Mehmed attempted to exploit Greek–Latin hostility is indicated by the speech of the nuncio of the grand master of the Hospitallers during the unsuccessful siege of Rhodes, in which he replied to the Ottoman ambassador that, “We are not frightened by your threats. We are in agreement and there is no discord between the Greeks and the Latins. We adore Christ with a single faith and sound spirit”. Interestingly, there had been a disturbance in the city at the beginning of 1477 related to difficulties between the Latin and the Orthodox populations, and

50 Tursun Bey, Târîh, p. 147.
52 Angiolello, Historia, p. 35.
53 Kritoboulos, History, p. 109; Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğlu’nun Tarihi, pp. 490–1, 221–2; Aşıkpaşazade, Chronik, pp. 135–6.
54 Doukas, Decline and Fall, p. 235.
56 Caoursin, L’assedio, p. 47.
a year before the Hospitallers had decreed that all non-Orthodox priests were to be expelled and no Greek priest who was not a subject of the Order was to be allowed onto the island, for such priests had been “spreading false religious views” and “deceiving the simple people”. This Greek–Latin discord is alluded to later in a letter sent in 1503 to Bayezid II’s son Korkud by a captive in Rhodes, Abu Bakir Darani, who urged the ease with which the Ottomans could take the island, drawing attention to the Hospitallers’ “tyranny” over the Greek Orthodox population.

In 1481, shortly after his troops landed in Otranto and before any further advance in Italy could be undertaken, Mehmed II died, a death “opportune for the Christian world” in the words of Galateo and one much welcomed by Caoursin, the vicecancelliere of the Hospitallers, who commented that “God has not conceded us any blessing . . . more important, better or more appreciated than the death of Mehmed II”. Mehmed’s departure from the scene was certainly opportune for many, for the role played by Bayezid in the eastern Mediterranean was, at least initially, to differ considerably from that of his father. Otranto was abandoned, despite Gedik Ahmed Paşa’s efforts to prevent this, and the Ottoman soldiers there were left to their fate, their wells poisoned, decimated by attacks and disease and reduced to eating cats and dogs until they surrendered on 10 September 1481.

1481–1533: Consolidation in the eastern Mediterranean

Two factors in the first part of Bayezid’s reign served to curtail any expansionist maritime ambitions he might have had: the revolt and subsequent flight of

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58 Tsirpanlis, ‘Decreto’, doc. 3, p. 79 (10 June 1476).
59 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşı, ‘Rodos Şövalyeleri Hakkında Antalya Valisi Sultan Korkud’a Gönderilmiş Bir Mektup’, Belleten 18, 91 (1954), 347–55 at pp. 352–4. According to Gerlach, a Protestant priest attached to the Habsburg embassy between 1573 and 1578, Chios fell in 1566 because the locals did not like the Genoese and asked the Ottomans to take it, while noting that the Venetians treated their subjects on Cyprus very badly. See Stephan Gerlach, Türkiye Günlüğü, 1573–1576, ed. Kemal Beydilli, trans. Türkis Noyan, 2 vols. (İstanbul, 2007), vol. 1, pp. 127, 240–1. He later states that the Ottomans took Chios on the pretext that the Chians had in the past given refuge to fleeing slaves (ibid., vol. 2, p. 603).
60 Caoursin, L’assedio, p. 67.
63 Lucano, ‘De bello hydruntino’, pp. 74, 75, 86, 87; Kemalpaşazade, Tevârih, VII, p. 519.
64 According to Giovanni Albino Lucano, there were on the ships leaving after the surrender very many Pugliesi girls “who had in two years easily learnt the religion and barbarian language” and had been hidden away during the loading of the ships. See Lucano, ‘De bello hydruntino’, pp. 86, 87. Of the Turks who survived the fighting, many went to Macedonia and many went to fight for Alfonso II, duca di Calabria (ibid., pp. 88, 89).
his brother Cem into the willing arms of the Hospitallers in July 1482 and his war with the Mamluks, which broke out in 1485 and ended in 1491, four years before the death of Cem.

From 1495, however, with the Mamluk war behind him and having now “freed himself from the fear of Cem”, as one Ottoman chronicler put it, Bayezid turned his attention to the sea. In fact, even before this date Bayezid had not been entirely inactive in the Mediterranean. Venice complained of attacks on its possessions in the Peloponnese from Ottoman ships, and in 1492 Bayezid had apparently contemplated taking Corfu but found it too well defended. Now, in 1496, he began major naval preparations. Alarmed, Venice inquired as to the purpose of these preparations, only to be told that the fleet was being fitted out for an expedition against corsairs in the Mediterranean. In 1498, Bayezid was again preparing a large fleet, and by 1499 the Ottomans were at war with Venice.

Venice had throughout the period of Cem’s captivity remained cautious in its dealings with Bayezid, assuring him in 1482 that Cem would not be given refuge in any Venetian port and despatching instructions to Venetian officials that no assistance was to be provided to him. They even went as far as assuring Bayezid that if they received any information about Cem, they would pass it on to him. However, in 1487 Venice did refuse Bayezid permission to use the port of Famagusta during the war with the Mamluks, prompting the Ottomans to attempt to seize it, prevented only by the swift arrival of Francesco di Prioli, sent there post haste to defend the city.

In the period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities, Bayezid had taken steps to improve his navy, increasing its size and, importantly, recruiting the corsairs Piri Reis, Burak Reis and Kemal Reis as navy commanders. These men were highly experienced in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean and brought with them not only their skill but also their ships and men. Kemal Reis’s fame was such that his name was celebrated “throughout the world”. Infidels in the

67 Angiolello, Historia, pp. 191–2; Piri Reis, Kitabi Bahriye, p. 330. Piri Reis refers to the lateness of the season and contrary winds.
68 Lefort, Documents, letter 1, Giovanni Mocenigo, doge of Venice, to Bayezid, September 1480, pp. 32, 34. According to Angiolello, Cem tried to go to the Venetians, but they did not want him because they feared ending up in a war with Bayezid. See Angiolello, Historia, p. 181.
69 Angiolello, Historia, p. 185.
Kate Fleet

Maghreb frightened their children into submission by threatening them with him: “if the infidels saw him, they died of fright, if they heard him, they became powerless . . ., if his name was mentioned, they lost control”.\(^70\) The Hospitallers were more afraid of Kemal Reis “than [of] the angel of death”.\(^71\)

The use of corsairs, a rather slippery term, for one man’s corsair was another man’s pirate, but who in essence were men who operated under the aegis of a state, was not new. Mehmed II used them, for example, in the capture of Otranto.\(^72\) But Bayezid’s initiative involved a greater, institutionalised corsair involvement within the naval structure. Clearly such a policy was not without risk, Nicolas Vatin arguing that by using pirates to re-construct his fleet Bayezid “opened Pandora’s box”.\(^73\) Certainly some observers were not over-impressed by Ottoman corsairs, the Venetian bailo Danielle de’ Ludovisi dismissing them in 1534 as “confused and unruly people”.\(^74\) Nevertheless, the advantage of using highly skilled, highly experienced mariners who knew the eastern Mediterranean backwards, there being, for example, “no island in that sea on which his [Kemal Reis’]s foot has not stepped”,\(^75\) was evident in the subsequent performance of the fleet. It was after all Kemal Reis’s nephew Piri Reis, a man who had gained his extensive knowledge of the Mediterranean from sailing with his uncle and other “sea gazis”, who was to present his world map, which he completed in 1513, to Selim in 1517 and his portolan on “the climate of the sea and the art of ships”, containing detailed descriptions and charts of the Mediterranean, to Süleyman in 1526.

As it had under Mehmed II, the navy continued to benefit from the presence of skilled foreign labour. The designer of the two large göke (cucca) built for the fleet and used in the siege of Lepanto was, according to some reports, a man called Yani, who had gained his skill in Venice.\(^76\) The Serenissima was by no means pleased with Venetians serving the Ottoman fleet, and in 1495 the Senate even considered a proposition by a certain Jacobo de Venetis to poison Benedicto Barbera, a Venetian and “most expert master of the maritime art”, who had gone into Ottoman service and converted. If successful, Jacobo was to receive 5 ducats per month for life.\(^77\)

71 Uzunçarşılı, ‘Rodos Şövalyeleri’, p. 347.
72 Marziano, ‘Successi’, p. 118.
75 Kemalpaşazade, Tevārîh, VIII, p. 145.
76 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-Kibar, p. 247 (facsimile), p. 36.
77 Lamansky, Sécrets, doc. 26, pp. 30–1 (29 January 1495).
With Venice with his new, improved navy, whose sailors moved their ships with a skill that no cavalryman could match, and whose speed was such that if an arrow was fired ahead of the ship it would still fall on deck, Bayezid entered war with Venice. At the end of May 1499, the fleet sailed into the Mediterranean, its progress observed from Modon (Methone) by the commander of the Venetian fleet, Antonio Grimani. Thought to be headed for Corfu, its target was in fact Lepanto. In a major sea battle off Lepanto, Burak Reis was killed, his galley together with two Venetian galleys going down in flames. After further fighting during which “God blew out the candle of their wind”, leaving the French ships becalmed, and “the face of the sea was entirely painted with men’s blood”, the Ottomans entered Lepanto harbour and the defenders surrendered, victims, according to one contemporary, of Venice’s failure to defend them. The fall caused consternation in Modon, where a stunned population feared that they, too, would be abandoned by Venice. By 1500, the Venetians were suing for peace, to no effect, for the Ottomans wanted Coron (Korone) and Modon, referred to earlier by the Venetians as “the right eye of Venice”, Nafplio (Nauplia, Napoli di Romania), Monemvasia and an annual payment of 10,000 ducats.

In the same year, Bayezid assembled his forces for an attack on Modon, described by Andrea Balastero, who survived the siege and was taken captive to Istanbul, as being as dear to Venice as the heart is to the body of a man, and by Kemal Reis as one of the two eyes of Venice, the other being Corfu. Despite the propaganda tactic of firing letters attached to arrows into the city, urging the population to surrender and explaining the dire consequences of resistance, the defenders held out until the city finally fell, its male population put to the sword and the women and children enslaved.

79 Ibid., p. 212.
82 Kemalpaşazade, Tevârih, VIII, p. 187.
83 Angiolello, Historia, p. 231, account of Andrea Balastero.
87 Piri Reis, Kitabı Bahriye, p. 330.
88 Angiolello, Historia, p. 251.
From Modon, the fleet set sail for Coron, their ships flying like the wind on the face of the sea and speeding along like birds.\(^{90}\) Having taken Navarino (Navarin), the fleet arrived at Coron, where, as an encouragement to surrender, the Ottoman commanders referred to their recent success at Modon, whose infidels they had despatched “into the fires of hell”. Resistance would result in a cruel destruction, surrender, a “joyful celebration in the stronghold of the protection of the sultan of the world”.\(^{91}\) Coron surrendered.

Despite losing Coron and Modon, Venice did have some success that year. In conjunction with French, Spanish and papal forces, the Venetians captured Cephalonia and retook Navarino, only to lose it again to Kemal Reis in May 1501 when, confronted by Ottoman forces who “raised their heads like a crowd of excited crocodiles coming to the surface of water”,\(^{92}\) it surrendered. Active in the Aegean, the Venetians attacked various islands,\(^{93}\) landed on the Anatolian coast, attacking Çeşme, where many, including the kadi, were killed,\(^{94}\) and later plundering Meğri.\(^{95}\) Franco-Venetian forces attacked Lesbos, unsuccessfully, where, by the time the Ottoman fleet arrived, the Venetians had, according to one anonymous Ottoman history, attacked the castle of Mytilene 18 times without success.\(^{96}\) Venetian forces plundered Thessaloniki, and, together with papal, French and Rhodian ships, attacked and took Lefkas,\(^{97}\) thus, at least temporarily, establishing control over the Ionian islands of Corfu, Lefkas, Cephalonia and Zakynthos. However, they lost Durrës (Durazzo) on the Adriatic, taken by the Ottomans in 1501.

By 1502, Venice was once more desirous of peace, bereft of money and strength, according to Kemalpaşazade, who went on to explain that as a trading nation Venice did not produce anything but relied on commerce for the wealth with which to pay its soldiers. The war had thus “eaten its soul. The knife had bitten to the bone and its strength was gone”.\(^{98}\) While Angiolello stressed that the Ottomans needed peace because of the Safavids,\(^{99}\) the Ottomans were in fact in no pressing need for peace at this point. Under the treaty concluded in May 1503, Venice lost Modon, Coron, Lepanto (Nafpaktos), Durrës and Lefkas. The Venetian position in the eastern Mediterranean was

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\(^{90}\) Kemalpaşazade, Tevârîh, VIII, p. 212.
\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 206.
\(^{92}\) Ibid., p. 213.
\(^{93}\) Angiolello, Historia, pp. 262, 267.
\(^{94}\) Kemalpaşazade, Tevârîh, VIII, pp. 214–5.
\(^{95}\) Ibid., p. 229.
\(^{96}\) Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği, p. 128 (facsimile), pp. 138–9.
\(^{97}\) Angiolello, Historia, p. 267; Kemalpaşazade, Tevârîh, VII, p. 229.
\(^{98}\) Kemalpaşazade, Tevârîh, VIII, p. 231.
considerably weakened, while that of the Ottomans, in contrast, was strengthened, thus, Tansel has argued, assisting Selim’s subsequent conquest of Egypt and Syria. According to Tansel, had Venice been able to remain a force in the eastern Mediterranean, Süleyman’s siege of Rhodes in 1522 would not have been an Ottoman victory. Bayezid’s victory over Venice both signalled the emergence of the Ottomans as a major naval power and delivered control of maritime trade in the region into Ottoman hands.

For the rest of Bayezid’s reign and for that of his successor, Selim I, naval conquest took second place. The main concerns for the Ottomans were the Safavids in Iran, defeated by the Ottomans in 1514, and the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt and Syria, ended by Selim in 1517. At sea, the main concern was coastal defence and the drive against piracy, a perennial problem for all. Pirates and corsairs raided indiscriminately from their island bases, Piri Reis noting that the monks of Mount Athos did not reveal the whereabouts of Turkish pirates to Christian pirates or vice versa. Bayezid’s son Korkud sponsored corsairs, including Hayreddin, known in European sources as Barbarossa, who plundered ships in the Aegean before sailing off to the west. The Venetians complained to the Ottomans about the seizure of Venetian ships. In 1507, corsairs captured two Venetian vessels from Crete headed for Istanbul loaded with grain, and in 1508 another Venetian ship fell prey to a certain Fra Bernardino, a corsair from Rhodes. Several years later, the Venetian bailo Andrea Foscolo was forced to pay a considerable sum of money in a case involving an Ottoman ship sailing from Alexandria carrying merchandise and janissaries which was seized by corsairs at Mykonos. In 1512, Foscolo was discussing with Ottoman officials the necessity of punishing corsairs.

Although sea campaigns were not of foremost importance in Selim’s reign, the navy remained significant, the fleet taking part in the conquest of Egypt and Syria. Towards the end of his reign, Selim was planning an extension to the naval arsenal at Istanbul and preparing a large naval force, thought by many to be intended for an attack on Rhodes, an attack urged by his vezir, who “tried to turn the eyes of the sultan . . . to contemplating the destruction of the castle of

101 Piri Reis, Kitab Bahriye, pp. 111–12.
102 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-Kibar, p. 252 (facsimile), p. 44.
104 Ibid., p. 9.
105 Ibid., pp. 30–1.
106 Ibid., p. 6.
Rhodes”. Selim, however, did not attack, due, apparently, to the insufficiency of resources for the lengthy siege he foresaw would be necessary.

After only seven years on the throne, Selim died in 1520. The news was well received in the West, it being felt that “an enraged lion had left a docile lamb as successor”. Much less of a lamb than expected, one of Süleyman’s first acts was the conquest of Rhodes, “the refuge of the vile Franks . . . the place of residence of those condemned to hell”. This “great business house of the wealth of the Franks” seethed, at least according to Lütfi Paşa, with hundreds of Muslim slaves kept in shackles in dungeons by night and used for hard manual labour by day. Strategically placed on the route between the newly acquired Egyptian territory and Istanbul, Rhodes was the ideal base for Hospitaller attacks on Ottoman commercial shipping, complained of by Lütfi Paşa, and for their seizure of Muslim pilgrims, whom they “dishonoured . . . with shackles and chains”.

Having observed the castle, Süleyman adopted a festina lente approach to the conquest, commenting that “you do not destroy your enemy by speed because by using caution the problem of the matter will be easy, and with speed easy work will be difficult”. After five months, Rhodes fell. “Innumerable Muslims [including] sayyid and şeyh and ulema and many men addicted to asceticism, of all communities and sects, whose necks had been dishonoured by a chain of pain, whose feet had been bent by the shackles of the people of error” were rescued, “their sad days transformed into joy, their destiny converted, through the power of the victorious emperor Padişah, into happiness”. Having taken Bodrum and İstanköy (Kos), replete with a fortress “whose walls reached to the heavens and whose base touched the fishes”, the sultan boarded his galley, which “ploughed the sea with the speed of a flash of lightening”, and set sail with his fleet for Marmaris, “the vast plane of the sea, full of ships high like mountains, . . . strewn with sails of various colours and resemble[ing] the multi-coloured face of the heavens”.

112 Lütfi Paşa, Tevarih, p. 249; Lütfi Paşa, Tevarih, p. 311.
113 Lütfi Paşa, Tevarih, p. 249; Lütfi Paşa, Tevarih, p. 311.
114 Mustafa Celalzade, in Rossi, Assedio e conquista, p. 27, Ottoman text pp. 23–4.
115 Lütfi Paşa, Tevarih, p. 249; Lütfi Paşa, Tevarih, p. 311.
116 Mustafa Celalzade, in Rossi, Assedio e conquista, p. 39, Ottoman text p. 31.
117 Ibid., p. 43, Ottoman text p. 34.
118 Ibid., p. 46, Ottoman text p. 38.
The fall of Rhodes was a very satisfactory outcome for the Ottomans, but “all of Frengistan mourned and grieved for Rhodes and St. John because it was the talisman of the Franks”. According to Lütfi Paşa, the Hospitallers reproached the European leaders whom they regarded as having neglected them, saying “what shameless people you are that you did not send us troops and did not help us that the Turk came and despised and insulted St. John and the religion of Jesus and us”, something which, at least according to Lütfi Paşa, the “great men of Frengistan” accepted.

Having captured Rhodes, Süleyman turned his attention away from the sea to the Hungarian campaign. When he returned to maritime affairs, he found that the navy he had was not sufficient to combat his opponents in the Mediterranean, in particular the Hospitallers, now based in Malta, and the Spanish fleet based at Messina. According to Venetian reports, it suffered from a lack of skilled personnel, and many of the galleys were in poor condition. Lütfi Paşa blamed the failure of the Ottoman naval expedition against Coron, which had been recaptured from the Ottomans by Andrea Doria in September 1532, on maritime incompetence, commenting that “the commanders were frequenters of taverns and wine drinkers and were unable to provision the ships and the ships were destroyed because of their folly”. If the navy had not fallen into the hands of incompetent commanders, then, in Lütfi Paşa’s estimation, the infidels would not have been able even to contemplate plundering.

1533–1574: The western Mediterranean

Faced with the need for a more effective naval force, Süleyman turned to an expert in the waters of the western Mediterranean, the renowned corsair Hayreddin, summoning him from the Maghreb in 1533 and making him admiral of the imperial fleet. Hayreddin Reis now became Hayreddin Paşa.

Originally from the Aegean, where he had traded grain before turning to piracy, Hayreddin had fled to the west with his brother Uruç in 1513, after...
Korkud’s murder by Selim. There they set themselves up as rulers respectively of Algiers and Tunis. In 1519, Hayreddin, under threat in Algiers from local political opposition and from the Spanish at sea, had submitted to Selim, after which Algiers and Tunis became nominally Ottoman territory.

Corsairs were something of a two-edged weapon whose loyalty was flexible, for, as Piri Reis had pointed out in response to Venetian complaints against the well-known corsair Kurdoğlu, “he is a corsair, he attacks us too”. From their various “nests”, such as Algiers, Durrës (Durazzo) and Velona, Ottoman corsairs attacked commercial shipping, Ottoman territory and Ottoman subjects, seizing livestock, goods and people. There were constant reports of corsair attacks, and streams of instructions to take precautions against corsairs and to investigate complaints of corsair activity. Orders were issued for the arrest of known corsairs, and protection promised to those on the Aegean islands such as Andros. In 976/1568–9, orders were issued that corsair ships coming to over-winter in the harbour of Lefkas were not to be allowed to do so unless they had a guarantor (kefil), and the corsairs were to be scattered around to avoid concentration of numbers and to prevent harm coming to the population. In short, corsairs were useful but only when controlled, as reflected in the judgement of the bailo Marino Cavalli, who commented that...

129 6 Mühimme Defteri, no. 1211 (gurre-i Zilkade 972/31 May 1565), no. 1287 (20 Zilkade 972/19 June 1565), no. 1302 (21 Zilkade 972/20 June 1565), no. 1428 (24 Zilhicce, 972/23 July 1565); 7 Mühimme Defteri, no. 1431 (6 Zilhicce 975/2 June 1568), no. 1588 (Zilhicce 975/May–June 1568).
130 6 Mühimme Defteri, no. 126 (Safer 972/September–October 1564), no. 399 (Rebi‘ullevvel 972/November–December 1564), no. 773 (Receb 972/February–March 1565); 7 Mühimme Defteri, no. 1120 (Ramazan 975/February–March 1568).
132 7 Mühimme Defteri, no. 2320 (29 Rebi‘ullevvel 976/21 October 1568).
the Ottomans used the corsairs “like doctors do poisonous things, that is in little quantity and accompanied by all the rest of the navy”.  

However, the knowledge of the corsairs was invaluable, their ships being “the backbone of the entire fleet”, for which they also acted as an advance guard and gathered intelligence. Hayreddin’s appointment underlined the importance of the corsairs to the Ottoman navy. Katip Çelebi, writing in the first half of the following century, advised that “if a kapudan [admiral] is not himself a corsair, let him take advice from and listen to corsairs on maritime matters and naval warfare”, while for Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, only a corsair should be a kapudan. Selaniki frequently referred to the skill and talent of the corsairs and their great expertise in the art of seamanship, relating on one occasion how corsairs had saved the imperial fleet when it was caught in a severe gale near Gelibolu. That Süleyman certainly had great faith in at least some of the corsairs is evident. In a ferman issued on 24 March 1555, he instructed Piyale Paşa, who was to undertake a joint naval action with the French, that he should consult and take advice from Turgud Reis, a man who “knows all the conditions and work of the sea”. Süleyman was equally impressed by Turgud’s knowledge of Malta, regarding him as knowing the location of the fortifications there and how the island should be besieged, and instructing his commanders that they were without fail to take his advice on the strategy to be adopted in the campaign.

Apart from corsairs, there was another component of the Ottoman navy which also showed the fluidity of loyalties. As in the past, the Venetian subjects in this period, too, worked, apparently in significant numbers, in the Ottoman marine. For many Venetians, Istanbul, far from being the lair of infidel corruption, was a very attractive job market for master builders in the shipyards, captains in the navy, and oarsmen on the corsair ships, all of whom

had received their training on the galleys of the Serenissima. The number of Venetians crewing Ottoman ships was so great that in 1562, at least according to the bailo Marcantonio Donini, the Ottomans could fit out 15 galleys almost entirely with Venetian subjects. Many of these Venetian subjects, called marioti, came from Crete, Zakynthos, Cephalonia and Corfu. What attracted Venetians, and other Christians, to work in the Ottoman navy, apart from escaping Venetian justice in the case of bandits, was money, for they were able to earn in four months working for the Ottomans what it would take them with great difficulty an entire year to earn on a Venetian galley. Very well paid and well treated, those already in Ottoman service sent for their relatives and friends, who then also came to work in Istanbul. The problem of Venetian subjects leaving Venetian service and moving over to the Ottomans was sufficiently serious for the bailo Domenico Trevisano to suggest in 1554 various ways to combat it.

Serving in the navy was apparently attractive to many, Marcantonio Donini reporting that people in Istanbul shut up their stalls in order to serve on the galleys. When the Malta campaign was announced in the markets of the capital in order to attract volunteers, many people “from every class with eagerness and delight” joined up. Successful campaigns brought riches, Donini noting that many of those who went to Jerba “did not have a shirt on their back which was their own, but now they find themselves owners of 15, 20 or 25 slaves, as well as money and goods, earned in this enterprise”.

143 Ibid., p. 192.
145 Relazione di Marcantonio Donini, in Albèri, Relazioni, p. 192; Relazione di Domenico Trevisano, ibid., p. 147.
146 Relazione di Antonio Barbarigo, in Albèri, Relazioni, p. 152.
147 Relazione di Marcantonio Donini, in Albèri, Relazioni, p. 192.
148 Relazione di Domenico Trevisano, in Albèri, Relazioni, p. 147. Colin Imber notes that Ottoman sources are silent about the number of Europeans in the navy and also points to the European eagerness to stress European contribution as the reason for any Ottoman success. See Colin Imber, ‘The Navy of Suleyman the Magnificent’, Archivum Ottomanicum, 6 (1980), 211–82 at p. 255, reprinted in Colin Imber, Studies in Ottoman History and Law (Istanbul, 1996), pp. 1–69. While this is undoubtedly true, Ottoman sources may well be silent for the simple reason that the origin of those working in the marine was of no interest, while it is clear that the Venetians at least were concerned about the movement of their own subjects into Ottoman service.
150 6 Mühimme Defteri, no. 597 (Cemazüllevvel, 972/December–January 1564–5).
152 Relazione di Marcantonio Donini, in Albèri, Relazioni, p. 193. Service in the Ottoman marine was not, however, popular with all. See Imber, ‘Navy’, p. 221.
The Ottoman navy which now sailed out under Hayreddin, the dangerous and “evil natured” enemy of the Spanish, was to become a serious contender in the Mediterranean, even apparently gaining a reputation for being unbeatable, for Antonio Doria was to claim in his report of 1572 that the lesson to be drawn from the battle of Lepanto was that the Ottoman navy was not in fact invincible.

Ottoman policy in the Mediterranean over the following decades was dominated by the conflict with the Habsburgs, whose capture of Tunis in 1535 was both a considerable irritation for the Ottomans and a prestigious victory for Charles V. Allied by their shared hostility to the Habsburgs, the French king François I and Süleyman signed the first of a series of Ottoman–French alliances in February 1536. For the Ottomans, although under no illusions over the sincerity of French commitment, an alliance with the French would secure useful support in their war with Spain and offered the prospect of the use of French ports, while for the French such an arrangement gave them Ottoman naval support against the naval forces of Spain, Genoa and Naples, all under Habsburg control, as well as, at least from the French point of view, assisting in their ambitions of territorial conquest in Italy.

In June 1537, the Ottoman navy appeared off the Italian coast, causing great consternation to Pope Paul III, who wrote to Charles V about the Ottoman armada “which you know is very large”, adding anxiously, “may it not be that by the time your Majesty reads this letter we are getting the news that it has set sail and landed in Italy”, which indeed it did and raided Apulia. This was followed by an Ottoman attack on Corfu, “the right eye of Venice” (the left being Modon) according to Kemal Reis, who several times urged Süleyman to take it because of its strategic location. According to Lütfi Paşa, who was in command of the expedition in 1537, he and Hayreddin Paşa were ordered to attack Corfu because the Venetians, “that abject crowd of infidels ceaselessly employed in commerce, amassing wealth, and pursuing profit through cheating and treachery”, had broken their agreement with the sultan and joined the Spanish infidel, “committing many abominable acts and causing much trouble at sea”. The war with Venice was to continue until 1540. The

153 Letter from Lope de Soria to Charles V (1533), quoted in Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, ‘Charles V and the Ottoman War’, Eurasian Studies 1, 2 (2002), 161–82 at p. 177.
158 Lütfi Paşa, Tevârîh, p. 279; Lütfi Paşa, Tevârîh, p. 362.
following year, Hayreddin captured the Venetian islands of Naxos, Andros, Paros and Santorini, prompting the formation of the Holy League consisting of Venice, Pope Paul III, Charles V (Holy Roman Emperor and king of Spain) and his brother Ferdinand of Austria. Exhibiting great naval skill, Hayreddin scored a major naval victory over the fleet of the Holy League under the command of Andrea Doria at the Gulf of Prevesa in a hard-fought battle during which cannon smoke was so thick that neither side could see the other.\(^\text{159}\) The war with Venice ended two years later, with Venice agreeing to pay a hefty indemnity, handing over Monemvasia and Nafplio and ceding the Aegean islands already taken by Hayreddin, an outcome hardly satisfactory for Venice, which was several years later contemplating the re-conquest of Mykonos.\(^\text{160}\)

It was not just the Venetians who were perturbed by the Ottoman presence in the Mediterranean. Ottoman possession of the North African coast was threatening for the Habsburgs, for it was close to the Spanish kingdom of Naples and Sicily, also under Spanish control, as well as Spain itself. The Moriscos, the Muslim population of Granada, looked to the Ottomans for help, apparently, at least at one point, with the support of the müftü, who in 1570 was to tell the sultan that if he abandoned those believers, his population would have just cause for complaint against him. Orations were also made in all the mosques of Istanbul about the Muslims of Granada.\(^\text{161}\)

Having captured Tunis in 1535, the Habsburgs moved against Algiers, Charles V launching an attack in late 1541. This attack, however, met with disaster when a violent storm, which raged for three days, destroyed most of the Spanish fleet. This Habsburg reversal encouraged the French, who renewed their alliance with the Ottomans in 1543. In this year, Hayreddin raided Sicily and southern Italy and anchored off Ostia, an appearance which “left all Rome . . . topsy-turvy” according to one contemporary.\(^\text{162}\) Hayreddin next took part in the joint French–Ottoman attack on Nice, then under the duke of Savoy, who was allied to Charles V, and the Ottoman navy wintered at Toulon in 1543–4. This access to a winter base for their naval forces in the western Mediterranean, plus the support of the French in the region, was a major advantage for the Ottomans, as the Spanish well knew.\(^\text{163}\) Leaving

Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean

Toulon in May 1544, Hayreddin raided southern Italy on his way home to Istanbul.

This period of cooperation ended shortly afterwards, with the signing in September 1544 of the peace of Crépy between Charles V and François I, followed soon afterwards by a Habsburg–Ottoman peace of 1545, renewed in 1547. Neither of these arrangements, however, was to prove long-lasting, for in 1550 Andrea Doria attacked Mahdia and Monastir, the strongholds of the corsair Turgud Reis, attacking Jerba the following year, almost seizing Turgud himself and prompting an unsuccessful Ottoman offensive against Malta. Seeking to justify the assault on Mahdia and Monastir, Charles V claimed that it was a legitimate response to corsair activity and thus not in contravention of the 1547 agreement. While the Ottomans demanded the cities back, a request rejected by Charles V, who assured the sultan in a letter of 8 March 1551 that both would remain in Habsburg hands, they were not immediately anxious to enter into hostilities with the Spanish over the issue. The French ambassador, d’Aramon, however, perceived a break in Ottoman–Spanish relations as being to French advantage and thus covertly worked to bring one about. As ambassador to Istanbul from 1547 to 1551, d’Aramon had been an active proponent of a new Ottoman–French alliance in pursuit of “the common enemy”.

While demanding the return of Mahdia and Monastir, the Ottomans attacked and took Tripoli in 1551, held since 1530 by the Hospitallers, whose constant aggression, as Sinan Paşa explained to the French ambassador during the siege, was irritating the sultan, who was determined to take it. It was, as d’Aramon noted in a letter to Henri II written from Malta in August 1551, a very good conquest for the Ottomans, who he felt sure would be quite content to have Tripoli rather than Mahdia, for Tripoli was the best location in the Maghreb, a port which could accommodate “the largest army that the sultan could construct”. In d’Aramon’s estimation, its fall was likely to be

168 Nicolay, Soliman, p. 80.
170 Ibid., p. 162 (26 August 1551).
of great advantage to the sultan and very damaging to the Habsburgs, in particular since the “nest of corsairs” which would presumably be established there would represent a constant problem for Sicily, the kingdom of Naples and indeed for the rest of Italy. While the fall of Tripoli was a source of consternation to the Hospitallers, it was an outcome not entirely unsatisfactory to the French, who could see distinct advantages in an Ottoman rather than a Hospitaller stronghold on the North African coast. Rumours abounded about French involvement in the affair, fuelled by the fact that the Hospitaller commander who had surrendered Tripoli was in fact French. Some Hospitallers accused the French ambassador, when he arrived in Malta on his way to Istanbul from Tripoli after the fall, of being in league with the Ottomans, in Malta merely to spy out the land and hand the island over to the sultan.

In the same year as the fall of Tripoli, the French king, now Henri II, made another alliance with Süleyman, both rulers being “one and the same” for Pope Paul IV, a similarity which did not apparently disturb him, as Setton points out, the pope also referring to them as having “a very good mutual understanding together”. In July 1552, the Ottoman fleet appeared off Naples, having done much damage to Venetian possessions en route, and in August Ottoman ships attacked Andrea Doria, taking seven of his galleys. They then landed at Gaeta and ravaged the area around the city. In 1555, a joint French–Ottoman naval force descended on Naples, Pietro Pacheco, archbishop of Siguenza, writing to Giovanna, princess of Portugal, in March 1555 that everyone thought that the Ottoman fleet would without doubt attack that year. Citizens of Naples complained to Philip II in February of the same year that the Ottoman fleet had over the past years sacked much of the kingdom’s territory and abducted a great number of the population. Indeed, in August 1551, d’Aramon had reported that Turgud Reis and others were about to set out corsairing with the intention of destroying as much as possible in Sicily, Calabria and Apulia. Pope Julius III was also clearly concerned in this period

171 Ibid.
176 Coniglio, Viceregno, vol. 1, doc. 4, p. 83 (2 March 1555)
177 Ibid., doc. 2, p. 43 (February 1555).
at the pressing Ottoman danger to Italian coastal regions.\textsuperscript{179} At the beginning of 1559, Philip issued instructions about the necessity of guarding the coasts and keeping well informed about Ottoman movements in the waters of the Levant, the Ottoman fleet being very familiar with the seas of Italy.\textsuperscript{180} The Ottomans, too, adopted a similar approach to Spanish shipping.\textsuperscript{181}

Not merely active against the Spanish in southern Italy, the Ottomans were also busy in North Africa, taking the Spanish fortress of Wahran (Oran), west of Algiers, in 1556 and Bizerta, near Tunis, in 1557. The French were at this point most anxious to secure Ottoman naval assistance in their struggle with Spain. The French ambassador, the “blunt and overbearing”\textsuperscript{182} Jean de la Vigne, tackled Rüstem Paşa, who remained unmoved. The pope was, he said, “a tyrant and a fool”, and it was better to leave him, Philip and Henri to “exhaust and consume each other”.\textsuperscript{183} Despite all his efforts, de la Vigne was unable to extract Ottoman naval support, leaving him to exclaim in exasperation that the sultan was “barbarously opinionated”.\textsuperscript{184}

In 1558, an Ottoman fleet sacked Sorrento, seizing a large number of captives and in general “amusing themselves”.\textsuperscript{185} The Ottomans then plundered Ciutadella on Minorca, prompting the Spanish to take Jerba, temporarily, for Piyale Paşa re-occupied it in 1560. The arrival of the victorious Ottoman fleet in Istanbul, replete with prisoners and spoils and captured ships in tow, was “a sight as joyful to the Turks as it was mournful and deplorable to us Christians”, according to the Habsburg ambassador Busbecq, who also suffered the attentions of the happy crowds who “congregated … round my door and mockingly asked my people whether they had a brother or relation

\textsuperscript{179} Setton, \textit{The Papacy and the Levant}, vol. 4, p. 581. In December 1556, the Ferrarese ambassador was instructed to inform him that the Ottoman fleet would ravage the kingdom of Naples, a task which he did not look forward to, for he "knew not how to make the announcement from fear lest it might cause displeasure". It certainly did, for the ambassador "having muttered something to the effect, the Pope replied, "Ah, dogs" [i.e., the imperialists] they compel us to let even Sultan Soliman come", at which point the ambassador informed him that the French king had requested this. See letter from Bernardo Navagero to the Doge and Senate, 26 December 1556, in Brown, \textit{Calendar of State Papers}, vol. 6, pt. 2, no. 774, p. 885.


\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Mihimme Defteri}, no. 51 (Safer 975/August–September 1567), no. 653 (6 Receb 975/6 January 1568), no. 1431 (6 Zilhicce 975/2 June 1568).


or friend in the Spanish fleet; for, if so, they would have the pleasure of seeing them shortly”. By this time, the Spanish had a freer hand in dealing with the Ottomans, for in 1559 they had signed the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis with France and the period of Ottoman–French political alliance was over.

The next major Ottoman campaign was not in North Africa, for in 1565 the Ottomans attacked Malta. Held by the Hospitallers since 1530, the island was situated in the narrowest stretch between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean and dominated the passage between east and west. Its strategic location, as well as its occupants, made an Ottoman assault inevitable. The siege was ultimately unsuccessful, the result apparently of a dispute among the leadership. Strategy was decided upon without the input of Turgud Reis, in direction contravention of the sultan’s wishes, and there was a division between Mustafa Paşa, who mistreated his troops, and Piyale Paşa, who ignored the corsairs. All these difficulties were well known to the defenders on Malta, who were kept informed by deserters who reported on the divisions in the Ottoman leadership and discontent in the army and navy. According to Balbi da Correggio, it was Piyale’s opposition to Mustafa Paşa’s plan to attack simultaneously Mdina (Città Vecchia), Birgu (Vittoriosa) and San Michele that led to the decision to attack San Elmo. If Mustafa’s plan had been put into operation, then Malta would have been lost, “But God almighty did not wish for our defeat and through his will the two Paşas, jealous of each other, were not in agreement; the result of their errors is evident and, for us, so favourable”. Although San Elmo was taken, it was at great cost, many “drink[ing] the sherbet of martyrdom”, and the remaining soldiers left exhausted. Turgud was killed, an event which gave “great happiness” to all the defenders on Malta, and much gunpowder and other equipment was used up. Piyale Paşa and Mustafa Paşa blamed each other for the failure of the enterprise, the soldiers blamed the serdar (commander)

188 Francesco Balbi da Correggio, Diario dell’assedio all’isola di Malta (Genoa, 1995), pp. 67–8, 78, 185, 191–2, 208–9.
189 Ibid., p.72.
191 Balbi da Correggio, Diario, p. 103.
192 Katip Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-Kibâr, p. 302 (facsimile), pp. 101–2. Balbi da Correggio also noted that Turgud was not happy about the bombarding of San Elmo, and he had not failed to give suggestions “all naturally to our disadvantage given the great experience of such a famous corsair”. See Balbi da Correggio, Diario, pp. 85–6, 102.
193 Balbi da Correggio, Diario, p. 208.
and the serdar blamed the vezirs.\textsuperscript{194} “Burning with shame”, they returned to Istanbul blaming each other.\textsuperscript{195}

The failure at Malta was perhaps somewhat made up for by the easy capture of the Genoese island of Chios in 1566, taken “without the striking of a sword”\textsuperscript{196} in an attack in which, according to one contemporary Genoese account, Piyale Paşa took great care not to harm the local population.\textsuperscript{197}

The offensive was launched, according to Katip Çelebi, because of the Chiotes’ attacks on Muslim vessels and their good relations with the Franks, to whom they constantly gave information on the movement and makeup of the imperial fleet.\textsuperscript{198} Such information was apparently not limited to the Ottoman fleet, for according to one Genoese source they “rendered great services . . . by affectionately and carefully keeping our princes informed of every event, every intrigue, and every movement that occurred amongst the Turks in their neighbourhood”.\textsuperscript{199} According to Gieronimo Giustiniani, the son of the last podestà of Chios, Piyale Paşa accused the Maonesi of maintaining spies who dressed in “Turkish costume” and, pretending to be Muslims, infiltrated government circles and spied on the movements and actions of the sultan, their ears ever open to receive the secrets of the state.\textsuperscript{200} A further source of considerable irritation was the assistance they gave to runaway slaves, to the extent of maintaining an “ufficio de’schiavi”, a clearinghouse for slaves,\textsuperscript{201} a complaint reiterated by Piyale Paşa.\textsuperscript{202} The Ottomans also complained of the arrears in tribute paid by the Chiots,\textsuperscript{203} and of their constant support of corsairs, those “thieves and assassins” who descended on the lands of the sultan, sacking and pillaging.\textsuperscript{204} The Genoese government regarded the French as being behind the Ottoman attack on Chios,\textsuperscript{205} while for some the hostility of the new grand vezîr Mehmed Paşa

\begin{itemize}
\item[195] Ibid.
\item[196] Philip P. Argenti, 	extit{Chius Vincta} (Cambridge, 1941), doc. 55, p. 138, letter from Adamus di Franchi to Maximillian II, sent from Edirne, 17 May 1566.
\item[197] Ibid., doc. 48, pp. 120–1, letter dated 1566.
\item[198] Katip Çelebi, 	extit{Tuhfetü’l-Kibâr}, p. 305 (facsimile), p. 103.
\item[199] Argenti, 	extit{Chius Vincta}, p. cxix.
\item[201] Argenti, 	extit{Chius Vincta}, doc. 48, p. 124, letter dated 1566.
\item[203] Ibid., pp. 224; Michael Heberer, 	extit{Osmanlıda Bir Köle : Brettenli Michael Heberer’in Anlanyatısı, 1585–1588}, trans. Türkis Noyan (Istanbul, 2003), pp. 224–5. Heberer was captured by the Ottomans in 1585 and spent three years as an Ottoman galley slave.
\item[204] Giustiniani, 	extit{History}, p. 224.
\item[205] Argenti, 	extit{Chius Vincta}, p. xcv.
\end{itemize}
was also a factor, Mehmed Paşa having announced at one point that he wished to reduce all the houses in Chios to rubble.\textsuperscript{206}

With Chios captured, the Ottomans had total domination of the Aegean, and only two major islands in the eastern Mediterranean remained out of Ottoman hands: Crete and Cyprus. The Ottomans now turned their attention to the Venetian island of Cyprus. While the two states might have been at peace, there were always tensions, the Venetians complaining of Ottoman corsair attacks against their subjects and commercial shipping,\textsuperscript{207} or of attacks by Ottoman state officials,\textsuperscript{208} and the Ottomans accusing the Venetians of being in league with the Uskoks, the rising pirate force based in the Adriatic, who were to become an increasing problem for the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{209} There were, however, occasions of cooperation, such as that in 1552 when a group of Ottoman merchants thanked a Venetian captain, Nicolò Balbi, for rescuing them from Uskoks.\textsuperscript{210} Venice, however, was by no means well intentioned. For example, in 1568, the Senate issued instructions to the commander of the fleet in the Adriatic that, while making a great public display of good treatment, he was very secretly to arrange for the murder of the captain of an Ottoman justa whom he had captured. This should be done in such a way that his death should appear natural, the result of a head wound he had earlier received or due to some other accident.\textsuperscript{211}

For Venice, Cyprus was a strategically vital location for its trade in the eastern Mediterranean. It was its location, apart from any economic considerations, which made it a prime target for the Ottomans. Situated on the route between Egypt and Istanbul, its survival was dependent on Ottoman calculation, the Venetian bailo Pietro Zen noting as early as 1524 that the Ottomans were not at that moment contemplating attacks on either Crete or Cyprus, however attractive as targets, because of the expense in maintaining control there.\textsuperscript{212} Now, irritated by attacks on pilgrims and merchant shipping which emanated from Cyprus, an accusation vehemently denied by Venice, which maintained that such attacks came from Malta and Messina, and particularly

\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., doc. 48, p. 124, letter dated 1566.
\textsuperscript{207} \textit{6 Mühimme Defteri}, no. 1425 (17 Zilhicce 972/16 July 1565); \textit{7 Mühimme Defteri}, no. 907 (22 Şaban 975/25 March 1565), no. 2226 (Rebiulahir 976/September–October 1568).
\textsuperscript{208} \textit{6 Mühimme Defteri}, no. 498 (? Cemaziülevel 972/December–January 1564–1565).
\textsuperscript{209} \textit{Relazione di Alvise Renier}, in Pedani-Fabris, \textit{Relazioni}, pp. 50, 52, 54; \textit{7 Mühimme Defteri}, no. 2768 (21 Şaban 976/8 February 1569).
\textsuperscript{210} İdris Bostan, \textit{Adriyatik’teki Korsanlık: Osmanlılar, Uskoklar, Venedikiler, 1575–1620} (İstanbul, 2009), doc. 2, pp. 129–30 (5 September 1552). See also doc. 4, pp. 133–4 (19–28 February 1578).
\textsuperscript{211} Lamansky, \textit{Sécrets}, doc. 53, pp. 76–7 (12 May 1568).
incensed by the seizure and plunder of the ship of the defterdar of Egypt, the sultan turned to the şeyhülislam Ebussuu Efendi for a fetva justifying the attack and the consequent breaking of the treaty with Venice. Accepting the argument that Cyprus had once been Muslim territory, thus necessitating its recapture, Ebussuu’s fetva stated in essence that such treaties were only to be observed so long as they served Muslim interests. Once they ceased to do so, it was imperative to break them. The sultan then informed Venice that he wanted the island handed over, the grand vezir responding to the protestations of the Venetian bailo Alvise Buonrizzo by asking “what do you want with that island so far away [from Venice] which is no use to you and is the cause of such discord? Leave it to us, because it will be much better in our hands…. In any case, the Signor [the sultan] is resolute about wanting it”. 

Although not all the vezirs were in agreement, and despite Venetian protestations that Cyprus did not give refuge to corsairs nor had it ever been a Muslim possession, the attack on Cyprus was launched in 1570. Nicosia fell in September, the Ottomans taking more booty and captives “than had ever been seen or heard of in history”. Famagusta, after a long and difficult siege during which Mustafa Paşa sent an urgent request for naval assistance, fell in 1571.

One of the reasons the grand vezir Sokollu Mehmed Paşa had opposed the campaign had been fear that it would provoke a united European response. This was indeed what happened, the Holy League emerging as a result of the Ottoman attack on the island. In October 1571, the fleet of the Holy League under Don Juan of Austria met the Ottoman fleet off Lepanto. The Ottoman decision to fight was taken on the insistence of the kapudan paşa Ali Paşa, who apparently regarded the enemy as contemptible. His decision faced strong opposition from Uluç Ali Paşa, who argued that the ships, having been at sea for six months, were not fit for battle, and from Pertev Paşa, concerned over the deficiencies in crew numbers. This latter objection was swept aside by Ali Paşa, who considered the shortage of five or ten men per ship of no matter.

216 Selaniki, Tarih, vol. 1, p. 78.
218 Selaniki, Tarih, vol. 1, p. 82.
Uluç Ali’s suggestions over tactics were similarly dismissed, and Pertev Paşa, a man by nature suspicious and fearful, gave way.\textsuperscript{219} The ensuing battle was a disaster for the Ottomans, indeed so great for some Ottomans that no such catastrophe at sea had occurred since Noah’s flood.\textsuperscript{220} For Gelibolu Mustafa Ali, this defeat was inevitable given that the *kapudan paşa*, a man “useful and assiduous” but with “no experience of sea battles and ignorant of the art of corsairing”,\textsuperscript{222} suffered from misplaced boldness, the ships had insufficient rowers and the crews were made up of press-ganged poor and men with no experience, shackled to prevent them from escaping.\textsuperscript{223} Katip Çelebi’s summation was that commanders should not rush headlong into battle and that, even if sufficient force were available, peace where possible was always preferable. It was, he noted, a skill to withdraw as soon as it became apparent that there was no hope of victory, and he cautioned that commanders should not think of sea battles as land battles but should learn the rules of engagement from the works written by the wise.\textsuperscript{224}

Although a shattering defeat, Lepanto was not the crushing blow the Europeans initially took it to be, for it was “a battle without strategic consequences”.\textsuperscript{225} A new dockyard was built and a large, new fleet constructed, perhaps greater than before.\textsuperscript{226} This was an achievement which startled the Europeans, and even perhaps Uluç Ali himself, now *kapudan paşa* with the new *lakab* of Kılıç, for he had pointed out to Mehmed Paşa that while “it is easy to make vessels, it is difficult to complete 500–600 anchors and ropes, sails and other necessary things for 200 ships”. The grand vezir had famously replied that the power of the state was such that were the sultan to command that the anchors for the entire fleet be made from silver, the ropes from silk and the sails from satin, it would be done.\textsuperscript{227} By 1573, the Venetian *bailo* Costantino Garzoni reported that Uluç Ali had put the navy back on its feet.

\begin{itemize}
\item Peçevi, *Tarihi*, vol. 1, p. 350. This opinion was echoed by Gerolamo Diedo, who said that Pertev Paşa gave in either because he was persuaded to or because he was afraid. See Onorato Caetani, *Gerolamo Diedo. La battaglia di Lepanto (1571)*, ed. Salvatore Mazzarella (Palermo, 1995), p. 192.
\item Katip Çelebi, *Tuhfetü’l-Kibâr*, p. 316 (facsimile), p. 117.
\item Imber, *Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650*, p. 63.
\end{itemize}
after Lepanto, and it was a result of his great experience and skill, according to the Venetian bailo Paolo Contarini, that the Ottoman navy was extremely well organised.

Only one year after Lepanto, Antonio Doria wrote in his report urging the necessity of maintaining the Holy League and pursuing the war in the Levant that if the Ottomans were allowed to regain their power at sea, the Venetians would inevitably lose their islands and fortresses in Dalmatia, while Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, Majorca, Minorca and Ibiza would be prey to the enemy, involving a crushing burden of expense for their protection. Venice in this period was openly encouraging Venetian subjects to engage in corsairing against the Ottomans, even issuing instructions to the captain of the gulf to hand over captured Ottoman vessels to any who wished to arm them, at their own expense, for such corsairing operations.

In 1573, Venice once more sued for peace, apologising for its past behaviour, according to the Ottomans. The sultan, for the sake of the population, chose to “consign the past to the past” and, regarding peace as auspicious, agreed. Ottoman forces, he announced, should now expend their energies on attacking and destroying Spanish territory. For Venice, the war had been an expensive enterprise, for as Giovanni Francesco Morosini, Venetian ambassador to France, pointed out to the English ambassador in November 1574, the Republic had “spent fourteen millions in gold and wasted its people”. The Republic now paid a hefty indemnity, an increased tribute for Zante, and lost Cyprus.

In 1574, in response to Don Juan’s re-conquest of Tunis in 1573, the grand vezir Mehmed Paşa “tucked his skirts into his waist” and fitted out a fleet which, setting sail for North Africa, took La Goletta and Tunis that summer. Much of the North African coast to the east of Wahran was now under Ottoman control, and the position of the Spanish increasingly threatened. In October, Don Juan wrote to the duca di Terranova in Sicily advising in detail on the measures necessary to protect the island against the Ottoman fleet in

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the aftermath of the Ottoman conquest of La Goletta and Tunis, a victory by the Ottoman navy which had increased the “haughtiness” of the sultan.\textsuperscript{235}

The post-1574 Mediterranean

Ottoman arrogance might have been boosted by the victory in North Africa, but Ottoman pragmatism remained unaffected. The period from 1574 marked a shift in Ottoman strategy in the Mediterranean from aggression to defence, necessitated by the more immediate pressure of the land wars with Hungary and Iran and the increasing economic difficulties of the state, which clearly had an impact on the provisioning of the navy. According to Katip Çelebi, from the taking of Tunis in 1574 until the beginning of the Crete campaign in 1645, the imperial fleet was not despatched on major voyages of conquest or employed in major sea battles but was active in the Mediterranean mainly for defensive purposes.\textsuperscript{236} Gerlach noted in 1578 that the Ottomans had undertaken to send their fleets into the archipelago with defensive, not aggressive, aims, a policy adopted also by the Spanish, who, occupied with their enemies in northern Europe, were by now wanting peace and who signed a truce with the Ottomans in 1580, renewed in 1581.\textsuperscript{237}

Such a shift in strategy and any downsizing of ambitions and activities in the western Mediterranean did not, of course, mean the total abandonment of maritime aggression. Although charged with “the defence of the sea” in the words of Selaniki, Çigalazade Sinan Paşa, for example, returned in 1002/1593–4 from a tour of sea protection complete with booty that included seven ships which, contrary to the agreement with Venice, were transporting war materials and Spanish soldiers, “behaviour contrary to the peace [which] these accursed polytheists were constantly adopting”.\textsuperscript{238} The Venetians complained that their ships coming and going from Alexandria, İskenderun (Alexandretta) and Cyprus were seized by Ottomans when they called at Rhodes on the pretext that they were “thieves and corsairs”\textsuperscript{239} and of the danger of corsairs suffered by the merchants of Crete.\textsuperscript{240} That defence could also

\begin{itemize}
  \item Coniglio, Viceregno, vol. 2, doc. 47, p. 390 (28 October 1574).
  \item Selaniki, \textit{Tarih}, vol. 1, p. 349.
  \item Georgios Ploumides, \textquote{Έμποροι και ναυτικοί του 17ου αιώνα. Τέσσερις περιπτώσεις}, in \textit{Ροδονιά τιμή στον Μ. Ι. Μανούσακα}, vol. 2 (Rethimno, 1994), doc. 1 (26 September 1607), pp. 473–82 at p. 479.
  \item Katerina Zaridi-Vasileiou, \textquote{Λόγος του βίκτωρα Μεσέρη προς τιμή του Δούκα της Κρήτης Marcantonio Venier (1596)}, \textit{Κρητολογία} 10–11 (1980), 257–69 at p. 268 (16 April 1597).
\end{itemize}
mean attack is clear from the fate of the Trablusgarb beylerbeyi Cafer Paşa, who was imprisoned in Yedi Kule in 995/1586–7 for failing to attack French and Maltese ships, claiming that his job was defence of the homeland.241

Two issues remained essential for the Ottomans in the Mediterranean, one, the protection of commercial shipping and ensuring food supplies, in particular to Istanbul, and the other, highly related to the first, piracy. Vessels transporting grain were a favoured target, the Ottomans seizing enemy grain ships242 and punishing those who attacked Ottoman ships carrying cargos of grain.243 Ottoman corsairs, Selaniki’s renowned fighters in the gaza against the infidel in the Mediterranean,244 were as ever active, and corsairs operating from the North African coast regularly attacked Calabria.245 The Uskoks were a major menace to all, preying on shipping, ports and people from their bases in the Adriatic.246 Maltese, Florentine, Genoese, Venetian, French and Spanish ships cruised the waters of the Mediterranean, harrying the Aegean coast and attacking the pilgrim and merchant ships from Egypt.247 Michael Heberer, who wrote an account of his experience as an Ottoman galley slave, was himself captured in an encounter between Ottoman and Maltese ships off Alexandria in mid-1585 during which he and his fellow fighters, having boarded an Ottoman ship, were abandoned to their fate, the Hospitallers sailing away as a rescue party of Ottoman ships appeared.248 It was the Hospitallers, too, who in June 1597 seized Macuncuzade Mustafa Efendi while he was sailing to take up his appointment as kadi of Paphos in Cyprus. As a result of the encounter, the French captain, St. Aubin, took 12 vessels and 283 captives back to Malta, where Macuncuzade Mustafa Efendi was to stay until January 1599.249 Among the other captives he found there was another kadi from Cyprus, who had been captured in June 1591.250 While irritating, the Hospitaller attacks were perhaps not of such great significance, for Henry Blount was to report at the beginning of the next century that the Ottomans regarded the Hospitallers as being “like little barking Dogs about a Lyon”

242 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 392; vol. 2, p. 792.
243 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 294.
244 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 619.
246 Bostan, Adıriyatik’te Korsanlık, doc. 7, p. 143 (5 February 1586); Gerlach, Türkiye Günlüğü, vol. 1, pp. 314, 316.
248 Heberer, Osmanlıda Bir Köle, p. 73.
250 Ibid., p. 23.
who might keep him awake or sometimes nip but this “did but rouze him, without any hurt of importance”.  

Piracy was by no means a new problem, and was certainly one that affected all states operating in the Mediterranean, leading, for example, to Ottoman–Venetian cooperation against the Uskoks. What was new apparently was the level, at least according to Gelibolu Mustafa Ali, who noted that the current level of piracy would not have been possible under Süleyman, when control over the sea was much more effective. Although the Ottomans did attempt to control piracy and the corsairs, their own included, settling people on Samos in an apparently successful bid to curb corsair activity in the region, for example, they were unable to impose effective authority. This was presumably related to Ottoman internal economic problems and their shifted focus onto Iran and Hungary, a shift reflected in the report of the Venetian ambassador in early 1592 that the Ottomans had “abandoned all idea of operations, either by sea or land”, this not being the time “to think of fresh undertakings, but rather to observe the action of the Persians”. In consequence, there was no activity in the arsenal.

A further factor which distinguished the late sixteenth century from the earlier period was the emergence of major new players in the waters of the Mediterranean, the Dutch and the English. The Ottoman moment in the Mediterranean was not quite over, however, for in 1669 Mehmed IV took Crete from Venice after a long war which had begun in 1645 with the conquest of Chania (Hanya).

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251 Henry Blount, A Voyage into the Levant (London, 1636), p. 73.
252 Bostan, Adr`iyatik‘e Korsanlık, doc. 8, pp. 145–7 (10–19 May 1586).
254 Heberer, Osmanluda Bir Köle, p. 179.
The defeat of the Mamluk army by Ottoman forces in 1516 and 1517, a defeat due in particular to the Ottoman use of firearms, resulted, on the one hand, in the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty over the region of Syria and Egypt and, on the other, presented the Ottomans with the opportunity of wielding influence over the Red Sea. Gaining possession of the economic resources of Egypt, and having before them the prospect of southward expansion and dominance of the Red Sea, Arabian coastlines, Yemen and the shores of north-east Africa, the Ottomans also gained a religious significance with the occupation of the şeriflik (a position belonging to the descendants of the prophet Muhammad) of Mecca, which thus made the sultan the “protector of Mecca and Medina”. The Ottomans’ success, both in gaining effective control in a region which formed one of the important pilgrimage routes and in securing dominance of the Red Sea route, one of the trade routes linking the eastern Mediterranean with the Indian world on which were situated key cities such as Aden, Mocha, Jeddah, Yanbu, Hodeidah, Massawa and Suez, meant that they were now in a position to present themselves as a strong Islamic and imperial force against the sea empire of the Portuguese, which was attempting to prevent Ottoman encroachment in the region.

The reasons for the Ottomans turning their attention to the Mamluks, whom they had initially failed to defeat in the reign of Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512), cannot be sufficiently explained by linking the attack to the hostility of the Mamluks as allies of the Safavids, whom Selim I (r. 1512–20) had successfully attacked in order to eliminate the Shi’i danger. Even if it is difficult to talk of the existence of a plan prepared in the capital to take possession of the Red Sea route which united the Indian Ocean and the eastern Mediterranean, or to point to the existence of a calculated and documented project as support for the argument of some historians for whom the Ottomans were aware of the Portuguese Empire’s activities directed towards the Red Sea, it is known that the Ottomans were interested in the life of the holy lands of Islam and
had for many years sent assistance, known as *sürre*, to the Hijaz. Economic relations had begun many years earlier: in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, commercial links existed, in particular between Bursa and the Arab regions and the Red Sea. Further, the Ottomans wished, and planned, to strengthen the Mamluk navy against the common enemy, Christendom. Aware of the Portuguese threat both in Arabia and in the Indian Ocean in this period, they assisted the Mamluks with weapons such as cannonballs, guns and arrows, and with munitions including oars, copper and gunpowder; and they sent commanders such as Emir Hüseyin and Selman Reis to serve the Mamluk state. A force of 6,000 made up of Mamluks, Turks, Turcomans, Maghribis and Arabs attempted the conquest of Yemen, and it is known that this force took Zabid. In this period before the conquest of Egypt, it is important to keep in mind the environment created by the adventure-seeking salaried Ottoman soldiers, who were widespread in the Islamic world and were known as Rumi both in the Red Sea world and in India, and who knew in particular how to use firearms. In answer, thus, to Fernand Braudel’s question “how could anyone have foreseen the victories of Turks against the sultans of Cairo in 1516 and 1517?”, one can refer to the remark of Halil İnalcık, for whom “the conditions in Arab lands were ripe for the acceptance of Ottoman rule”, an interpretation which reflects the historical, if not ethical, reality.

In the year before the Ottoman Empire’s armies invaded Egypt, and before an artillery force and a Mamluk fleet under the leadership of Selman Reis protected Jeddah against a Portuguese fleet, the position in the Red Sea can be summarised as follows. Mamluk state control was not restricted to the

1 Halil İnalcık, ‘Bursa and the Commerce of the Levant’, *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 3, 2 (1960), 131–47.
Hijaz region but extended to Suakin on the African coast and to Aswan on the Nile, and benefited from the advantages of the traditional trade route. While Cairo, a location of great commercial activity frequented by merchants from many different “nations”, represented its wealth, Mamluk culture, as it did in Egypt and Syria, made its presence felt, too, in Mecca and Medina. Yemen was divided into two: while in the north San’a and its dependencies were tied to the Shi’i Zaidi dynasty and, with ports such as Luhaïyah, Hodeïda, Zabïd and Mocha, opened onto the Red Sea, the south was centred on Ta’izz and, with Aden as a very important entrepôt, opened onto the Indian Ocean. On the African coast, there was the kingdom of Ethiopia, which ruled in particular over the more inland and upland areas, and the Muslim emirates, which were sometimes under its influence; the location of Massawa and the Dahlak islands close to it linked the Red Sea opening into the Indian Ocean with the African continent.

Chronology

When a Portuguese fleet of 37 ships under the command of Lopo Soarez was driven back in 1517 by Selman Reis, who was engaged in protecting Jeddah, an ocean-going force with Atlantic characteristics confronted a naval force produced by a Mediterranean system and commanded by an Ottoman seaman working in Mamluk service. This historic event, constituting an example of Red Sea defensive tactics for Ottoman naval forces, was in later years to provide an example for the application of a seamanship which, consisting of a strategy involving land forces and artillery, could not be put into action in the open seas of the Indian Ocean. It was, of course, to be expected that the Ottoman forces would be influenced by the conditions prevalent in the lands and seas they took over from the Mamluks. Climatic and geographical conditions, together with the strategies followed by the Ottomans, which were for the most part insufficient, were to characterise the historical landscape of the Red Sea, in particular that of Yemen and the Indian Ocean.

Without doubt the greatest difficulty that faced the Ottomans was the activities of the Portuguese naval forces which aimed to take control of the entrance to and exit from the Red Sea and, by blocking the movement of Muslim merchant ships transporting goods from India and the Far East into and out of the eastern Mediterranean ports, to direct trade along the oceanic route around South Africa. The blow struck by the Portuguese forces to the Mamluk economy, in particular the pepper and spice trade, was indeed a serious threat for the Ottomans. In 1518, for example, a Red Sea fleet (armada do Estreito) composed of ten ships under the Portuguese captain António de Saldanha set fire to rich Muslim ships loaded with spices trading between the Red Sea and the Indian coast. Two years later, the Portuguese governor-general Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, who commanded a naval force of 24 ships carrying around 3,000 soldiers and possessing effective firepower, entered the Red Sea but was unable to realise his plan to destroy the ships at Jeddah. The Portuguese commander, however, called at Massawa on the African coast and from there sent an embassy to the Christian emperor Prester John (Preste João) and established relations with him and, at the same time, captured Muslim merchant ships sailing to the Red Sea and burnt the city of Dahlak.

This kind of attack by the Portuguese fleet is also to be seen in the events which occurred in 1523 when a Portuguese naval force seized five Muslim merchant ships in the region of Guardafui and burnt four of them in the port of Aden. Portuguese forces, which had destroyed the town of Shihr, went as far as Massawa and on their return set fire to Zufar on the Omani coast.

In the years during which the Ottoman Empire was expanding its suzerainty over the Red Sea, it thus came face to face with the activities of a rival Christian empire. The results of the Portuguese blockade – even if some merchant ships managed to conduct commercial voyages – dealt a perceptible blow to Levantine trade. The drop in the volume of commercial goods, in particular pepper, spices and, to a lesser extent, silk, coming from the East to trade centres such as Cairo, Alexandria and Beirut, combined with the fact that some such commodities never reached these markets, forced the


Ottoman expansion in the Red Sea

Ottomans to establish a naval force in the Red Sea, which opened into the Indian Ocean, analogous with their activities in the Mediterranean. The Suez shipyard therefore became pivotal in Ottoman activities directed towards the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and even the Persian Gulf.

In 1519, Selman Reis went to Istanbul, according to the *Diarii* of Marino Sanudo, an important source for the period, and was employed to prepare a sea force of 30 galleys at Suez to counter the Portuguese threat in the Red Sea. Again according to the same source, 12 ships, 3,000 fighters, timber, ship construction materials and cannon were brought to Alexandria for the construction of this fleet. A report dated 2 June 1525 from the Topkapı Palace Archives in Istanbul, which is thought to have been Selman Reis’s and to have been presented to the grand vezir İbrahim Paşa, is an important source for the naval force which the Ottoman Empire prepared in the Red Sea in this period. Such a report, even if it bears the characteristics of a personal enterprise and even if it was not prepared within the framework of an imperial expansion plan, is important as an indication of the tax resources and the strategic points which were to be taken in later conquests and because it serves as a guide for our understanding of Ottoman strategy. The document shows the numbers of the sea forces which the empire took over on the conquest of Egypt and which were prepared at Suez, of the ships and cannon and the great quantity of war materials and men at Jeddah: six bastards, eight galleys, three galliots, one boat (caique); seven large siege guns (basilik), 13 medium and 57 small guns, 29 guns mounted on warships (saykas), 95 iron guns, 97 cannon employed in the fleet (falconets); about 18 tons of gunpowder, 430 basilik cannonballs, 900 copper falconet cannonballs; about 25 tons of pitch, nine tons of white lead, nine tons of cable fibre, 6,800 metres of sailcloth, 20 pairs of top-gallant yards, nine tons of linseed oil, 500 oars; 50 caulkers, 20 carpenters, two ironsmiths, two workbenches, two sawyers, 20 artillery men and 1,000 sailors.

These figures, when compared with the Ottoman naval force in the Mediterranean, are not large and cannot be said to show a navy possessing the attributes and capacity necessary to put out to sea in the Indian Ocean. The preparation of a more powerful fleet would be undertaken in later years. But the Ottomans, the Rumi in Arab and Portuguese sources, began to have

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an impact in a closed sea like the Red Sea and represented a significant attempt to prevent the Portuguese “bloqueia” fleet from gaining complete control of it. In December 1524, when news was received that the Ottomans were preparing a fleet of 20 ships and that some of these vessels were in Jeddah, a Portuguese fleet under the command of António de Miranda was able to sail as far as the island of Kamaran, but after taking in water there was forced to return to India. Selman and Emir Hüseyin (Rumi) defeated Mustafa Bey, who had established hegemony in Yemen, and in 1526 took Zabid and Aden and, by establishing a military base on the island of Kamaran, succeeded in taking control of the Red Sea. Among the information reaching Venice from Alexandria two years later was the news that Selman’s forces had defeated seven Portuguese ships off Aden and had sunk four of them; the Ottomans were thus now on the offensive. It is important to note that the endeavours of the Ottomans in the Red Sea were the result more of personal endeavour and competition than central planning, and it is evident that the administration of those places which were very far from the centre lacked strict order and control. Thus the killing of Selman Reis by Hayreddin Bey, who had earlier been appointed as commander of the army, disrupted the running of the Ottoman southern policy, and such an event was seized on as an opportunity by the Portuguese. At the same time, a Muslim fleet of 20 ships, including a large Ottoman galley, working between the Red Sea and India was captured by the Portuguese, a great deal of plunder was taken, and Zayla, on the African coast, was set on fire. Among news reaching Egypt was that the Portuguese had either taken a trade vessel or had destroyed an Islamic town. While the Tarikh al-Shihri, an Arabic chronicle from Hadramut, registered a Portuguese ship coming to Shihr in 1529 and seizing a loaded ship there, the contemporary Portuguese historian Fernão Lopes de Castanheda wrote that they had taken nine ships wishing to bring spices from India to the Red Sea and had burnt four of them. The ruler of Aden’s offer of payment to the Portuguese of 100,000 xerafim in return for Portuguese protection of the city against the Ottomans and, further, Aden’s offer of recognition of freedom of movement for the Portuguese, together with the desire of the Portuguese to build fortifications on Zayla and Massawa, must have worried the Ottoman

10 Barros, Da Ásia, década IV, livro I, capítulo VIII; Kutbeddin Nahravali/Ali, Ahbarul-Yemani, Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, nu. 886, fol. 27v.
12 Castanheda, História, livro VII, capítulo XCVI; Serjeant, The Portuguese, p. 54.
13 Xerafim was an Indo-European coin with a value of 300 reis (one reis was about 1/400 of a gold cruzado, or 1/400 of an Ottoman sultani).
Ottoman expansion in the Red Sea

administration. If a letter written to the king by the Portuguese ambassador in Venice, Pero Caraldo, is to be believed, the Venetian ships expected in Beirut and Alexandria in 1531 were unable to transport spices to Venice. The effect of the Portuguese naval forces in the Indian Ocean is thus clear. Such a position must have been a disappointment for Istanbul. The Ottomans had, however, taken control of the Red Sea and were determined to enter the waters of the Indian Ocean. Further, if one can believe the information given by Godinho, relying on Marino Sanudo, the Ottomans were even planning at that date to open a canal between the Nile and the Red Sea, work on which was going on in 1532, although the project was never completed. In that year, the Ottomans were unable to function effectively in the Indian Ocean, either in response to the request for help from the Gujarati sultanate or to counter the Portuguese, activities which the Ottomans saw as essential. The Ottoman Empire was prevented from pursuing its policy in the Indian Ocean by the need to transport equipment and cannon from Egypt to the Mediterranean to counter the ambitions of the Spanish king Carlos V in North Africa, an event followed by the departure of the beylerbeyi of Egypt, Süleyman Paşa, together with his treasury, to join the sultan on the Ifrakeyn campaign.

It was not until 1538 that the Ottomans were once more in action in the region. In that year, a naval force of possibly 72 or 74 ships, among which were many bastarde, galleys and munitions ships carrying, among other cargo, up to 20,000 men, including 6,500 soldiers, and large cannon, set out from Suez on campaign to Diu in India. In reality, the Ottoman Diu campaign was not a great success, but on its way back the fleet was to play a very important role in Ottoman dominance in the Red Sea and was to set up the basis for the eyalet of Yemen which would establish the connection between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Amr ibn Davud, who was the ruler in the Aden region, and Nahuda Ahmed, who held Zabid, having been killed, Mustafa Bey, who had created the naiblik (the office of deputy judge) of Gaza, was appointed

15 Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, Gaveta 20, Maço 7, Documento 15.
18 According to Barros (Da Asia, década IV, livro X, capítulo II), among the ships were 15 bastarda with 33 benches and 25 galleys with 30 benches. The fleet carried forces including 1,500 janissaries and 2,000 bowmen and brought carpenters, caulkers and artillery men who had been taken from Venetian ships. For an anonymous eye-witness account of this military campaign, see Robert Kerr (ed.), A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels, 18 vols. (Edinburgh and London, 1824), vol. 6, pp. 257–87.
“vali ve hâkim-i Yemen” (governor and judge of Yemen). About 1,500 janis-saries were settled at Aden in Yemen, which was then raised to the status of “mir-i miranlık” (beylerbeylik), several galleys from the fleet were left in the harbour at Aden and the fortifications of Zabid were strengthened. In reality, these forces were neither sufficient to stop a Portuguese fleet nor to bring the Arab tribes under control. However, with the conquest of various strategic and important towns, Ottoman influence now became more pronounced in Yemen, and the empire secured, through the land taxes and the revenues of the port, at least a contribution towards the pay of the soldiers. This eyalet, which was to be the graveyard of many thousands of Ottomans during its history as an Ottoman province, was to be remembered in bitter folksongs about the tragic loss of those who went to Yemen never to return and whose fate remained unknown to those at home.

The attention of Portuguese naval forces remained firmly fixed on the Red Sea. When in 1540–1 a Portuguese ship, passing through the waters off Aden, took 300 people prisoner from various trading vessels it encountered and seized a large quantity of goods, it proved impossible to offer any resistance from Aden and Zabid. The Portuguese king, regarding the Ottoman fleet at Suez and the Ottoman presence in the Indian Ocean as a grave danger to Indian trade, ordered the burning of such a competitive fleet and the destruction of this threat. In 1541, a fleet under the command of the governor-general of India, D. Garcia de Noronha, made up of 70 fiesta (oared ships), eight galleys, two carracks (não), one caravel and three kalyate (warships) and carrying 2,300 soldiers, entered the Red Sea. Calling at Massawa, it then went on to Suakin. Upon learning that this rich commercial centre had paid a tax of 70,000 Venetian ducats (venezeanos) to the Ottoman sultan, it promptly destroyed the island, killing 50 Ottomans who were there for trade, and destroyed Qusayr. The fleet next appeared before Tur and then Suez, its main objective. The campaign, however, did not bring the results the Portuguese wanted. The Ottoman artillery successfully protected the shipyards and ships from Portuguese attack, while the Portuguese were also hampered by natural hazards, disease, violent heat and famine. The Ottomans had not, therefore, lost momentum.

20 Serjeant, The Portuguese, p. 98; Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Corpo Cronológico, Parte 1, Maço 66, Documento 40 and 75.
While the Ottoman fleet dropped anchor in the shipyard of Suez and galleys began to appear in various harbours of the Red Sea, organisation of the beylerbeylik of Yemen was taken in hand, and in 1542 assistance was given from Yemen to the Muslim emirate which had declared *cihād* on the Ethiopian kingdom on the African continent and which had its centre at Harar, help that ensured victory for the Islamic emirate. At this time, an Ottoman force of 900 artillery men and ten cannoners played an effective role in the Red Sea, as Portuguese sources noted. According to the information given by Gaspar Correia, relying on eye-witnesses, Ottoman galleys and *fustas* attempted to take control of the entrance to and exit from the Red Sea and were able to sail as far as Malindi. This Portuguese historian, talking of events in 1544 and relying again on an eye-witness account, speaks of the Ottomans at that date having an *amil* (*faítor*, agent) employed to collect the tax at Massawa and of a group of 25 merchants engaged in trade there. Describing later events, he speaks of four Ottoman *kalyate* in 1546 going first to Kishn (in southern Arabia, on the coast of the Indian Ocean) and, after bombarding the town, sailing on to Zufar, where the Ottoman forces built a castle and which they took under Ottoman control. From there the fleet went as far as Malindi, where it engaged in plundering. In the same period, eight Ottoman *kalyate* and a *catur* (fast, light boat) were cruising around the Maseira islands. The *Tarikh al-Shihri*, talking of the events of 951 (1544–5), records that Ottoman galleys captured a Portuguese galley loaded with goods in the sea off Shihr.

It was apparently at this point that things began to unravel for the Ottomans. Ottoman assistance to various local rulers and attacks on others led them into a more aggressive stance against their European rivals. At the same time as this heightening of competition, however, the 1540s saw peace overtures and diplomatic manoeuvrings designed to keep the Red Sea and Persian Gulf trade routes open. There was thus a diplomatic correspondence between the Ottoman sultan, who had his eyes firmly fixed on the Red Sea, and the Portuguese king, who was determined not to allow shipping into this route. At the same time, Ottoman advance in the Red Sea and encroachment...
in the Indian Ocean zone continued with the conquest of Basra in 1546 and the establishment of the beylerbeylik of Basra, and the expansion into Lahsa (al-Hasa) in eastern Arabia. Thanks to the efforts of Özdemir Paşa in 1547, Ottoman sovereignty was extended into the inland areas of Yemen. Various settlements, including San’a, were taken, castles conquered and Aden re-conquered in 1549, the Ottomans having lost it in 1546. In 1550, Ottoman forces plundered Kalhat. In the same period, a Portuguese fleet under the command of Captain Luiz Figueira, which had carried off 40 galleys in the seas of Ras al-Hadd, was defeated, and Figueira killed, in an encounter with five Ottoman kalyate commanded by Sefer Reis. In 1552, a fleet made up of 25 galleys, four galleons and one other ship carrying 850 soldiers was assembled in Suez and set out on a campaign in which the famous seaman and geographical scholar Piri Reis plundered Maskat and then besieged Hurmuz, which controlled the entrance and exit to and from the Persian Gulf. Despite this victory, however, this fleet, as a result of inadequate political strategy and a lack of mastery of the technology of warfare, once more demonstrated the weakness of the Ottoman naval forces in the Indian Ocean. After the death of Piri Reis and the failure of Murad Reis’s plans to bring the ships remaining at Basra to Suez, Seydi Ali Reis’s adventurous voyage was to end in disaster, as this fleet, which had remained in the Persian Gulf, thus leaving the Red Sea unprotected, vanished in the ocean. The second, and final, major Ottoman exodus from the Red Sea thus ended in failure.

After these unsuccessful activities in the waters of the Indian Ocean, Ottoman policy reverted to protection of the frontiers and, in particular, exploitation of the advantages which the customs taxes, taken from the merchants from Gujarat and other Muslim regions, and especially the land taxes (harac-ı arazi), brought them. Having conquered some parts of Ethiopia in 1554–5, the Ottomans were keen to benefit from the trade, in particular the gold trade, of this region, situated on the shores of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Cengiz Orhonlu, known for his work on the Ottoman presence in Ethiopia, described this conquest and the subsequent establishment of a new eyalet there as “one of the most important phases of the Ottoman Empire’s southern policy” and noted that “This was a movement which put much pressure on the economic realities [of the empire]”. The eyalet of Ethiopia was

24 Nahravali/Âli, Ahbarü-l-Yemani, fols. 47r–50r; Diogo de Couto, Da Ásia, década VI (Lisbon, 1781), livro VI, capítulo III–V; livro VIII, capítulo XII; livro IX, capítulo III.
26 Orhonlu, Habeş Eyaleti, p. 31.
officially established in 1555 with the transfer from Suez to Suakin of 3,000 Ottoman soldiers, whose salaries were to be paid from the treasury of the eyalet of Egypt, and all types of ammunition and provisions, and the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty over the ports on the African coast, together with the island of Dahlab, opposite Massawa, which lay farther south. In 1557, first Massawa, followed by Arkiko and then Zayla came under Ottoman suzerainty, and with the conquest of important towns near the Red Sea such as Debarwa, Ibrim, Derr and Say, Ottoman influence was extended into the interior of Ethiopia. However, Ottoman documents show that this sovereignty was not effective beyond Suakin on the shores of the Red Sea or the frontiers of Funj control in the regions of the Upper Nile, Upper Egypt and Nubia. Geographical factors and insufficient military strength made it difficult for the Ottomans to establish themselves firmly in areas distant from the shores of the Red Sea. After the years of conflict with the Portuguese Empire, which were characterised by large naval clashes and displays of power at sea, the Ottomans reinforced their policy of defending the regions where they had sovereignty and of stamping out rebellions by local populations, as they adopted the defensive imperial policy of an empire which had over-reached its territorial limits. The Ottoman existence in Yemen is one of the clearest examples of this.

Ottoman administration of Yemen in the years following the conquest in 1547 of Ta’izz, which had a significant Zaydi influence in the uplands of southern Yemen, and of San’a, which was the base of the Zaydi imam, was not without negative features, as is clear from the misuse made of his position for personal gain by Mahmud Paşa, the beylerbeyi of Yemen in 1560, or from the excessive taxation imposed by his successor, Ridvan Paşa, in order to increase his own income. The reaction of al-Mutahhar and his supporters to the oppression of the people living in the Shi’i Zaydi regions is a further example. In 1568, the Ottomans lost suzerainty over San’a and Aden, and the influence of the empire receded to the shores of the Red Sea. The Ottomans were not slow to counter this first attempt made by the Zaydis to rescue Yemen from Ottoman occupation, for the eyalet controlled the entrance to and exit


from the Red Sea and was an important source of tax income. The beylerbeyi of Egypt, Sinan Paşa, was appointed serasker (commander-in-chief) for the reconquest of Yemen. Setting in place the preparation of new galleys and gal- leons in Suez and amassing ammunition and munitions, Sinan Paşa set out for Yemen overland with a force of 3,000 men. This campaign, which is depicted in the miniatures of the work of Rumizi and which is known by historians as the second conquest of Yemen, took place in the years 1569–71 and was conducted under very difficult conditions due to internal disorder and the geography of the region, but it was never possible to conquer the whole region.29

Under the administration of Murad Paşa (1576–80), certain taxes were decreased, and Yemen experienced a more just rule. In later years, beautiful buildings, including the Muradiye (Muradiyyah) and Bekiriye (Bakiriyyah) mosques, were erected, and innovations in infrastructure such as water facilities were constructed in San’a.30

Turning to the developments in the eyalet of Ethiopia, here the situation was maintained with the help of soldiers who came always from the eyalets of Egypt and Yemen and whose numbers were generally insufficient. In 1561, Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa, who was appointed beylerbeyi of Ethiopia in that year, an office he was to remain in until 1568, and who had gained a good understanding of the strategic position of the region during the period of his father’s administration, followed a policy of expansion, using the advantage of firepower, and in 1562 defeated the army of the Ethiopian king Minas. But the revolt of Imam Mutahhar in Yemen, referred to earlier, had drawn Ottoman attention away from Ethiopia and undermined the adoption of measures necessary for the development of this eyalet. With the Ottoman position once more established in Yemen, the transfer of troops and guns from Yemen and Egypt continued. Ottoman relations with the king of Ethiopia were not smooth, and diplomatic relations went through various ups and downs. Benefiting from the superior guns which he had obtained, the Ethiopian king, Sarsta Dengel, gained a victory over the Ottomans at the battle of Addi Quarro, thought to have occurred in 1579, at which Ahmed Paşa, the beylerbeyi of Ethiopia, and very many Ottoman ağas (senior officers) were killed. The Ottomans were, however, successful in re-capturing Arkiko and, after a battle in Debarwa in 1582, taking possession once more of the Tigre region.31

30 Serjeant and Lewcock, *San’a*, p. 72.
At the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, the Red Sea was the setting for commerce based in particular on the export of coffee. In the Indian Ocean, Portuguese influence began to decline, but with the organisation of Dutch and English commercial companies supported by the state, the Levant route, while remaining deprived of spices, was again to prove profitable thanks to customs charged on Yemeni coffee, and the port of Mocha, close to the area of coffee production and well protected, would become the desired destination of many merchants trading in the Red Sea region.32

Political, economic and military structure

In the sixteenth century, the majority of the Arab regions, which were absorbed into the Ottoman state structure and whose conquest represented a considerable extension of the empire’s frontiers, which now lay far distant from the centre, were of necessity tax farmed, a system adopted earlier in much of Anatolia and Rumeli. The fleet in these regions was independent of the kapudan paşalığı (the office of grand admiral), as indicated by a ferman in a mühimmé defteri (drafts of sultanic decrees) dated 1560 which refers to the need for an independent kapudan for Suez.33 There is no question that Egypt occupied a very important position in Ottoman Red Sea naval activities from a political, strategic and economic, in particular commercial, point of view. Egypt was thus a pivotal point for the Ottoman takeover of control in the Red Sea and the Hijaz from the Mamluks, and in their strategy of maintaining dominance there. It was from here that military campaigns set off for Yemen and Ethiopia, and when the resources of these eyalets proved insufficient, which was often the case, the military contingents there were augmented by troops from Egypt and provisions and munitions provided. It was a very important transit centre in the trade link between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and it created a model for beylerbeyliks which were set up in several Arab regions.

33 Salih Özbaran, ‘Ottoman Naval Power in the Indian Ocean in the 16th Century’, in The Kapudan Pasha: His Office and His Domain, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 2002), pp. 109–17 at pp. 112–13: “an independent kapudan for Suez was necessary, and Sefer, then the kapudan of Yemen, should be appointed” (müstakil kapudan lazımdur deyı Süveyş kapudanlısıın Yemen kapudanı Sefer’e olması).
In contrast to the administrative structure based on timarlı sipahi (timariot cavalry, who held a military fief (timar) in the provinces in return for military service), the regime established in the eyalets of Egypt, Yemen and Ethiopia was one in which tax farming of revenue in cash was adopted, due to the impossibility of collecting tax in kind, a system which facilitated the payment of the soldiers. For this type of eyalet, the sultan appointed one governor (vali, beylerbeyi), one financial official (defterdar, nazır-ı emval) and one legal official (kadi). The salaries (aylık, salyane) of the high-ranking officers, and the pay (mevacib) of the military forces of the eyalets, including in particular the janissary garrisons, the gönüllü, azep and merdan, were paid from the income collected there. Similar differences also existed in the naval organisation. Naval operations in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean were under the direct control of the centre, with orders issued and appointments made directly by Istanbul, rather than being incorporated into the kapudan paşalık structure, which was responsible for the direction and development of Ottoman naval force elsewhere in the empire. The organisation of the relations of the Ottoman administration with the Red Sea, and thus with the wider world, was an important part of the job of the beylerbeyis of Egypt, who were generally given the rank of vezir. The eyalet of Egypt held prime place in the Ottoman administration of the region, and it was from here that forces were transferred to the eyalets of Yemen and Ethiopia and from where Ottoman sovereignty was directed.

The beylerbeylik of Egypt and the Hijaz

Stanford Shaw, who conducted research on Ottoman Egypt, stressed, while explaining the basic structure in the eyalet of Egypt, that the main economic asset of that region was the richness of its soil and that for this reason the land was seen as the fundamental source of income of the Ottoman treasury. He argued, therefore, that under the Ottoman rule production in the region was encouraged and was structured with the aim of obtaining sufficient income. As Shaw noted, the beylerbeylik of Egypt, as was the case also with the other beylerbeylik in the Red Sea region, was divided into revenue-producing units (mukataa, literally meaning cutting off) whose exploitation was conducted by agents. There were essentially two types of mukataa: the tax farm (iltizam),

34 Özbaran, Ottoman Response, pp. 27–9, 33–6.
in which a tax farmer (mültezim), who collected the revenue for the treasury, was granted a percentage of the mukataa revenue for his services; and the emanet (stewardship), in which revenue was collected by an agent (emin), who received a salary from the treasury. For Michael Winter, who has recently published research on, in particular, the social history of Ottoman Egypt, it was the askeri, the administrative class, a group which believed in making itself rich by both legal and illegal means, which was responsible for the Ottoman administration conducted in the regions of the Red Sea. The governor, the head of the Ottoman administration, saw to it that Istanbul’s interests were protected and its strategic interests in the region safeguarded. He was responsible for law and order, revenue collection and, most importantly, the organisation and protection of the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca, and for the provisioning of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina with grain from Egypt. Mirroring the administrative structure of the sultan and the divan (council of state) in Istanbul, the governor presided over a divan which met four times a week and which formulated policy.

The annual income of the beylerbeyi of Egypt, who held the title of paşa and who appears as mirmiran in some documents, was around 2 million pare, and the sancaks, which were established on both banks of the Nile, were under his authority. In effect, the standard sancak and sancakbeyliği structure, which was used in regions in which the empire operated the timar system, was not used in Egypt. Administrators who held the important administrative/military roles were seen in the same way as they had been in Mamluk times. Thus, the eyalet of Egypt was not divided into sancaks, typical of the Ottoman administrative structure, but was generally separated into vilayets. But in strategic regions, for the purpose of defence, places such as Raşît, Dimyat, Suez, Jeddah, Asyut and İbrim were organised as sancaks. Only Asyut, to the south of Cairo, appears as a sancak (liva) in a central budget document which was prepared for the period 1527–8. In the Ottoman Egyptian kanun-name (law code) which was drawn up in 1525, 14 vilayets were counted as units of administration, and their administration was run by kaşifs (agents of government), who were responsible for the tax income of the region, controlling the watering systems and ensuring order. Here it is necessary to highlight two important issues which concern the Red Sea and which formed part of

the duties of the beylerbeyis: the conducting of relations with the Hijaz, which carried great prestige for the empire and great importance for the sultan, who from time to time used the title “servitor of Mecca and Medina” (Hadimü’l-Haremeyn-i Şerifeyn), and, a matter of equal importance, the order of the hac (pilgrimage) and protecting of the hac route.

It is clear from research done using documents found in the Ottoman archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) in Istanbul, and in particular the Divan-ı Hümayum Mühitimne Defterleri,\(^{40}\) that the emir/şerif of Mecca usually referred to the beylerbeyi of Egypt over any problems in his region or concerning work that was required to be undertaken in the Haremeyn, and matters were forwarded to Istanbul from Egypt on the authority of the beylerbeyi. All expenses and needs, building and repairs were met from the Egyptian treasury and from the income of Jeddah. Moreover, the beylerbeyilik of Egypt ensured the continuity of the assistance made for the poor of the Haremeyn on behalf of the empire and of the vakıfs set up there. To give but two examples, ferman from 1560 show the efforts of the kadi of Mecca to counter the problems of water scarcity and of filth around the well of Zemzem, which were particularly prominent in the pilgrimage season, and similarly, various ferman from the year 1577 show the need to control the excessive spending on the gold embroidery of the cover of the Qa’ba. The performance of the obligation of the hac, which carried a unifying role from the point of view of the empire and a legitimising one from the point of view of the sultan, and the revitalising of the Hijaz region were considered very important duties of the beylerbeyis of Egypt.

Grain was sent to the Hijaz by vakıfs, the majority of which were established in Egypt to assist the poor, and the system of grain transportation has been described by Suraiya Faroqli. It was shipped down the Nile from Upper Egypt to, probably, Bulak, and from there transported overland by camel to Suez. From there, grain for Medina was shipped to Yanbu, where it was once more loaded onto camels under the supervision of a member of the Şerif

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family resident there. Grain for Mecca was shipped to Jeddah, from where it was transported by camel caravan to Mecca.41

When looked at from the economic point of view, Egypt represented a great asset to the Ottomans. The income from the mukataas, both rural and urban, the mal-i haraj-i arazi (land tax), the kusifiye (annual payment by the principal office-holders), the ihtisab (urban taxes) and the sea and river customs together formed the irad (revenues). The salaries of the beylerbeyis, the kapi halklari (entourages of bodyguards, slaves and domestic servants of local elites and grandees), the army commander and the soldiers, and the expenses of the sea campaigns, the pilgrimage and the activities in the Hijaz, were secured from these sources. Further, an annual 16 million – at the end of the century 20 million – para42 were sent to Istanbul as irsaliye (remittance to the treasury).

An important aspect which must be stressed here from the point of view of the Red Sea is the port and shipyard of Suez, which linked the Red Sea with Egypt. Even if initially limited, the tax yield taken from the customs on merchandise, including products such as pepper and spices and, in the seventeenth century, coffee, formed a substantial part of the Egyptian budget. The income of Suez was obtained through tax farming (iltizami), and after tax was collected as “mukataa-yi uşûr-i esnaf-i bahar” (farm of tithes on commodities), it was transferred to Cairo.43 Suez, whose importance is indicated by many travellers, eye-witnesses and seamen, was described by Duarte Barbosa, who knew the world of the Indian Ocean in the first half of the sixteenth century:

There is a sea port which is called Çues, whither the Mors were wont to bring all the spices, drugs and other rich wares from Juda, the port of Meca, which came thither from India. These they carried from Juda in very small craft, and then loaded them on camels, and carried them by land to Cayro, whence other traders took them to Alexandria.44

Another important aspect of Suez’s position in the Red Sea is without doubt its military significance. In the years of Ottoman rule, and in particular during the preparations for the 1538 Diu and the 1552 Hormuz campaigns, Suez acted as an important military base. Its activities were under the command of the

42 Para was the money in circulation in Ottoman Egypt and in the region of the Red Sea, and was valued at 1/40 of a gold coin. For the income and the budget of Egypt, see Shaw, The Budget of Egypt.
43 Shaw, Financial and Administrative Organization, p. 104.
Egyptian (İskenderiye) kapudanlık, for the appointment of an independent kapudan for Suez, something which the sultan regarded as necessary, was only able to be put in place in 1560.\textsuperscript{45} It is very interesting that such an appointment occurred in the period in which the empire was abandoning its attempt to move with a powerful fleet into the open waters of the Indian Ocean.

While the military organisation of the Egyptian beylerbeylik – as was the case in other aspects of the administration – represented a model for the organisation and the formation in the beylerbeyliks of Yemen and Ethiopia, and a source for the material and military needs of these areas, the shipyard in Suez ensured the activities of the Ottomans in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Initially, this organisation, which was set out in the 1525 Egyptian kanunname and which was shaped more clearly during the expansion which was to occur in the following years, was aimed at protecting in particular the eyalet centre, the kazas (administrative/judicial districts) and nahiyes (administrative districts of a liva, sanjak) tied to the sancaks, the hac routes and the ports, and at building an Ottoman fleet in the shipyard at Suez which would enter the Indian Ocean and would protect the ports on the Red Sea. The Ottoman forces in Egypt, which numbered only 10,000, were divided into odas (military units) and bölüks (small military units), headed by an ağa (master, supervising a bölük), and their pay was distributed every three months (mevacib). The soldiers were divided into the following units: the müteferriktiyan, used mostly for ceremonial occasions and whose numbers were around 450; the çavuşan, used in government and in communications; the 2,000-strong gönülüyan, who were cavalrymen used for protection and public order in the centre and in the provinces and who also when necessary collected tax and undertook secretarial work; the tüfenkciyan, who used light firearms and whose numbers were 1,400; the çerakise, a cavalry unit created from Mamluk soldiers, whose numbers were restricted to 1,000 men; the mustahfızan (janissaries), infantry who were employed as defence troops in castles and in the towns of the eyalet and in the benders (commercial seaports), and were organised into cemaats (military units) such as cebeci, topçu and arabaci; and the 1,000-strong azeban, whose job it was to defend the castles, police the towns, defend the hac caravans and go on campaign.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45} In the words of the sultan’s ferma, “an independent kapudan for Suez was necessary, and Sefer, then the kapudan of Yemen, should be appointed” (müstakil kapudan lazım dur deyu Şüveys kapudanlığın Yemen kapudanı Sefer’e olması). See Özbaran, ‘Ottoman Naval Power’, pp. 112–3; Colin Imber, ‘The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent’, Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980), 211–82 at p. 270; İdris Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Tescilatı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire (Ankara, 1992), pp. 20–1.

\textsuperscript{46} Mahmud, XVI. Asırdı Misır Eyaleti, pp. 173–225.
The beylerbeylik of Yemen

The beylerbeylik of Yemen at the most southerly point of the Arabian peninsula, centred on San’a, was an eyalet of the Ottoman Empire situated on the south-east coast of the Red Sea which also had ports on the shores of the Indian Ocean. This eyalet, which was very far from the centre of the empire, was usually tied financially and militarily to the beylerbeylik of Egypt, which extended authority over it. Its administration, generally accepted as being more difficult than its conquest, was based on a type of system similar to that adopted in Egypt. In other words, it was an eyalet in which the tax was collected in cash as mukataa (tax farm) and was transferred to the budget of the beylerbeylik.

We do not have detailed information about the first organisation of the Yemen beylerbeylik, which can be taken as having been founded in 1540 after the conquest of several port towns during Hadım Süleyman Paşa’s Diu campaign. But, thanks to mühimme and maliye registers for the later years and to chronicles and various local and foreign archive material related to the region, we are able to form a better understanding of the political, economic and social structure of the eyalet in the subsequent period. According to Richard Blackburn, who researched the development of Yemen in the period after the Ottoman conquest using local, Ottoman and Western sources, Ottoman domination in Yemen in the 30 years after the conquest “passed through perceptible stages of expansion, consolidation and contraction”.47 This definition is relevant not only for the initial decades of Ottoman control of Yemen but also for the last decade of the century and for the centuries that followed. The judgement of Caesar Farah, referring to Ottoman entry into Yemen in 1569 under the leadership of Sinan Paşa and the second conquest so beautifully portrayed in Ottoman miniature art, that “The Yemeni system of fortification played the decisive role in preventing the Ottomans now as in the nineteenth century, from ever achieving full control of the land” cannot be regarded as exaggerated.48

According to a defter which covers the years 968–9 (1560–2) and which can be described as a budget, Zabid, Ta’izz, San’a and Sa’da formed the four sançaks (vilayets) of the beylerbeylik of Yemen, while coastal cities such as Jeddah, Jazan, Hodeida, Salif, Kamaran, Mocha, Aden and Shihr were made into important ports.49 According to a sultanic ferman of 1565, the region – even

48 Caesar Farah, ‘Yemeni Fortification’, p. 89.
49 Özbıran, Ottoman Response, p. 52.
if only temporarily – was divided into two, the vilayet of Yemen (vilayet-i Yemen) and the vilayet of San’a (vilayet-i San’a), with Yemen having 12 and San’a 17 sancaks.50 Kazas and nahiyes were also listed under vilayet. Vilayet thus was not a clear geographical and political unit. This is clearly shown in the budget defters from the last years of the sixteenth century. According to the budget (accounts register) which covers the financial year 1008 (1599–1600), there were four main vilayets (sancaks) collecting land tax; there were seven vilayets (kazas and nahiyes) in Zabid, 12 in Ta’izz and 30 in Sa’da and San’a, and 12 ports (Jazan, Hudeyda, Luhayya, Ferasan, Salif, Kamran, Mocha, Aden, Lahij, Shihir, Hadramaut and Hud), for which income was listed in separate sections.51

We can follow the financial and military structure in the beylerbeylik of Yemen better in Ottoman sources from the second half of the sixteenth century. From the contents of the budget defters prepared at the end of the financial year, which gave the income from the previous year assigned to that year, and the expenses made, we can understand clearly how an eyalet like this, which did not employ a timar system, worked. These budgets have come down to us in the form of summary (icmal) and detailed (muhasebe) registers and contain sections giving the total income (asl-i mal) from which expenses were made and expenditure (vuz'i zalike), el-baki if in the black and ez-ziyade ani'l-asil if in the red. The finances of this eyalet, far from the centre of the empire, were administered by a newly appointed defterdar (nazir-i emval), and the pare or sikke-i hasene was used as the unit of account.

The main tax returns were collected from the four large vilayets of Zabid, Ta’izz, San’a and Sa’da. In the period 1561–2, 5,795,080 pare were collected from Zabid and its regions (together with 1,405,403 pare remaining from the previous year), and of this 4,657,665 pare came from harac-i arazi and 1,137,415 pare from mukataat. A total of 6,633,523 pare were collected from Ta’izz and its surroundings. In the same budget defter, the yield from the port of the eyalet was 4,273,806 pare, and of this 1,765,274 pare was the remainder from earlier years. A basic calculation shows us that the income from the ports of Ottoman Yemen opening onto the Indian Ocean remained far below the income from land. In other words, the Ottoman administration in Yemen collected far more from the land taxes which were collected through the iltizam system operating in the region than from the income which they tried

to secure from the oceanic trade. According to the budget for 984 (1576), the largest income was obtained from the agricultural sector: from 17,896,315 pare, the total irad, 10,332,325 pare came from land taxes and 1,903,354 pare from the ports. In the 1599–1600 budget, the total income was 16,424,056 pare, and of this 7,994,966 pare (48 per cent) was collected from land and 4,845,951 pare (29 per cent) from the ports.\(^{52}\) This income was not sufficient to cover the expenses of the high-ranking officials and soldiers employed in the eyalet, and the beylerbeylik of Egypt was always the centre for assistance for Yemen as it was for the beylerbeylik of Ethiopia.

Turning to the expenses of Yemen, 17 high-ranking askeri appear in a 12-month budget defter for the period 1561–2, and salary payments for them (including the beylerbeyi) amounted to 3,834,564 pare. The income of the beylerbeyi alone came to 1,667,925 pare. Apart from him, 18,479,035 pare were paid to the bölük ağalar, müteferrikalar, çavuşlar, gönülüiler, tüfenkçiler, nevbeçïler, mustahfsizler, cebeciler, topçular, arabacïlar, azebler, reïsler, şeggalin and other soldiers. When it is recalled that the asl-1 mal was 31,730,951 pare, it will be seen that 70 per cent of the total income was spent on the beys and soldiers. A similar situation also appears in later budgets. Further, as was the case in the 1599–1600 budget, military expenses came to 15,639,609 pare out of a total income of 16,425,056 pare, with the result that the income was completely consumed and there was a budget deficit. No ırsaliye, or trade goods, as a substitute could be sent to Istanbul.\(^{53}\)

The largest part of the expenditure on the beys and the defensive forces was assigned to the aylık of the cemaat and divisions which were stationed in the castles in Yemen. Apart from these soldiers, the number of officers of the naval forces, excluding those in the major campaigns in the Indian Ocean, who were either permanently located on the coasts of Yemen or at Suez, and of the rüesa (captains), azeban (mariners) and alatçıyan (riggers), were limited, and the expenses for their aylık represented only 3 per cent of the general expenses.\(^{54}\)

### The beylerbeylik of Ethiopia

The foundation of the beylerbeylik of Ethiopia in 1555 was made possible by the payment from the treasury of the eyalet of Egypt of both the yearly

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53 Özbaran, Ottoman Response, p. 53.
allowance (salyane) of Özdemir Paşa, known to have been 1,400,000 akçe, the yıl lik of the high-ranking administrators appointed there, and the aylıks (mevacib) of the soldiers. In later years, the yıl lik in some of the beylerbey-lıks were reduced because of the ever-present financial difficulties: Hüseyn Paşa was appointed with 1,000,000 akçe in 1567 and Ridvan Paşa in 1573 with 1,200,000 akçe. It is important to stress that the treasury of Ethiopia was most of the time in financial difficulty, and application was often made to the beylerbeyi of Egypt for payment, apart from the beylerbeyis, of beys and soldiers and for other needs of the eyalet. There were times when money was even borrowed for the military mevacib from pearl fishers of the region. The beylerbeyis appointed to this eyalet had generally served in Egypt or Yemen and were chosen from people who knew the region, such as Hızır Bey, who had seen service in Yemen and was appointed to the beylerbeylik of Ethiopia in 1579, or Mustafa Bey, who had been sancak beyi in Egypt in 1582. The island town of Suakin, which was originally part of the beylerbeylik of Egypt, was included in the new beylerbeylik and made the administrative centre of the eyalet. Kadi Abdülvehhab Efendi, who was appointed in the same year, and the nazır-ı emval Ahmed Bey, who was charged with the financial administration, began their careers here. Towns like Massawa, Suakin and Beyliül, important locations in the eyalet, were ports which levied customs taxes. Our information about the sancak division of the region is very limited. A sancak could be created by combining several small units or recently conquered places, for example that which was created in the time of Ahmed Paşa in 1574 from various places, including Sam’a, Akala (Guzay), Dabbe (Daber) and Korbariya (Coiberia), or from Bor (Bur), Matrer (Matara) and Hindye (Hindibe). Akik (Aquico), which was to the south of Suakin, appears for the first time as a sancak in a Ruus defteri of 1580. Sarave (Sarawa) appears, too, with the status of sancak. In 1573, the sancak of Ibrim, which had been part of the beylerbeylik of Egypt and was an important settlement on the Nile, was incorporated into the eyalet of Ethiopia because it was thought that the income of this sancak would ease the financial situation of the eyalet of Ethiopia.55

The eyalet of Ethiopia was not a place based on agricultural income, like Egypt or Yemen. What brought the eyalet’s largest income was the port customs, the leading source of income being the pepper and spice trade. The navlun bedelleri (freight duties), which ships loaded with spice calling at the Ethiopian ports were forced to pay, was an important source, especially for

55 Orhonlu, Habeş Eyaleti, pp. 107–9; Ménage, ‘The Ottomans and Nubia’.
the soldiers’ mevacib. Thus, as is recorded in the mühimme registers, the rüşûm (taxes) which were taken from spices coming from Yemen in 1580 were used for the pay of the troops. Among other important sources of income of the administration of the eyalet were the taxes taken on gold dust which Indian merchants bought in Suakin and on the sale of ivory, the Sudanese gold sources which can be regarded as important for the Egyptian treasury, and, in particular, the income from the sale of slaves who were brought by land routes from the interior.

Turning to the military organisation of the eyalet, this relied on troops whose numbers were on occasion strengthened and who were always transferred from Egypt and sometimes from Yemen. The difficulty in setting up the structure of the eyalet is matched by the difficulty, due to the lack of historical evidence, of shedding light on the military organisation that was established. Using the information given by Cengiz Orhonlu on the eyalet of Ethiopia and the work of Victor Ménage related to Ottoman existence in Nubia, it is, however, possible to conclude that the Red Sea coast of the beylerbeylik of Ethiopia was protected by the forces to be found on the galleys.

International trade

As Suraiya Faroqhi has pointed out, there is very little numerical data available on Red Sea trade. Indeed, when one compares the historiography concerning the Portuguese, who aimed to dominate the trade routes in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the number of ships working on the Indian–Red Sea route and, in particular, the quantities and values of pepper and spices, with the literature related to the commerce in the centres where the Ottomans engaged in trade activity such as Aden, Mocha, Jeddah, Suez and Cairo, and even Suakin and Massawa, one finds that the latter is so small as to be nonexistent. We know about sixteenth-century Indian–Red Sea trade, which was fairly active before the arrival of the Portuguese in India, from the works of A. H. Lybyer, F. C. Lane, F. Braudel, M. Godinho, C. R. Boxer and M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, who concern themselves mainly with the Portuguese Empire and with the Mediterranean states such as Venice. Such work...
is augmented by the research of historians such as R. B. Serjeant, Cengiz Orhonlu and Halil İnalcık, who use local histories and sources.

By the end of the period of Portuguese expansion at the end of the fifteenth century, under the leadership of Vasco da Gama, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese had taken over control of the shores of western India and Hurmuz and disrupted the trade to the Red Sea. Routing eastern goods around South Africa to the markets of Europe, the Portuguese drove the Mamluk state into financial difficulty and damaged the economy of the Mediterranean region, in particular that of Venice. This situation negatively affected the commercial prospects of the Ottomans, who had taken the region from the Mamluks. However, this situation was of comparatively short duration, and, in any case, the Portuguese did not completely cut relations between the Red Sea ports and India. In the second half of the sixteenth century, or even by the end of its second quarter, the Red Sea, competing with the Atlantic route, again became a lively commercial zone, with especially pepper and spice trading conducted in its ports and in Cairo. With the arrival of the Dutch and the English at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the pepper and spice trade was much reduced or even dried up altogether and was replaced by commerce in coffee.61

Even if we cautiously accept Barendse’s recent conclusion that, “What we can discern in the sixteenth century in the trade with a whole array of products and routes is continuity rather than any sharp break”,62 this does not remove the need for substantial supporting numerical data, as has been noted by others. As Sanjay Subrahmanyam has stressed, the views of certain historians whom I have mentioned previously concerning the pepper and spice trade in the Red Sea, and their theories on the periodisation of Portuguese hegemony beginning in 1500–30, developing from 1530 and peaking after 1570, particularly with the activity of the Achenese and Gujarati traders, need quantitative data. In this connection, Subrahmanyam believes in the necessity of keeping before one’s eyes the statistical data produced by C. H. Wake, which echoes the results in the European countries,63 an approach which encourages us to work comparatively. The Portuguese documents for this period which have been published and analysed by Luís Felipe Thomaz, who

has produced one of the most recent and most detailed works on the pepper trade of the middle of the sixteenth century, and the research conducted on the Diu campaign of Süleyman Paşa by Dejanirah Couto, are significant guides for research, both present and future, for throwing light on sixteenth-century Red Sea trade and offer an excellent example for future work which will allow clarification of the current approaches that proceed from the premise that the Red Sea trade was unaffected by the commercial disturbances at the beginning of the century or those that attribute too great an importance to Indian Ocean–European trade.  

While acknowledging the lack of investigative work based on numerical data and accepting the lack of a pool of extant numerical data, it is nevertheless essential to use what material is available, both by using what we have and by discovering new sources, and by contextualising such data spatially and chronologically to develop a picture of the historical development of trade in this region and this period.

Ottoman sources are fairly scarce for the first half of the sixteenth century, and those that do exist are silent from the point of view of trade. However, it is useful to give some figures which can be established relying in particular on European sources, which can be testified to for the aforementioned half century. Firstly, the statistical data which the Portuguese historian Magalhães Godinho prepared, relying on Marino Sanudo and Girolamo Priuli, who are considered important sources of the period, and which he collected for the early period of Ottoman hegemony in Egypt and the Red Sea, give an idea about the spices which were brought by the Venetians in the port of Alexandria and about prices in Cairo.

In order to make a basic comparison and establish the differences between these figures, it is necessary for us to know the quantity of pepper and spice in these figures which reached Portugal from the Indian Ocean. On average, the quantities reaching Portugal for the years between 1503 and 1506 were a total of 21,368 quintals, made up of 18,825 pepper and 2,543 spice, and for the years 1526–31, a total of 20,600 quintals, made up of 18,102 pepper and 2,498 spice.

Fernand Braudel, in assessing the trade which was conducted between the Mediterranean world and the Indian Ocean, supports the conclusion of Godinho and stresses that the situation in the spice trade became favourable for the Venetians and various other Mediterranean countries. Relying

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65 Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos*, vol. 2, pp. 115–21, 146.
on customs registers from Marseilles, he states that pepper was sent in 1543 to Lyon and Toulouse and that the Persian Gulf routes had even begun to compete with the spice shipped around South Africa. For Braudel, “What is quite clear is that the Mediterranean had recaptured a large portion of the pepper trade, indeed the lion’s share. Trade with the Levant was flourishing, supplied by numerous caravans, some from the Persian Gulf, others from the Red Sea.”

The ideas of Halil İnalcık, too, are in line with those of these two historians. İnalcık stressed the importance of spices in this trade, together with that of refined cotton and cloth dyes, particularly indigo. This trade from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf was not confined to the Mediterranean but also reached Anatolia, particularly Bursa and Istanbul. Pointing to the policy of expansion which was initiated by the Ottomans, in particular by the vali of Egypt, Süleyman Paşa, the establishment of hegemony in Yemen (in particular against the Portuguese), the taking of Aden, an important port city with a key role as a link to the Indian Ocean, and the ties which were established with Muslim regions such as Gujarat and Acheh, İnalcık shows the liveliness which the Ottomans brought to the Red Sea trade. Charles Boxer, relying in particular on Diogo do Couto, taken as a well-informed contemporary witness of the period, argues that the Red Sea spice trade developed in the middle of the sixteenth century and dates Atjehnese activity in this trade to the 1530s and early 1540s, not the 1560s as is usually accepted. For Boxer, “Atjehnese participation in the Red Sea spice-trade was undeniably in full swing by the mid-sixteenth century”.

Dejanirah Couto, while discussing the 1538 Diu campaign, refers to the Ottoman gains in Yemen, the Ottoman–Portuguese political relations and the peace between them which was attempted and points to the use by some historians of exaggerated figures in relation to the Red Sea trade and to the reliance on, in particular, random figures for Venetian goods bought in the ports of Alexandria and Beirut. Dejanirah Couto argues that historians should take Ottoman existence in the region into account, and indeed this should encourage researchers to use Ottoman and local sources together with the numerical data found in Portuguese, Venetian and other European archives and in the chronicles.

68 İnalcık, An Economic and Social History, pp. 327–31.
In the light of Portuguese documents from 1545 (even though they lack numerical data), the majority of which were sent from Goa and which were published by Luis Felipe Thomaz,\textsuperscript{70} we can talk of the panic which the pepper and spices coming to the Red Sea from the Far East created in that period among the Portuguese administrators. In the years under discussion, it is thought that the trade ships working the Red Sea route were of a considerable number. In later years, it appears that the volume of trade was maintained. \textit{Commendador-mor} D. Afonso, in a report sent from Rome to the Portuguese queen on 10 December 1558, informed her that a great quantity of pepper had reached the Red Sea, a quantity so great that her majesty would not want to hear it. The following year, reports based on news which Lourenço Pires, the Portuguese representative at the papal court, had received from Cairo corroborate these high numbers and record that in the middle of the year 40,000 quintals – perhaps a slightly exaggerated figure – reached Alexandria.\textsuperscript{71}

In the 1540s, the quantity of pepper of a saleable condition reaching Lisbon was on average 22,000 quintals; the average for the 1550s and 1560s fell to 17,000 quintals, and in the 1570s and 1580s it increased to an average of between 19,500 and 20,800 quintals. In the 1590s, there was a complete collapse.\textsuperscript{72} In response to this, according to the figures which Niels Steensgaard established (and which some historians find exaggerated), while 40,000–50,000 quintals of pepper and spices came to Jeddah from Gujarat and Acheh in the 1570s and 1580s, 40,000 quintals reached Cairo in 1593 and 1601.\textsuperscript{73}

Throughout the century, the Red Sea was very important for the Gujaratis, and the majority of Acheh pepper was transported there by these sailors. Several of the Gujarati ships carried very valuable cargoes; in 1582, one of the ships of the Mughal ruler Akbar returned from the Red Sea with great quantities of highly valuable gold and silver.\textsuperscript{74} Willem Lodewijcks, one of the Dutch pioneers who visited Acheh and stressed the importance of the trade with that region, noted on his map dated 1598 that “they have great store of pepper, which the ships from Suratte and Cambaye come yearly to fetch and take to the Red Sea”.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{71} Özbaran, \textit{Yemen'den}, p. 177: “... a muito cantidade de pimenta que he vinda aquelas partes de Meca e asy tudo ho mays que quiser saber”.
\textsuperscript{72} Wake, ‘Changing Pattern’, pp. 382–3.
It is possible to give some figures, of which there is a need in order to throw light on the history of this trade route, from the accounts kept for the customs of various Ottoman ports of the Malabar–Red Sea trade (from the mahsul-i iskeleha which were registered in defters showing the incoming and outgoing accounts known as ruznamçe). In the Yemen budget for 969 (1561–2) which I referred to earlier, the taxes which were taken from the ports in the eyalet of Yemen only came to 13 per cent of the entire income for the eyalet.\(^76\)

While it is possible to compare the numerical data relating to approximately the first 30 years of the century with various budget figures from the last years of the century, it does not at present seem possible to fill in the years in between with the same sort of data. But we can gather some information, bringing together various scattered figures.

In a summary budget account book covering the period 1576–7, it is seen that only 16 per cent of the income of the eyalet of Yemen was obtained from the mahsulat taken from the ports. A few surviving budget figures from the end of the sixteenth century reflect other figures we have, and, as will be understood from these figures, the average of 19 to 21 per cent of the income of the Ottoman ports in all the budgets was slightly higher in comparison with earlier years but still in essence low.\(^77\)

A reasonable estimate of the volume of pepper and spices and other goods reaching either the Mediterranean ports or Ottoman territory via the Red Sea route can be arrived at from the data we have in hand, although it must be said that such figures are much smaller that those for “A Carreira da Índia sailing around South Africa”. But the statement that “the Levantine trade was always marginal to the trade of the Portuguese and could flourish only when, and insofar as, Portuguese imports were affected by losses at sea”\(^78\) is too strong. As was made clear earlier, the statistical information we have for the sixteenth century is insufficient and the information for the Red Sea ports is extremely limited, so it is necessary to keep in mind that historians have not considered goods which were consumed at least in the Red Sea region and the areas linked to it which were not imported into Europe. While some historians have focused on the non-Mediterranean aspect of Red Sea trade (Faroqhi, for example, in her work on coffee and spices, which I referred to earlier, looking at the local-scale trade, and Inalcık arguing that a significant


\(^77\) Salih Özbaran, ‘Ottomans and the India Trade’, p. 177.

part of the spices which were unloaded in Jeddah reached Bursa overland by the Mecca to Damascus route\(^79\), it is important that we do not make the mistake alluded to by Barendse of relying only on the prices and quantities of pepper and spices leaving Alexandria or reaching the Mediterranean ports of Europe.\(^{80}\)

\(^{79}\) İnalçık and Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, p. 345.
PART II

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GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC LIFE  
AND SOCIETY
The functions of Ottoman government were, in essence, to raise revenue with which to support the sultan’s army and court, to conduct war and relations with foreign powers, to uphold law and order, and to support what the ruling elite regarded as the right religion. Most day-to-day public functions – for example, the construction and maintenance of mosques, education, welfare of the poor, the provision of a water supply in towns and the upkeep of bridges and cemeteries – were the responsibility of vakıfs (endowments of land or other sources of income used for the charitable purpose defined by the founder), established through the private beneficence of individuals. The founders of the greatest vakıfs were, it is true, the sultans and their ministers, and their foundations – notably the imperial mosques in Istanbul – served to project the grandeur and munificence of the dynasty. Nonetheless, they were legally autonomous institutions and, strictly speaking, outside the realm of government. The scope of Ottoman government was therefore limited but in this respect no different from the governments of other pre-modern states. Furthermore, while the problems which the Ottoman government faced between 1453 and 1603 may have grown in scale and complexity, the basic functions of government remained unchanged. Equally, the institutions and offices that were in place during the reign of Mehmed II (r. 1451–81) were still in place and, in appearance, largely unchanged in the reign of his descendant Mehmed III (r. 1595–1603).

Nonetheless, between 1453 and 1603, the Ottoman Empire underwent a transformation and, despite its apparent conservatism, Ottoman government adapted to the change. In 1453, the Ottomans were a regional power with lands in the Balkan peninsula and in Anatolia. By 1550, the empire was a major international power whose territories encompassed most of southeastern Europe south of the Danube and Sava rivers, Anatolia, Iraq, Greater Syria and Egypt. To the north of the Danube, the central portion of the old kingdom of Hungary was a directly ruled Ottoman province, while the
realms to the east – Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia and the hanate of the Crimea – were tributaries of the sultan. In North Africa, Algeria and, from 1551, Tripoli were semi-autonomous Ottoman enclaves. Campaigns in the early 1570s added Cyprus and Tunis to the empire, and the long war with Iran between 1578 and 1590 added territories in the Caucasus and western Iran, all of which the Safavid shah ‘Abbas I was to re-conquer between 1603 and 1606. After the mid-sixteenth century, the nature of Ottoman campaigns changed. Between 1453 and about 1540, Ottoman armies had made their conquests usually within the space of a single campaigning season between April and October, and often under the leadership of the sultan in person. After about 1540, the age of large-scale conquests within a single season’s campaigning was past. This was a change which the Habsburg ambassador Busbecq was to observe when in the early 1560s he compared Süleyman I’s rapid conquest of Hungary in the Belgrade and Mohács campaigns of 1521 and 1526 with his subsequent failure to advance his territories in central Europe. Campaigns against the Safavids on the eastern front paralleled this pattern. Between 1514 and 1516, Selim I (r. 1512–20) followed his victory at Çaldıran over the Safavid shah Isma’il with the conquest of much of south-eastern Anatolia. His successor, Süleyman I (r. 1520–66), seized Baghdad from the Safavids in 1534, together with more territory in eastern Anatolia. However, Süleyman’s later campaigns against Safavid Iran, like his campaigns against the Habsburgs in Hungary, were – set against his earlier conquests – failures. The war with Iran from 1578 ended with large-scale, if short-lived, conquest, but only after 12 years of continuous warfare. The war against the Habsburgs in Hungary was to last 13 years, from 1593, and produce no significant gains for either side. The changing pace of conquest and the prolongation of campaigns were factors influencing the Ottoman practice of government.

So, too, was the changing nature of the enemy. For much of the fifteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had grown at the expense of local Anatolian and Balkan dynasties and of the Italian maritime colonies. From the 1520s, however, the empire faced the power of the Habsburgs in central Europe and the Mediterranean and of the Safavids along its eastern border. The rivalry with the Habsburgs had, in terms of practical politics, the effect of drawing the Ottomans into international alliances and so into the political system of western Europe. The rivalry with the Safavids likewise drew them into

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contact with the Shaibanids, who threatened the Safavids on their eastern border, and so into the politics of Central Asia.

In brief, therefore, between 1453 and about 1540, the Ottoman government faced problems attendant on conquest, and in particular the questions of how to overcome resistance from supporters of the displaced regimes and the incorporation of the new territories within the political structure of the empire. From the mid-sixteenth century, the problems were rather those of how to maintain intact vastly expanded territories within stable borders and how to manage periods of prolonged and no longer profitable warfare.

The authority of the sultan

In his famous and perceptive comparison of the French and Ottoman monarchies, Niccolò Machiavelli noted that while a hereditary aristocracy limited the power of the French king, “the entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord. The others are his servants and, dividing his kingdom into san-çaks, he sends these different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses”. What Machiavelli was describing in 1513 was a system of government where the sultan made all appointments to office from among men who had grown up in his household and were completely dependent upon him for patronage and promotion, with no hereditary office-holders to challenge his absolute rule. This was certainly the ideal model of Ottoman government, but it was one that was never fully realised since there were always restraints on the sultan's authority and direct challenges to his rule. These came both from within the imperial family and ruling establishment and from local powers in provinces often far from the capital. In either case, the sultans had to confront the dangers either with violence or, where this was impractical, with political arrangements which compromised their own authority.

The most obvious threat that any sultan faced was from dynastic rivals. In the period up to the end of the sixteenth century, there were two laws governing eligibility for the throne. The first was that females were ineligible. The second was that descent was patrilineal. The son of a sultan's sister, for example, could not inherit, although Süleyman I threatened, during the dispute between his sons Selim and Bayezid in 1558, to break with tradition and fix the succession on his sister's son, Osmanşah. In practice, however, between 1450 and 1595, the succession always went from father

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to son, and it was civil war and fratricide that decided which son was to inherit. If any son survived his brother’s accession, he was a potential challenger for the throne. Mehmed II in 1451 had only one surviving brother, an infant whom his first act as sultan was to execute. His son Bayezid II, by contrast, reached the capital before his adult brother Cem and claimed the sultanate, only to face a civil war and, when Cem escaped to Rhodes into the captivity of the Knights of St. John in 1483, the constant threat that his captors would release him as a claimant to the Ottoman throne. It was only after he had executed Cem’s sons, and after Cem’s death in Naples in 1495 and public burial in Bursa,⁴ that Bayezid felt that his throne was secure. In the end, it was not his brother but his son Selim I who deposed him, in 1512, the competition for succession having broken out already during his lifetime. It culminated in Selim’s victory and the execution not only of his brothers Korkud and Ahmed but also of Ahmed’s sons, apart from one, Prince Murad, who escaped to Iran.⁵ Having no brothers, Selim’s son Süleyman I succeeded to the throne without bloodshed, but the succession of his own son, Selim II, was more troubled. As had happened in the reign of his grandfather, the succession struggle began before Süleyman’s death, the competition between Selim and Bayezid leading to civil war and the victory – with the support of Süleyman himself and the vezir Sokollu Mehmed Paşa – of Selim over Bayezid at the battle of Konya in May 1559. Prince Bayezid’s subsequent flight to Iran threatened Süleyman in the same way as the flight of Cem had threatened Bayezid II, by putting a pretender to the Ottoman throne in the hands of an enemy. It was not until the Safavid shah Tahmasb had extracted payment and a favourable treaty from Süleyman that he allowed the Ottoman sultan to send executioners to Iran to dispose of the captive prince and his entourage.

It was the succession of the last two sultans of the sixteenth century that – more or less – put an end to the practice of fratricide. At his death in 1574, Selim II left only one adult son, who succeeded him as Murad III. On assuming the throne, custom obliged Murad – apparently reluctantly – to execute his four brothers, who were still in their childhood. Murad, too, left only one adult son, who succeeded him in 1595 as Mehmed III and whose reign opened with the execution of his 19 infant brothers. There are hints in some chronicles that the practice of fratricide always displeased the sultan’s subjects, but

now the murder of innocent children caused a public outrage. The famous “fratricide clause” in the “Law Book of Mehmed II”, “For the good order of the world it is licit for the sultan to kill his brothers. The majority of ulema are agreed on this”, was probably no more than an attempt to appease public opinion. The Law Book itself is a confection, dating apparently from the early seventeenth century, and the clause justifying fratricide most probably served to legitimise the execution of Mehmed III’s brothers. More importantly, however, it seems to have been public revulsion at the slaughter of princes that put an end to the custom of fratricide and to have initiated the practice of secluding princes so that they could not present a danger to the reigning sultan.

It was not only brothers whom sultans might see as a threat to their authority. Suspicion could also fall upon sons. It was fear of a plot to replace him on the throne that persuaded Süleyman I to execute his son Mustafa, together with two members of his entourage, in 1553. This, too, caused public outrage, but not to the extent that it deterred Mehmed III from executing his son Mahmud when he suspected him of plotting to seize the throne.

The sultans therefore used execution as the way to meet challenges to their occupation of the throne. Such a threat, however, could come only from within the royal family, and in practice only from a brother or a son. No one from the governing elite ever contested the sultan’s right to rule. Nonetheless, sultans might also grow suspicious of over-mighty subjects, and in these cases, too, execution was the means of asserting their authority. The careers of Mahmud Paşa and İbrahim Paşa exemplify the practice. Mahmud Paşa occupied the grand vezirate for long periods between 1455 and 1474, exercising such power that the chronicler Neşri commented that it was “as though the sultan had abdicated”. It was presumably, at least in part, fear of Mahmud’s independent authority that persuaded Mehmed II to order his execution in 1474. İbrahim Paşa enjoyed a similar career. Süleyman I had appointed him grand vezir in 1523, adding the title serasker (army commander), and with it

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8 Ibid., pp. 177–8.
9 Ibid., p. 171.
a substantial increase of income, in 1529. In 1536, at the end of the campaign that had seen the capture of Baghdad, the sultan ordered his execution. The nisancı (chancellor, responsible for the drafting of documents and oversight of the sultan’s chancellery) Celalzade justifies the sultan’s decision on the grounds that during the Baghdad campaign İbrahim had “associated with the ignorant” and as a result made serious errors of judgement. One of his successors as grand vezir, Lütfi Paşa, explains his fate and that of the defterdar (finance officer, with oversight of the sultan’s treasury) İskender Çelebi, whom the sultan had also executed during the course of the Baghdad campaign, by commenting that the two men had become “thorns in the eye”. The reality is – most probably – that the sultan had begun to fear İbrahim as a rival to his own authority. Sometimes the reasons for execution were more specific. Bayezid II put the powerful grand vezir Gedik Ahmed Paşa to death in 1482, clearly because he suspected him of supporting his brother Cem. In 1598, Mehmed III ordered the execution of the grand vezir Saticı Mehmed Paşa because of his failures in the war in Hungary.

However much the sultans regarded executions such as these primarily as a way to rid themselves of those whom they regarded as a threat to their rule or to punish those whom they saw as failures, they also served as an edifying spectacle. They warned against disloyalty but, above all, reminded onlookers that ultimate power rested with the sultan. Furthermore, it was not only at the level of government that the sultan exercised his powers of life and death. Exemplary executions also functioned as a means of enforcing – or attempting to enforce – public order. Celalzade, for example, records how, in 1528, a gang of unidentified men plundered a house in Istanbul, killing all the residents. Since the perpetrators were unknown, enforcers from the palace rounded up and executed 800 “unemployed ruffians from the markets, wine-taverns and boza (a beer brewed from millet) shops”. Celalzade justifies this apparent injustice on the grounds that the terrifying spectacle helped to quell such crimes by serving as an example to the populace.

A more benign method than terror of securing the loyalty of the sultan’s ministers was marriage. From 1450, the practice of making marriage alliances with foreign dynasties came to an end, and it became the custom instead to marry Ottoman princesses to senior statesmen. This was occasionally the

13 Ibid., fols. 277a–277b.
practice before 1450. After this date, it became the norm, with the marriages of Bayezid II’s daughter Hundi Hatun to the five-time grand vezir Hersekzade Ahmed Paşa, of Selim I’s daughter Şahi Hatun to the grand vezir (1539–41) Lütfi Paşa, of Süleyman I’s daughter Mihrimah to the grand vezir Rüstem Paşa (1549–53; 1555–62) and of Selim II’s daughter to the grand vezir Sokollu Mehmed Paşa (1566–78) as the outstanding examples. This practice tied the vezirs to the imperial dynasty and so rendered rebellion unthinkable, even if it did sometimes subject their careers to the whims of internal dynastic politics. Lütfi Paşa apparently suffered permanent dismissal from the vezirate following a quarrel with his Ottoman wife, and a probably well-founded rumour implicates Rüstem Paşa in the plot to kill Prince Mustafa in 1553. His wife Mihrimah was daughter of Süleyman I’s spouse Hürrem, and there was a suspicion that he had plotted with the two women to secure the succession for one of Hürrem’s two sons, Bayezid or Selim, by engineering Mustafa’s execution. The rumour, whether true or not, was strong enough to make Rüstem Paşa sufficiently unpopular at the court, among the soldiery and, apparently, among the wider public to force his dismissal from office. That the sultan himself was reluctant to let him go is apparent from his re-appointment of Rüstem to the grand vezirate two years later.

The fear of execution and the constraints of royal marriages were two ways by which the sultan ensured the loyalty of his ministers. However, the power of the sultan was untrammelled only in his own palace. Even here, however, there were constraints, and in particular limitations on whom he could appoint as governors and vezirs. This was especially true of the period between the mid-fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries when, as a result of conquest, the empire absorbed large chunks of new territory. The process of incorporation was not easy, requiring the sultans to secure the loyalties of the old elites and dynasties which they had displaced. The difficulty of fully absorbing the conquests of Selim I into the structure of the empire exemplifies the problem in its most acute form. On his succession in 1520, Selim’s son Süleyman I immediately faced a revolt in Syria, where Janbirdi al-Ghazali, a former Mamluk governor who had defected to the Ottomans at the time of conquest, declared his independence. A series of rebellions in Egypt, between 1522 and 1524, followed the defeat of Janbirdi, requiring a military campaign and careful negotiations under the aegis of İbrahim Paşa

17 Celalzade, Geschichte, fols. 28b–40b.
to suppress.\(^{18}\) The Ottoman government was able to overcome a series of millenarian rebellions in south-eastern Anatolia between 1526 and 1528 only after İbrahim Paşa had negotiated terms with an important section of the rebels. These were the fief-holders from the formerly independent emirate of Dulgadır, who had lost their fiefs when the Ottomans finally annexed the principality in 1522. It was by promising these men the return of their fiefs that İbrahim was able to detach them from the main body of the rebels and suppress the insurrection.\(^{19}\)

Similar problems, if on a smaller scale, followed every conquest. In order to secure the territory, the sultans had to come to an accommodation with pre-existing powers. One way to deal with members of the local elite, if they did not flee the conquest, was to award them an appanage in a district removed from their home territory. In 1460, for example, following Mehmed II’s annexation of the lands in the Peloponnese belonging to two scions of the Byzantine imperial dynasty, Thomas and Demetrios Palaiologos, Thomas fled to Venice, ending his days in poverty in Rome, while the sultan awarded Demetrios lands in Thrace. Similarly, following the defeat of the İsfendiyar ruler of Sinop on the Black Sea coast, Mehmed removed its last independent ruler but compensated him with lands in western Anatolia. The same practice continued into the sixteenth century. Celalzade, for example, reports that in the 1520s İnal Bey, a member of the ruling stratum of Circassian Mamluks in Egypt, held a large fief in Rumeli.\(^{20}\) However, not all influential members of former regimes were displaced. For example, the 1518 land and tax register of Amid in the south-eastern Anatolian province of Diyarbakır (Diyarbekir) records a number of fief-holders as Akkoyunlus – that is, as members of the clan that had ruled the area until the early years of the sixteenth century. The same register, however, records that it was a man “from Rumeli” who held the largest fief in the district,\(^{21}\) his presence evidently intended to counterbalance the influence of the men with local roots and influence.

The need to absorb locally powerful dynasties and clans into the ruling establishment is also evident at the centre of power. Between the 1370s and 1453, a single family, the Çandarlıs, had enjoyed a quasi-monopoly of the vezirate. After the execution of Çandarlı Halil in 1453, only one member of the family, İbrahim Çandarlı, was to serve as grand vezir, in 1498–9. Instead,

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\(^{18}\) Ibid., fols. 121a–130a.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., fols. 157b–172a.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., fol. 197b.

the pattern of appointments to the vezirate and provincial governorships came, in part at least, to reflect the enlargement of the empire and the assimilation of the pre-Ottoman elite. Of the grand vezirs who held office between the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the accession of Süleyman I in 1520, Mahmud Paşa (1455–66, 1472–3) was a scion of an important Graeco-Serbian family. His rival Rum (“the Greek”) Mehmed Paşa (grand vezir 1466–9) was presumably of Byzantine origin. Mesih Paşa (grand vezir 1499–1501) and the governor-general of Rumeli, Hass Murad Paşa, who lost his life in the war with the Akkoyunlus in 1473, were members of the Byzantine imperial family. Hersekzade (“son of the Duke”) Ahmed Paşa (grand vezir 1497–8, 1503–6, 1511–12, 1512–14, 1516) was a descendant of the ducal family of Herzegovina. Dukakinzade (“son of Dukagjin”) Ahmed Paşa (grand vezir 1514–15) was a member of the powerful north Albanian Dukagjin clan. For these men and for others like them who occupied lower-ranking offices and also had Christian backgrounds, the first requirement for entry into Ottoman service was conversion to Islam. This was not difficult in a society where identity was fluid and boundaries between religions not always clear-cut, and where social status took precedence over religious affiliation. Ideally, too, they would have had an education and served in the sultan’s palace: the name Hass Murad, for example, implies that before his elevation he had served in the sultan’s privy (hass) chamber.22

For the sultans, the practice of co-opting members of the pre-conquest elites had the advantages first of forestalling resistance to Ottoman rule and second of giving the sultans access to networks of power in newly conquered territories. The policy of assimilation rather than eradication was remarkably successful. The case of İskender Bey – Scanderbeg – who in 1444 had re-established himself as an independent ruler of his family’s hereditary territory in Albania and, until 1466, resisted Ottoman and Venetian attempts to dislodge him, is exceptional. The local lords and dynasts who joined Ottoman service probably enjoyed more personal power than they or their forebears had in pre-conquest days. Nonetheless, their position now depended ultimately on the patronage and goodwill of the sultan. Events such as the dismissal from office of Mesih Paşa following his failure as commander at the siege of Rhodes in 1481, or more spectacularly the executions of Mahmud Paşa and Dukakinzade Ahmed Paşa, emphasised the fragility of their positions. In this sense, their careers in Ottoman service followed the pattern that Machiavelli had laid out.

However, in some instances, local resistance to Ottoman rule rendered the policy of assimilation impractical. This was the case with the former emirate of Karaman. A brutal campaign finally subjugated the emirate to Ottoman rule in 1469, with the Karamanid capital of Konya becoming the seat of governorship of Mehmed II’s son Mustafa and of later princes of the dynasty down to the mid-sixteenth century. Nonetheless, members of the deposed dynasty attempted to reclaim their lost territory by allying themselves in the early 1470s with the Akkoyunlu ruler, Uzun Hasan, and with the Venetians, and there were further rebellions on behalf of the dynasty into the early 1500s. In other areas where local dynasties were impossible to eradicate, the sultans made no attempts to do so but rather reached an accommodation. In Rumeli, the families of the marcher lords who had become established in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries – in particular the Evrenosoğlus, with lands in Macedonia; the Turahanoğlus, with lands in Thessaly; and the Mihaloğlus of Vidin – continued to exercise local influence and to receive from the sultan, as of right, governorships in Rumeli. In these cases, however, the loyalty of the old marcher families never seems to have been in doubt.

The situation on the eastern and southern borderlands of the empire was different. In 1516, for example, Selim I gained the allegiance of the Kurdish tribal chiefs in the mountains between Ottoman Anatolia and Safavid Azerbaijan by sending as his envoy İdris of Bitlis, a scholar in Ottoman service who was a native of the area. İdris had with him “white Noble Commands” – that is, blank sheets of paper bearing the sultan’s cipher, on which he was to write the terms agreed with each chieftain to secure his loyalty. The sultan was in effect negotiating a treaty with the head of each tribe, who would remain loyal so long as it was in his interest to do so. That the allegiance of the Kurds was not guaranteed became especially evident in the early seventeenth century, when the tribal leaders, hitherto loyal to the Ottomans, deserted to Shah Abbas before the battle of Suyivan in 1605, leading the Safavid chronicler Eskandar Monshi to comment on “their blame-worthy habit of keeping in with both sides”. Equally uncertain were the loyalties of the Arab tribes in the marshlands of southern Iraq and the desert fringes of the northern Gulf, where the sultans resorted to the expedient of

granting local chiefs Ottoman titles of governorship in an attempt to secure their allegiance. Thus, for example, Ibn ‘Ulayyan, who had led a successful anti-Ottoman rebellion from the marshes of the Tigris and Euphrates delta and defeated several attempts to oust him, received the Ottoman title of sancak beyi in 1567. Nor was it only in frontier regions that local dynasties survived. In northern Syria, for example, the sultans recognised members of the Canbulad clan as hereditary governors of Kilis. In some places, however, efforts to co-opt local chiefs into the Ottoman system evidently failed. In his survey of the resources of the empire made in 1609, the clerk Ayn Ali has no more to say about the mountainous areas of the Lebanon than the bald statement “There are non-Muslim lords in the mountains”. In such areas, the sultan’s authority was non-existent.

Nonetheless and despite its hyperbole, Machiavelli’s description of Ottoman governors as the sultan’s “servants” is essentially true, and the Ottoman term kul – literally slave – used to designate men, from the grand vezir downwards, who received a salary from the sultan reflects this fact. From the second decade of the sixteenth century, the practice of selecting vezirs and provincial governors from the scions of the pre-Ottoman elites came to an end. From the appointment of İbrahim Paşa as grand vezir in 1523 until the end of the sixteenth century, the vezirate and, as far as was politically practical, provincial governorships were usually the preserve of men, mostly of humble background, who had entered the sultan’s palace in their early teens, received an education in one of the palace schools and served in one of the service corps within the palace that attended to the sultan’s needs before receiving a government office. Lacking powerful family connections, and in a society without autonomous institutions, such men relied for protection and patronage entirely on the sultan or factions of their peers, who in turn were dependent on the sultan.

There were normally two routes into the palace schools. The first was through capture and presentation to the sultan. It was famously as a prisoner-of-war taken captive at Jerba in 1560 that Cigalazade Sinan Paşa began his career in the sultan’s service. A scion of the Genoese family of Cicala, he entered the palace school following his captivity, serving in the palace and later as governor-general (beylerbeyi) of Van and Erzurum, admiral of the Mediterranean fleet (kapudan paşa) and vezir, briefly becoming grand vezir

in 1596.\textsuperscript{29} Captivity, however, was not the usual route into the palace. The majority of recruits came through the \textit{devşirme}, the levy of non-Muslim boys made from within the sultan’s own territories, predominantly from the western parts of the Balkan peninsula but also from other areas of the Balkans and Anatolia.

The \textit{devşirme} took place every three to seven years, according to need. A commission from the capital would visit the area where the levy was to be made, visiting the villages and towns within a pre-determined itinerary. At each stop, the local authorities would assemble the non-Muslim lads from the district, aged usually between 12 and 14 years, and from these the visiting commission would pick one. The number of boys selected from each district was relatively small. For example, in 1495 the levy raised 163 boys from the island of Evvoia from a total of 26,026 tax-paying households.\textsuperscript{30} The boys so chosen had then to march, in groups of about a hundred, from their homeland to Istanbul, where they underwent conversion and circumcision. A second selection followed, using the science of physiognomy, which separated the lads into two groups, with the majority group destined for a training which led to service in the janissaries.\textsuperscript{31}

The janissaries formed a standing infantry corps, numbering about 12,000 in the mid-sixteenth century,\textsuperscript{32} which drew its recruits from among prisoners-of-war and the \textit{devşirme} levies and received salaries directly from the treasury. As a group of “foreigners” – in this case men with a non-Muslim background – in the personal service of the monarch it resembled some of the military corps in the service of contemporary European princes. One of the functions of the janissaries was undoubtedly as a support to the personal power of the sultan, who was both their paymaster and sole patron, and as such they had an important position in the political structure of the empire. No sultan could ascend the throne without their backing. In 1481, in order to gain their allegiance against his brother Cem, Bayezid II paid the janissaries an accession bonus, and henceforth no sultan could come to power without paying this bonus, whatever the state of the treasury. In 1566, when Selim II tried to dispense with the gratuity on the grounds that since he had no rival to the throne he did not need the janissaries’ backing, a janissary rebellion

forced him to comply with the custom. In 1512, Bayezid II had no choice but to abdicate when the janissaries transferred their allegiance to his son Selim [I].

The janissaries were unswervingly loyal to the Ottoman dynasty, but never blindly obedient to an individual sultan. The constant possibility of a janissary rebellion was a permanent check on the sultan’s freedom of action.

The devşirme levies who entered the palace schools were the minority who had before them the possibility of occupying the highest political offices in the empire. The oldest of the schools, which pre-dated the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, was in the old palace in Edirne. Mehmed II established a second school in the old palace in Istanbul, whose construction he began immediately after the conquest. The new palace – the present-day Topkapı Palace – completed in the 1470s, housed two schools, the Great Chamber and the Small Chamber. To these, Bayezid II added Galatasarayı, a school in the largely Christian enclave of Pera, in 1481, while Süleyman I, following the execution of İbrahim Paşa in 1536, converted the latter’s mansion on the Hippodrome to a school. The first requirement for the new recruits to the schools was to learn Turkish. This was the lingua franca of the palace and of the administration, although within the palace it was the native tongue only of the sultan and his family and of some religious functionaries. The education which followed under the fierce discipline of the eunuchs of the inner palace was both physical, involving, for example, horsemanship and the use of weapons, and intellectual, involving in particular training in Arabic, Persian and the Islamic sciences. The treatises on various problems in Islamic jurisprudence, which the former grand vezir, the Albanian-born Lütfi Paşa (1539–41), was to compose in his retirement, are a product of this aspect of palace education.

On the completion of their education, the careers of the graduates diverged. Perhaps the majority left the palace for service in one of the six elite cavalry corps, probably with a girl from the imperial harem as wife. Like her husband, she, too, would be a slave of non-Muslim origin. In the sixteenth century, these corps each comprised about 2,000–3,000 men and were, like the janissaries, in the personal service of the sultan. In addition to their military and ceremonial role, many of their members also pursued lucrative careers as tax gatherers and tax farmers. The graduates who remained in the palace would become members of one of the service groups – for example, the larder, the treasury, the gatekeepers – attending to the upkeep of the palace

33 Vatin and Veinstein, Le Sérial, chap. 2.
but, in particular, attending to the sultan’s personal needs, both in the palace itself and on campaign. The most privileged group, the pages of the privy chamber, waited on the sultan in his private apartment in the inner court of the palace and followed him in processions, carrying his weapons, garments, water and other items. It was on completion of service in one or more of these groups that a graduate of the palace schools would receive an outside appointment, usually an office in the service of a provincial governor. Success and appropriate patronage could lead to appointments as sancak governor, governor-general, and finally as vezir, serving on the sultan’s imperial divan (the imperial council, meeting under the presidency of the grand vezir).35

The function of this system of education is clear. The recruits came from humble or, in the case of prisoners-of-war, foreign backgrounds. Consequently they could call on no powerful networks outside the palace. The personal and often menial service rendered in the palace gave them privileged access to the sultan, while also reminding them of their status as his servants. Furthermore, the shared education within the close confines of the palace created a shared culture and an esprit de corps which set them apart from the mass of the sultan’s subjects, and an outlook which identified their own interests with those of the dynasty. It was these men whom Machiavelli identified as the “servants” of the sultan, whom “he shifts and changes as he chooses”.

The processes of government

The role of the sultan

Conquest was the primary justification for the rule of the Ottoman dynasty, and leadership in war the primal role of the Ottoman sultan. It is this virtue as a warrior that the poet Baki (d. 1600) celebrates in the final hemistich of his elegy on Sultan Süleyman, where he praises the late sultan – who had died while besieging the Hungarian fortress of Szigetvár – as “both gazi and şahid”; that is, both as a warrior and as a martyr. Until the death of Süleyman I, the ideal of the sultan as military leader was also a reality: sultans had not only been present on the battlefield in many campaigns but had also directed strategy in person. Mehmed II and Selim I were clearly active military commanders. So, too, was Süleyman I. In his first campaign, in 1521, for example, which culminated in the conquest of Belgrade, the eccentric approach of the army via Šabac seems to have been at the insistence of the sultan and against

the advice of the grand vezir, Piri Paşa.\textsuperscript{36} In March 1529, he delegated military command, with the title serasker, to the grand vezir Ibrahim Paşa, with the stipulation that his orders were to be accepted “as commands from the tongue of the sultan”\textsuperscript{37} and, until his execution in 1536, it seems to have been Ibrahim who was in effective command of military campaigns. Nonetheless, the delegation of command did not pre-suppose the absence of the sultan: both sultan and serasker were present on the campaigns to Hungary and Vienna in 1529, to Hungary in 1532, and against the Safavids in 1533–6, and after Ibrahim’s death Süleyman continued to accomplish and command campaigns in person and to participate, whether directly or in writing,\textsuperscript{38} in tactical decisions.

After the death of Süleyman I, the sultans no longer accompanied military campaigns. Neither Süleyman’s son Selim II (1566–74) nor his successors Murad III (1574–95) and Mehmed III (1595–1603) seem to have had a taste for warfare. Nor was it any longer practical for the sultan to lead his army in person. From the second half of the sixteenth century, frontiers were distant and warfare prolonged, often requiring the troops to over-winter in the field. Not only was it unthinkable to subject the sultan to the harsh conditions of the new style of warfare, it would also have rendered the government of the empire impossible. In the earlier epoch, the sultan and his ministers were able, when on campaign, to conduct much of the routine business of government – for example, making appointments to office or receiving ambassadors – from the army camp. This was possible when campaigns lasted for months, but not when they lasted for years on end and on frontiers remote from the capital.

Nonetheless, despite the reluctance of sultans after 1566 to move from the capital to the battlefront, and the evident impracticality of such a move, the notion of the warrior-sultan persisted. It was not that the sultan was necessarily seen as a commander. He was essentially a talisman whose presence on the battlefield ensured victory. Already in the late fifteenth century, the reluctance of Mehmed II’s successor, Bayezid II (1481–1512), to lead his armies in person, in particular in the unsuccessful war of 1485–91 against the Mamluks, had evidently led to criticism of his rule, which the chronicler Tursun Bey felt obliged to rebut.\textsuperscript{39} This view of the sultan as a talisman who procures victory persisted even in the changed conditions of the late sixteenth century

\textsuperscript{37} Celalzade, \textit{Geschichte}, fol. 178b.
and beyond. In seeking to reverse the disasters suffered in the war against the Habsburgs, the vezirs in 1596 found the solution in persuading the reluctant Mehmed III to accompany the army to the front in Hungary. The role of the sultan, who played no part in planning the campaign or in the fighting, was simply to bring good luck, and it was to his presence that the Ottomans attributed their conquest of Eger and the unexpected victory at Mező-Keresztes. The Ottoman chronicler İbrahim Peçevi remarks that had the sultan remained in the field, the victorious army would have proceeded to capture Vienna.40

For the sultan, however, one campaign was enough. He refused to return to Hungary.

Between the reigns of Mehmed II and Mehmed III, therefore, the Ottoman sultans had withdrawn from the role of active leaders in war, even though their subjects clearly continued to believe that their symbolic presence in the army was a guarantee of good fortune in battle.

After 1566, therefore, the sultan relinquished his role as de facto commander of the army. It is, however, difficult to assess the degree of his de facto authority in other areas of rulership. Although Ottoman government was in principle wholly dependent on his will, this had never been entirely true, and the increasing size and complexity of the empire between 1453 and 1603 must have increasingly diminished his ability to intervene directly in all aspects of government. It remains, however, difficult to assess how far the sultans involved themselves in affairs of state and political decision-making.

All decrees and letters of appointment emanating from the government use the formula “I have commanded that …”, as though coming from the sultan himself, masking the reality that many, if not most of them, would have been issued without the sultan’s knowledge. Occasionally drafts of decrees – which become available in large numbers only from 1560 – bear the note “with the imperial rescript”, indicating that the decree embodies the written command of the sultan, but these are infrequent. When they occur, however, they indicate the personal interest of the sultan in the matter at hand. They make clear, for example, that Süleyman I involved himself closely in the effort to stop his rebel son Bayezid from escaping to Iran in 1559. In general, however, the role of the sultan remains hidden from view.

One reason for this, apart from the formulaic language of decrees, is that the most important political decisions rarely left written records: surviving decrees concern the implementation of decisions rather than their formulation. While major policy resolutions must always have required the consent

of the sultan, some were clearly also his personal decisions. The contemporary chronicler Tursun Bey’s comment that no one but the sultan knew the destination of Mehmed II’s final campaign in 1481 is undoubtedly an exaggeration, but also an indication that it was Mehmed himself who had planned the expedition. A note in Bayezid II’s own hand to a certain İskender, informing the recipient that he has executed Gedik Ahmed Paşa and ordering him to kill Prince Cem’s sons, shows that the executions were at the private, probably secret, command of the sultan. Bayezid also conducted personal negotiations with the Knights of St. John concerning Cem’s captivity, bypassing his vezirs. Bayezid’s son and grandson, Selim I and Süleyman I, respectively, must also have played important roles in the formulation of policies and decisions. It was clearly Süleyman himself who, at the urging of the miğifti (a jurisconsult) Çivizade, in 1539 ordered the abolition of vakıfıs, which derived their income from interest paid on loans, and rescinded the order shortly afterwards, when the kadıasker of Rumeli Ebussuud convinced him of its impracticality. It was probably Süleyman, too, who was personally responsible for a decree forbidding Ottoman kadıs from applying Shafi’i law in a small number of cases where Hanafi law did not provide a remedy, a restriction that was entirely unhelpful to practising jurists. The three successors of Süleyman probably had less personal involvement in government, both as a matter of temperament and as a result of the increasing complexity of the task. It appears, in particular, that Süleyman’s son Selim II (r. 1566–74) was happy to delegate his role to his grand vezir and son-in-law Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, who held office throughout his reign. However, assessments of the sultan’s personal role in government can never be more then speculative.

The same is true of the vezirs and other members of the governing elite, although one or two accounts do survive of informal conclaves where they argued, sometimes in the sultan’s presence, over momentous decisions of state. In the debate over whether to attack the Venetian island of Cyprus, the grand vezir Sokollu Mehmed apparently opposed the plan, while the vezir Lala Mustafa Paşa and the vezir and former admiral Piyale Paşa advocated it, probably with the sultan’s backing. In discussions over whether to attack Austria in 1593, the grand vezir Koca Sinan Paşa – probably with an eye

41 Tursun Bey, Tarih-i, p. 181.
to personal aggrandisement – led the case for war against the pleading of the vezir Ferhad Paşa, the victor in the final stages of the recent war against the Safavids, who was aware that the exhaustion of the troops and treasury made further warfare inadvisable.46 However, aperçus such as these into the higher decision-making in the empire are rare. A few decisions, once made, required the religious sanction of the chief mûftü or other religious authority, whether or not he had played a role in their formulation. Famously, in 1514 Selim I sought a fetva (a legal opinion issued by a competent authority) from Hamza Saru Görez 47 to sanction his campaign against the Safavids and execution of Safavid followers within his realms, the problem being that the Safavids were not technically “infidels”, against whom it would be licit to wage war. Ebussuud was to amplify and refine Hamza’s arguments in his fetvas justifying Süleyman I’s Iranian campaign in 1549. It was Ebussuud, too, who sanctioned Süleyman’s execution of his rebel son Bayezid and the attack on Cyprus in 1570 while a ten-year truce with Venice was still in force. These religious sanctions for policy were, however, a formality, and were always forthcoming. The mûftü Zenbilli Ali’s refusal to sanction Selim I’s command to execute a hundred clerks accused of corruption 48 remains an exception.

The institutions of government

If decisions on war and peace and other momentous issues in the life of the empire emerged from the will of the sultan or from private and informal discussions, the process of implementing these decisions and dealing with day-to-day problems was the business of formal bodies. The most important of these was the divan-i hümâyun, or Imperial Council.

From the time of the completion of the new palace in the 1470s, the divan met in the second, semi-public courtyard of the palace. Before the mid-sixteenth century, its members would also accompany the sultan and grand vezir when they were on campaign and meet at intervals during the army’s journey to and from the battlefront. Assembling under the presidency of the grand vezir, its membership comprised the senior members of each branch of government. The vezirs stood at the head of the political-military establishment, serving both as the sultan’s ministers and as military commanders in times of war. Until the 1540s, there were normally three vezirs on the divan. This rose to four and then, in 1566, five. From 1570 until the end of

48 Ibid., p. 211.
the century, there were normally seven. Representing the judiciary were the kadıaskers. Until late in the reign of Mehmed II there was, we are told, only one kadıasker. From this time onwards, there were two. The kadıasker of Rumeli dealt with the legal affairs of the European province, while the kadıasker of Anatolia dealt with the Asiatic territories. Representing the financial branch were the defterdars. Their numbers increased from – probably – one in the fifteenth century to two in 1526, three in 1539 and four in 1587, the increasing numbers reflecting the growing importance of financial matters, particularly towards the end of the sixteenth century, when both expenditures and deficits mounted.49 The other member of the divan was the nişancı, or tevkii, whose title is an indication of his symbolic function of affixing the sultan’s cipher – nişan or tevki – to imperial decrees as a guarantee of their authenticity. It was the nişancı who had the final responsibility for each decree or other document that the divan issued, ensuring that it conformed to standard.

These were the executive members of the imperial divan. A larger number of clerks serviced their administrative needs, receiving and filing incoming correspondence, preparing materials for discussion, and preparing the drafts and final copies of decrees and other documents. A scribal service had clearly existed in the fifteenth century, but it is only in the sixteenth that any details of its organisation emerge. At its head stood the chief clerk (the reisülküttab), a post whose creation late sources dubiously attribute to Süleyman I and which could be a stepping stone to an appointment as nişancı. The most famous of nişancıs, Celalzade Mustafa, served as reisülküttab before his elevation to nişancı in 1534. Below the reisülküttab, at least in the sixteenth century, was the tezkereci, whose function most probably was to summarise incoming letters and petitions for presentation to the divan, reducing them to the form in which they appear in the documents which the divan issued in response. A second group of clerks worked under the aegis of the defterdars. The distinction was necessary since these required not only a knowledge of accountancy but also expertise in drawing up treasury documents, which used a specialised – and, to the uninitiated, impenetrable – language, script and way of writing numerals. The number of clerks servicing the divan grew as the sixteenth century progressed, the increase probably reflecting the expanding volume of business rather than simple bureaucratic inflation. In 1527, there were 11 clerks “in the following of the nişancı” and 7 “in the following of the defterdars”. In 1561, there were 25 and 9, respectively. By the end of the

century, there were over 50 altogether. The clerks of the divan were not, however, the only clerks in the service of the central government. Others served in the defterhane, the office of the land registry, responsible in particular for recording the allocation of fief holdings, and in the treasury. In 1531, there were seven clerks in the defterhane and 33 clerks and 17 apprentices in the employment of the treasury.

The imperial divan customarily met on four days of the week, from Saturday to Tuesday, with the clerks attending in rotation. The sultan himself was not present. According to Ottoman tradition, Mehmed II abandoned the practice of attending meetings of the divan in person, and later sultans usually followed his example. Instead they adopted formal and informal means of following discussions and approving or vetoing decisions. Following meetings, the grand vezir reported on the proceedings in private discussions with the sultan. In other reports, the entire divan met the sultan in the petition chamber at the entrance to the third court of the palace, and its members in turn reported on those matters that lay within their competence. It is probable that both procedures were followed at different times and under different sultans. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, as the sultans grew more reclusive, it seems to have become the common practice for the grand vezir to communicate with the sultan via written notes.\(^5\) The sultan could also at any time convey messages to the divan from his residence in the third court, the “Law Book of Mehmed II” laying out a procedure for this. He also had another means of following proceedings. Above the council chamber there was a window with a connection to the inner palace, from where he could watch the meetings of the divan unobserved, the ever-present possibility of his witnessing what was discussed acting as a disincentive to the grand vezir to misreport or to conceal information.

The divan had more than one function. It dealt with important affairs of state, overseeing, for example, the preparation of war materials and the call-up of troops before major campaigns, or drawing up correspondence with foreign rulers, usually following private meetings between the grand vezir and the ambassador. Much of its time, however, was spent responding to letters and petitions from provincial governors, dealing with a vast range of issues.


from the pursuit of brigands to the construction of aqueducts. However, it was not only holders of public offices that had access to the *divan*. On certain days, individuals had the right to present their claims in person either to the full council or to the grand *vezir* in his residence after the full *divan* had retired. It was disguised as a petitioner that an assassin gained access to and murdered the grand *vezir* Sokollu Mehmed in 1578. An individual from outside the capital could also present a grievance to the local *kadi*, who would then forward it to the *divan* for redress. In addition, the *divan* acted as a court. It seems to have been Bayezid II who decreed that the ordinary courts should no longer hear cases against his servants – that is, those who drew salaries from the treasury or received fiefs from the sultan. Instead, it was the *divan* that passed judgement on these and some other cases. In all matters, however, it acted in the name of the sultan. All decrees and letters of appointment emanating from the *divan*, whether he was aware of them or not, were in his name.

The *vezirs* on the *divan* would normally have reached the position after a period serving in provincial governorships. Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, for example, graduated from the palace in 1549 and, between that date and 1555, when he became third *vezir*, occupied the posts of *sancak* governor (*sancak beyi*) of Gelibolu (Gallipoli) and of governor-general (*beylerbeyi*) of Rumeli. Records of provincial government are, however, too scarce to provide any very clear idea of how it functioned.

In 1453, there were three provinces in the empire: Rumeli, comprising all Ottoman territory in Europe; Anatolia, comprising Ottoman territory in western Asia Minor to the west of Ankara; and Rum, comprising Ottoman territory in central and north-eastern Asia Minor. The conquest of the emirate of Karaman in 1468–9 added a fourth. Throughout the period 1453–1603, Rumeli had the “senior” status among the provinces, with its *beylerbeyi* gaining the ex officio right to attend meetings of the Imperial *divan*. The conquests of Selim I between 1516 and 1518 added the two formerly Mamluk provinces of Syria and Egypt and the formerly Safavid provinces of Diyarbakır (Diyarbekir) and Kurdistan, although the latter was not to survive as a recognised administrative area. The reign of his son, Süleyman, saw the creation of more provinces: Dulgadir, following the annexation of that principality,

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and Baghdad, Şehrizol, Van and Erzurum, following the campaign against the Safavids in 1533–6 and 1548–9. The creation of the provinces of Basra and of al-Hasa on the shores of the Persian Gulf followed the extension of Ottoman power into southern Iraq after 1536. The formation of these provinces followed the acquisition of new territory through conquest. Other creations followed a different logic. In 1533, the sultan appointed Hayreddin Barbarossa, the conqueror and governor of Algiers, admiral of the Mediterranean fleet. Hitherto admirals had held this position together with the office of sancak beyi of Gelibolu. Considering this rank too lowly for Hayreddin, the sultan appointed him with the rank of beylerbeyi of the Archipelago. This was a new province created by detaching existing sancaks from the littoral of the existing provinces of Anatolia and Rumeli. It was an ad hoc creation that disappeared after Hayreddin’s death in 1546, to be revived again in 1551 with the appointment as admiral of Sinan Paşa – brother of the grand vezir Rüstem Paşa. His successor, Piyale, received the admiralty with the rank of sancak beyi of Gelibolu but, from the time of his promotion to beylerbeyi of the Archipelago in 1558, the province had a continuous existence. Other provinces came into existence for reasons of defence. After the defeat of King Lajos of Hungary in 1526, Süleyman maintained his elected successor, János Szapolyai, in power as king. However, in 1541, after Szapolyai’s death, central Hungary became a directly ruled Ottoman province, serving as a military frontier against Habsburg Austria. The detachment of Bosnia, previously a sancak in the province of Rumeli, to become an independent province in 1580 presumably had a similar aim. The same defensive logic saw the creation of the small province of Kanizsa in south-western Hungary in 1600, following its capture from the Habsburgs that year.

Most provinces outside southern Iraq, Egypt and North Africa were subdivided into smaller units. These were the sancaks, each under the governorship of a sancak beyi and often taking its name from the chief town in the district. By the sixteenth century, most of the beylerbeyis and sancak beyis had risen to the position from service in the palace. However, some sancaks were hereditary, and some families, notably the Evrenosoğlu, Turahanoğlu and Mihaloğlu families in Rumeli, enjoyed a hereditary right to appointment as sancak beyis. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, when financial affairs became pressing, it became more common for defterdars to cross into political

service as provincial governors. Posts of sancak beyi were also open to sons of vezirs and other office-holders, and to members of the dynasty in the female line. These groups, however, could rise no higher in the government hierarchy, a prohibition which clearly aimed to prevent the formation of veziral or other powerful dynasties. The practice, too, of moving beylerbeyis and sancak beyis, apparently every two to three years, prevented the non-hereditary provincial governors from forming local power bases.

Beylerbeyis and sancak beyis, like the vezirs and the sultan himself, had both civil and military functions. The two functions were in fact intertwined. Although it is possible to define a sancak as a unit of territory, the reality was rather more complex. A sancak consisted of the aggregate of military fiefs (timars and zemets) that came under the administration of the sancak beyi. The borders between sancaks could in places be ill defined as fiefs were reallocated, enlarged or diminished. Furthermore, certain timars – the so-called free timars – fell outside the sancak beyi’s jurisdiction, as did areas within the sancak that might be allocated to royal revenues, vakıfs or other purposes. The sancak beyi therefore was in command of the timar-holders that fell under his authority as well as the lands which their timars encompassed.57

The major non-military function of the sancak beyi was the maintenance of order within his sancak and the pursuit and punishment of wrongdoers. It was the sancak beyis, too, who pocketed fines levied on miscreants. The judicial powers of the sancak beyi were not, however, unlimited. In principle, he and his men (the ehl-i ‘örf) executed the sentences imposed by a judge (the kadi), in whose appointment the sancak beyi played no part. In practice, the separation of powers was probably never so clear-cut. The number of orders forbidding the commutation of the death penalty for a fine58 suggests an ever-present temptation for sancak beyis to act independently. In wartime, if he did not receive a command to remain behind and maintain order in his district, the sancak beyi commanded the timar-holders in his sancak, being responsible for their mustering at the point specified in a command from the divan and commanding them on the battlefield. Sancak beyis in frontier districts had the additional task of defending the frontier against enemy incursions or for themselves organising raids into enemy territory. For example, in the fifteenth century and later, the Mihaloğlus of Vidin had the task of mounting annual raids across the Danube into Wallachia and Hungary. The

sancak beyi was not responsible for the initial appointment of timar-holders but nonetheless had the authority to petition for their promotion – effectively for an enlargement of their timar – normally citing bravery on the battlefield as the grounds.

If the sancak beyis commanded the timar-holding troops in their sancak, they themselves came under the direct command of the beylerbeyi in whose province their sancak was situated, serving under his standard whether against foreign enemies or internal disorders, as, for example, in the campaigns against Kızılbaş rebels in central and south-eastern Anatolia between 1526 and 1529. The beylerbeyi himself was the most powerful and wealthiest person in a province, deriving his income from specified parcels of revenue – notably from urban taxes – within his province. Sancak beyis similarly received an income from the revenues assigned to them from within their sancaks. The revenues of a beylerbeyi supported a large household mirroring on a smaller scale the sultan’s household in the capital. Nonetheless, in the absence of surviving documents, it remains difficult to define his administrative functions. Like the sancak beyis, he had a role in the administration of justice, probably in fact holding a court which, like the divan in Istanbul, could pronounce and execute sentences. He had responsibility for the finances of the province, and above all he was responsible for the oversight of timars, holding copies of the detailed land-and-tax registers of the sancaks in his province. He did not, however, have an unrestricted right to award timars. Instead, this involved a lengthy process whereby a beylerbeyi or a sancak beyi forwarded a list of candidates to the grand vezir, who in turn would forward to each candidate a decree documenting his eligibility. When a timar became vacant – perhaps after a campaign where a large number of timar-holders had lost their lives – he could present the decree to the beylerbeyi of the province, who could then award a timar. That was not, however, the end of the matter. If the timar was below a certain value – 6,000 akçe in Rumeli, 5,000 akçe in Anatolia and 3,000 akçe elsewhere – the beylerbeyi could award the timar on his own authority. Above this value, however, the candidate had to take his memorandum of appointment to the land registry in Istanbul, which would check his claim against the register and, if satisfied, issue a warrant of appointment. The system thus gave the beylerbeyi the overall surveillance of the timars in his province but no absolute authority. During the fifteenth century, the procedures for appointment had most probably been less formal, in particular in

the areas where powerful families, such as the Evrenosoğlus in Macedonia or the Turahanoglus in Thessaly, exercised their influence. In the late sixteenth century, too, the long absences of armies and their commanders at the front increased the need to make immediate appointments to re-allocate the timars of the fallen and of deserters without reference to Istanbul, bringing about confusion in the system.61

Between 1453 and 1603, therefore, timars were the basis of provincial organisation. A sancak was in essence a conglomeration of timars in a particular district, while a province was a conglomeration of sancaks. A timar itself was a parcel of revenues allocated as income to a cavalryman (a sipahi) in exchange for military service or, less commonly, to an official such as a clerk in the sultan’s service or to a princess or other member of the imperial family. In principle, any revenue source could be assigned as a timar but, in practice, since the Ottoman economy was overwhelmingly agricultural, so, too, were the taxes assigned to timars. Typically, the revenues which constituted a timar came from a village or villages in the countryside and its associated fields and pastures. The timar-holder had a right to these revenues so long as he continued to perform his military service, but he would forfeit them if he failed to present himself when summoned to war. He also exercised some authority over the land from which he drew his income. He had a policing function, sometimes sharing with the sancak beyi half the fines for crimes committed on his timar-holding. He oversaw the inheritance and allocation of peasant-holdings, having the entitlement to an entry fine from newcomers settling on the land. He also had access to a plot for his own cultivation. Nonetheless, he did not own the land and enjoyed its revenues only at the sultan’s discretion. Nor, before a decree of 1585 permitted the practice,62 did timars pass from father to son, this prohibition on inheritance serving to prevent timar-holders from coming to form a local landed class. What was inherited was instead status as a member of the military class, which carried with it the entitlement to a timar but not to any timar in particular. When timars fell vacant, sons of sipahis would compete among themselves and, to a lesser degree, with former janissaries, palace servants and others on the sultan’s payroll who were also entitled to receive timars. Competition was evidently fierce. Two decrees of 1531 and 1536 specify precisely how many


62 Pál Fodor, The Last Major Taxation Surveys of the Empire: Farewell to the tahri r System, typescript. My thanks to Pál Fodor for allowing me access to this work-in-progress.
sons of an existing sipahi inherit the right to a timar and the value of the timar to which each son is entitled. These rules were evidently as much an effort to restrict entry to timars as they were to rationalise the system. The same decrees also forbade the allocation of timars to “outsiders”, a rule which, if strictly applied, would have the effect of making timar-holding the monopoly of a closed caste.

In principle, and probably to a large degree in practice, each timar had a central, indivisible core, known as a “sword” (kılıç). It was possible, however, for a sipahi to increase his income through the addition of revenues – perhaps from an adjoining village – to his basic kılıç. The award of extra timar income through the re-allocation of revenues that did not form part of a kılıç was made typically on the petition of a sancak beyi, and typically following a campaign, when the deaths of sipahis in battle left many timars vacant. There were, as a result of this process, considerable disparities of income among sipahis. An increased income, however, brought with it increased responsibilities. The law required sipahis to bring with them to war men-at-arms, horses, tents, weapons and armour, with the level of their income determining the scale of their obligations. The maximum value of a timar was, notionally, 9,999 akçe per annum, this exact figure probably losing any real significance in the period of high inflation in the last two decades of the sixteenth century. Each sancak also contained a number of fiefs, designated as zeamets or, in the older terminology, subaşılık, with a notional yield of between 10,000 and 100,000 akçe. Their holders had greater responsibilities within their districts than ordinary sipahis – the zaims or subaşıs seem to have had particular responsibilities for policing urban areas – and acted as military officers when on campaign. The largest fiefs in a sancak, of 100,000 akçe and over, designated as hass, were the preserve of the heylerbeyis and sancak beyis, or else formed part of the imperial domains, with revenues going to the sultan personally or to the treasury. Sources of revenue which did not form part of hasses, zeamets or timars came under the control of salaried officials (emin) or, more often, tax farmers, with a specified annual sum going directly to the treasury or to service a local need, such as the upkeep of a fortress or garrison.

The responsibility for collecting taxes lay with the fief-holder himself or – especially in the case of larger fiefs – with his agent. In principle, however, he had no discretion over which taxes he could collect or at what rate but had the right only to those taxes assigned to him in the land and tax survey of

the sancak and at the rate specified. Only the sultan had the right to collect in times when normal treasury income did not suffice. Since they had few resources, timar-holders in particular faced a number of problems in collecting dues. First, throughout this period, peasants frequently paid the taxes due on crops in kind rather than in cash, forcing the timar-holder to arrange for the transport of his share of the produce to a town market to sell for cash.64 Second, taxes on crops and extra dues (avanız) usually fell due in the late summer or autumn when the sipahi might be absent on campaign, requiring an agent to collect what was owing. This problem became more acute towards the end of the sixteenth century, when prolonged campaigns often required troops to over-winter at the front.65 Third, the nominal rates of taxes to which fief-holders were entitled did not increase during the period of high inflation in the last two decades of the sixteenth century, greatly reducing the value of those dues which they collected in cash.

The government, for its part, faced the problem of how to enforce the rules governing the appointment to timars and the inheritance of military status and to ensure that timar-holders, most of them based far from the capital, met their contractual obligations. The essential instruments in achieving control were the land and tax registers. From the late fourteenth century down to about 1600, the government at regular intervals compiled detailed registers of each sancak, recording all timars and other fief holdings, the name of each fief-holder, the names of heads of household in each village, the amounts and types of taxes due and other information. The fifteenth-century registers append “men and tent notes” to each timar entry, recording the level of each sipahi’s obligations to bring retainers, tents and weapons on campaign.66 A copy of each register was available in the register office (defterhane) in Istanbul and at the provincial centre, and served as an authoritative source of reference. During its period of currency, clerks in the registry office could check each new application for a timar and note changes in the margins until such time as the sultan ordered a new survey. The detailed registers were also the source for shorter timar registers, from which the registry clerks compiled muster registers, which allowed army commanders on campaign to take roll calls of the sipahis arriving from each sancak. Timars were subject, therefore,

64 Barkan, Kanunlar, p. 131.
to close administrative surveillance, which kept the system under effective control until near the end of the sixteenth century, when inflation, desertion, and disorder in registration procedures and their eventual abandonment, together with new forms of warfare, created confusion in the old system and heralded the radical changes of the succeeding century.

Law and the legal system

The Ottoman legal system reflected the multi-confessional nature of the empire. Each religious community enjoyed a degree of legal autonomy in internal matters, allowing, for example, Greek Orthodox, Armenian or Jewish subjects to settle intra-communal affairs in their own courts. However, the empire was an Islamic polity, and Islamic courts took precedence. In every town, there was an Islamic court which heard all cases where either one or both of the parties was Muslim. Furthermore, whereas Christian and Jewish courts were open only to members of those communities, the Islamic courts were open to all, the records showing that it was fairly common for non-Muslims to bring cases for settlement in the Islamic courts. In some cases, it was advantageous for them to do so. Jewish women, for example, could receive a larger share of an inheritance under Islamic than under Jewish law.

A judge (kadi) presided over each court, usually with the assistance of a deputy (naib). A group of “witnesses to the case” (the şühudülhal) also attended sessions of the court. Their function was evidently to ensure that the proceedings were in order and also, presumably, to act as a communal memory, to mediate between plaintiffs and defendants and to provide advice to people bringing their cases before the court. The kadi’s role was not simply to adjudicate in contested cases but also to serve as a notary, recording, for example, sales of property, marriages and other contracts, or dividing inheritances among heirs. In addition to these legal functions, he acted as an administrator, registering decrees from the divan and fulfilling a multitude of tasks, including such matters as negotiating levels of taxation, levying oarsmen for the fleet or buying and amassing provisions for the army along its line of march. The range of tasks which they performed made the kadıs the most important figures in maintaining the empire’s administrative and

68 Aryeh Shmuelevitz, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire in the Late Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (Leiden, 1964), p. 66.
legal stability. They also acted as a check on local powers of the beylerbeyis, sancak beyis and subaşis. Although the kâdis were usually resident in towns, their judicial districts (kazas) extended into the countryside, covering, in principle, all settlements within the empire. The boundaries of kazas did not correspond with the boundaries of sancaks, and since the kâdis derived their authority directly from the sultan, their tenure of office was independent of the beylerbeyis or sancak beyis. They did, however, cooperate with them in matters of crime and public order. The apprehension, investigation and punishment of criminals was a function of the sancak beyis and subaşis and their men (the ehl-i ‘örf), but the passing of sentence was, in principle if not always in practice, the prerogative of the kâdi.\(^\text{69}\)

The century and a half between 1453 and 1603 saw the development of a hierarchy of kâdis. Most received appointments in small towns, and it was as small-town kâdis that they made their careers, changing locations every two to three years. Appointments were in the gift of the kadiaskers. At the beginning of his career, a graduate from a college (medrese) had normally to choose between a career as a teacher (müderris) in a college or as a kâdi. If he chose the latter path, he required a sponsor, whether an office-holder or a well-placed member of his own family, and then, before his appointment or between appointments, had to spend a period in the capital “in attendance” on one of the kadiaskers in expectation of a post. The kadiaskers of Rumeli and Anatolia controlled the posts in the European and Asiatic provinces, respectively. During his period as kadiasker of Rumeli, Ebussuud rationalised the system of appointment, fixing a quota for the number of nominees an office-holder might make and a time interval between each batch of nominations, and requiring the kadiaskers to keep enrolment registers.\(^\text{70}\)

During the sixteenth and probably also the fifteenth centuries, the kâdis of Istanbul, Bursa and Edirne occupied a higher rank than the small-town kâdis and provided the candidates for promotion to kadiasker. With the expansion of the empire in the sixteenth century, Damascus, Cairo and then Baghdad also became the seats of senior kâdis, and in the late sixteenth century, when competition for prestigious kâdi-ships evidently became fierce, a way to satisfy frustrated aspirants to office was to designate otherwise insignificant towns as “great molla-ships” for the duration of the candidate’s appointment. Appointment to a “great molla-ship” followed a different pattern from


appointment as a small-town kadi. The former went not to existing kadıs but to men who had followed a career as müderris, and normally to those occupying a post in one of the Eight Medreses of Mehmed II, the most prestigious teaching institutions in the empire before the completion of the medreses attached to the Süleymaniye mosque in 1557. Furthermore, occupants of the higher grades in the legal and teaching professions came almost always from a very limited number of families, who competed fiercely for office.\textsuperscript{71}

While the kadaasker of Rumeli occupied the top rung in the hierarchy of kadıs, his was not the highest post in the legal profession. During the course of the sixteenth century, the müftü of Istanbul or, to use the title which became habitual from the second half of the sixteenth century, the  şeyhülislam, emerged as the senior legal figure in the empire. Almost invariably, in fact, holders of this office had previously served as kadaasker. The function of a müftü is to issue fetvas (that is, authoritative opinions on any legal or other issues that are set before him). A fetva is not, however, binding and to be put into effect has to be embodied in the decree of a kadi or of a political authority. As a müftü, therefore, the  şeyhülislam was not a member of the divan and had no executive powers. Nonetheless, his authority was immense. Within the formal intellectual structure of Islamic law, he occupies a position above the kadi. Unlike the kadi, he is independent of the secular authority, acting as an intermediary between God’s will, as expressed in the law, and the daily affairs of the Muslim community.\textsuperscript{72} Although his fetvas have no executive force, they have a permanent validity, unlike the rulings of a kadi that are valid only for the case at hand. It is this lofty conception of the müftü’s role that in part explains the rise of the müftü of Istanbul from apparent obscurity in the fifteenth century to the pinnacle of the Ottoman legal establishment. Another factor in his rise must also have been the authority and personal prestige of the two greatest  şeyhülislams of the sixteenth century, Kemalpaşazade (1525–34) and Ebussuud (1545–74). Nonetheless, despite the theoretical independence of müftüs, the  şeyhülislams rarely acted independently of the will of the sultan. Unlike the  şeyhülislams, the müftüs in provincial towns did not enjoy a high status. They remain among the most obscure figures in the legal and learned hierarchy.

Ottoman kadıs – apart perhaps from a few which served Muslim populations that followed a different branch of Sunni Islam – gave judgements according to the Hanafi school of Islamic law, as did the  şeyhülislam in his fetvas.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., pp. 44–9.
\textsuperscript{72} Norman Calder, ‘Nawawi’s Typology of Muftis, and Its Significance for a General Theory of Islamic Law’, Islamic Law and Society 3 (1996), 137–64.
Necessarily, therefore, Hanafi _fiqh_ formed an essential part of an Ottoman _medrese_ education, and three of what were to become standard works of Hanafi law – the _Durar al-Hukkam_ of Molla Hüsrev (d. 1480), the _Multaqa’l-Abhur_ of Ibrahim Halabi (d. 1549) and the _Tanwir al-Absar_ of Timirtashi (d. 1595) – were produced under Ottoman auspices, the last two being abridged compendia of law and so particularly useful for teaching. Juristic texts were extraordinarily conservative, the function of the jurist being primarily to pass down the inherited tradition, in summary or in expanded form, to his own and succeeding generations. In this, Ottoman jurists were no different from their predecessors. The law was nonetheless remarkably flexible, and both _kâdis_ and _müftüs_ were highly skilled in adapting the tradition to provide the materials for a practical legal system suitable for their own times. It was also a tradition that put a severe restraint on the authority of the ruler, neither the Ottoman sultan nor any other Islamic monarch having any powers to alter the law.

However, in two areas in particular, Ottoman practice was at variance with Hanafi theory. In the field of criminal justice, Hanafi law does not provide a coherent set of workable rules. Furthermore, since it was only with extreme reluctance that Hanafi jurists recognised the legality of money fines, the Hanafi system was at odds with Ottoman reality, where money fines were the norm and an ingredient in governors’ incomes. A curious compilation of statutes, attributed in its heading to Mehmed II but dating from after 1488, contains a tariff of strokes and fines for specified offences whose original text dates quite probably from the first half of the fifteenth century. This document was to be incorporated, with some modification, into the law book which Bayezid II promulgated in about 1500, and thereafter provided a standard code for the punishment of crime. It is evident from some sections of the code, notably in its treatment of sexual offences and its tariff of punishments for inflicting head wounds, that its compilers were aware of Hanafi law in these areas. The resemblances are, however, superficial. Ottoman criminal law, in common with the criminal law of other Muslim polities, was secular rather than Islamic.

The second area where Hanafi law did not apply was in the law of land and taxation. The Hanafi jurists treat land as private property, its tax status depending on what happened to it at the time of the Islamic conquest. If it became the property of one of the conquerors, it paid only a tithe (‘_ushr_)

on the crops. If, however, it remained in the hands of its pre-Islamic owners, it was subject to two taxes, classified as *kharaj muwazzaf*, a fixed annual tax on the land itself, and *kharaj muqasama*, a tax levied as a proportion of the crops. The land retained its tax status in perpetuity whoever owned it after the conquest. Land and taxation in the Ottoman Empire, and elsewhere in the Islamic world, did not conform to this theoretical scheme. In the first place, very little land was held as private property. Since this would entail division among the heirs on the death of the owner, it was more advantageous for a landowner to convert his property to *vakıf*, nominating himself and his heirs as beneficiaries in perpetuity. Furthermore, it was local practice and local economic activities rather than Hanafi theory that determined the forms and rates of taxation on the land.

Most land, however, was neither private property nor *vakıf*, but *miri*. The term itself means simply “relating to the ruler”, and *miri* land was land at the disposal of the sultan and therefore available to him for distribution as a *timar* or other type of land grant. In principle, therefore, *miri* land could not be bought and sold. However, in practice, peasant cultivators did buy and sell plots, and it was in order to legitimise this practice that legal texts in the early sixteenth century begin to refer to these transactions not as sales of land but as sales of the “right of residence” (*hakk-i karar*), which the purchaser could acquire only with the permission of the sipahi and the payment to him of the tax due from each new entrant to the land. While *miri* land itself was not subject to ownership, anything above the land – effectively, houses and other buildings, trees and vines – was private property and could be bought, sold or rented out.

The basic peasant holding was a *çift* (yoke), notionally the area of land which a family could cultivate with a yoke of oxen: the land and tax registers recorded villagers as holding a *çift* or half a *çift*, or as a *bennak* (smallholder), *caba bennak* (landless) or bachelor (*mücerred*), and registered their taxes accordingly. To gain title (*tapu*) to a piece of land, a peasant paid *tapu* tax to the fief-holder and thereafter, provided he did not leave the land fallow for more than three years and continued to pay his taxes, he had security of tenure. On his death, the land passed to his son without payment of an entry fine. If he had several sons, they could share the *çift*, which would be registered in the name of one of them. The others would be registered as *bennak* or *caba bennak*, and they could divide their tax liability as they wished. The

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taxes due from cultivators of the land varied according to local economies and local practices, many of which were inherited from pre-Ottoman times. However, in all agricultural areas, the basic taxes were the çift tax, an annual rent payable on each çift, tithes on crops levied usually at rates of one-tenth, one-eighth or one-fifth, and incidental taxes, notably fines and bride tax, payable on weddings.

Already in the reign of Mehmed II, the land and tax registers recorded the types and rates of taxes due to each fief-holder in each sancak. In the reign of his successor, Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512), it became customary to append to each register a law book setting out the taxes due in that sancak, together with the time and manner of collection and other rules governing relations between fief-holders and taxpayers. The earliest such law book (kanunname) was for the sancak of Hüdavendigar (Bursa) and dated 1487. Thereafter, it was customary to append a kanunname to each register and to amend it as necessary with each new survey of the sancak. The reign of Bayezid also saw the compilation of a “general kanunname” which aimed to codify and, as far as possible, to standardise the laws governing relations between the military class and taxpayers, above all between timar-holding sipahis and the peasant cultivators. Bayezid’s code underwent several recensions between about 1500 and the 1540s.

The body of law which emerged from this period of codification came to be known as kanun. Although fiscal regulations remained the most important part of kanun – the word itself may derive directly from the Greek kanōn, the shortened version of dēmosios kanōn, the basic Byzantine land tax – the term was to acquire a general sense of Ottoman secular law as distinct from the shari’a.

While the kanunnames lay out detailed regulations concerning taxation and tenure on miri land, they are not wholly systematic and tend to concentrate on problematic cases. What they do not do is to lay out general principles. These were known through custom and practice rather than through written codes or entries in the land and tax registers. However, the conversion of central Hungary to an Ottoman province in 1541 created the need for an account of the general rules of Ottoman land tenure, and the task of providing one fell to the kadısker of Rumeli, Ebussuud. The statement that he provided, together with an extended version that he wrote in connection with a land

78 Heyd, Studies, chap.1.
and tax survey of Macedonia in 1568–9, was to gain acceptance as the basic account of the tenure and taxation of *miri* land until the end of the empire. The systematisation of the rules is Ebussuud’s most important achievement, but he went further than this and provided Ottoman land law with an Islamic gloss. In order to explain why *miri* land was not in private ownership, he adopts the fiction that, at the time of the conquest, the treasury – which is nominally the joint property of the Muslim community – took it into ownership in order to prevent its excessive fragmentation through inheritance. More importantly, he re-defines the two basic Ottoman taxes, the çift tax and the tithe on crops, in Hanafi terms as *kharaj muwazzaf* and *kharaj muqasama*, respectively. This allowed him to rebut objections from taxpayers that they should not be paying the tithe at a rate higher than one-tenth on the grounds that the Ottoman tithe was not the ‘*ushr* of Hanafi law but rather *kharaj muqasama*, which the ruler could levy at a rate of up to 50 percent. An effect, therefore, of Ebussuud’s “reconciliation” of Ottoman kanun with Hanafi law was not simply to present the Ottoman law of land and taxation as Islamic but also to increase, or at least to confirm, the tax-raising powers of the sultan.79

Conclusion

From the 1580s, Ottoman writers began to comment unfavourably on the changes in the structure and effectiveness of Ottoman government, the loss of Ottoman supremacy on the battlefield and the unrest and rebellion in the provinces, seeing a return to the virtues of the age of Süleyman I as a solution to the problems of their own times. They were, however, over-optimistic in their view of the Süleymanic age, and certainly misguided in the view that the military and political institutions of that era could be restored. Troubles in the provinces were endemic throughout the sixteenth century: the ease with which the rebel prince Bayezid could raise an army in 1558 suggests that discontent was widespread, even when there was no open revolt, as there had been in 1511 and 1519 in Anatolia, between 1520 and 1524 in Syria and Egypt, and in 1527–8 in Anatolia. Furthermore, from the mid-sixteenth century, the empire’s extended frontiers, geographical barriers and the prolongation of military campaigns ensured that there would be no more conquests on the scale of those of Selim I, or of Süleyman I in the first 20 years of his reign. These conquests had added vast territories to the empire and with them an increase in the revenues flowing to the treasury. By contrast, the wars against

the Safavids between 1578 and 1590 and the Habsburgs between 1593 and 1606 were the major cause of a chronic fiscal deficit. It was to plug this deficit that the government resorted to the debasement of the currency and such practices as the sale of offices, which Ottoman commentators saw as a major cause of decay in the institutions of government. However, the most urgent reform that the commentators wished to see was a restoration of the timar system, as it was this that had provided the cavalry forces which they saw as the key to Ottoman victories in the past. This, too, was wishful thinking. It was, in fact, largely as a response to Ottoman cavalry that the Habsburg armies in the war of 1593–1606 developed successful defensive tactics based on the use of infantry, forcing the Ottomans to follow suit. As infantry came to predominate on the battlefield, there was a consequent decline in the number of cavalry, and with it an inevitable reduction in the number of timars needed to support cavalrymen. These fiscal and military changes were problems which Ottoman governments had not had to confront before the 1580s, and which made it impossible to return to the earlier patterns of government and, in particular, impractical to resuscitate the timar system.

However, the nostalgic view of the sixteenth century, or rather the tenth century of the Muslim era, was not entirely misplaced. The empire was a monarchy which required a commanding figure – if not the sultan himself, then an effective grand vezir – at the centre of government. By providing both political and military leadership, the sultans themselves between the time of Mehmed II and Süleyman I conformed to the pattern of the ideal ruler and projected an image which later sultans were unable to match. Furthermore, the reigns of Süleyman I and Selim II (r. 1566–74) in particular saw a succession of vezirs and other royal servants whose commanding presence and length of time in office gave an impression of stability, which stood in sharp contrast to the decades between the 1580s and the mid-seventeenth century, when fierce competition for office and the treasury’s need for the cash demanded from new appointees led to a rapid succession of appointments and dismissals. The long-serving grand vezirs İbrahim Paşa (1523–36), Rüstem Paşa (1549–53, 1555–61) and Sokollu Mehmed Paşa (1565–78) dominated the politics of their era. In the longer term, however, the legacy of the administrative and legal figures of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was more significant. The sultan Bayezid II oversaw the first systematic efforts to codify Ottoman fiscal, land and criminal law which regulated relations between tax-paying peasants and the holder of timars and other fiefs on whose land they worked, the first empire-wide code appearing in about 1499. The sixteenth century saw further refinements. In 1516, the five-time grand vezir Hersekzade Ahmed Paşa issued
an important set of regulations governing peasant tenure, and during the reign of Süleyman, the long-serving nİŞänçi Celalzade Mustafa (1534–57, 1567) oversaw a new recension of Bayezid’s code. The most important legal figure of the era, and perhaps in the history of the empire, was, however, Ebussuud (kadiasker of Rumeli, 1537–45; chief müftü, 1545–74). It was he who, for the first time, formulated a general statement on the principles of Ottoman land law, amplified by fetvas and other rulings, which remained effective until the nineteenth century. He regularised the system of appointing kadis and, by composing an anthology of specimen documents, improved the formulation of court records. By opposing the abolition of cash vakifs and other demands of fundamentalist ulema, such as the destruction of church buildings in the capital, he maintained the social harmony of a multi-confessional society. He established the rules of orthography for use in Turkish fetvas and other documents and organised the chief müftü’s office as an institution which was able to issue hundreds of fetvas of a uniformly high standard in the course of a single day. It was these unspectacular administrative and legal innovations that provided the solid foundation to Ottoman government which allowed the empire first to absorb and stabilise the territories conquered during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and later to survive the multiple political, fiscal and social crises which were to beset it in the decades after the 1580s.
The Ottoman government and economic life: Taxation, public finance and trade controls

MURAT ÇİZAKÇA

Introduction

From the conquest of Constantinople (1453) to the treaty of Zitvatorok (1606), the Ottoman Empire was a world power, capable of directly challenging both the Austrian Habsburgs in central Europe and their Spanish relatives in the western Mediterranean. We will here use 1606 as our cut-off point because the end of the Long War with the Habsburgs of Vienna (1593–1606) had much greater financial and economic importance than the death of Mehmed III in 1603, which otherwise serves as a period limit for this volume. Among the enemies of Habsburg Spain, we find the newly emerging Protestant nations of England and the Netherlands as well as Catholic France. In addition to this involvement with the Western powers, the sultans also projected their power towards the East, across the Indian Ocean all the way to Sumatra, where they aided the Muslims of that region against the Portuguese.

Ultimately, the fierce rivalry between the Ottomans and the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs originated in the conquest of Constantinople. Mehmed II (the Conqueror) and his entourage considered the acquisition of this once magnificent city, which had been the capital of the Roman Empire for a period of 1123 years (11 May 330 to 29 May 1453), as the rebirth of the dominion of the Caesars. The young sultan officially used the title Kayser-i Rum, “Caesar of the Romans”. Calling their new emperor “Sultan Basileus”, the Orthodox people of Constantinople accepted this claim, combining his two attributes, Muslim and imperial, in a single title. In 1466, the philosopher Georgios Trapezuntios legitimised this acceptance as follows: “No one should doubt that you are the Emperor of the Romans. The person, who legally holds the capital city...

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of the Empire, is the Emperor and the capital city of the Roman Empire is Constantinople”.¹ Not only Greek, Italian and Austrian but also Arab and Persian authors considered the new empire as the continuation of its Roman predecessor. For these people, the Ottoman Turks were the Romans of modern times.² Even in Sumatra, Malacca and the Indonesian archipelago, the sultan was known as the “Raja Rum”, the Roman Raja.³

Acceptance as the successor of the Byzantine emperor also gave the sultan a unique religiously based legitimacy among his Orthodox subjects, for shortly after Constantine had established his capital in Byzantium, when celebrating the thirteenth year of the emperor’s reign, the noted church historian Eusebius had declared (in 335 A.D.): “The empire of Constantine is the earthly reflection of the Kingdom of Heaven. As there is but one God, so there is but one emperor.”⁴ With so much emphasis on continuity, it was inevitable that the Byzantine political doctrine of a worldwide empire ruled by a single emperor would also find acceptance among the Ottomans. Moreover, on the legal plane, this claim served as a legitimisation for Mehmed II’s conquests, as the sultan planned to revive the Roman Empire under his own rule and restore to it all the territories that once had belonged to the empire of Justinian. Since, as the conqueror of its capital, Mehmed II saw himself as the legal inheritor of the Roman Empire, the existence of another such empire in the West was totally unacceptable to him. This refusal became even more pronounced as the western empire gained strength and in the sixteenth century under Charles V (1500–58) began to emerge as another global power. This time the ambitions of the Habsburg Empire collided with those of Süleyman the Magnificent. Accordingly, the Venetian resident at the Porte in 1537 wrote to the doge: “Sultan Sulaiman always calls Rome, Rome. He talks about the Emperor and his title of Emperor with hatred. He desires himself to be called the Emperor.”⁵

In short, during the sixteenth century, two neo-Roman empires, the western one Christian and the eastern one Muslim, were on a collision course. Much of the sixteenth century is the history of the epic struggle between

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⁵ İnalcık and Renda, *Ottoman Civilization*, vol. 1, p. 113.
these polities, and out of this conflict there emerged the future leaders of Europe: England, France and the Netherlands. These “emerging nation-states” could protect themselves from the ambitious western emperor’s designs only by obtaining the support of his eastern rival. Indeed, as the king of France, François I, explained to the Venetian ambassador, in his opinion the Ottoman state was the only force that could guarantee the survival of the European states against the Habsburg emperor. Ottoman support was equally significant for the Dutch, who officially since 1568 but in actuality even earlier were fighting for their independence from Spain. In 1565, the prince of Orange wrote to his brother: “The Turks are very threatening, which means that we will not be visited by the [Spanish] King this summer”. A century later, this support was still crucial. At least one scholar has considered the failure of the English king Charles I (1600–49) to obtain Ottoman aid as one of the reasons for his demise.

Halfway across the world, in the Indian Ocean, we encounter a similar pattern. It was a primary aim of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean to deprive the Mamluk sultans and later the Ottomans of the Mediterranean spice trade by diverting it to the new route they had discovered. Once established in Egypt, the borderlands of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Basra, the Ottomans reacted quickly. They formed alliances with the Muslim rulers in Gujerat and Acheh, and these three Muslim polities, occasionally supported by Malay, Javanese and even some non-Muslim Indian rulers, launched an effective defence against the Portuguese. The Ottoman sultan legitimised his leadership of this alliance by means of a novel interpretation of the caliphate, in which the most powerful sultan, able to defend all Muslims, rightfully possessed the caliphate regardless of his descent. Thus, as legitimate caliphs of the Islamic world, the Ottoman sultans considered it their duty to protect the Muslims of the Indian Ocean from the Portuguese.

In 1513, 1537, 1539, 1547, 1551, 1568, 1573, 1574, 1575 and 1587, the forces of Acheh, Johor or Japara repeatedly attacked the Portuguese stronghold in Malacca.
Moreover, when the Portuguese conquered strategically important places like Goa, Malacca, Socotra and Ormuz, Muslim merchants, and together with them much of the spice trade, simply moved on to other ports like Acheh, Bantam and Brunei, thereby enriching these cities and depriving the Portuguese exchequer in Malacca of much revenue. By 1530, the Portuguese were on the defensive, after the Sultan of Acheh had repulsed their attacks on Sumatra.\^{11} Recent research moreover has revealed that the Ottomans financed their support for the sultanates of South-East Asia by means of the spice trade; usually the sultan provided cannon, musketeers and cannon founders.\^{12} This policy is analogous to a modern super-power exporting military technology to its allies and receiving payment in raw materials. Exporting technology and materials had the added advantage that it enabled the Ottomans to curb the illegal export of precious metals to South Asia, a perennial tendency going back to Roman times.\^{13} By 1566, the alliance had acquired a new dimension, when the sultan of Acheh informed the Ottoman ruler that he himself as well as the Muslims of the Maldive Islands and India recognised him as their suzerain and protector.\^{14} Enjoying Ottoman support in the form of military technology, Muslim rulers of South-East Asia, particularly Acheh, constituted a formidable challenge to the Portuguese during the second half of the 1500s and on until 1640.\^{15}

To sum up, the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century was a world power perfectly capable of challenging its chief rivals, the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, not only in the western Mediterranean and south-eastern Europe but also at the eastern end of the Indian Ocean; after all, Portugal had become part of the Spanish world empire after the demise of its royal dynasty in 1580.

As for the Ottoman impact on European politics, it appears to have been a complex matter. On the one hand, the sultans’ powerful and huge army, supported by artillery, forced the Habsburgs also to raise very large armies, thus pushing them towards a military-bureaucratic absolutism. On the other hand, Ottoman support for the anti-Habsburg powers, namely France, England and the Dutch Republic, had both military and more importantly economic

\^{11} Ibid., p. 14.
\^{14} İnalck, ‘The India Trade’, in İnalck and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, vol. 1, p. 328.
The Ottoman government and economic life

aspects: constant Ottoman pressure upon the Spanish armies forced the latter to repeatedly withdraw from Holland, allowing the Dutch to recuperate and extend the revolt. The difficulties of the Spanish Habsburgs resulted in the formation of the Dutch Republic, internationally recognised in 1648. Where France was concerned, the Ottoman alliance with François I (1494–1547) made it easier for the latter to sustain his rivalry against Charles V; and, perhaps more significantly, the capitulations finally granted to King Charles IX of France (r. 1560–74) in 1569 obliged all non-Venetians from the western lands to trade under the French flag. But about ten years later, in 1579, Sultan Murad III (r. 1574–95) granted capitulations to the English as well, which permitted the latter to begin a profitable trade in Iranian silk, much of it exported through Ottoman territory; the English also had sought political support in their war with Spain, which, however, did not materialise.

For over a hundred years, from the mid-1400s to the mid-1500s, the Ottoman armies were superior to their European and Safavid competitors, and while by the end of our period unquestioned superiority had come to be a thing of the past, the Ottoman military enjoyed a supply system that was far superior to that of their rivals.\(^\text{16}\) Only a century later, after 1688, did the ministers of Louis XIV (1638–1715) organise a system of comparable efficiency in a European kingdom. With cash, the sultans’ officials purchased essential foodstuffs from the peasantry living near the main army routes and stored them at a series of stopping points separated by a day’s march. When the sultan planned a campaign, his vezirs issued orders to transport supplies to the appointed locations and sell them to the armies on the march; the term sürsat denoted this arrangement. Sürsat orders clearly stated the government’s intention to provide for the troops and at the same time allow the producers to make a profit; whether this latter intention materialised depended on the sale prices decreed by the central administration.\(^\text{17}\) If the state-determined prices were close to market prices, the peasants must have indeed made a profit; yet if the opposite was true, such deliveries were a burden for the producers. However, during the period under consideration, the system worked reasonably well, and the government’s means of coercion in outlying villages were, after all, limited. Thus there may well have been price incentives encouraging producers to fulfil their quotas.

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These observations lead us to ask what kind of an economic system was behind the Ottomans’ military might and how these operations were financed. It is to these questions that we will now turn.

The Empire’s “budgets”: Ottoman imperial revenues and expenditures

Numerous scholars have attempted to conceptualise the Ottoman economy. With the exception of the Asian Mode of Production, based primarily on Marxist ideas, which is basically deductive, all of the relevant models are inductive; in other words, they attempt to generalise on the basis of historical observations. We will now focus on the known facts about the Ottoman economy in its political context and refer to these models whenever pertinent.

Beginning with Ömer Lütfi Barkan, several scholars have published and analysed Ottoman annual account books, for which in our field the term “budgets” has become customary; some of these accounts may refer to periods shorter or longer than a single year. Most recently, Mehmet Genç and Erol Özvar have summarised earlier studies and expanded them through their own work on Ottoman budgets.18 As a result, we now possess a reasonably good idea about the size and other characteristics of Ottoman imperial revenues and, albeit indirectly, of the economy that produced them.

Estimates by contemporary European observers are a good starting point. A comparison with Ottoman budget data indicates that the revenue figures given by these outside observers were remarkably accurate; typically they differed from the official accounts by no more than a 10 per cent margin. But the estimates of expenses were not nearly so accurate. It was as if the Ottoman rulers wanted European observers to know about their revenues, probably to impress them, but kept the expenditure data secret. Throughout the sixteenth century, both revenues and expenditures apparently increased the former more rapidly than the latter. Only after the 1560s did expenditures begin to exhibit a faster rate of growth; yet total expenditures did not exceed revenues until the very late 1500s, in the middle of an exhausting war (1593–1606). Put differently, throughout most of the sixteenth century we do not observe significant deficits, which only appear in the budgets of 1592–3 and 1597–8. For most of the sixteenth century, revenues fluctuated around an annual average of 132 tons of pure silver and expenditures around 118 tons. In Venetian ducats,

these sums are equivalent to 3,000,000 and 2,680,000 ducats, respectively. If we take into consideration not only the central treasury but also extra-treasury revenues from sultanic pious foundations (vakif) and military tax assignments (timar, zeamet), from 1461 to 1560 total revenues ranged between 11 million and 15 million ducats. From the beginning to the middle of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman treasury succeeded in doubling its revenues in real terms. By contrast, expenditures increased only by about half as much.\textsuperscript{19}

On their own, these figures do not mean very much, and we must compare them with the finances of other European powers. Thus the annual average expenditure of the Ottoman central treasury, about 118 tons of silver, was dwarfed by Spanish and French expenditures. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, the Spanish exchequer spent 500 tons and its French counterpart 440 tons.\textsuperscript{20} On the other hand, the Ottoman annual average expenditure of 118 tons was about twice as large as that of Venice. Considering that the Ottoman Empire was able to project its power from the western Mediterranean all the way to Sumatra and at the same time aid France, England and the Netherlands against the Habsburgs, there is a crying need to account for the paradox that these comparative budget data represent.

One explanation lies in the fact that the Ottoman central treasury data do not reflect timar and vakif revenues collected and spent locally. However, the 1527 budget does allow us to incorporate these revenues and expenditures and thereby calculate totals.\textsuperscript{21} Accordingly, in the year 1527, the total expenditures of the Ottoman Empire, paid out by the central treasury as well as by local authorities, amounted to 306 tons of pure silver.\textsuperscript{22} This figure brings the Ottoman Empire closer to France (440 tons) but still falls short to a significant extent; the difference is even more marked in the case of Spain (500 tons). Therefore we still have some explaining to do.

A comparative analysis of tax-collection systems is helpful as well. We have noted that the Ottoman treasury enjoyed budget surpluses for most of the sixteenth century. Thus sultans, vezirs and finance directors were more than capable of financing the aggregate government expenditure of this period. In this relatively comfortable position, they hardly needed to reform their public finance system. Indeed, sixteenth-century Ottoman public finance was

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 210, table 50.
\textsuperscript{22} Özvar, ‘Bütçe Harcamaları’, in Genç and Özvar, Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 211.
basically the same as it had been in previous centuries; on the one hand, tax farmers (mültezim) collected urban indirect taxes, while, on the other, timar-holders benefited from rural taxes and converted them on the spot into military services, as they staffed the cavalry forces known as the sipahi. As is well known, major reforms in public finance usually occur in response to military or political crises. It is possible that, unlike western Europe, where more or less similar decentralised political systems were in fierce competition and could not easily expand at one another’s expense, the absolutist Ottoman state could do so with relative ease against the feudal Balkans and even the kingdom of Hungary.

Political factors promoting Ottoman expansion

Apart from purely military and financial considerations, we thus need to pay special attention to political factors, especially Ottoman absolutism. As the sultan concentrated overwhelming power in his person, he gained an effectiveness that was much admired in sixteenth-century Europe. Alexander Rüstow, a well-known political scientist who taught in Turkey for some years, considered the Ottoman Empire the most modern and advanced absolutist state of its time. He emphasised that Ottoman absolutism at the time of Süleyman the Magnificent had a two-hundred-year head start over its European rivals and thus provided a model for the latter to emulate.23 More specifically, sixteenth-century observers such as Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq (1520–92) admired the absence of an estate of noblemen in the Ottoman Empire: members of the sultan’s governing elite could neither inherit position from their ancestors nor pass it on to their offspring.24 When arriving at this latter judgement, however, European observers only had a limited social group in mind, namely the sultan’s servitors (kul), as merchants and scholar-officials (ulema) could and did inherit. As for the kul, they received their wealth entirely because of their successes and enjoyed great vertical mobility. Foreign observers also noted that Ottoman Greeks, in spite of their religious difference, might advance to very high positions in tax farming. It was therefore not surprising that in some regions the Balkan peasantry received the Ottoman armies with enthusiasm.

Sixteenth-century writers on political affairs, including Giovanni Botero (ca. 1544–1617) and Busbecq, considered the Ottomans as the Romans of modern times. Machiavelli recognised the advantages the absolutist Ottoman sultan

enjoyed vis-à-vis Western feudal lords and considered him the prototype of the French kings of his time; this notion survived into the late 1600s, when Louis XIV was considered the “new Soliman”. Martin Luther clearly referred to a similar admiration, *Türkenbewunderung*, current in the political thought of his time when he urged Germans to respect the emperor as the Turks respected theirs. Diplomats and travellers well informed about Ottoman affairs reported that a decision which took weeks of negotiations and compromises between various kings and princes in the Holy Roman Empire would be taken by the Ottoman sultan in a single session of his council (*divan*).25

In short, for a while, the absolutism of the Ottoman rulers allowed them to expand into decentralised Europe with considerable ease.

In addition, the Ottoman policy known as *istimalet*, or accommodation, also facilitated expansion. After all, the Qur’an ordains Muslims to respect Moses and Jesus Christ as well as their books.26 Accordingly, the Ottomans granted religious freedom to Christians and Jews. Martin Luther confirmed this much discussed religious tolerance when he observed that the Turks granted religious freedom to all, while the pope did not.27 Moreover, the Ottomans successfully exploited inter-Christian rivalry, for instance in the Balkans, where Venice and Hungary also had expansionary schemes. If among these three competing powers the Ottomans were the winners, they owed this major success to their policy of accommodation. To Orthodox Christians, both Hungarian and Venetian expansion would have meant domination by Catholics, who regarded them as schismatics. Ottoman sultans and vezirs, by contrast, protected the Orthodox Church. Consequently, whereas the Balkan Christians resisted the Hungarians and Venetians, they cooperated with the Ottomans, an attitude which explains the repeated failures of Venetian condottieri and Hungarian crusaders to dislodge the Ottomans from the Balkans.28 Moreover, when in the late 1500s the Habsburgs tried to initiate a Counterreformation in Transylvania, a revolt erupted and the principality returned to the Ottoman orbit.29 Since Protestantism not only was tolerated

26 Qur’an, III: 3.
but also expanded under Ottoman rule, Reinhold Lubenau of Kaliningrad/Königsberg considered it a miracle that all the Christians suffering under the pope’s yoke did not immigrate into the Ottoman lands.\footnote{Sturmberger, ‘Das Problem der Vorbildhaftigkeit’, p. 206.}

But, as a matter of fact, Christians did immigrate in large numbers, and not only because of religious tolerance but also to escape serfdom. When the Hungarian peasantry armed by the nobility to fight the Turks turned against their masters in 1515, a terrible civil war ensued, which resulted in the permanent enserfment of the Hungarian peasantry. In Hungary as well as in the frontier province of Bosnia, squeezed between the two neo-Roman empires, the Ottomans competed successfully with their Austrian rivals for the favour of the peasantry. As part of this policy, they at least during the early decades of the sixteenth century abolished the corvée and other feudal obligations.\footnote{Halil İnalcı, ‘Empire and Population’, in İnalcı and Quataert, Economic and Social History, vol. 1, pp. 16, 24.} Indeed, in 1551 the Hungarian magnates felt compelled to ask King Ferdinand to emancipate the peasantry since the Turks had declared their peasants free and many Hungarians and Croatians had already fled in that direction. In 1556, some 70,000 more peasants left the Habsburg territories for Ottoman Bosnia. Not that human traffic was always one way: as the Ottoman armies advanced, some Hungarian peasants also vacated their villages and disappeared; and as a result about 20 per cent of the villages of the Simontornya district became pastureland. An analysis of abandoned villages has revealed, however, that the Ottoman advance in comparison to the destruction of medieval warfare was decidedly less brutal. Moreover, once Ottoman rule was firmly established, the ratio of abandoned villages to the total number of settlements declined to a mere 3.5 per cent, for newcomers eventually re-settled many villages abandoned before the advancing armies.\footnote{Fikret Adanır, ‘The Ottoman Peasantries, 1360–1860’, in The Peasantries of Europe from the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Tom Scott (London and New York, 1998), pp. 269–310 at p. 287; Géza Dávid, 16. yüzyılda Simontornya Sancağı (Istanbul, 1999), pp. 81–2; Géza Dávid, ‘Ottoman armies and warfare, 1453–1603’, Chapter 9, this volume, p. 300.}

Almost a century later, Habsburg authorities were still concerned about the flight of serfs to Ottoman territories. In 1645, the commander of the Austrian forces had to admit that the peasants among his troops did greater harm to his war effort than the enemy.\footnote{Ferenc Szakaly, ‘Das Bauerntum und die Kaempfe gegen die Turkén bzw. gegen Habsburg in Ungarn im 16.–17. Jahrhundert’, in Aus der Geschichte der ostmitteleuropäischen Bauernbewegungen im 16.–17. Jahrhundert, ed. Gusztáv Heckenast (Budapest, 1977), pp. 251–66 at p. 258.}

Even so, however, Royal Hungary in the 1500s had twice the population of the Ottoman sector – a puzzle which needs to be addressed by specialists in Hungarian history.\footnote{Géza Dávid, ‘Ottoman armies and warfare, 1453–1603’, Chapter 9, this volume, p. 300.}
Thus, not only the inherent efficiency of absolutism, with its concentration of overwhelming power in the hands of a single ruler and a superb military organisation, but also religious tolerance and relative freedom for the peasantry facilitated the Ottoman advance in the Balkans. To these factors we must add the well-known devşirme, which provided certain elements of the Christian population with opportunities for vertical mobility; the term devşirme denoted the practice by which a certain proportion of boys in the conquered territories were recruited for the service of the sultans. With skill and good fortune, some of these people had brilliant careers.

At least in the 1400s, sultans and vezirs encouraged not only the peasantry but also the petty nobility of the Balkans and the Orthodox Church to accept Ottoman rule. Halil İnalcık has shown that at this stage, depending upon the region, the administration assigned anywhere from 3.5 to 50 per cent of all timars to the Christian nobility and Orthodox ecclesiastical institutions. During the sixteenth century, however, the sultans apparently abandoned this arrangement; perhaps the istimalet policy ground to a halt after the conquest of Syria and Egypt, when Islamic scholar officials from these regions vocally expressed their dissatisfaction.

To sum up, these socio-political factors made the Ottoman advance into the vast Balkan territories relatively easy, and, as a result, the sultans of the 1400s and 1500s continuously expanded their tax base. In fact, when the latter faced fiscal problems, rather than reforming their tax-collection system, the Ottoman rulers may well have chosen the easier option of simply continuing to advance in Europe in order to increase their revenues.

But among the rulers and populations of Catholic and Protestant Europe, the inevitable reaction was not long in coming. First of all, we have already noted that while the sultans of the sixteenth century continued to protect the rights of their non-Muslim subjects, the istimalet policy slowly came to an end. Enthusiasm for the Ottoman advance should have dwindled as a result. Secondly, Ottoman absolutism became the model for central European dynasts to follow. Indeed, the closer the Ottoman armies approached the Habsburg heartlands, the greater was the threat and also the urge to emulate

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35 Murphey, Ottoman Warfare; Finkel, The Administration of Warfare.
37 I owe this point to Mehmet Genç.
38 Lowry, Fifteenth Century Ottoman Realities, p. 175.
them. To establish a unified front against the sultans, many princes on the territory of the Holy Roman Empire (Landesfürsten) pushed for and obtained a considerable degree of centralisation and concentration of power. As for the Habsburgs of Vienna, in 1556 they established a permanent War Council (Hofkriegsrat), which from the start firmly focused on the eastern front against the Ottoman rulers. It has been claimed that “without the Turkish threat a Habsburg Monarchy would not have become a reality”.40

The Ottoman revenue administration: Missing out on the “financial revolution”

There were other and perhaps more important impediments to a further Ottoman advance, for as a result of the so-called financial revolution, European cities, principalities and kingdoms could borrow huge funds from their respective publics at very low cost. This western European system of domestic borrowing actually had started way back during the thirteenth century in the cities of northern France, Flanders and Tuscany, and the “emergent nation-states” later on successfully adopted this “permanently funded national debt”.41 The debt was “public” because it was the responsibility of the government itself. Secondly, in order to escape the fierce medieval usury prohibition, the debt was based not upon loans but upon the sale of perpetual annuities. This condition of perpetuity made the debt “permanent”. Finally, the latter was “funded” because governments had a legal obligation to earmark specific taxes for the annuity payments contracted for.42

Thanks to these arrangements, European governments began to borrow ever larger amounts at constantly declining rates of interest. While during the eleventh century in France certain mortgage payments involved 100 per cent interest, in 1152 Genoa borrowed at 40 per cent and managed to reduce the rate to 8 per cent by 1259. In 1171, Venice began to borrow at 5 per cent, and this low rate became the norm in 1262. Most remarkably, these modest rates of interest prevailed in the very long run. The Genoese public debt was increased to 6,440,000 ducats in 1509, with an interest rate of just 2.8 per cent. In 1624, the yield was reduced to 1.03 per cent, a world record that still stands. Investors regarded the Genoese public debt as so safe that although

42 Munro, ‘The Usury Doctrine’.
nominally it was less than the city’s total gross national product (GNP), the market valued it at more than double the national income. Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor and archrivial of the Ottomans, was also able to borrow, in Castile among other places. The *juros*, as the Castilian annuities were called, represented perpetual indebtedness rather than indebtedness for life. They produced yields that started out at around 10 per cent and then after 1530 declined to 5 per cent.\(^{43}\)

In short, successful European governments were able to borrow up to twice as much as the GNPs of their respective realms at very low rates of interest. Moreover, when we compare the Genoese public debt with the total revenue of the Ottoman central treasury, we make a striking observation: measured in Venetian *ducats*, in 1509 the Genoese public debt of 6,440,000 *ducats* was about five times as high as the revenue of the Ottoman central treasury for the same year, which stood at 1,326,144 Venetian *ducats*.\(^{44}\) Put differently, by paying just 2.8 per cent interest, the Genoese government could borrow a sum of money amounting to more than five times the annual revenue of the Ottoman central treasury – it was only in 1785 that the Ottoman authorities were able to borrow up to half the annual revenue of their own central treasury, but at a cost of 15 to 19 per cent.\(^{45}\) Moreover, from Genoa to Lübeck and Hamburg public borrowing was widespread all over western Europe.\(^{46}\) City-states, princes, kings and even emperors financed their enterprises by this means. Obviously not all polities managed their public debt prudently, and failure to do so led to royal bankruptcies, particularly in Spain and France.

This achievement of the European financial revolution made many things possible, above all raising armies; in fact, domestic borrowing became the crucial component of European warfare. By contrast, the Ottomans lacked access to funds of this magnitude, and already by the early 1500s sultans and vezirs faced a formidable if disguised financial power on their western frontiers.

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A long-term perspective: Increasing collection costs and the financial administration’s attempts to cope

To complete this comparison, we will take a closer look at Ottoman methods of public finance, but to explicate the problems involved we will have to go beyond the time limit of 1606 specified at the beginning of this chapter. During the sixteenth century, the dominant mode of Ottoman public finance was the traditional tax farming, known as iltizam. This procedure was not really domestic borrowing in the European sense but rather privatised tax collection, the financial administration holding a public auction and delegating the right to collect the taxes in question to the highest bidder, an entrepreneur called a mültezim. While tax farmers received their appointments for an indefinite period, the administration could at any time transfer the privilege to a rival who promised to pay a higher amount. If the current tax farmer increased his payment to match the new bid, he could continue in office. If not, the treasury calculated the money due according to the number of days the tax farmer had collected his dues (kist el-yevm). After the outgoing mültezim had settled his accounts, the new holder took over the tax farm.47

It is very difficult to calculate what it cost the sultan’s treasury to collect taxes by this system. But in general we can say that the more competitive the auctions, the greater the amounts the treasury could collect. Yet towards the end of the sixteenth century we observe a tendency in the opposite direction: now many tax-farm yields began to “freeze”. During the early 1600s, these “frozen” tax farms continued to increase in number, and by mid-century roughly 31 per cent of all tax farms were in this position.48

A probable explanation for the anomaly just described is the risk aversion of the Ottoman financial administration, beginning with the often tumultuous 1580s, for competitive auctions generally reflect economic conjuncture. When the economy expands, prospective tax farmers compete and promise to pay ever higher amounts. But, in times of depression, the reverse occurs and the treasury receives lower bids. With firm annual commitments to the military corps, the sultans’ administration must have felt extremely uncomfortable with these fluctuations. Consequently, financial officials may have come to an agreement with certain members of the military and, in return for fixed annual payments, allowed these men to collect the revenues from

The Ottoman government and economic life

certain tax sources specifically assigned to them. In other words, after having paid the treasury a fixed amount, these military men cum tax collectors were free to demand whatever they wanted, subject of course, at least in principle, to the tax rates fixed by the sultan’s law. When tax farmers exceeded these rates, Ottoman subjects could and did complain to their ruler, but we do not know how often they obtained redress.49 Nor do we know what percentage of the taxes collected actually reached the central treasury and what percentage was retained by the mültezims. As a result, we cannot calculate the exact cost of Ottoman tax collection in this period. But obviously the treasury lost money when the number of “frozen” tax farms was constantly on the rise.50

However, for a somewhat later period, we can approximately calculate the cost of tax collection in the form of “revenue forgone,” and given the lack of earlier data, these figures may at least provide an order of magnitude. After 1695, the treasury introduced the lifetime tax farm (malikâne).51 In the following years, out of 100 gruş collected from the public, only 24 gruş actually reached the treasury. Thus the cost of taxation was approximately 75 per cent, a major loss not only to the exchequer but also to the taxpayers, for in many cases the latter would have had to make up the shortfall in the form of further dues.52 In western and southern Europe, however, contemporary domestic borrowing rates for kings and princes were as low as 3 per cent. Indeed, if we consider the cost of taxation in the form of “taxes forgone” as a rough approximation of the rate of interest paid by a Western ruler for domestic borrowing, we will conclude that the Ottomans borrowed at extremely high and disadvantageous rates.

To place these developments into perspective, a brief glance at the 1700s is unavoidable. After another disastrous war (1768–74), the Ottoman government attempted a major financial reorganisation to reduce the amount of “taxes forgone”. In this context (in 1775), the financial administration finally introduced tax-farm shares (esham); this novel arrangement implied selling to the public shares in the revenues of certain specified tax farms, thus tapping into the savings of small investors who could not have bid for an iltizam or malikâne on their own. By this device, the Ottoman government was able to significantly reduce its cost of borrowing.53

49 Hans Georg Majer (ed.), Das osmanische “Registerbuch der Beschwerden” (Şikayet Defteri) vom Jahre 1675 (Vienna, 1984); Suraiya Faroqhi, Coping with the State (Istanbul, 1995).
50 Çizakça, A Comparative Evolution, pp. 140–5.
52 Çizakça, A Comparative Evolution, p. 166.
Of the three tax-collection systems considered so far iltizam, malikâne and esham, the last was the most similar to European forms of domestic borrowing. Indeed, the original tax-farm shares, issued with special appointment documents (berats) and registered to a specific person, came closest to the Flemish lijffrenten, annuities paid for life. But when the treasury issued esham without a document referring to a specific person, in other words without the berat, the tax-farm share became a de facto bearer’s share. This peculiarity made it very similar to the Flemish erfelijk renten, payable in perpetuity. The transition from esham “for the life of the investor” to esham “without berat”, meaning for several lives, made this instrument very popular and at the same time reduced the cost of borrowing to the Ottoman exchequer from 18–19 per cent to merely 8 per cent.54

To sum up, in the field of public finance, the Ottoman Empire struggled with a very significant disadvantage: compared to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European polities, the exchequer’s cost of borrowing was huge. More precisely, with the iltizam system, which was prevalent in the 1500s, the Ottoman administration was not even borrowing but merely delegating the right to collect taxes to private enterprise. True public borrowing, as we have seen, only began in 1775 with the introduction of the esham system, almost two hundred years after the end of the period treated here and about half a millennium later than in western Europe.

The reasons for fiscal inefficiency

We now need to answer the question of why the financial administration of the 1500s did not adopt the solutions that its successors of the 1600s and 1700s were to devise when under severe pressure due to long and difficult wars. The answer that comes to mind first is that the Ottoman elite and more specifically the ulema may have considered tax-farm shares as usurious. If so, it would have been all but impossible for the administration of, for instance, Süleyman the Magnificent, who placed such a high emphasis on upholding Islamic religious law, to even consider the introduction of tax-farm shares into financial administration. To find out more, we need to look at just what exactly constitutes riba, usury or interest, from the perspective of Islamic law.

First of all, religious scholars define riba as a pre-determined surplus over and above the loan at issue. Moreover, the following three conditions must be

jointly fulfilled for a transaction to constitute riba: (1) excess or surplus over and above the loan capital to be returned to the lender; (2) determination of this surplus in relation to time; (3) stipulation of this surplus in the loan agreement.⁵⁵ Now, as the lifespan of the person purchasing a tax-farm share is unknown, there can be no certainty of a surplus occurring; in itself this fact nullifies all three conditions. In addition, the lack of any stipulation obliging the exchequer as the borrower to redeem the esham eliminates the basic characteristic of the loan and also violates the first and third conditions. Put differently, the government could but was in no way obliged to redeem the revenue shares. Therefore the latter were not loans, and according to Islamic law, where there is no loan there is also no usury.⁵⁶ In short, since esham are not usurious, interest prohibition cannot have been an impediment for the introduction of domestic borrowing into the Ottoman economy.

A second explanation for the late introduction of domestic borrowing may be the simple fact that the Ottomans did not really see any need for it. We have already referred to their ability to advance with relative ease into the Balkans of the late 1400s and early 1500s and thus expand their tax base through conquest. Foreign observers have pointed out that it was much cheaper for the Ottomans to wage war than for their European rivals.⁵⁷ Indeed, a Venetian diplomat observed as late as 1640 that the sultan could put into the field a force of 200,000 horsemen without spending a penny from his treasury.⁵⁸

A third possible explanation is related to attitude. Since absolutist rulers tend to consider all assets on the territory that they govern more or less as their own, why indeed should they consider borrowing from their subjects?⁵⁹ This mentality problem is worthy of serious consideration. If we conced this point, Ottoman absolutism – and its corollary the absolutist mentality – so admired in the West during the 1500s, actually appears to have carried in itself the seeds of its own destruction, for in the long and very long runs, history has demonstrated that states with wider political participation tend to win out over the absolutist ones. Governed by the rule of law, regimes that allow a larger group of people to participate in political decision-making are in a better position when it comes to borrowing from their own public, and this fact has played a very important role in their success.⁶⁰ Flemish or

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⁵⁷ Faroqhi, Ottoman Empire and World around It, p. 108.
⁵⁸ Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, p. 36.
⁵⁹ Macdonald, Free Nation, pp. 6–7.
⁶⁰ Ibid.
Italian medieval city-states and the Crown in England in the late seventeenth century all needed to persuade merchant guilds or else Parliament of their credit-worthiness, leading to the recognition of the subjects’ property rights and also to sensitivity on the part of the public finance administrations to the needs and concerns of the lenders, usually merchants.

Indeed, when the state borrows from its citizens and wishes to do so time and again, a convergence of interests emerges, a situation which makes government responsive to the needs of its creditors. In the Ottoman Empire by contrast, we only occasionally observe any sensitivity to the needs of the mercantile community. If commercial interests were not a priority for the Ottoman government, then what was? What were the foundation stones upon which the sultans’ economic policy rested?

**Ottoman economic policy “in the long run”**

A major specialist on these issues, Mehmet Genç, has described the foundations of Ottoman official policy as “provisionism, fiscalism and traditionalism”.\(^{61}\) By “provisionism” the author means an overwhelming concern with the needs of army and navy in addition to the sultan’s court and the inhabitants of the Ottoman capital. In this context, it is the administration’s principal aim to ensure that the people involved in the sultan’s service and also the inhabitants of Istanbul receive the necessary supplies, the government often securing goods at prices way below market level. “Fiscalism” stands for a dominant concern with maximising revenues in the short term, neglecting the longer-term view that may recommend forgoing certain types of income in order to increase production or trade, which may generate much higher revenues in the future. As for “traditionalism”, by this term Genç refers to the Ottoman administration’s often expressed belief that past practice had a legitimacy of its own, while deviating from it was always problematic. After all, past practice had ensured the balance of social groups within the Ottoman enterprise, which “novelties” might endanger.

In what way was this approach “typically Ottoman”? In responding to his critics, Genç has argued that although various cities and empires at various times may indeed have applied similar policies, Ottoman practice was unique in the sense that it remained consistent over three hundred years, from the mid-sixteenth century all the way to the 1850s. Such a consistent devotion to

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“provisionism”, for instance, meant that the Ottoman authorities generally impeded exportation but allowed and even encouraged importation.

As striking new research has shown, this concern was so long-lived that to place our sixteenth-century findings into perspective we once again must look beyond 1606. In a recent study, Murat Metinsoy has explained that the economic policies applied by the Turkish republican government during the Second World War were remarkably similar to the provisionist and fiscalist policies typical of the classical age of the Ottoman Empire with which we are presently concerned.62 If this was indeed so, we are confronted with a remarkable continuity in economic policies within the Mediterranean world, from Roman antiquity all the way to the Second World War, and the consistency that Genç has referred to apparently lasted for much longer even than the three hundred years envisaged by this author. Most recently, Şevket Pamuk has uncovered further evidence confirming this hypothesis, observing that, in comparison with the average of 12 Western European countries, income per capita in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey has declined consistently ever since the seventeenth century, with the trend being reversed only after the 1980s.63

Such a continuous decline in relative income most probably occurred in response to the Ottoman and later the Turkish governments’ consistently applied economic policies, for a long-term lack of sensitivity to the plight of producers and domestic merchants must have made for economic stagnation. After all, these people were mostly unable to expand their markets by finding outlets beyond the Ottoman borders. This is because exportation meant a withdrawal of goods from local markets, so the elite discouraged and at times altogether prohibited this kind of enterprise. Importation, by contrast, meant an injection of goods into the markets, and hence the government encouraged it. This – in our perspective – paradoxical attitude was due to the fact that, as we have observed, the Ottoman administration considered the provisioning of its armed forces, the sultan’s court and Istanbul to be of overriding importance.64

Furthermore, the Ottoman government’s policy made the markets of its realm very important for the newly emerging European powers – put differently, the Ottomans provided crucial market diversification to a Europe choked by protectionist policies. In a mercantilist continent where all the borders were rigidly controlled and imports limited to an absolute minimum, the significance of the vast, open Ottoman markets should not escape attention. Historians of Ottoman economic thought have long known that sultans and vezirs tended towards neither free-market liberalism nor mercantilism. This was not for lack of information: Mustafa Naima, a well-known Ottoman historian of the 1600s and 1700s, was well informed about mercantilism and even promoted it; however, without any impact. Whereas mercantilists aimed at maximising the amount of bullion in the economy, the Ottoman government aimed at maximising the aggregate supply of necessities. Economic policies differed substantially as a result: whereas European rulers convinced by the ideas of the mercantilists promoted exports and impeded imports in order to minimise the outflow of bullion, the Ottomans impeded exports and promoted imports in order to maximise the supply of goods available in their markets. Thus the export-promoting European mercantilism was matched perfectly by an import-promoting Ottoman system! This is the reason why, as İnalçık argues, obtaining capitulations from the sultans had become a condicio sine qua non for the newly emerging mercantilist states of Europe. While those governments that adhered to mercantilism tried to minimise imports from one another, the Ottomans in their vast markets, extending from Algeria to Constantinople, had no such concerns.

For these claims, England may serve as a cogent example. Even in the 1660s, 48 per cent of total exports from London still went to the Mediterranean, 43 per cent to all other European ports and only 9 per cent to North America. Thus, during the seventeenth century, the Mediterranean was more important to English traders than the whole of northern and western Europe combined. Unfortunately, we do not know what percentage of the Mediterranean-bound English goods went to the Ottoman realm. But even so, it is probable that the Ottoman markets were a major factor in English trade during the late seventeenth century, when the local economy first took off. Because of

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66 I owe this point to Mehmet Genç.
67 İnalçık and Quataert, ‘General Introduction’, in İnalçık and Quataert, Economic and Social History, vol. 1, pp. 1–6 at p. 3.
this importance of Ottoman trade for the well-being of London merchants, appointing a British ambassador to Constantinople was crucial for the rival parties of the English Civil War.\(^69\)

Moreover, not only were the Ottoman ports open markets, but European merchants were also protected by the capitulations (ahidnames) granted by the sultans. Once in possession of these precious documents, foreign traders, at least in principle, could freely enter into the Ottoman interior. Due to these advantages, France, England and the Netherlands all were keen to obtain capitulations from the Porte, which allowed their merchants safe access to the markets of the sultan’s territory.

We can fully appreciate the importance of this relatively free access when we compare it with the prevailing situation in the West. Apart from the “porti franchi” (“open ports”) such as Venice, Ancona, Livorno (Leghorn) and perhaps Bari, sixteenth-century Italy was closed to Muslim merchants. Of these ports, Venice was probably the most important. At the end of 1570, some 75 Muslim merchants were active there, and the city apparently continued to attract many Ottoman merchants until the 1620s.\(^70\) Although in the “porti franchi” all merchants could trade regardless of their faith, if Muslims were caught in the interior of Catholic Italy, they faced prosecution as infidels. Not being baptised, they were considered by governments and populations as non-persons without civil rights.

If, by contrast, Muslim merchants could visit the “porti franchi”, this was due to special legislation constituting an exceptional space; thus Livorno became accessible as a result of the “Constitution Livornina” promulgated by the Grand Duke of Tuscany Ferdinand I in 1587.\(^71\) Apparently, two opposing forces were at work: while the Catholic Church imposed regulations prohibiting Muslim and Jewish merchants, secular governments passed legislation to welcome them. Yet even in Venice the population was so hostile and the harassment of Muslim merchants reached such proportions that the authorities of the republic had to intervene. In August 1594, they declared that whoever harmed the “Turkish” merchants was liable to heavy penalties and could


be exiled, imprisoned or even executed by hanging. When in 1555–6 Pope Paul IV in his port of Ancona imposed measures against baptised Jews who had reverted to their original faith (Marranos) and had these people persecuted, a universal Jewish boycott of the city followed. Meanwhile the town of Pesaro tried to benefit from the decline of Ancona by passing legislation welcoming Levantine merchants, not only Jews but also Turks, Greeks and Armenians.

Capital formation in the Ottoman polity

As in most societies, in the Ottoman Empire the mercantile class had the greatest potential for capital formation and enrichment; however, due to the political setup, traders were effectively prevented from realising this potential. Indeed I would argue that the Ottoman Empire’s political economy was “proto-pseudo-socialist”: I would advocate the term “proto-socialist” because this particular form of socialism emerged centuries before Karl Marx and “pseudo-socialist” because, unlike Marxist socialism, it was not based on class conflict. On the contrary, the rulers of the Ottoman polity were supposed to preserve the harmony between its different components, which for the sake of convenience we will sometimes call “classes”. To preserve this harmony, the Ottoman government applied pressure upon the mercantile class and ended up choking it. Thus, if not in theory at least in application, the Ottoman system was “proto-pseudo-socialist”.

Some historians will fault me for using a term invented by Karl Marx during the mid-1800s for the sixteenth-century Ottoman political economy. But I simply wish to argue that just as there were capitalist or pseudo-capitalist systems before Adam Smith, so was there an Ottoman “proto-pseudo-socialism” long before Marx. Actually this situation did not escape Ömer Lütfi Barkan, the pioneer of all studies on the Ottoman political economy, for almost 70 years ago he was probably the first researcher to apply the term “socialism” to the Ottoman system, describing it as “a type of war socialism” (Bir nevi harp sosyalizmi). Recently, furthermore, to characterise the political and economic system of the period between 1300 and 1800, Traian Stoianovich as well


as Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert have used a closely related term, namely “command economy”.75

In order to maintain harmony between different social groups and in conformity with the “traditionalism” referred to previously, the Ottoman government prevented not only the mercantile but even the military/ruling class (askerî) from advancing too far. Politically speaking, this policy aimed at preventing high officials from turning into the sultan’s rivals, and given the extraordinary longevity of the empire, from this point of view it was certainly successful. In legal terms, sultans and vezirs justified the infringement of the property and inheritance rights otherwise sanctioned by Islamic law by decreeing that the servitors of the sultan were in a status of dependence that – if not actually slavery – still was close enough to servile status to nullify their rights to own property. While in power some members of the elite could collect massive salaries and other revenues related to their positions. But this income was theirs only as long as they remained in office. Apart from the specially privileged scholar-officials (ulema), office-holders who retired or fell from favour had their income taken away or at least reduced to a small fraction of what it previously had been.76 Under these circumstances, secure property rights must have been most attractive for members of the Ottoman military/ruling class. Halil İnalcık has found out that certain Ottoman pashas purchased bonds issued by the French king Henry II in 1555; we may understand their investment as an attempt to diversify their wealth and guard against confiscation.77 It would of course be interesting to find out what happened to these bonds later on, as the kingdom of France in the sixteenth century was not the safest place for investments.

Thus, by means of regular confiscations, the Ottoman sultans effectively prevented the formation of a noble estate. Actually, even during active service, most members of the military/ruling class could not become very rich because they often had to bring many retainers with them to the army and pay out large sums for projects devised by rulers and grand vezirs. Ömer Lütfi Barkan has produced what is still one of the most comprehensive studies of post-mortem inventories (tereke defterleri); these documents refer to late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century members of the Ottoman

76 Özvar, Malikâne Uygulamasi, pp. 16–17.
military/ruling class, the askeri, who happened to be stationed in Edirne at the time of their deaths. On the basis of this study, we find that an average askeri dying in this city left less than 300,000 akçe, askeri inheritances ranging from 1,758 to 4,688 Venetian ducats. Of the 175 estates analysed, one-third belonged to ruling class members who had died indebted and nothing was owed to their estates, 10 per cent had no debts or credits outstanding and only 7 per cent were people without debts but who were owed money. As for the remainder, they must have had both debts and money owed to them, or else the documentation is incomplete. Moreover, Barkan also has demonstrated that the land holdings which these individuals sometimes possessed were by no means large.

Certainly members of the military/ruling class collected most of the taxes paid by their subjects and in addition got to spend most of the money involved. But typically these people were unable to hold onto their wealth, which ultimately reached the sultan’s coffers through confiscations. Compared to the capital of some partnerships established by Ottoman merchants involved in international trade, the sums of money left by Edirne’s askeri likewise were relatively modest, and after a comprehensive survey of the relevant sources, Halil İnalcık has expressed the opinion that the wealth left by “ordinary” members of the military/ruling class was “not so very impressive”.

In addition, the Ottoman government targeted wealthy members of the subject class, or at least those unlucky enough to live in the central provinces. One way to tap their wealth was to appoint such people, usually merchants or usurers, as celep or celepkeşan. These men had to serve as drovers, purchasing large numbers of sheep in the Balkans at market prices and then selling them in Istanbul at the prevailing administratively determined (narh) rates, which usually did not even cover purchases. Consequently, appointment as a celep or butcher almost always meant financial ruin. The government continued this arrangement from the late fifteenth century to 1597, when instead

81 Özvar, Malikâne Uygulamasi, chap. 2.
82 İnalcık, ‘Capital Formation’, pp. 110, 125.
it began to impose a special tax called zarar-ı kassabiye, defined as 1 per cent of the general customs levy. Obviously, as long as it lasted, namely for at least a century, the practice of drafting wealthy men as drovers or butchers must have impeded private capital accumulation significantly. Indeed, we can consider recruiting celepkeşan and butchers in this fashion as a “proto-pseudo-socialist” policy par excellence because it targeted the accumulated wealth of the rich; however, these resources benefited the soldiery and the inhabitants of Istanbul that already enjoyed significant privileges rather than the generality of the labouring poor.

Members of the Ottoman military/ruling class tried to mitigate the effects of the inevitable confiscations by accumulating wealth in the names of trusted relatives. Another way of maintaining control over property after their tenures had ended was to establish a family foundation, for from the perspective of Islamic law, a vakif was God’s own property and therefore the sultan could not confiscate it. At least this principle applied if the founder had provided legal evidence that he or she owned, as unencumbered private property, the assets he or she had assigned to his or her pious foundation. In Egypt, where such foundations had a long and illustrious history, the Ottoman central government encountered fierce resistance from among the local jurists when it attempted to tax or even confiscate foundation properties.

Thanks to their family foundations, some members of the military class thus could more or less preserve their wealth for future generations, but they definitely were not in a position to continue accumulation, for as Timur Kuran has correctly pointed out, a pious foundation entailed important running costs. Most family foundations did not merely benefit the founder’s descendants but also provided substantial services to society, financed out of foundation income. For powerful individuals, providing such services was a matter of noblesse oblige. Moreover, by failing to do so, the founder would have provided the Ottoman administration with an excellent reason for confiscation. Thus the costs of sheltering wealth in the form of a pious foundation were anything but negligible. Moreover, transforming private property into a pious foundation was tantamount to transforming a dynamic kind of wealth into a more stagnant one due to the stringent rule that the will of the

84 Özvar, Malikâne Uygulamasi, pp. 64–6.
founder as expressed in the foundation document was sacrosanct, in principle for all time.\textsuperscript{88}

Legitimised in this way, confiscations in the sixteenth century normally affected only members of the military/ruling class. But once again we need to look beyond 1606 to discern long-term trends, and taking these into consideration permits us to view sixteenth-century conditions in a different light. When by the late 1600s and throughout the 1700s the empire had to fight wars on several fronts against European powers with vast financial resources, to say nothing of Iran, serious defeats began to occur. To secure extra revenue, individuals not belonging to the military class became subject to confiscation as well. Officials legitimised these serious infringements of Islamic religious law by claiming that major wealth could only have been accumulated by tax farming, so that the deceased had become a member of the military/ruling class and his wealth was forfeited after his death.\textsuperscript{89}

From our perspective, the argument that substantial wealth could only result from tax farming suggests that different rates of profit prevailed in different sectors of the Ottoman economy, public finance allowing gains vastly superior to the profits available elsewhere. If so, Ottoman trade and production should have suffered severe disadvantages, as apparently the state sector sucked out most of the savings available for investment in the private realm through tax farming, leaving little for other investments. This situation in itself was very harmful for the economy because the more productive private sector lost funds to the less productive public realm.

Under free-market conditions, this is the result we would expect. But is our model appropriate, and did private sector savings indeed flow into economically less productive public finance? Apparently, at least after the 1630s, in actuality something rather different happened, for in its attempt to preserve the traditional boundaries between the tax-paying (\textit{reaya}) and tax-collecting (\textit{askeri}) sectors of society, the Ottoman administration evicted the former from public finance. Thus the Jewish tax farmers, very active during the sixteenth century and dominant between 1591 and 1630, came under serious pressure. In the early 1600s, these Jewish tax farmers steadily diminished in number and influence, and by the 1650s they had disappeared from Ottoman public finance, replaced by members of the military/ruling class. Thus, by the end of our period, the government no longer permitted the higher rates

\textsuperscript{88} Kuran, ‘The Provision’, p. 864.
of profitability prevailing in tax farming to accrue to representatives of the private sector. On the contrary, after the 1610s, the administration evicted any private owners of capital that had managed to enter the field. We may wonder if perhaps this policy caused tax farmers to become less competitive; put differently, as private enterprise and especially the Jews disappeared from tax farming and the military/ruling class increasingly controlled the system, less cash arrived at the exchequer, and in turn this development may have been one of the causes for the massive budget deficits we observe by mid-century.

**Few occasions for private profit**

When deploying these arguments, I have assumed the existence of differential rates of profit prevailing in different sectors of the Ottoman economy. But was this really the case? Based upon a decree dated 1501, Ömer Lütfi Barkan has shown that long ago, possibly from the mid-1400s but definitively from about 1500 to the later 1800s, the Ottoman administration controlled prices and thereby profits. Artisans were normally not permitted to earn profits of more than 10 per cent; in cases where they had to make special efforts, legalised profits might rise to 20 per cent. To top it all off, over more than three hundred years, the government continued to insist on these maximum profit rates, and we can observe efforts in that direction in places as diverse as Istanbul, Bursa, Salonika and Egypt. Thus it was a general Ottoman policy to limit the profit rates of artisans, and albeit to a somewhat lesser degree those of merchants as well; the authorities achieved this aim, to a greater or lesser extent, by controlling prices. A law promulgated in the name of Mehmed IV (r. 1648–87) most tellingly stated that there was no commodity upon which the authorities could not impose maximum prices. Dated to 1680, this edict essentially repeated the same profit rates promulgated in 1501. Such constantly low profit margins imposed by the government over the long run confirm the insensitivity of the latter to the needs of artisans and merchants as well as the importance of “traditionalism” as stated by Mehmet Genç.

Moreover, since the guilds organised all production, from the raw material to the final product, each guild tried to control not only the prices charged by

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its own members but also those of the goods that the latter needed as inputs. Thus any given guild constantly concerned itself with the prices charged by others, and this mutual supervision by means of the production nexus was another factor that helped to enforce the maximum profit rates imposed by the sultan’s government. The strictly guild- and narh-controlled production process appears to have functioned as a zero-sum game, with any guild able to increase its profit rate only at the expense of artisans representing a later stage of the production process. To summarise, the guilds controlled each other, both in terms of prices charged and profits earned. When in conflict, the contending parties appealed to a court, the latter always ruling according to the rates and prices promulgated by law.footnote{94} Administratively controlled prices continued, not only in Istanbul but also in the provincial cities, until the middle of the nineteenth century.footnote{95} Despite these mechanisms, presumably there was often a gap between official policy and what actually happened “on the ground”, but supervision was particularly strict in times of crisis. Thus the authorities seem to have been more vigilant after 1550 than they had been in earlier times.

Under these conditions of limited profits and controlled prices, it is no wonder that capital accumulation among Ottoman merchants and artisans did not amount to much. We do not possess analyses of private fortunes for the 1400s and 1500s, so we have to turn to the work of Haim Gerber on early seventeenth-century Bursa; his data are just beyond our time limit but still close enough to be meaningful. Between 1600 and 1630, the artisans of Bursa, on average, left estates worth 66,163 akçe, not a high figure if we keep in mind that Gerber considered 20,000 akçe as the borderline of poverty. The average estate left by a merchant in the same period was worth 133,395 akçe, about 6.5 times the estate of a pauper, once again not a huge fortune. Moreover, 68 per cent of the merchants left estates below 100,000 akçe, and only 5 per cent had serious capital, with estates worth between 500,000 and 1,000,000 akçe.footnote{96} Thus, in Bursa and probably elsewhere, even the richest guildsmen and traders did not possess large capital sums.

Profit controls imposed by the state did not constitute the only impediment to the accumulation of mercantile or artisan capital. Another factor of equal importance was the relationship between profit rates and the prevailing rate of interest. Adam Smith has argued that it is an important condition for

footnote{94} Genç, ‘Osmanlılar, İktisadi ve Ticari Yapı’.
footnote{95} Kütküoğlu, Narh Müessesesi, pp. 8, 18.
capital accumulation that the interest rate or marginal cost of capital be about half as much as the “ordinary rate of clear profit”. In the Ottoman Empire, roughly the reverse was true. Indeed, according to Adam Smith, for Ottoman merchants to accumulate capital the interest rate would have needed to be about 5 to 10 per cent, or half as much as the average rate of permitted profit. But the prevailing rates of interest in the unofficial Ottoman capital markets were between 15 and 25 per cent; only pious foundations with cash to lend contented themselves with about 11 to 12 per cent. High interest and low profit margins must have rendered investment difficult if not impossible.

Last but not least, there was the tax load to consider. Certain artisans had to follow the army on campaign, and we have no way of knowing how many managed to come back with a small profit or even to come back at all. It fell to fellow guildsmen to finance the ventures of those who were drafted, an additional drain on resources that were already quite small. Thus we can say without too much exaggeration that Ottoman taxation practices punished producers, particularly the large and efficient among them. This point was obvious to an observer of the eighteenth-century scene, but perhaps to a more limited extent it was valid for the 1500s as well.

Restating our findings

In the context of recent debates on the exact nature of the Ottoman economy, Mehmet Genç has restated his tripod model comprising “provisionism, fiscalism and traditionalism”, while the present author has refined his argument concerning “proto-pseudo-socialism”; both of us agree on the “pseudo-socialist” characteristics of the Ottoman economy. In emphasising the longue durée both views have received support from Mübahat Küttükoğlu, who has pointed out continuities with the teachings of the late eleventh-century Siyāsatnāma by the Seljuk vezir Niẓām al-Mulk. Already this author had warned his ruler that if the qadi, who determined administratively imposed prices, did not receive support from the secular authorities, merchants would sell their

goods at whatever prices they preferred. But the profits from such transactions would not be legitimate. Moreover, unless the government firmly controlled merchants, people would be impoverished. Thus, possibly already in the pre-Ottoman Turkish empires and definitely in the Ottoman instance, the authorities regarded mercantile profits with a jaundiced eye and assumed that traders needed constant supervision. Consequently, they generally prevented merchants from advancing their status by capital accumulation.

In pursuit of this aim, the Ottoman government used its power to limit the profits of traders and artisans to a range between 2 and 10 per cent. As for the prevailing interest rate, it was much higher than the legitimate rate of profits, while the practice of drafting wealthy men as celepçeşan and butchers radically re-distributed wealth from the merchants to the military and, to a lesser extent, the ordinary inhabitants of Istanbul. Thus the mercantile class, normally the group with the highest potential for capital accumulation, was unable to realise its potential, and as a result the Ottoman economy suffered from a serious lack of capital formation.

After all, this socio-political system permitted only ephemeral capital accumulation in the hands of selected members of the askeri class. Merchants and artisans, as well as landowners, were in no position to emulate them. Şevket Pamuk has confirmed this general lack of capital accumulation, calculating the sixteenth-century Ottoman income per capita at around 60 per cent of the average observed in 12 contemporary Western European countries. Moreover, due to the notorious lack of capital accumulation, the exchequer also was in trouble when it came to borrowing from the public.

Yet in the 1500s we also observe a trend in the opposite direction. Even though not as privileged as merchants in the medieval city-states of Europe, which borrowed heavily from their merchants and therefore needed to listen to their grievances, certain members of the Ottoman mercantile class were for a while able to make their voices heard as well. During most of the sixteenth century, we observe certain parallels to the European situation, as at least some traders were involved in competitive tax farming and advanced significant sums to the exchequer. As a result, sultans and vezirs were responsive to their problems and interfered vigorously on their behalf if their business was interrupted and they therefore failed to fulfil their obligations to the treasury.

102 Pamuk, ‘Estimating GDP Per Capita’.
Thus, when the persecution of Marranos in Ancona by the Inquisition led to the bankruptcy of the Jewish tax farmers of Istanbul and Salonika, who had invested heavily in Ancona, the sultan came to their aid. In the sixteenth century, we also find sultans and vezirs protecting merchants whose goods and money had been robbed by corsairs in the Adriatic.\(^\text{103}\)

After the 1610s, however, we observe a turnabout, with the eviction of the Jewish and Muslim merchants from tax farming and their gradual replacement by the members of the Ottoman military/ruling class.\(^\text{104}\) After the end of our period, in the 1600s, the Ottoman government must have become less interested in the troubles of the merchants and more sensitive to the needs of the military/ruling class,\(^\text{105}\) for when Ottoman merchants active in the international arena no longer provided capital to the sultan, their opinions and problems no longer mattered.\(^\text{106}\) Now it was the military/ruling class which lent crucial funds, usually by means of tax-farming contracts. As a result of the merchants’ defeat, the Ottoman economy was shaped not by the interests of the producers or merchants but by those of the dominant military/ruling class.\(^\text{107}\)

We should not underestimate the importance of these dynamics, not just in the realm of public finance but also in the political arena. Recent research has indicated that public borrowing in the long run determines the very structure of a political system. If these views are correct, then the concluding years of our period and the immediate aftermath, in other words the 1610s to 1650s, were of crucial importance for the Ottoman Empire. With international merchants evicted from the tax-farming system and replaced by the military/ruling class, the empire must have moved irrevocably towards increasing domination of the subject class. Moreover, tax farmers, particularly those concerned with customs duties, also took on administrative positions involving the control of merchants, and this situation must have increased the vulnerability of the merchants. In certain cases, we can view these takeovers as sales of public office.\(^\text{108}\) Combining such sales with the increasing militarisation of


\(^{104}\) Çizakça, _A Comparative Evolution_, pp. 144, 158.


\(^{106}\) Şevket Pamuk, _Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire_ (Cambridge, 2000), p. 10, fn. 35; p. 85.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., p. 10.

the tax-farming system, we can hypothesise that the latter development was far more than a mere change in the social composition of the tax farmers: increasingly it amounted to a subjugation of the economy to the rigorous control of the military/ruling class. Apparently such subjugation occurred not only in public finance but also in other sectors. The increasing involvement and meddling of the military/ruling class in the affairs of merchants and artisans is well known.\textsuperscript{109}

Historians have argued that the Ottoman socio-political system was stagnant and that at least where economic mentalities were at issue the “classical age” continued from the mid-fifteenth to the nineteenth century with hardly any change in its main tenets.\textsuperscript{110} We can also observe stagnation in the realm of business techniques: differently from Western business partnerships and also those Ottoman enterprises serving the exchequer through tax farming, private business partnerships – in general – were hardly dynamic. This lack of dynamism probably was due to the fact that the governmental apparatus tended to choke off all Ottoman private enterprises not involved in tax farming.\textsuperscript{111} Eventually the system became self-defeating: insufficient capital accumulation by merchants led to insufficient tax potential and insufficient tax revenue to a weakening of the military. Thus the Ottoman political system originally designed for military supremacy eventually ended up with a weakened military.\textsuperscript{112}

“Pockets” of economic vitality – in spite of all impediments

In my view, the observations presented so far confirm the “proto-pseudo-socialist” character of the Ottoman political economy. But, if so, how can we explain its longevity? While the Soviet socialism of the twentieth century lasted for about 70 years, the Ottoman Empire held on for more than six hundred.

Historians of Ottoman commerce and artisan production have provided the keys to an explanation, although they mostly have posed their questions differently from the present author. Clearly, within the “proto-pseudo-socialist” framework described earlier, there existed important pockets where the free market could operate. Halil İnalcık demonstrated long ago

\begin{itemize}
\item[109] André Raymond, \textit{Yeniçerilerin Kahiresi} (İstanbul, 1999).
\item[110] Genç, ‘Osmanlılar, İktisadî ve Ticarî Yapı’.
\end{itemize}
that the profit restrictions discussed in this chapter, one of the most important impediments for capital accumulation, did not apply to international merchants and that as a result these traders could accumulate massive wealth. Goods imported from distant markets were usually luxuries and often exempt from administrative price controls. Because certain centres of production, like the Bursa silk or the Ankara mohair industry supplying these merchants, were in close connection to the market forces of international supply and demand, they could become the sites for capitalist ventures.\textsuperscript{113} Quite possibly the Ottoman government was willing to tolerate a few capitalistic segments within the overall “proto-pseudo-socialist” system because of the constant inflow of silver brought about by European merchants. Of course, even in these cases, “provisionism” demanded that exports did not deplete domestic markets.

Yet both Bursa and Edirne suffered from their proximity to Istanbul, their geographical position making them vulnerable to the relentless “proto-pseudo-socialist” pressures exercised by officials in the capital. Merchants from Bursa and Edirne, in addition to the Istanbul trading community, risked getting appointed as celepkeşan or butchers. A list of celeps covering the years between 1536 and 1597 survives, comprising 314 persons. This document indicates that most of these unfortunate souls were from the heartlands of the empire; in other words, from the Danubian provinces in the north to those of Syria in the south. Not a single merchant in this list was from Egypt; thus, if we can extrapolate from this source, we may explain why in the decades before and after 1600 a great merchant like Ismail Abu Taqiyya could flourish in Cairo without losing his entire wealth by appointment as a celep.\textsuperscript{114} Thus it appears that Ottoman intervention in economic life was not systematic but selective, and at least during the 1400s and 1500s sultans and vezirs approached the economic lives of their subjects with a healthy dose of pragmatism.\textsuperscript{115} When overriding military and political priorities were not at issue, the Ottoman authorities were quite capable of a certain tolerance, not only in political matters but also in economic ones.


\textsuperscript{115} Pamuk, Monetary History, pp. 14–15.
Conclusion

While discussing economic life in the Ottoman Empire between 1453 and 1606, the present study has often moved beyond the prescribed boundaries. After all, economic institutions and policies, which affect the lives of millions of people, operate in the *longue durée*, and only when we are willing to look at a period extending over several centuries will we be able to understand the consequences of the decisions made by a given polity’s economically active persons and also by the elites that ruled them. Such continuity is particularly relevant for the Ottoman Empire, which inherited not only its territory but also certain aspects of the dominant “economic ideology” from the Roman and Byzantine as well as the pre-Ottoman Islamic empires.

Ottoman “proto-pseudo-socialism”, with its consistent and long-term price and profit controls, tendencies towards growing gaps between administered and market prices, supply shortages and violations of property rights through confiscations and the drafting of *celepkeșan* and butchers, developed a self-sustaining economic system. This system aimed at financing expansionary wars, imperial longevity and class harmony. The Ottomans were so convinced of the success of their system that they called their state *devlet-i-êbed müddet*, the perpetual state.

New evidence has surfaced showing that there really was a remarkable continuity about Ottoman “proto-pseudo-socialist” policies and institutions. “Provisionism”, for instance, had been practised for centuries in the Roman and Byzantine empires. From these earlier polities, the Ottomans may in fact have inherited all three foundation stones of their economic thought: “traditionalism”, “fiscalism” and “provisionism”. Such continuity was also apparent in rural life, where the Roman agricultural unit, the *jugum*, lived on in the Ottoman *çift*, the family farm ploughed by a yoke of oxen.

Moreover, whether expressed as “proto-pseudo-socialism” or as a tripod of “provisionism”, “fiscalism” and “traditionalism”, these characteristics of Ottoman economic thinking appear to have continued well into the twentieth century. As we have seen, the economic policies applied by Turkish republican governments during the Second World War were remarkably similar to those in favour between 1450 and the early 1600s; in other words, during the period that concerns us at present. If so, within the territories of the

118 Inalcık and Quataert, ‘General Introduction,’ in Inalcik and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, pp. 1–7; Murat Çizakça, ‘Tax-farming and Financial Decentralization in the
Ottoman Empire, there must have been a striking continuity in economic institutions and policies from late Roman antiquity all the way to the 1940s, a consistency that apparently lasted not just for hundreds of years but for almost two millennia.

For a few brief years in the sixteenth century, a change seemed possible. Merchants involved in long-distance trade both within the empire and beyond its borders became a source of finance to the central government, both as tax farmers and as a source of customs revenues. As a result, in the mid-1500s, Ottoman sultans and vezirs showed some responsiveness to the needs of long-distance traders. But the magic moment did not last: by the end of our period, military-administrative personnel had ousted the merchants from tax-farming positions. In consequence, the Ottoman government no longer viewed the mercantile class as a source of credit and, mindful of the interests of the tax-farming elite, easily reverted to time-honoured controls.

Such continuity apparently had disastrous consequences, for ever since the seventeenth century, income per capita in the Ottoman Empire, and later in Turkey, declined consistently when compared with Western European countries. Such a long-term decline can only have been caused by a path dependency over centuries, for which I have here suggested the term Ottoman “proto-pseudo-socialism”. The trend was reversed only after the 1980s, when the Özal government introduced modern capitalism.\footnote{Pamuk, ‘Estimating GDP Per Capita’}. It seems that the Ottoman political cum economic system has the dubious honour of being the first socialism that failed.

Introduction

Between 1453 and 1566, the Ottoman Empire reached the apogee of its military potential; during the later sixteenth century, sultans' armies were still formidable, but not as strong as they had been. Especially after 1580, former glory started to fade away, as the long war in Hungary (1593–1606) ended with the mutual exhaustion of both Ottomans and Habsburgs and without major gains for the empire of the sultans. By contrast, the reigns of Mehmed II (r. 1451–81), Selim I (r. 1512–20) and Süleyman I (r. 1520–66) featured splendid territorial expansion, aspirations for world hegemony and an extraordinary capability to match and overcome the adversaries' war potential. Based on accumulated wealth and power, after about 1530 the Ottomans for a while seem to have aimed at universal political supremacy and for this purpose developed a “grand strategy”, to use a currently fashionable term.¹

When Mehmed II acceded to the throne, there was no enemy in the vicinity who could have seriously contested his superiority. Byzantium was in a desperate situation, reduced to a city-state which would fall very soon, on 29 May 1453. Nor was it difficult to subjugate the remaining Greek principalities, partly because they were so eager to resort to Ottoman aid. Nor could the Balkan states withstand the Ottoman advance. Only Hungary, though close to the borders of the sultan’s realm, was in a somewhat stronger position: Mehmed II had not succeeded in his attack against Belgrade in 1456, and King Matthias (r. 1458–90) in 1463 had conquered the fortress town of Jajce. Thus, from an Ottoman military viewpoint, the kingdom of Hungary remained a somewhat remote target, but although in this period its ruler was quite a dangerous rival to the sultan, he mostly focused on European matters.

During Mehmed II’s rule, a significant tribal confederation, the Akkoyunlu, gained control over eastern Anatolia and territories beyond. Yet in 1473 successful military operations eliminated any threat to Ottoman dominance and in the long run opened the way to further conquests in the east. In the fifteenth century, the struggle with the Mamluks for supremacy in the Middle East posed no threat to the Ottoman sultans either, although between 1485 and 1491 the two rulers were at war. In 1514, near Çaldıran, Selim I defeated the forces of Shah Isma’il I (r. 1501–24), the founder of Safavid rule over Iran.  

From now on, Selim I was free to choose his next target, as in the later years of his rule the shah was no longer a menace. As a result, Selim I concentrated on the conquest of Syria and Egypt, while his son and successor, Süleyman, added Iraq to the Ottoman domains.

By the reign of Süleyman I, however, Safavid Iran had recovered as a military power; moreover, after the battle of Mohács in 1526, the Ottomans had become the neighbours and rivals of the Habsburgs. As Charles V (r. 1516–56) and his son Philip II (r. 1556–98) had their own aspirations to world power, the Ottoman–Habsburg fight for hegemony took place on both land and sea. This rivalry dominated events on the Ottoman western and south-western borders, and as a result the sultans were unable even to incorporate all of Hungary into their realm. By the time of Selim II (r. 1566–74), the Russians had also emerged as a dangerous enemy.

Historians have studied the Ottoman approach towards war, conquest and peace, yet we understand only in part how sultans and vezirs justified wars against their co-religionists. One author has argued that “a violation (ta’addī) of the shari’a by one Muslim state gave the right to another state to enforce the shari’a against the violator. A great Muslim power could attack a small Muslim state under the pretext of violation of the shari’a, regardless of whether the alleged violation had actually occurred or whether its seriousness justified an act of war.”

A somewhat more detailed examination of this issue reveals that the Ottomans gave special emphasis to the doctrine which permitted holy war against Muslims if the confrontation was motivated by theological concerns and not by sheer power conflicts. The legist İbn Kemal justified the subjugation of the Anatolian principalities by maintaining that

with their permanent trouble-making they hindered the Ottomans’ holy war, and what was worse they encouraged the infidels and collaborated with them against the Ottomans, who wished to accomplish the Islamic prescription of raiding the infidel (gaza). Consequently their elimination was even more important than fighting against the unbelievers since the latter activity was a collective obligation of the Muslim community; in other words, one ruler could undertake this obligation on behalf of others. On the other hand, it was the duty of each and every person to repress heresy. In other words, the Ottomans declared their Muslim adversaries rebels, which entitled them – at least in their own view – to subjugate these potentates without violating the sacred law.

When elaborating their reasons for going to war against the Safavids, the Ottoman rulers and their advisors went one step further. Although the shah and his governing elite claimed adherence to Shi’ism during the sixteenth century at least, in fact they had adopted a syncretistic religious practice, a mixture of “popular Islam”, Shi’ism and sufi mysticism. As the Ottomans perceived it, these Iranian Shi’ites (Kızılbaş) not only rejected several basic elements of the sacred law but also falsified the Qur’an, cursing venerable figures of early Islamic history. Since in this perspective the Kızılbaş were out to ruin Islam, the sultans and their servitors had the right to treat them as infidels, godless folk and heretics. Once again, these people were worse than “real” infidels and deserved eradication and annihilation. Admittedly, other major opponents, such as the Mamluk sultans, were Sunnis, but in the early sixteenth century they were allies of Shah Isma’il I, and therefore the Ottoman authorities saw no problem in using the same argument against them.

Though the expressed motivation for war against the Christian powers was religious, sultans and vezirs occasionally formulated their claims according to nomadic tradition. In this line of thinking, during the long negotiations with Hieronymus Łaski, John Szapolyai’s (r. 1526–40) envoy to Süleyman I in 1528, the second vezir, Mustafa Paşa, once declared: “[T]ell me, how did your lord dare to enter the place which had been trodden by the hoofs of our emperor’s

horse. . . . According to our law, the place where our ruler’s head has reposed and into which his horse has stuck its head, by this legal title will eternally belong to our ruler.” In 1530, a letter of the grand vezir İbrahim Paşa advanced a similar idea: “[W]henever the feet of one of the horses of the padishah honour and favour a country, it becomes his possession.”

Some 30 years ago, Géza Perjés, a military historian, argued the rationality of the sultans’ military politics, opposing the notion that the Ottomans were motivated exclusively by religious zeal, a mindset which when waging war allegedly made them oblivious of practical considerations. An immense world empire could not have survived without strategic rationality, and in this context the author emphasised the importance of the action radius; in other words, the distance the imperial army could march forward and back within a single season if it did not winter on or near the battlefield. Like any other generals, the Ottoman high command had to recognise and respect this practical necessity. On the basis of these considerations, Perjés developed the idea that the Hungarian Kingdom, falling more or less outside the Ottoman radius of action, could have survived as a vassal state had the royal government permitted the sultans’ forces to march across its territory when attacking the Habsburgs; he called this assumption “Süleyman’s offer”.

Vienna, however, lies 250 kilometres to the west of Buda; therefore it would have been even more difficult to launch spring–autumn campaigns against and beyond this city. Moreover, when considering whether “Süleyman’s offer” was ever an option, we must keep in mind the “mentality of great powers”, which has blinded the governments of almost all super-formations in world history. In other words, the Ottomans knew no limits when setting their targets, as exemplified by the flexible notion of the kızıl elma (red/golden apple), which designated the next significant place(s) to be conquered, such as Buda, Vienna, Rome or even Cologne. On the other hand, however, sultans and vezirs carefully prepared their campaigns and tenaciously kept their goals in mind; thus, as so often happens in the world of politics, their behaviour was at once rational and irrational.

All in all, waging wars constituted the raison d’être of the empire.\(^{11}\) Warfare determined the policies of the Ottoman elite, perhaps even more decisively than was true of other polities of the Old World, where rulers also were rather bellicose.\(^{12}\) Therefore it came as no surprise to their western contemporaries that the Ottomans constantly re-appeared on their frontiers. Nevertheless, at certain times the sultan and his advisors found themselves in a crisis of orientation. Thus, in 1552 the Ottoman armies waged war in five rather distant theatres, namely Hungary, the Mediterranean, Iraq, the Anatolian border region near Iran and in addition the Persian Gulf, a situation which resulted in the dispersion of military and financial resources and in most cases a failure to attain the sultans’ presumed original goals.\(^{13}\)

The army

\textit{Historiography}

Among older studies of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Ottoman military, Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı’s books contain useful general information and many interesting details, often based on archival material that the author was the first to use.\(^{14}\) In 1977, Gyula Káldy-Nagy, in an excellent pioneering article, surveyed the historical development of the various constituents of the empire’s armed forces.\(^{15}\) Eleven years later, Caroline Finkel produced the first detailed monograph on Ottoman military logistics, discussing in great detail the problem of campaign supplies, a subject which earlier on had interested Lütfi Güçer as well.\(^{16}\) Besides conceptual novelties, Finkel’s work abounded in references to Ottoman documents. Rhoads Murphey also used ample archival evidence for a more broadly based study on Ottoman warfare covering the

period between 1500 and 1700 and featuring a splendid characterisation of the land forces in a “long-run” perspective. Though the period covered in this study overlaps with our own but in part, several of his examples are highly relevant since they concern unchangeable features of warfare.

More recently, Colin Imber has brought out a well-proportioned overall description of the Ottoman military, focusing on the structure of sultanic power. Moreover, due to continuities between the period before 1453 and the following decades, we can learn a great deal from Pál Fodor’s detailed and competent discussion in the first volume of The Cambridge History of Turkey. After all, as we will see, between the accession of Mehmed II in 1451 and the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent, basically the same types of forces made up the backbone of the imperial army. Fodor’s concluding remarks are valid for most of our period as well; he leaves no doubt that “during a century and a half the Ottomans developed one of the best militaries and warfare of the age.” Among detailed specialist monographs, two recent works on guns and the war industry particularly stand out. In addition, historians have dedicated separate volumes to semi-military organizations like the voynuks, yürüks or derbendcis.

While for the fifteenth century sources are rather scarce and mostly narrative in character, beginning with the period of Mehmed II archival documentation increases and becomes richer in content. In spite of serious damages that Ottoman records have suffered in wars and uprisings, and also due to neglect and even intentional annihilation, they are so numerous and provide such an immense amount of information that it will take two or three further generations of scholars to fully explore them. Therefore, at the present stage

17 Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700 (London, 1999).
21 Yavuz Ercan, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bulgarlar ve Voynuklar (Ankara, 1986); Mehmet İnbaş, Rumeli Yörükleri (1544–1675) (Erzurum, 2000); Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Derbend Teşkilatı (Istanbul, 1967); Aleksandar Stojanovski, Dervendžistvoto vo Makedonija (Skopje, 1974).
of our knowledge, several intriguing aspects of Ottoman warfare will remain at least partly in the dark, and we will not be able to deal with all territories in the same depth.

The land forces: Janissaries as salaried troops of the court (kapıkuşu ocakları)

We can characterise the Ottoman polity between 1453 and 1603 as a patrimonial, redistributive system governed by three major status groups: men of the sword (ehl-i seyf), men of [religious] knowledge (ehl-i ilim) and men of the pen (ehl-i kalem). All these categories featured as askeri, literally “military”, whose members enjoyed certain prerogatives and thus distinguished themselves from ordinary subjects (reaya). The decisive element within the imperial household was the standing army, employed to defend the absolute monarch and extend his territories. To characterise their status vis-à-vis the sovereign, the term “servant” or even slave (kul) was in common usage.

Soldiers in receipt of stipends and subordinate to the sultan’s court functioned as the essential constituents of the Ottoman land army. These contingents were the first and largest of their kind in Europe, where standing armies of comparable size evolved only in the seventeenth century. The infantry or janissaries and the six cavalry regiments directly serving the palace were for a long time well trained and satisfactorily equipped; by the standards of the sixteenth century, these soldiers also received regular pay.

In the reign of Bayezid II or Selim I, the Ottoman administration decided to change the structure of the janissary corps, adding a third unit, the so-called ağa bölükleri, to the previously existing two elements, known as the cemaat and sekban bölükleri. The new division encompassed 61 basic units. While the reasons for establishing the ağa bölükleri remain obscure, we may surmise that the ağa of the janissaries had taken a hand in this matter. This is because from the early sixteenth century onwards, this commander came from a palace background, and when he emerged to take over the janissaries, he needed a reliable retinue.22 The corps was elaborately articulated; its members lived regulated and structured lives.

During the later period of Mehmed’s II rule, the janissaries amounted to about ten thousand men in total. This number did not significantly change during the next few decades; in 1514, the year of the Çaldiran victory, 10,156 janissaries received their pay from the sultan’s court. However, in 1527, only 7,886 janissaries appeared in the official budget; perhaps this elite corps had

suffered serious losses during the Mohács campaign. However, in Istanbul there were sizeable numbers of novices (*acemi oğlan*) waiting to be called up, and prisoners of war and recruits drafted among the empire’s Christian population by means of the *devşirme*, or “levy of boys”, rapidly filled any vacancies. Yet certain territories, including the Hungarian provinces, were exempt from the “levy of boys”, and from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards the number of *devşirme* recruits diminished as the sons of military men increasingly succeeded to their fathers’ positions.\(^{23}\) In the 1530s, the corps seems to have suffered attrition, as merely 6,362 janissaries participated in the 1541 campaign when the sultan finally conquered Buda (Budin).\(^{24}\) Two years later, 8,166 of these soldiers participated in the next Ottoman enterprise in Hungary, while a quarter of a century later 12,798 men received their pay from the exchequer.\(^{25}\)

Due to structural changes within the Ottoman army in response to European challenges, when the military value of foot soldiers came to surpass that of their mounted colleagues, the janissaries rapidly increased in number. Some 35,000 men were on record in 1597, and a few years later the total had reached 37,600. The source of this last figure was a scribe of the imperial council who wrote in 1609 and occasionally used data from earlier periods, but in this particular instance he probably relied on a document of recent vintage.\(^{26}\) However, the practical value of the enlarged contingent was not necessarily higher, since officers took less care in selecting new recruits and traditional janissary discipline weakened as a result of shorter and less severe training.

Fairly large contingents served in fortresses in various parts of the empire, especially in the borderlands, making it difficult to determine the mobilisation strength of the janissary corps. From the mid-sixteenth century onwards, in other words shortly after the occupation of the key strongholds, janissary garrison troops were on record in the Arab lands but also in Hungary. When campaigning under the command of the sultan, it was the primary function of the janissaries to defend the person of the ruler. In this respect, the last

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24 Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, D 9619/2.
26 Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, p. 45, table 3.5.
campaign of Süleyman the Magnificent, in 1566, marked a turning point. It was not until 30 years later, in October 1596, that an Ottoman ruler again appeared on the battlefield, when Mehmed III (r. 1595–1603) participated in the campaign culminating in the battle of Mezőkeresztes. It was another important obligation of the elite infantry troops to fight in the first lines during decisive assaults. Lastly, when not in the field, they were responsible for public order in the capital.

During the 1500s, Ottoman army commanders slowly phased out the traditional weaponry of the janissaries and replaced it by handguns, possibly matchlock harquebuses. In addition, the soldiers kept some of their lances and bows or crossbows. It seems that by the second half of the sixteenth century most of them used firearms, and during the reign of Murad III (r. 1574–95) commanders introduced matchlock muskets, a more advanced type.27 Earlier research had maintained that Dutch theoreticians at the end of the sixteenth century invented the volley or salvo fire. A recent article casts doubt on this contention, arguing – on the basis of Ottoman narrative and miniature evidence – that the janissaries must have applied an identical method more or less contemporaneously or even somewhat earlier.28 Doubtless William Louis (Willem Lodewijk) of Nassau did not learn this technique from the Ottomans; he claimed to have been inspired by ancient Roman practices. While the technique of firing volleys conceivably may have travelled eastward, a simultaneous development in the Ottoman world and western Europe also seems possible, as officers everywhere came to realise the possibilities of handguns.29 Relying on the dominant firepower of the janissaries, the Ottomans were able to gain the upper hand in several sixteenth-century battles. Yet by about 1600 the European infantries mostly were superior in this field.

The land forces: Salaried horsemen (altı bölük halkı)
While the janissaries did not make much money, the six cavalry regiments serving the sultan’s court were rather well paid. These mounted soldiers were not very numerous: our records speak of about 5,000 men in the 1510s and 1520s, and of 3,670 joining in the Buda campaign. When the Ottomans

27 Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, pp. 88–90.
marched against Esztergom (Estorgon), once again approximately 5,000 men participated in the action. According to the budget of 1567, by that time the number of cavalry soldiers had more than doubled in comparison with the early sixteenth century and now stood at 11,251 men. As all our documents tell us, the sipahis (cavalrymen) and silahtars (“bearers of arms”) were the largest units within the corps. As for the four other divisions, the “salaried men of the right and left” (ulufeciyân-i yemin and yesar) and the “strangers of the right and left” (gureha-i yemin and yesar), they made up one-half or even less of the total. It was the corps’ traditional role to accompany the ruler on his military enterprises and shield him from the left and right during field battles, and this function did not change throughout the period under discussion. At the same time, quite a few cavalry soldiers, especially among the sipahis, played a significant role in tax collection. Other salaried groups included gunners (topçu), gun carriage drivers (top arabacı), armourers (cebeci), bombardiers (humbaracı) and sappers (lağmeci).

For the fifteenth century, evidence on artillerymen and their assistants is scarce. But as the Ottoman polity became a “gunpowder empire”, by the time of Selim I these groups had turned into an indispensable element within the army and remained so during the following decades. Between 1514 and 1598, the number of topçus multiplied eightfold, arriving at some 2,800 men as the sixteenth century drew to a close. Figures for the top arabacı corps are less consistent, varying between 400 and 900 men. But – among other things – these soldiers had an essential function, for they supplied vehicles for the circles of war wagons (Wagenburgs) used by the Ottomans in several field battles.30 The importance of the cebecis also grew significantly because their workload became heavier due to the increase in the larger stipendiary regiments. As a result, their number rose from a starting value of 450 to 3,000 by 1598 and 5,730 by 1609.31 Yet compared to the other corps cebecis and topçus were not numerous, even when taken together.

Sappers or miners belonged to the most effective military elements within the Ottoman army, quite often more skilful than their European counterparts. Working in a sitting position, they performed their tasks efficiently and rapidly, creating a complex system of partly inter-connected corridors.32 In

31 Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, p. 30, table 2.2.
these units, it was not necessary to be a Muslim, and especially Armenians sometimes served in them.

With the development of gunpowder technology, military men invented new sorts of explosive devices. We do not know when hand bombs first appeared; nor is there much information about the earliest bombs shot by mortars. In the sixteenth century, the producers of such items formed part of the cebecis, while those who projected them were topçus. It is also unclear to what extent the sultan’s specialists imitated or independently constructed other types of deadly incendiary and exploding mechanisms – the two functions might be combined – used in Christian Europe mainly for the defence of castles. During the siege of Eger in 1552, both the Hungarians and the sultan’s troops employed such devices. Yet no further information is available on the possible Ottoman varieties of fireballs (Feuerball), incendiary mugs (Sturmkrüge), clubs (Sturmkolben), serpents/wreaths (Sturmkrantz, Feuerring) and “tubes” (Röhrlein). Merely some of the less sophisticated seventeenth-century devices of this kind feature in the work of the late seventeenth-century Habsburg general Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, who devoted much attention to his Ottoman opponents. However, these were not very complicated weapons; therefore we may also imagine that they were in use temporarily and later forgotten.

The land forces: Timar-holding sipahis

In the later fifteenth century and throughout the sixteenth century, the prebendal cavalry was the second major component of the Ottoman armed forces. These men formed part of the timar system, which played a vital role in supporting the Ottoman establishment politically, economically and socially.

It was the sipahi’s main duty to serve the sultan as a mounted soldier in exchange for his holding, which mostly consisted of permission to collect the taxes he had been assigned and use these resources to keep up his fighting strength. In addition he was indispensable for the maintenance of the Ottoman land system (miri topraklar) at the local level, as the sipahi controlled the peasantry’s use of ploughlands, over which the sultan held eminent domain. Quite often the timar-holder must have had a say in the selection of crops as well; after all, he collected many peasant dues in kind and had them

33 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından Kapukulu Ocakları, vol. 2, p. 117.
Ottoman armies and warfare, 1453–1603

sold on his behalf by the villagers. Finally, the sipahi secured public order in the name of the ruler and performed police services in the countryside. In the fifteenth century, some timars went to civilian office-holders. But during the 1500s such arrangements practically disappeared and only military men were eligible.

In all newly conquered European provinces, the Ottoman authorities introduced the timar system, but not in certain eastern territories, including Egypt. As an interesting example of Ottoman pragmatism, in the Balkans Christian petty aristocrats and other military men sometimes could preserve their socio-political status by becoming sipahis; this practice continued until the end of the fifteenth century. For instance, in 1467–8, some 60 per cent of the timars in northern Serbia were in the hands of Christians, and in 1469, 82 per cent of all Bosnian timars had non-Muslim holders. With the passing of time, however, these Christian sipahis disappeared as a result of dispossession or conversion to Islam. Thus only a few Christian timariots are on record in sixteenth-century Ottoman Hungary, partly because the custom had been abandoned and partly due to the unwillingness of the local nobility to enter the sultans’ service.

Christian sipahis also officiated in the north-eastern Anatolian province of Trabzon, which in 1461 Mehmed II had conquered from its Byzantine rulers. Our records show that by 1486 two Christians from this sub-province held timars on a hereditary basis, and in 1516 the number of such timars had risen to 22. Remarkably, these cavalry soldiers appeared in the registers as martolos, an expression commonly used in the Ottoman Balkans (Rumeli) for a different kind of service but otherwise unknown in Anatolia. However, since this term is a derivation of the Greek armatolos, it may well have emerged independently from Rumelian usage in this previously Byzantine territory. The survival of local landlords can be supposed in Georgia, too, although so far only a single indirect reference supports this assumption.

40 C’isana Abulaje and Miheil Svanije, Č’ildiris etialet’si Jaba daveti’si 1694–1732 cc. (Tbilisi, 1979), p. 278.
Already in the fifteenth century, the Ottoman authorities sometimes assigned timars to garrison soldiers instead of paying them in cash. Apparently this practice became more widespread in the 1500s. As for the money involved, it might go not to individuals but collectively to groups of military men. Even the prayer-leaders and other religious personnel officiating in the fortresses might receive their pay in this fashion. In the early 1590s, the financial administration further modified this system by introducing the so-called ocaklık regime. When regular sources of income of one or more settlements were given to a garrison as ocaklık, it became the responsibility of the assignees to collect the dues and distribute them among the members of the relevant unit; such arrangements typically were valid for a lengthy period of time. Though this practice weakened the redistributive character of the empire, it seemed expedient in a period of financial crisis.

In principle, all timars contained an essential revenue element (the kılıç, or “sword”) which theoretically had to remain intact even in the case of re-assignment. In several instances, however, the grant was too small for a kılıç. A comparison of ten sub-provinces (sancak, liva) located in Rumeli between 1533 and 1695 reveals that, over more than a century and a half, the number of kılıç remained roughly constant; from the late 1500s, the Ottoman court seems to have considered 40,000 kılıç an ideal figure for the empire as a whole. But in an increasing number of cases the administration could not prevent prebends from gradually turning into continuous possessions of their holders and even becoming hereditary.

We can best make these processes visible by analysing data from the so-called timar ruznamçesisi (or day-to-day prebend records). From the late 1580s and 1590s onwards, short notes in a different hand typically appear above the original entries, which narrate the later fate of the holdings. Or at least we

41 Bašbakanlık Osmanlı Arsivi, Istanbul, Maliye defteri 1, fols. 57v–74v. There were more than 80 persons in four castles in the sancak of Vidin in 1483.
45 See, for example, Bašbakanlık Osmanlı Arsivi, Istanbul, Maliye defteri 15567, 16052; Kepeci 344; Ruznamçe 216, passim.
can observe this practice in the volumes concerning the Hungarian territories, where no such supplementary remarks had been customary in earlier times. The additional note often bears a date 15 to 20 years later than the grant itself, and since no new name appears, we can infer that in the meantime the person collecting the revenues in question had not changed. In one instance, the holder enjoyed the same allotment for 37 lunar years.46 Other examples, however, show that after the death of a timariot his son inherited his holding; often the official value of the deceased father’s grant and the composition of his income passed to his son intact.47 Timars did not become hereditary from one year to the next; however, the direction of change and its progressive character are quite obvious.48

In the course of our period, the average income derived from timars seems to have increased. But even in the late 1500s, many of them still remained relatively modest and often provided no more than bare subsistence. For instance, in 1485, 71 per cent of all grants located in the sub-province of Ordu by the Black Sea brought in less than 1,000 akçe and 95 per cent less than 3,000 akçe, while not a single timar yielded more than 4,000 akçe per year.49 Eighty-three years later, in the district of Erzurum, 67 per cent of all allotments remained below 3,000 akçe.50 Nor was the situation much different in the sancak of Çorum: in 1575, 51 per cent of all timars produced an income under 3,000 akçe and 81 per cent did not exceed 5,000 akçe.51 According to a document dated to 1583, the situation was slightly more favourable in the liva of Akşehir, near Konya, since here only 64 per cent of all timars produced less than 5,000 akçe in revenue.52 However, the price increases of the late 1500s must have taken their toll: in the sancak of Muş, to the west of Lake Van, in the first years of the seventeenth century, 38 per cent of all timars still did not reach 3,000 akçe, and 71 per cent remained below 5,000 akçe.53 Thus, throughout the period under

47 See, for example, Başıbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul, Maliye defteri 15567, pp. 107, 180; ibid., Kepeci 405, passim.
49 Yılmaz Kurt, 'Sis Sancağı (Kozan–Feke) Mufassal Tahrir Defteri Tanıtımı ve Değerlendirmesi II: Ekonomik Yapı', OTAM 2 (1991), 151–99 at pp. 165–6. In the district of Arvanid in Albania some 50 years earlier (1431–2), 70 per cent of all timars yielded less than 3,000 akçe. See Fodor, 'Ottoman Warfare', p. 201.
50 Başıbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul, Tapu defteri 468, p. 3.
consideration, the holders of small and very small timars must have been quite poor. Although we cannot directly compare the available data with earlier figures from the same regions, it seems likely that the living standard of certain sipahis deteriorated in the course of the 1500s due to the very considerable inflation which took place in the meantime and markedly in the last quarter of the sixteenth century.\(^54\)

The situation was not any better in Rumeli: during the 1530s, in 27 sancaks located on this territory, 40 per cent of all timars remained below 3,000 \(\text{akçe}\), and 72 per cent did not produce 5,000 \(\text{akçe}\) in revenue.\(^55\) Only in the Hungarian territories was there no such plethora of minor timar-holders; in the sancak of Simontornya, for instance, only three timars were granted in 1552, all of them above 5,000 \(\text{akçe}\) in value. In 1565, four grants out of 17, or less than 25 per cent, fell below this limit; five years later, in 1570, all 15 timars on record were worth 5,000 \(\text{akçe}\) and more.\(^56\) In the sancak of Buda, a mere 20 per cent of all ordinary timars yielded less than 5,000 \(\text{akçe}\).\(^57\)

There was thus a significant difference between Anatolia and Rumeli on the one hand and the Hungarian provinces on the other. However, this observation does not necessarily mean that the latter were richer in taxable resources, for in the newly conquered areas the government perhaps intentionally kept the number of timariots low. In Anatolia on the other hand, the Ottoman sultans may well have hesitated to change arrangements that went back to earlier centuries and thus had the sanction of tradition. Moreover, in the course of time, certain timars may have been sub-divided between heirs, a practice which the administration allowed at least to a limited extent at least from the 1530s.\(^58\) We can also explain the higher timar revenues documented for Hungary by the fact that the province was on the frontier. Possibly the government perceived that here the sipahis in return for living in constant peril needed encouragement by more substantial grants, and timars located in the borderlands quite often included revenues derived from places which were not under complete Ottoman control. As a result, sipahis in these positions

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56 Bašbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Tapu defteri 1030, 353, 505, respectively.
57 Bašbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Tapu defteri 329.
often could collect only a part of the revenues they had been assigned, and the administration must have made allowance for this fact.\textsuperscript{59}

Did the grantees really receive the sums to which they were entitled according to their diplomas (berat)? Not necessarily, for often there were remarkable differences between the nominal and actual values of a given prebend. Some timariots were so fortunate as to enjoy a somewhat higher income than that officially granted to them, for instance when the surplus revenue could not easily be used for another purpose. At least this was the formula that the scribes employed in such cases; in reality, other factors, especially good contacts with the right people, were probably decisive. Sipahis who received just the full amount granted to them also had reason for satisfaction, for many of their colleagues were far worse off, being accorded significantly less yearly revenue than their timars were worth “on paper”. Such situations occurred even in the fifteenth century: thus a register from Vidin dated to 1483 shows that within a sample of 129 timar grants, 98 (or 76 per cent) consisted of smaller sums than scheduled. A mere 12 persons (9 per cent) were lucky enough to get exactly what they were entitled to, while 19 sipahis (15 per cent) managed to obtain somewhat more revenue than scheduled. But their gains were on the whole minute.\textsuperscript{60}

To our surprise, a similar inquiry concerning the sancak of Szigetvár (Sigetvar) in 1582–3 has shown that the local sipahis did much better than their colleagues in Vidin had done a century earlier. Resources at the disposal of the exchequer made it possible to fully satisfy nearly half of the grantees (32 out of 67), and the missing sums also were a good deal lower.\textsuperscript{61} From a list covering the sancak of Buda in 1584–5, it appears that in this sub-province 52 per cent of all timariots were “underpaid”. Even less favourable was the situation in the sancak of Smederevo (Szendrő, Semendire), where during the same period the administration fully satisfied but 124 out of 282 persons; as for the remaining 56 per cent, they had to make do with less than their “paper” revenue.\textsuperscript{62}

When it came to absorbing losses, the timariots were not equal. The size of the original grant also made a difference. Presumably a zeamet-holder usually did not get into great financial difficulties even if he received less than his

\textsuperscript{60} Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Maliye defteri 1, fols. 7v–56v, 57v–75r.
\textsuperscript{61} Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Maliye defteri 15283, pp. 301–42.
due. Those timariots, however, who collected 50 (!), 150 or 200 akçe instead of 3,000 must have had serious trouble making ends meet: the amounts collected would have covered their expenses only for a few days or weeks. To make matters worse, many sipahis had to wait for years, sometimes more than a decade, after having received the sultan’s order for a revenue grant. We encounter cases of this kind mainly in the late sixteenth century, but presumably they occurred in earlier periods as well.

Why did these people accept their prebends at all, and on what other income could they count? Booty comes first to mind, and some timariots may have appropriated goods under various pretexts. “Underpaid” timariots probably had additional ways of making money that as yet escape us. Even so, it is clear that quite a few prebend-holders just barely managed to survive. But many irregular warriors and garrison soldiers still were eager to join this select group for reasons of prestige.

Revenues available to military men might diminish for all sorts of reasons, but administrative practice was always a significant factor. Thus, besides the developments discussed earlier, in the course of the sixteenth century the Ottoman government tended to reward more and more highly privileged individuals associated with the sultan’s court and the central administration with so-called gedikli zeamets. In the 1580s and 1590s, the number of people enjoying prebends of this kind was over six hundred. Scribes of the Imperial Council, officers (müteferrikas) of the court, commissaries (emins) and pursuivants (çavuşes) of the palace, and even the servants of high-ranking officials received fabulous sums, frequently far beyond the often-mentioned upper limit of the zeamet category. Supposedly no such grant was to exceed 99,999 akçe, but this rule was frequently honoured in the breach. The “paper” value of the zeamets allocated to these dignitaries reached 50 million akçe; such revenue sources existed even in places remote from the capital such as Syria, Georgia and Hungary. Direct comparisons are impossible, but it is still worth noting that in 1530 the sum total of all zeamets and timars distributed in the provinces of Anatolia, Rumeli, Rum, Karaman and the Arab territories approximated 110 million akçe.

63 In the sancaks of both Buda and Smederevo, we have located one timariot with an income of 50 akçe.
64 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul, Tapu defteri 687.
Admittedly, in practice these high-level dignitaries resident mostly in Istanbul received only about 40 million akçe, but the original sum of 50 million akçe still would have sufficed for 10,000 timars with revenues of 5,000 akçe each. Almost 150 of these fortunate personages enjoyed nominal sums of over 100,000 akçe per person, and the most highly privileged ones even had “paper” revenues of 300,000 akçe. The average amounted to 80,000 akçe or so, a substantial sum of money, indicating the high status of this group. People benefiting from such grants normally received exemption from military service, and typically they did not even live in the territory where their prebends were situated.\footnote{Géza Dávid, *Osmanlı Macaristan’inda Toplum, Ekonomi ve Yönetim. 16. Yüzyılda Simontornya Sancağı*, pp. 105–6.} This privilege caused envy among their rivals, who occasionally managed to induce the sultan’s court to confiscate some of these holdings\footnote{Başbakânlık Osmanlı Arsivi, İstanbul, Kepeci 344, p. 354.} or persuaded the monarch to withdraw the prerogative of not participating in war. Thus a certain officer (müteferrika) lost his zeamet because he had failed to join the “Hungarian campaign”.

Another list, from the year 1600, contains nearly 300 individuals enjoying the revenues of zeamets and timars belonging to the gedikli category.\footnote{Başbakânlık Osmanlı Arsivi, Istanbul, Tapu defteri 691, pp. 121–83.} This register shows that at least in this year the grantees in question had to appear at a muster similarly to ordinary timariots. In addition, the scribe also mentioned the armed retainers (cebelis) these dignitaries needed to provide, together with their arms. In a manner which perhaps was not completely systematic, the scribe also indicated if the man at issue was found to be “perfect” (mükemmel); this remark must mean that the dignitary appeared with the prescribed number of men-at-arms properly equipped.

In the late fifteenth century and throughout the sixteenth century, the administration did not spell out the exact rules of fielding cebelis as clearly as had been the custom in the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror. Apparently, the holders of timars smaller than 6,000 akçe were not expected to bring retainers.\footnote{This can be inferred from the timar defteris of the vilayet of Temesvár. See Başbakânlık Osmanlı Arsivi, Istanbul, Tapu defteri 691, pp. 121–83.} On the other hand, timar-owners with an income between 10,000

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and 19,999 akçe uniformly needed to maintain three cebelis, while zaims had to keep a man-at-arms for every 5,000 akçe they received – earlier on, this limit had been 4,000 akçe. Supposedly these modifications dated to the late 1500s, although Ayn Ali first mentioned them only in 1607.\footnote{Ayn-i Ali Efendi, Kavânîn-i Ál-i Osman der Hûlûsa-i Mezâmîn-i Defter-i Divân, preface by M. Tayyib Gökbilgin (Istanbul, 1979), pp. 13, 39. Compare Sofyâli Ali Çâvus Kanunnâmesi, ed. Midhat Sertoğlu (Istanbul, 1992), p. 21; Ahmed Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukûkî Tahîlîleri, 9 vols. (Istanbul, 1990–6), vol. 4, p. 464.}

Applying these principles to our case, which involves 1,379 retainers, it appears that slightly less than half of all prebend-holders conformed to regulations; it is a bit surprising that the registrar did not classify all these men as “perfect”. As for the remaining grantees, some of them fielded more retainers than prescribed. In some cases, the number of “extra” men-at-arms was striking: a man who brought in four cebelis while enjoying a timar of 5,000 akçe turned out to be the recorder in person. Others by contrast did not fulfil their quotas; interestingly enough, the scribes still labelled some of these delinquents as “perfect”. The final result suggests that 93 per cent of the cebelis who theoretically should have been present actually put in an appearance; even if we make allowance for the inconsistencies mentioned earlier, this achievement is remarkable. Moreover, on average, every timariot brought in 4.7 warriors, once again a very high figure due to the special status of the grantees; these men mostly possessed zamets with a good or even elevated income. On the other hand, on the basis of a list dated to 1583, we arrive at an average of 1.4 cebelis for ordinary zemet- and timar-holders.\footnote{Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul, Kepeci 320, pp. 114–16; Dávid and Fodor, ‘Changes in the Structure and Strength of the Timariot Army’, p. 171.} The resultant discrepancy once again shows the huge differences between the allotments enjoyed by grant-holders at the centre of government and those assigned to local timariots.

Surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of the men-at-arms (82 per cent) serving these high-ranking prebend-holders possessed a sword and nothing else.\footnote{The text has a ç below the names of the individuals concerned. Possible equivalents coming to mind are kilçi (“sword”), çark (“crossbow”), mizrak (“lance, javelin”) and sırick (“pole”). After some hesitation, I have decided on “sword” as the most likely weapon in the hands of a retainer. As Colin Imber has remarked, “the timar-holding cavalrymen were adept in the use of the short sword” (Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650, p. 276).} Nine per cent of the cebelis appeared with a “pole” (sırick), and only 5 per cent of the total benefited from the protection of a shield in addition to the “pole”.\footnote{The term sounds strange, but at least one contemporary chronicle refers to sırick cebelis: Topçular Kâtibi Abdülkâdir (Kadri Efendi Tarihi (Metin ve tahilî), ed. Ziya Yılmazer, 2 vols. (Ankara, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 194, 258. It is also noteworthy that when a certain Yunus bey passed} In our sample of 1,379 retainers, 32 had a handgun (tüfenk) and a
few others a rifle and another weapon, including tirkeş or srınk. Eight irregulars (sekbans) also appeared along with their guns; after all, the army employed these semi-military groups because they were able to handle muskets. All in all, due to the impoverishment of many sipahis, it was their commanders, namely the governors of sub-provinces and provinces, who needed to shoulder the expenses of warfare. As a result, governors hired armed men to serve in their households, and the sultan’s court came to rely on these supplementary forces. Therefore we find a plethora of new provinces and sub-provinces instituted during the 1500s; their governors received so-called has revenues – the same term was used for treasury lands – which were high enough to allow them to hire more reliable and effective troops. While in the early 1500s there had been 90 sancaks and 3–4 beylerbeyliks, by the century’s end there were over 200 sub-provinces and more than 30 provinces. Territorial expansion certainly was an important factor, but reorganisation within the boundaries of the early 1500s also counted for something. Provincial governors received supplementary income when the exchequer allocated them the has revenues of entire sancaks as arpalık (literally “fodder money”).

It is difficult to determine the exact strength of the timariot army on an empire-wide basis. Sources are scarce; in addition, there was constant fluctuation as sipahis died or resigned and others received new grants, some of the latter remaining ineffective. We also know very little even about the number of armed retainers demanded from timariots “on paper”, to say nothing of the actual number, and this is a further source of doubts. Therefore estimates vary from one author to the next, within a range of 50,000 to 90,000, although all scholars base their figures on the same or less reliable source, dated to 1527 and covering timars, zeamets and hases within the empire. Yet given the problems connected with the numerous small timars that we already have discussed, it seems more realistic to assume that in the 1520s the sultan could count on a maximum of 60,000 prebendal soldiers and retainers. Territorial expansion during the 1500s resulted in significant increases, so that by the end of the century the Ottoman high command could put together an army away in 1572, he left 25 srınks; Ömer [Lütfi] Barkan, ‘Edirne Askerî Kassaml’na Âıt Tereke Defterleri, 1545–1659’, Belgeler 5–6 (1966), 1–440 at p. 147.
of perhaps 80,000–100,000 individuals.\textsuperscript{78} By this later date, however, a timar-holder could avoid mobilisation by forgoing part of his yearly income; this option could seriously influence the number of fighting men present at any given muster.

\textit{The land forces: Auxiliaries}

For a lengthy period after 1453, the organisation of the auxiliary forces did not change substantively.\textsuperscript{79} But, in the long run, certain groups, like the \textit{azabs} and the \textit{martoloses}, became regular, paid garrison soldiers or served on river flotillas and in the navy, while others, such as the \textit{yayas}, \textit{müsellems} and \textit{cerehors}, lost most of their military importance; they now laboured as transporters and pioneers or else supplied the armies. By the later 1500s, the Ottoman government considered certain paramilitary units obsolete and dissolved them. As a result, \textit{müsellems} and \textit{yayas} were disbanded first in 1582 and once again before 1609.\textsuperscript{80} As for the \textit{akıncı} and their special breed of horses, in the battle of Târgovişte (Tergovişte) in 1595, losses were so high that reorganisation seemed unpromising; henceforth this corps became quite insignificant.\textsuperscript{81} In its place, the Ottoman commanders now relied on the nomadic light cavalry of the Crimean \textit{hans}, whose ferociously and cruelty were a source of terror to their victims but redoubtable even to the Ottomans themselves.\textsuperscript{82} Observers often exaggerated the number of men provided by the \textit{hans}; during the long war, no more than 20,000–25,000 Tatars appeared when led by their ruler and 10,000 to 15,000 when a prince, such as the \textit{kalga} or a \textit{mirza}, commanded this contingent.\textsuperscript{83}

Sometime in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century, Ottoman army commanders on the Balkan Peninsula created a new corps, known as the \textit{deli}. Its members belonged to the households of the provincial and also the – more prominent – sub-provincial governors, so that they do not figure in state

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{78}{Barkan, ‘Timar’, p. 290, cetvel 2.}
\footnote{79}{Fodor, ‘Ottoman Warfare, 1300–1453’, pp. 205, 211–17.}
\footnote{82}{In an official Ottoman document sent to the voivode of Moldavia in 1532, the author claims that the Tatars eat horse and human (!) flesh and are difficult to control. See Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, ‘Az ország ügye mindenenk előtt való.’ \textit{A szultáni tanács Magyarországra vonatkozó rendeletei (1544–1545, 1552). Affairs of State Are Supreme’. The Orders of the Ottoman Imperial Council Pertaining to Hungary (1544–1545, 1552) (Budapest, 2005), p. 229 (Turkish text).}
\footnote{83}{Mária Ivanics, \textit{A Krimi Kánság a tizenöt éves háborúban} (Budapest, 1994), pp. 176–7.}
\end{footnotes}
documents but only in narrative material. Perhaps with a bit of exaggeration, our sources describe them as unusually courageous and indeed fanatic, clad in wild animals’ furs and carrying huge weapons to terrify their opponents; their function was similar to that of the *akıncı*.

In Anatolia, *sancas, sekbans* or *levends* had a status similar to that of the *délis* in Rumeli. These young men left their homes in the countryside due to the attractions of a military career and also to escape excessive taxation. Those who were lucky found places in the households of governors and chief officers (*ümera*); others were only temporarily employed for the duration of a given campaign, and when discharged they lived by robbery and banditry. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, military uprisings sometimes involving huge armies broke out all over Anatolia; the fighting forces of these so-called *celali* rebels were typically *sancas, sekbans* or *levends*.

**The land forces: Fortress garrisons**

At the outset, pre-existing castles conquered by the Ottomans served to stabilise the frontier; later on, sultans and commanders added their own fortifications when and where it seemed necessary. Given the territorial expansion of the empire, new conquests transformed the front lines again and again. Places that earlier on had been important lost their significance, while new centres emerged crowded with garrison troops. As few scholars have studied the changing Ottoman borders and the pertinent castles manned by frontier troops, we also know little about the fortress garrisons. As a rare exception, we possess a detailed monograph on Ottoman Hungary. Consequently, all we can offer here is a sketchy characterisation of the large Ottoman defence network, which apart from new creations incorporated fortifications from the Roman, Byzantine and Seljuk periods.

On an imperial level, an account book, often called a “budget” in the scholarly literature, lists the total number of fortress soldiers region by region, both

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those receiving pay in cash and those accorded timars. Dated to 1527–8, this document tells us that some 58 per cent of all the garrison soldiers in question, roughly 24,000 out of 41,000 persons, served in the Rumelian territories, although these were much smaller than the Asian and African provinces of the empire.\(^8^9\) This concentration of power along the Hungarian borderlines signifies that western territories featured prominently in Sultan Süleyman’s field of vision and that in his perspective the Habsburg enemy was stronger and more dangerous than Safavid Iran.

While this list provides only totals but no information on individual castles, we can supplement the available data on the basis of a general survey of the empire’s resources (muhasebe defteri) compiled around 1530, which we have already used in another context as well. Moreover, we can derive further figures from more or less contemporary timar (or icmal) defteris.\(^9^0\) Certainly we cannot vouch for the completeness of the relevant data. However, it appears that a castle with over 500 defenders was a rare phenomenon in this period; border areas aside, quite often the more or less symbolic presence of soldiers in the provincial centres was enough to prevent local disturbances.

Slightly later, the Ottoman government began to favour considerably larger garrisons in the newly conquered territories. Thus the vilayet of Buda, whose provincial capital was the former royal seat, continued to expand until 1566. There emerged three castles with gigantic defence forces, namely Buda, Esztergom and Székesfehérvár (Istolni Belgrad), which the Ottoman armies had captured at an early stage of their advance. Due to their strategic importance against the Habsburgs, these three fortresses for a while gained an exceptional position. Thus, in 1541–2, 3,000 soldiers garrisoned Buda, but this number diminished later on: by 1543 there were about 2,500 soldiers, nearly 1,900 by 1549 and some 1,700 by 1557–8. With temporary ups and downs, the garrison retained this latter size until 1591. Esztergom, which came to be of special significance as the stronghold nearest to the Habsburg Empire, had a “paper” contingent of some 3,300 men in 1543. However, at the muster undertaken in the same year, merely some 2,200 soldiers were present since apparently supplements were under way but had not yet arrived. Here, too, the garrison contracted with the passage of time. Moreover, in 1549, the defenders


of Cığırdelen, a fortress on the other side of the Danube, featured among the approximately 1,800 men on active service in Esztergom. In 1554, 1,562 soldiers were present, and by 1557–8 their number had further diminished to nearly 1,500. During the following decade, the number remained more or less stable, but by 1591 it had dropped to 1,418. Székesfehérvár, the former coronation town of the Hungarian kings, in 1543 had a nominal strength of over 3,000 soldiers, with only a hundred of them absent. Later evidence is somewhat contradictory, but here as well the number of soldiers diminished; in 1591, only some 1,300 men were left.91 Garrison troops in the “Big Three” decreased between the 1540s and 1590s because the Ottoman military authorities had instituted a system of smaller and medium-sized strongholds in the surrounding areas, which encompassed both pre-existing fortifications and newly built palankas. As a result, huge contingents in the main fortresses were no longer necessary.92

Around 1545, 13,000 men served in the defence of the province; except for the withdrawal of more than 2,000 janissaries, this figure did not change significantly during the following decade. By the 1570s, some 15,000 garrison troops were on guard, aided by almost 1,000 janissaries. At the end of our period in 1591, 14,000 soldiers were stationed in Hungarian fortresses; complemented by 800 janissaries, they ensured the security of the frontier.93 Altogether there were approximately one hundred forts of various sizes in the province after the Ottoman armies captured Szigetvár in 1566, just after the death of Sultan Süleyman. Transdanubia and northern Hungary were thickly dotted with castles, while the Great Plain contained but a few defence works. Likewise, the right bank of the Danube was strategically more important than the left bank or the river Tisza.

As regards the second Hungarian province, the vilayet of Temesvár (established in 1552), we possess very few sources; taken together, the defenders amounted to no more than 4,000–4,500 men in over 35 usually rather small fortifications. Only 600 soldiers sufficed for the provincial seat of Temesvár.94 After all, in the period under discussion, the Habsburgs were not in a position to threaten this particular section of the Ottoman borderlands.

94 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 166; vol. 2, p. 1355.
The territories south of the river Drava had been subject to the kingdom of Hungary and after the Ottoman conquest first formed part of the province of Rumeli; in 1580, the Ottomans established Bosnia (Bosna) as an independent province. Information on garrison troops here comes from an undated but detailed list, probably compiled in the early 1600s. This date is highly probable, as the soldiers listed here received merely 70 per cent of their original pay, a practice introduced at about this time.  

The text enumerates 10,304 paid soldiers stationed in the sancaks of Požega (Pojega), Bosnia, Bihać (Bihke), Začasna, Herzegovina (Hersek), Klis (Clissa, Kilis) and Krka (Kırka).

Thus the defence capacities of the Ottoman border fortifications from the Adriatic Sea to the Lower Danube amounted to 30,000 soldiers at the end of the sixteenth century; of this rather significant force, the overwhelming majority faced the troops of the “king of Vienna”.

On the Habsburg side in 1572, 128 strongholds contained some 20,000 soldiers, about 14,000 in Hungary in addition to 6,000 men in Croatia and Slavonia, a threefold growth as compared to 1526. By 1593, there were 171 castles with about 22,700 registered soldiers: some 15,450 in Hungary and 7,250 in the two other regions. Since some 1,800,000 people lived in Royal Hungary, well over 1 per cent must have consisted of military men. This proportion was, however, much higher in the Ottoman borderlands, as the Hungarian territories under their rule were inhabited by 900,000 souls. To this figure we should add an unknown number for Bosnia. Garrison forces ranging between 20,000 and 30,000 soldiers thus should have made up between 2.2 and 3.3 per cent of the resident population and somewhat less if we include Bosnia. Along the Mediterranean littoral of Ottoman Europe, the survey of 1530 indicates that Navarino (Navarin/Neokastro, in the vicinity of modern Pylos, Anavarin) was probably the premier strategic point, with a minimum of 650 frontier guards. Together with nearby Modon (Methoni, Moton), with about 330 defenders, and Koron (Koroni), with at least 380, Navarin was well able to resist any attack on the Peloponnese. By contrast, otherwise

96 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul, Maliye defteri 5279, p. 349.
important cities, like Thessaloniki (Selanik), seem to have possessed only 150 paid soldiers. On the Black Sea coast, Kilia (Kilija) and Akkerman (Bilhorod Dnjistrovskij) had the largest garrisons, with at least 500 men in the first and over 650 in the second; by comparison, Azov (Azak), with some 300 paid soldiers, and Kaffa (Kefe), with fewer than 250, were of secondary importance.

Temporary successes on the Persian frontiers resulted in large garrisons established in the newly conquered castles of Armenia and Georgia. Around 1585, in Yerevan (Revan) alone, 5,600 soldiers were to be stationed, perhaps the highest figure attested so far for any fortification within the empire. In Dmanisi (Tumanis), there were about 2,400 garrison soldiers, and in Lori nearly 1,900. However, in Azerbaijan, the Ottoman commanders seemingly needed far fewer fighting men: in 1597–8, only 481 paid combatants and 19 repair workers were responsible for the defence of Tabriz, including the newly built bastion. In the southern section of the Ottoman–Iranian frontier, there were no mountains to separate the two empires. As a result, Basra needed a garrison of respectable size: in 1599–1600, more than 1,700 persons were in charge of its castle, among them 217 pursuivants of the divan, whose combat value was probably limited.

Egypt was a special case. As the authorities had never introduced the timar system, a rather large paid contingent served here, mainly in Cairo (Al-Kahira, Kahire / Misr). We do not know the total number of gönüllüs, mounted gunners and the so-called Circassians (Çerakise), the three units generally stationed in the centre of the province; nor do we have much information on soldiers serving in provincial fortifications, some of which were Ottoman constructions. An order dated to 1568 refers to 8,811 soldiers (kul) in “Misr”. Only 4,700 were present in the city, while the others served in various, not necessarily military, functions, mainly in the countryside. Among their other duties they protected the pilgrims en route to Mecca and Medina and also served in the Yemen. From the central government’s viewpoint,

99 Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, p. 54.
101 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Maliye defteri 6416.
103 This term denotes both Egypt and Cairo. Since the text refers to Misr as opposed to the rest of the province, the scribe probably intended “Cairo”.
the Abyssinian territories were an extension of Egypt, and the authorities did not feel that they needed a large concentration of power so far to the south. Some 500 or 600 soldiers, rarely more than one thousand, could manage the defence of the coasts and frontiers.\footnote{106} On the North African shoreline, Tunis and La Goletta changed hands quite often; in 1534, 1570 and 1574, the city and the fortress fell into Ottoman hands, the last conquest being the final one. We have only estimates concerning the numerical strength of the defenders; supposedly some 8,000 soldiers served here both in Ottoman and Spanish times.\footnote{107}

Once again, several of the values proposed earlier are minimums; in Damascus, for instance, janissaries sent from the centre might significantly augment the size of the local garrison. All in all, however, the figures referred to previously probably characterise the relative military strengths of the individual regions and fortifications with some accuracy.

A garrison normally held müstahfizes (hisar eri, merd-i kale), azabs and martoloses, who were foot soldiers, cavalry men (fâris, beşli, ulufecîyan-i süvari) and gönülüs, who also served on horseback, topçus as artillerymen and non-combatant units, including craftsmen, musicians and gatekeepers. Proportions could vary; certain contingents were frequently missing altogether. Garrison commanders were known as dizdar; they received better pay than their subordinates but still much less than sancakbeyis. Usually a dizdar could count on 3,000 to 6,000 akçe per year; his pay rarely surpassed 8,000 akçe but exceptionally exceeded 10,000 akçe.\footnote{108} Commanders active in the Tabriz region were the best paid of all; at least in 1597–8, 16,666 akçe were on record in Sindiyan and 19,999 akçe in the provincial centre of Tabriz.\footnote{109} An officer who was probably the warden of Aleppo castle in the 1550s got 50 akçe daily, or 18,000 akçe per year.\footnote{110} On the other hand, a district governor pocketed at least 150,000–200,000 akçe every year. Admittedly, certain dizdars exploited their privileged positions and thus succeeded in accumulating a certain amount of wealth.\footnote{111}

\footnote{108} Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Tapu defteri 22, position 56; Tapu defteri 58, p. 324.
\footnote{109} Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Tapu defteri 668, pp. 281, 297.
\footnote{110} Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Maliye defteri 3723, p. 153.
\footnote{111} Nenad Moačanin, ‘Hacı Mehmed Ağa of Požega, God’s Special Protégé (ca. 1490–ca. 1580)’, in Hungarian–Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent, ed. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Budapest, 1994), pp.171–81.
An example: Soldiers deployed in the 1543 campaign

Scholars often have discussed the total number of soldiers deployed in Ottoman imperial campaigns. Several authors have opined that, including irregulars and non-combatants, this figure could amount to a hundred thousand or more. Thus Géza Perjés has proposed that in 1526 the Ottomans entered Hungary with an army of 150,000 men, while Christopher Duffy has postulated that 125,000 soldiers and others marched against Vienna in 1529. Comparing these figures with contemporary contingents deployed in the European theatres of war, however, we can conclude that if the Ottomans had managed to field armies of even half the size attributed to them, it would have been a great success.

Concrete evidence from the 1543 campaign suggests that the number of Ottoman soldiers involved could not have been much higher than 50,000 or 60,000. At the outset of operations, roughly 13,000–13,500 janissaries and members of the six cavalry regiments of the sultan’s court received their pay when under Siklós in southern Hungary. We should add nearly 1,500 armourers, artillerymen and gun carriage drivers and some 3,600 people of the Seraglio, some of them surely non-combatants. The rest of the computation remains speculative: perhaps 20,000–27,000 timariots and their retainers participated, equivalent to some 33–45 per cent of all sipahis in the empire, along with their cebelis. But it is very hard to find reliable data on the number of timariots actually deployed, particularly as we cannot tell to what extent cavalry soldiers from the more remote provinces actually showed up. If this estimate is realistic, we arrive at about 40,000 or 45,000 “regulars”. In addition, the army may have contained 10,000–15,000 irregular soldiers and other auxiliary troops. In certain campaigns, we also have to reckon with the contingents provided by vassal states, but in enterprises without the sultan, when the commanders were vezirs or paşas, even fewer soldiers must have participated.

113 Tallett, War and Society, p. 5, table 1.
115 Dávid and Fodor, ‘Changes in the Structure and Strength of the Timariot Army’, p. 171.
The navy

Originally a continental and nomadic society, the Ottomans had a long way to go before they became a “seaborne empire”.\(^{117}\) Mehmed II made certain efforts in this direction and was successful against Venice on several occasions, occupying islands and towns; albeit temporarily, in 1480 he even captured Otranto in southern Italy. But the real breakthrough occurred when in 1494 or 1495 Bayezid II pragmatically invited a pirate by the name of Kemal Reis to lead the Ottoman fleet.\(^{118}\) Kemal Reis effectively reorganised the navy, building larger warships; as a result, in 1499 he was able to gain the first great naval victory near Lepanto (Navpaktos /İnebahtı). After Kemal’s death, performance became less brilliant. Süleyman the Magnificent then took the next momentous decision when in 1534 he decided to employ Barbarossa Hayreddin, another well-known and charismatic corsair.\(^{119}\) From this time on, the main Ottoman fleet was under the command of the kapudan paşa (kapitanpaşa, kapudan-ı derya), who was at the same time the beylerbeyi of the Archipelago; the centre of this maritime province was located in Gallipoli (Gelibolu). To counter Portuguese aspirations in the region, in 1525 the sultan had a smaller naval base established on the Red Sea coast.\(^{120}\) Between 1538, when the Ottoman navy won a major victory near Prevesa, and 1571, marking its defeat at Lepanto, the sultans were the equals of or perhaps even superior to the Venetian and Spanish Mediterranean navies.

A galley with 200–300 persons aboard could not move very far away from the shore, as the crew needed to obtain fresh provisions and water daily or at least every second day.\(^{121}\) Therefore admirals generally attacked the opposing fleets near a coastal supply base and not on the open sea; after all, the main goal of such encounters was expansion on land.\(^{122}\)

\(^{120}\) See Fleet (Chapter 5) and Özbaran (Chapter 6) in the present volume.
When constructing their dockyards and also several types of warships, the Ottomans mainly followed the Venetian model and thus benefited from a centuries-old tradition of warfare in the Adriatic. In addition to techniques, they also imported many nautical terms. The earliest large dockyard (ter-sane) was in Gelibolu, superseded in the beginning of the sixteenth century by the shipyard in Istanbul. In the latter, there were two covered slipways in each dock; taken together, Istanbul and Gelibolu had a construction and maintenance capacity of 250 galleys. This remarkable potential must have been very close to the combined capability of the arsenals in Venice and Barcelona, and in case of urgency sufficed for the construction of a large number of ships in a very short period of time: after the crushing defeat at Lepanto, a completely new Ottoman fleet sailed out the following spring. Other docks functioned in Sinop, İznikmid/Izmit, Samsun and Rusçuk (Ruse), where timber and other building materials were at hand, but due to military necessities, naval construction also took place in Birecik, Basra and even Suez (Süveys). In the sixteenth century, vessels with oars and sails were the backbone of the Ottoman navy and were complemented by sailing ships. The most common warship was the galley, first the lighter type known as the galiot (Ottoman kalyata, Italian galeotta or fusta). Later Istanbul shipbuilders favoured the heavier variety, called kadırga, the equivalent of the Venetian galea. In the course of the 1500s, shipbuilders all over the Mediterranean began to furnish an increasing number of galleys with cannon, also rearranging the oars so as to make the ships more efficient. Mavnas – and the Venetian galeazzas – were the largest vessels of this type. On the basis of Ottoman evidence, the galeazza seems to have appeared in the sultan’s navy in 1572. On the other hand, an Italian author writing in 1565 maintained that both galeazzas and mavnas (mahone) were present in Süleyman Paşa’s fleet as early as 1537. Among sailing ships, the kalyon (galeone) enjoyed special prominence, being used mostly for transportation but later on also in combat.

123 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 301.
124 Similarly, in 1570, 100 galleys left the Venetian Arsenal in less than two months. See Robert C. Davis, Shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenal: Workers and Workplace in the Preindustrial City (Baltimore and London, 1991), p. 80.
125 Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı, pp. 17–24.
126 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 297.
127 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 298; Alfonso Ulloa, La vita dell’invitissimo e sacratissimo imperatore Carlo quinto (Venice, 1575), p. 147b.
128 Further types of ships are described in İdris Bostan, Kürekli ve Yelkenli Osmanlı Gemileri (İstanbul, 2005).
It is difficult to estimate the total number of warships sailing under the Ottoman flag, for example in the 1530s or the 1570s. Most available figures – such as they are – come from the descriptions of major battles. Accordingly, in 1538 some 140 galliots fought the battle of Prevesa against some 130 Christian galleys; in addition, the Red Sea fleet had about 70 vessels. As a result, the Ottoman navy should have possessed 210 large ships. Thirty-three years later, the sultan’s admirals deployed 210 galleys, 64 galliots and 64 fustas against 201 galleys and 6 galeazzas – or perhaps even 236 Christian galleys – put to sea by Philip II, the pope and Venice. This figure suggests that Ottoman naval strength had increased by 50 per cent in the intervening years. However, in 1538, the admiral was Barbarossa Hayreddin, an experienced sailor of unquestionable authority; he thus could win with a weaker fleet. On the other hand, the 1571 commander Müezzinzade Ali Paşa, a former ağ of the janissaries, had a much more modest competence in maritime warfare, and this fact partly explains why the Ottomans lost in spite of a slight numerical superiority.

In the Ottoman Empire as elsewhere, building vessels and maintaining an armada was extremely expensive. In Spain, the Ottomans’ chief naval opponent, expenditures trebled between 1529 and 1587, mainly due to increasing biscuit prices, and the situation was not basically different in Venice. Interest in large-scale naval confrontations therefore diminished during the 1570s. In the case of the Ottomans, this newly found cost-consciousness meant that after the capture of Tunis in 1574, a significant success against the Portuguese in Morocco in 1578 and a truce with Spain signed in 1580, the sultans’ high command tended to pay much less attention to the navy. When Murad III changed his mind and decided to re-animate the fleet in 1590, he had to face a lack of adequate personnel, especially commanders. Financial resources also were insufficient, a deficiency which induced the sultan to attempt a concealed taxation of the ruling elite. Beylerbeyis, sancakbeyis and defterdars were to pay the treasury, in cash, the sums of money needed to construct one to eight galleys per office-holder, depending on the revenues at his disposal. Had this initiative been realised, the navy would have gained 148 galleys. As

130 For the huge costs of maintaining the Spanish navy, see Felipe Ruiz Martin, ‘Las finanzas de la Monarquía Hispanica y la Liga Santa’, in Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del ’500 alla luce di Lepanto, ed. Gino Benzoni (Florence, 1974), pp. 325–70; Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, pp. 270–1 and figs. 13 and 14 on pp. 224–5.
the authorities calculated the value of a ship at 300,000 akçe, total expenses, including the share to be paid by the exchequer, would have amounted to 66,900,000 akçe. This sum corresponded to 23 to 35 per cent of the annual central “budgets” of the later sixteenth century, once more indicating the costliness of the navy.132

Most of the naval fighting crews were soldiers known as azabs, but the military administration also regularly obliged certain timariots, generally those with the least pay, to participate in campaigns aboard ship. Janissaries and soldiers known as levends made up the remainder of the fighting men.133 Once again, numbers are difficult to estimate, but we can probably count on 25,000 Ottoman and 28,000 Christian soldiers participating in the battle of Lepanto.134 Thus, compared to a campaign on land, about half as many fighting men participated in a major sea battle.

Among the oarsmen propelling naval vessels, the majority probably were young men levied from among the Balkan and Anatolian populations. As so often when the administration recruited personnel, a certain number of households needed to send one person to provide military or non-combatant services, covering also his travel expenses.135 Secondly, it was common practice to send criminals to the galleys. Ottoman law did not identify specific crimes to be punished in this fashion; rather, due to the pressing need for oarsmen, the sultan occasionally demanded that as many offenders as possible be made to serve the navy in this fashion.136 Thirdly, as a cheap and easy method of recruitment, on both the Ottoman and the Spanish Habsburg galleys, many rowers were captives.137 By contrast, the Venetians were more cautious and hesitated to utilise Ottoman slaves for this purpose.138 Survival rates were low, especially among prisoners; if a galley sank, these unfortunate pariahs, chained to the benches, went under. Some of the slaves, however, managed to escape, due to mutiny, success of the other side in battle, an individual act

or else a gesture on the part of the victors. Volunteers formed a fourth category, but often we do not know whether they had really chosen this job or were indirectly forced into it by poverty or some other problem.

Military authorities also extended the earlier network of small river flotillas plying the Danube and the Morava. These ships were indispensable in transporting victuals and war materiel, in Hungary especially on the strategically important waters of Transdanubia. Around 1542–3, after the final Ottoman conquest, the first naval commander (kapudan) of the Danube River fleet took office, with his seat in Buda. Though significantly smaller, the river Drava was also in use, and references to a flotilla on Lake Balaton have survived as well. On the Great Plain, the Tisza, the country’s second largest river, gave its name to a kapudanlık centred in Szolnok. Dated to 1589, a document mentions a captain commanding boats on the river Maros. Similar naval commands also appeared in the Bosnian border region, the first in Gradiška on the Sava around 1535 and some six less important captaincies elsewhere at different dates before 1580. Small kapudanlikks located on the seaboard also existed, but only two of them were in Rumeli, namely Kavala and Nauplia (Napoli, Anabolu). In Egypt, the kapudans of Alexandria (İskenderiyye) and Damietta (Dimyat) are referred to in our sources either because they defended the ports where they were stationed or because they joined the sultans’ navy with their ships. Furthermore, Suez, Moha, Remle/Basra and Lahsa all figured as captaincies of secondary importance. Evidently sultans and admirals established subsidiary naval commands, mainly in border regions. Although by the mid-1500s most of the Mediterranean coastlands were part of the Ottoman domain, control of the sea was always precarious, and the ports in this area needed constant watching.

139 Aymard, ‘Chiourmes et galères’, p. 86; Motta, ‘Da Messina a Lepanto’, p. 89; Roma, Biblioteca Vallicelliana Mss. N. 36, fols. 1r–26r; Venezia, Archivio di Stato, Lettere e scritture turchesche IV, pp. 115–16.
142 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Mühimme defteri 65, p. 92, no. 378.
The sinews of war

Armaments

Early Ottoman cannon founders began by casting real monsters, among other things during the siege of Istanbul in 1453. However, huge guns became obsolete very soon. The sultans and their military leaders quickly responded to the new challenge and began to use French techniques developed in the second half of the fifteenth century. From the study of a sample of over one thousand pieces, it emerges that between 1522 and 1525 some 97 per cent of the new cannon manufactured in Istanbul were of small or medium size. The relevant list also demonstrates that founders in the Ottoman service soon reduced the production of wrought iron guns and replaced them by the more efficient bronze cannon.\(^{147}\) The greatest imperial foundry was located in Istanbul, and as the preceding example suggests, it possessed remarkable capacities. Smaller enterprises of this kind functioned during campaigns in some 20 places all over the empire. Their output occasionally matched or even outclassed the capacities of major European foundries.\(^{148}\)

While we can reconstruct the locations and capacities of cannon-producing workshops, much less information is available concerning handguns. Apart from official enterprises serving the soldiery, private gunsmiths also manufactured muskets, which were sometimes of higher quality and consequently more popular. To some extent, firearms also arrived from outside the empire, but their number remains unknown. By the end of the sixteenth century, Ottoman authors were quite critical of local handguns.\(^{149}\)

Gunpowder mills (\textit{baruthane}) and saltpetre pits functioned all over the empire, and during the sixteenth century production met all needs. In our epoch, eight major mills were in operation, three in Istanbul and one each in Belgrade, Buda, Temesvár, Baghdad, and Cairo. Around 1570, the \textit{baruthanes} of Istanbul produced a minimum aggregate yearly output of 145,800 kilograms and a maximum of 291,600 kilograms. The quality of Ottoman gunpowder usually met European standards, and manufacturers throughout the empire tried to use identical proportions of ingredients, no matter where they operated.\(^{150}\) At the end of the sixteenth century, the

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{Ágoston, \textit{Guns for the Sultan}, p. 180.}
\footnote{Ibid., pp. 90–1, 93, 95.}
\footnote{Ibid., pp. 128–63.}
\end{footnotesize}
government experimented with the importation of small quantities of gunpowder from England; from this source, Ottoman arsenals received some 500 barrels per year.\textsuperscript{151}

**Provisioning**

Provisioning is a crucial factor for the success of any campaign, and in this field the Ottomans were especially effective. When appointed grand vezir in 1539, Lütfi Paşa reformed the previous “postal service”, now renamed menzilhane. Officially determined stopping points not only served imperial couriers but also functioned as supply centres for food and fodder during campaigns; the new system functioned quite efficiently.\textsuperscript{152} When the sultan had decided on a military enterprise, local kadi received orders prescribing the quantities of wheat, flour, barley and other necessities to be collected in their respective districts.\textsuperscript{153} Sheep-breeders/drovers (celep) were responsible for supplying the soldiers with meat, mainly mutton, acquired from Rumeli, Moldavia and Walachia and sometimes from the nomads of Anatolia.\textsuperscript{154} The sultan’s court probably asked for more than the minimum required, while local officers often faced difficulties in assembling the quotas demanded. A short list probably dated to 1543 clearly shows this tendency. People living in nine administrative districts of relatively small size were to deliver 1,700 münd of flour and 2,000 münd of barley, but officials could only collect 428 münd and 11 kile of flour and 94 münd and 3 kile of barley in addition to some hay.\textsuperscript{155}

Such a low degree of efficiency was not the rule, as is apparent from another document prepared in the same year, probably at the end of the campaign, which contains cumulative figures concerning the provisioning of the army. These data do not permit us to gauge local effectiveness, but they do give a general impression of the resources at the disposal of the Ottoman


\textsuperscript{152} Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Osmanlılarla Ulaşım ve Haberleşme (Menziller)* (Ankara, 2002), for example pp. 7, 13, 43.


\textsuperscript{155} Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul, Maliye defteri, 157, fols. 5r–6v.
army command: 4,815 müd of flour (2,470 tons) were collected, but the soldiers only received about 25 per cent. Of the surplus, 1,609 müd stayed in Belgrade, the principal provisioning centre for the Hungarian campaigns, where the Ottoman administration had huge storage facilities built. The army conveyed 231 müd to Esztergom, and there still remained 1,740 müd of flour at the disposal of the authorities. As regards barley, 9,649 müd (4,294 tons) were accumulated, of which 850 müd were shared out to the soldiers and 3,450 müd passed on to the imperial stables. Stocks in Belgrade amounted to 3,138 müd, and the various military leaders still had 2,209 müd at their disposal, a really impressive quantity. Sofia served as another site for military storehouses, while Amasya and Aleppo played a similar role when the army was to campaign against the shah of Iran, either on the north-eastern or the south-eastern frontier.

The document covering the campaign of 1543 allows us to compute per capita rations: janissaries as well as armourers, artillerymen and gun carriers received about 1.4 kile of flour each, while salaried cavalrymen of the court could count on 1 kile. The former also got between 0.2 and 0.3 kile of barley per person; this quantity was small, but after all these infantry soldiers and artillerymen only used a small number of horses. Cavalrymen, by contrast – or rather their horses – enjoyed 2–2.4 kile of barley per capita. Unfortunately, the document does not tell us how long these supplies should have lasted; perhaps “a standard campaign season” was at issue, for during the war of 1521 the soldiers had received the same quantities of food and fodder, once again for an unspecified length of time. A rough computation gives the following results: 1.4 kile of flour equals 34–36 kg; from this quantity bakers could produce approximately 26–28 kg of bread and 13–14 kg of hardtack. If we apply the per diem cereal rations recorded by Marsigli for Ottoman soldiers when resting in barracks, which amounted to 320 grams of bread and 160 grams of hardtack, we may conclude that the quantity distributed sufficed for about 80–90 days. Consequently soldiers had to find supplementary sources of nourishment, particularly since both men and their mounts needed more food and fodder while on the march.

In the course of imperial operations, the army rarely faced shortages. One of the few known exceptions is the 1529 Vienna campaign, when the

157 Bağbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Maliye defteri 499, p. 29.
159 Cited in Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, p. 89.
lack of food and fodder, especially barley, seems to have reached exceptional dimensions. Stocks were so limited that only the cavalrymen of the sultan’s court received flour and barley, and several poor people died of starvation.

Spying

When working out strategies for a campaign, information about the enemy’s political situation, economic conditions, military plans or actual movements could be essential to say nothing of the peculiarities of the landscape, roads and passes that soldiers would need to traverse. As recent research has revealed, the Ottomans had a rather effective on-the-spot intelligence network. Furthermore, certain European cities served as centres of international spying. Venice played a very special role: in this city, one could collect all sorts of knowledge from merchants and secret agents, mainly about the Ottomans; yet spies serving the sultan also gathered information here. Certain highly mobile merchants from Ragusa/Dubrovnik quite often worked for both sides. In Iran, there lived quite a few Sunni Turks, and some of them could supply useful information about the shah’s military strength. Though we have no direct proof, we can almost take it for granted that for instance Ulama Bey/Paşa, who had temporarily served the shah but then fallen from grace, shared his experiences of the Iranian court with Ottoman leaders when he fled back to the sultan’s territory.

Soldiers in life and death

Our knowledge about the marital status of Ottoman garrison soldiers is extremely limited. Thus a pay list dated 1558–9 from the vilayet of Buda is a fortunate find, for it not only records whether a given man was married but also whether his wife was living with him.\textsuperscript{166} Our sample is rather modest, covering 417 soldiers in five fortresses; of this group, 109 men (26 per cent) had spouses. Central European figures were not fundamentally different. Thus, according to a presumably seventeenth-century document, in the Münster garrison of Coesfeld 36 per cent of 918 soldiers had established families.\textsuperscript{167} The percentage of married men in the province of Buda is perhaps higher than anticipated at this stage of the Ottoman presence in Hungary, and it is also surprising that 84 women lived together with their menfolk in the fortresses. Those females who had not accompanied their husbands resided in towns and villages of southern Hungary and the Balkans. Presumably, many men who had left their spouses in faraway places expected to return to their homes fairly soon.

A list dated to 1554 and enumerating 3,412 soldiers serving in Hungary also contains information on their marital status and ethnic background. Here we find 514 married men, 15 per cent of all soldiers, with noticeable variations among the different ethnicities serving in the province. Soldiers from Bosnia and Herzegovina seldom had wives (9.8 and 8.2 per cent, respectively); these men usually had chosen the military as a lifetime career. On the other hand, among the contingents from Greece, Anatolia and the Near East there were many more married soldiers.\textsuperscript{168} A third register shows that marriage was more widespread in certain fortresses than in others and that there were also notable differences between the various corps. Members of prestigious units like the gönülüs were probably older and thus more often had founded families – 26 out of 48 deceased gönülüs left orphans – but in the other corps men with children were very much the exception.\textsuperscript{169} In general, cavalrymen remained single more often than soldiers serving in the infantry.

We know nothing about women accompanying the army. It is difficult to imagine that there were no females consorting with the soldiers during the long months of marching, but we cannot tell whether military men found themselves female company among the local populations or whether,

\textsuperscript{166} Hegyi, \textit{A török hódoltság várai}, vol. 1, pp. 218–19.
\textsuperscript{167} Tallett, \textit{War and Society}, pp. 132–3.
\textsuperscript{168} Hegyi, \textit{A török hódoltság várai}, vol. 1, pp. 219–22.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p. 223.
similarly to the European custom, professional prostitutes joined the army for an entire campaign.\textsuperscript{170}  

Nor is there much information available on the medical treatment of wounded and sick soldiers.\textsuperscript{171} So far, we have found only very few references to surgeons or doctors employed in the garrison towns; in Ottoman Hungary, they were on record only in the three major fortresses of Buda, Pest and Gyula.\textsuperscript{172} Presumably there were others about whom nothing is known; doctors (\textit{tabibs}, \textit{hekims}), surgeons (\textit{cerrahs}) and oculists (\textit{kehhals}) must have regularly been present in the armies.\textsuperscript{173} However, among the ten persons figuring under the heading of “doctors” (\textit{atibba}) in a campaign record of 1521, only two actually seem to have been \textit{tabibs}, while eight apparently were religious scholars (\textit{mevlanas}, \textit{hocas}).\textsuperscript{174} Herbalists (\textit{attars}) must have also played a role in curing the sick and preparing medicines and liniments, while we do not know whether barbers (\textit{berbers}), listed among the numerous craftsmen serving soldiers on campaign (\textit{orducus}), dealt with minor medical problems as well.\textsuperscript{175}

A contemporary witness noted that, in order to avoid epidemics, great efforts were made to maintain cleanliness in the camp; two separate tents served as toilets, and when pits filled up, the men covered them immediately and moved the tents to some other place.\textsuperscript{176} Archival records confirm the observations of this Hungarian gentleman.\textsuperscript{177} However, these precautions could not always prevent the outbreak of epidemics like typhus or dysentery.

According to the law book of the janissaries, on campaign soldiers known as \textit{yayabaşış} were responsible for transporting the dead and wounded; this text also describes the job of the \textit{mahfeci}, who placed a framalike device on army camels, where sick and wounded soldiers found temporary shelter.\textsuperscript{178}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Hegyi, \textit{A török hódoltság várai}, vol. 2, pp. 479 (1630–1: Buda), 487 (1543: Pest), 495 (1557–8: Pest); vol. 3, p. 1470 (around 1621: Gyula).
\item Topçular Kâtibi, vol. 1, pp. 12, 184, 402–3, 485.
\item Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul, Maliye defterleri 499, p. 29.
\item Nurhan Atasoy, \textit{Otağ-ı Hümayun: The Ottoman Imperial Tent Complex} (Istanbul, 2000), p. 18; on p. 137 we find a \textit{hayme-i ābkâne}; i.e., “privy tent”.
\item Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Keleti Gyűjtemény, Budapest, T. O. 252, fols. 97a, 99a. For a Hungarian translation, see Pál Fodor, \textit{A janicsárok törvényci} (1606) (Budapest, 1989), vol. 1, pp. 70–1.
\end{enumerate}
A document written during the battle of Zenta in 1697 mentioned rafts for transporting disabled janissaries on the Tisza and Danube rivers. 

Ottoman authors official or non-official rarely had anything to say about the treatment of battle wounds. The chronicle of Topçular Katibi noted that surgeons worked in the trenches, dispensing medicine to the wounded; however, some of the latter died in spite of this treatment. On another occasion, the same author emphasised that wounded soldiers did not have to pay for their treatment (harac vermezlerdi); the exchequer defrayed the relevant costs. In yet another instance, this same work recorded that of certain injured persons each received ten gold pieces as a reward, but perhaps this claim is an exaggeration.

As for the death rate in Ottoman military operations, it is just as difficult to estimate. Yet by means of the journal covering the 1543 campaign cited earlier, when the sultan’s armies besieged and occupied three fortresses, a rough guess is possible. The total loss cannot have been higher than 5–7.5 per cent, a rate significantly lower than that experienced by European armies of the 1500s and 1600s. Mortality in the 1629–30 eastern campaign must, however, have been much higher: a contemporary estimate claimed that some 8,000–9,000 warriors died in battle, while around 30,000 persons lost their lives through typhus. These figures are extremely high even if the number of participants remains unknown and the figures are crude contemporary approximations.

Battle victims were buried, but few traces remain. Archaeological excavations in the vicinity of Hungarian fortresses have brought to light very few skeletons of Ottoman soldiers. Curiously enough, the one major contemporary group of mass graves unearthed so far contains only the remains of some 900–1,000 Christian soldiers killed in or after the battle of Mohács in 1526; of the dead janissaries and cavalrymen serving the sultan in this confrontation, there remains not a trace.

In conclusion: The Ottomans and the “military revolution”

When trying to establish the strength and efficiency of the Ottoman army at the end of the sixteenth century, we cannot avoid discussing the complex
problem of the so-called European military revolution. During the last 60 years, a number of authors have examined the topic and – as so often happens when theoretical issues are at stake – they have arrived at sharply differing conclusions. Certain influential scholars have regarded a number of contemporaneous technical innovations as the most important factor determining military effectiveness.\footnote{184} By contrast, others have conceptualised a “punctuated equilibrium evolution”; in other words, a series of sequential military revolutions which started well before 1500.\footnote{185} Yet others have rejected the technological determinism involved in these two models, emphasising instead fundamental changes in socio-economic conditions, which then instigated military progress.\footnote{186} According to a French author’s witty formulation, throughout Europe an “army mentality” replaced the mindset of earlier aristocratic warriors.\footnote{187} Certain historians have argued against the revolutionary character of the process and posited shorter or longer phases of advancement interrupted by relative stasis; according to this model, until the end of the sixteenth century, evolution dominated the scene.\footnote{188} 

At the beginning, historians believed that these momentous developments were a Western phenomenon in the narrow sense of the word. Further research, however, has shown that the Viennese Habsburgs kept pace with these developments and – at least during the Long War – their armies operated on the same principles as those of the French, Spaniards and Dutch.\footnote{189} Commanders in Habsburg Hungary started to adapt to the new situation after 1526; from this date onwards, they began increasing the garrison troops stationed in fortifications near the Ottoman border. Further essential modifications were administrative and technical, and thus more qualitative than quantitative. One of the most important novelties was the creation of the Aulic War Council in Vienna (1556); within Europe as a whole, this organisation was
one of the first specialist military institutions forming part of a central government that held regular sessions.

As the Habsburg emperors, who now also bore the Hungarian crown, established arsenals with associated workshops in several politically and militarily significant centres, their armies became more effective than they had been in the fifteenth century. A massive diffusion of firearms ensued: during the Long War some 75 to 80 per cent of both Hungarian and foreign troops used handguns. Similarly, architects transformed the art of constructing fortifications with the implementation of the *trace italienne*. The best examples, like the renovated fortifications of Vienna, Győr or Komárom and the newly erected structures in (Érsek-) Újvár (Nové Zámky) and Károlyváros (Karlovac), matched those of their most up-to-date Italian, Dutch or Maltese counterparts. To supervise and realise these constantly increasing construction projects, the Habsburgs also formed a separate organisation concerned with military architecture. All these institutional and administrative innovations deserve particular attention, as for the period under discussion we have no knowledge of similar arrangements relevant to other European theatres of war.

The Ottomans, on the other hand, were somewhat less resolute in changing their mode of fighting. Keith Krause has developed a model classifying different polities according to their capabilities of manufacturing arms; in this perspective, the Ottoman Empire is an example of the third-tier category implying sufficient scientific and engineering skills to reproduce or copy basic weapons but a lack of innovative spirit. Some scholars have argued that the Ottomans or their European advisors occasionally improved what they had borrowed, but these cases were exceptional. In the light of recent research, however, this entire diagnosis has become somewhat problematic.

Yet it is difficult to deny that, on average, European military establishments were more dynamic than their Ottoman rival. Supposedly, in the mid-1500s the *sipahi*s refused to exchange their earlier weapons for handguns, arguing that the latter were not suitable for a manly warrior. If true, this account would indicate a lack of aptitude to keep up with the times. However, this


317
story comes from the writings of a Habsburg ambassador, and we thus should treat it with some caution.\textsuperscript{194} Yet it remains true that while Ottoman cannon founders rapidly implemented European methods of casting cannon, the material composition of their guns often left much to be desired.\textsuperscript{195} But at the same time the sultans’ gunners were effective as mediators, transferring firearms to faraway countries.\textsuperscript{196}

Moreover, Ottoman military men tended to neglect theory, limiting their efforts to practice. Thus, for instance they made no effort to develop the study of ballistics, while in Europe already before 1550 a few works dealt with this branch of military science, Nicolò Fontana Tartaglia bringing out two relevant works in 1537 and 1546.\textsuperscript{197} As a result, the sultans’ artillerymen often miscalculated the course of their cannonballs, and the latter flew high above the heads of enemy soldiers.\textsuperscript{198}

The shortfall is most obvious in the field of tactics, where the Ottomans avoided renewal. As regards sieges, during the Long War both sides were more or less on the same level; Ottoman sappers were especially good at digging trenches and mines. On the battlefields, however, the traditional crescent-shaped formation with the janissaries, artillery and azabs in the centre surrounded by a Wagenburg with light sipahi cavalry on the wings, became less and less effective, and the same observation applied to the old stratagem of faked flight. Commanders in the service of the Habsburgs increasingly adapted to these tactics. Moreover, coordination was often missing between the different Ottoman units, with chaos and defeat likely results. Since, however, pitched battles were usually of minor significance in Ottoman–Habsburg confrontations, such losses had no long-lasting consequences.

Luck certainly was a factor that helped the army of Mehmed III to win the battle at Mezőkeresztes in 1596, and while luck is an indispensable ingredient of warfare, contemporary and somewhat later Ottoman observers did realise that power relations were changing.\textsuperscript{199} In any case, this victory could

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{194} Charles Thornton Foster and F. H. Blackburne Daniell (eds.), \textit{The Life and Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Seigneur de Bousbecque, Knight, Imperial Ambassador} (London, 1881), vol. 1, pp. 242–3. \\
\textsuperscript{195} Ágoston, \textit{Guns for the Sultan}, p. 198. (Here the author is more hesitant about Ottoman inferiority than in his earlier works in Hungarian.) \\
\textsuperscript{197} István Szabó, ‘Die Anfänge der äußeren Ballistik’, \textit{Humanismus und Technik} 14, 3 (1971), pp. 1–9. \\
\end{flushleft}
temporarily cover up but did not solve the military problems that the sultans seemed unwilling to address. In part, the Ottoman side could counterbalance these deficiencies by larger resources in manpower and materiel. Furthermore, the sultans had the only standing army in Europe at their disposal and therefore could deploy larger contingents in the Hungarian arena than the Viennese High Command. Lastly, and decisively, Ottoman logistics still excelled. Troops could be mobilised in the spring and transported over long distances; by early summer, the sultans’ armies were ready for action.²⁰⁰

In the final analysis, we can say that although the Ottomans made several attempts to keep pace with sixteenth-century military developments in central Europe, these efforts did not suffice for a repetition of their earlier successes in the Balkans. Often enough, their adversaries were able to thwart even minor Ottoman projects. However, the sultans’ armies could protect their earlier conquests for almost one hundred more years.

The world of the scholar-officials (ulema)

From its very beginnings, the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic polity through and through. Early on, the lords (beys) of this dynasty, who soon laid claim to the title of sultan, adopted the fundamental institutions of an Islamic principality, such as the kadi’s court, the mosque and its personnel, the allocution at Friday prayers in which the preacher proclaimed the name of the legitimate ruler, the theological college (medrese) and the fundamental institution of the pious foundation. Yet, at the same time, everyday realities were more complex, for Sunni Islam was not the religion of the population in its entirety.

Nor were there in this early period many religious cum legal scholars (ulema) who had received their training locally; rather, such people had to be brought in from other places, including those Anatolian principalities where Islam had struck deeper roots or else from the Near East or Central Asia. Very often, these “imported” doctors of the faith were both scholars and mystics, with one or the other identity predominating; according to the terminology used by Taşköprüzade, biographer of numerous early Ottoman religious cum legal scholars, they were mevlas, adherents of the Hanefi school of law, and/or dervish masters or şeyhs. Moreover, among the early beys and their companions, formal Sunni Islam co-existed with beliefs and practices derived from different worlds: shamanism and other religions practiced by the Turkic peoples before adopting Islam had left tangible traces, and the same thing

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can be said of the antinomian and esoteric tendencies characterising the Malamatiyya/Melametiyye style of mysticism. Shi'ite tendencies also flourished in this milieu, and presumably other types of religious practices that our scanty sources do not permit us to identify.

The dominant figures of this syncretism typical of the Turkmen population were the babas, or “fathers”, who operated as spiritual and apparently sometimes as temporal leaders, too. While alive, these men guided their disciples, and after their deaths their spiritual powers aided those who piously visited their tombs. These Turkmen babas maintained close connections with the rising Ottoman dynasty. From the vita (Menakibname) recounting the life of Baba Ilyas-i Horasani, who led the Babai revolt against the Seljuks in 1239–40, we learn that Şeyh Edebali belonged to this movement and may have taken part in the uprising. After taking refuge in the far north-west of Anatolia, this şeyh was to interpret a dream of Osman, a minor local prince, as indicative of the future grandeur of the latter’s dynasty; he was also to become the bey’s father-in-law. With the blessing of the early Ottoman rulers, dervish orders such as the Bektashis were to take up the heritage of the Babais.

However, the situation changed significantly once the early principality had turned into a sultanate extending over Asia Minor and south-eastern Europe and the governing apparatus grew stronger and more centralised. Now the Turcoman and the sultans, who intended to rule as absolute masters, inhabited different worlds. Locally trained religious cum legal scholars became more numerous, even though some of them continued to attend the colleges of Egypt and Syria. Thus the Çandarlı, who formed a veritable dynasty of four grand vezirs, had trained as ulema and were among the most effective architects of the fiscally minded and overwhelmingly powerful Ottoman Empire of the fifteenth century. However, their power was broken when in the summer of 1453, just after the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed II (r. 1444–6 and 1451–81) had his grand vezir Çandarlı Halil Paşa executed. For reasons both religious and political, the Ottoman sultans from the early fifteenth century onwards began to persecute those men that they – and/or the ulema functioning as their advisors – considered heretics. Thus, with considerable violence and bloodshed, Mehmed I (r. 1413–21) suppressed the movement of Şeyh Bedreddin, an eminent legal scholar, ardent mystic and revolutionary leader. As for Murad II (r. 1421–51 with an interruption), he persecuted the antinomian mystics known as Hurufis and Bayramis.

Between the mid-fifteenth and the late sixteenth centuries, we encounter even more dramatic changes. Now the sultan unambiguously appeared as the champion of Sunni Islam, while the *ulema* came to form a highly centralised and bureaucratised organisation. Three events, with their short-term and long-term consequences, play a key role in this process. First, in 1453, the conquest of Constantinople allowed the Ottoman dynasty to give free rein to its imperial ambitions, and the centralised organisation of the *ulema* soon became one of the pillars of the emerging empire. In 1501, Shah Isma‘il I (r. 1501–24) ascended the Iranian throne; this event began a long-term imperial rivalry between the Ottoman and Safavid dynasties, and the former began to view Shi‘ism as a political threat. Finally, in 1516–17, Selim I (r. 1512–20) conquered Syria and Egypt, while North Africa apart from Morocco became part of the Ottoman Empire under his successors Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66) and Selim II (r. 1566–74). Within these greatly enlarged frontiers, the Ottoman sultans as rulers of the central Islamic territories could lay claim to a greatly enhanced status within the Muslim world.

*Imperial* *ulema* *in an imperial capital*

 Shortly after the conquest of Constantinople, on 6 January 1454, Mehmed II re-established the Orthodox patriarchate of this city, appointing the monk Georgios Scholarios, who took the name of Gennadios II. This newly invested Ottoman dignitary was to exercise many of the powers and prerogatives that had traditionally pertained to his office in Byzantine times. The sultan also appointed as grand rabbi (*haham başı*) Moses Capsali, who held this office from 1453 to 1497. But we cannot be sure whether the authority of his office encompassed the empire in its entirety or was limited to Istanbul. As this office did not sit well with Jewish traditions, it lapsed after the death of the second grand rabbi, Elijah Mizrahi (1498–1526), and did not re-emerge until 1835. As for the Armenians, they also received a patriarch, but only between 1526 and 1543. However, the story that Mehmed II was responsible for the latter’s institution as well is no more than a legend, born of the desire to have an “ancient tradition” going back to the sultan who established the Ottoman capital in Istanbul. But, in the early sixteenth century, the spiritual head of the Istanbul Armenians did acquire a set of specific rights and prerogatives, and in 1543 Astuacatar appears in our sources bearing the title of “patriarch of Constantinople”.

Throughout its history, Constantinople and later Istanbul had always been home to people of different religions and denominations, but through the measures just described, the Ottoman sultans officialised this de facto situation. The arrangements adopted in the 1400s and 1500s were not identical to the so-called millet regime, which in the nineteenth century, in the context of the reforms known as the Tanzimat, accorded religious groups far-reaching rights of self-government. But even so, a degree of autonomy certainly was involved, especially since religious dignitaries so often were responsible for the payment of certain dues to the Ottoman financial administration. The sultans recognised Christians and Jews as protected non-Muslims (zimmis), Islamic religious law (şeri’at) defining their status. While this situation involved restrictions and often public signs of disrespect, zimmis also benefited from a degree of tolerance. For legal scholars, this issue was a cause for concern, as only unbelievers who had submitted voluntarily possessed the right to recognition as zimmis. Constantinople, however, had been conquered manu militari. To cope with this anomaly in the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent, decisions by legal scholars and even full-fledged court procedures attempted to obtain credence for the myth that the inhabitants of Constantinople had submitted voluntarily. Mehmed II probably saw the matter in a different light, for due to his claim to universal empire, a capital where the adherents of different religions lived together seems to have been an overriding concern. Moreover, there were practical problems involved; after all, in many of the sultan’s new conquests there lived a substantial number of non-Muslims.

Priests and rabbis, who thus remained in place or else were reinstated, must have played a significant role in limiting conversion to Islam. Certainly many Christians and Jews must have found conversion a tempting prospect, for by accepting Islam they both improved their social status and lightened their tax load. Apart from the adolescents drafted for service in the army and the sultan’s court (devşirme), the Ottoman government thus saw no need to resort to forced conversions. Voluntary Islamisation certainly took place; but at least in

south-eastern Europe only limited numbers of people were involved, apart from Bosnia and – later on – Albania, where the locals had special reasons for conversion. Throughout the period under discussion, Muslims remained a minority in the Ottoman Balkans, and this fact surely is due to the continuing strength of communal organisation.

Due to the ambiguities inherent in the religious policies of Mehmed II, all sorts of totally unfounded rumours emerged in the West concerning the sultan’s possible conversion to Christianity. Just like his ancestors, Mehmed the Conqueror viewed his empire as an Islamic polity, and quite obviously the Muslim religion was to enjoy a paramount position. On the contrary, the sultan had scheduled Istanbul, the former metropolis of the unbelievers, which for certain Ottoman Muslims continued to be an accursed site, to become a Muslim city and even a holy place of Islam. He therefore entrusted one of his close associates, the şeyh of the Bayrami dervish order Ak Şemseddin, with the mission of locating the grave of Eyüp, standard-bearer of the prophet Muhammad, who according to tradition had met his end during one of the Arab sieges of Constantinople. Outside the city walls, where by miracle Ak Şemseddin had discovered the grave close to the place where the Golden Horn ends, the sultan ordered the construction of a mausoleum, a mosque and a dervish lodge. The ruler evidently intended this complex to serve as a site of pilgrimage, and it continues to play this role down to the present day. Also directly after the conquest, Mehmed II transformed the church of Hagia Sophia, famous in history and legend, into the Aya Sofya mosque, and over time other Byzantine churches were “converted” in the same fashion. Finally, on the site of the former monastery Church of the Holy Apostles, the Conqueror ordered the construction of his mausoleum, and nearby that of his own monumental mosque. The sultan had hoped that the latter’s dome would surpass that of Aya Sofya; however, this was not to be. The mosque and mausoleum complex also contained no less than eight juridical cum theological colleges; together they formed the “courtyard of the eight” (sahn-i seman or semaniye), for several decades the highest-ranking schools in the Ottoman Empire.

Sultan Mehmed’s successors and the dignitaries of their governments actively pursued the Islamisation of the city, not only by the conversion of further churches but also – and most visibly – by the construction of a sequence of imperial mosques, which completely transformed the cityscape. The Süleymaniye complex, designed and executed by the famous architect Sinan (about 1490–1588), was only the most impressive among a large number of structures serving pious and charitable ends. Moreover, after Selim I returned from his conquest of the Middle East, the Topkapı Palace accumulated a collection of holy relics in its treasury and in this manner came to resemble the abode of the defunct Byzantine emperors, who also had been avid collectors of such objects of devotion. Istanbul was further sanctified as a result.

Şeri’at and kanun

However, when establishing a corpus of laws, a major aspect of the construction of any empire, Mehmed II had no intention of limiting Ottoman legal practice to the application of Islamic law. To a great extent, he relied on the kanun, based on custom and sultanic commands, which in principle were not to contravene Islamic law but merely to “fill in the gaps”. Covering many areas of human endeavour, kanun was to occupy an exceptional place in the emerging Ottoman corpus of law, still embryonic under Mehmed the Conqueror but which developed vigorously under his successors, including his son Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) and especially Süleyman the Magnificent, whom Ottomans called “the legislator” (Kanuni). In Kanuni’s time, reconciling şeri’at and kanun became a more important concern than it had been in the past, and the architect of this synthesis was the chief jurisconsult (şeyhüislâm) Ebusuud Efendi (in office 1545–74). Members of the Ottoman elite elaborated a theory of the caliphate that differed profoundly from that adopted by nineteenth-century sultans, who were to style themselves “sultan-caliph”. Rather, sixteenth-century legal scholars saw the caliph as a personage whose role it was “to order what is right and prohibit what is wrong”. This understanding went back to older thinkers such as al-Baghdadi and al-Mawardi, who regarded the caliph as the mujtahid, who had the capacity to discern the correct interpretation of Islamic religious law among the many variants proposed by the ulema, in this case of the Hanefi school of legal interpretation, and who possessed the
power to enforce what he had understood to be right. From this understand-
ing arose a novel concept of the relationship between şeri‘at and kanun: the latter formed a particular response to questions that hitherto sacred law had not categorically solved, permitting several possible interpretations.

Classifying the ulema

In the perspective of Mehmed II, the construction of empire also involved the elaboration of a courtly protocol that ranked the highest dignitaries and governed their behaviour when on official business (teşrifat kanunu). Religious cum legal scholars were accorded high honours: thus the professors (müderris) of the eight new medreses founded by the Conqueror preceded all provincial governors except those of the highest order. Teachers who were less prominent, but still received 50 akçe per diem, came before military men and palace officials bearing the title of ağa. In the provinces, kadıs with a daily pay of 150 akçe were of a higher rank than the local finance directors (defter kethidasi) and cavalry commanders (alaybeyi). Selim I later decreed that ulema holding public office, kadıs as well as müderris, legal experts (müftü) and administrators of pious foundations all ranked as askeri. Even though they obviously were not military men as suggested by the term asker, meaning “soldier”, they enjoyed the privileges of the latter, particularly exemption from taxes.

An officially imposed order of precedence, which situated the ulema among the privileged servitors of the sultan, implied further hierarchy within the group, established already during the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror. Over time, this hierarchy, expressed by the gradation of official salaries, became more and more elaborate, and this inclusion of all recognised ulema within a single “table of ranks” became a defining characteristic of the Ottoman learned establishment (ilmiyel).
Religious institutions, policies and lives

Official status accorded to a learned man derived from the rank of the institution where he taught. When in 1463–70 Mehmed II founded eight colleges within the complex of his great mosque, he evidently intended them to form the summit of this hierarchy. About 90 years later, however, the six schools established by Süleyman the Magnificent near his imperial mosque (built in 1550–9) clearly outclassed the Conqueror’s colleges: four of the new foundations trained religious cum legal scholars, while one of them specialised in the prophet Muhammad’s traditions (hadis) and another in medicine.

In the course of their careers, students and teachers needed to pass through a sequence of colleges: when enrolling in higher-ranking establishments, the students encountered more difficult texts than in the more elementary schools. As in any scholastic routine, commentaries, compilations and extracts quite often took the place of original works, and students used to memorise what the teacher said or else copied out their own textbooks. Moreover, the salary of the principal teacher was no secret to anybody and in the official pecking order served to establish the rank of the school and professor concerned.

We will review these establishments according to their places in the hierarchy, beginning with the lowest rank. The “exterior”, or hariç, medreses began at 20 akçe, while a slightly higher category at 30 akçe also went by the name of miftah (“key”). This term was due to the fact that students in “30 akçe colleges” often studied a treatise on rhetoric by Yusuf b. Abi Bakr al-Sakkaki (d. 1229) known as the Miftah al-‘ulum or “key to the sciences”. Higher up but still in the “exterior” category were colleges paying their teachers 40 and 50 akçe a day, all situated in Bursa, Edirne and Istanbul.

The next category was that of the “interior” (dahil medrese), also with three sub-divisions. In the colleges for “beginners” (ibtida-i dahil), students pursued the legal studies that they had begun earlier by working their way through the text known as the Hidaya (“correct guidance”), by al-Marghinani. Next were the schools preparing candidates for study in the eight medreses of Mehmed the Conqueror, known as the tetimme or musile-i sahn. Successful candidates then could go on to the imperial colleges properly speaking. Certain medreses founded by Sultan Süleyman paid their professors 60 akçe per diem and therefore were known as altmışlı. In this case, there were only two sub-categories, namely the “beginners” (ibtida-i altmışlı) and the “complementary schools” (hareket-i altmışlı). As for the fourth and highest category, it consisted of the


establishments forming part of the Süleymaniye complex: once again, certain schools counted as preparatory (musile-i Süleymaniye), followed by the Süleymaniye medreses in the narrow sense of the term. Among the latter, the college for the study of the Prophet’s traditions held the highest rank. As noted previously, the rank of the institution determined that of the professor teaching in it.

A parallel hierarchy existed among kadıs. Once again, official salaries indicated rank, but the prestige of the city in which a given judge officiated also counted for something. This prestige might be due to the historical and religious role of certain cities. Thus the judges appointed to ancient political and religious centres of the Islamic world now part of the Ottoman Empire enjoyed the bonus of working in one of the “judgeships of the throne” (taht kadılıkları). In the same way, an office in Istanbul or, even better, inclusion in the sultan’s council (divan-ı hümâyûn) gave the holder particular authority; after all, when attending to his duties in this city, he was likely to encounter vezirs and other high-ranking personnel. While kadıs were administrators first and foremost, they needed to have gained experience as scholars and teachers as well; and, at least in principle, the rank to which a kadi might aspire depended on the college where he had previously taught.

Kadıs officiating in small towns (kasabat kadıları) received 25 to 150 akçe a day and formed the lowest level of the judicial hierarchy. In larger places, the official revenues of a kadi began at 150 akçe and might rise to almost 300 akçe; in 22 cities considered to be of yet higher prestige, the judge could count on 300 akçe a day. Only in the most important places, namely the former capitals Bursa and Edirne as well as Cairo, Damascus, Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, all major centres of the Muslim world conquered by Selim I, did the judge receive a salary of 500 akçe; yet the rank and pay of the kadi of Istanbul was higher still. Among the most prestigious cities were the three successive capitals of the Ottoman Empire, namely Bursa, Edirne and Istanbul; as for the taht kadılıkları, they included Aleppo, Damascus and Baghdad, the latter conquered by Süleyman the Magnificent. Damascus and Baghdad successively had been capitals of the caliphate, while for certain periods in its history Aleppo, too, had been a princely centre of major importance.

However, above the judges of even the most important Ottoman cities there were the scholar ofi cials incorporated into the central administration. Already in the fourteenth century, Sultan Murad I (r. 1362–89) had instituted an army judge (kadiasker) superior to all other kadıs. Towards the end of his reign, Mehmed II decided to appoint two such judges, one for the Ottoman Balkans (Rumeli) and the other for Anatolia; the administration also experimented
with a kadıasker in charge of the Arab provinces, but this office disappeared very soon. These “great judges” formed part of the Imperial Council, with authority over all other kadıs. They chose the incumbent judges from among the many candidates proposed to them.

The army judges pronounced their verdicts in the name of the sultan, for the divan-ı hümayun decided many cases, especially those that might be politically sensitive, such as disputes involving the ambassadors of foreign rulers and also accusations of ritual murder against local Jews. Moreover, any subject of the empire might lawfully appeal to the justice of the sultan. But the divan-ı hümayun was not a court of appeals in the modern sense of the term. Very often this authority merely transmitted affairs of which it had cognizance to the kadıs; when receiving the relevant files, the latter obviously realised that the eye of the grand vezir or even the sultan was upon them. To stimulate the kadi’s zeal, the central authority sometimes admonished him to ensure that the matter was solved once and for all and did not trouble the sultan again (tekrar kapuma gelmelii etmeyeziz …).

In exceptional cases, when convinced that the complainant had good reason to be wary of the local judge, the sultan’s council might transfer the case to a colleague officiating in another town not too far away. Occasionally the council might take matters into its own hands and decide the case or at least determine the relevant punishments; but even in such instances, a kadi first received the order to investigate and locate the suspect.

The central power thus exercised a good deal of caution when intervening in local judicial affairs. Presumably sultans and vezirs wished to avoid overloading the army judges with a plethora of cases. But, in addition, every kadi, no matter what his rank, enjoyed judicial autonomy, and the government respected this prerogative. The illustrious jurisconsult Ebussuud Efendi had expressly stated this principle of Islamic law according to which the judgement of a kadi could only be appealed if the sultan had authorised this move by special decree. Moreover, even in such a case, the appeal was not acceptable if the original decision had been in conformity with religious law. As the famous legist explained, sultans and even caliphs did not have the right to annul a judgement of that sort.

When keeping in mind this principle of

17 Hans Georg Majer (ed.), Das Osmanische Registerbuch der Beschwerden (Şikayat defteri) vom Jahre 1675 (Vienna, 1984), fol. 32b, doc. no. 3.
judicial autonomy, we gain a better understanding of the sense in which we may speak of hierarchy and subordination among kadıs, for no matter how modest the kadi’s rank, he was autonomous in his judgements, and in these matters no higher authority had the right to intervene. However, the kadi’s revenues were subject to modification due to a decision made by his superiors, and these authorities could both appoint him and revoke his appointment.

Süleyman the Magnificent decided to crown this already elaborate hierarchy by giving it a formal superior. From the very beginning, the legal expert (müftü) of the capital had of necessity played an important role. But his authority had been mainly personal, due to his knowledge and virtues, for originally he did not form part of the scholarly cum juridical hierarchy. But after 1545, when Sultan Süleyman appointed the former army judge of Rumeli Ebusuud müftü of Istanbul, the new office-holder became the chief jurisconsult (şeyhülislam) of the Ottoman Empire in its entirety. Now he was higher in rank than any other judge or scholar and received a salary to match. Given his dignity and the trust he enjoyed, Sultan Süleyman consulted him not only on juridical issues but also on political ones, demanding Ebusuud’s opinion on matters of war and peace, legislation on landholding and the rules that should govern the administration of pious foundations. Ebusuud felt that all these matters saddled him with heavy responsibilities and distracted him from his real task, which was to emit legal opinions (fetva). But like it or not, Selim II (r. 1566–74) drew him yet further into politics, for now he was to submit, in the shape of documents known as telhis, the names of eligible candidates for the highest offices that ulama might be called upon to fill. In the past, this task had been part of the grand vezirs’ responsibilities, but in the sovereign’s opinion these officials had not always made the right choices and were now to refrain from interfering in these matters. Known as mevali, the offices now granted upon the recommendation of the chief jurisconsult included the kadıs and all professors with revenues of over 40 akçe. In addition, the mevali encompassed a fair number of less important positions, including certain prayer leaders (imam), preachers in Friday mosques (hatib) and even men chanting the call to prayer (müezzin). Otherwise the army judges had the right to propose candidates for these inferior positions.¹⁹

When analysing the discussions that preceded the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, we encounter a good example of the now enhanced position of the chief jurisconsult in political affairs. This campaign involved breaking the

Religious institutions, policies and lives

treaty with Venice, which successive sultans had confirmed by oath and most recently, in 1540, Süleyman the Magnificent had sworn to uphold. To solve this juridical and moral problem, the famous jurisconsult Ebussuud Efendi invoked the Islamic past of the island, which in his view permitted the sultan to do whatever he deemed appropriate. The preamble to the question posed to the legist ran as follows:

A piece of land originally had belonged to the *dar al-islam*. After a time the vile infidels invaded it, ruined the Islamic colleges and mosques and filled the preachers’ pulpits and the galleries with marks of infidelity and error, with the intention of insulting the religion of Islam by many evil actions and spreading their ugly behaviour all over the world. As required by [his task of] protecting Islam, His Majesty the Sultan has decided to take the land in question out of the hands of the contemptible infidels and join it to the *dar al-islam*...

On this occasion, the chief jurisconsult justified the sultan’s breaking of his oath by the observation that Islamic edifices had once existed on the island which the infidels who had later gained control of Cyprus had had the temerity to profane. Thus the honour of Islam was at stake, which took precedence over all other considerations. In the sixth year of the Hijra (627–8), the Prophet himself had set a precedent when after two years he broke the pact he had concluded with the infidels of Mecca, for the interests of Islam were more important than any other concern. Ebussuud Efendi took up this latter argument when he affirmed that nothing prevented the sultan from breaking what in any event had been no more than a truce.

In the late seventeenth century, Hezarfen Hüseyn asked himself whether according to Ottoman protocol the *şeyhülislam* preceded or followed the grand vezir; in other words, whether this dignitary was the second or third personage in the Ottoman Empire. He arrived at the conclusion that normally the chief jurisconsult was third in line, but meaningfully he added that the Ottoman ruler saw matters differently because “the affairs of state are based upon religion.” Moreover, in the view of this author, the salaries that top-level members of the *ilmiye* received in the late seventeenth century were infinitely higher than those of the early Ottoman period; after all, they reflected the enrichment of the Ottoman Empire in the intervening period. Hezarfen

Hüseyin did, however, add that “the honours rendered to the *ulema* in this Sublime Empire have no equivalent elsewhere in the entire Islamic world.”

**Ulema careers**

After reviewing the different offices accessible to members of the *ulema*, we will now discuss the ways in which people entered this career and what they needed to do in order to advance in it. The studies and competencies outlined earlier did not suffice; in addition, co-optation was a prerequisite. According to Atai, a seventeenth-century biographer of the Ottoman *ulema*, in the early period positions were given out in a rather haphazard fashion. Once again, it was Ebussuud Efendi, while he was still an army judge, who established the rules that later generations were to follow. Ebussuud drew up a list of the high-ranking scholar-officials who every seven years should propose candidates (*mülazim*) from among their respective entourages. Such candidates might be advanced students (*danışmend*), tutors (*muıd*) and other close collaborators of the dignitary submitting their names. Apparently, in real life the Ottoman authorities only moderately respected these seven-year periods (*nöbet*): on various occasions, the government might decree that an exceptional *nöbet* was in order, and high *ulema* sometimes even proposed their candidates without reference to any *nöbet* at all.

Ebussuud’s original list has not survived, but records concerning the *nöbet* of 963/1555–6 fill this gap to some extent. Each of the *kâdis* of Istanbul, Bursa and Cairo presented four *mülazims*, while those of Damascus, Aleppo and Baghdad handed in two names per person, and the teachers of the sultan’s sons also could suggest suitable candidates. At the *nöbet* of 976/1566, the *kâdis* of Istanbul, Edirne and Bursa were able to sponsor five candidates each, while the *taht kadıları* proposed three per person. Ebussuud also determined that the two army judges should keep registers of the *mülazims* applying for positions within their respective competencies. In this way, he hoped to ensure that nobody was forgotten and candidates received their positions according to their dates of application. In brief, the new regulations were to do away with the previous disorders, which had been the source of much arbitrariness and injustice.

Upon entering the *ulema* path, the *mülazim* could choose one of two routes; this choice, which determined his later career, was a notable characteristic of

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23 Ibid., fol. 235r.
the Ottoman *cursus honorum*. Those young men who opted for “the road of judgeships” did not need to teach, or at least not beyond the *hariç* level. They immediately or at least rapidly received judgeships, which paid better than the positions available to a beginning müderris. Financially speaking, this career path was more rewarding in the short term, but with respect to promotions it was a dead end, as *ulema* without professorial experience could not expect to rise beyond judgeships in the most modest of small towns, with daily emoluments of 25–100 *akçe*.

As for the second route, known as the “road of teaching positions”, it began with a lengthy tour through the different grades of colleges, during which the budding scholar-official, if he was lucky, got himself promoted to ever more prestigious schools. This course was not only long but also demanded financial sacrifices, as the daily emoluments at the end of the professorial *cursus honorum* still were no more than 100 *akçe* a day. Moreover, a teacher did not have the opportunities for more or less licit extra earnings always available to a *kadi*. But this kind of sacrifice was the prerequisite for appointment to the higher positions in the hierarchy of judges, which brought power, prestige and also the most elevated salaries.

Taşköprüzade’s account of his own – admittedly very successful – professional career exemplifies these rules. As we might expect given his “love for holy scholarship”, this author chose the “road of teaching positions”. His first appointment was to a provincial school, when in Receb 931/April–May 1525 he started to teach at the college of Dimetoka, today in Greece, close to the Greco-Turkish border. Two years later, we find him in Istanbul at what was surely a rather modest institution, founded by a certain Mevla Ibn el-hac Hasan. After three years, he received another provincial position, this time to the İshakiye medrese in Üsküb/Skopje; there Taşköprüzade remained for six years before returning once again to Istanbul, this time as a professor at the Kalenderhane medrese, from which two years later he moved to the college founded by vezir Mustafa Paşa. His stay in this position was very brief, for the following year he found himself in Edirne, where he also taught for only a year. His next step finally was a clear promotion, for Taşköprüzade now received a position at one of the eight colleges founded by Mehmed II, at this time not yet outranked by the Süleymaniye. Even so, after five years we find him returning to Edirne, where he became a professor at the college founded by Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512).

After a one-year stint in this school, there came the turning point in Taşköprüzade’s career, for at the age of fifty-one, in the fullness of life as he put it, he became *kadi* of Bursa. Two years later, he returned to his academic
career, once again at one of the Conqueror’s colleges. Taşköprüzade meticulously recorded his academic activities in this position, as he had done for his earlier medrese appointments as well. He produced a copy of the _Sahih al-Bukhari_, one of the major works on traditions derived from the prophet Muhammad, and also taught the _Hidayat_ from the beginning of the section on marriage until the section covering marriage contracts. In addition, he introduced his students to the _Kitab al-Talwih_, proceeding from the beginning to the fourth section, and also covered the appendixes to the _Kashaf_ of Seyyid el-Şerif, taking his class all the way to the section on the first surah of the Qur’an.

This time, Taşköprüzade taught for four years before, on 17 Şevval 958/18 October 1551, he obtained the highest promotion of his life when he became _kadi_ of Istanbul. With regret, he noted that the responsibilities of a judge removed him from “holy scholarship”, but he resigned himself, quoting the Qur’an (33/38, English translation by Marmaduke Pickthall): “and the commandment of Allah is certain destiny”. But three years later Taşköprüzade had to resign, as chronic conjunctivitis had caused him to go blind. His official career was over; however, he continued his scholarly work, under difficult conditions, until his death in 1561.25

By the centralisation and hierarchy which the Ottoman rulers imposed upon the _ulema_, the sultans and their grand vezirs came to control this body of scholar-officials; for this purpose, they used certain high dignitaries that they could appoint and depose without any trouble. As previously noted, not all appointees followed the _cursus honorum_ outlined in the case of Taşköprüzade. After all, the entourage of the sultan, including his former teacher (_hoca_) and other palace functionaries, quite often intervened to promote their own candidates. As a result, appointment to high _ulema_ offices might become a prize fought over by various coteries among Ottoman governing circles. Moreover, in some cases scholar-officials simply purchased their positions.

_Venal judges and the problem of unemployment_

If we believe a critical discourse widespread among Ottoman writers from the later sixteenth century onwards, the system as it functioned at that time promoted careerism and cupidity among the holders of high office more than knowledge or virtue. In the “justice edicts” (_adaletnames_) emitted in the name of the sultan, we encounter the most dramatic versions of this particular discourse. Thus a text promulgated under Ahmed I (r. 1603–17) dated to

Religious institutions, policies and lives

30 September 1609 did not mince words when denouncing the disorders and abuses that had crept into public administration, and in one section the ruler particularly targeted the kadıs and their substitutes, the naibs. Around 1600, the kadıs tended to farm out these latter positions to the highest bidder and, as a result, while in office the naibs had to maximise their profits.  

From the relevant passage, the reader comes away with an unedifying picture of the cupidity and nastiness widespread among officials who in principle should have administered justice. Thus these men undertook numerous inspection tours in the countryside, using the occasion to demand sheep, lambs, chickens, butter and honey, while for their mounts they collected straw, barley and hay. Needless to say, they never paid for any of these deliveries. Some kadıs and naibs entered cemeteries to count and register the new graves so as to fine villagers for not having reported the deaths and requested a burial permit. Infidels could only obtain these permits against payment.

The idea behind these “lists of new graves” was not to check whether funerals had been properly conducted or to collect demographic data but rather to locate decedents. When a deceased person left an inheritance and there were minors or absentees among the heirs, it was obligatory to ask the kadi for a properly certified inventory of the goods and chattels involved, and the judge could demand a fee for his service. But when there were no minors or absentees, the heirs did not need to call upon a kadi; however, judges avid for gain did not hesitate to impose their services nonetheless. Moreover, dignitaries of this type tended to exaggerate the value of the inheritances at issue because the dues they could demand were proportional to the financial worth of the deceased. If certain items tempted the cupidity of the judges, they often grabbed them for themselves; and, even worse, they re-registered inheritances already taken care of by their predecessors, with the excuse that the heirs had hidden part of the inheritance and the registers were thus incomplete. Certain kadıs thus managed to redo some inventories twice or even three times over, with the result that the heirs lost half of the inheritance. To top it all off, while there were statutes fixing the amounts of money that kadıs and naibs could collect for registering different kinds of documents, these office-holders did not hesitate to badly overcharge whoever needed their services.

Disputes among claimants to tax assignments (timar, zeamet) or among administrators of pious foundations or şeyhs of dervish lodges typically gave

rise to other types of judicial corruption. The \textit{adaletname} accused the \textit{kadı}s of not ruling in favour of those who had the law on their side but rather giving the advantage to those paying 5 or 10 piastres or even a gold coin or two. When on inspection tours, which as we have seen tended to cost the inhabitants dearly, \textit{kadı}s on the lookout for gain falsely accused local wealthy people of having held back money that should have gone to the exchequer, merely to pocket a bribe. Even if the Muslims of a given town or village testified that this or that person was innocent, the \textit{kadı} did not hesitate to record the contrary in their registers. By contrast, when receiving the payment they had demanded, corrupt \textit{kadı}s were perfectly capable of deleting crimes and misdemeanours already on record; they even delivered attestations of virtue and piety.

Tax farming was another source of abuses. When tax farmers were indebted to the hilt or even bankrupt, \textit{kadı}s, after receiving the appropriate bribes, assigned them guarantors from among the better-off inhabitants without asking the latter or even informing them that they stood to lose their entire fortunes to the exchequer.

All these abuses had come to the “august knowledge” of the young sultan. According to the edict at hand, the ruler expressed his consternation when finding out that \textit{kadı}s and other office-holders blatantly ignored his orders, which after all expressed quite clearly what the sultan’s servants could and could not demand from the empire’s subjects. When courageous persons reminded the sultan’s corrupt servitors – including certain \textit{kadı}s – of their duties, the latter did not hesitate to accuse the men who had warned them of disobeying the imperial orders. They had their potential nemeses arrested and, supposedly as a penalty, robbed these unfortunates of all their possessions.\footnote{Halil İnalcık, ‘Adâletnâmeler’, \textit{Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi} 2, 3–4 (1965), 49–145 at pp. 129–30.}

According to the authors of the \textit{adaletnames}, all evil was due to human vices. A century later, however, Hezarfen Hüseyin had come to realise that the system also was to blame and that vices tended to spread from the top of the hierarchy down to its base. These are his comments:

\begin{quote}
In addition to being scholars, \textit{kadıaskers} must be very pious and abstemious. Certainly some of them [meaning those currently officiating] are genuine scholars, but they have debts and as soon as they begin their period in office, they sell the \textit{kadi}-positions [in their gift] to the highest bidder. But can you expect a man to be just, if he arrives in his place of office heavily indebted? … While it is the responsibility of the \textit{kadi} to implement the law of God, at present [most \textit{kadı}s are mainly concerned with] finding out how they can best take away people’s money.\footnote{Hezarfen, ‘Telhisû’l beyân’, fol. 24iv.}
\end{quote}
We usually think that abuses of this type crept in when the empire was in decline. But do we really know when they began?

In addition, a demographic factor exacerbated competition among the ulema; given population growth and increased educational opportunities, there was an ever-increasing disproportion between the number of jobs available and the number of candidates qualified to fill them. Quite a few advanced students never became candidates (mülaṣım), and many of the latter never obtained positions. In addition, there were fully trained scholars who spent more years out of office and waiting for a position (mazul) than on active duty. Due to the insufficiency of positions, waiting periods increased in length, while kadis and professors could expect to officiate for ever-briefer timespans.

Scholar-officials in imperial politics

As we have seen, sultans and vezirs had established their control over the ulema, but, as a corollary, these latter personages became more and more influential in the empire’s politics. Admittedly, after 1453 there were no longer any scholarly members of the Çandarlı dynasty to be appointed grand vezirs, nor do we find finance directors (baṣ defterdar) of ulema background. This particular “mixing of career lines” ended with Pirî Paşa (d. 1532), the last grand vezir of Selim I and the first holder of this office under Süleyman the Magnificent. Where finance directors were concerned, the recruitment of ulema may have continued somewhat longer, but one Ebul Fazıl Mehmed Çelebi (d. ca. 1574 or 1575) seems to have been a late exception, for beginning with the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror, high-level administrators typically began their official careers as “servitors of the sultan” (kul), usually drafted from among Christian peasant boys by means of the procedure known as devṣırme; these new-style office-holders received their training not in the medrese but in the palace schools. Or officials already in the sultan’s employ brought their sons and nephews to train for bureaucratic jobs while serving apprenticeships as junior scribes. These “men of the pen” (eḥl-i kalem) gained more and more influence in the course of the sixteenth century, and between them kul and eḥl-i kalem managed to oust the ulema from positions not part of the juridical-religious hierarchy.

But even so, the ulema continued to play significant political roles. As we have seen, the sultans of the sixteenth century frequently asked for the advice of their chief jurisconsults even in political matters. Moreover, the opinions of the latter carried much weight among the high dignitaries of the empire collectively known as “pillars of the state”, who came to run political affairs.
at the end of our period, when most sultans spent but a limited amount of time and energy in governing the empire. The two army judges also figured among this select group of office-holders, although they seem to have limited their activity to legal matters. Moreover, the kādis played a pivotal role in local administration apart from acting as notaries and applying şeriat and kanun; the central administration continued to view them as its principal supports in the provinces. As a result, kādis might collect taxes, draft workmen for official building projects and deal with a variety of other matters that had little to do with the scholarly subjects they had once studied and taught in the medrese. In brief, as Halil İnalcık once put it, the kādis formed the backbone of provincial administration.29 After all, governors of different levels were often concerned purely with military matters, and when not on campaign they mainly dealt with issues that in later periods were to become the responsibility of the police and gendarmerie.

Upholding Sunni “right belief” and the problem of heterodoxy

Certainly the sultans and vezirs of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries spent a great deal of effort on the construction of a strong empire with an active and powerful administrative apparatus. Centralisation and regularisation were part of this project, yet by themselves they do not explain the religious policy of the sultans and particularly their staunch and sometimes rigid defence of Sunni “right belief”, which implied completely abandoning the latitudinarian attitude of their fourteenth-century predecessors. To explain this change, we need to look at the sultans’ conflict with the Safavid dynasty, which began when Shah Isma’il I (r. 1501–24) created a rival empire and began to make over Iran into a country inhabited largely by Shi’ites. Moreover, the Safavids had a considerable number of adherents among the Anatolian population, while Ottoman–Safavid conflict frequently recurred throughout the 1500s and early 1600s. When analysing the religious policies of the Ottoman sultans, we need to take all these factors into consideration.30

29 İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, p. 118.
The Ottoman–Safavid conflict and the Kızılb aş problem

The Ottoman–Safavid conflict was a “classical dispute” between two empires, with certain territories coveted by both sides. But it was also a religious and, more broadly speaking, “ideological” conflict. Shah Isma‘il I had begun life as the hereditary master of a Sufi fraternity that a few decades earlier, under his father and grandfather, had accepted extremist Shi‘ite views, and true to his origins he established an empire of a rather special kind. Moreover, Shah Isma‘il drew much of his support from Turcoman tribes, some of them nomadising in Iran, but the same tribes were also active in central, western and southern Anatolia, where in fact they had been living for several centuries. Thus the Ottoman elite felt threatened not merely by a foreign enemy but also a domestic one. In this perspective, “Redhead” (Kızılb aş) tribesmen, allies and disciples of the shah, acted upon his orders, or at least the sultan’s government readily suspected them of such “subversive” activities.

Beginning with Bayezid II and intensifying under his successors, the sultans’ reaction took several forms. Thus, to ensure stricter control of the Muslim population, Süleyman the Magnificent in 944/1537–8 commanded that a mosque be constructed in every village. But the sultans’ reaction was, above all, military. Selim I defeated Shah Isma‘il near Çaldıran in 1514, while his son and successor Süleyman campaigned against the “Two Iraqs” and took Baghdad from Shah Tahmasp I (r. 1524–76) in 1534–5. Once the city was in his hands, Sultan Süleyman immediately demonstrated the religious and symbolic aspects of this enterprise by ordering the construction of a funerary monument for the miraculously located remains of the great legal scholar Abu Hanifa (ca. 699–767), from whose teachings had originated the school of law (mezheb) followed by the Ottomans and most present-day Turks. Moreover, accompanied by his grand vezir, pašas and ağas, the sultan undertook a pilgrimage to Najaf and Karbala to visit the mausoleums of the Prophet’s son-in-

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law Imam 'Ali and the latter’s son Imam Husayn. Presumably, by this gesture Sultan Süleyman meant to make it clear that the struggle against “heretics” did not exclude veneration for the family of the Prophet.

In Anatolia, Sultan Süleyman had serious trouble defeating the Turcoman rebellions of Baba Zülnun (1526) and Şah Kalender (1527), campaigns that resulted in a great deal of bloodshed. Afterwards the Kızılbaş mostly avoided open rebellions, but even so the Ottoman authorities continued to persecute them. Once the treaty of Amasya (1555) for some decades had established an uneasy peace with the Safavids, the conflict lost its “inter-imperial” aspect and continued on the domestic level only, with the local adherents of the Safavid project acting more or less in secret. Matters calmed down somewhat after the mid-1580s, but the “ideological” aspect of the conflict never entirely disappeared.\(^3\)

From the edicts that the central administration sent to its local representatives, whose job it was to investigate and repress real and imagined Kızılbaş, we learn that several criteria counted as clear indicators of “heretic” sympathies, making it unnecessary to engage the suspects in theological debate. Some people refused to name their sons Ebubekir, Ömer and Osman after the first three caliphs, whom Anatolian Shi’ites held in abhorrence; the authorities regarded this behaviour as highly suspect. People also courted trouble if their neighbours claimed that they did not perform the five daily prayers and, even worse, avoided communal Friday services.\(^4\)

“Heresy” in the courts

Given official concern with the “Kızılbaş peril”, the authorities began to chase down any religious dissidents within Islam, no matter what their background. Here there was no trace of the relative tolerance, strongly tinged with indifference and disdain, that some Muslims typically adopted towards Jews and Christians. Repression came in different forms. Some suspects were executed in secret or under some “non-political” pretext to avoid negative reactions on the part of a local society that administrators considered unpredictable. In other cases, local kadıs and their subordinates undertook court cases ending


in condemnations, while the highest authorities in the capital, including the army judges and the chief jurisconsult, proceeded against more influential persons of heterodox backgrounds. At some of these trials, the sultan himself was present.

Personages of heterodox convictions stood accused of being “heretics and atheists” (zindik ve mülhid), several trials of this type taking place under Süleyman the Magnificent. In 1527, the accused was a scholar by the name of Molla Kabız; according to contemporary chroniclers, he was the instigator of a current that claimed the superiority of Jesus over Muhammad. In his first trial, presided over by the two army judges and at which the sultan assisted, Molla Kabız gained an acquittal because his judges ran out of arguments against him. In a second trial, this time presided over by the şeyhülislam İbîn Kemal, the judges also debated at length, but in the end the accused was sentenced to death as a heretic. Moreover, a certain Hakim İshak had inspired a mode of thinking, probably derived from Jewish and/or Christian roots, according to which the Old and New Testaments were just as valuable as the Qur'an. Ebussuud Efendi condemned him in a legal opinion, and Hakim İshak was executed as well.

In the final analysis, the network of medreses covering the empire, the activity of the kadıs, the supremacy of the chief jurisconsult and the heresy trials presided over by scholar-officials all served the same aim: to ensure the maintenance of Sunni “right belief” as espoused by the Ottoman dynasty.

“Permitted” Sufi orders (tarikat)

Official promotion of Sunni Islam (“Sunnitisation”) did not exclude the continuing presence of a Sufi-tinged version beside the religion of the legists. As for the adherents of Sufism, they normally organised in “orders”, or mystical fraternities. Some individuals even tried to incorporate both the esoteric and exoteric dimensions of Islam in their religious lives. Certainly this widespread tendency towards mysticism gave rise to some controversy: deriving his inspiration from the rigorist Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), Mehmed, later known as Birgevi, a provincial müderris from the little town of Birgi in


36 I owe the term “Sunnitisation” to Nathalie Clayer, Mystiques, état et société: Les Halvetis dans l’aire balkanique de la fin du XVIe à nos jours (Leiden, 1994).
western Anatolia, was highly critical of what he considered an impure version of Islam. But in the sixteenth century such voices were quite rare and only gained in significance after the end of our period, with the rise of the Kadizadeli during the early 1600s.37 Yet, in the atmosphere of the times, people strongly emphasised the difference between “licit or acceptable” (makbul) dervish fraternities and those that religious scholars regarded as “condemnable” (merdud); in some cases, a given order might contain both “acceptable” and “condemnable” branches.38

Among the “acceptable” tarikats, the Zeyniyye was of importance during the 1400s but disappeared soon afterwards.39 By contrast, the Halvetiye/Khalwatiyya, which had originated in Azerbaijan and remained important throughout Ottoman history, enjoyed its greatest influence during the 1500s and 1600s, producing several new branches in the central provinces of the empire.40 Şeyh Çelebi Halife (d. 1484 or 1485) initiated Bayezid II into the Halvetiye when Bayezid was still a prince in Amasya; later on, the şeyh followed the sultan to Istanbul, where the newly enthroned ruler had invited him. Sultan Süleyman also was close to several Halveti şeyhs, one of them Mustafa Musliheddin Nureddinzade (1502–74) from Filibe/Plovdiv in today’s Bulgaria. According to the biographer Atai, Nureddinzade persuaded Süleyman, at that time already sick and elderly, to personally participate in the Szigetvar campaign of 1566, in the course of which the sultan died. As for Murad III (r. 1574–95), he also joined the Halvetiye; his şeyh was a certain Şüca, whose influence upon the monarch gave rise to acrimonious controversy.

Quite a few dervish şeyhs were able to render political services in exchange for the sultan’s patronage. All over the empire, the Halvetis, for instance, defended Sunni “right belief” as propounded by the Ottoman government. Together with local scholar-officials and military authorities, they cooperated in the repression of dissidents. Müniri Belgradi, a jurisconsult of Bosnian background, composed a collection of saints’ biographies known as the silsilat al-mukarrabin ve manakib al-muttakin.41 This author showed Halveti

40 Clayer, Mystiques, état et société, pp. 63–179.
41 Ibid., p. 56.
şeyhs acting as spiritual guides to Ottoman frontier troops in places today located in Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Bulgaria. This is what the author had to say of şeyh Ali Dede Sigetvari, a disciple of Nureddinzade, who had lived in Mecca for a long time and finally had become the guardian of Sultan Süleyman’s cenotaph in Szigetvar: “In the borderlands he dispensed his abundant teachings. Thirsty with ecstatic love and ardour, he set out with the campaign against Varad [Oradea in today’s Rumania], without having been able to finish a set of poems (gazels)”.

Other orders had a more questionable reputation but still enjoyed a degree of sultanic favour. Certainly the Mevlevis (“whirling dervishes”) – or at least their Veledi branch, named after Mevlana Celaleddin’s son Sultan Veled – were in this position; members of the Ottoman elite apparently had more reservations with respect to the rival Şemsi branch. In the long run, the Veledis grew into a mainstream Sunni order with many elite members, and when Sultan Süleyman passed through Konya on his way to do battle against the Safavids (1534), he did not neglect to visit the tomb of Mevlana Celaleddin. Even the Bayramis, with their antinomian background, sprouted a branch espousing Sunni right belief: we have already encountered Mehmed the Conqueror’s spiritual guide Ak Şemseddin, and, following him, the Celvetiye branch also adopted a staunchly Sunni attitude.

“Illicit” dervish orders

On the other hand, the branch of the Bayramis that adopted the name of Melami clearly stood outside the circle of Sunni “right belief” due to the Melamis’ extremist notions reminiscent of Shi‘ism. For this reason, the Ottoman authorities sought them out in order to punish them. The Melamis also professed the “oneness of being”; politically speaking, this belief meant that they tended to regard their master as their temporal as well as their spiritual chief, so that the relevant Sufi şeyh could easily become the more or less openly declared rival of the sultan. This rivalry found expression in current terminology: Melami-Bayramis called their leader Kutb-i Mehdi (“messianic

pole"), Suret-i Rahman ("God’s epiphany") and Sahib-i Zaman ("Master of the age").

A young şeyh named İsmail Maşuki (d. 1529) professed these potentially seditious ideas with special ardour, while at the same time he managed to gain new types of adherents. In the past, the Melamis had mainly attracted Anatolian peasants and artisans, but İsmail Maşuki, the “adolescent sheik” (oğlan şeyh), succeeded in winning over educated men, poets, bureaucrats, ulema and wealthy merchants of Istanbul. Sultan Süleyman’s servitors were not slow to react: Maşuki and 12 of his disciples were arrested in the Ottoman capital and sentenced to death; the şeyhülislam İbn Kemal’s legal opinion relevant to this affair has come down to us. Dated 25 August 1529, this text claims that the accused propagated ideas very similar to those for which, about a century earlier, Bedreddin of Simavna had been hanged in Serres.

Some 40 years after Maşuki’s death, we encounter an analogous scenario. At its centre was Hamza Bali, in his youth a disciple of the oğlan şeyh. A Bosnian, Hamza Bali seemingly had wider contacts beyond his home province, as he supposedly was a chief disciple and emissary of Hüsameddin Ankaravi, a şeyh connected to Ankara who had died in prison. Concerning the end of Hamza Bali, Müniri Belgradi once again provided precious and revealing information. The author reported how Hamza Bali felt threatened in Istanbul and knew what could happen to him once his residence became known; he therefore fled from Istanbul to Bosnia. Activating his previous ties to some of his faithful, he stopped over in the upper part of the town of Tuzla, where he appointed chief disciples (halifes). However, these activities led to a denunciation on the part of the Halveti şeyh Nureddinzade, and the court sent an official poursuivant (çavuş) to Tuzla, who took Hamza Bali by surprise and carried him off to Istanbul, where he was executed in 1573.

Once again, as Müniri Belgradi informs us, the court condemned the şeyh as a “heretic and atheist”. But the author did not agree that the two main points of the accusation against Hamza Bali really amounted to “heresy and atheism”. On the one hand, the şeyh had permitted people to address him as “sultan”, and on the other he had declared that, if he wished, he could make the plague disappear from Istanbul. In the eyes of Müniri Belgradi, who was a dervish sympathiser, these two points appeared in rather a different

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light: “I have had occasion to meet many people who follow his path and visited the regions where they live: they have no principle but love. To sum it all up, they call their sheik sultan because of the immoderate love that they bear him.”

At the same time, the author denied that, in proclaiming that he could deliver Istanbul from the plague, Hamza Bali had set himself up as a magician and thus committed a crime: “Being a saint and possessing miraculous powers does not constitute blasphemy or atheism”. Müniri thus concluded that Hamza Bali’s guilt had not been established “except in the imagination”. He also gave his readers to understand that the government had taken fright at the success of the şeyh’s propaganda, not only in the Balkans but also among the elite in Istanbul and the janissaries. When hearing of Hamza Bali’s death, a janissary even committed suicide by stabbing himself and, just before dying, sighed “oh my sheik”. In other words, Müniri Belgradi, a jurisconsult with an inclination towards dervishes, felt that the government had wildly over-reacted in the face of what its members regarded as political subversion. Due to frequent persecution, some Melamis, now often called Hamzevis in memory of their major martyr, took refuge in Bosnia, the place where Hamza Bali had lived as well as an ancient homeland of heresy ever since the time of the Bogomils.

Other Melamis found a way of surviving by joining other dervish fraternities who were willing to accommodate their beliefs while being less exposed to the ire of the Ottoman authorities. This practice was common enough among people who suffered persecution for religious reasons, particularly the Kızılbaş, and Mevlevis, Bektashis and even some of the “less respectable” branches of the Halvetiye provided places of refuge for religious dissidents. Quite obviously, not all representatives of this last-named fraternity resembled Nureddinzade, the nemesis of Hamza Bali. We have observed that certain illicit dervish communities possessed branches that were acceptable to the government, but the opposite could also be true. It is thus important to differentiate between the different branches of the major orders, and certainly the powers that be did not fail to do so.

Thus a Halveti şeyh by the name of İbrahim Gülşeni featured among the men accused of “heresy and atheism”. At one time, Gülşeni had been a disciple of Ömer Ruşeni (d. 1475). Arrested in 1530, Gülşeni was interrogated at length in the presence of Sultan Süleyman. Once again, the accusation was that, like the Melamis, he believed in the incarnation of God in human

form (*hulul*). But İbrahim Gülşeni was able to convince his judges and also the sultan of his innocence; he then returned to his native Cairo, where he died in 1533 and was buried in a mausoleum that still survives.47

But nevertheless the government and the *şeyhülislam* continued to prosecute İbrahim Gülşeni’s disciples. In 1550, there began the trial of Muhiddin Karamani, *şeyh* of the *zaviye* of Çoban Mustafa Paşa in Gebze, on the outskirts of Istanbul. In the records of this trial, which survive in the archives of the Istanbul Müftülük, we encounter once again the accusations once made against *şeyh* Bedreddin: belief in the unity of all things (*vahdetü ‘l-vücud*), claims to divinity (*uluhiyyet*), rejection of the obligatory Islamic rituals and, in a materialist perspective, of all notions of resurrection and the hereafter. Muhiddin Karamani was sentenced to death and decapitated.48

Relations between the Ottoman government and the Bektaşıye were especially complex. The earliest princes of the dynasty had been very close to this fraternity, as is apparent from several references in the vita of the order’s eponymous saint Hacı Bektaş.49 Possibly the first Ottoman sultans even contributed to the formation of the order, for apparently they encouraged people to associate this particular holy man with a large number of local saints whose cults had previously been independent of that of Hacı Bektaş, or even rivals to the veneration of this minor participant in the mid-thirteenth-century Babai uprising. Hacı Bektaş seems to have lived as a recluse in the village of Suluca Kara Öyük in central Anatolia; in the fullness of time, his mausoleum became the nucleus of the modern town bearing his name.

Sultan Bayezid II visited this sanctuary and had its domes covered with lead; he even accorded an annual gift of several thousand *akçe* to the Kızılbaş *halife* in the province of Teke, in the south-west of Anatolia.50 But everything changed with the advance of Shah İsmail, once the Ottoman government became conscious of the dangers inherent in the Bektaşı-Kızılbaş connection. Bektaşı tradition has it that Selim I closed down the lodge, and only in 1551 did Süleyman allow it to re-open.51 Imperial benefactions did not resume before the eighteenth century. Certainly the order was heterodox and more than any other served as a refuge for dissidents fleeing persecution. As a result,

50 Sohrweide, ‘Der Sieg der Safaviden’, p. 139.
Religious institutions, policies and lives

Hurufis, in addition to Shi’ites and especially Kızılbaş, have left traces of their ideas in the doctrine of the order, syncretistic to a fault. But, even so, the Bektaşiş remained licit and, as is well known, had considerable influence among the janissaries. Perhaps the Ottoman authorities considered that this order was “under control” due to its centralised structure, a legacy of the order’s “second founder”, Balım Sultan (active 1501–2 to 1516–17). After all, brutal repression had not eliminated heterodoxy, and if necessary Ottoman rulers and vezirs could be pragmatic; thus the order may well have appeared as a convenient manner of channelling political and religious dissension into a course that the authorities could live with.

The shadow of God on earth

The sovereigns responsible for the construction of the elaborate institutions and policies upholding Sunni “right belief” were no longer the local lords of little-known background that they had been in the early 1300s, or even the “sultans of Rum” notable for their successes against the infidels that they had become, at the latest after the conquests of Bayezid I Yıldırım (r. 1389–1402). We will now analyse the changes in the religious status of the sixteenth-century Ottoman sultans that accompanied – or followed from – their gains in political power.

In the Islamic tradition, the conquest of Constantinople had an eschatological significance, and therefore this victory possessed significant symbolic meaning; but even so, the Ottoman sultan claimed no more than the title of “king of the warriors for the faith” (şah-ı güzat). In the official communication concerning his great victory that Mehmed II addressed to the Mamluk ruler al-Malik al-Ashraf Inal, the sender certainly emphasised the magnitude of his personal merits. But, at the same time, he accepted his limits when contrasting “[the person] who takes it upon himself to equip the men who labour [on the road of] gaza and cihad” – in other words those who prepared armies for holy war – and “[the person] who assumes the arduous task, inherited from his father and ancestors, of re-animating once again the ceremony

54 Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Conflict, Accommodation and Long-Term Survival: The Bektashi Order and the Ottoman State (Sixteenth–Seventeenth Centuries)’, in Popovic and Veinstein, Bektachiyya, pp. 171–84.
of the pilgrimage to Mecca”.\footnote{Feridun Bey, Müşəədet al-Seldtin, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1274/1857), vol. 1, pp. 228–31.} In this manner, Mehmed II acknowledged the political and religious role of his prestigious correspondent, who every year was responsible for the protection of the great Islamic pilgrimage to the holy cities of the Hijaz.

*The padişah of Islam*

Whatever the religious value of the conquest of Constantinople, in the eyes of literate Muslims the status of the Ottoman sultans changed much more profoundly once they had come to rule Syria and Egypt due to the conquests of Selim I. Certainly the Ottoman attack upon a Sunni sultanate, which moreover had gained great prestige because of its role as a rampart of Islam against Mongols and Crusaders, was illegal in terms of religious law. Nor did outside observers take very seriously Selim’s pretext that the Mamluk rulers had colluded with the heretics of Iran. In spite of such reservations, military success soon eliminated objections based on legal principle, as is apparent from the rapid submission of the Şerifs of Mecca to the Ottoman conqueror. Selim’s conquests of a broad swath of territory were of obvious strategic and economic value. But the symbolic gain also was not negligible. While the Ottoman capital remained in Istanbul and the provinces conquered early on, for the most part taken from infidel rulers, continued to be the core lands of the empire, this polity now was no longer a “sultanate of the frontier”. Gone were the times when the Ottomans had ruled a territory that previously had been external to the Muslim world and thus, as far as Islamic observers were concerned, lacked a sacred history and geography. On the contrary, the sultans now controlled the innermost sanctum, the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and after the campaigns of Süleyman the Magnificent, they also ruled the historic centres of the caliphate, namely Damascus and Baghdad.

As the Ottomans extended their domination over the Arab lands, they confronted Islamic schools of law other than the Hanefi to which they had been subscribing for centuries: in the east, Shafi‘is and Hanbalis were a significant presence, while the Malikis were dominant in western North Africa. All these variants count as moving within the bounds of Sunni “right belief”; therefore Shafi‘is, Hanbalis and Malikis co-existed with the dominant school of law without major troubles. But this co-habitation was anything but egalitarian. In the Arab provinces, Hanefi  profes sent out from Istanbul occupied the highest positions as defined by the *cursus honorum* previously discussed;
as for the locals, most had not built their careers in Istanbul, and they were only eligible for lower-level positions. Apart from doctrinal peculiarities, the ulema of the Arab lands retained their organisation, and upon occasion they were quite capable of expressing their hostility towards certain aspects of Ottoman law, especially where interest-bearing loans and fiscal practices were concerned. In their eyes, the Ottoman sultan remained the sultan of Rum; he had not in any way become the padişah of Islam.

Surely sultans and vezirs were aware of these reservations, but they do not seem to have had a great impact on the self-image that Ottoman monarchs chose to project. In his most solemn missives, the titles attributed to Sultan Süleyman show that this ruler was highly aware of his enhanced position: when enumerating the conquests of his ancestors as well as his own, the monarch and the secretaries speaking in his name proudly made the holy cities and the ancient caliphal capitals precede all other places. The addressees were meant to understand that the Ottoman sultans took pride of place among the sovereigns of Islam. Only the Great Moghuls of India, at least in the reign of Akbar (1542–1605), were in a position to contest this pre-eminence and to substantiate their claims, establishing a presence in Mecca.

The servitor of the two Holy Sanctuaries

After his conquests of 1516–17, Selim I immediately adopted the ancient Mamluk title “servitor of the two Holy Sanctuaries” (hadim al-haramayn); holding this prestigious title made Selim and his successors the protectors of Mecca and Medina. In addition to various rights and prerogatives, this title also conveyed heavy responsibilities which the Ottoman rulers could only undertake because of their de facto power. Put differently, this title reflected the strength of their position and also legitimised it.

The sultans not only were responsible for the defence of the holy cities but also needed to embellish and supply them; in addition, the Ottoman rulers annually had to disburse large sums of money as alms, known as the süre-i hümâyûn. They also had to ensure that two well-organised caravans departed from Cairo and Damascus every year; in both of these a palanquin, the mahmal, represented their authority, as had previously been the custom during

56 Gamal H. El-Nahal, The Judicial Administration of Ottoman Egypt in the Seventeenth Century (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1979); Nelly Hanna, Making Big Money in 1600: The Life and Times of Isma'il Abu Taqiiyya, Egyptian Merchant (Cairo, 1998).
58 Naim ur-Rahman Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations (A Study of Political and Diplomatic Relations between Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire, 1556–1748) (Delhi, 1989), p. 191.
the Mamluk sultanate. The Ottoman rulers also had the prerogative of annually supplying the *kisve*, a black covering for the Kaaba. For the entire journey, the sultans had to ensure the safety and security of the pilgrims. After some prudent hesitation at the beginning of the Ottoman–Mamluk conflict, shortly after the end of the fighting in July 1517, the Şerif of Mecca, Barakat II b. Muhammad b. Barakat, recognised Selim I as his suzerain. For this purpose, he sent his son as an ambassador to Cairo, where by then the victorious sultan was busy establishing an Ottoman framework for the new province of Egypt.

Selim thus returned from his decisive campaign as *hadim al-haramayn*. In the *Nushatü 'l-selatin*, the historian and litterateur Mustafa Ali praised his achievement in the following terms: “Thus his zeal was the cause that he raised the honour of the Empire higher than under his great ancestors, and adding the noble title of Servant of the two Sacred Cities to his illustrious *khutba* he surpassed all the other sultans in rank.”

We thus need to abandon the tenacious legend that Selim I had acquired his title of caliph by a renunciation of the last scion of the Abbasid dynasty, at that time resident in Cairo. In the early 1500s, the title had lost much of its former prestige; on the other hand, the notion of the caliph as the spiritual head of all Muslims, internationally accepted in the treaty of Kütük Kaynarca (1774), is of much later vintage and emerged in a totally different historical context. Even so, however, the de facto supremacy of the Ottoman sultans among all Muslim monarchs and their control of the ancient metropolises of the Arab empires in the long run did encourage people to regard these rulers as the successors to the caliphs of the early period of Islam.

Given this situation, the protection of the two holiest Muslim sanctuaries became a major component of Ottoman “imperial ideology” and the self-image of Ottoman sovereigns. The preamble to a command issued by Selim II to his governor of Egypt dated 17 January 1568 forms but one textual example among many. In addressing a subordinate and reminding him of the many

achievements of the dynasty, the monarch declared that “sultans of reputation and monarchs of high rank glorify and elevate themselves by [exercising the office] of servitor of the two Holy Sanctuaries”.  

When the Mamluk sultans ruled in Cairo, their Ottoman rivals had not been able to undertake any construction work in the holy cities. But after 1517 they were free to engage in architectural projects and urban reconstruction: in the sixteenth century, their principal undertaking was the restoration of the Great Mosque in Mecca. 

At the same time, the mahmal (in Ottoman, mahl and mehmel) inherited from the Mamluks every year departed from Damascus and Cairo with the pilgrimage caravans. Admittedly, no Ottoman sultan ever visited Mecca. Cem Sultan (1459–95), son of Mehmed II and brother of Bayezid II, was the only male representative of the dynasty ever to do so; but whatever his ambitions, he never ascended the Ottoman throne. Shortly after the end of our period, the young Sultan Osman II (r. 1618–22) declared his intention to perform the pilgrimage, but many people suspected him of ulterior motives, so that the project merely exacerbated the hostility of his adversaries and contributed to his downfall. Under these circumstances, it was the function of the mahmil to symbolise the presence of the Ottoman monarch.

As for the mahmil covers, in the course of the Ottoman period they changed colour several times: while at first they were yellow, at a later stage they turned crimson and yet later green. The new protectors of the Holy Sanctuaries, at the acme of their fortunes, ordered more elaborate versions, and the same thing applied to the gilded balls affixed to the ends of the palanquin. European visitors who watched the outgoing mahmils paraded in processions indicate yet another change. While originally the mahmil had been a purely political symbol, in time it became the subject of a particularly fervent popular devotion, and the same thing applied to the kisve and the cordage which was to hold the latter in place; after all, these items were to stay in contact with the Kaaba for a full year. Already in the mid-1500s, people attributed supernatural

64 Shai Har-El, Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War, 1485–1491 (Leiden, 1995), p. 104.
powers to these items. To justify this devotion ex post facto, many observers believed that the palanquin, while in reality empty, contained a particularly valuable copy of the Qur’an.

The sultan in the eyes of Mecca pilgrims: Guaranteeing the completion of the pilgrimage

After Sultan Süleyman had conquered Yemen, a third caravan under Ottoman auspices appeared in Mecca, including a third mahmil proceeding in the name of the sultan. However, this mahmil existed for less than a century, between 1543 and 1630, because Ottoman control of this remote province was nothing if not precarious. By contrast, Sultan Süleyman’s conquest of Baghdad in 1534 did not result in the revival of an Ottoman-sponsored “Iraqi” palanquin, which had, however, existed under the Ilkans of Iran after Islamisation, and also the Jalayirid and Akkoyunlu dynasties. But a sultanic command to the governor of Basra dated March 1565 records that after the Ottoman conquest of 1546 local authorities constituted a direct caravan to Mecca, which was to proceed separately from its Damascus and Cairo counterparts. After all, the distance between Basra and Mecca was only 20 days of travel. However, as the new caravan had not received due authorisation from the sultan, the Şerifs of Mecca used this circumstance as a pretext for demanding money from the pilgrims. Thereupon the inhabitants of Basra turned to the sultan, asking for the confirmation of a fourth pilgrimage caravan. However, the sultan refused, stating: “It is not my will that after the conquest [of Basra], a mahmil depart for the glorious Kaaba nor should a caravan leave [this city] for the pilgrimage.”

How should we explain the sultan’s refusal? Perhaps he did not want the additional responsibility of sending another palanquin, symbolising imperial power and protection of the pilgrims, on a desert route which, just like all other roads of access to Mecca, was exposed to Bedouin attack. It is also possible that once again fear of the infiltration of Iranian spies was at issue; at least the administration posed the problem in these terms a few years later.

In the course of the sixteenth century, the relative importance of the Cairo and Damascus caravans changed. In the Mamluk period as well, the Cairo

Religious institutions, policies and lives

and Damascus caravans had belonged to the domains of the same ruler. But as the Cairo caravan came from the capital, it enjoyed certain prerogatives, including the precedence of its mahmal when in Mecca, a privilege which members of the relevant caravan jealously defended against their Damascene rivals. In the Ottoman period, the Cairo caravan certainly continued to transport the kisve, which Coptic weavers manufactured in the citadel of this city. But even so, the metropolis of the Nile now was only a provincial capital and the Damascene caravan enjoyed higher prestige, for the alms (süre) sent by the sultans travelled by way of Damascus and the same thing applied to pilgrims from Istanbul and the empire’s central provinces.70

If according to the period involved the Ottoman sovereigns thus patronised two or three official caravans, which they had inherited from preceding regimes, we must keep in mind that the subjects of other rulers also participated in the pilgrimage. Relatively frequent were the Moroccans, in addition to Iranians, Indians, Central Asians and inhabitants of the Caucasus. Moreover, among these pilgrims there were Shi’ites as well as Sunnis. But once they had joined one of the great caravans, these non-Ottoman Muslims took their places behind the mahmil and thus accepted the authority and protection of the sultan. Thus, in a limited but very tangible sense, the Ottoman sultans’ power encompassed the entire Islamic world.

Given these circumstances, Selim I, Süleyman and their successors protected pilgrims on a much broader scale than the Mamluk sultans, who had always remained a purely Middle Eastern power. As the Ottoman Empire now extended over three continents, the protection of the pilgrimage also acquired a global dimension. It is fascinating to note that certain great enterprises undertaken or at least conceived in the euphoric early years of Selim II by the grand vezir Sokollu Mehmed Paşa (about 1505–79) and his associates, according to official discourse wholly or at least in part should have protected pilgrimage traffic as well as the two holy cities. Thus the sultan questioned the governor of Egypt about the feasibility of a Suez Canal project. The opening of this route would have allowed the Ottoman navy to do battle in the Red Sea, thus protecting Mecca from the Zaydis of Yemen and, moreover, fight the Portuguese, who constantly caused trouble for Indian pilgrims and the ships on which they travelled.71 Another such canal, planned and perhaps even begun, was to link the Don and the Volga; in this manner, the sultan

71 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul, Mühimme Defteri, VII, no. 721.
planned to retake Astrakhan, recently conquered by the Russians. In this case, too, Ottoman officials in the name of their sultan presented the city as an essential stopping point for pilgrims who wished to travel to Mecca without passing through “heretic” Iran.72 Furthermore, at least when addressing the Spanish Moriscos, the Ottoman authorities justified the conquest of Cyprus by the need to prevent the Venetian authorities on the island from providing aid and comfort to the pirates who had been making life difficult for pilgrims in the eastern Mediterranean.73

In place of a conclusion

In the present chapter, we have focused on the learned hierarchy, not only the co-optation of the ulema into the Ottoman project but also their increased dependence on the will of the ruler and his third- or second-in-command, the chief jurisconsult. In this context, the institution of a fixed cursus honorum and the need for scholars of high ambition to study in Istanbul facilitated government control over its learned men. At least in part, this control served the cause of religion: turning their backs on the latitudinarian practices of an earlier age, sixteenth-century sultans made the defence and enforcement of Sunni “right belief” into a major political goal. Yet this policy did not mean that the government permitted no alternative to the religion of its scholars and legists; as a result, we have needed to examine the close but often also tension-ridden relationships between the representatives of Islamic mysticism and the Ottoman elite.

Moreover, we have discussed the manner in which the conquest of the Arab provinces changed the status of the Ottoman sultans, not only in terms of power politics but also in a global religious context. Previously these monarchs had been successful fighters on the margins of the Islamic world, but the conquests of Selim I catapulted them into a central and even paramount position, where they could command a vastly enhanced prestige but also needed to take on heavy responsibilities. Selim I, Süleyman and their successors made

it into a major factor of their imperial legitimacy that they ensured the safety of the pilgrimage caravans, supplied the holy cities with alms in food and money and beautified the mosques of Mecca and Medina. As the subjects of foreign Muslim rulers also undertook the pilgrimage, joining the caravans that set out from Cairo and especially Damascus, every year the Ottoman sultans in a limited but significant manner affirmed their position as the paramount rulers of the Islamic world. In the protection and promotion of the pilgrimage to Mecca, religious and political concerns came together.
In the century and a half covered by this volume, Ottoman governmental structure changed enormously, and so did the society subjected to the rule of the sultans and their office-holders. At the beginning of our period, the empire governed by the sultans extended over the Balkans to include central Anatolia, while the eastern section of the peninsula for the most part was still under the rule of princes recognising as their overlords not the Ottomans but the Mamluk sultans of Egypt and Greater Syria. The latter term refers to the region stretching roughly from the present-day Turkish border to that of Egypt; it encompasses today’s Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine. Mehmed the Conqueror (r. 1451–81) made the Tatar hanate of the Crimea into a dependent principality and the Black Sea into an Ottoman lake. He also began the long, drawn-out project, completed only in 1669 with the conquest of Crete or even in 1715 with the re-conquest of the Peloponnese after a short Venetian occupation, of driving Venice out of the eastern Mediterranean. But for the time being the Venetians and to a lesser extent the Genoese were still very present in the region. While there survive very few official counts recording the empire’s taxpayers of that early period, we can assume that Mehmed II ruled over a population that was Christian to a very large extent.

But by 1603, when our period ended, the Ottoman polity had turned from a regional empire into a world one, and the religious composition of the population had dramatically changed as well. The crucial step was the conquest of the Mamluk sultanate in 1516–17, followed by the annexation of the Hijaz, which made the Ottoman sultans the acknowledged protectors of the pilgrimage to Mecca. There followed the – albeit temporary – acquisition of Yemen and the more durable conquest of Iraq. By the 1530s, the sea captains of Sultan Süleyman I (r. 1520–66) challenged the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, and while they did not succeed in driving their opponents out of Goa or Hormuz, they did ensure Ottoman control over the Red Sea and thereby
the security of Mecca and Medina. In addition, the sultans had established their rule on the coast of North Africa all the way to the borders of the sultanate of Morocco, and on the Red Sea littoral as well, founding the coastal province of Habeş (Abyssinia). As a result, the sultans now governed the central Islamic lands once controlled by the Abbasid and Fatimid caliphates, and their subjects were largely Muslims, of whom a considerable number spoke Arabic as their mother tongue. Certainly many of the newly conquered regions were thinly settled by peasants farming the dry steppe or even oases in the desert, or else inhabited by camel-raising Bedouins. Yet the total population of the empire greatly increased as a result of the conquests of sultans Selim I and Süleyman.

Against this backdrop, our discussion of the Ottoman population will form a triptych. We begin by introducing the most important sources and the historiography that in the past 70 years or so has attempted to analyse and evaluate this material. Our second section will deal with some significant characteristics of this population. In the absence of direct data on births, marriages and deaths, we will draw what conclusions we may from the often scanty information that we do possess. Relevant data concern epidemics and the condition of women and non-Muslims, as well as the frequent conversions to Islam observed among the latter. In the long run, conversion significantly changed the religious makeup of the Ottoman population. We will also take note of the urbanisation that often accompanied the consolidation of the sultans’ rule. As for the third part, it concerns migration, much of it involuntary: flights from the countryside, slaves carried away from their homes and forced removals of populations by administrative fiat. We will also discuss more or less voluntary migration. Young men left their homes in search of work, including military service in the sultans’ armies. Entire families might move in search of security and more or less congenial political regimes; such migrations happened especially but not exclusively in border regions. Last but not least, there were the nomads and semi-nomads, the most mobile of all populations. The sultan’s government often encouraged these people to establish agricultural villages, even if by 1603 the first attempts to forcibly settle them were still 80 years or so in the future.²

¹ Salih Özbaran, Ottoman Expansion towards the Indian Ocean in the 16th Century (Istanbul, 2009), pp. 59–76; Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Güney Siyaseti, Habeş Eyaleti (Istanbul, 1974).
Using tahrirs as sources for the history of Ottoman populations: Overall parameters

Historical demographers focus on births, deaths and migrations as the causes that determine the size and age composition of any given population. As in the Ottoman realm of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries neither the administration nor religious communities recorded births or deaths, these central aspects of population change escape us. Even gravestones, which have become important as sources for the cultural and occasionally even demographic history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, are rare for our period and thus of limited use. Our discussion will therefore be based only in small part on quantitative evidence; in quite a few cases we will proceed in a manner familiar to medievalists and use limited or even anecdotal evidence to illustrate trends that remain impossible to quantify. In addition, while historical demographers usually deal with religion only in a marginal sense – namely insofar as religious practices affect births, migrations and deaths – we will include religious changes in our consideration of population characteristics. As religion was so central to the manner in which Ottoman officials classified the populations they recorded, we cannot make sense of our sources without taking this factor into account.

Most of our information about Ottoman populations comes from the enormous series of registers compiled by Ottoman officials that cover the towns and villages of at least the central provinces of the sultans’ empire; scholars call them tahrir or tapu tahrir. These documents provide listings of the tax-paying population and therefore a static picture; for most information on movement, we need to turn to other sources.

After all, it was not the job of the officials in charge of compiling tahrirs to collect demographic information. Rather they were to keep track of particular types of taxes, namely those assigned as revenue sources to grantees serving as cavalry soldiers (timar, zeamet), timar-holders being known as sipahi and assignees with zeamets as zaim.3 Provincial governors and their retainers also received their pay in this fashion, although the sums of money at issue were much larger. A sizeable share furthermore fell to the sultans and other members of the Ottoman dynasty; these large blocks of revenue were known as hass. Tahrir registers thus were of interest to the state elite because they recorded revenues and only in a secondary fashion the taxpayers that had

produced them. In addition, these volumes contained records of revenues and lands in mortmain (vakıf); taxpayers who resided in these territories paid at least part of their dues to the trustees of the pious foundations in question. Vakıf revenues apart, taxes did not appear in these records unless assigned as timar, zeamet or hass. Thus the head tax payable by non-Muslims (cizye), which did not fall into this category, did not appear in the tahri_rs but always in special registers.

One variety of Ottoman tahri_rs – the basic format – was called “detailed” (mufassal); these registers contained the names of individual taxpayers and the taxes these men were required to pay. As a result of their great bulk, mufassal registers were not easy to handle; in particular, it was difficult to compute the total revenue of a province available for assignment as timar, zeamet and hass, or else not disposable because it was in mortmain. By contrast, the “abridged” (icmal) registers only listed those settlements available for assignment, along with the revenues expected and the numbers – but not the names – of working and producing taxpayers. With the aid of these registers, it was much easier to make the computations preliminary to determining the extent of individual timar, zeamet and hass. However, given frequent mistakes in copying, counting and computing, icmals are always less reliable than mufassals.

Officials were to prepare registers at regular intervals, but in real life irregularity was the norm. Certainly we find a few sets of such records documenting large areas and almost simultaneous; for instance, in the early 1580s, the officials of Sultan Murad III (r. 1574–95) covered many Anatolian provinces in rapid succession. Yet if we look at any particular place, we soon find that registers appeared at highly variable intervals. Accidents of preservation surely count for something. But many irregularities were due to the administration’s lack of money or else accidents on the road that the officials in charge of the count must often have suffered. Last but not least, the unwillingness of certain taxpayers to provide information must have delayed the completion of many registers.

In the tahri_rs, settlements formed districts (kaza, nahiye) and districts sub-provinces (sancak or liva, meaning “flag”). In their turn, several sancaks made up a province (beylerbeylik, meaning “[territory] in charge of a lord of lords” or high-level governor). Thus the tax registers also provide a comprehensive overview of the administrative structure of the empire, or at least of its central territories. However, dependent principalities, whose rulers owed allegiance to the sultan but where no direct Ottoman administration existed, did not enter into the registers. Thus we have no tahri_rs concerning Walachia, Moldavia, the domain of the Crimean Tatars or the Hijaz, to name but a few
examples. Certain sections of today’s Greece also seem to have escaped the attention of the recorders.

These tax registers, the oldest samples of which date to the 1430s but which become more abundant only by the late fifteenth century, are the basic source for the population historian concerned with the eastern Mediterranean.⁴ However, we do need to ask ourselves to what extent these registers are indeed reliable guides to Ottoman populations. Certainly they are not as useful as they had once seemed. Closer inspection has shown for instance that some officials in charge of compiling tahrir were given to copying from their predecessors. Occasionally they openly acknowledged this fact, explaining for instance that the inhabitants of such and such a village had not shown up for the count. From the registers compiled in the bureaus of local kadis (sicil) it has also emerged that – to mention one very striking example – certain Palestinian peasants openly mocked the scribes sent to prepare the tahrir and may well have given them fanciful answers.⁵ While the insults that the villagers addressed to the sultans’ officials active in this region do not to my knowledge have any counterparts in kadi registers covering other Ottoman provinces, surely similar confrontations occurred elsewhere as well.

In other cases, moreover, officials did not acknowledge their copying, so that only a comparison of older and more recent tahrir will show to what extent independent counting had really taken place. Heath Lowry’s warning that we must never use tahrir singly but always in series is therefore most appropriate.⁶ However, we occasionally have to deal with regions on which we possess no more than a single tahrir. In some cases, we may contextualise the relevant data by confronting them with information derived from the local kadi registers. While this procedure is often fruitful, such registers for the most part survive only for the period after 1570 and thus do not help us when dealing with older tax records.⁷

Ottoman populations as reflected – or not – in the tahrir

As we have seen, Ottoman registers contain the names of individual taxpayers because these men were the ultimate revenue sources, without whose

⁵ Amy Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 91 and 127.
labour no fields, pastures or mines could be productive. Therefore the tah-rirs, especially those of the mufassal type, in spite of all their drawbacks, are so precious to the historian of population. These lists included personal names, patronyms and the names of the villages/town quarters where the taxable populations resided. Officials also categorised rural taxpayers by the amount of land that they were supposed to be cultivating: a full or half farmstead (çift, nim çift) or a piece of land that was even smaller than a half-çift (bennak). Peasants in these three categories counted as married men; furthermore, in all settlements there lived a number of bachelors, normally called mücерred. In some regions, we also encounter so-called caba or kara. Officialdom employed this term for bachelors who, while not possessing any land, made their living independently from the men in whose households they probably resided. Caba or kara may have worked on other people’s farms or else as herdsmen.8

Beginning in the late 1930s and at an accelerating tempo in the course of the 1940s and 1950s, Ömer Lütfi Barkan – and somewhat later Halil İnalcık – published a series of studies that introduced the Ottoman tax registers to the scholarly world. Due to his ongoing dialogue with Fernand Braudel, population questions were especially important for Barkan.9 Since that time, an enormous bibliography has accumulated, which due to its bulk we cannot begin to review here.10 But at present many scholars seem to feel that, for the time being at any rate, we have worked the potential of the tahırirs to excess. As a result, a large share of the literature discussed here is at least 25 years old. The current lack of interest is particularly meaningful, as the pace of

Ottoman history-writing has noticeably quickened in the last quarter century, and important new studies now appear almost every few weeks.11 Disillusionment with the tahrirs has resulted from the experiences of numerous scholars who have prepared the monographs on individual regions and their populations, of which we now possess quite a few examples.12 These historians soon came to understand that the tahrirs were by no means the “census data” of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, as we have seen, these documents recorded only tax-paying adult males and nobody else, the exception being those widows who at least in many parts of the Balkans/Rumeli cultivated their deceased husbands’ lands, mostly on a temporary basis until their sons were old enough to take over. Non-taxpayers often went unrecorded: garrison soldiers, servants of the kadas’ court, the blind and lame, in addition to prayer leaders, were tax-exempt, and so were certain privileged dervishes and, depending on the locality, other personages as well. All these men might or might not show up in the registers. Boys usually entered the counts upon reaching puberty, but the actual age was variable. Furthermore, some early registers did record a few boys (sabi), but certainly not the entire underage male population. It often remains unclear why certain juveniles and not others appeared in the tax records, although in some cases the officials seem to have included those appearing close to adulthood.13 All these problems have prompted a recent researcher to conclude that “there seem to be no easy solutions to the problems of Ottoman demographic history”.14

In addition, all estimates of population totals are hypothetical because we do not know the size of the average household. Significant infant mortality probably meant that the number of children actually present in any given household was much smaller than the total offspring born to the parent couple. In the Hungarian province of Simontornya in 1565, family size seems to have oscillated between a minimum of 3.7 and a maximum of 4.6, but families

11 As an exception, compare Mülhahat Kütükoglu, XV ve XVI. Asırlarda Izmir Kazasının Sosyal ve İktisadi Yapısı (Izmir, 2000). As an example for the editions sponsored by the Ottoman archives, compare İsmet Binark et al. (eds.), 166 Numaralı Muhasebe-i Vilâyet-i Anadolu Defteri (937/1950) (Ankara, 1995).
Ottoman population

varied greatly over time and place.¹⁵ In the rural area of Simontornya, most households probably consisted of parents and children, with an occasional further relative thrown in. On the other hand, in cities close to the centre of government, particularly Istanbul, Bursa and Edirne, many families owned slaves, who did not appear in the tax registers. Yet slave-women might bear the children of their owners, who were born as free descendants of their fathers, thus increasing family size.¹⁶ Secondly, only a close study of several registers covering the same region will allow us to determine which figures are based on actual counts and which ones are merely carryovers from previous registers, an eventuality that we already have had occasion to note.

When estimating regional population size, it is best to make use of the age data collected for many populations the world over ever since the 1700s and visually organised in “age pyramids”.¹⁷ Adult males, in other words men 15 years and over, in all known cases roughly comprise between one-third and one-quarter of the total inhabitants of a given province or country. If we assume that the overwhelming majority of entries in the tax registers concern adult males, we can thus estimate total population by multiplying by three to get the minimum and by four to obtain the maximum possible size. However, this method yields approximations and only works for good-sized regions. In the case of towns and cities, agglomerations of unmarried men, such as casual labourers, soldiers or monks, may be so large as to make this method unreliable. Moreover, sometimes a higher quotient seems more appropriate. Géza Dávid has suggested that we use a multiplier of five to arrive at the population of Simontornya.¹⁸

**Cizye and avâriz registers**

Non-Muslim subjects of the sultans had to accept a number of restrictions that marked them as inferior to the Muslims; furthermore, in return for an assurance of life, property and the exercise of their religion, they paid the head tax (cizye) demanded by the sultan in accordance with Islamic law. Early cizye registers date to 894/1488–9 and the immediately following years; at this time the Ottoman Balkans, including the island of Midilli/Mytilini, were home to

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¹⁵ Dávid, Osmanlı Macaristanı’nda Toplum, p. 67.
¹⁸ Dávid, Osmanlı Macaristanı’nda Toplum, p. 68.
between 500,000 and 600,000 cizye-paying families plus 40,000 to 50,000 widows. These figures constitute a minimum, as once again certain people were exempt; some scholars assume that on general principles it makes sense to add 20 per cent to Ottoman cizye data. If so, we can assume that Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Balkans of the late fifteenth century numbered two to three million; of course this figure must be taken “with a grain of salt”. For Anatolia, cizye-paying households were slightly under ten thousand.

Moreover, Hungarian scholars have studied cizye records from the 1500s, which sometimes list only the number of persons subject to payment but on occasion include the names and patronyms of the individual taxpayers as well. However, provincial officials in charge of these counts sometimes have done their work in such a sloppy fashion that even specialists have had trouble identifying these documents as records concerned with the collection of cizye as opposed to other taxes. At least with respect to Hungary, the contribution of head tax registers to demographic history has been much weaker than that of the tahiris.

While more widespread in seventeenth-century fiscal practice than earlier on, the collection of the tax called avâriz began in the 1500s, and relevant records go back to this period. Originally an extraordinary tax that in time became ordinary, the avâriz was payable by groups of taxpayers known as avâriz-houses. If located within a single province or sub-province, all these “houses” paid the same amount of tax. In the case of widespread poverty, a large number of people, administratively speaking, came together in one “house”; if the locality was better off, a smaller number of taxpayers made up a unit with the same tax liability. For calculating population, these registers are helpful only if the scribes compiling them have entered the names of the taxpayers comprising the individual “tax houses”. Or at least the officials must have recorded the number of taxpayers that on average made up the “avâriz-houses” in the region they had covered. Sometimes this information is in fact available, but in other cases it is not. While avâriz records thus are not especially helpful to the historian of population, sometimes no other source material is available and scholars have done their best to “mine” them. Thus Süleyman Demirci’s novel and extremely thorough study cautiously says that in conjunction with other sources these registers are indicative “to a certain

degree, of demographic trends”.

The author does not seem to have found much information on the number of taxpayers in central Anatolia and thus has had to derive demographic indicators from “extraneous” data, such as petitions by taxpayers pleading poverty, to reduce the number of avâriz-houses in a given area.

A cause of many premature deaths

While we have no way of detailing just how many people prematurely lost their lives due to epidemics, both current and soon-to-be-conquered Ottoman territories must have suffered from the great plague epidemics of the 1300s and 1400s. These events were as cataclysmic in Egypt and Syria as they were in Byzantium and medieval western and central Europe. Given the scanty documentation on the Balkans and Anatolia during this period, we cannot say anything about the extent to which the “core lands” of the fledgling Ottoman Empire suffered as well, but they cannot have escaped this scourge altogether.

Apparently the attack of Timur’s army against Bayezid Yıldırım’s recently formed empire became even more disastrous to the Anatolian population because, as so often happened, the movement of armies spread the plague. During the years immediately following the conquest of Constantinople (1453), there was a major epidemic in Thrace and also in the new capital city, which Mehmed II avoided by taking his army northward (1467). Further outbreaks in the second half of the fifteenth century have been catalogued by Greek-language sources; only one of the early Ottoman chroniclers mentioned what he called the “taun-i ekber (great bubonic plague)”.

However sometimes the term taun also referred to non-plague epidemics. In the sixteenth century as well, there were numerous outbreaks, some of them extremely serious. On the plague of 1561, there survives the eye-witness testimony of the Habsburg ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq. Apparently, when the epidemic was at its height, some one thousand to twelve hundred people died every day. After some discussion with the current grand vezirs and indirectly


24 Lowry, ‘Pushing the Stone Uphill’, p. 28.

25 Ibid., p. 46.
Sultan Süleyman as well, the imperial ambassador finally received permission to wait out events on one of the Princes’ Islands in the Sea of Marmara, at that time almost uninhabited; later European ambassadors were to follow his example by withdrawing to their summer houses.26

At the limits of the knowable: Ottoman women

Just like the records of many other cultures before the twentieth century, Ottoman sources do not contain much information on women. Even genealogies normally only include male ancestors; although Islamic religious law allows people to inherit property from their mothers, for official purposes a person’s only progenitor was his or her father.

As the overwhelming majority of women were not taxpayers, few tax records mention them. Beyond females appearing in the kadi’s registers as individuals because they left inheritances, divorced, manumitted a slave or else were involved in criminal cases, archival sources mention women wealthy enough to establish pious foundations (vakıf). In Istanbul, females leaving charitable bequests seemingly were more numerous than elsewhere. Perhaps the accumulation of wealth and especially cash in the Ottoman capital made it easier here than in the provinces for some fortunate women to secure a share of the available material resources. Women could obtain wealth through inheritance from their natal families; if widowed or divorced, the “deferred dowry” (mihr-i müeccel) might be a further source of capital. In a limited number of cases, women also were active in the market, especially as money-lenders.

We possess a register of Istanbul pious foundations, dated to the year 1009/1600; the overwhelming majority of people who had established these charities evidenced no connections to the ruling dynasty. Thanks to this bulky volume and its editor, Mehmet Canatar, we know at least the names and patronyms of certain better-off women who lived in the Ottoman capital between 1453 and the end of our period.27 The list compiled by Canatar contains approximately 1,381 names; because of frequent homonyms, it is impossible to be more precise. While counting I have tried to eliminate the second and/or third references to the same person, but this is a chancy business. When the same name occurs several times in succession or in very close

27 Mehmet Canatar (ed.), İstanbul Vakıflan Tahrir Defteri, 1009 (1600) Tarihli (Istanbul, 2004), pp. XXXIII–XL.
proximity, I have counted only the first occurrence and eliminated the later ones. If not in close proximity, I have regarded women bearing the same name and patronym as separate but homonymous persons. Given these uncertainties, it is impossible to avoid all double-counting. In spite of these drawbacks, however, this text contains one of the largest accumulations of female names that we are likely to encounter for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

The document covers one and a half centuries; the list of Istanbul’s pious foundations, however, is not complete, as those establishments that once had existed but did not survive until 1600 do not enter our record. Presumably small and poor foundations were more likely to soon disappear than those more richly endowed. As women’s foundations typically were more modest than those of men, the attrition rate of charities instituted by females should have been greater than that of the vakıfs established by their men-folk. If these assumptions are true, the number of pious foundations on record in 1600 gives us only a minimum indication of female-sponsored charities, and the proportion of pious foundations actually established by Istanbul women during the city’s first 150 years as the Ottoman capital must have been higher than the 42 per cent (1,381 out of 3,265 foundations) derived from the surviving record. Of course it bears repeating that the women mentioned by the registrar were not necessarily contemporaries but could have lived at any time during the one and a half centuries covered by our document. As for the names, they are real; only in a few rare cases do we encounter circumlocutions such as “the mother of Prince so-and-so” or sobriquets like “the washerwoman”.

As we might expect, Istanbul was home to a large number of women who appear to have been recent converts to Islam. The only possible way of even roughly estimating their number involves looking at the women’s patronyms: as Ottoman scribes avoided direct references to the non-Muslim ancestors of a Muslim, it was customary to call the father of a convert Abdullah or “slave of God”. However, as Abdullah is and was also a given name among Muslims, we cannot assume that every son or daughter of Abdullah was really a convert. Yet, in the sixteenth century, converts of higher status quite often substituted names such as “Abdülmennan” or even “Abdurrahman” and “Abdülkerim” for the “regulation patronym” Abdullah; for example, the famous architect Sinan, known to have been the son of a Christian, often favoured the “fancier” appellations.28 As we will not count the “daughters of Abdülmennan” and related names among the converts, we have probably

more or less compensated for our over-estimation of converts merely known as “daughters of Abdullah”.

Among the 1,381 female founders, 556 had Abdullah for a patronym, and we can regard most of them as recent converts; this figure amounts to slightly over 40 per cent of the total, an impressive value, demonstrating the rapid Islamisation of the Ottoman capital after 1453. Quite a few of these women probably had come to Istanbul as slaves, and it would be most interesting to distinguish these freedwomen from the other converts. The term atike (freedwoman) occasionally occurs, but it is too rare to be of use for any general conclusions. Furthermore, although at this time women’s names based on popular flowers such as çiğdem (crocus), gül (rose), benefs or menekşe (violet) or yasemin (jasmine) were often given to slaves, and the terms denoting birds such as the nightingale (bülbül) or turtledove (kumru) served the same purpose, identifying freedwomen on the basis of their names alone is a hazardous business.29

In a few cases, we find the elaborate, “poetic” names of the kind favoured by the sultan’s harem well into the nineteenth century, such as Ferahnâz, Âfitâb, Cânsûz or Mâh-ı Habîb. When these names occur in combination with the “bint Abdullah” patronym, we can risk the assumption that the bearers were members or ex-members of elite harems. But similarly elaborate names might also occur among women born into Islam. Thus there was a Mihrîşah hatun daughter of İskender Paşa and a Şâh-ı Zâmân daughter of what was probably a different İskender.30 But many Muslims by birth bore simple names with an Islamic connotation, such as Ayse, Fatma or Habibe.

Of course we cannot claim that the characteristics of female vakif-founders in Istanbul were applicable also to other Ottoman women, but even if we study the relevant figures as data pure and simple, refraining from extrapolation of any kind, we can arrive at some interesting conclusions. Thus it is noteworthy that a large number of converts should have decided to establish a vakif at all instead of leaving their property to their heirs and donating some of it, while they were still alive, to their friends and neighbours. Given the rareness of women who had performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, establishing a foundation apparently was a more accessible manner of showing piety. In addition to religious concerns properly speaking, some women who founded vakifs may have considered the social status of the family into which

they had married and which probably had allowed them to accumulate some property in the first place. Leaving visible traces of their own lives on earth may have been another motivating factor. Viewed from a different angle, as nobody could establish a pious foundation without some property, however modest, quite a few women who must have arrived in Istanbul as destitute slaves ultimately came to own a house or a sum of money. We can thus conclude that the integration of these women into Istanbul’s Muslim society had been reasonably successful; of course our sources have nothing to say about the failures.

Our information on female Orthodox Christians is if anything even scantier than that concerning Muslims, but some evidence is available on Jewish women. Gravestones form one possible source, but most importantly for our period, the responses of rabbis to questioners anxious to find out whether certain acts were licit or illicit according to Jewish law indicate examples of demographically relevant behaviour among Istanbul’s Jewish communities. Customs differed, as many of the Jews living in sixteenth-century Istanbul had immigrated from a variety of communities in Portugal, Spain and Italy. But certain common features also existed: most notably, girls were married off at a very young age and expected to bear children as soon as they were physically able to do so. As many young girls conceived before they were fully grown, this practice resulted in numerous deaths in childbirth and babies that were too weak to survive. Minna Rozen has surmised that this behaviour resulted from a desire to fill, as rapidly as possible, the gaps that had resulted from the expulsion from Spain and the long trip to the Ottoman lands. From the perspective of the individual family, the pressure to bear children intensified due to low survival rates, and gravestones indicate that shortly after the end of our period, in the mid-1600s, the life expectancy of women was significantly lower than that of men.

The non-Muslim population and the routes of Islamisation

Among the empire’s non-Muslims, the vast majority were Orthodox Christians. In Greater Syria and Iraq, there also were some Jacobites and Nestorians, while Egypt contained a sizeable Coptic minority. Armenians were present in eastern Anatolia and Istanbul, where Sulumanastır was the residence of a patriarch, and also in Jerusalem, where the monastery of

St. James attracted many pilgrims. But the main religious centre of the Armenians was on Safavid territory in the town of Echmiadzin, near Eriwan. As we have little information on sixteenth-century Armenian settlement patterns in Istanbul and elsewhere, we have to fall back on the information furnished by the mid-seventeenth-century Armenian scholar Ereyma Çelebi: he recorded over a thousand families in the Istanbul quarter of Samatya, near the Sea of Marmara. By this period, Armenians also had come to be numerous slightly further to the east, in the vicinity of the gate known as Kumkapi. Galata had its contingent of Armenian inhabitants, too, and so did certain Bosporus villages, which at this time were still very small.

In the Balkans, the Orthodox population related to its church by means of a network of parish priests who were allowed to marry; these priests were subject to a hierarchy of bishops, archbishops and ultimately the patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria, as well as the ecumenical patriarch in Istanbul. Marriages were under church jurisdiction, but occasionally the marital problems of Orthodox couples appeared in the registers of the local kadi’s court. Village and small-town priests learned their profession through apprenticeship, and only a few attended the patriarchal academy in the capital. Ottoman administrative practice had long since accepted this system of church government, and from the population’s point of view, it had the advantage of not requiring great expenditures. Thus, in regions such as the former Yugoslavia, where Orthodox and Catholics co-existed, the former often gained ground at the expense of the latter.

Catholics lived on some Aegean islands, where sections of the population had adopted this faith after 1204, when these territories were under the domination of Venice, Genoa or certain feudal lords of Italian background. In Cyprus, by contrast, Catholicism more or less disappeared with the Ottoman conquest (1571–3) due to war-related deaths, enslavement and emigration, but in the 1600s a small community re-established itself. In today’s Lebanon, the Maronites formed a close relationship with Venice and the papacy: already in the twelfth century they had recognised the pope as the head of their church.

34 Ladislas Hadrovics, Le peuple serbe et son église sous la domination turque (Paris, 1947).
but retained their own rites and performed religious services in Arabic. In 1584, the pope set up a college in Rome to train their priests.\textsuperscript{36} In the Balkans, Catholics lived in the port town of Dubrovnik, whose upper class had adopted Italianate culture. In spite of its small size (about 7,000 inhabitants), this town was an active commercial centre and while subject to the Ottomans retained an autonomous government. This peculiar situation must have contributed to Dubrovnik’s staunchly Catholic allegiance. In Albania, among other factors, the Venetian domination of certain port towns prior to the Ottoman takeover also had resulted in a sizeable Catholic population.

Last but not least, a number of Catholics lived in Istanbul’s northern suburb of Galata as the descendants of the Genoese and other merchants of Italian background who without a fight had submitted to Mehmed the Conqueror in 1453.\textsuperscript{37} While in the 1400s their number was quite small, more Catholics appeared in the area once permanent French and Venetian embassies established themselves in villas north of the Galata walls in Pera (today Beyoğlu). In this still semi-rural district, foreigners and local Catholics prayed together in churches that though rebuilt in the 1800s are still in place today.

In Hungary, the sultan’s administration tolerated both Protestants and Catholics; in the autonomous principality of Transylvania, most of the population was Orthodox, but the newly emerged Lutheran, Calvinist and Unitarian churches obtained official recognition in addition to Catholicism. For a while scholars assumed that under Ottoman rule Protestants were in a favoured position because Hungarian Calvinists were strongly opposed to the sultans’ archenemy the Habsburgs. But apparently this convergence of interests did not result in determined official Ottoman support for Hungarian Protestantism.\textsuperscript{38} Mostly this aid was indirect, as the sultans’ rule meant that the Counterreformation only arrived very late, after the Habsburg conquest in 1699, and therefore was perhaps less effective than in the other domains controlled by this arch-Catholic dynasty. In this sense, the survival of Protestantism in Hungary owed something to Ottoman domination. On the other hand, no Catholic bishops could – or would – reside in Ottoman

territory. By the 1600s, in other words shortly after the end of our period, Bosnian Franciscans, often in conflict with Rome over jurisdictional matters, came to represent the Catholic Church in the eyes of both the Ottoman administration and the faithful as well.

Conversion to Islam was a widespread phenomenon. However, in the Balkans it is often difficult if not impossible to distinguish converts from Anatolian immigrants and their descendants. As we have seen, first-generation converts appear as the “sons and daughters of Abdullah”, but descent from a convert on the mother’s side does not appear in the records at all. Moreover, the grandsons of a convert are impossible to distinguish from the general Muslim population; given the often short lifespans current in the 1400s and 1500s, descent from a convert thus might become officially irrelevant within a very brief time. Especially if they were townsmen, old and new Muslims lived in close proximity, inter-married and soon formed but a single population. Partly for this reason, our information on conversion processes in the Balkans during the 1400s and 1500s is very limited indeed. Nationalist assumptions are thus often based on little evidence and have often gained a currency that they do not deserve. For most regions, we simply cannot know the ratio of immigrants to converted Muslims. Only where Bosnia is concerned can we be sure that the majority of local Muslims, who continued to speak a Slavic language, were part of the pre-Ottoman autochthonous population.

Enslavement was a major route of conversion. While accepting Islam did not mean that the slave obtained his or her freedom, manumission, which was quite a frequent occurrence, normally pre-supposed that the man or woman in question had accepted Islam. We do not know how much pressure slave-owners typically applied to ensure conversion. Our only testimony comes from returned captives and is therefore suspect; in fact, some of these men tried to hide from their home communities that during their stays in the sultans’ territories they had become Muslims. Thus it is obvious from the story of the Nuremberg soldier Hans Wild, who returned to his native city after lengthy enslavement and ultimate manumission that he must have converted to Islam at some point; but the author never mentions this part of his biography. And as he was a native of a Protestant town, there was no Inquisition that might have forced him to be more explicit.

In the papal and Spanish domains, Inquisition courts demanded that people who had spent time in the Ottoman Empire upon their return must give an account of their religious conduct and convictions. In this situation, a history of conversion to Islam was a major drawback, which the man – or very rarely woman – might gloss over to the best of his or her ability. If the
returnee was lucky, the judges might assume that slaves would have had little alternative but to convert and therefore treat “conversion under pressure” rather leniently. But the returnee had no guarantees of such indulgence, and on the other hand it was a major concern of the Inquisition courts to maintain the number of rowers serving on the galleys of the pope, as well as of Catholic kings and princes. If for one reason or another an ex-Christian turned Muslim and returned to Spanish or papal territory was sentenced to the galleys, he thus was likely to remain in this unenviable position.\textsuperscript{39} In self-defence, former captives who had returned to the Christian world and could not hide a previous conversion must have routinely claimed that their owners had forced them to change their religion through beatings and other physical pressures. That said, it would, however, be over-optimistic to assume that no captives in the world of Islam ever suffered mistreatment of this kind.\textsuperscript{40}

Conversion through slavery was common in the sultans’ realm as in many other societies, but the so-called levy of boys (devşirme) that also accounted for many new Muslims was an Ottoman peculiarity. In the 1400s and 1500s, village youngsters from Anatolia and the Balkans were periodically “gathered in” to serve the sultan in his army, and a privileged few joined the ruler’s court as pages.\textsuperscript{41} While otherwise obligatory conversions were exceptional, in this instance and as a matter of course the boys were expected to become Muslims.\textsuperscript{42} Some officials in charge of recruitment seem to have brutalised the non-Muslim population, while others accepted bribes in exchange for “overlooking” the boys of certain families. Such cases have entered the record only if the culprits were caught, as happened to a certain Cani, who had collected 262 sheep for his services to probably desperate parents.\textsuperscript{43} Once the recruits had joined the candidate janissaries (acemi oğlan) and later the janissary corps, the Bektashi order of dervishes, to which many janissaries paid allegiance, apparently facilitated the integration of these new Muslims through its often syncretistic ceremonial.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{40} Ibid., p. 330.
\bibitem{41} Inalcik, \textit{The Ottoman Empire}, p. 78.
\bibitem{42} Basilike D. Papoulia, \textit{Ursprung und Wesen der “Knabenlese” im Osmanischen Reich} (Munich, 1963), p. 80.
\end{thebibliography}
Contrary to what has sometimes been claimed, the devşirme did not necessarily imply the severance of all family ties.44 People who reached prominent positions in the Ottoman military and administrative apparatus might ensure that younger relatives followed them into state service. As one example among many, we might mention the relatives of the grand vezir Mehmed Sokollu (ca. 1505–79).45 On a much more modest level, provincial janissaries might intervene in the court cases of their Christian relatives as they could testify against other Muslims, a form of recourse not available to Christians or Jews. Some parents must have considered the levy of boys as a means of upward social mobility, and long-Islamised Bosnians continued to send their sons to the janissary corps.46

Last but not least, some people accepted Islam not because they were pressured or obliged to do so but out of sheer conviction. Quite probably, the endless disputes between Orthodox and Catholics must have made some inhabitants of the sultans’ realm wonder whether perhaps neither side had much of a claim to God’s grace; especially people who had experienced recurrent and arcane debates about the qualities of the Trinity may have concluded that Christians of both parties had lapsed into polytheism. Others may have abhorred the devotion that both Orthodox and Catholics showed to religious images, or else accepted the claims of some Muslim holy men that the saints whom they traditionally had venerated could be honoured in an Islamic context as well.47 As for the less devout, becoming a “first-class” and not a “second-class” Ottoman subject must have been a significant consideration: why show respect and submission to some ordinary Muslim when by conversion this man could become one’s equal or even inferior? Furthermore, some practically minded people may have figured that they had a better use for the money that every year they had to spend on the cizye.

Be that as it may, a map based on data from the 1520s and 1530s shows that many Balkan towns, such as Üskülp/Skopje or Sofia, had Muslim majorities although local villagers remained Orthodox Christians.48 In Bosnia, Islamisation proceeded much more rapidly than elsewhere; by the later 1500s,

44 Bennassar and Bennassar, Les Chrétiens d’Allah, p. 338.
46 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, p. 78.
48 Barkan, ‘Harita’.
the Ottoman elite already regarded this area as a reservoir of soldiers willing to fight unending border wars against the Habsburgs. In the vilayet of Buda, by contrast, there were few conversions to Islam and many resident Muslims were immigrants from nearby Bosnia. In Anatolia, apart from a few places such as the regions of Kayseri and Sivas and the eastern provinces, by the early 1500s the vast majority of the population had accepted Islam and very few non-Muslims remained. 49

Population and urbanisation

While we possess quite a few monographs on individual towns and regions, nobody except Ömer Lütfi Barkan apparently has dared to estimate the population of Ottoman Europe, Anatolia and the Syrian provinces on the basis of the Ottoman tax registers. 50 According to Barkan, in 1520–35 Rumeli and the sultans’ capital, Istanbul, supposedly had a population of almost six million, while Anatolia and certain territories called “Arab”, probably more or less equivalent to Greater Syria, were home to about 5.7 million. By this count, the Ottoman central provinces had a population of about 11–12 million people, with Istanbul, the largest city, amounting to about 400,000 inhabitants. None of these figures are very solid, and Barkan has suggested that the actual population may have been higher by about 10–15 per cent; in other words, he has posited an alternative figure of about 14 million. As Ottoman historians have become more and more aware of the pitfalls inherent in the tahrirs and especially the icmals, on which Barkan’s count is based, they have tended to shy away from broad estimates and prefer to work on small regions, where the sources are easier to control. Moreover, the lack of taxpayer enumerations for all of North Africa, including Egypt, makes any estimate of the total Ottoman population very hazardous indeed. Nicolas Michel has recently studied the sole surviving set of Ottoman tax registers covering Egypt, dated to 933/1527–8. Compiled ten years after the Ottoman conquest, these registers only record the presumably wealthier peasants, whom Michel calls “rural entrepreneurs”. Differently from other tahrirs, the Egyptian records therefore do not convey any information on population at all. Barkan himself

50 Cem Behar, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nu ve Türkiye’nin Nüfusu 1500–1927/The Population of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey (with a summary in English) (Ankara, 1996), p. 4.
once suggested a figure of over 30 million, which must refer to the later 1500s, when population had significantly increased; however, Fernand Braudel has considered this figure far too high.\footnote{Braudel, \textit{La Méditerranée}, vol. 1, p. 363; Nicolas Michel, ‘Migrations de paysans dans le delta du Nil au début de l’époque ottomane’, \textit{Annales Islamologiques} 35 (2001), 241–90.}

In the course of the sixteenth century, the sultans’ subjects multiplied, not only due to Ottoman conquests but also because overall population expansion, often observed in the territories where Latin Christianity predominated, occurred in the Ottoman lands as well. Increased population and growing opportunities for long-distance trade revived towns and cities. While in the early 1500s Anatolian towns aside from Bursa, Ankara and Kayseri were for the most part so small that it is difficult to speak of an urban network, this situation had changed by the late 1500s, and a sizeable number of towns now contained populations of ten thousand or more.\footnote{Leila Erder and Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘The Development of the Anatolian Urban Network during the Sixteenth Century’, \textit{Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient} 23, 3 (1980), 267–303.} At this time, the premier city of Anatolia was Bursa, which held a population of about 65,000, and a sizeable number of its inhabitants made a living from the textile industry. Here merchants and weavers obtained Iranian raw silk that they transformed into the precious fabrics demanded at the Ottoman court.\footnote{Behar, \textit{Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nu ve Türkiye’nin Nüfusu}, p. 7.} Ankara was home to a population of approximately 25,000 men and women; the city’s principal crafts involved the weaving, dyeing and finishing of angora wool.\footnote{Özer Ergenç, ‘1600–1615 Yılları Arasında Ankara İktisadi Tarihine Ait Araştırmalar’, in \textit{Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri: Metinler-Tartışmalar 8–10 Haziran 1973}, ed. Osman Okyar and Ünal Nalbantoğlu (Ankara, 1975), pp. 145–68.}

In south-eastern Anatolia, towns such as Urfa and Diyarbekir grew to substantial size, probably because once there was no imperial border separating them from nearby Aleppo the proximity to a major market increased the incentive to expand craft production. Bire (today Birecik) became important as the site of a naval arsenal on the banks of the Euphrates which the sultans established in order to maintain control over Mesopotamia, conquered only in the 1530s.

In south-eastern Europe, several important cities had come to prominence only under Ottoman rule: Saraybosna/Sarajevo had been no more than a village in pre-Ottoman times, and Byzantine Hadrianopolis/Edirne was also a tiny settlement. Among the older towns, Salonika doubled its population around 1500 when Sultan Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) permitted the immigration
of Spanish Jews, who were to use their skills in manufacturing woollen cloth to provide “regulation” uniforms for the janissaries.55

Somewhat special was the situation of Ottoman Hungary, which Sultan Süleyman began to conquer after capturing the border fortress of Belgrade in 1521. By the 1540s, the Ottomans and their Habsburg opponents had divided up the former kingdom between them. Transylvania became a principality under Ottoman suzerainty, with Sibiu/Herrenmannstadt and Brașov/Kronstadt major commercial centres. Central Hungary was now the vilayet of Budun/Buda, and the former royal capital suffered considerably because it was now a border town of mainly military significance. As for the Habsburgs, they controlled a small strip of land along the border, under the name of Royal Hungary, for which they paid tribute to the sultans; here the main city was Poszony/Pressburg (today Bratislava).

Istanbul, the former Byzantine capital conquered by Mehmed II in 1453, was the city whose population increased most rapidly. In the last century of Byzantine rule, 50,000–75,000 people – estimates vary – apparently lived in a number of scattered nuclei separated by gardens, vineyards and even fields.56 Just before the Ottoman attack, the population must have declined even further, for quite a few inhabitants with the necessary means must have fled the city before the siege began, to the Aegean islands, Crete or quite simply the Ottoman territories which, after all, began a kilometre or two outside the city walls. When Constantinople was taken, moreover, the Ottoman soldiers carried off as slaves many of those inhabitants who had survived the fighting. The population must have diminished yet further as a result. A survey of the city intra muros, undertaken in 1455 and surviving as a fragment, shows 918 houses, of which 291 were empty or ruined; however, the area covered does not include the more densely populated sectors close to the Golden Horn. On the northern shores of this long inlet, the town of Galata also was surveyed in 1455, and once again the count is incomplete, for the surviving fragment of the Galata register does not contain the western section of the town. As a result, the text records only 1,108 individual taxpayers living in 908 houses; moreover, quite a few residences were still sealed up, as it was not

clear whether the owners would come back and accept zimmî status. Both
the Istanbul and the Galata surveys remain unpublished; recently İdris Bostan
has discovered a further section of the Istanbul survey, but as yet there is no
information about its contents.

Already by 1455 there had been some immigration into Istanbul, as the
relevant survey mentions Muslims, Jews and Christians sometimes from
rather distant places, such as Manisa or Filibe/Plovdiv. Some of these set-
tlers may have come of their own volition, but many must have been forcibly
brought in, with an obligation to remain in the city although otherwise they
retained the rights of free men and women (sürgün). Others had arrived in the
Istanbul region as slaves: in 1454, Mehmed II settled captives from the region
of Smederovo in Serbia. In yet other cases it is hard to judge whether the fam-
ilies in question were slaves or free sürgün. Probably the inhabitants of a small
fortress that negotiated their surrender to the sultan fell into the latter cate-
gory, but on this distinction the text is disturbingly vague. Many of the new
arrivals paid high taxes and were subject to legal disabilities that indicate prior
enslavement. Between slaves and sürgün, by 1499, 180 villages in the region
of Istanbul held almost 14,500 inhabitants; for once the register lists women
and children as well as their men-folk. Most of the settlers had come from
recent Ottoman conquests in Thessaly, Bosnia, Albania and Serbia, the latter
founding a village that they called Belgrad, but a few Kurdish settlements of
unknown antecedent were also in evidence.

Some people who moved to Istanbul on their own initiative did so in
order to take up Mehmed the Conqueror’s offer of free housing. They were
thus disaffected when the sultan changed his mind and instead decided to
endow these buildings to the Aya Sofya complex of mosque and theologici-

58 Halil Inalçik, ‘The Ottoman Survey of Istanbul, 1455’, 1453, İstanbul Kültür ve Sanat Dergisi 3
59 Ibid., p. 22.
60 Stéphane Yerasimos, ‘Les déportés et leur statut dans l’Empire ottoman (XVe–XVIe siècles)’,
in Moatti, Kaiser and Péberthe, Le monde de l’itinérance en Méditerranée de l’Antiquité à l’époque
61 Halil Inalçik, ‘The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the
Ottoman population

This growth is all the more remarkable as the plague of 1467 had largely nullified the increase brought about by Mehmed the Conqueror’s policy of resettlement.\(^{62}\)

Major pious foundations established by Sultans Mehmed II, Bayezid II and Süleyman, the latter acting once in the name of his deceased son Prince Mehmed and once in his own, encouraged immigrants by providing jobs and locales for trade and crafts. Mosques and medreses attracted professors and students, while newcomers with little preparation but influential patrons might find jobs as cooks and cleaners.\(^{63}\) By the late 1500s already, the administration had begun to worry about possible over-population, when widespread military rebellions in Anatolia resulted in a stream of refugees seeking the protection of the walled city. This concern intensified shortly after the end of our period, when Murad IV (r. 1623–40), with rather excessive optimism, decided that the Anatolian countryside was once again safe, and many more or less recent migrants had to return to their places of origin.\(^{64}\) By that time, the city contained several hundred thousand inhabitants, although the lack of surveys does not permit any definite statement.

Urbanisation in the Arab provinces

In 1516–17, the Ottomans conquered three major cities: Cairo, Aleppo and Damascus. As we have seen, no Egyptian tax register provides demographic information. But Cairo seems to have prospered enough during the first century of Ottoman rule that immigrants from Syria, such as the merchant Isma’il Abu Taqiyya, settled there and made their fortunes.\(^{65}\) In the long run, Cairo expanded, probably from under 200,000 inhabitants in the late Mamluk period to about 300,000 at the end of the seventeenth century. Growth was apparent from the fact that tanneries with their evil smells now occasioned complaints, and tanners moved farther away from the city centre; this occurred at the very end of our period, between 1580 and 1630. Public baths sprang up, denoting the presence of people who would pay for their use.

\(^{62}\) Lowry, ‘Pushing the Stone Uphill’, p. 43.


\(^{65}\) Nelly Hanna, Making Big Money in 1600: The Life and Times of Isma’il Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian Merchant (Syracuse, N.Y., 1998).
New water fountains also appeared, although their number in the 1500s was modest when compared with the following century.\textsuperscript{66} 

Aleppo had been a hub of international trade already in the Mamluk period, and the Ottoman conquest permitted its merchants to increase their activities. Rather puzzlingly, however, the tax registers of the sixteenth century indicate a diminishing number of taxpayers. In 1537–8, Aleppo supposedly was home to about 80,000 men, women and children; by 1584, their number had dropped to 75,000.\textsuperscript{66} In terms of taxpayers alone, 11,224 entries in 1519 declined to 8,883 in 1526, and by 1585 the tax-paying population amounted to only 8,430.\textsuperscript{68} Charles Issawi has suggested that Ottoman officials seriously under-counted the non-Muslim inhabitants.\textsuperscript{69} 

But a further consideration surely is also relevant: as we have seen, the tax registers often omitted people who because of their affiliation with the military were exempt from many if not all taxes. Moreover, in the later 1500s, with inflation eating away at the soldiers’ pay, these men began to engage in crafts and trade so as to make ends meet; at the same time, certain merchants and artisans joined the military. Aleppo soon had acquired a substantial garrison, whose members became involved in the local business scene. Quite possibly some artisans and merchants thus disappeared from the tax registers simply because they had joined one or the other military corps. Given this situation, we should add about 20 per cent to the recorded taxpayer figures to arrive at the number of actually resident house-holders, and surely the number of ordinary townspeople “disappearing” from the registers in this fashion was greater at the end of the sixteenth century than during the first years of Ottoman rule.

On the other hand, in the sixteenth century Aleppo expanded dramatically in terms of built-up areas. In the 1530s and 1540s, the Ottoman governor Hüsrev Paşa sponsored the construction of a great mosque, which numbered a major commercial centre (\textit{han}) among its revenue sources. Another governor, of the ancient Dukakinzade family, added a second mosque surrounded by three \textit{han}s; shop-lined streets were also part of the complex. In the 1570s, the \textit{han} of the customs office was a major addition; it provided almost 350

new business locales. Aleppo’s sixteenth-century building boom ended with the Bahramiyya mosque, again amply supplied with attendant shops and markets. While elite figures could have built mosques in the absence of an expanding population, merely to enhance the legitimacy of Ottoman rule, hans and shops were only useful if tenanted. It thus makes sense to assume that the city was growing, and the construction of major pious foundations promoted expansion; less than a century earlier, Istanbul after all had experienced a similar development.\textsuperscript{70}

Damascus by contrast housed mainly inter-regional and not inter-empire traders. Along with Cairo, this city was the starting point for a pilgrim caravan to Mecca, and many traders made a living by supplying the pilgrims with mounts and other necessities. The textile crafts were highly developed, and some of their products doubtless found their way to Istanbul and Bursa with the return caravans. In this city as well, we observe a contradiction between the \textit{tahrirs} on the one hand, which show a decline in taxpayers from 10,423 in 1521–30 to only 7,778 in 1595, and on the other hand the contemporary expansion of the built-up area.\textsuperscript{71} Suleyman the Magnificent had a complex of mosque cum public kitchen constructed and also endowed the mausoleum of Muhyi al-Din al-\textsuperscript{5}Arabi, thus providing employment to a substantial number of townsmen. Furthermore, in 980/1572, Derviş Paşa had a major business centre constructed, which took its name from the city’s flourishing silk trade. Given the size and activity of the Damascus garrison, the passage of artisans and traders into the military establishment may once again explain at least part of this contradiction between our two sets of data. But in terms of commercial activity Aleppo was certainly the principal city of the Syrian provinces in the early Ottoman age.

In the “Far West” of North Africa, Algiers and Tunis were the two major centres, but due to the lack of \textit{tahrirs} all population estimates are very doubtful. No figures at all survive for our period; where the late 1700s are concerned they revolve around 80,000 for Tunis and 30,000 for Algiers.\textsuperscript{72} During the 1500s, both cities, but especially Tunis, received a large number of immigrants from Spain. We cannot know how many people in the course of the century left Spanish ports on their private initiative and paying their own way. But in and after 1609, just after the end of the period we are concerned with, the Spanish crown had about 300,000 persons officially deported; the

\textsuperscript{70} Heghnar Zeitlian Watenpaugh, \textit{The Image of an Ottoman City: Imperial Architecture and Urban Experience in Aleppo in the 16th and 17th Centuries} (Leiden, 2004), pp. 1–22.
\textsuperscript{71} Barkan, ‘\textit{Tarihi Demografi}’ , p. 22.
\textsuperscript{72} Raymond, \textit{Grandes villes arabes}, pp. 62–5.
expulsion involved not only declared Muslims but virtually all people with Muslim antecedents. Most of the expellees probably immigrated to North Africa. Apparently Tunis was a favoured destination because the city offered opportunities for traders and artisans, while the surrounding countryside lent itself to garden cultures of the type that many Muslims had practised while in Spain. Unfortunately, while we have records of the Moriscos forced to leave the Iberian Peninsula, researchers have not found any figures concerning arrivals in Ottoman territory.

In the eastern borderlands, the major Ottoman city was Baghdad, not conquered by Sultan Süleyman until 941/1534, after the city had been in Safavid hands for a generation or so. An abridged (icmal) tahrir prepared shortly after this event (951/1544) and succeeding registers show that in Baghdad as well the Ottoman administration heavily invested in mosques and theological schools. As a symbol of Sunni right belief, the sultans and their governors particularly honoured the saintly figure of ʿAbd ul-qādir Geylānī; at the same time, several tahrirs documented the institution of timars, zeamets and hass. In the late 1700s, the city supposedly was home to about 90,000 inhabitants.

Population increase, diminishing food supplies and flights from the countryside

It has become axiomatic that in pre-industrial settings periods of rapid population growth are also “hard times”, in which food becomes increasingly scarce, for typically agricultural expansion fails to keep pace with population growth. With respect to the Ottoman realm, this issue has also attracted scholarly attention. Where population growth is at issue, we have seen that the tahrirs apparently reflect a significant population expansion that in the course of the sixteenth century occurred throughout the sultans’ territories. As for changes in the food supply, we can estimate taxable harvests on the basis of the tahrirs because these documents record the tithes that the peasants usually had to deliver in kind; the attendant provincial tax regulations (liva kanunnameleri)


normally tell us whether the tithe was meant to be one-tenth, one-eighth, one-fifth or some other percentage of the total crop. This information allows us to calculate the officially recognised harvest of grains and also of minor crops such as almonds, nuts or vetches; however, the tithes of perishable products such as grapes and other fruit were calculated in money only, and thus the amounts actually harvested remain unknown.

According to the evidence provided by the tahrirs, in many places sixteenth-century grain production definitely did not keep up with population growth. A particularly telling example concerns ten rural districts of north-central Anatolia documented from the late fifteenth century onwards and throughout the 1500s in which nowhere did the increase in grain harvests even begin to equal population growth. Retaining seed must have posed particular challenges; after all, in dry-farming areas yields were low and peasants therefore had to reserve a disproportionately large part of the harvest for the following year. But we do not know to what extent our information is reliable; officials recorded data for taxation purposes, and at the end of the day the tahrirs may well have depicted a rural economy appearing even poorer than it was in real life.

After all, in certain cases both peasants and timar-holders had an interest in under-reporting. If in the course of compiling a new tahrir it emerged that a given village produced more revenue than recorded in the previous register, the taxpayers’ interest in concealing this augmentation is obvious. But if the timar-holder had only a small tax assignment, as was often the case, the revenue based on the increased agricultural product after re-evaluation might be greater than the amount to which the sipahi was officially entitled. Presumably, in such a case the central administration would appoint a second revenue-holder, who would demand a share of the agricultural revenues that the grantee already in place regarded as his particular source of livelihood. In such a situation, peasants and revenue-holders may well have backed each other up and the crops officially taxed thus were much less than the actual average harvest. While we cannot prove these assumptions, they seem probable nonetheless.

However, despite attempts at minimising taxation, the food supplies of many villages must have dwindled, especially in campaign years when

peasants needed to supply the stopping points of the armies en route to the battlefronts. Quite often, transporting the grain over bad roads was at least as costly as the officially determined value of the grain itself. Matters became even more difficult as the armies requisitioned scarce draft animals, which the peasants might be unable to retrieve even after the job finally was done. Villages located far from military routes might still deplete their food reserves. They often had to pay substantial amounts in cash, which they must have acquired at least in part by selling grain that they would otherwise have consumed. While in the earliest stages of Ottoman expansion warfare in certain cases paid for itself, by the sixteenth century the peasantry shouldered a substantial part of the costs of war in the shape of increased taxes.

Historians have constructed different scenarios concerning the villagers’ reactions in such situations. Mustafa Akdağ has proposed that as sixteenth-century Anatolian population increased, a significant number of young men were unable to marry because they could not gain access to a farmstead. Some of these youngsters enrolled in juridical cum theological schools (medreses) in preparation for careers in the judicial and educational services. But even though late sixteenth-century provincial administration intensified and new judicial districts emerged, there were never enough positions to go around. In the same fashion, medreses increased in number, but not sufficiently for all candidates to receive teaching posts. Disappointed students rebelled, demanding employment. But the government only offered amnesty to the rebels if they served in the army for more or less symbolic pay, and this most of them were unwilling to do. We may thus conclude that life in the village was not very attractive to many peasant boys and they were more than anxious to get away.

Some of these young men joined the mercenaries that the central government of the time increasingly hired to wage its wars. These soldiers did not enjoy the job security and other privileges of the janissaries and cavalrymen in permanent service and sometimes rebelled in order to obtain positions in the standing army. However, from the government’s point of view, hiring

Ottoman population

mercenaries on a temporary basis was a means of fielding the large armies required by the wars against Habsburgs and Safavids at an “affordable” price. Therefore the majority of mercenaries never did have a realistic chance of becoming janissaries or salaried cavalrymen. In the later seventeenth century, soldiers without access to the regular Ottoman army often found employment in the households of vezirs and pāşas, for a governor now had to find and pay the men that he would need to run his administration. But this employment was not very secure either, as it was apparently common for such dignitaries to hire and fire mercenary bands at short intervals.\(^81\) As in the case of the medrese students, attempts by the government to pacify the former soldiers were often unsuccessful, and disaffected students and ex-military men caused a great deal of unrest.\(^82\) From our present point of view, these conflicts are important because they gave rise to many migrations whose origins and destinations are, however, often impossible to discern.

Michael A. Cook has approached the matter from a different angle. His argument focuses not on the alternatives open – or closed – to young villagers but on the relationship of peasants to the land. His analyses resemble those of certain European medievalists concerned with twelfth- and thirteenth-century population growth. Similarly to parts of medieval Europe, certain regions of sixteenth-century Anatolia supposedly suffered from “population pressure”; in other words, the cultivation of marginal lands became more frequent, and there was a tendency to sub-divide farms into units no longer viable because they were too small.\(^83\) With the decline of European population during the plagues and famines of the 1300s and early 1400s, many marginal lands reverted to pasture and villagers gave up their farmsteads, in some cases for good.\(^84\) Around 1600, abandoned settlements were no rarity in Anatolia either, but these villages apparently disappeared because of the rampant insecurity caused by tax collectors and mercenaries both employed and unemployed.\(^85\) Typically the inhabitants relocated in hilly territory, which in spite of its limited agricultural potential offered better security. Once again, sociopolitical conflict gave rise to migration.

Mustafa Akdağ, Michael A. Cook and Wolf Dieter Hütteroth have concentrated on the “push” factors that caused young men to leave their villages. By contrast, Halil İnalcık has emphasised that the demand of the central government for mercenaries acted as a “pull” factor causing young men to try their luck outside of the region where they had been born. In İnalcık’s perspective, the increasing availability of handguns – despite official attempts to prevent this development – allowed discontented villagers an option that many of them took up. Viewing the question from yet another angle, Huri İslamoğlu Inan has emphasised that population increase might, at least under certain circumstances, also open up new fields of activity to villagers who needed to compensate for the declining yields of their farms. Thus the diffusion of marketable crops, including cotton and rice, and the development of village crafts might permit families to survive without leaving their homes. If these alternatives were available, peasants obviously could make a living without ploughing up ever more marginal lands and/or sub-dividing their farms beyond the point of viability. Most recently, however, Oktay Özel has once again emphasised the formidable difficulties confronting peasants in an era of population increase and political crisis.

Whichever way we interpret these data, the Anatolian countryside of the late 1500s was not a particularly restful place in which to live. However, there is a significant difference between the low-level disturbances caused by small robber bands and the “bandit armies”, also known as Celalis, that by the end of our period not only scoured the countryside but also took and plundered major towns and cities such as Urfa, Ankara and even Bursa. Possibly the organisers of these armies had the ambition to join the Ottoman governmental apparatus, and in fact some of them finally accepted high-level positions on the Ottoman–Habsburg frontier. Karen Barkey therefore has made the point that contrary to French kings of the early and middle 1600s, who violently repressed provincial uprisings against increased taxation that royal administrations imposed to finance the growing costs of foreign wars, Ottoman sultans relied on the integration of rebels into the ruling group.

However, other aspects of bandit life also should enter the model. When ex-peasant mercenaries left the vicinity of their villages and joined rebel armies,

87 İslamoğlu Inan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire.
88 Özel, ‘Population changes’.
they generally acted with much less restraint than they had done in their places of origin, where they had friends and relatives living in the neighbourhood. In fact, their commanders might encourage the rebel soldiers to be ferocious, for the more apparent the “nuisance value” of such unofficial armies, the greater the chance that the central government would attempt to reduce the danger by inducting the soldiers into the regular army as mercenaries. Last but not least, the integration of the commanders into the Ottoman governmental apparatus might not be permanent, and they might either get killed very soon or else desert and revert to banditry. These limits of the “integration model” have become clear in the case of early twentieth-century China, where documentation is much better than for sixteenth-century Anatolia. But there are enough parallels to make it seem likely that in the Anatolian case as well the “integration model” was at best only partially successful.90

Migrations under duress: Captives

Mercenaries were by definition migratory, and as long as they joined the sultans’ armies we may view their movements as government-sponsored, although an element of choice was also present. But, in their turns, soldiers of all kinds caused sometimes quite massive migrations under duress because they took captives and sold them as slaves. Some of the latter ultimately were ransomed or manumitted by their owners, and a few freedmen managed to return home and write down their experiences, providing us with valuable evidence on the migrations of captives in the train of Ottoman armies. Thus Hans Wild has described his travels during the early 1600s, which led him to Mecca and Cairo, while Johann Michael Heberer von Bretten has left an account of his captivity on an Ottoman galley in the late sixteenth century; after having crossed the Mediterranean several times, he narrowly missed being sent to North Africa.91 These returnees were the fortunate ones; lucky in a different sense were some young captives who were brought into the sultans’ palace and, similarly to the devşirme boys we have already encountered, received an education that in due course would fit them for service in the Ottoman administration.

91 Johann Michael Heberer von Bretten, Aegyptiaca Servitus (Heidelberg, 1610), reprinted with an introduction by Karl Teply (Graz, 1967); Johann Wild, Reysbeschreibung eines Gefangenen Christen Anno 1604 (Stuttgart, reprint 1964); Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (eds.), Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders (Early Fifteenth to Early Eighteenth Centuries) (Leiden, 2007).
However, these elite slaves were a small minority, and some of the others, if assigned to the one-fifth share of all booty that fell to the sultan, might after Islamisation seize the chance of joining the Ottoman army. But this type of opportunity must have been more easily available in the 1400s, when population was still sparse.\(^92\) Certainly a few opportunities of this kind opened up even in the sixteenth century, yet due to the expansion of the navy, many captives found themselves rowing the galleys outfitted by the sultans’ servitors, a hard and dangerous job with a low life expectancy. Captives also quite often worked in the naval arsenal, both in Istanbul and in the North African ports of Tunis and Algiers. Others laboured on land holdings surrounding the Ottoman capital and belonging to members of the elite or else to pious foundations, and in the registers covering the construction site of the Süleymaniye mosque complex (1550–7) a small number of slaves are also in evidence.\(^93\) Last but not least, many captive men and women served private owners from among the Ottoman subject population, and the court register of the township of Üsküdar (today part of Istanbul) dating to the years of 919–27/1513–21 is full of entries concerning slaves sold, escaped or manumitted.\(^94\) With respect to late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Bursa, a careful survey of the local population has shown that 15 per cent were in all probability recent Muslims and for the most part former slaves; in this city, it was common practice to employ servile labour as weavers and manumit the people concerned after they had worked for a certain time or woven a pre-established quantity of cloth. Even if we only retain as freedmen those people that the recorders identified as such by the term atik, former slaves headed 64 out of 923 households, or almost 7 per cent.\(^95\)

Female slaves served in the households of wealthy people either as menials or as concubines; in Bursa, some of them probably also laboured on the loom. Similarly to the young males previously discussed, a few exceptional slave girls might end up in the palace. Hürem Sultan/Roxelana, later the wife of Süleyman I (r. 1520–66), had been a captive probably from what is today the Ukraine, and Nurbanu, who apparently married Süleyman’s successor, Selim II (r. 1566–74), claimed to be of noble Venetian origin. However, Benjamin

\(^92\) Bennassar and Bennassar, \textit{Les Chrétiens d’Allah}, p. 231.
Arbel, a recent biographer, considers all sources concerning her background as more or less apocryphal.96 Other young girls, after serving a sultan or princess for a short while, were married off to former pages who had just “graduated” from the palace training program (cikma).

If a female slave bore a child that her proprietor recognised as his own, this concubine could expect freedom after the owner’s death. In this case, the family of the latter would probably marry her off to a former servitor. If during his lifetime the owner decided to free his concubine, he might marry her himself; such cases sometimes found their way into the kadi registers. Once brought to the Ottoman central provinces by the soldiers who had captured them or by professional slave-traders, females were likely to stay put and become part of the local population.

Enslaving captives taken in war with non-Muslim rulers was a licit act, but in addition quite a few young sons and daughters of Ottoman subjects were kidnapped illegally and sold someplace far away from their homes – another case of blatantly involuntary migration.97 Pirates scoured the Aegean Sea and the Anatolian coastlands. As galleys were an important component of the navy, the demand for rowers was always high. Among naval captains and owners of galleys, pirates thus could count on finding purchasers of their booty who would not ask many questions. Moreover, in some cases the kidnappers might not be people who robbed for a living but men with a “regular” source of income, such as a merchant who sold an apprentice that he had taken along on a journey. Most cases of illegal enslavement known to us are on record in the chancery registers (Mühimme) if the people concerned had managed to take their complaint to Istanbul, or else in the kadi registers of a town where the illegally enslaved person attempted to prove his or her free status.98 Presumably there were many cases that never made it into the records, and many young people so abducted never returned from their involuntary migrations.

Slavery was of particular importance in the Ottoman “Far West”, namely in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. While local society consisted of Arab or Berber Muslim peasants, nomads and artisans, the “political class” typically came from outside North Africa. Many, especially in Algiers, were soldiers recruited in Anatolia, a further example – among many – of military mobility. Among

98 Ibid.; see also Bennassar and Bennassar, Les Chrétiens d’Allah, pp. 231–2.
the sea captains, we find quite a few freebooters from Christian Europe, Dutchmen and Englishmen among them. These elite figures commanded the services of numerous slaves, both male and female, some taken while traveling across the Mediterranean and others in the coastal regions of southern Italy and Spain, particularly Mallorca, Minorca and the other islands of the western Mediterranean. The Habsburg kings of Spain never applied for the “privileges” (ahidname) that the Ottoman sultans accorded to friendly rulers, and in consequence inhabitants of Spain and the Spanish possessions in Italy could be enslaved according to Islamic law. Some of the people enslaved in North Africa ultimately returned home, their ransoms often paid through the mediation of the Trinitarians and other religious orders that worked among the captives and tried to dissuade them from accepting Islam and becoming part of local society. On the other hand, quite a few captives did just that: once they no longer had any hope of ransom or exchange, they converted to Islam. While this move did not liberate them from slavery, it was often, as we have seen, the first step towards a later manumission and social integration.

Ottoman subjects also might be enslaved abroad, either because of capture in war or because they fell into the hands of the Maltese corsairs, whose activities in many respects resembled those of their Algerian and Tunisian counterparts. At the conclusion of peace, the Signoria of Venice typically sent home all Ottoman captives taken in war unless the government considered a particular personage as dangerous; in this case, the prisoner was quietly executed. If they belonged to the governments of the Papal States and Genoa, Muslim slaves typically rowed the galleys; if in private hands, they served in the households of prominent people. Some former slaves of modest condition remained in Italy, although given the Counterreformation atmosphere prevalent in the later 1500s, integration was on the whole more difficult than in Muslim lands. But in the absence of much active help from the Ottoman side where the ransoming of prisoners was concerned, many captives may have had few alternatives.

Migrations under duress: Sürgün and service to the sultans

Free civilians also were caught up in migrations ordered by the sultans, as the latter claimed the right to settle their subjects in places of their own choosing

99 Bennassar and Bennassar, Les Chrétiens d’Allah.
100 Salvatore Bono, Schiavi musulmani nell’ Italia moderna, Galeotti, vu’ cumprà, domestici (Naples, 1999); Pál Fodor, ‘Maltese Pirates, Ottoman Captives and French Traders in the Early Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean’, in Dávid and Fodor, Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders, pp. 221–38 at pp. 227–33.
Ottoman population

(sürgün). Such settlers needed to leave their homes, often for remote places. Sometimes the Ottoman rulers wished to populate a new conquest with “reliable” people who had been their subjects for generations, or else they planned to remove the established aristocracies of newly conquered provinces from those localities where the noblemen in question had relatives, adherents and property. Thus, after the conquest of the Comnene principality of Trebizond/Trabzon, Albanians were brought in from the Balkans, while certain aristocrats of Byzantine background were sent there.101 As we have seen, sürgün also arrived in newly conquered Istanbul. Even in the later 1500s, when the sultans no longer wished to attract population to their capital, upon occasion wealthy provincials from Anatolia accused of usury were banished to Istanbul in order to operate butchers’ shops. Given the low prices that butchers received for their meat at that time, such service was sure to bankrupt the men involved.102

In other instances, people with special skills whom the court considered desirable were sent to Istanbul as sürgün. When Selim I (r. 1512–20) briefly conquered Tabriz, he recruited a sizeable number of artists and artisans; some of them or their descendants were still in the employ of the palace in 932/1526.103 Other artists and artisans came to Istanbul from Cairo shortly after the Ottoman conquest and at the end of the sixteenth century, when Sultan Murad III (r. 1574–95) required certain well-known carpet weavers to relocate to Istanbul.104

Towards the end of our period, the servitors of Selim II (r. 1566–74) once again ordered people from Anatolia to leave their homes and settle in a distant place, this time in Cyprus, newly conquered from the Venetians. There were several reasons for a campaign of forced settlement. First of all, the island had lost many of its previous inhabitants due to massive enslavement: a single register detailing the captives taken in Nicosia/Lefkoşe mentions over 13,700 people, largely women and children; the total population of Cyprus before the Ottoman conquest amounted to about 165,000 persons.105 Presumably the owners sold many of these captives in other provinces, particularly Syria and Istanbul. Given a large quantity of unused land on the island, the settlement of sürgün also aimed at supplying landless people with farms, thus making them fiscally productive.

101 Barkan, ‘Sürgünler’, final section (vol. 15), pp. 219–22.
105 Costantini, Il sultano e l’isola contesa, pp. 66 and 91.
However, just as in the case of the Istanbul butchers, forced settlement in Cyprus also might function as a form of punishment. Local communities could choose the people to be resettled, and as a result quite a few men considered undesirable in their home communities found themselves on the sürgün lists. By contrast, people with connections at the sultan’s court sometimes managed to obtain exemptions; thus the chief architect Sinan, who was at that time building his masterpiece, the Selimiye mosque complex in Edirne, obtained a decree from his patron the sultan which exempted his relatives in a village near Kayseri from forced relocation to Cyprus.

Many of the people drafted strongly resisted resettlement. A couple of kadişis officiating in the Black Sea region even made money out of the locals’ distress by falsely claiming to possess official orders for the transfer of virgin girls to Cyprus as brides for local military men. The officials concerned with the case assumed that the errant kadiş had spread these lies so as to collect the fee coming due when a judge registered a marriage. Some families apparently believed these stories and hurriedly married off their daughters, even to bridegrooms of much lower social status. Perhaps others paid the judges to get their daughters exempted, although our text does not say so. Sürgün should have lived permanently in the places to which they had been assigned, but in addition the government also decreed migrations that its officials intended to be temporary. Ottoman rulers demanded large numbers of artisans both for military campaigns and for the great mosque-building projects that as organisational feats rather resembled warfare. When on campaign the troops needed the services of shoemakers, blacksmiths, tailors and a host of other artisans, for as a principle of Ottoman military policy commanders attempted to minimise the appearances of soldiers on their way to the front in urban markets and shops, where they could easily become involved in crimes and disputes. Typically the government counted on the cooperation

of local guilds; presumably the latter selected the artisans who were to serve in person and collected the funds that these men would need before they could set up shop in the army camp. In addition, guilds also must have disbursed money to the families of absent artisans, or at least to those that could not survive without the daily contribution of the breadwinner. However, the details of these operations continue to escape us.\textsuperscript{109}

When specialist artisans went to work for the sultans directly, we possess a certain amount of information on their temporary migrations. Thus the building of the Süleymaniye and the more modest construction sites that produced pavilions in the sixteenth-century gardens of the sultans also occasioned migrations. Sometimes the artisans drafted made their way to the capital on their own; particularly those men who were itinerant construction workers by trade must have relied on private arrangements. But when the administration felt that many of the draftees might escape, the latter were sent to Istanbul under guard. Non-Muslims might have to surrender the receipts for their cizye payment, for presumably they would not risk being stopped and required to pay a second time. Once they arrived in the city, the workmen may have found that they needed to serve but intermittently, so that some of them might also work for private persons. But when the sultan’s administration required workmen, even vezirs might have to stop their building projects. Yet if certain “temporary” workmen managed to establish links to the private sector, some of them might settle in Istanbul on a permanent basis, and in this roundabout fashion the tightly controlled building projects of the central administration must have promoted a certain amount of voluntary migration.

Migrations in search of income, security and more or less congenial regimes

In principle, Ottoman peasants were to stay in their villages, cultivate the soil and pay their taxes unless the sultan sent them off as sârgûn or they received permission to leave from their local administrators. However, as so many sipâhis and zaims were often absent on campaign, quite a few peasants took off without asking for permission. If they settled in a town, the administrators of timars, zeamets, hass or pious foundations might locate them and in the court of the local kadi demand their return. But in the absence of surnames

identification was not always an easy task, and an ex-peasant might show witnesses to the effect that he had lived in the city for so long that a statute of limitations now applied. In some cases, the administrator might prefer to collect an additional tax and let the migrant remain where he was.

In many cases, migration was necessary for survival, for under fifteenth-and sixteenth-century conditions, mountainous regions and islands typically did not produce enough to feed their populations. As a result, every spring young men left these places in search of work; some returned in the autumn, while others stayed away for several years or even their entire working lives. At the end of the latter, certain migrants found their way back to their home villages, but others stayed away for good, transferring their families to the localities where they had found work. Some permanent migrants married local women and rapidly became part of the society into which they had entered.

For Ottoman migrations in search of work, we possess a relatively large number of documents concerning the regions that today form Albania. In addition to economic need, in this region socio-political factors stimulated out-migration. In some cases, blood feuds in the home community induced people to migrate. Moreover, in the mid-1400s already, before the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans and especially after the death of Skanderbeg/George Kastriota and the collapse of his rebellion against the rule of Mehmed the Conqueror (1468), entire communities migrated and established Albanian-speaking villages in Sicily and southern Italy. In the latter region, much land had fallen vacant because of plague epidemics, and therefore local feudatories were willing to accept the newcomers. Religious differences were not as yet an impediment to the migrants’ insertion into the society of southern Italy, as the Albanian populations only accepted Islam in the seventeenth century.

Other Albanians of the 1400s and 1500s migrated to Venice, where many of them found work in and around the port. In this city, commoners often came together in religious cum charitable organisations known as scuole, and the Albanians soon applied for permission to establish such an organisation. For a while the Venetian authorities were of two minds; the Signoria wished to integrate the migrants as soon as possible but had trouble deciding whether they should be integrated as individuals or families or else as a group with a

common linguistic and cultural background. As the Signoria finally preferred
this second alternative, the Albanians were allowed their scuola and although
much altered its building survives to the present day.\textsuperscript{113}

In the sixteenth century, with the Albanian provinces firmly integrated
into the Ottoman Empire, some Albanians, with the sultan’s permission,
apparently became mercenaries in Venetian service.\textsuperscript{114} But most of them now
migrated to Istanbul. By the late 1500s, janissaries and other possessors of
gardens and vineyards near the Ottoman capital employed them to guard
the fruit prior to harvesting and probably also for less legitimate purposes.
After all, in this period it was common for janissaries to use strong-arm tac-
tics when setting themselves up in business, and as outsiders whose livelihood
depended on the goodwill of their employers, the immigrant guardsmen
must have been useful helpers whenever violence was at issue.

While Albanian migrations normally involved young men without spe-
cial privileges, other movements from – as yet – Byzantine territories to Italy
were often an elite affair. The Byzantine Empire had been steadily contracting
already in the fourteenth century, and but for Timur’s invasion and the fall of
Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402) the Ottoman armies probably would have conquered
the city half a century earlier than they actually did. Realising that jobs under
the new dispensation might be limited and their social status much reduced,
some Byzantine scholars emigrated and found themselves jobs as teachers
in Italy. Italian cities were ready and sometimes even anxious to hire them,
as public servants now often needed a humanist education. In many cases,
that included some knowledge of classical Greek and familiarity with the
Byzantine textual tradition of ancient Greek writings that Italian educated
men now increasingly wished to read in the original. Certain figures of the
Byzantine nobility also emigrated or at least contemplated emigration. Thus
Lucas Notaras, killed on the orders of Mehmed the Conqueror shortly after
the conquest of Constantinople, previously had taken out citizenship in both
Venice and Genoa. Anna Notara, one of his female relatives, actually made
it to Venice, where her considerable fortune allowed her to sponsor artwork
and become one of the pillars of the local Orthodox Christian community.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., pp. 143–220.
Migrations at the limits of empire: Border societies, border-crossers

Migrations in border regions were a special case. In certain places where feudal dues were heavy, Ottoman rule attracted Balkan peasants either because taxes and labour services were lower on the Ottoman side or because service to the sultans’ armies made it possible to supplement income from farming. Especially in areas close to the Habsburg–Ottoman frontier in Hungary, where a condominium of Hungarian lords and Ottoman timar-holders established itself, peasants had to pay dues to both sides.\footnote{Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, ‘Hungarian Studies in Ottoman History’, in The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, ed. Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi (Leiden, 2002), pp. 305–49 at p. 320.} Apparently the sultans’ administrators accepted this arrangement because these lords, though residing in Habsburg territory, sent their servitors to hold court in the villages, and thus the Ottoman side could minimise administrative overhead in areas where there were few if any Muslims. But of course the peasants had an incentive to abandon regions of double taxation and, given the prevalence of serfdom in Hungary, some of them probably moved to Ottoman territories farther away from the frontier. However, we cannot say very much about the number and identity of these fugitives.

Young men in search of a better life crossed not only the land frontiers but also the Adriatic and western Mediterranean, which separated France and the principalities comprising modern Italy from the sultans’ lands. Most migrants must have come to the Ottoman territories as captives, but voluntary arrivals were also in evidence, for in North Africa or Istanbul barriers to upward mobility were not as high as in the estate societies of early modern Europe, where the ascent to prominence – if successful – normally took several generations.\footnote{Bennassar and Bennassar, Les chrétiens d’Allah, pp. 437–93.} Discontent with Spanish rule also might induce people from southern Italy, for instance, to defect to the Ottoman side. Thus one of the companions of the political author and philosopher Tommaso Campanella in his failed rebellion against Spanish domination actually sought refuge in Istanbul.\footnote{Jean Delumeau, Le mystère Campanella (Paris, 2008), p. 111.} *Mi faccio turco* (I will “turn Turk”, in other words become a Muslim) was sometimes simply an expression of annoyance, but in certain cases the speaker followed up on his intent, and we even find quite a few Italian friars and priests who emigrated to the Ottoman realm and became Muslims.\footnote{Salzmann, ‘A Travelogue Manqué?’, pp. 149–72.}
Joining the sultan’s border guards was a further option for young men seeking a life of mobility. In this case, it was not even necessary to become a Muslim, as one fighting unit, known as the martolos, consisted of Christians. \(^{120}\) Such irregular soldiers received no or minimal pay and served in the hope of booty. Prisoners’ ransoms typically involved large sums of money, especially if the irregulars had managed to capture officers of some prominence, and cattle-rustling was a supplementary source of income. \(^{121}\) Requiring constant movement, life as an irregular soldier on the border may have attracted young men who had no liking for the sedentary life of a Balkan peasant.

In addition to irregulars, janissaries also organised raiding parties, taking captives north of the Danube in Walachia, which was an Ottoman subject territory. In times of war, the local princes sometimes made their subjects into fair game for Ottoman raiders because they had formed alliances with enemies of the sultan. But after the conclusion of peace these princes once again paid tribute to the Ottoman ruler, and there remained no legal basis for the enslavement of their subjects. Raiding, however, was ubiquitous in border areas and continued, albeit on a lower level, even in times of peace.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the inaccessible fortress of Senj on the Adriatic coast (in Ottoman, Seng; in Italian, Segna) was home to a border society of raiders under the sponsorship of a Habsburg archduke. \(^{122}\) Supposedly the Uskoks, as they called themselves, were refugees from Ottoman rule, but quite a few of them really had started life as subjects of Venice or even the Habsburgs. These border raiders legitimised their aggressions against Venetian and Ottoman ships alike by claiming that they would attack anybody who traded with “the enemy” (in other words, the Ottoman sultan) or accepted his protection. Even if they were Christians, such people supposedly deserved their fate because they contravened the tenets of their faith.

Kidnapping people was part of Uskok piracy, but the migration they caused was often temporary, as they typically held prisoners for ransom or else exchanged them. Only those captives from the Ottoman world who were unlucky enough to be sold might live out their lives as galley slaves in the service of Christian powers and thus form yet another category of involuntary migrants. Finally, just after the end of the period discussed here, another bout

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\(^{121}\) Dávid and Fodor, Ransom Slavery, pp. xiii–xxii.

of migration ended the life of the pirate community. Under strong pressure from Istanbul to ensure the protection of Ottoman merchants in the Adriatic, the Republic of Venice in 1615–17 waged war against the archduke, who had been patronising the Uskoks. This confrontation ended with the Habsburgs removing the pirates from Senj and resettling them in inland frontier zones.

Other border-dwellers that raided Ottoman territory and thus provoked the flight of “regular” peasants and townsmen were the Cossacks, whose number included disaffected gentlemen from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and also ex-peasants fleeing serfdom. Cossacks lived in the regions to the north of the Black Sea, where they worked at fishing and animal husbandry, which they supplemented by piracy. Quite often the Cossacks attacked the towns of the Anatolian seaboard; if captured, they were enslaved, and must have accounted for many of the so-called Rus that served the well-to-do inhabitants of sixteenth-century Bursa. However, Cossack raids peaked in the early seventeenth century, shortly after the end of the period treated here.

**Nomads and settled populations**

Nomads were another example of people permanently on the move whose motivations had little to do with the political concerns of the Ottoman administration. By the sixteenth century, the central government therefore looked upon nomads with misgivings and showed a decided preference for settled folk. Yet, in early Ottoman history, several sultans and their principal servitors may well have had close connections to the nomad world; certain scholars have even hypothesised the existence of an Ottoman tribe. But because so few documents survive from the 1300s and almost all chroniclers recording the deeds of the sultans wrote their works much later, namely in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, solid information on this topic is impossible to obtain.

For the thirteenth century, we have some evidence of nomad immigration into the Balkans from Anatolia. In the following period, this type of immigration continued, as is apparent from the icmals of around 1530 that we have

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124 Sahilioglu, ‘Slaves’.

already encountered. In those regions that today form eastern Bulgaria, population was sparse and a large share consisted of so-called yürük, nomads who owed services to the Ottoman army. In the fifteenth century, yürük often served in the military. In a manner that we can no longer re-construct, they had lost their tribal structures at an early date, or at least the recording officials claimed that they had done so. Instead these nomads formed groups known as ocaks. A certain number of men fought in the sultan’s army, while those oacak members not on active service were responsible for supplying their fellow members while on campaign. To ensure that yürük services remained available to the government, officials discouraged these people from settlement, and thus their treatment was diametrically opposed to that of other nomads.

In terms of Ottoman administrative thinking, the Balkan yürük formed a category intermediate between the tax-paying population and the tax-collecting members of the army and administration. This privileged status applied even though some nomads had come to the Balkans not of their own volition but had been forcibly settled (sürgün). However, in the sixteenth century, the government gradually phased out the military activity of the yürük, but these nomads still performed guard duty near Balkan mines and transported goods demanded by the Ottoman administration.

Another group of nomads with a special status were the Tatars, who for the most part lived in the Crimea and the grasslands to the north of the Black Sea but also had immigrated into present-day Bulgaria at a fairly early time. The Crimean Tatars were ruled by their own princely dynasty, the Giray, who claimed descent from Djingis Khan. Certain nomad confederacies, such as the Nogay, were subject to the hans in theory but in practice did not always obey them. As we have seen, in dependent principalities the Ottoman sultans did not order taxpayers to be counted. We therefore only possess information on the numbers and tax categories of the people inhabiting the province of Kefe/Caffa/Feodosia, which the Ottomans established in order to maintain a modicum of control over the activities of the Tatars. The centre of this province was the town of the same name, which in 1520 and 1542 held a population of over 16,000 taxpayers, although it is not clear how many men were actual household heads.

127 Ibid., p. 49.
From the Ottoman viewpoint, the Tatars were valuable auxiliaries in Balkan campaigns and sometimes also in the sultans’ wars against Iran.\textsuperscript{130} Once again, the Tatars’ principal asset was their mobility. Kept outside of the regular field army, they usually formed the avant-garde, whose job it was to disorganize the enemy by raiding the civilian population, setting fire to towns and villages and carrying off large numbers of prisoners. Slave-hunting was not limited to wartime but occurred even in periods of peace. On the long and ill-defined borders with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and the tsars of Russia, taking captives was an important source of livelihood in addition to stock-breeding. Upon occasion the customs records of Anatolian Black Sea towns such as Samsun have survived, and these record the prisoners introduced into the Ottoman realm on their way to the slave markets of Istanbul and beyond.\textsuperscript{131}

When attempting to study the nomad population, researchers encounter challenges similar to those which once faced Ottoman scribes, for nomads and their animals were very hard to count. Officials typically recorded these people in small units called \textit{cemaat}, a catch-all phrase that could be used also for religious or non-nomadic ethnic groups and even for people sharing certain legal disabilities, such as sharecropper slaves settled on the land. Perhaps the larger tribal units that had existed in the pre-Ottoman period, known as \textit{boy}, were no longer of much practical importance in the 1500s or the administration had its own reasons for ignoring them.\textsuperscript{132} Sometimes registers recorded only the nomad populations of a given area; in other instances, we find them interspersed with the village population, as they must also have been in real life.

Probably the sixteenth-century population expansion forced certain nomads to settle, and the \textit{tahrirs} reflect this process when \textit{cemaats} of an earlier period appear in more recent registers as ordinary villages. However, it is hard to say which nomads had genuinely settled down and which ones merely featured as peasants for the convenience of the financial administration; after all, villagers owed a slew of taxes from which nomads were exempt. Moreover, in Anatolia, where rainfall agriculture is – in a pinch – possible everywhere, the transition from nomadism to village life and back again if necessary was not too difficult to achieve.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{130} Carl Max Kortepeter, \textit{Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus} (London and New York, 1972), p. 57.
\textsuperscript{131} Faroqhi, \textit{Towns and Townsmen}, pp. 89–90.
\textsuperscript{133} Xavier de Planhol, \textit{De la plaine pamphylienne aux lacs pisidiens: nomadisme et vie paysanne} (Paris, 1958), pp. 115–18.
Ottoman population

Many peasants also possessed some sheep, and the *tahrirs* quite often recorded the right of certain villages to uninhabited or sparsely inhabited grazing lands (*mera*). In addition, many Anatolian peasants visited summer pastures (*yayla*) usually located some distance away from the main settlement, where they grazed their sheep. Some of these lands belonged to a given locality, reserved for the exclusive use of its inhabitants, while in other cases several villages frequented the same pasture. Or else nomads and settled folk might take turns using the same *yayla*. Furthermore, in certain parts of the Mediterranean and Aegean coastlands of Anatolia, migration was universal for reasons that had nothing to do with grazing and livestock; many sites, including the Büyük and Küçük Menderes valleys, were abandoned by everybody with the means to do so during the malarial summer season. Pirate attacks further compounded the dangers of spending time on the coastal plains in summer. All these activities meant that even settled peasants or townsmen did not necessarily “stay put” throughout the year, and therefore their lifestyles had some affinity to those of the nomads.

On the other hand, in certain regions, such as for instance the Çukurova, nomads cultivated fields that they harvested upon returning from their highland pastures in the autumn. Such an arrangement was of course only possible if the tribal units in question frequented the same sites year after year. The capsules of the cotton cultivated at that time did not open when ripe, and the risk of spoilage therefore was much reduced even if the owners could not immediately harvest their crop. As a result, some nomads grew cotton, and “part-time” agriculture could even transcend immediate subsistence needs; people legally classed as *cemaats* thus drew part of their sustenance as cultivators. Quite possibly the officials preparing the *tahrirs*, who after all were largely strangers to the region they covered, really had trouble categorising some of these groups as either peasants or nomads. Yet wherever the sultan’s servants might take their registers, they were sure to encounter migration as an important feature of local society.

In conclusion

The Ottoman lands of the early 1500s were not densely inhabited, although by the century’s end population increase had been large enough to generate a number of major cities and a coherent urban network. Apparently, Mehmed

the Conqueror, as well as his immediate predecessors and successors, coped with the relative rarity of human beings by adopting forced settlement as a favoured means of stabilising their rule.

If the impression that we gain from the early tax registers is more or less correct, these population transfers were on the whole successful, while the Cyprus settlement project of the 1570s and afterwards was something of a failure. Perhaps the stabilisation of Ottoman rule had allowed a genuine peasant society to develop in Anatolia, and these villagers were less inclined than the nomads and semi-nomads of an earlier age to pack up and go. Economic opportunity may also have played a role. Earlier transfers quite often brought sürgün to Istanbul, and the possibilities of making a decent living in or near the capital of the expanding Ottoman Empire were probably greater than those available in Cyprus, an island whose long-term economic crisis presumably was well known to the deportees.135 Last but not least, the mercenary rebellions and long wars against the Habsburgs and Safavids may have made it difficult for the Ottoman administration to supervise the recently arrived Cyprus sürgün, and many of the unwilling migrants must have seized the opportunity to get away.

At the same time, the Ottoman administration expected its non-sürgün population to stay put, and the administrators of timars, zemets, hass and pious foundations could track down escapees and get the kadıs’ courts to order these migrants to return. But in this case as well, there was a significant gap between declared aims and practical life. Migrating peasants were often difficult to track down, especially if they had joined the sultans’ armies. But even those who had simply moved to mountainous areas were not so easy to find for both tax collectors and marauding soldiers, and the protection afforded by an inaccessible site, relative though it may have been, allowed these people to continue as peasants. If we take into account that nomads were even harder to supervise than people who tilled the soil, we will not over-estimate the control that the Ottoman administration, in spite of all the rules and regulations that it emitted, was able to exercise over the local population.

Control was easier when slaves were involved, and apparently a sizeable number of the inhabitants of both Bursa and Istanbul in the 1400s and early 1500s were recent converts and many of them even former slaves. If the impression conveyed by our primary and secondary sources is reasonably accurate, then in the case of these two cities at least we should differentiate between the post-conquest situation, when there was an enormous influx of

135 Costantini, Il sultano e l’isola contesa, pp. 138–9.
captives ultimately Islamised and acculturated, and the urban population of the late 1500s, where the local element was of much greater significance. But while the difference was important, we should not exaggerate. To the great displeasure of the authorities, Istanbul continued as a magnet for migrants, during the sixteenth century and later on as well. And given the plagues and other risks inherent in life in a great pre-industrial city, without substantial immigration Istanbul could not have become the premier city of the sixteenth-century Mediterranean and continue to play this role for a long time after the end of our period.
PART III

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CULTURE AND THE ARTS
In a list of the “diseases of the soul”, the philosopher Kinalzade Ali (d. 1572) lists, together with all other vices, two kinds of ignorance: simple ignorance (cehl-i basit), which is ignorance aware of its ignorance, and complex ignorance (cehl-i mürekkeb). Since cognizance of ignorance is the beginning of every quest for knowledge, simple ignorance is not even reprehensible initially. It can be healed by recognising the unique position of human beings among all animals, distinct through the gift of speech – and thus capable of preserving and transmitting knowledge. The other kind of ignorance, however, is not even to be cured by Jesus, who can heal the deaf and the blind. When encountering such a person, the only cure a wise man may undertake is to teach him mathematics, so as to awaken in him the desire for definite proof, and then lead him on to other knowledge to which he will apply himself with the same desire.¹

This passage demonstrates the value that sixteenth-century Ottoman society placed on knowledge, also hinting at the way in which people acquire it and alluding to the instrumental relations between different kinds of knowledge. After scattered and heterogeneous beginnings in the pre-imperial period, between the conquest of Constantinople and the late 1500s, a new, coherent system of knowledge production and dissemination came into being in the Ottoman Empire. Around 1600, towards the end of the period under consideration, we encounter a well-established canon of knowledge which has fully appropriated the classical Islamic tradition and expanded on it. This Ottoman canon of knowledge fully deserves to be called classical in itself, as it has attained systematic organisation and internal ordering while at the same time imposing order onto its subject matter. Just as Ottoman religious architecture moves from the loosely grouped zaviye-mosque arrangement to the

rigidly structured and ordered imperial mosque embodied in the layout of
the Istanbul mosques of Mehmed the Conqueror and Süleyman I, Ottoman
intellectual life gains breadth and splendour as well as regularity and order. In this chapter, we will attempt to summarise the more salient aspects of this
canon of knowledge.

Sociologically, the system of knowledge and knowledge production to be
studied here is centred upon the Ottoman imperial household and the house-
holds of the governing elite, together with the upper echelons of the learned
class (ilmiye). Yet Ottoman historians have a tendency to overemphasise the
dynasty and its household, denoted as the “Ottoman state”, despite the limits
of the latter’s reach and its absence from so many spheres of life. However,
the background, distribution and preservation of the written sources that
document the ideas we seek to study almost inevitably lead to a compar-
able imbalance, for knowledge that was not “officially sanctioned” had little
chance of survival. As a result, historians often assume that social status more
than anything else pre-determines the outlook and world view expressed in
the surviving texts. Yet this bias is highly problematic. Instead, intellectual
traditions have their own dynamics, and the links between intellectual life
and political ideologies in the pre-modern age are far more ambiguous than
state-focused historians are ready to admit.

Obviously, the Ottoman system of knowledge accessible to us is only one
of the multiple cultural sub-systems existing within the empire, and an appro-
priate representation of Ottoman intellectual history would have to address
the ideas of numerous groups differing in social status, language, ethnicity,
religion or place. Nor will we claim that such sub-systems existed separately
from each other – in fact, multiple interactions must have been the norm.
Simply and pragmatically, the availability of sources and the linguistic and
cultural expertise of the author dictate the focus of the current chapter; he
has not been able to examine texts in Greek, Armenian or Slavic languages.
Similarly, the geographical focus will largely be on Istanbul, which in the
period under consideration developed from a peripheral position in relation
to the great centres of Islamic learning in Syria, Egypt and Central Asia to a
centre of gravity in its own realm.

2 Howard Crane, ‘The Ottoman Sultan’s Mosques: Icons of Imperial Legitimacy’, in The
Ottoman City and Its Parts: Urban Structure and Social Order, ed. Irene Bierman, Donald Preziosi,
3 Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire (London,
2000), pp. 7ff.
Systematising knowledge

In contrast to historian Aşıkpaşazade’s romanticised picture of an illiterate Osman I, the “classical period” boasted an abundance of written sources, as the Ottoman elite systematically collected books and greatly appreciated the most handsome exemplars. The library of Mehmed II, with its texts in Christian and Islamic languages, has attracted much attention. But the palace was not the only collector of books. After the scholar Müeyyedzade died in 1516, his heirs dispersed his 7,000-volume library, but Selim I ordered its restitution, documented in a list in the palace archive. After conquering the Mamluk Empire, Ottoman soldiers and scholars also brought significant numbers of books from Cairo to Istanbul. Yet already in 1502, Bayezid II had had an independent and systematic catalogue of the palace library prepared, which ran to 340 folios and included 7,200 titles in 5,700 volumes. The register of Istanbul’s mid-sixteenth-century pious foundations (vakıfs) explored by Ismail Erünsal shows numerous libraries available to the students of Islamic colleges (medreses) and others.

Taşköprüzade Ahmed (d. 1561), a famous Ottoman legal scholar, wrote his bibliographic encyclopaedia *Miftah al-saadat wa misbah al-siyada* in Arabic. It is the most visible expression of the Istanbul elite’s desire to cope with this new wealth of circulating knowledge by ordering and regulating it, canonising some parts and excluding others. The introduction contains a systematic discussion of the ethics and virtues of learning, and the relationships of teachers and students in the process of instruction. As both Taşköprüzade and his son Kemalüddin Mehmed (d. 1621), who produced an enlarged version of his father’s work in Turkish under the title *Mevzuatu’l-Ulum*, were part of the Ottoman ilmiye, these texts function as a kind of code of conduct for people within the Ottoman medrese system. During this period, the latter came into its own, with master–student relationships inspired at least in part by the strict hierarchy between seyh and disciple in the budding Ottoman dervish orders. The main part of this work, however, provides a systematisation of the sciences that far exceeds the specialised curriculum of the medrese. In a very philosophical way, Taşköprüzade created his own categories, differing

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from his medieval predecessors and drawing on Aristotelian concepts as formulated by Avicenna.\textsuperscript{6}

Know that all things exist at four [different] levels: in writing [\textit{kitaba}], in verbal expression [\textit{\text patient}ibara], in the mind [\textit{\text patient}han], and in substance [\textit{\text patient}yan, rendering the Greek \textit{ousia}]. The former ones are always means to the latter ones, as writing points to the words, those in turn to what is in the mind, and that points to what exists in substance. It is obvious that existence in substance is the real, original existence, and regarding existence in the mind there is disagreement if it is real or symbolic [\textit{\text patient}jazi], and the first two are definitely symbolic. Then, the first three are certainly instrumental. The sciences relating to the substances are either practical [\textit{\text patient}amali], meaning that they aim to attain something other than themselves, or theoretical [\textit{\text patient}zari], meaning that they aim to attain themselves. In both of those, disputation is either based on the law, these are the legal sciences, or according to the requirement of reason, this is philosophy [al-\textit{\text patient}ilm al-hikami]. These are the seven principles.\textsuperscript{7}

Subsequently, Taşköprüzade divides his encyclopaedia into seven parts, the first three of which bear a certain resemblance to the trivium of medieval Western learning: (1) the sciences related to writing, such as calligraphy; (2) the sciences related to the word, such as grammar and poetry; and (3) the sciences of the mind, especially logic. However, the next group combined the remaining liberal arts with the next level, namely the law: (4) the natural and occult sciences, including mathematics and medicine; (5) practical philosophy; and (6) the legal sciences. These first six parts are separated from the seventh and last section, which deals with the purification of the soul and spiritual knowledge in the broadest sense. A separate introduction makes it clear that this last section is the ultimate goal of learning, the stripping away of the worldly concerns to which other sciences offer the key. Every chapter consists of numerous sub-chapters, each of which is dedicated to a specific science. The first five parts are much shorter than the last two; they all briefly discuss the main concerns of the science under consideration, and this is followed by a list of essential books written on the relevant topics. Thus the work is a bibliography as much as an encyclopaedia. In the last section, however, the author’s desire to present a rigid, authoritative summary of the field entirely eclipses the bibliographic concern.

Aside from the obvious Sufi background, Taşköprüzade’s categorisation stands for the claim of the \textit{\text patient}lmiye not to teach everything but to control all


\textsuperscript{7} Ahmed b. Mustafa Taşköprüzade, \textit{\text patient}iftāḥ al-	extit{\text patient}a‘āda wa miṣbāḥ al-	extit{\text patient}iyāda}, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1968), vol. 1, p. 74.
realms of knowledge. Certain sciences are only permissible to certain degrees, while others are considered inherently forbidden according to religious law; in this matter the author agreed with his colleague Birgivi Mehmed b. Pir Ali (d. 1573), a famous and controversial legal scholar, and also with the author of yet another contemporary encyclopaedia, the *Netaʾicīl-fīnūn* by Nevi.\(^8\)

In the perspective of these authors, knowledge ultimately is appreciated only in written form and is validated by scholarly authority, leaving only limited means of access to the canon for the non-academic. These writers also remind their readers that any kind of knowledge was subject to judgment *sub specie aeternitatis*; that is, people should value it according to its potential contribution to their future salvation. This holds true even for the fields which are not per se religious and typically did not feature in the *medrese* curriculum.

A survey of Ottoman intellectual history in all its intertwined strands of theology, philosophy, law, natural sciences, medicine, history and political thought is beyond the scope of this chapter. Ottoman multi-lingual scholarship has long been a serious obstacle for modern researchers.\(^9\) Moreover, modern Western and Turkish biases have resulted in selective and heterogeneous approaches to the history of Ottoman knowledge and knowledge production, so that historians only recently have begun to reflect on the philosophical and epistemological interconnectedness of the different sub-fields. According to some authors, however, it is exactly this epistemological unity focused on the understanding of existence and the divine, and on a common language to express ideas, that is most characteristic of philosophical and scientific thought during the Seljuk and Ottoman periods.\(^10\)

In the broadest sense, the ideas we will study here emerge from the human encounter with the physical world and the desire to understand its inner workings; from the experience of living in society, and in particular of social orders based on inequality; from the realisation of space and place; and from the exposure to time experienced in multiple linear or cyclical ways by individuals and collectives. Broadly speaking, we might summarise these themes

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under the headings of “history”, “science” and “geography” if those modern terms did not imply a particular interest and epistemology shaped by academic discourses, which potentially suppress or obfuscate the specific way in which a pre-modern or early modern society explores its world, with the desire to find a transcendent meaning in it. While religious practices and doctrine remain outside the purview of this chapter, religion as an interpretive system ordering and validating human experience will be at the very centre of our analysis.

Cosmography as encyclopaedia

In conformity with the spirit of the period, the study of the physical world also generated its own encyclopaedias, which were meant to be comprehensive and accessible compendia of essential knowledge. One of them became known in the Islamic world as ‘Ajāʾīb al-makhluqat, in Turkish sometimes simplified to ‘Acaʾ ibname. Modern scholars have come to call this genre cosmography, as in it the representation of the universe and the earth occupy a prominent place. We will continue to use this term for the sake of convenience.

In this field, Zakariya al-Qazwini’s (d. 1283) two-part work ‘Ajāʾīb al-makhluqat and Athar al-bilad occupies a central place, the first volume being dedicated to the natural world and the second to human geography. Al-Qazwini’s works found many readers in the Ottoman lands, together with the even more popular Kharidat al-‘ajaʾib, written around 1419 and erroneously attributed to Ibn al-Wardi, and a number of others. Taşköprüzade was particularly interested in the edifying aspect of these works, which combine exact observation of natural history with a selection of geographical mirabilia under the guiding principle of acknowledging God the Creator’s omnipotence by contemplating phenomena of the visible world. In his heuristic approach, the author juxtaposes strict rationalism based on ancient Greek traditions of science with so-called Islamic cosmology, which draws on religious authorities such as the Qur’an and hadith in addressing natural phenomena such as rainbows, thunderstorms, or tides. Anton Heinen has identified the terms tafakkur and tadhakkur, contemplation and recall, as the two complementary principles

of producing knowledge about the physical world. Al-Qazwini’s redactors and successors often shifted their focus between these different approaches. In particular, *Kharidat al-‘aja’ib* largely abandoned the critical observation advocated by al-Qazwini in favour of all kinds of pious legends, making his work extremely popular among the Ottomans, including Taşköprüzade and the historian Mustafa Ali, who based much of the geographical introduction to his world chronicle on this source.

Beginning in the late 1300s, certain Ottomans not only read and studied these classics in Arabic and Persian but also produced translations, usually more or less liberal adaptations of one of the works discussed here. Even in the late seventeenth century, the Qazwini translation begun by Süruri when he was tutor to Prince Mustafa, the son of Süleyman the Magnificent, was regarded as worthy of completion.

In the reign of Mehmed II, the prominent dervish and scholar Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bican, known as an early translator of al-Qazwini, has used the framework of a cosmography to impart to his followers essential knowledge about the creation, the cosmos and especially the imminent end of time. *Dürr-i Meknun* is ultimately a didactical work, teaching the purpose of creation and the transience of this world. But the author also has included a chapter on the places destroyed by God’s wrath, all with the purpose of inculcating moral behaviour, complaints about the corruption of the age being a *topos* in other texts of the period as well.

Around 1600, on the other hand, Mehmed Aşık’s (d. 1596) *Menazırul-avalim* led his readers in exactly the opposite direction. *Menazırul-avalim* was typical for the period also because of its combination of scholarly authority with literary ambition. The author obviously made a living in the retinue of Ottoman dignitaries, being charged with occasional administrative jobs, but his main social capital was his erudition in conjunction with his experiences during his travels. A report on his captivity in the Caucasus and daring escape

apparently started him on his career as boon companion and early predecessor of the famous travel writer Evliya Çelebi, who incidentally did not hesitate to plagiarise the work of Mehmed Aşık. We can use this work, qua culmination and conclusion of a genre, as an example of the Ottoman trend to organise, structure and classify knowledge, and this work can also serve as a guide to the realms of knowledge, canonised and un-canonised, of the period under study.

The first concern of a cosmographer is to establish the structure of the universe. Ottomans were familiar with different cosmologies, especially those from diverse Sufi traditions. Often we find the two most important ones explicated side by side, although they appear, to the modern mind, as mutually exclusive. The scriptural authorities of Islamic cosmology provide the core for a creation narrative which relates a highly symbolic order with God’s throne and footstool at the top and seven layered heavens mirroring seven degrees of inferno. Angels, devils and demons populate this universe, and cosmographers discuss in some detail the characteristics and hierarchies of these beings. An angel standing on the back of a bull, which in turn stood on a giant fish emerging from the world ocean, held the entire structure of the cosmos in place.

On the one hand, we find this image of the world in rather “popular” (i.e. non-scholarly) works, such as the widely read catechism known as Book of Forty Questions, whose first few queries deal mainly with creation and the structure of the cosmos. On the other hand, this “popular” religiosity was obviously not connected to a specific class or level of education, for scholars, too, appreciated it for its symbolic significance, so that most people regarded it as all but indisputable. The spheres of the four elements separated these “upper worlds” (avalim-i ulviyye) from the “lower world” (alem-i sufl), meaning the physical cosmos accessible to human senses. Here again, cosmographers disagreed about its structure: Mehmed Aşık reported opinions that the earth was flat, and in cosmographies we frequently find maps showing a circular earth surrounded by the world ocean (bahr-i muhit), which in turn was surrounded by the Mountain of Qaf, near which the authors sometimes placed the fountain of the “Water of Life” mentioned in the Qur’an.

The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order

purposes, however, the cosmographers adopted a simplified version of the
gocentric model going back to Ptolemy: a spherical earth in the middle of a
concentric series of nested spheres, which carried the moon, the sun, the five
known planets and finally the fixed stars. An outer sphere surrounding all the
others set them all in motion, albeit at different speeds. Below the sphere of
the moon lay the spheres of the four elements: fire, air, water and finally the
heaviest, earth, at the centre, more than half covered by water.

Astronomy

The knowledge of astronomy which Mehmed Aşık displays in his description
of the cosmos is very limited. In few areas of knowledge did popular imagina-
tion differ so fundamentally from the state of the art information available
to the Ottoman elite. As astronomy along with mathematics was one of the
few scientific subjects forming a regular part of the medrese curriculum, the
discrepancy between “learned” and ”popular” is even starker.\footnote{21}

A substantial tradition of astronomical study and observation in Islam
goes back via the Abbasid caliphate and the caliph al-Ma’mūn in particular, to
Ptolemy’s *Almagest* as a kind of founding document. But some of the most
important advances in Islamic astronomy are due to the Mongols, who, begin-
ning with Chenggis Han, took an active interest in the subject by attract-
ing astronomers from all the lands under their domination. Chenggis Han’s
grandson Hülâgü (d. 1265) founded the observatory of Maragha near Tabriz,
“often seen as the apex of Islamic observatories,” as a “pan-Eurasian enter-
prise” involving Chinese astronomers as well as Western sources.\footnote{22} A simi-
larly cosmopolitan astronomical institution operated, next to other “experts
in futurology”, at the Mongol (Yuan) court of China. In the Timurid period,
the observatory of Samarqand founded by Uluğ Bey (d. 1449), a grandson of
Timur, was the leading institution. Here was the workplace of Kadızade Rumi
(d. ca. 1432), a scholar and mathematician from Bursa, whose commentary on
al-Chaghmini’s textbook became one of the most widely used astronomical
works in the Ottoman realm.\footnote{23} Under him trained the talented Ali Kuşçu (d.
1474), who after the murder of Uluğ Bey first took refuge with the Akkoyunlu;
later, Mehmed II lured him with an exorbitant stipend to Istanbul, where he
taught at the Aya Sofya medrese.\footnote{24}

Ali Kuşçu and Kadızade Rumi, wrote further commentaries on the works of his ancestors and also contributed to the literature on astronomical instruments and other applications, such as sundials.\(^{25}\)

Keeping time in the course of the day and throughout the cycle of the lunar and solar years had immediate practical importance for the fulfilment of religious obligations.\(^{26}\) Many mosques in the Ottoman period had a special office for timekeeping, called muvakkithane, and the timekeepers typically trained in the medreses. As managers of time, astronomers also determined the proper moment to begin and end all kinds of activity – economic, military, ritual and spiritual.\(^{27}\) But particularly timekeeping was indispensable to administrators since the revenues of an agricultural empire such as that of the Ottomans depended on the harvest cycle. Practical men appreciated astronomical observation because its practitioners produced calendars and tables that facilitated the administration of agricultural resources. Yet, in addition, in Allsen’s words, “timekeeping always has ritual and cosmological implications. Any astronomical irregularity, any miscalculation of a cosmic event such as an eclipse, undermined the emperor’s connectedness to the cosmos and thus his legitimacy and mandate to rule.”\(^{28}\)

Presumably the Ottoman interest was not substantially different from that of the Mongols; in other words, the ultimate purpose of astronomy was always astrology (\textit{ahkami‘n-nücum}) in the broadest sense of the term. Certain litterateurs even claimed that a ruler must keep an astrologer at his court.\(^{29}\) Taşköprüzade emphasised the difference between astronomy, which was part of the mathematical sciences (\textit{min furu‘ al-riyadi}), and astrology, which worked “with the guidance of nature” (\textit{bi-dalalat al-ţabi‘a}). Thus the author emphasised that the connection between the stars on the one hand and the terrestrial events and processes influenced by them on the other were all part of the larger structure of the physical world. Apparently Taşköprüzade did not worry too much about long-standing legal strictures against astrology, which after all appears to jeopardise the dogma of God’s omnipotence. In this context, it is noteworthy that one of the early calendars claimed that the


\(^{27}\) Allsen, \textit{Culture and Conquest}, p. 175.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.

The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order

prophet Idris had adopted astrology. We certainly should read this statement as a legitimating claim.\textsuperscript{30}

Belief in the efficacy of the stars was ubiquitous. Thus the great historian Mustafa Ali (d. 1600) explained in the general introduction to his world history how the constellation at the moment of conception determined the fate of the child.\textsuperscript{31} Remarkably the author did not bother to use the theologically correct phrase, namely that the stars only reflected what God Almighty had ordained. Mustafa Ali had his own horoscope cast twice in 1568, asking the astrologer about the outcome of the military campaign to which he was being dispatched.\textsuperscript{32} More than for anybody else, however, the “judgment of the stars” mattered for the sultan himself.

Several perpetual almanacs, which indicated constellations and prognostics for the cycle of a solar year, were popular in the Ottoman Empire, most prominently the Şemsiye, also known as Melheme, of Salahuddin Yazıcı, written in 1408. Scribes often copied this versified treatise in a mesnevi format; in 1635–6, the Mevlevi dervish İbrahim Cevri composed an updated version.\textsuperscript{33} Under Bayezid II, a large number of astronomers flocked to the Ottoman court, dedicating a total of 30 works to him.\textsuperscript{34} A register tentatively dated to the years after 1495 lists six astrologers (münecçim) among the recipients of salaries from the imperial treasury.\textsuperscript{35} Of all Ottoman astronomical works that contain a dedication to a member of the House of Osman, almost half are dedicated to Bayezid II.

We do not know when the sultans first instituted the office of chief court astronomer, charged with the preparation of astronomical tables and predictions for every year; late sources provide diverging lists, and no additional documentation has surfaced. Only with Mustafa b. 'Ali al-Muvakkıt (d. 1571), a prolific author of astronomical as well as geographical works, did the office gain a firm place in the hierarchy of the sultans’ palace.\textsuperscript{36} In addition to serving the court, chief astronomers cum astrologers also often took office within the ilmiye and elsewhere. Their main task was to prepare annual almanacs

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Taşköprüzade, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa mīṣbāḥ al-siyyāda, vol. 1, pp. 359ff.; Nihal Atsız, Osmanlı Tarihine Ait Takvimler (İstanbul, 1961).
\item Schmidt, Pure Water, p. 120, with reference to Kühn’s Ahbar, vol. 1, p. 21.
\item İhsanoğlu et al., Osmanlı Astronomi Literattürü Tarihi, p. 112.
\item Aydüz, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde Münecimbaşılık Müessesesi’, p. 183.
\item İhsanoğlu et al., Osmanlı Astronomi Literattürü Tarihi, pp. 161–79.
\end{thebibliography}
with the relevant predictions for each single day, to be submitted to the sultan on the spring equinox, the beginning of the Iranian solar year (nevrūz). A great many of these calendars with various types of prognostications, as well as calendar-type tables and notes of important events, have come down to us. Before any important action, the sultans and their dignitaries demanded horoscopes. Thus, for instance, Tursun Bey reports that the hour for beginning the construction of the Rumeli Hisari fortress (1452) was chosen with the help of astrologers, incidentally one of the earliest attestations of such a specialist in the retinue of an Ottoman ruler.

General textbooks and specialised treatises on instruments and timekeeping make up much of the intellectual output of Ottoman astronomers. But the crucial part of their work was the preparation of astronomical tables based on observations, to serve as the basis for further calculation. Before telescopes became available, there was only one way to improve the quality of measurements and observations, namely to increase the size of the instrument. Most spectacularly, Uluğ Bey sponsored this expansion of astronomical activity in Samarkand, where the remnants of his mural quadrant, several storeys high, are still visible today. Astronomy thus became a worthy object of imperial patronage because it required great investments both in instruments and scientific education. It is no coincidence that the essential astronomical tables produced in the observatories of Maragha and Samarkand bore the names of their imperial sponsors: Zij-i Ilhani and Zij-i Sultani or Zij-i Uluğ Bey, respectively. Mehmed II’s sponsoring of Ali Kuşçu and a continuing interest on the part of Bayezid II thus place the Ottoman court squarely within this imperial tradition.

For all the money he was willing to spend on the stars, however, there is no evidence that Mehmed II also planned to establish his own observatory in continuation of the Timurid model, to have a zij-i Osmani to his name. Such an attempt only occurred towards the very end of our period, under Sultan Murad III. The guiding spirit of this enterprise was Takyüeddin, arguably the most important of all Ottoman astronomers. Born in Damascus, he embarked on an ilmiye career, though certainly with a special focus on astronomy and mathematics, working first in Cairo, then after 1570 in

38 Ibid., pp. 208–24.
Istanbul. Under the protection of the sultan’s influential advisor and future şeyhülislam Hoca Sadeddin (d. 1599), in 1571 Takıyüddin became chief astronomer (müneccimbaşısı). Murad III agreed to establish a new observatory and pay all the expenses; Takıyüddin himself was promised a princely salary as well as a fiefdom to supplement his income. In 1574, the first sections of the observatory began operations, and new buildings and instruments were added through 1577.

While reports about an observation well are contradictory, miniatures show a giant wooden armillary sphere, pointing to an ambitious program of upgraded observation, supported by improved timekeeping with the help of mechanical clocks, on which Takıyüddin wrote several treatises. Scholars have pointed out that Takıyüddin’s and Tycho Brahe’s observatories, more or less simultaneously, used very similar instruments. In fact, a Western spherical globe is clearly visible on one of the miniatures showing the Istanbul observatory, indicating close interconnectedness between Ottoman and European circuits of scientific knowledge. But the enterprise turned out to be short-lived: already in 1580 a wrecking squad of soldiers tore down the facilities so thoroughly that later sources were unable to indicate the precise location.

We do not really know the ultimate reason for this end of the last grand astronomical enterprise in the Islamic world. As for the official fetva, it cites theological objections against astronomy and astrology in addition to the harm these pursuits might do to the empire; political historians point to infighting between the şeyhülislam and Takıyüddin’s powerful protector Hoca Sadeddin, and historians of science cite Takıyüddin’s misinterpretation of the comet of 1577 as having de-legitimised the enterprise. In the verse chronicle that is the main source for this affair, we also find the claim that Takıyüddin assented to the destruction, arguing that the revision of the tables of Ulugh Bey was now complete. Five years later, the astronomer died in Istanbul.

Much ink has been spilled by historians of science to explain why Islamic (and Chinese) astronomers, despite excellent observation facilities and a proud tradition of mathematical modelling, failed to develop a heliocentric system or, after its development by Copernicus, to swiftly adopt it. As a major factor, scholars have proposed the lack of scientific institutions as

the framework supporting disinterested research. However, most discus-
sants ignore the uncomfortable fact that the heliocentric system was math-
ematically convincing only with Kepler’s innovations, and even then took
another century to firmly take root in Europe. Other explanations have
more or less subtly drawn on culturalist arguments, with the destruction
of Takıyüddin’s observatory as “exhibit A” for the thesis that Islam and sci-
ence are incompatible. Posed in this way, the question is, however, rooted
in the old-fashioned school of history of science which primarily seeks to
create a heroic narrative of progress driven by individual luminaries towards
an enlightened future. Or at the very least the question is thoroughly
Eurocentric, taking what happened in Europe as a model rather than as an
anomaly on a world-historical scale, albeit a very successful one. Our
presentation should suggest that this is a moot point: Ottoman interest in
astronomy, as in any other branch of science (as we will see), was strictly
anthropocentric, directed at practical applicability, and the tables and models
available by 1600 sufficiently served this interest.

Universal geography

We return to our guide through the orders of knowledge, Mehmed Aşık’s
Menazıru’l-Avalim, the bulk of which is devoted to geography. As mentioned
before, despite references to other models, for practical matters cosmogra-
phers typically followed a Ptolemaic model involving a spherical earth, and
Mehmed Aşık was no exception. According to this author and his medieval
predecessors, about one-half of this spherical earth consisted of land, sur-
rounded by an ocean which penetrated it in seven major seas, from the Baltic
and Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. The southern half of this hemisphere
was too hot to be inhabitable or even known, leaving only the “inhabitable
quarter” (al-rub’ al-ma’mur) for the geographer to describe. Following ancient
Greek models – though typically giving credit to Ptolemy alone – Islamic
geographers had divided the surface of the northern hemisphere into paral-
lel latitudinal zones called climes (iqlim), distinguished by the duration of the
longest day. The seven resulting climes roughly covered the area from the

and New York, 2003).
44 Cemil Aydın, ‘Beyond Culturalism? An Overview of the Historiography on Ottoman Science
in Turkey’, in *Multicultural Science in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, Kostas
Chatzis and Efthymios Nicolaidis (Turnhout, 2003), pp. 201–16.
The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order

southern margin of the inhabited world, often assumed to be the equator, to its northern edge. In another manifestation of the all-pervasive notion of inter-related orders, these seven climes did not simply cause differences in flora, fauna and culture due to different climatic conditions but also through their association with a celestial body; to geographers and their readers, the characteristics of the seven climes and their effects arguably became the centre of interest.46 Again, typical of the overall preference for balance, the middle clime was considered the best, both in terms of its conditions and the qualities it brought about in its populations. By the same token, the seven climes could easily serve as the fundamental organising principle for any description of the world, and the authors of a wide variety of texts, including Mehmed Aşik in his Menaziru’l-Avalim, have used them as such.

The “scientific” map that divides the surface of the world into seven parallel strips of equal latitude, however, intersects with a “mental map” in which the viewer stands at the centre and which extends outward in concentric circles. Nearest to the beholder is an area of cultural, linguistic and climatic familiarity. Next comes a periphery, which is similar, yet different in a number of important respects, and finally the entire system is surrounded by a fringe of utterly incommensurable otherness. In other words, the people of the inner circle are one’s “own”, on the periphery there live “others” with whom interaction is possible, but on the fringe the observer who ventures this far will only find monsters and demons.47 By no means are the relevant boundaries co-terminous with political frontiers. On the one hand, Mustafa Ali, a member of Istanbul’s elite, in his description of Ottoman Cairo, heavily exoticises the city, while on the other hand Seydi Ali Reis found the culture of the Mughal courts of India very similar to his own.48 Moreover, the boundaries shift outward with the accumulation of geographical knowledge.

Visual representation in maps remained rare. The Ottomans inherited an ancient tradition of strongly abstract world maps, ultimately going back to the tenth century and the “Atlas of Islam”, through the popular Kharidat al-’ājā’īb mentioned earlier. Similar maps, all more mythical than realistic in character,

also found their places in certain world histories of the late sixteenth century. Mehmed Aşık’s own works typically do not include maps.49

In the eclectic and atomistic concept of the “marvels of creation”, every single marvel attested to the same transcendent phenomenon, while writers and readers paid no attention to continuities and commonalities. Obviously, most marvels were located in the peripheral and marginal regions. However, another branch of Islamic geography, which took the cultural-historical region, also called iqlim, as its basic unit, foregrounded continuity and commonality as structuring principles. It is Mehmed Aşık’s great merit to have opened the cosmographic tradition and its atomistic and theocentric outlook to those more historical views, most easily accessible in Abu ʿl-Fida al-Ḥamawi’s (d. 1331) great compilation Taqvim al-buldan and in Nuzhatuʿl-qulub by Ḥamdallah Mustawfi (d. after 1339–40), the massive cosmography of Ilkhanid Iran. Taqvim al-buldan unifies a number of earlier traditions, in particular the “Atlas of Islam”, and the mathematical strand going back to adaptations of Ptolemy. By contrast, Nuzhatuʿl-qulub contains a vast amount of invaluable information on Iran that has nothing to do with the theological concern of the marvel but is useful mainly to administrators. While these two authors record and catalogue the familiar, primarily the world of Islam, Mehmed Aşık has gone one step further in re-centring the gaze of the cosmographer on the familiar inner circle of the world.50 Having assimilated the scholastic tradition of medrese learning, this author usually restricts himself to juxtaposing accounts from different sources even when they are obviously contradictory. Validated by traditional authority, they stand, even when hundreds of years old.51

However, where he knew better, Mehmed Aşık inserted his own experiences, which after a lifetime of travel and service in various provinces of the Ottoman Empire were substantial. Instead of scholarly written authority, he sought to authenticate his own contributions by meticulously indicating the date and occasion of his visit.52 Thus Mehmed Aşık in his way recognised that traditional cosmography, at least in the description of the lands of the earth,

50 Ignatii Iulianovich Krachkovskii, Aralskaia geograficheskaia literatura, Izbrannye sochineniia (Moscow, 1957).
The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order

had reached its limits. The realism of contemporary experience was one way to revive the genre. Yet it turned out to be the last attempt of its kind, for the next great Ottoman work of world geography, Katip Çelebi’s Cihannûma, begun in 1648, built first on Sipahizade’s alphabetical re-ordering of Taqwim al-buldan, then supplemented it with Menaziru’l-avalim, and ultimately abandoned these models in favour of a new one, the European atlas as it emerged in the late sixteenth century.

New geography outside of the canon

In all of this, however, Mehmed Aşik strictly upheld the scholarly and mental maps established by the cosmographical tradition, which given the Ottoman position at the margin of the larger Islamic world, and in view of the intensifying interaction with neighbours to the north as well as the east, was already becoming obsolete at the time of writing. Parallel to his traditional encyclopaedia, a new universe of geographical knowledge was emerging. Due to its novelty and relation to the West, it has attracted much more attention from modern historians; yet its marginal position in relation to the traditional canon is often overlooked. This new geographical knowledge came from two main sources: empiricism, in other words travel, and new literary sources, in particular Western works.

The most important of these new developments is maritime geography. Seafaring in the Mediterranean, traditionally a trans-cultural or multi-cultural enterprise, had accumulated a stock of essential professional knowledge, transmitted in portolan charts and sailing handbooks called isolarii. Portolan charts had been produced since the 1300s in the western Mediterranean, with a centre in Mallorca. While the vast majority of those preserved are in Romance languages, a few examples have come down to us in Arabic. There are some portolan-style world maps, but the majority are charts of the Mediterranean, strictly to scale, with a grid of loxodromes to facilitate calculation of a course across the open sea towards a specific port. Sometimes owners bound several maps together to form a kind of atlas.

54 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World around It (London, 2004).
55 Henry R. Kahane, Renée Kahane and Andreas Tietze, The Lingua Franca in the Levant: Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin (Urbana, Ill., 1958).
consists of small-scale maps of individual islands, often taken from a portolan chart, along with supporting text.57

We can link the adoption of these models by the Ottomans to the name of Piri Reis (d. 1554), a captain in the Ottoman navy with a distinguished pedigree of seafarers and corsairs: he was the nephew of the Ottoman admiral Kemal Reis.58 Like many men in his profession, Piri Reis probably had encountered sailors from a variety of backgrounds, who had been to the farthest parts of the world. But he was the only one to actually use these sources to bring forth novel works. In 1513, Piri Reis created a world map in the style of a portolan, which according to a note on the chart itself he had compiled from Arab and Western maps. Only its westernmost third is extant today, showing the Atlantic Ocean, parts of Spain and the African coast in the east and an outline of southern and central America, including a number of islands in the Caribbean, in the west. These latter parts are based on a now-lost map by Columbus, as well as oral knowledge pertaining to Columbus’s last voyage, obtained from a Spanish captive.59 Praises for Piri Reis’s scientific and cartographic achievements tend to overlook that in the fast-paced age of discoveries much of his knowledge was already outdated by the time he made his map.

However, a fragment of another map made by Piri Reis in 1528–9, also surviving in the Ottoman palace library, is of the highest quality. It is apparently only one-sixth of what was once a world map, showing the north-western Atlantic coast from the Antilles to Labrador in excellent detail: “If this fragment is representative of the entire map, the latter would have occupied a rightful place among the best specimens of the period, including the famous Portuguese world map of 1510 known as the Miller Atlas.”60

Piri Reis also wrote an isolario, entitled Kitab-ı Bahriye, in which he described the entire coastline of the Mediterranean, counter-clockwise from Gallipoli, in a series of small maps with accompanying text. The first version appeared in 1521, in 130 chapters, with a map attached to each chapter, surviving in about 20 manuscripts. Having attracted the attention of grand vezir İbrahim Paşa, in 1526 Piri Reis prepared a new version, expanded to 210 chapters and

59 Ibid., pp. 54–79; Gregory W. McIntosh and Norman J. W. Thrower, The Piri Reis Map of 1513 (Athens, Ga., 2000).
60 Soucek, Piri Reis and Turkish Mapmaking after Columbus, p. 80.
maps, together with a grandiloquent introduction in verse, as a presentation copy for Sultan Süleyman. Ten manuscripts, for the most part carefully executed, are known today. In addition, three portolan atlases on vellum, of exquisite beauty and produced between around 1560 and 1580, have surfaced in the last few decades in Turkish libraries.

Travellers also produced works about countries and peoples situated on the margins of the Ottoman mental world. A courtier in the entourage of Cem Sultan, the brother and competitor of Bayezid II for the succession of Mehmed II, wrote an account of Cem’s stay in Italy, which, however, furnishes little information on the country itself. Similarly minor is the yield of factual knowledge the reader may derive from the elegant prose of Seydi Ali Reis (d. 1562). In Mir‘âtü’l-Memalik, he narrated his tribulations in Mughal India, where he was stranded after a botched naval excursion in 1554, having to return overland, through Shaybanid Central Asia and Safavid Iran. In the exoticism of India, Sufi shrines and poetic exchanges with Mughal princes provided him, as we have seen, with a strong sense of cultural familiarity. Seydi Ali Reis also wrote a manual for seafaring in the Indian Ocean, using the works of the Arab pilots Ahmad b. Majid and Sulaiman al-Mahri, apparently as the intellectual exercise of an educated gentleman.

More informative was the Khitay-name (Book of China), which the Iranian merchant Ali Ekber wrote in Persian and submitted to Sultan Süleyman in 1520. While ambiguities in the itineraries have led one researcher to believe that the author used written sources rather than travelling himself,


the description of the administrative and judicial system of Ming China is detailed and surprisingly accurate.\textsuperscript{65} But the same cannot be said about the curious collection of legends and fables in simple Turkish which purports to convey the history of China, India and other Asian peoples, by an otherwise unknown Seyfi Çelebi and presented to Murad III, a sultan known for his taste for the esoteric and curious.\textsuperscript{66} This ruler also ordered a translation of Ali Ekber’s work into Turkish. In the same period, an unknown person compiled a history of the discovery and conquest of the New World, from a number of Italian sources, and presented it to Murad III in an illustrated copy as Hadis-i Nev, or Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi, which for a century remained the main Ottoman source of information on America.\textsuperscript{67}

Historians continue to hotly debate the significance of this literature. Three dimensions are relevant: the scientific, the aesthetic cum cultural and the political. Arguments often depend on the researcher’s political or disciplinary background and agenda. While previous generations have faulted the Ottomans for their lack of interest in the outside world and failure to keep pace with European explorations, more recent scholars have taken pains to demonstrate that the Ottomans were just as interested, and scientifically as advanced, as their European counterparts.\textsuperscript{68} Piri Reis’s works show that he was well integrated into Mediterranean circuits of navigational knowledge; his skill and expertise matched that of the best European sailors and cartographers. His and his colleagues’ maps share a visual idiom that was widely understood from Portugal to the Levant, although the flow of information, for instance about America, seems to have been erratic. Nor incidentally is there any evidence that Western sailors learned from their Muslim counterparts. Seydi Ali Reis in his sailing handbook, on the other hand, mostly copied from the works of famous pilots Ahmad b. Majid and Sulaiman al-Mahri. A twentieth-century scholar has dismissed it as the exercise of a litterateur.


\textsuperscript{67} Thomas D. Goodrich, \textit{The Ottoman Turks and the New World: A Study of Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi and Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Americana} (Wiesbaden, 1990); Tülây Duran et al. (eds.), \textit{Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi el-misemmâ bi-Hadis-i nev} (Istanbul, 1999). The book was among the first works printed in Turkish by İbrahim Mütüferrika (1730).

\textsuperscript{68} Bernard Lewis, \textit{The Muslim Discovery of Europe} (New York, 1982). For a more nuanced study, see Faroqhi, \textit{The Ottoman Empire and the World around It}. See also Svat Soucek, ‘Piri Reis and Ottoman Discovery of the Great Discoveries’, \textit{Studia Islamica} 79 (1994), 121–42.
The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order with limited understanding of the matter at hand, and therefore considers the work to be without practical value. Literary qualities certainly prevail in Seydi Ali Reis’s travelogue Mir'atü’l-Avalim.

Throughout, Ottoman authors took care to package potentially useful information in aesthetically appealing ways, using beautiful language and intriguing images. Even Piri Reis’s first map included entertaining images of animals, ships and monsters right out of cosmographic legends. His narrative also featured digressions about his own exploits with Kemal Reis, and in order to make his Bahriye palatable to the sultan he felt compelled to upgrade its literary qualities with a lengthy rhymed introduction recounting the seven seas on the basis of popular knowledge and sailors’ yarns. More often than not, in the works preserved, the aesthetic aspect may have eclipsed the practical. Most likely, no copy of Bahriye known to us was ever taken to sea, and the only preserved portolan perhaps used on shipboard was that of Mehmed Reis b. Menemenli. While Piri Reis thought of the text of the Bahriye as the most important medium of information, later copies often omitted it, reducing the work to a string of beautiful pictures, like a coffee-table book; the so-called Atlas of Seyyid Nuh is a good example of the genre. Especially the second version of the Bahriye included a strong plea for expertise in the service of the House of Osman, but apparently nobody attempted to build and improve on the scientific and practical side of Piri Reis’s work.

Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi framed the history of the New World as part of a cosmography, quoting many legends from the classics, and with its illustrations in the tradition of al-Qazwini it appeared more as a “book of wonders” than an account of recent world-changing political events. Furthermore, Seydi Ali Reis did not write a description of India but rather a lively travel narrative patterned on the old Middle Eastern formula al-faraj ba’d al-shidda (relief after distress).

It is impossible to determine what exactly went through the minds of Ottomans viewing maps and reading exotic travelogues; however, it is fair to say that today’s science- and policy-minded historians tend to underestimate

73 Soucek, ‘Piri Reis and Ottoman Discovery’.
the cultural and aesthetic aspects of their experience. Scholars have argued that the set of texts about foreign countries discussed here reflects an Ottoman imperial vision of the world. In this context, the “discovery literature” in Ottoman Turkish supposedly results from, and in turn informs, a long-term policy aimed at expansion and conquest with respect to China and, more recently, the Indian Ocean. Yet we may object that the works in question are few and far between and that whatever political implications they may suggest are typically no more than random remarks, while their main concern is literary and edifying. As a whole, the literature surveyed here is remarkably non-belligerent and pays little attention to political and cultural boundaries; as we have seen, Seydi Ali Reis actually emphasises the cultural and linguistic commonalities with the Mughal princes of India. Moreover, much of the information offered was either legendary to begin with or quickly outdated. Seafarers and authors never updated and improved the available works in any systematic form, as would have been necessary had they served a coherent policy of expansion. Having distinguished himself as an expert in the Mediterranean, at a great old age Piri Reis was despatched to the Red Sea, and in 1554 he was executed after a failed confrontation with the Portuguese. Through the message this event imparted to later generations, Piri Reis’s death on the orders of his sultan may well have been the harbinger of an Ottoman failure to pursue exploration and cartography.

Frequently, it was individual more than societal concerns that made authors write down travel experiences, although they certainly did pander to the known interests of their audiences. Although interesting in its particulars for its content and its context, Ottoman knowledge production about foreign countries differed too much from the European “discovery literature” for a comparison to be fruitful. Whereas Europeans produced enormous amounts of travelogues for a vast readership eagerly awaiting the most recent news from every corner of the world and creative publishers assembled collections

77 Soucek, ‘Piri Reis and Ottoman Discovery’.
like Ramusio’s *Delle navigationi e viaggi* or compiled atlases like Ortelius’s *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, Ottoman knowledge production about the periphery remained scattered, haphazard and incomplete. No author took the trouble to collect the potentially vast reservoir of knowledge available in the minds of merchants and sailors, and diplomats’ reports remained locked up in the archive, never making it into Mehmed Aşık’s – or anybody else’s – canon.79

By the same token, travel narratives from within the Ottoman Empire, like the journal of Qutbaddin al-Makki or the illustrated campaign accounts by Matrakçı Nasuh and others, remained singular works without resonance in their time.80 The synthesising of all this information with a concern for its practical applicability was to be the project of a different person and a different period.81

**Natural history**

Ottoman geography was at its core human geography. Spaces devoid of human settlement were of no interest to the geographer. Aside from natural wonders, Mehmed Aşık, like his predecessors, considered physical geography inasmuch as it was important for humans, be it hot springs, food resources or obstacles to travel.

At the same time, the sense of order apparent from the works of the cosmographers extended to nature as well. In the Islamic tradition of science as inherited by the Ottomans, three hierarchical realms feature in God’s creation, a concept which Mehmed Aşık adopted to structure his account. Animals form the highest order, to which man also belongs, although he is distinct from all others through his gift of speech. Plants belong to the second realm and earth and stones to the third. Mehmed Aşık gives us lengthy lists of different animals, plants, minerals and other substances, compiled from classical sources such as al-Damiri’s (d. 1405) zoological work *Hayat al-hayawan*.82


81 Hagen, *Osmanischer Geograph*.

These lists merit discussion here only inasmuch as they cohere by way of the concept of “sympathetic qualities” inherent in all the items listed. These qualities, *khavass* in Arabic, *havass* in Turkish, exist in every created thing, and thus establish occult connections between things in different realms of nature, substances, ideas, locations or celestial bodies insofar as the sympathetic qualities of these entities are related or opposed to each other.\(^3\) Intelligible to the initiated but often kept secret to prevent abuse, “sympathetic qualities” in one thing or creature may serve to manipulate another being, so that in the exploitation of *havass* for the manipulation of others medicine and magic inextricably intertwine.\(^4\) Modern scholars have for a long time dismissed the concept of *havass* as lacking theoretical and scientific foundations, as a corruption or aberration of rational and scientific thought.\(^5\) Such criticism, however, does not take into account that the thought processes establishing and perpetuating the entire system of occult interconnectedness were certainly grounded in rational and, to a degree, empirical observations. It is more fruitful to critically analyse the ideas of past eras in their respective intellectual and social contexts than to fault them for their epistemologies, but Ottoman magic has barely been studied so far. At this point, it may suffice to say that this conceptual system fits the desire to understand the world as structured through inter-related orders remarkably well.

The body

The last large section of *Menazırû'l-Avalîm* is devoted to man as “the noblest being and the most perfect and most beautiful creature”.\(^6\) Mehmed Aşik does not concern himself with the origin of life and the duality of body and soul. These questions are relevant for theologians and philosophers but do not concern natural history except for the development of the fetus in the womb, regarding which the author entirely relies on scriptural authorities. In the remaining section, the author deals with human anatomy in tedious detail, but his very insistence indicates that this knowledge was part of a canon relevant not only to specialists. We will pursue this issue further into the realm of medicine to discuss basic ideas of body and health.


\(^{84}\) Schmidt, ‘Occult Sciences’.


\(^{86}\) *Menazırû'l-Avalîm*, vol. 2, p. 219b. A similar arrangement is found in Dürr-ı Meknun; see Yazıcıoğlu, ‘Dürr-ı Meknûn’. 

430
The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order

Physicians transmitted their medical knowledge by training their aides through practice, or else students attended the Süleymaniye medrese, the only institution of its kind to include a special section of medicine. There is no evidence that the various hospitals in Ottoman cities also trained physicians, as scholars have sometimes assumed.⁸⁷ Ottoman physicians had, as in other realms of knowledge, adopted the Arabo-Islamic tradition of anatomy and surgery, which Mehmed Aşık also knew.⁸⁸ But surgery as a massive physical intervention was in the Ottoman understanding of health and treatment only a last resort. Ottoman understandings of bodily health were more complex and more closely related to larger systems of order:

The Ottomans, like other premodern cultures, positioned the human body in two parallel circles or cosmoses. The wider one dealt with the interaction between the surrounding world and the body – in other words, the environment. The inner circle was focused on the body as the exterior form of a complex cosmos within it. The discussion dealt with each cosmos and at the same time emphasized the intrinsic interactions between cosmoses and their reciprocal influences.⁹⁹

The four humours are the “physiological building blocks” of the body, corresponding to the four elements: blood/air, phlegm/water, black bile/earth, and yellow bile/fire.⁹⁰ For the preservation or restoration of health, the balance of these humours is crucial. Outside factors such as climate or diet may affect it; the logic of medication is to a large degree based on giving the patient substances that possess characteristics which may restore the balance of his humours due to the sympathetic correspondences just discussed. Mehmed Aşık’s discussion of mineralogy, botany and zoology provides many examples of this thinking, and works on materia medica follow the same principle.⁹¹

Ottoman authors even categorise musical modes according to their correspondence with the four elements; according to the element connected to a given musical mode, the latter may influence the human body in the same manner as the element itself. Musical therapy as frequently applied in Ottoman hospitals thus rests on the same principle of Galenic humouralism.⁹² Given

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 49–54.
⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 66.
⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 15; Yazıcıoğlu, ‘Dürr-i Meknûn’, p. 11.
⁹² Shefer-Mossensohn, Ottoman Medicine, p. 75, quoting Mustafa Âli.
the use of such obvious or secret correspondences between body, substances and environment, by modern scientific concepts certain aspects of Ottoman medical practice appear sound and others as pure magic. However, such an extraneous evaluation misses the crucial point that these correspondences all follow the same logic, and adherents regularly claim that experience has proven the validity of these practices (*empirica, mücerer*).

Humouralism was not the only system of medicine employed in Ottoman society. Another set of practices was “folkloric”, varying considerably according to time, place and cultural context and therefore extremely hard to classify. Practitioners often rationalised folk medicine in humouralist terms; claims of empiricism could apply to both as well. Moreover, both folk medicine and humouralism can transcend cultural boundaries: many practitioners of medicine in Ottoman society were of Jewish origin, including prominently Moses Hamon, the influential physician of Süleyman the Magnificent. Others had received their training in Egypt and had come – or been transferred – to Istanbul.

A third medical system, however, was conceptually different. Prophetic medicine (*al-tibb al-nabawi* in Arabic), healing through the power inherent in the word and practice of the prophet Muhammad, was only accessible to Muslims. Yet prophetic medicine was not totally separate from humouralism and folk medicine. Practitioners did not reject humouralism but considered it incomplete; they added on a spiritual dimension, using God’s names, words from the Qur’an or prophetic hadith, and also amulets and talismans in addition to other treatments. But often their ideas came down to little more than a theological re-conceptualisation of humouralism. As a classic of the genre, readers in the central Ottoman lands might familiarise themselves with al-Suyuti’s *Al-manhaj al-sawi wa l-manhal al-rawi i l-tibb al-nabawi* and also al-Qastallani’s treatise on the life of the Prophet, which included a section on the topic; the famous Ottoman poet Baki (d. 1600) translated this piece into Turkish.

According to Shefer, “Ottoman integralism portrayed body and mind as meshed into one entity and positioned this entity in relation to its surrounding

95 Shefer-Mossensohn, *Ottoman Medicine*, p. 28.
In consequence, there was a powerful moral dimension to the understanding of the body. An influential scholar and critic of Ottoman morality, the preacher Birgivî Mehmed (d. 1573), structured a substantial part of his catechism al-Tariqa al-Muhammadiya around the members of the human body and listed every vice and sin in which people might engage by means of the relevant parts of their bodies. In different proportions, the four humours existed in everybody, determining his temperament and character. Accordingly, a trained eye could recognise a person’s good and bad qualities from his bodily appearance. Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bican’s Dürr-i Meknûn warns, for instance, that nothing good can come from short men with blue eyes, sparse beards, few teeth and a belly as if they were pregnant: “[…] Righteous is the man whose body is healthy and who maintains his health”.

In rudimentary form, Ahmed Bican here applies the art of physiognomy, which in its more refined and perfected form was held in high esteem throughout our period (kiyafet or firaset). A sixteenth-century treatise says the sultan should “acquire the skill and expertise to discern their inner character from outward behaviour and from their external appearance the true nature of his kul … and those in the hierarchy of government, and even his subjects [reaya]”. Ottoman purchasers of slaves systematically applied this knowledge, and so did officers recruiting boys into the janissary corps (devşirme). But physiognomy also applied to the sultans: thus Seyyid Lokman produced Kiyafetü’l-insâniyye fi Şemâil-i ‘Osmâniyye, an album of portraits of the sultans with a systematic introduction explaining some of the main features, while, however, warning that the sultans are not comparable to normal human beings. Thus knowledge of the body and its workings afforded much more than just a healthy life; it provided controlling insight and power over others and helped to keep them in their places within the cosmic order.

Man and society

Cosmography does not devote any attention to the description and understanding of human beings beyond bodily existence; it ignores human society and its changes as documented by history. Kınalızade Ali (d. 1571) gives us a
possible explanation when he says that there are two categories of things, those created perfect, like the earth and nature, and those that have to be perfected in the course of their existence, like man. Striving for an ideal state in which felicity (saadet) can be achieved is therefore the underlying theme of the study of human affairs. As we have seen, the human body is a microcosm manifesting relations between substances that also apply to the macrocosm; therefore it is at the same time a metaphor for other larger orders, such as the order of society.

As mentioned before, the perfect king is like the experienced physician, and the subjects are like the human body. The physician has to know what the [possible] diseases of the body are, their symptoms, their causes, and their remedies. Equally, the king has to know the healthy state of the kingdom – which consists of it being in balance – and how its illness – which consists of slipping from balance into affliction, and from wholeness into deficiency – occurs, and by which measures it can be returned to its original health and wholeness.

Ottoman visions of social order and politics draw heavily on the Persianate tradition of manuals of statecraft. One of the great works of Persian advice for kings, the Qabusname of Kaykavus b. Iskander, was available in Turkish already in the fourteenth century; by 1432, four more translations had followed. The Siyasatname of the Seljuk vezir Nizamülmülük and Nasihat al-Muluk by al-Ghazali (d. 1111) had all appeared in Turkish by the end of the fifteenth century, some of them several times. This literature is primarily concerned with “right” or “just” government within a pre-existing framework of institutions, offices and social groups, which the authors will reflect but not analyse or justify.

People more or less closely involved in state affairs – or wanting to be – also wrote manuals of advice for kings. The grand vezir Lütfi Paşa called his treatise on good government Asafname, after the advisor of the biblical King Solomon, easily identified with Lütfi’s lord, Sultan Süleyman. Modern readers must be careful not to reduce the advice-to-kings (or mirror-for-princes) literature to plain factual political memoranda. As the trope of the biblical advisor indicates, their authors intended them as carefully crafted

103 Ibid., p. 479.
works of art, and we should read them as such. Authors routinely supported their cases with rhetoric and literary tropes, expended as social capital in the struggle for patronage and attention at the Ottoman court. Mustafa Ali’s *Nushatu’s-Selatin* is an obvious example; the author, always vying for a state appointment, used every stylistic device at his command to ensure that his patrons appreciated his highly critical assessment of the Ottoman Empire’s situation. However, the heyday of advice-for-kings literature came only when the period under consideration here had ended, when Aynı Ali, Koçı Beg, Katib Çelebi, Defterdar Sari Mehmed Paşa and İbrahim Mütteferrika reacted to the numerous fiscal, social, political and administrative crises of the seventeenth century.

Apart from this literature driven by contemporary interest in state affairs, another strand offers a different, more philosophical kind of insight into Islamicate, and specifically Ottoman, understanding of social order and government, with Kınalızade Ali’s *Ahlak-i Alai* as its most important representative. Once again, this literature builds on Persianate models, as is apparent from the title *Ahlak-i Alai* (Alid Ethics) in analogy to Nasiruddin Tusi’s *Akhlaq-i Nasiri* and Jalaluddin Dawwani’s *AkhlAQ-i JalALi*. In turn, these works draw on Greek philosophy, dealing with ethics as far as the individual is concerned but also with the government of the household (*oikos*) and the state (*polis*). For Kınalızade, state and government only form a small portion of this complex, connected through the metaphor of the human body and the analogy between the household and society at large. In another twist of the same metaphor, the head of the household appears as the doctor, who balances the humours through appropriate medication.

From his ancient and Islamic predecessors, al-Farabi in particular, Kınalızade Ali adopts the concept of man as a *zoon politikon*, forced to form communities to compensate for his weaknesses. Men are created different; every one has his place in a social group in which he provides a vital service, a contribution to the “virtuous polis”, which is to be knowledgeable, righteous and pious. By contrast, the “non-virtuous polis” may be ignorant (*cahil*), mischievous (*fasık*) or in error (*dall*). Five classes form the fundament of the moral economy of the “virtuous polis”: the “distinguished” (*afadil*) rule and guide the city by their superior knowledge and wisdom. While the “orators” (*zu’l-elsine*) teach

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and guide the uneducated masses with words, the “accountants” (muqaddir) control and supervise weights and measures. It falls to the “warriors” (gazi) to protect the community against external enemies and undertake conquests. People who are economically active (erbab-i emval), such as farmers, artisans and merchants, form the last class of people. Elsewhere we find four classes as the basis of a more politically conceived economy: the men of the pen (ehl-i kalem), the men of the sword (ehl-i simşir), the merchants (tüccar) and the agriculturalists (zira’at-ger). Returning to the metaphor of the human body, Kinalizade Ali describes these four classes as corresponding to the four humours of Galenic medicine.

As people not only belong to different classes but also have different ethical qualities, the social order is subject to disruption by the unruly, the evil and the ignorant. Therefore it is the essential task of government to “rein people in”, as indicated by the etymology of the Arabic term siyasa; in other words, to keep them in place. Justice as the right balance between these groups involves treating everybody according to his place in the social order rather than treating all people equally. However, such differentiation does not mean license to oppression, for the subjects are entrusted to the ruler, and he is responsible for their well-being.

In Ahlâk-i Alâi, the inter-dependence of ruler, ruling class and ruled has found its perfect expression in the “Circle of equity” (daire-i ‘adliye), which is appended to the work as part of the “legacy” of Alexander the Great, the perfect king. Its eight maxims are typically written around the perimeter of a circle:

- There can be no royal authority without the military
- There can be no military without wealth
- The subjects produce the wealth
- Justice preserves the subjects’ loyalty to the sovereign
- Justice requires harmony in the world
- The world is a garden, its walls are the state
- The Holy Law orders the state
- There is no support for the şeri’at except through royal authority

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110 Kinalzade, Ahlâk-î Alâi, p. 485.
As we have seen, Kinalızade Ali regards the king as the physician, whose task it is to preserve or restore the health of this organism; in other words, the perfect balance between its different parts or humours. This view has several implications. Firstly, the socio-political order is divinely ordained and therefore largely beyond human influence. Humans may disrupt or upset the order, but it is not their calling to establish it; in other words, there is only one form of social order, not different ones for different states or periods. Secondly, social groups and government are universal categories and in no way specific to any culture or nation, just as cultural, ethnic, religious or other differences among the subjects are not part of the theory, not even the distinction between nomads and sedentary folk so pervasive in other theories. On this level of abstraction, the author does not even need to theorise the legal distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, and differences of ethnicity are of interest only when it comes to domestic slaves. This universal mechanism is captured by the ideal of nizam-i ‘alem, world order; therefore, interpreting this term as an Ottoman aspiration to world domination is a modern ideological construct. The third implication of this metaphor is that the king or sultan is separate from society. Other less elaborate theories of the polity as a body equate the king with the head or describe him as part of the military class, but Kinalızade Ali does not leave any room for such a view. Interestingly, the second half of the sixteenth century, and the period of Murad III in particular, indeed saw an increasing retreat of the Ottoman sultans into the palace, reducing interaction with their subjects to a minimum. Kinalızade did not live long enough to see Murad III ascend the throne, but evidently he recognised the signs of the times, even under the latter’s predecessors.

The king or sultan rules with the aid of the law. Some thinkers, like Tursun Bey, allow for the possibility of legitimate rule based on purely rational law (kanun) while admitting that the result will only be an externally imposed order. This is inferior to an order based on sacred law (ṣerîʿat), for only the latter can lead to felicity in both worlds (ṣaʿādeteyn). Consequently, Kinalızade Ali presents sacred law as the only possible basis for just government and felicity, arguing that only this kind of law proved by miracles will gain everybody’s willing obedience, whereas kanun as traditional law (not positive law) will have to resort to coercion.

Although many of Kinalızade Ali’s illustrative examples – probably on purpose – refer to the caliphs of the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, he does not
explicitly discuss the caliphate as an ideal form of government. This omission is all the more intriguing as the Ottomans had used this title for a long time, and, moreover, Knalızade Ali’s contemporary, Sultan Süleyman’s long-term şeyhülislam Ebussuud (d. 1574), had taken pains to demonstrate the legal claim of the Ottoman dynasty to the defunct title of caliph, implying ultimate sovereignty over all Muslims.115

Yet the sultan’s “authority over the substance and application of the law” remained limited even as caliph.116 After all, Ottoman realities had only limited connection to this idealised theoretical state. Knalızade Ali did not at all conceptualise the significant possibilities for social mobility from the subject class to the elite that the Ottoman system permitted, be it through recruitment into the janissaries or else through a medrese career. Nor, as we have seen, did the author analyse official policies of maintaining differences among the subject populations.

State-minded readings of Ahlak-i Alai have tended to focus on the ideal of justice as a political principle and neglected another important aspect. In a society constituted by different groups and classes, justice can help to avoid conflicts; however, it can only induce an artificial kind of unity. Only by means of a different principle, namely love or attraction (mahabbet), can people hope to achieve natural unity. Attraction rules within the family (between husband and wife or between parents and children) but also within the social order (between teacher and student, sheikh and disciple or king and subject). Mahabbet exists even between animals, plants and inanimate substances by virtue of their attracting or being attracted to other beings that correspond to them in terms of their fundamental characteristics of warmth/coldness or dryness/humidity. In fact, the concept of love is well nigh ubiquitous when it comes to the interpretation of social and cosmic relations.117 Thus, once again, the search for a universal principle that has the power to unify what appears to be different manifests itself, attributed to the prophet Muhammad in the context of the pilgrimage ritual but also understood at the cosmic level: “The goal of the legislator (şari’) is as much as possible to confirm the bond of unity, and to abolish the affliction of plurality.”118

116 Ibid., p. 111.
118 Knalızade, Ahlâk-i Alâî, p. 434.
The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order

History: Concepts of time

Between the conquest of Constantinople (1453) and the late 1500s, Ottoman historiography emerged and matured to the point where a set of authoritative works came into being which defined a canonical understanding of the past – and therefore of the present – similarly to Menazırı’l-Avalim in the description of the physical world. Just as maps, geography and knowledge of natural history help man to orient himself in space, history and memory permit humans to orient themselves in time. Speculative and transmitted knowledge about the great cosmic cycles overlaps with memories of collective and individual experience.

To study the development of Ottoman historiography always means understanding the bitter arguments over the past, the rifts in society at large as well as among the elite, for while referring to the past, these disputes concerned both the present and the future. Jan Assmann has developed the concept of mnemohistory as the investigation into how and why collectives remember. Mnemohistory is “not concerned with the past as such, but with the past as it is remembered”; for a historian of memory, the “truth” of a given memory depends not so much on its “factuality” as on its “relevance to actuality”. Events are forgotten unless they live on in collective memory. The reason for this “living on” lies in the continuous relevance of particular events, derived not from their historical past but from an ever-changing present in which they are remembered as facts of importance.119 Seen from this angle, the sudden outburst of historical writing especially in the period of Bayezid II indicates considerable tension over the direction in which the newly enlarged empire was heading socially, politically and ideologically. For a long time, scholars have either dismissed certain episodes as obviously legendary or else uncritically accepted them as factual accounts, but in reality we will most fruitfully read such accounts as contributions to the struggle over memory.120 In order to appreciate the function of historical accounts, however, it is vital to understand the genre and the sense of history and memory as it evolved in our period. There is no single line of development; instead, different strands interweave and intersect, coming to the forefront at different times.121

120 Karl Teply, Türkische Sagen und Legenden um die Kaiserstadt Wien (Vienna, Cologne and Graz, 1980).
121 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, p. 238.
The human sense of history operates with different concepts of time, and to a degree the numerous groups by means of which every individual defines his or her identity promote different understandings of time. All inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, subjects and elite alike, experienced their lives foremost as personal time in which the profane annual cycle featured prominently. However, personal time is related to other concepts of time in a number of ways, which we will now explore. In Ottoman historiography, different concepts of time are present and frequently overlap, yet they can be analysed as distinct. Research into the genre of historiography and its sub-categories still is insufficient; while certain scholars have proposed the use of indigenous categories for analysis of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century historiography, such categories do not seem to allow sufficiently precise distinctions.

Mehmed Aşık was well aware of something that we can call cosmic time. While his description of the globe, the universe and the realms of nature is detailed and differentiated, this author expresses only the most rudimentary sense of history. His work begins with an account of creation, which culminates in the first construction of the Kaaba, while Judgement Day provides closure. Starting with Adam, who first received a revealed law from God, cycles of revelation history impart a structure to this cosmic time. Among the prophets, cosmographers usually include the major biblical figures in addition to the so-called Arabian prophets Hud and Salih; the series ends with the prophet Muhammad, whose law has abrogated all previous ones and will only come to an end with Judgement Day.

Ottomans became familiar with this concept of sacred time in the form of various translations and adaptations of a popular Arabic genre known as qisas al-anbiya, the earliest translations of such texts into Turkish going back to the early fourteenth century. Turkish kisasül-enbiya works were distinct from their Arabic models in that they contained a section on Muhammad and thus provided a complete account of revelation history by the standards of Sunnism. From a Shi‘ite point of view, sacred history after the death of the prophet Muhammad was, however, mainly the history of rejection, oppression and suffering. As such, the narrative continued with the lives of the Alid imams, as for instance in Fuzülî’s (d. 1556) martyrology Hadikatü’s-Süada, which culminated in the death of Hüseyn in Karbala and was widely read among the Ottoman elite.

The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order

Obviously, revelation history provided no direct frame of reference to any political entity of the time, being more relevant for individual piety as a foundational narrative of Islam. In the chronological calendars of the early fifteenth century, in a sense the beginnings of Ottoman historiography, the sequence of the prophets served to anchor even the most recent events. Moreover, the authors placed the prophets in an absolute chronology leading all the way back to Adam, thus mapping revelation history onto the cycles of astronomical time. Later, world chronicles often narrated pre-Islamic history primarily as revelation history, and only after Muhammad discussed a political history of dynasties. Ramazanzade Mehmed Paşa, known as Küçük Nişancı (d. 1571), in the very title of his work Kısas-ı Enbiya-i İzam ve Tevarih-i Hulefa-i Kiram retained a reference to the history of the prophets. Yet as cosmic time implies that both the beginnings and the end of history link up with current events in a single unbroken chronology, awareness of an imminent end and the proximity of Judgement Day permeated Ottoman historical thought. Late in the sixteenth century, around the time of the Islamic millennium, this kind of consciousness was to culminate.

In the formation and development of Ottoman historical thought, a second concept of time was at work as well, which we can call mythical time. Human beings can never bridge the chasm between personal time and this time of origins, an idealised past irretrievably lost but always remembered. Instead they will perform the narratives of such a past as a ritual return to it; through the relevant stories, they transmit the foundations of collective identities and values. As for the Turks of Central Asia, an aristocratic nomadic society, its members preserved and ritually remembered this mythical past in a vast literature of heroic epics. Under the social conditions of Anatolia, however, these epics seem to have become obsolete early on, with the Book of Dede Korkut, written down early in the sixteenth century, as the only example preserved. The theme of a larger-than-life hero in an ideal past recalled as inspiration for the present found a different form of expression in the “frontier narratives” which glorify the endless confrontations of Muslims and infidels in Anatolia in works such as the Battalname, Ebu-Muslimname and Daniştendname.


125 Atsiz, Osmanlı Tarşihine Ait Takvimler.
127 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, 1995).
While these epics functioned primarily in the milieu of frontiersmen and fighters, narratives serving a similar aim also appeared among religious communities, in particular among dervishes and other followers of the numerous local saints of Anatolia. Quite a few legends of saints (menâkıbnâmes) have come down to us which relate the lives of holy persons. Narrators give pride of place to the saint’s mission, often understood literally in the sense that God or a sheikh had sent the saint to a given locality; at later stages of the story, there followed the establishment of a shrine, struggles with local power-holders and all kinds of miracles. These legends of saints share with the heroic epic the focus on the life and deeds of an individual as the model or founder of a community as well as the concept of time, for the deeds of the heroes and saints occur in a past whose chronological distance from the present of reader and narrator remains unspecified. Neither the Battalname nor for instance the Vilayetname of Haci Bektaş, believed to have been written down in the late 1400s, give their readers any chronological information beyond vague claims of simultaneity with certain rulers, often equally legendary.

Increasingly, heroic epics came to occupy but a marginal position in the canon. But menâkıbnâmes retained their importance at the very least within the religious communities that had produced them and whose members continued to perform and transmit them orally. As a result, it oftentimes was only in the nineteenth century that dervishes and others committed to writing certain saints’ legends, especially from the Alevi-Bektaşi tradition. Given the importance of oral transmission, hagiographies easily adapted to changing circumstances, accumulating different layers in the process. Thus the Vilayetname of Hacı Bektaş reflected tensions with political power-holders in general, even while reproducing Ottoman claims to legitimacy. Numerous competitions with other saints suggested that the Bektaşi order during its formative period aimed to incorporate local sanctuaries in various places of the empire. At the same time, the originally rather simple religious setting was complicated by the insertion of more Sunni orthodox elements, perhaps due to official pressures.

128 Ahmet Yaşar Ocağ, Kültürlü Tarihi Kaynağ Oarak Menâkıbnâmeler: Metodolojik bir Yaklaşım (Ankara, 1997); Ahmet Yaşar Ocağ, Bektaşi Menâkıbnâmelerinde İslâm Öncesi İnanç Motifleri (İstanbul, 1983); Ahmet Yaşar Ocağ, Türk Halk İnançlarında ve Edebiyatında Evliya Menkabeleri (Ankara, 1983).
The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order

Between hagiography especially of the early Anatolian saints, heroic epic and historiography there lies what we may call a "gray area". Saints are often treated like heroes, and their legends follow similar narrative patterns, some of which recur in the early chronicles, which extol the virtues and deeds of heroic individuals. Thus Umur Paşa, a historical figure, entered into legend, and his menakıbnname found a place in an Ottoman chronicle.131 Other political personages might become the subjects of hagiographical accounts as well, like Mahmud Paşa, the famed vezir of Mehmed II. Unfortunately, many elements in this latter menakıbnname are hard to connect to events documented in other sources, and we no longer know anything about the context or debate in which this text must once have intervened.132 Similarly, the roles of saint and warrior often overlap, as in the narrative of Seyyid Ali Sultan.133 The Saltukname of Ebü Hayrı Rumi, commissioned by Cem Sultan, the son of Mehmed II, recounts the life of an elusive saint venerated in many places in the Balkans, but the actual narrative has much more in common with a heroic legend; especially the Battalname seems to have been a direct model. Given this situation, literary analysis must often undermine any attempt to use epics and saints’ legends as sources of factual information.134

Hagiographies originating from the larger trans-regional Sufi orders might become much more complex than the folk legends gathered in the vilayetname literature, with its oftentimes strictly local audience. Thus, for example, the hagiography of İbrahim-i Gülşeni (d. 1534), a prominent leader of the Halveti order of dervishes, dealt with an individual in clearly identifiable historical contexts, based on the personal memories of the author(s). Of course, Gülşeni’s hagiographer Muhyi-yi Gülşeni (d. 1617) used the legend for polemic or apologetic purposes, too, but he no longer held a mythical concept of time.135


133 Yıldırım, Seyyid Ali Sultan.


Personal time, defined by the horizon of individual memories and experiences, is the third concept of time relevant for us. Certain individual accounts of events, by eye-witnesses or participants, become part of the collective memory, in accordance with the norms and values of the particular collective. Modern historians of the Ottoman Empire in search of factual data have always privileged this last concept of time over the others, ignoring their interplay and the different levels of meaning attributed to them. Memoirs in the proper sense are not a familiar genre in the Ottoman context. But historical writings explicitly and exclusively based on whatever political events and military campaigns an individual author was able to observe, or have related to him by eye-witnesses, form a small but important sub-genre of the historiography. Sometimes gatherings in the sultan’s court and elsewhere listened to accounts of military campaigns called gazavatnames, presumably as “modern” variants of heroic epics. Later on, prominent litterateurs edited these texts as fethnames, which the sultan sent to other rulers to announce recent victories. Such works typically covered only short timespans and celebrated sultans or military leaders as heroic fighters for Islam.

In its purest form, historiography as individual memory originated from men close to political power. As examples, we might name bureaucrats like Tursun Bey, who composed a history of Mehmed II and his times (Tarih-i Ebu’l-Feth), and the imperial chancellor Celalzade Mustafa, known as Koca Nişancı, with his Tabakatü’l-Memalik ve Derecatü’l-Mesalik, a history of the reign of Süleyman Kanuni up to the year 1557. Celalzade Mustafa had previously written several fethnames, which he then incorporated into his masterpiece. Occasionally he quoted documents, some of which he may have drafted himself. But otherwise Celalzade Mustafa, who had conceived the extant portion of his work as only the thirtieth part of a vast panorama of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Süleyman, took pride in not having to rely on the historical works written by others. In the Selimname and Süleymannname literature, we sense a struggle over memory, underpinning praise for individual sultans or specific actions and dictated by strong normative concepts. Especially in Selim’s biography, the contentious issues are rather obvious.
After all, as a prince he had rebelled against his father, Bayezid II, and when the latter died shortly after his deposition, rumours were rife that Selim had murdered him. The exact nature of the debate over Süleyman’s memory remains to be explored. Among other aspects, authors may have wished to comment on the struggle between Süleyman and his sons, a major conflict threatening the empire at the time of writing.139

Dynastic history

Dynastic history and world history ultimately constitute the two main genres of Ottoman historiography. For political history, the dynasty is the fundamental unit. History happens through rulers, and in the absence of a ruling house there is no history to be written. Prior to the 1700s, Ottoman historians paid very little attention to pre-Islamic dynasties, with the possible exception of Iranian history, for which the Shahnama probably was the most important conduit. Classical sources also tended to interweave Sasanid and early Islamic history. We can analyse both dynastic and world history by using the three different concepts of time discussed, which authors have combined, multiplied and mapped onto one another, thus forming various sub-forms and sub-genres. Throughout, we can observe, as in previous sections, a tendency towards standardisation and canonisation.

When authors chose the duration of the Ottoman dynasty as the time-frame for their historical writing, they identified in one way or other with the Ottoman enterprise, perhaps as members of the political, administrative or military elite. Apart from narrative representations of history in the narrow sense, the impact of dynastic identity is apparent in the prosopographical and biographical compilations, which typically focus on the territory controlled by the Ottoman sultans. Thus Taşköprüzade’s foundational compilation of the lives of scholars and sheikhs referred to the newly expanded Ottoman Empire in its entirety, as is apparent already in the title of his work: al-Shaqa’iq al-nu’maniyya fi ‘ulama’ al-dawlat al-‘Uthmaniyya. Comprising the period up to 1558, Shaqa’iq made available bio-bibliographies and essential career data concerning scholars in the service of the sultans. Beginning with the earliest rulers, the author arranged his material by reign, indicating thereby that a

collective identity of Ottoman scholar-officials was taking shape. Apart from the translation into Turkish we have already encountered, a number of later authors continued the work of the two Taşköprüzades, an indication of its crucial role. In a similar way, the emerging cultural self-confidence of the Ottomans as “people of Rum” manifested itself in the first collections of poets’ lives (tezkire), beginning with Sehi’s Heşt Behişt in 1538 and culminating a generation later in Aşık Çelebi’s Meşâ’irü’l-Ṣu’ara (completed in 1569).

Prior to our period, the only narrative account framed as a history of the Ottoman dynasty is a section of about 300 verses in a classic of moral and political advice literature, Ahmedi’s İskendername (ca. 1410), probably inserted when the author – or somebody close to him – re-dedicated the work to an Ottoman patron. This account remained relatively isolated; however, in the later 1400s, especially after the death of Mehmed II, a flurry of works came into being as a result of the power struggles between his two sons and the re-orientation of the empire after the advent of Bayezid II. Presumably these writers reacted to the defunct sultan’s autocratic regime, the struggle over his succession and the marginalisation of the Turkish aristocracy. As a result, Ottoman dynastic history, structured by the reigns of successive sultans, became the historiographical form par excellence. Incidentally, Arab historiography in the Ottoman period was to favour the same format, as opposed to a strictly annalistic narrative.

The earliest examples of the genre known as Tevarih-i Al-i Osman were anonymous, written in simple, straightforward Turkish as a series of discrete episodes, often in the format of popular tales preserved as oral narratives with relatively little coherence. Combined with calendars, these collections


The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order

acquired a chronological structure of sorts. As topics, individual leadership and morality predominated, as similarly to the heroic epic, every episode carried its object lesson within itself. The dervish Aşıkpaşazade (d. ca. 1484) was perhaps the first author within this genre to speak with a distinct voice – frank and critical of the present – against which, in a recourse to mythical time, he presented an idealised image of the Ottoman enterprise in its beginnings, when the Ottoman gazis waged selfless war against the infidels and the possessions of Osman Bey amounted to little more than a caftan, some blankets, a few good horses and some herds of sheep.

In the accounts of Aşıkpaşazade, Oruç (d. after 1502) and others, there emerged a distinct Ottoman dynastic myth which presented the earliest phases of the dynasty as already imbued with the spirit of holy war for Islam; it struggled to demonstrate Ottoman loyalty to their alleged Seljuk overlords and justify the sultans’ wars against fellow Muslims. In addition, these authors provided the Ottomans with a tribal genealogy, proving their rank above competing dynasties like the Akkoyunlu or Safavids or improving their Islamic credentials through a connection to the sons of Noah. The famous dream in which Osman was promised rule over the entire world served as the divinely approved foundation for an alliance between the house of Osman and certain dervishes. But the early chroniclers were not simply mouthpieces of imperial ideology; on the contrary, they also participated in a debate about the legitimacy and righteousness of the Ottoman imperial project by recounting legends and counter-legends: the portrayal of Constantinople and even Hagia Sophia as accursed locations, found in certain chronicles and related texts, voiced a powerful rejection of Ottoman ambitions to take over this infelicitous empire. In the period of Mehmed II, other authors circulated a counter-legend which cast a much more favourable light on the city as a place full of blessings.

Such controversies demonstrate the conflictual origins of
Ottoman historical thought, in which the past – true to Assmann – was of immediate relevance for the present. When the empire was firmly established under Mehmed II and Beyazıt II, these legends soon became obsolete, however, and in the later historiography ended up as mere baggage.

Yet other transformations of the Tevarih-i Al-i Osman genre continued. Aşıkpaşazade narrated, for instance, how in the days of Orhan the daughter of a Byzantine frontier lord handed over her father’s castle to the Ottomans after seeing a gazi-saint in a dream that announced (and caused) her conversion to Islam. Later authors found such pious legends to be at odds with a more scriptural understanding of Islam. A generation later, Neşri (d. before 1520) as a member of the learned establishment (ulema) retold the same story, replacing the religious motivation by a simple love story between the Christian girl and one of Orhan’s gazis. In this way, the rough and idiosyncratic narratives of the early days were increasingly domesticated and rendered harmless at the hands of later chroniclers.¹⁴⁹

Parallel to this process, the adaptation of the simple, vernacular style of the early chronicles to more elaborate elite tastes was under way. Persianate models, adopted via the Timurid culture of Herat and Samarqand, are apparent already in the chronicle of Oruç, with its ubiquitous references to the heroes of the Shahnama. The Persian Heşt Behişt of İdris Bidlisi, begun in 1502–3, explicitly drew on the stylistic and organisational models of Persianate historiography, while most of the content was lifted from the earlier Ottoman chroniclers. At the same time, Turkish increasingly came into its own as a literary language, partly due to the adoption of Persian literary models from the Timurid high culture of Herat and Samarqand. Tursun Bey’s Tarih-i Ebu’l-Feth had already adopted for the writing of history the heavily Persianate style of the Ottoman chancery, another crucial breeding ground for literary and ideological trends.

Now, almost simultaneously with İdris Bidlisi, Kemalpaşazade (d. 1534) was to produce a similar work, but in Turkish. He had gained fame as a legal scholar, being the author of the most important Ottoman commentary on the Qur’an, and rose to become şeyhülislam in 1526. Originally conceived in eight parts like the Heşt Behişt, one for each sultan up to Bayezid II, continuations were added later in Kemalpaşazâde’s lifetime, but he never completed

his work.\textsuperscript{150} Despite its scope and literary qualities, Kemalpaşazade’s history ultimately had little impact; rather, the canonical version of the “Tevarih-i Al-i Osman” came about with Hoca Sadeddin’s (d. 1599) Tacii’t-Tevarih, which brought the diverging and conflictual traditions of the earlier chronicles into a unified and distinctly authority-oriented master narrative. Dedicated to Murad III but covering the dynastic history only to the death of Selim I, Tacii’t-tevarih became extremely popular, de facto superseding all its predecessors, partly due to its elaborate Ottoman high prose.\textsuperscript{151} Just as in the chancery, style was expected to match content; the use of ornate prose allowed the author to display his poetic skill and learning, and arguably this literary device supported his authority and that of his account. Thus, style here is more than prettification that we can strip away without loss to content.

World history

World history, in comparison with dynastic history, developed at a very different pace. Some early accounts of the Ottomans are actually part of world histories, but even where we possess the full text, present-day scholars have paid hardly any attention to those terse and obviously unoriginal parts. Examples include Şükruallah’s Persian Bahjatu t-tawarikh (ca. 1458) as well as Enveri’s Düşturname, with its account of the Aydinoğulları, who had preceded the Ottomans in south-western Anatolia. Of Neşri’s Cihannûma, conceived as a world history, only the sixth book, dealing with the Ottomans, is extant. Furthermore, Ramazanzade Mehmed Paşa’s Kısas, mentioned earlier, is the typical popular world history, providing a uni-dimensional line first of prophets and then of caliphs and dynasties from Adam to the Ottomans.

Yet sixteenth-century historians were clearly aware that the past was more complicated and that even in most periods of Islamic history there had been more than one dynasty at a time. In a manner reminiscent of the Table of Peoples in Chapter 10 of the Book of Genesis, certain authors visualised the connections between dynasties in a set of diagrams on scrolls, sometimes generically entitled Silsilename, the most impressive of which was Lokman’s Zübдетü’t-Tevarih, produced in the late sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{152} All these works

\textsuperscript{151} Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual.
depicted history as one unified genealogy of dynasties, branching out from Noah and his sons, while making no clear distinction between the ancestry of an entire people and that of the relevant ruling dynasty.¹⁵³ For the most recent period, the House of Osman provided unity. Several of these scrolls were richly illustrated, while simpler versions just showed a circle for every individual. It was only late in the sixteenth century that historians began to compile universal histories which discussed as many dynasties as possible, with a separate chapter for each. Relying on classical Arabic and Persian sources for the pre-Ottoman period, they used earlier Ottoman sources for the relevant sections of their surveys. Massive compilations, preferably in Arabic, like Cenabi’s (d. 1590) Al-‘Ay lam az-zahir fi ahw al al-awā’il wa l-aw ah ir and al-Qaramani’s (d. 1611) Ahbar ad-duwal wa atar al-uw al, inaugurated the age of Ottoman world historiography.

Although these works were popular as references, Mustafa Ali’s magisterial world history, Künhü’l-Ahbar, eclipsed them all due to its scope, coherent intellectual outlook and the author’s outspoken character. Künhü’l-Ahbar assumed an authoritative position, opening a new period of Ottoman universal historiography which would only come to a close a century later with the work of Müneccimbașı (d. 1702). We may take Mustafa Ali’s great work as another part of the canon of Ottoman knowledge.

Künhü’l-Ahbar breaks down history into four major periods, namely the beginnings (including the cosmography mentioned before), pre-Islamic and Islamic history up to the Mongols, the Mongol and Turkic empires, and finally the Ottomans. As the non-Muslim world appeared only in occasional fragments, a contemporary and unique work on the kings of France, though put together in Mustafa Ali’s lifetime, remained without impact.¹⁵⁴ According to Cornell Fleischer, Mustafa Ali “strove to adhere to a flat, seemingly objective presentation of major, pertinent events and historical facts, with relatively few intrusions of opinion or subjective tone”. And “Künhü’l-ahbar was intended as a work of history and part of a particular historiographical genre, exemplified by Persianate historians like Rashīduddīn and Mīrkhwānd, even though the canons of that genre might not be explicitly articulated.”¹⁵⁵

By integrating Ottoman history into world history, Mustafa Ali consciously subjected the sultans to comparison with other ruling dynasties. His critical

¹⁵³ Schmidt, Pure Water, pp. 138–44.
¹⁵⁵ Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, pp. 237, 240.
attitude towards his own time very much motivated his writing history in the first place; to express his criticism, the author made use of an infinite number of examples he had collected in his study of history. While the contentious character of the Tevarih-i Al-i Osman hinged on the idealisation of a particular period of Ottoman history, especially the earliest sultans, Mustafa Ali’s basis of reference was an ideal polity of non-equals, kept in just balance by an enlightened ruler. While Künh is an extremely rich source, Ali’s political concepts did not differ substantially from the ideas propounded in the Ahlak-i Alai and elsewhere. But Mustafa Ali had distilled his ideal from a historical survey all his own; the perpetual cyclical patterns of world history came about as rulers observed or neglected the ideal of just balance.\(^\text{156}\)

In the absence of an abstract theory of history, it is from practice that we need to extract the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of Ottoman historiography. Mustafa Ali’s concept of historical cycles has much in common with the theories of Ibn Khaldun; the correspondence seems to derive partly from the fact that both authors treat similar historical cases of sedentary empires founded by nomadic tribes. But of greater importance is a convergence of cultural traditions in historical consciousness, even more remarkable as it is unlikely that Mustafa Ali had read Ibn Khaldun directly.\(^\text{157}\) Despite the mechanisms of rise and decline, history for Mustafa Ali is an interconnected series of events caused by human decisions, hence his lengthy biographical chapters at the end of every section. In fact, he declares that “reviving the dead” is one of the purposes of history.\(^\text{158}\) A rational morality as well as Islam guides individuals in their decisions; while moral action carries its reward within itself, God also guides his servants by means of dreams, portents and other interventions, or sends catastrophic events as warnings and punishments in case of deviation. Such occurrences figure in conspicuous frequency, for instance in the work of the chronicler Oruç.

As world histories focus on persons, such as rulers and their servants, no room remains for more complex or abstract agents in history. However, as political wisdom and morality are of central importance, these works show a concern for statecraft that we have already encountered in the advice-to-princes literature; a good example is the advice section which precedes Tursun Bey’s history of Mehmed II. On the other hand, and to a degree in contradiction with this practical and ethical perspective, all these histories agree that the House of Osman occupies a special place in world history, announced in

\(^{156}\) Fleischer, ‘Dynastic Cyclism’; Schmidt, Pure Water.
\(^{157}\) Fleischer, ‘Dynastic Cyclism’.
\(^{158}\) Schmidt, Pure Water, p. 133.
divine approval for the first sultan and merited by the piety and justice of his successors.

We have encountered Sadeddin writing an authoritative account of Ottoman history; he was the second şeyhülislam, after Kemalpaşazade, to do so. In addition to Tursun Bey and Celalzade Mustafa, several grand vezirs of the period, such as Ayas Paşa (d. 1539), Lütfi Paşa (d. 1562–3?) and Rüstem Paşa (d. 1561), featured among the high-ranking servants of the House of Osman who wrote the history of their patrons. Given the close relationship of many prominent historians with the imperial household, we may wish to examine the role of these authors in the formulation of Ottoman imperial ideology. But instead we may prefer to think of historiography as one arena in which different concepts and formulations compete and that under the right circumstances can all figure as parts of an imperial ideology.\(^{159}\)

Our queries are particularly pertinent to a group of mid-sixteenth to early seventeenth-century historians who produced high-prestige works for the court while holding special salaried posts called şeynameci. Following the model of the Shahnama, the first works of this type were verse narratives in Persian; later examples were also in prose and in Turkish. Mustafa Ali, in continuous rivalry with the şeynamecis, wrote in similar forms.\(^{160}\) The 15 works produced by the five şeynamecis over the half-century that the office existed included individual campaign accounts, dynastic and world histories, and an album of images showing the physical appearance of the sultans.\(^{161}\) The highly ornamental literary style of these works corresponded to the exquisite decoration of the written copies, with splendid calligraphy, binding and often rich illustrations all made in the palace workshops. Outside circulation of these books on the other hand was minimal; often only one copy existed, which probably never left the palace. Baki Tezcan, thinking of historiography as serving imperial propaganda, has therefore considered the şeynameci project a failure.\(^{162}\)

Arguably, however, in the şeyname literature specifically but also in other works with a panegyric slant, like the earlier gazavatnames, the addressee was not a public in need of indoctrination but rather the ruler himself. In their praise of the sultan, panegyric works evoked the ideals and norms the latter was to follow. Confronted with his actions, albeit in an idealised form, the

\(^{159}\) For a slightly later period, see Gabriel Piterberg, An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play (Berkeley, 2003).

\(^{160}\) Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, p. 240.

\(^{161}\) Woodhead, ‘Şehnameci’.

The order of knowledge, the knowledge of order

sultan might measure them against the norms proposed and draw political and moral lessons from the comparison. On the other hand, an all too obvious discrepancy between the ideals presented and real life might well embarrass a sultan such as Murad III, who visibly did not conform to them.\textsuperscript{163}

Prognostication and the end of time

In the Ottoman world view, the past was not simply preserved and made accessible in human memory as would any series of random events. On the contrary, its inherent regularity and moral significance allowed for its reconstruction as a source of norms: Ottomans always knew what the past “must have been”. This same sense, however, not only comprised the past and, through it, lent meaning to the present; it also helped to prepare for the future, because of the regularities of history, the cosmic cycles and the unchanging, extra-historical character of human nature and society. Moreover, God had pre-ordained every event from creation to the end of time as written on the Well-preserved Tablet.\textsuperscript{164} Prognosticating events, both on the individual and the cosmic levels, thus was almost an obsession of Ottoman society.

Apart from the astrological horoscopes mentioned earlier, individuals found many other ways to find out about their futures. Oneiromancy drew on Hellenistic models and handbooks, which attributed meaning to specific elements in a dream. Dreams were also a favourite medium for Sufis to determine their progress on the mystical path. Other means of obtaining knowledge about the future included geomancy and searching books for oracles.\textsuperscript{165} Techniques using the involuntary twitching of limbs during sleep must have resulted in rather crude predictions, yet this practice was current at all times from one end of Eurasia to the other.\textsuperscript{166} In response to such omens, people could change their behaviour or protect themselves against evil with the help of prayers, sacrifices, magic and talismans. Numerous instructions survive in manuscripts, but to date no systematic study of the topic exists. Many prayers were expected to protect against harm in battle, and certain Ottoman sultans

\textsuperscript{163} Woodhead, ‘Şehnameci’, p. 181.
wore talismanic shirts for the same purpose.¹⁶⁷ Both the individual and the universal, eschatological dimension effectively fused at the Ottoman court, which, like its Mongol and Timurid predecessors, at times gathered a full-fledged “bureau of futurologists”.¹⁶⁸ In problematic decisions, divination lent additional legitimacy by removing agency from the individual to the cosmos and impacting public opinion as well. While omens from heaven bolstered the imperial image of a heavenly mandate, multiple readings of such omens always were possible and preserved policy options.¹⁶⁹

The practices of specific prognostication, in other words soothsaying, overlap with attempts to predict the end of history and of all time, a purpose for which the Islamic tradition provided numerous and often contradictory signs. However, specific prognostication and concern with the end of the world are not the same: Ahmed Bican, deeply concerned with the apocalypse, detested soothsaying.¹⁷⁰ While it is difficult to identify a notion of progress towards an extra-historical goal of salvation in Ottoman historical thought, the imminence of doom seems to have been permanently present in people’s minds. Cosmographies like Menazırı’l-Avalım therefore typically conclude with a list of the “signs of the hour”.¹⁷¹ This awareness is not always clearly distinguishable from a personal sense of mortality and culpability before God. Laban Kaptejin argues that the apocalyptic expectations invoked in Dürr-i Meknûn are first of all individual, relating to the moment of death; they do not necessarily imply an immediate end of the world.¹⁷² The apocalyptic significance of the conquest of Constantinople was not lost on Ahmed Bican. Authors vehemently criticising the times of Süleyman also couched their strictures in apocalyptic terms.¹⁷³

In the reign of Mehmed II, courtly interest in apocalyptic thought and eschatology drew on Muslim as well as Christian texts and included the use of Greek manuscripts copied for the sultan or obtained from other sources.¹⁷⁴ At

¹⁶⁸ Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 207.
¹⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 204–6.
the court of Süleyman Kanuni, Haydar the Geomancer, who had previously served Shah Tahmasp of Iran, wielded an unprecedented degree of influence. Later in the century, the sultan’s court used books of omens (falname), which combined illustrations with prognostications in words, a model adopted from the Timurids. Under Murad III, Mehmed III and Ahmed I, the rulers and their high-ranking officials showed an avid interest in books on prognostication and eschatology, including Tercüme-i Miftah-i Cifr-i Cami and Ahval-i Kiyamet. Süleyman as a young man had fashioned himself as the mehdi to usher in the end of time; as for his grandson Murad III, in many of his dreams he created an image of himself as the highest spiritual authority (kutbül-aktab) but also as a messianic figure. Such claims, however covert, speak to a tendency towards extreme sacralisation of the persona of the sultan, by means of which Ottoman rule acquired universal and thus apocalyptic significance. We may assume that in the late sixteenth century Ottoman legitimacy no longer directly rested on justice in government and victory in war; rather, both had become secondary results of the sultan’s sacred status granted by divine favour alone and therefore not in need of worldly justification. But the pendulum would swing back to more archaic and popular sultanic discourses with Osman II and Murad IV, who openly adopted older models of rule.

Conclusion

Ottoman authors of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries believed in the interrelation of historical and political events with cosmic orders; human reason and insight can comprehend these connections. It has been the underlying argument of this chapter that such an understanding of the universe, typical of the classical period of Ottoman culture, had practical consequences, and belief in prognostication was one of them. Just like magic, prognostication is possible because the universe is structured and its different orders are interconnected. People were able to map the celestial bodies onto the regions of the globe and thus understand the different races and peoples of mankind. Their diversity corresponds to the different sympathetic qualities of stones,

plants and animals. These also influence and react to the humours of the human body, which is a microcosm of human society. We can continue this list of correspondences in many directions without even having recourse to more esoteric components such as hurufism, the search for the secret cosmic significance of the letters of the alphabet, so common in our era.\(^{179}\) The poetic language of the classical period mirrored the multiple valences of every phenomenon of the physical universe. As Walter Andrews has demonstrated, in Ottoman poetry “four discourses – love, religion, politics, and psychology – intersected in a complex ecological relationship”, each being available as a metaphor for the other.\(^{180}\)

Yet all these orders remained distinct and subject to different kinds of regularities. As Western early modern scepticism finally subjected all realms of the known world, both physical and intellectual, to the same critical gaze of empiricism and strictly rational analysis, Renaissance scholars began to view the universe as gigantic clockwork. In the Ottoman context, the crucial first steps in this direction seemingly occurred in the seventeenth century with the approach taken by Katib Çelebi, who dismissed the imagery of Islamic cosmology as purely symbolical, \textit{ad usum delphini}, and instead subjected the celestial world to the same physical laws known on earth. In the same way, Katib Çelebi overcame the fragmentation of knowledge imposed by the categories of Taşköprüzade, Mehmed Aşık, and others to unify it into one vast complex, referring to the same epistemological principles throughout.\(^{181}\)

In all of this, however, the Ottoman world view remained essentially theocentric, continuing to attribute ultimate agency and causation to God alone, who had created the world and continued to create the links of cause and effect within each of its parts as well as between them. Such theocentrism oftentimes supposedly denotes a pre-modern, and in particular pre-Enlightenment, outlook, as opposed to a modern view which takes human experience and reason as the ultimate means for the comprehension of the universe; the latter view is therefore called anthropocentric. However, the Ottoman world view was anthropocentric in a different way, as it viewed all intellectual activity, all human knowledge, as serving the ultimate goal of individual or collective salvation. Outside of ascetic world rejection, a path open only to a select few, the proper understanding and manipulation of phenomena within the created world were important as means to this end.\(^{182}\)


\(^{180}\) Andrews and Kalpaklı, \textit{Age of Beloveds}, p. 228.

\(^{181}\) Hagen, \textit{Osmanischer Geograph}.

\(^{182}\) Fazlıoğlu, ‘Türk Felsefe-Bilim Tarihinin Seyir Defteri (Bir Ön Söz)’.
The visual arts

Çiğdem Kafescioğlu

Visual articulations of an imperial identity, as well as its dynamic encounters and reformulations beyond the imperial locus, constitute a unifying thread through the century and a half that is examined in this survey. Between the 1450s and the turn of the seventeenth century, the agents of – and the media in which – such articulation occurred changed considerably. Scholarship on Ottoman visual arts has tended to prioritise the “classical era”, particularly the second half of the sixteenth century. The progressive and evolutionary emphases of the art historical discipline on the one hand and the correspondence of this period to the “classicism” of Ottoman institutions on the other have reinforced the characterisation of this period as the unquestionable apex of Ottoman arts towards which all converged and after which there followed an insipid lack of creativity. Rather than the “classicization” of the later sixteenth century, with its connotations of maturation, lucidity and stasis, this chapter seeks to foreground the dynamism embodied in the shifting priorities of artists, patrons and intermediaries over this century and a half and to highlight the plurality of loci and actors that shaped the production and use of artworks. The power of the Ottoman centre as the creator and disseminator of cultural trends and of the Ottoman court as the primary arbiter of taste were unquestionable for the larger part of the spatial and temporal expanse with which this survey is concerned.

At the same time, patterns and mechanisms of patronage and organisation of the arts changed within the courtly context. A multiplicity of other centres and actors within the Ottoman realm, and within larger networks of cultural connection and interaction in which the Ottomans participated, shaped cultural predilections at the court, the capital city and in the provinces. Webs of reciprocity informed exchanges between court and city, between centre and provinces, and between the Ottoman court and its contemporaries.

Section divisions of this chapter, in chronological order and offering a rough periodisation within the century and a half that it focuses on, aim to highlight
the connections of artistic production and consumption in various media to the broader political and cultural matrix, which itself underwent significant transformations. In the first section, covering the period between around 1450 and around 1520, the discussion will focus on patterns of architectural and artistic patronage, production and use in relation to multiple power holders and various centres of cultural production in the region that became the Ottoman central lands. The second section (ca. 1520–ca. 1570) emphasises the articulations of an Ottoman imperial identity and image across diverse media, concomitant to the emergence of the Ottoman Empire as a world power and to the further political and ideological transformation in the mid-1500s that led the polity to reinforce its identity as the foremost Islamic state. In the third section (ca. 1570–1600), the account concentrates particularly on the painting and to a lesser extent the architecture of these decades; the discussion aims to trace Ottoman patrons’ and artists’ responses to the set of contemporary transformations in the structure of rule and also in the economy and social order. While following major political transformations, this chronological division lacks absolute precision, and where thematic discussions necessitate it, objects and trends will be presented outside of the particular time frames proposed here. This survey does not attempt a comprehensive portrayal of visual culture across the wide geographic, cultural and demographic expanse of the Ottoman domains and of the plural Ottoman society. Rather, it selectively follows patterns in the courtly and urban production and use of buildings, objects and images; where available sources and the scholarship allow, it touches on local practices and on local uses and adaptations of courtly idioms in the ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse empire.

Multiple centres and a new vantage point, ca. 1450–ca. 1520

Webs of connections, novel encounters, and interactions with cultural worlds within and around the region that would become the core Ottoman domains fed into a visual culture of dynamic variety and remarkable heterogeneity. A multiplicity of visual idioms characterised the art of these decades, when the rising Ottoman polity had to confront other political entities ruling over parts of Anatolia while it also had to reckon with various local power holders within its expanding domains, including frontier warrior lords in the west and hereditary aristocracies in the east. Timurid resonances in Ottoman, Karaman and Dulkadir court arts represented a continuation of cultural trends established in the wake of Timur’s invasion of Anatolia (1402). In the southern and eastern parts of Asia Minor, Mamluk political influence was substantial and
The visual arts

imparted high prestige to Syrian and Cairene forms. Ottoman architectural thinking and practice absorbed aspects of the late Roman and Byzantine legacy of Constantinopolitan architecture, continuing a trend that had shaped Ottoman building ventures from their early beginnings in Bithynia.

Emerging supreme within a landscape of multiple and rapidly altering political entities, and driven by the imperial vision of Mehmed II and his successors, the Ottoman polity embraced the high cultural traditions with which it came into contact, absorbing, juxtaposing and at times synthesising models from a broad and diverse array of sources. As a result, extant connections and channels of cultural interaction were expanded and acquired new meaning, while novel connections shaped artistic ventures. Conquest, consolidation and growing political claims led to new encounters and shaped the dynamic cultural eclecticism of the fifteenth-century Ottoman world. In the early 1500s, Ottoman invasions of Mamluk and Safavid territory brought an abundance of artists and objects into Ottoman courtly environments. From a Constantinopolitan vantage point, Iran and central Asia, eastern Anatolia, Mamluk Egypt, Byzantium and Italy were all visible and accessible in a novel manner. Timurid, Mamluk and Renaissance resonances and engagements on one hand and Ottoman re-workings of late-antique and medieval legacies on the other shaped the visual culture of the era.

Re-formulations in architecture: Istanbul and beyond

Radical changes in the visual domain paralleled the profound political transformations that took place in the wake of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. The domain of architecture offers the most visible expression of this change, for the political reformulations and transformations that characterised this period were most tangibly reflected in the spaces that housed the newly established institutions in the new capital, Istanbul. The architecture of palaces and public structures accommodated and represented socio-political and institutional change; at the same time, these buildings and their urban configurations reflected the burgeoning imperial vision and identity of the Ottoman house.

Architectural projects in Istanbul aimed to introduce Ottoman visual, spatial and institutional order to the newly instituted capital, itself a multi-layered entity bearing the millennial legacy of the eastern Roman Empire. Royal construction, palaces and mosque complexes and military and commercial structures encompassed the wide expanse of Constantinople. The new ruling elite of devşirme origin followed a frequently quoted order by Mehmed II to undertake constructions so as to decorate, glorify and order the recently
established capital city. Two major projects by Mehmed II, the construction of the Topkapı Palace (Topkapı Sarayı) and a mosque complex, occupying the sites of the Byzantine acropolis and the Holy Apostles ecclesiastical complex, respectively, were the premier testimonies to Ottoman empire building and state construction.¹

Today a palimpsest of architectural and decorative layers that accumulated over the nearly four hundred years during which it served as the locus of Ottoman rule, the Topkapı Palace nevertheless preserves its original layout to a remarkable degree (Figure 13.1).²

Its three successive enclosures housed a series of public and private functions. Service and administrative spaces filled the first two courtyards; a council hall flanked by a treasury tower constituted the node of the second enclosure. Behind the ceremonial gate separating the second and the third courtyards stood the sultan’s audience chamber. The monarch shared the


third courtyard, housing his residence and recreational spaces, with the dormitories of his pages; the small women’s section abutted this area. The military appearance of the outer and inner enclosure walls, each marked with numerous towers, and the double-towered entrance to the second courtyard in an idiom newly emerging in contemporary Italy, resonated with a medieval palatial paradigm that conflated the functions and the visual markers of the palatial residence with that of the military stronghold.

Beyond the succession of courtyards, the vast enclosure that encompassed the north-eastern tip of the Constantinopolitan peninsula housed gardens, orchards and game preserves, dotted with kiosks and pavilions. To the west, three such pavilions in Byzantine, Ottoman and Persian styles faced each other, products of multitudinous encounters, metaphors of Mehmed II’s universal ambitions. The contemporary Greek chronicler Kritoboulos, underscoring the aesthetic predilections of his patron, wrote:

They were all built with a view to variety, beauty, size, magnificence; shining and scintillating with an abundance of gold and silver, within and without and with precious stones and marbles, with various ornaments and colors, all applied with a brilliance and smoothness and lightness most attractive and worked out with the finest and most complete skill, most ambitiously.3

While in its broad outlines the layout of the palace reflected the Turco-Persian notion of the “outer” and “inner” realms of the ruler’s domain (birun and enderun), emerging protocols and the daily and ceremonial requirements of the Ottoman ruling body shaped individual sections. In comparison to what is known of pre-conquest palatial enclosures, the Topkapı Palace is striking in its highly articulated organisational scheme, which accommodated the newly defined hierarchies of the administrative apparatus and manifested the absolute authority of the sultan. Remaining evidence from Ottoman palaces of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries suggests that they were loosely organised ensembles with a number of pavilions and temporary structures. A multi-functional tower served as the treasury, audience hall and residence of the sultan, thus constituting the symbolic as well as the functional core of the complex.4 Through the three-courtyard scheme of the Topkapı Palace, by

contrast, the private, residential and recreational spaces reserved for the sovereign and his immediate entourage were clearly distinguished from public and administrative ones. A set of newly designed buildings fulfilled separate functions in the palace’s successive courtyards; their location and architectural configuration underlined the inner divisions and differentiations within these separate quarters. While strict geometry or symmetry did not govern the design concept, a tight organisational layout imposed order on everyday as well as ceremonial uses of space. Location, architecture and epigraphy of the Topkapı Palace boldly manifested the imperial claims of the ruler.5

The palatial paradigm created by the patron and architects of the Topkapı Sarayı would determine the spatial configuration and symbolic uses of palaces in princely capitals such as Amasya and Manisa, complexes founded during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries and expanded later on. As for the Edirne palace, started by Murad II (1421–51, with an interruption) and completed by his successor, Mehmed II, it conformed to the model of the Topkapı. Its continued use as a secondary royal residence informed the reciprocal relationship it had to the Istanbul palace, as both complexes were expanded and refurbished through the following centuries. In the later fifteenth century and beyond, palaces of the grandees within the capital city emulated the royal dwelling, with their succession of two or three courtyards ranging in use from public to private quarters, and with spatial and symbolic distinctions such as an audience hall and, in at least one case, a treasury tower.6

In response to changing representational agendas and new cultural connections, the public architecture of the period presents equally bold re-phrasings of extant forms. Mehmed II’s main architectural undertaking within Istanbul is the grand complex of socio-religious structures built between 1463 and 1470 known today as Fatih (Figure 13.2).7 The project draws upon two distinct types

5 Necipoğlu, Architecture, Ceremonial and Power.
The visual arts

of structures which until then had formed the main objects of Ottoman rulers’ architectural patronage. One was the congregational mosque located at the city centre near the commercial core, serving for Friday prayer and sermon. The other object of royal patronage was the socio-religious complex (imaret in contemporary texts, külliye in modern usage), which often constituted the core of an urban or suburban development through the wide range of services it offered and was thus one of the instruments of Ottoman territorial consolidation. Usually located at the outskirts of a town, such complexes were centred by a multi-functional dervish convent (zaviye) cum mescit and the founder’s mausoleum, surrounded by a range of public structures such as a soup kitchen, medrese, public bath and fountain. Designed for social and ritual gathering and for accommodative purposes, the zaviye-mescit did not have arrangements for congregational prayer.

Drawing upon former Ottoman practices, Mehmed II’s ensemble was at the same time shaped by a set of novelties that were to have a significant impact on Ottoman architectural ventures through the following centuries. The ruler’s religious space no longer accommodated the once celebrated dervishes and gazis; a congregational mosque replaced the multi-functional zaviye-mescit as the visually and spatially dominant building. A plot outside of the main core housed an elaborately designed and furnished hospice, a soup kitchen and a caravansary, emphatically separating the space of prayer from
the space of accommodation. Like the Byzantine church of the Holy Apostles on whose grounds it stood, and similar to the earlier Ottoman complexes at whose centre stood a convent-mescit, the complex was conceived as a dynastic funerary monument; shortly after his death, the founder’s mausoleum rose behind the qibla (kible) wall of the mosque. The foundation was also to serve as the premier educational institution of the empire, with its eight medreses
training the highest-ranking members of the Ottoman learned hierarchy. Finally, echoing earlier Ottoman complexes, it was to function as the centre of a developing residential and commercial area in a district beyond the inhabited core of late medieval Constantinople, housing a primary school and a public bath, and surrounded by commercial establishments.

The completely novel spatial arrangement of the compound powerfully resonated with the emerging configuration of the learned hierarchy and its recently re-defined position vis-à-vis the ruling body. The mosque stood alone at the centre of a vast plaza measuring 210 meters to a side; in uncompromising symmetry, the medreses flanked the latter in rows of four, while the siting of the remaining dependencies followed the geometric logic of the layout. The compelling symmetry and axiality of the design centred on a large plaza testifies to the impact of notions of ideal planning newly being elaborated in Renaissance Italy, and circumstantial evidence suggests the possible involvement of the contemporary Florentine architect Filarete in the design process. This radical re-formulation, which accommodated the absolutist aims of Mehmed II, remained a lasting legacy for Ottoman architectural practice. In strong contrast to earlier royal complexes where the buildings adapted to the topography of the land, their later Ottoman counterparts, with few exceptions, were designed on an orthogonal principle, imposing strict geometric schemes on the urban fabric.

The chronicler Tursun Bey’s comments on the mosque of Mehmed II succinctly capture the building’s novelty, and its clear reference, through its vaulting structure, to the primary religious monument of Istanbul, the Hagia Sophia: “[H]e built a mosque in the likeness of the Hagia Sophia, which, apart from encompassing all the arts of the Hagia Sophia, was built according to the latest practices in a fresh new idiom and with immeasurable beauty; its miraculous splendor is apparent.” In other respects, the mosque was based on Murad II’s Üç Şerefeli Cami, completed in Edirne in 1447. The hemispherical dome that covered the larger part of the prayer hall, the marble-paved courtyard and the multiple minarets signifying royal patronage were references to the Edirne monument, which itself represented a departure from established norms for Ottoman congregational mosques. Merging aspects of these two symbolically significant buildings, the architects created a new iconography for the Ottoman sultanic mosque.

that would continue to resonate with Ottoman notions of monumentality through the late eighteenth century.

The three urban projects sponsored by Bayezid II, their construction spread over nearly two decades, embody the diverse cultural currents of the period that followed the demise of Mehmed II. At the centres of the complexes in Amasya, Edirne and Istanbul, completed in 1486, 1487–8 and 1505–6, respectively, there is always a multi-functional zaviye-mosque, now appointed for congregational prayer. A bold manifestation of their patron’s favourable stance towards the dervish milieu, Bayezid II’s mosques feature large and elaborately designed convent sections, presenting a compromise with respect to the radical step taken by his father in the design of his Istanbul foundation. The architect of Bayezid II’s Istanbul mosque, Yakub Şah bin Sultan Şah, re-interpreted the layout of Mehmed II’s mosque in the capital. With a central dome supported by two half-domes on the qibla axis covering the prayer hall, the building presented a further step in Ottoman responses to the city’s primary religious monument, the Hagia Sophia. Convent sections flanked the prayer hall on two sides; like the patron’s mosque in Edirne, these lateral wings were each arranged around a domed central hall to which four iwans opened in a cruciform plan. Bayezid’s three complexes in princely and sultanic capitals had diverse programmes and layouts, bespeaking the varied priorities of the patron in these cities. Accommodative functions prevailed in Amasya, where the buildings were aligned with the Kızılirmak. Also aligned with a river, the Tunca, but governed by an orthogonal design, the Edirne compound housed an elaborately designed and richly endowed hospital and a medrese. In Istanbul, the monumental mosque flanked by the founder’s mausoleum was boldly displayed on the crossroads of the city’s main ceremonial artery and a main street leading to the harbour area, its dependencies located along these two streets.

From the 1460s onwards, forms of elite institutional and architectural patronage were transformed as shifting agendas of self-representation dictated changes in particular forms and the rise of others. The most typical of Ottoman public buildings through the 1300s and early 1400s, the T-type convent-,mescit, underwent a significant adaptation: this multi-functional building featured a central domed hall, which was abutted by an iwan used as a prayer space on the vertical axis, and hospice rooms – at times opening into lateral iwans – to the sides. While such buildings remained the basic form of the

ruling elite’s public patronage, they were now designated as congregational mosques, with allocations for Friday prayer and sermon. Architects explored new spatial arrangements to divorce the spaces of worship from the hospice rooms for dervishes and travellers, with their fireplaces and storage facilities. Separate side entrances for the hospice rooms, at times through iwans opening to the building exterior, as in the Gedik Ahmed Paşâ mosque in Afyon, or the addition of an internal corridor separating the prayer space from the side rooms, as in the Mahmud Paşâ mosque in Istanbul, were among the solutions offered by architects working within this increasingly obsolete typology. The oculus of the central dome and the fountain underneath were eliminated, as the central hall became contiguous with the prayer iwan. Changes in terminology reflected transformations in architectural culture and patronage. While extant foundation deeds define many of the buildings as congregational mosques, their foundation inscriptions most often refer to them as imaret, thus continuing an earlier system of references. Catering to the needs of the frontier, instrumental in the creation of a spatial and institutional framework in newly conquered territory and at times in use by ahi confraternities, the multi-functional T-type building was a cultural product of the early Ottoman centuries. The institutional and architectural transformation outlined here preceded the final obsolescence of this building type in the middle decades of the sixteenth century, when visual manifestations of the Ottoman elite’s ethos of provision and accommodation ceded to a strong emphasis on Sunni orthodoxy (Figure 13.3).

Like the convent-mescit, the prominently scaled and located public bath was a product of the early Ottoman centuries that continued to have symbolic import until the mid-1500s. Unlike the former, the public bath surely did not become completely obsolete, as its social, religious and hygienic functions remained pertinent. But in contrast to the monumental bath-houses built by the Ottoman elite through the 1540s, at times competing in size and visibility with the mosques in their vicinity, patrons sponsored humbler structures, often tucked away in inconspicuous locations. Once again, we observe the waning of early Ottoman representational priorities, predicated on hospitality and provision of services in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious socio-cultural environment. A comparison between the public bath of Bayezid II, its tepidarium domes facing Istanbul’s main thoroughfare and ceremonial

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Figure 13.3. Gedik Ahmed Paşa mosque-convent, Afyon, 1477: (a) exterior view with side iwans; (b) plan. (Boğaziçi University Aptullah Kuran Archive)
axis, and that of the Süleymaniye complex, one of the minor buildings of this most expansive of Ottoman architectural ventures, may demonstrate the point. It may be significant that two royal women, Hürrem and Nurbanu, continued to favour public baths for several decades more, commissioning to the chief architect Sinan monumental and elaborately designed bath-houses located on sites of high visibility and prestige within the capital city.

The architecture of the period between the 1480s, from which date the first large-scale urban projects of Bayezid II and his retinue, and the 1520s can be characterised by two diverse currents. On the one hand, buildings sponsored by the Ottoman elite were marked by a standardisation of formal vocabularies and typologies compared to the previous decades, owing in large part to the greater control over the arts through workshops functioning under court patronage. As in the previous centuries, public structures were typically laid out around arcaded courtyards, and particularly from the 1490s onwards, the dome served as the basic vaulting element for rooms, pillared halls and arcades alike. The consistent use of ashlar masonry and monolithic supports, often spoliated columns, in buildings of high prestige marked a departure from the possibilities and the aesthetic of brick or composite construction, bringing the Ottoman architectural idiom closer to the Roman architectural tradition of the Mediterranean.

At the same time, this was a period for exploring novel forms and idioms, owing to the diversity of architects, artists and craftsmen working on projects in various loci: experimentations with polygonal structures, which resonated with contemporary Renaissance searches for centralised geometric schemes elaborating on a set of ideal forms, included the Kapı Ağası medrese in Amasya and the hospital of the Bayezid II complex in Edirne (Figure 13.4). The former was laid out around a large octagonal courtyard, the latter around a hexagonal domed hall. Ottoman expansions into Turkmen, Safavid and Mamluk territory opened another channel of novelty, as they brought to the Ottoman capital scores of artists and objects from courtly centres such as Tabriz, Damascus and Cairo. Due to the presence of these masters and the high prestige of the visual idioms of the eastern Islamic lands for the contemporary Ottoman elites, Timurid-Turkmen and Mamluk forms became ever more visible.

To the extent that they survive, the decorative vocabulary and programmes of public buildings of the period evince the continuation of earlier trends, which were in turn tightly connected to the larger world of the inter-regional Timurid aesthetic. At the same time, particularly in the realm of the court, selective uses of Byzantine, Mamluk and Italian forms expanded the visual vocabulary. As in the prestigious projects of the pre-conquest era, in the later 1400s tile revetments in a range of different techniques, and hence of diverse visual effects, may be found in the same building, where they would be juxtaposed with marble revetments, wall paintings and inlaid and painted woodwork, creating a rich and varied visual effect.

Historians have identified at least two ceramic tile workshops hailing from the larger Timurid-Turkmen world: the “masters of Tabriz”, who had already decorated the Bursa foundation of Mehmed I (r. 1413–21), continued to work in our period, while a Khorasani group was also employed in Bursa and Istanbul. Techniques ranged from mosaic tile, monochrome polygonal tiles at times with gold leaf or relief decoration, to polychrome cuerda seca and underglaze tiles, including blues and whites as well as polychrome tiles that imitate the cuerda seca. The work of these ateliers survives in the Tiled Pavilion (Çinili Köşk, 1472) in the Topkapı Palace grounds, in Mehmed II’s congregational
mosque, and on the mausoleum of his one-time grand vezir Mahmud Paşa. The mausoleum of Prince Mustafa in Bursa (1479), also home to the tomb of Prince Cem, is the last building to feature a range of tiles produced by the Tabriz workshop. This building also houses the best-preserved programme of

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wall painting from the period known to date, which also is marked by a close affinity to Timurid models and the “landscape” features of Murad II’s mosque cum dervish convent in Edirne.\textsuperscript{15}

In the central cities of the Ottoman realm, the patronage of architecture and urban institutions reflected the political dynamics of the period, unfolding towards the unrivalled predominance of the dynasty and the palace elite. Through the 1540s, only the sultan, the ascendant ruling elite of devşirme origins, and servants of the palace built major public structures in the new capital. Mehmed II and the Istanbul-based elite were active sponsors of charities in provincial centres as well, and prospects of economic expansion led vezirs of the Imperial Council to invest in commercial infrastructure: in addition to considerable structures in Istanbul, Mahmud Paşa built the covered commercial centre (bedestan) of Ankara; in that city and in Bursa, he financed large urban caravansarys (hans) to serve the trade in camlet and silk, respectively. In Sofia, Mehmed II’s grand vezir also built a congregational mosque, a project that otherwise was often a sultanic prerogative.

Beginning with the reign of Bayezid II, the sultan and grandees turned their attention from the all-devouring new capital to centres of former political and symbolic prominence. Bayezid II allegedly built his royal complex in Amasya because of a promise made to the prominent Halveti şeyh Çelebi Halife, who was influential in his victory over Prince Cem during the fratricidal struggle that followed the death of Mehmed II.\textsuperscript{16} In that same city, two members of Bayezid’s princely household and at that time ağas of the court, namely Firuz and the chief white eunuch Hüseyin, undertook constructions alongside the sultan. Hüseyin Ağa’s bedestan (1483) and medrese (1489) were parts of a campaign that definitively altered the cityscape of Amasya, as constructions by the sultan and his courtiers endowed the town with buildings in a visual idiom specifically connected to the Ottoman centre. Bayezid II’s foundation in Edirne, the former capital and one of the power bases of the gazi constituency, was one of the most expansive and monumental urban ventures to date; within the same years, members of the palace elite also sponsored numerous projects in that city.

While their influence in the sultan’s entourage visibly diminished, the lords (beys) of the frontier, established as local dynasts with extensive land holdings and control over entrenched patronage networks, remained highly prominent sponsors of architecture, particularly in the Balkan provinces. In


\textsuperscript{16} Natalie Clayer, \textit{Mystiques, états et société: les Halvetis dans l’aire balkanique de la fin du XVe siècle à nos jours} (Leiden, 1994).
provincial centres such as Skopje and Sarajevo, frontier lords sponsored urban institutions alongside the Istanbul elite. Unlike the latter, their patronage was directed also at smaller towns where their power bases were located, including Iannitsa, Larissa, Veria and Trikkala. In towns the T-type convent-mescit and in villages hospices where wayfarers might spend the night were the most visible buildings sponsored by frontier lords; their larger foundations, on the other hand, comprised the whole range of Ottoman public institutions and infrastructural buildings. Their architects adapted sultanic models for urban complexes to current needs and agendas, as in the Skopje foundation of Isa Bey, comprising a convent-mescit (according to its foundation deed a hankah trusted to an ahi) and soup kitchen, medrese, double bath, caravansarys and three mescits in different neighbourhoods of the town.

In the early decades of the sixteenth century, Balkan-based ghazi families also actively patronised the popular shrine complexes of Seyyid Gazi and Hacı Bektaş in central Anatolia, an indication of their influence far beyond their immediate power bases. Members of the Mihaloğlu family were active in the early sixteenth-century remodelling of the Seyyid Gazi complex; descendants of the Evrenos and Malkoçoğlu families, perhaps alongside Bayezid II himself, participated in the early sixteenth-century expansion of the Hacı Bektaş complex near Kırşehir. We may regard the multiple architectural links of these complexes to local traditions on the one hand and to trends emanating from the centre on the other as reflections of their roles as sites of negotiation in this period that saw the redefinition of religious and cultural identities increasingly determined by Ottoman-Kızılbaş duality and conflict.

The Hacı Bektaş complex and its environs were sites of patronage not only for Ottoman central and peripheral power-holders but also for the Dulkadir dynasty, which often was caught up in the struggles between the Ottoman and Mamluk sultanes. Later on, the Dulkadir became major victims of the conflict between the sultan in Istanbul and the shah in Tabriz, for these confrontations precipitated the dynasty’s final demise in 1522. The architecture

of the Dulkadir dynasty in Maraş and Malatya was a product of the cultural environment of southern and eastern Anatolian crossroads where Rum Seljuk and medieval Armenian forms remained meaningful while currents of Timurid-Turkmen and Mamluk impact shaped various monuments. Public and commemorative structures such as mosques, medreses and mausoleums followed medieval prototypes, while Mamluk details marked the stonework. Farther to the south, the Ramazanoğlu of Adana remained largely within the Mamluk orbit, as evinced by the congregational mosque in this town (1513–41), whose immediate visual references were to the late medieval buildings of Aleppo and Damascus and whose later Ottoman additions, including domed aisles, a vestibule and rich tile revetments, complicated its decorative and architectural program.

Parallel to the rapidly shifting political boundaries in eastern Anatolia under the Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu, a comparable eclecticism emerged in the architecture of this region, as succinctly captured by commemorative structures built for members of these dynasties. Late fifteenth-century Karakoyunlu mausoleums at Van, octagonal baldachins with conical domes built of ashlar masonry, refer at once to the medieval Islamic and Armenian traditions of this area. An Akkoyunlu mausoleum in Ahlat commemorating the emir Bayındır (1491) is a cylindrical building featuring a gallery on round arches and a conical dome, muqarnas capitals and a muqarnas portal with carved floral decoration; this building, too, interprets intertwined medieval Armenian and Rum Seljuk building traditions. Another Akkoyunlu mausoleum in Hisn Kiyfa, commemorating Uzun Hasan’s son Zeynel Mirza (ca. 1473), diverges radically from its counterpart in Ahlat: a cylindrical building topped with a bulbous dome, completely covered with glazed brick and tile mosaic, this is a self-consciously Timurid building in design and decoration.

*Courts and cities: Baba Nakkaş, urban ateliers, and Ottoman variations on the Timurid-Turkmen decorative aesthetic*

The inter-regional aesthetic created under the Timurid and Turkmen dynasties, in wide circulation in the Islamic world at large, remained a primary

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and highly prestigious strand within the multiple vocabularies of ornament artists and patrons favoured through these decades. Ornamental idioms elaborated at Timurid, Akkoyunlu and Karakoyunlu courts constituted a basis on which artists of the Ottoman realm built local variants and introduced new vocabularies. Artists and craftsmen schooled in the Timurid tradition arrived at courts beyond the larger Iranian realm as invitees, captives or self-appointed gift-bearers in search of patronage, mediating the arrival of new variants of the already multi-centred Timurid-Turkmen schools. Timur’s invasion of 1402 and its aftermath, the Ottoman defeat of the Karaman and Akkoyunlu dynasties in the 1470s, and finally Selim I’s victory in Chaldiran (1514) and Ottoman expansion into Safavid territories mark three particular moments when, in the wake of military confrontation and conquest, artists and objects from the Persianate cultural sphere found an enthusiastic welcome in Ottoman courtly environments. Selim I’s conquests also resulted in the Ottoman control of two important ports of East Asian trade, Aleppo and Cairo, which facilitated the arrival of objects and ideas of eastern origin into the Ottoman domains.

Referring to ornamental styles, Ottoman commentators by the 1520s distinguished rumi and hatayi forms as the landmark features of the Ottoman decorative aesthetic. Artists often combined these motifs in a variety of dense compositions based either on a geometric order or on a free-flowing scroll. Rumi (literally “Roman”, which authors in the Persianate world called “islimi”) is an abstract floral ornament featuring palmettes and half-palmettes arranged according to a geometric order. A legacy of the late antique decorative vocabulary of the Near East, it remained resonant through the centuries. The term hatayi literally means “of Cathay”, pointing to the East Asian origins of this motif; as its distinctive element it featured a stylised lotus blossom on a scroll in combination with other East Asian motifs. In the late 1400s and early 1500s, a new set of motifs expanded the vocabulary of design: cloud scrolls of East Asian inspiration, three-dot and stripe motifs, and peonies were combined in myriad compositions. Together, this group constituted part of the design vocabulary referred to as the “seven modes” (haft asl) in Safavid and Ottoman sources of the later 1500s, highlighting the connections upheld between the increasingly distinct visual cultures of the early modern Islamic

empires. The floral aesthetic with its many variants prevailed; commentators and artists perceived geometric interlace (girih) as an integral part of this visual language, but designers used it more sparingly and even marginally. Inscriptions adorned objects but infrequently.

The emergence of a set of institutional practices that integrated artistic production more tightly into the palace hierarchies marks the turn of the sixteenth century and accounts for the creation of a more unified visual idiom linked to Ottoman elite sponsorship of the arts. In these years, for the first time, payrolls document the existence of groups of architects, builders of watercourses and craftsmen employed by the court; gift registers feature groups of craftsmen or individuals who were either commissioned or else presented works on their own.

Listing a range of objects of material or symbolic value kept in the various royal treasuries, the earliest comprehensive inventories of the treasury holdings also date from the final years of the fifteenth century. Possibly as part of a treasury inventory, palace officials also inventoried the royal manuscript collection and a group of individual designs, drawings and paintings during the first years of Bayezid II’s reign. These procedures brought the arts under closer courtly scrutiny and possibly also within easier reach of artists and patrons.

As part of a ransom he demanded from the Akkoyunlu in 1472, Mehmed II asked for “rare books and muraqqa” (collections of calligraphies, images and illuminations in a codex). His move signifies Ottoman participation in collection practices that were part and parcel of Timurid courtly culture, intimately linked to the production and consumption of luxury manuscripts and objects.

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27 Raby and Tanind, Turkish Bookbinding, pp. 53, 100–1.
From at least the 1480s onwards, several Timurid-Turkmen albums were held in the court treasury. Ottoman court artists partook in the creation and re-creation of albums, as they inserted new material into extant codices or created new ones featuring works of Ottoman, Turkmen and Italian provenance.  

While viewers can distinguish an Ottoman court style of the later fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, its relations to diverse media were complex. On the one hand, technique and autonomous developments within the context of particular media shaped individual objects, and on the other hand the dynamic nature of relationships between numerous centres producing not only for the court but also for a local or inter-regional market informed design choices and priorities. Visual links, however, spanned different media. Of particular interest in this regard is the “Baba Nakkaş” album, whose designs, characterised by rosettes and bi- or tri-lobed blossoms, in addition to large split palmette, lotus and oak leaf motifs on spirals, occur in the illumination and bindings of manuscripts and also in ceramics, textiles and carpets (Figure 13.5). These recurrent motifs suggest that a design office modelled after Timurid kitābkhānas may have been at work already under Mehmed II, and a payroll register from the final years of Mehmed II’s reign indeed records a group of painter-illuminators. The documents noted, on the other hand, suggest that while the formalisation of court workshop practices began under Mehmed II, a tighter net of organisational and archival practices emerged only around the turn of the sixteenth century.

Under closer courtly scrutiny, the arts of the book, particularly calligraphy, binding and illumination, were areas where from the later decades of the fifteenth century onwards, patrons and artists elaborated a distinctive and relatively unified Ottoman idiom. In contrast to earlier bindings featuring a variety of materials, techniques and tools, the basic composition and techniques of Ottoman bindings were canonised at the turn of the sixteenth century. Pressure moulding and panel stamping, and a composition based on a central medallion with pendants and corner quadrants, persisted well into the 1600s. In illumination as in binding, motifs changed and the vocabulary of ornament expanded in the course of the following decades, but the basic designs


and compositions, and in illumination the colour scheme dominated by lapis and gold, remained remarkably stable.\textsuperscript{30}

Calligraphy found fertile ground not only in Istanbul, where Mehmed II’s scriptorium produced manuscripts in Turkish, Persian, Arabic and Greek, but also in Amasya, where Bayezid’s princely court and a thriving network of Sufi lodges offered literati a rich cultural environment. Mastership often

ran within families. In the employment of Ottoman courts, masters of calligraphy re-worked styles widespread in the post-Mongol Iranian world for use in chanceries as well as in literary and artistic production. The six cursive scripts, “hanging” chancery scripts and stylised Kufic all remained popular, as did the juxtaposition of scripts in different styles within a single sheet or in overlapping Kufic and nesih compositions. Connections with Shiraz and Tabriz are attested to in the colophons of numerous manuscripts. The legendary Şeyh Hamdullah, an intimate of Bayezid II and the protagonist of tales of calligraphic virtuosity, sportsmanship and divinely inspired wisdom, created an Ottoman interpretation of the six cursive scripts that would remain canonical through the later seventeenth century. To Ottoman authors, Şeyh Hamdullah perfected Yaqut’s aklam-i sitta; to Ottoman calligraphers, he remained the master to whom they traced their genealogies (Figure 13.6).  

The epigraphic programs of major buildings paved the way for the development of monumental cursive scripts. Royal scribes designed, and at times signed, foundation inscriptions composed by important members of the learned elite and calligraphic panels consisting of Qur’anic verses. Among them were the famed Hamdullah and Ali bin Mezid al-Sufi, who favoured the monumental sülüs – called celi in modern scholarship – for use in structures of broader public access. A calligraphic scroll featuring a huge Qur’anic verse that carries the date of 1458 and the name of a Tabrizi master, probably created as a model for use in a building, testifies to the design process of such monumental inscriptions.

Connections between the sultanic and princely courts – and also elite households – fostered a unification of the visual idioms esteemed in this milieu, particularly with regard to the arts of the book. Gift exchange between Prince Cem’s court in Konya and that of his father in Istanbul connected the arts of bookbinding, illumination and calligraphy produced in these two centres. Şeyh Hamdullah’s early work was found not only in Amasya but also in Mehmed II’s collections. Along with their works, calligraphers and painters occasionally moved in person from elite households to the royal scriptorium, as happened at the death of Firuz Ağa in 1526. By contrast, products of the industrial arts responded to the ever-changing commercial and social networks in which they were embedded and to varying degrees of government control over urban artisans. Throughout the period and across media, the court ateliers and their design priorities grounded in book culture concurrently impacted urban workshops to different degrees. The result, in the case of luxury textiles, ceramics and carpets, was a turnout that was marked with a visible duality. On the one hand, designs were shaped by earlier encounters between craft industries, courtly tastes and market demands. On the other hand, the decorative idiom favoured at the Ottoman court, derived from the Timurid-Turcoman repertory and under constant revision, informed the work of urban workshops.

The marked distinction between the “Baba Nakkaş” ceramic wares and the contemporaneous “Miletus” type produced at various sites in western

Anatolia suggests such a duality between manufacture for the court and for the urban milieu (Figure 13.7a). The visual arts

Large-scale objects marked by a high degree of technical sophistication and fine and tightly structured designs are reminiscent of the drawings in the Baba Nakkaş album, which suggest links to the courtly milieu in Istanbul. The popular and mass-produced blue-and-white wares, displaying a wide range of designs of various provenances shared with the “Baba Nakkaş” wares their underglaze painting technique and their porcelain-inspired colour scheme. Pottery forms, compositional choices and the decorative vocabulary of the “Baba Nakkaş” wares drew on contemporary metalwork, court designs and Chinese porcelains. Intense and free-flowing designs typical of the 1480s, often white on a cobalt background, disappeared in the following decades; patrons now preferred relatively sparser compositions favouring chinoiserie patterns alongside the already popular rumi elements.

In addition to the inter-relationships between urban and courtly milieus, among luxury textiles Italian imports played a significant role. Velvets, gold brocaded silks and satins were produced in Bursa but also imported particularly from Venice and Florence. Documents also mention Indian and Damascene textiles. At times created in response to specifications from Istanbul, Italian luxury fabrics were in vogue particularly for the imperial wardrobe and palace furnishings. Silks with complex ogival patterns that re-interpreted, and at times Ottomanised, the compositions of highly prestigious Italian velvets soon appealed to wealthy buyers alongside velvets and brocades in traditional “three dot” (benek) and “wavy stripe” (plenk naksı) patterns.

Throughout this period, Venetian textiles remained objects of high prestige in Ottoman, Italian and northern European lands alike. A significant number of extant objects have proven difficult to attribute to the looms of Venice, Florence or else Bursa, demonstrating that the production and use of these conspicuous signifiers of wealth and status were profoundly interconnected

Figure 13.7a and b. Underglaze ceramic plates: (a) dish with rumi and Baba Nakkaş-style ornament and pseudo-Kufic inscription, ca. 1480 (Musée du Louvre, DAI, inv. QA 6321); (b) dish with tuğraç spiral design, ca. 1530–40 (Musée du Louvre, DAI, inv. 5592)
Figure 13.7c and d. Underglaze ceramic plates: (c) dish with rosettes, lotus flowers and saz leaves, ca. 1545–50 (Musée du Louvre, DAI, inv. MAO 385); (d): dish with tulips and hyacinths, ca. 1560–75 (Musée du Louvre, DAI, inv. 27715)
and textile artists lived in a world that was larger than the frontiers of the expanding empire (Figure 13.8).  

A comparable situation existed in the realm of carpet production: Uşak, Bergama, Konya and possibly other smaller centres continued to provide for the massive European demand for carpets with a range of geometric motifs. Perhaps we also need to factor in an Asian market. Italian trading houses, with their main bases in Constantinople but also maintaining important

establishments on the Aegean coast, had long been the principal intermediaries in the carpet trade to western Europe. Actors multiplied while the routes and the volume of trade expanded throughout the period under examination. Most common Anatolian exports have been dubbed “Holbein” and “Lotto” rugs by virtue of their ubiquity in Italian and northern Renaissance painting. Both feature variations of repetitive geometric compositions: “Holbein” carpets had a design often based on octagon and star patterns, whereas the “Lotto” rugs featured an open repetitive design in which angular rumi motifs prevailed. Pseudo-Kufic borders of monumental effect, with geometric knot designs loosely based on this angular Arabic script, were a legacy of medieval carpet weaving in Anatolia. Other fragments, on the other hand, present motifs such as lotus palmettes and multi-lobed leaves and compositions that link them to late fifteenth-century courtly arts in other media, including manuscript illumination and binding, metalwork, woodcarving and tile decoration. Possibly due to the large-scale constructions of the period, these carpets were much larger than the “Konya”, “animal”, and “Holbein” varieties. The connection between the various centres of carpet manufacture in western Anatolia and court styles continued through the later decades, as weavers incorporated “star” and “medallion” designs that came to dominate compositions. Weavers incorporated into their repertoires the long-favoured three-dot and stripe motifs (çintamani) and also motifs and colour combinations reminiscent of later sixteenth-century tile designs. Like Iznik and Kütahya ceramics or Bursa silks and velvets, the carpet production of Uşak and Bergama was highly varied in quality, size and dominant decorative aesthetic. These same centres – and different workshops within them – catered both to the local and/or inter-regional market and the sultan’s court. Patterns of courtly commission and supervision over artisanal production during these decades, on the other hand, continue to escape us.

Concomitant to the integration of artistic production and consumption into the increasingly more structured bureaucratic practices and hierarchies

40 Raby, ‘Court and Export: Part 2’.
of the empire was the articulation of reciprocities at different levels, based on gift exchange between elites from within and outside of the Ottoman realm. Gift-and-reward connections between artists and patrons were also at issue. Whether working within or outside of the court workshops, artists produced through a dual system of commissions and gifts. The presentation of precious objects became integral to norms and practices of gift-giving embedded within a complex web of courtly patronage, and in fact in the very fabric of courtly social and political interaction. A closely related practice, namely the bestowal of robes of honour (hilat) on dignitaries, ambassadors, courtiers and artists, created a considerable demand for luxury textiles. Of varying quality and meaning in different contexts, conferring hilat was at all times a means of confirming rank and status.

Pictorial representation: Eastern and western horizons of Ottoman painting

In contrast to the relatively uniform visual idiom created by calligraphers, binders and manuscript illuminators by about 1500, pictorial representation remained expressly hybrid, varied and multiple well into the mid-sixteenth century. Mehmed II’s patronage of Italian art and artists resulted in a number of works with varied resonance. Portrait medals produced throughout his reign attest to the sultan’s keen interest in this newly revived medium and his awareness of its possibilities for circulating multiple copies of his mimetic image combined with inscriptions announcing his imperial claims in European courtly circles. Portraits of Mehmed II and his courtiers were created in diverse modes and media: in addition to bronze medals and oils on canvas by Italian residents at court, a set of single-page paintings vividly capture the remarkable cultural wealth, pluralism and cosmopolitanism of Mehmed II’s court. Among the sultan’s artists were Costanzo da Ferrara, Sinan Bey, an Ottoman Muslim educated by an Italian master, and Şiblizade Ahmed,
the latter’s trainee; their diverse representational idioms combined Persianate and Italianate conventions of portraiture (Figure 13.9). Such a predilection for unreserved juxtaposition characterised narrative painting as well. Illustrated literary and historical works from the 1450s through the early decades of the sixteenth century offer a kaleidoscope of visual idioms originating in various Timurid and Turkmen palaces, the Byzantine art of Constantinople and contemporary Italian courts. Different styles and representational conventions may be confined to the individual pages of a manuscript or, more strikingly, visible within a single page.

Mehmed II’s scriptorium created works in a broad range of topics in Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Greek, his collection expanding into the Latin realm. Bayezid II’s keen interest in book culture expanded the production of illustrated manuscripts of literary and historical subject matter.45 Ahmedi’s

İskendername, a fourteenth-century Turkish epic on the exploits of Iskandar Zulkarnayn of Islamic myth, including also a chronicle of the House of Osman, was produced in multiple copies during the 1460s and 1470s.

Evoking Mehmed the Conqueror’s self-image as Alexander the Great, the illustrations of these volumes highlight an interest in historical narrative painting, for they include also images illustrating the Ottoman chronicle inserted into the epic. The Şahname-i Melik Ummi (ca. 1495), a chronicle of the Ottoman house up to the early years of Bayezid II’s reign, partook in the historiographical reckoning that followed Bayezid’s contested succession to the throne of Mehmed II. Its text and images addressed the issue of dynastic descent, a resonant topic during the earlier part of Bayezid’s rule (Figure 13.10).

Interest in illustrated manuscripts of Persian literary works continued into the reign of Bayezid II, as demonstrated by multiple copies of Khusrav va Shirin manuscripts or the Hesht Bihisht of Amir Khusrav Dehlavi, where Persianate iconography and visual norms and representational choices specific to the Ottoman court were often deployed together. Ottoman architectural and sartorial details inserted into the illustration of such popular romances underlined attempts at the creation of a local visual identity inscribed into the inter-regional and highly prestigious world of Timurid visual culture. Distinctions of a more structural nature lay in the uses of optical perspective, often in isolated sections of a given painting, modelling through tonal differences, and landscape features showing a degree of recession into space and thus contrasting with the two-dimensional picture plane in the foreground. The intimate and elaborately decorated interiors depicted in Timurid painting gave way to images of exteriors reflecting contemporary architectural practices and tastes.

Paintings from two manuscripts of this period may provide the most tangible and succinct evidence for the remarkable cultural eclecticism of the

47 Stéphane Yerasimos, La fondation de Constantinople et de Sainte-Sophie dans les traditions turques: légendes d’empire (Istanbul and Paris, 1990); Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, 1995); Bağcı et al., Ottoman Painting, pp. 31–4.

488
The visual arts

Figure 13.10. Bayezid II meeting with vezirs, Malik Ummi, Şehnâme, ca. 1495. (Topkapı Palace Library H. 1123, fol. 30v)

Ottoman court as reflected in the pictorial arts. An incomplete manuscript of Nizami’s Khamsa features two paintings, one depicting the Shahnama hero Bahram-i Gur’s struggle with lions and the other portraying Iskandar and his retinue in the land of darkness. Atmospheric perspective, foreshortened figures in dynamic interaction, dark saturated colours and a style of sketching that privileges the modelled figure evince the hands most probably of
Italian painters or their trainees, who were at the same time conversant with the conventions of the Persianate idiom. The intriguing double-folio frontispiece of Uzun Firdevsi’s Süleymanname, presented to Bayezid II around 1490, exhibits, in a radically different visual idiom, another instance of stylistic and iconographical juxtapositions from the farthest reaches of Ottoman cultural horizons. The image represents Solomon and Bilqis, the Queen of Saba, enthroned, presiding over their divan of fairies, demons, jinns, animals both fantastic and real, and courtiers. It is thematically connected to a set of frontispiece paintings favoured in Shiraz during the late 1400s and the 1500s. Art historians have at the same time linked its unusual registered composition and the shape of its demons to contemporary Spanish painting, samples of which may have arrived in Istanbul with the Sephardic communities after their expulsion from Spain. Venetian sources may also have provided models for particular figural and architectural renderings. Through the figure of Solomon framed by a towered structure that unmistakably reminds the viewer of the Middle Gate (Orta Kapı) of the Topkapı Palace, this broad range of associations converges at the very heart of Ottoman rule and foreshadows the Ottoman appropriation of the kingly image of Solomon as a just and universal ruler (Figure 13.11).

Richly illustrated and illuminated by artists working in a Khurasani idiom, the Persian Divan of Selim I (ca. 1515–20) was modelled after the Divan of Husayn Bayqara, and in turn this volume was the earliest of a series of poetry collections of Ottoman sultans, always distinguished by their opulent illumination and luxurious bindings. Production of luxury manuscripts visibly declined during the reign of Bayezid’s son Selim I, and the court also employed fewer calligraphers and scribes. At the same time, these years saw the creation of a team of artists that would introduce remarkable vivacity, richness and technical expertise into Ottoman artistic ventures of the following decades.

52 Bağcı et al., *Ottoman Painting*, pp. 55–67.
for when Selim I had conquered Tabriz there occurred the most substantial influx of artists, objects and ideas of eastern origin the Ottoman world had ever experienced. Upon Selim’s orders, artists and objects from Timurid Herat and the Akkoyunlu court in Tabriz, which had recently fallen to the Safavid Shah Isma’il I (r. 1500–24), now migrated to Ottoman imperial and princely capitals. The words Şükri-i Bidlisi put into Selim’s mouth highlight the actual and perceived dominance of Persianate cultural forms in the Ottoman courtly milieu of these decades: “[A]ll the scholars, artists, merchants, and men of wealth should be taken to Istanbul so that, henceforth, the Ottomans will have no further need of Persians in such matters.”

Articulating a new imperial image, ca. 1520–1570

Both within and beyond the court, the 1520s were a time of new vivacity and explorations in design, reflected in the arts of the book, industrial arts

and architectural decoration. As we have seen, Selim I’s eastern conquests and Süleyman’s early military ventures brought to Ottoman courts a wealth of objects and artists of diverse cultural traditions. In the form of new or newly perfected techniques in various media and new or newly interpreted forms, particularly in the decorative arts, these acquisitions bore fruit during the 1520s. An explosion of new work resulted from the exuberant lifestyle and tastes of the young Süleyman, bolstered by the ambitious projects at home and abroad of his deputy and confidante the grand vezir İbrahim Paşa. During the 1520s, the Topkapı Palace was largely renovated and refurbished, and new interest in cultural patronage brought numerical expansion, further bureaucratisation and professionalisation to communities of court artists and to the court scriptorium. Universalist iconography focused on world domination was articulated in diverse media and objects, such as Süleyman’s Venetian helmet crown, modelled on the papal tiara, and Piri Reis’s geographic and cartographic works of global expanse.54 Embodying the apocalyptic mood of the tenth Muslim century and resonant with the messianic identity and image of Süleyman in the earlier years of his reign, Abd al-Rahman al-Bistami’s prognosticative text Al-miftah al-jafr al-jami circulated in multiple copies. Against the backdrop of another surge of eschatological expectation, a Turkish translation of this text and its illustrated copies would appear at the end of the 1500s.55

In the later decades of Süleyman’s reign, when universal aspirations ceded to a focus on the empire as the foremost Islamic state, architectural and institutional patronage of public works became increasingly central to Ottoman elite identity. The ceaseless construction activity of those decades rendered the imperial architectural office and its chief, Sinan, important agents in the representation of elite ideals. This was also when arts of public display and spectacle, particularly architecture and luxury textiles, became loci for articulating modes of visual distinction. The visual idiom created under courtly patronage announced the distinctive imperial identity of the Ottoman house with respect to its Islamic and European counterparts. Arts and architecture partook of the regionalisation that marked Ottoman culture at large.56

The visual arts

A new aesthetic of ornament

The first extant registers providing ample information on the structure and workings of the court ateliers begin in 1526; at that time, the court workshops included 36 communities of ehl-i hıref, or “people of talent”. A document of that date noted the names of several artists, the famous Şahküli among them, who were resident in Amasya but now employed at the court workshops.57 Encompassing handicrafts of a wide variety, the ehl-i hıref included the designers and creators of court-sponsored arts. Certain communities (cemaat) within this group designed and produced luxury manuscripts and objects of precious materials, while others created designs for the industrial arts, such as ceramics, tiles and textiles. Officially attached to and receiving wages from the imperial treasurer, who was part of the inner palace organisation, the workings of the ehl-i hıref evince the dynamic and shifting web of connections between artisanal production, the collection of luxury objects, book culture and palace ceremonial. That all these fields of activity ultimately converged in one locus, the inner treasury (iç hazine), within the third, private court of the palace underlines the centrality of the treasury to Ottoman cultural production both as an institution and as a collection of objects. The belvedere kiosk at the north-eastern edge of the palace’s third court served as a storehouse and exhibition space for precious or exotic objects and also as a depot for raw materials to be used by palace craftsmen. The hazine was a storehouse of manuscripts but also functioned as a lending library for palace inhabitants, including members of the imperial household.58

Throughout the sixteenth century, documents reflect the highly heterogeneous makeup of artisans registered within the “communities of the people of talent” (cemaat-i ehl-i hıref), their numbers including craftsmen from the Timurid and Turkmen courts, from the empire’s Anatolian and Rumelian provinces and beyond, and from Austrian and “Frenk” territories. Through the following decades, the organisational structure of the court-employed artisan communities would change little, while the numbers of people

practicing different crafts did vary according to the changing priorities and tastes of the elite.\textsuperscript{59}

Of increasing prominence for Ottoman court arts through the middle decades of the sixteenth century were the painter-illuminators, who, as members of the cemaat-i Nakkaşan, worked in book painting and illumination and in the decoration of buildings, also creating designs for objects across a variety of media. Mid-sixteenth-century expansion and perhaps focus on cultural distinctions led to a short-lived division of the Nakkaşan into the Rumiyân and the Aceman. The first, literally “the people of Rum”, referred to artists who were Ottoman subjects from the central lands of the empire, while the second, literally “the people of Acem”, referred generally but not exclusively to those who hailed from the Persian-speaking world. While primarily artists of the book, Şahkulı (d. 1555–6) in the early decades of the sixteenth century and Nakkaş Osman towards its close produced works across media, decorating ceramic plates or kiosks in addition to the important manuscript commissions they received. Earlier sixteenth-century documents refer to creators of designs and figurative images in pen and ink (ressam), specialists in figurative painting (musavvir) and illuminators (müzehib). Later on, officialdom frequently replaced these different terms with the all-encompassing Nakkaş, while documents pertaining to particular projects, as well as commentaries such as Mustafa Ali’s Menakib-i Hünerveran, attest to the presence of a rich vocabulary of book arts and artists engaged in various modes of calligraphy, figural representation and ornamentation.\textsuperscript{60} The court Nakkaşan formed a composite group employed in a range of projects, including calligraphers (katiban-i kütüb) and binders (mücellid). Permanent and temporary workshops within and close to the Topkapı Palace, including the famed Nakkaşane outside the palace grounds close to the Hippodrome, accommodated the painter-illuminators.\textsuperscript{61}

With the creation of royal textile workshops, we encounter further differentiation among the designers employed by the court, a process that began


\textsuperscript{61} Çağman, ‘Saray Nakkaşhanesinin Yeri’. 

494
in the 1520s and gathered speed during the middle decades of the sixteenth century. Designers of textiles (nakşbend) now featured as part of the cemaat of craftsmen producing luxury fabrics; they were at times also lent out as designers to the tile-manufacturing workshops of İznik. As the nakşbend became a separate group, there occurred an increasingly visible differentiation between the public and private visual languages of the Ottoman court. Artists of the book worked in an idiom that remained in closer contact and dialogue with Persianate book culture, while the makers of textile and tile designs broke distinctly free from the conventions and relatively conservative predispositions of their colleagues.

Early in Süleyman’s reign, Şahküli, on record as ressam and associated with Baghdad, left a definitive mark on Ottoman design through his works on the “saz” style. Saz re-interpreted an earlier group of ink drawings popular in the Persianate world from the fourteenth century onwards which were partly cognate with hatayi designs and in part drew on representational themes of Central and East Asian inspiration. Intensely energised compositions of long, feather-like serrated leaves and dramatically bending stems bearing lotus flowers and palmettes, sometimes inhabited by fantastic animals and auspicious figures of Asian inspiration, concurrently entered Ottoman representation and illumination (Figure 13.13, Figure 13.7c). Single-page ink drawings, representing intertwined saz leaves and lotus blossoms, whirling compositions of fantastic creatures in combat surrounded by foliage, and images of fairies at times inspired by the conventions of portrait painting adorned albums through the later decades of the sixteenth century. Miniaturised in bindings and illumination or boldly magnified in textile and tile designs, saz proved to be of remarkable longevity. Its most celebrated application to tile design was the five large underglaze painted tiles in blue and turquoise on white, originally created for a newly built kiosk within the Topkapı Palace’s private third court and today adorning the façade of the Circumcision Room. Perhaps designed by Şahküli, these may have been the work of a group of Tabrizi masters heading the royal ceramics workshop in Istanbul, whose products in diverse techniques would adorn buildings in the capital city into the 1540s.

Court and urban ateliers enriched the Ottoman visual vocabulary by yet other motifs. Variants of the tuğrakes (or Golden Horn) style, invented in the court scriptorium and characterised by finely woven and floriated spirals, soon covered Iznik and Kütahya vessels (Figure 13.7b). Within the same years, the ceramics ateliers of these two cities produced wares bearing popular floral designs, at times merging these with motifs of courtly origin. Due to the larger holdings and greater use of Chinese porcelain at the Ottoman court in the aftermath of the Safavid campaigns, local potters adapted a host of East Asian motifs, expanding their vocabulary of chinoiserie.

A further expansion of the Ottoman vocabulary of ornament is associated with a former student of Şahkuli, Kara Memi (d. ca. 1570). A master specialising in illuminated manuscripts and albums, in the 1540s Kara Memi introduced naturalistic depictions of tulips, hyacinths, carnations, roses, irises, prunus and pomegranate blossoms in vibrant colours to the Ottoman decorative repertoire. The floral style, known as şükûfe (flower), first appeared in manuscript illumination, bookbinding and album pages featuring the katı (découpage) technique, but soon it spread across a variety of media (Figures

Though originating in the work of painter-illumina-
tors, the new motifs were used rather conservatively in luxury manuscripts and the imperial tuğra, an elaborate calligraphic composition authenticating documents issued in the sultan’s name. Designers often confined small-scale delicately rendered flowers within compartments whose divisions followed the conventions of earlier sixteenth-century illumination and bookbinding. Less often, they produced floral compositions evoking a paradise-like garden that occupied a complete page or book cover, again underlining the distinctiveness of this particular mode from the remaining abstract or semi-abstract decoration adorning the manuscript.

Presenting the complete range of Ottoman illumination at the time of its compilation in about 1560–5 is the “Nishaburi album”, a collection of mostly Safavid calligraphies of the earlier sixteenth century (including those of Shah Mahmud Nishaburi), black pen paintings possibly by Şahkuli, and a decoupage garden in full bloom (Figure 13.12, Figure 13.13). Possibly the chief Nakkaş, Kara Memi, created this manuscript and its binding for presentation to Süleyman: the illuminations surrounding selected examples of Safavid and Ottoman calligraphy as well as figural representation form a sumptuous and elaborately designed Ottoman frame. Thus the manuscript attests to the enthusiastic embrace of the book arts of the Persianate world on the part of Ottoman designers and audiences, who over the decades maintained a dialogue with this tradition. In their visual and literary choices, the makers of another album (murakka) from the 1570s, dedicated to Murad III and known by his name, largely followed the same model. Also completed under courtly

67 Istanbul University Library F 1426; Atl, The Age of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent, pp. 68–71, 105–9; Çağman, ‘The Earliest Known Ottoman “Murakka”’, pp. 75–8; Dorothea Duda, ‘Das
patronage during Murad III’s reign is the monumental Ahmed Karahisari Qur’an, partly inscribed by this famed calligrapher, whose re-interpretation of the cursive scripts attributed to Yaqut was celebrated by his contemporaries. The manuscript was completed, illuminated, and bound between 1574 and 1595 as a tour de force of Ottoman book arts. Underlining the value ascribed to the work of Karahisari (d. ca. 1555), the rich and varied illumination program encompassed the complete vocabulary of ornament in use by the court Nakkaşan, executed in varying scales and compositions, while responding to the work of the calligrapher displayed on the same pages (Figure 13.14).68 In

Figure 13.15. Ceremonial kaftan with ogival pattern, featuring tulips and rumis, mid-sixteenth century. (Topkapı Palace Museum, 13/932)


an additive manner, Ottoman ornament successively assimilated variations of the medieval Perso-Islamic decorative vocabulary, the *saz*, and finally the “florist’s idiom”.

While artists of the book often kept these various styles neatly framed and therefore quite distinct, textile and tile designers of the 1550s searched for a novel scale and syntax, creating an uninhibited fusion of magnified motifs rendered in bold outlines, coupled with an explosion of colour.\(^{69}\) Textile design was the motor force in the development of new compositional devices

\(^{69}\) Atasoy et al., *İpek*, pp. 155–75.
and bolder uses of recently introduced or older motifs. Basic compositional structures, most commonly staggered ogival medallions and undulating vines, were used as the matrix of myriad motif combinations. Staples of textile design in Italy, Mamluk Egypt and East Asia, these compositions were adapted to the vocabulary of Ottoman ornament, while large asymmetrical saz compositions and the long-favoured çintamani retained their popularity. Ogival lattices with fine tendrils, finely drawn rumis and hatayis, and delicate tuğrakeş spirals of the earlier sixteenth century receded into the background as bold and radically magnified designs strove for immediate visual effect in the expansive ceremonial spaces of court and city (Figure 13.15, 13.27).70

Surely this transformation in visual idiom benefited from the close proximity of artists working in different media, for in response to inadequate supply from Bursa and the high costs of foreign imports, the sultan’s court in the 1550s established royal weaving ateliers in Istanbul, with specific spaces for velvet and brocade looms. While Venetian and Florentine velvets remained prestigious, local textile production expanded in the royal karhane-i kemhaciyan and in private ateliers active in Istanbul. Due to the growing number of royal and private ateliers, contacts increased between various loci of design and production, while as mentioned court and urban ateliers also interacted more frequently. Court designers (nakşbendan or nakkaşan) now often supplied models for the weavers to follow, and workshops in İznik, Bursa and Uşak received such designs when courtly commissions were at issue. At times the court demanded that masters from the provinces be sent to Istanbul to assist in the founding or improvement of the royal workshops.71 Older centres of production came to be part of Ottoman commissioning and consumption networks, as was the case with “Mamluk” carpets produced in Cairo subsequent to Selim I’s conquests.72

Ceramic wares, and from the 1540s onwards specifically the architectural tile industry in İznik, profited significantly from such contacts. Towards the late 1520s, potters introduced the first saz motifs to İznik as they also expanded their colour range, adding sage green and purple to the formerly...
dominant blue and turquoise in decorating the “Damascus wares”. Mid-century saw a further sweeping change in the local industries as the court-based “florist’s style” took root and merged with earlier uses of floral vocabulary in the İznik ateliers. Compositional devices of textile design, ogival stacking and undulating vines particularly, now came to be used in tiles as well, alongside the complete range of Ottoman ornamental repertory (Figure 13.14). Artisans expanded their colour scheme yet further to include red and, shortly afterwards, emerald green as well. Court design, elite architectural projects and İznik industries now were linked much more tightly, while the court endeavoured to bring tilemakers under the direct control of the chief architect.73

Objects of this period held today in the Topkapı Palace collections are expressly un-iconic, as is the dominant aesthetic of Ottoman industrial and luxury arts. Yet İznik and Kütahya ateliers, as well as Bursa and Istanbul silk manufacturers, did produce objects bearing figural imagery for local and foreign markets. Liturgical objects with Christian imagery and symbols catered to Ottoman non-Muslims as well as buyers beyond the imperial domains. Particularly in the final decades of the 1500s, İznik potters used, alongside the dominant floral designs, a range of animal figures in compositions derived from the medieval Islamic repertory, from Ottoman and Safavid book painting as well as from Balkan metalwork.74

Objects of precious metal or rock crystal, often created for ceremonial or personal use, did not partake of this explosion of new design that revolutionised the ornamentation of tiles and textiles created also, if not exclusively, for public display. Tight interlocking patterns, variations of rumi-hatayi or saz designs, covered surfaces and provided the frames upon which precious stones might be mounted. The vast collection of Chinese porcelains at the Ottoman court may be mentioned in this regard: Ottoman craftsmen mounted smaller-scale, mostly blue and white objects with precious stones on patterned gold frames, imprinting this distinctive style on porcelains in use at the privy chamber. The diverse and dense designs that characterised the “bejewelled aesthetic” of such metal, crystal and porcelain objects and the courtly decorative idiom of these decades in general co-existed with what scholars have

73 Arthur Lane, Later Islamic Pottery (New York, 1957); Atasoy and Raby, İznik, pp. 129–44; Denny, İznik, pp. 59–114.
termed the “plain tradition”, characterised by a minimalist regard for the material and for the object’s sculptural qualities (Figure 13.17).

Intimately connected to elite identity and representation, the Ottoman decorative idiom remained multiple and diverse throughout the “classical” era. Tastes and design priorities differed across media; and a variety of factors created distinctions in visual idiom. Differences between the designs used for architectural tiles and luxury textiles on the one hand and those favoured in book arts on the other underscored preferences predicated on public and private uses. Spatial and visual distinctions and hierarchies ordered the ornamental repertory and relegated the preferred ornamental themes

of the medieval era to less visible parts of decorated surfaces or into framing devices. Vocabularies of ornament were also tightly connected to media and technique, as demonstrated by the bounteous use of geometric interlace in woodwork, whether in architecture or in inlaid objects. Such distinctions and divisions notwithstanding, the very characteristic of the emergent aesthetic, with its magnified motifs and unreserved juxtapositions of colour and motif, highlighted the ultimate success of the new, which co-existed with, but often subordinated, a broad and varied range of motifs and patterns formerly absorbed into Ottoman arts.

Illustrated manuscripts: The primacy of geography and history

A group of artists working in an inter-regional visual idiom left their traces in books produced in Herat, Tabriz and Istanbul in the 1520s and 1530s, underlining the interconnected nature of book painting across this wide expanse, particularly in a period of rapidly shifting boundaries. Connected to this group of mostly literary manuscripts illustrated in a Khurasani idiom, and of significant impact, was an illustrated history of Selim’s reign completed in 1527. The illustrated Selimname of Şükri-i Bidlisi was but one of a series of histories covering the same years and created under courtly auspices in a successful effort to re-write the controversial dynastic struggle that preceded this sultan’s rise to power. Textually based on earlier gazavatnames, Bidlisi’s Selimname in turn informed a host of illustrated dynastic histories of the later sixteenth century.

If the Selimnames represent a look inwards, aiming to revise a disturbing episode in Ottoman dynastic history and to demand a more exalted place for Selim in historical consciousness, Piri Reis’s contemporaneous Kitab-ı Bahriye and world maps represent a look outwards, a reckoning with the new imperial expanse and its widening horizons. In contrast to the Selimname, whose illustrated manuscripts are products of the court ateliers, the Kitab-ı Bahriye is the work of a naval officer who adapted the well-established isolario genre to create an Ottoman image of the Mediterranean coastlines, ports and islands. This was a sea chart to be used by sailors. But, at the same time, particularly the second, visually and textually more lavish, version, initially prepared through the mediation of İbrahim Paşa for presentation to Sultan Süleyman, was conceived as a portrait of the Mediterranean from an Ottoman vantage

The visual arts

point. Ottoman cartographic representation of the Mediterranean partook fully of contemporary developments in naval mapping developed simultaneously by Italian, Spanish and Portuguese mapmakers in portolan charts and isolarios.77

Kitab-ı Bahriye constitutes the earliest example of topographic representation in the Ottoman realm, a genre that by the mid-1500s had become a well-established feature of the Ottoman pictorial repertory. In representing port cities, the mapmakers working for Piri Reis adopted the basic conventions of the schematic “bird’s eye view”: they depicted the layout and boundaries of the urban enclosure and main features of its environment while especially highlighting a number of landmarks within an otherwise uniform urban fabric. While simpler than contemporary Italian views of the same city, Kitab-ı Bahriye’s double-folio bird’s eye view of Venice betrayed familiarity with the long-standing Italian tradition of mapping the lagoon. An image of Alexandria captured the town’s layout in relation to the port and highlighted the ancient ruins that marked the cityscape (Figure 13.18). The images of Istanbul inserted into later Kitab-ı Bahriye manuscripts partook of the newly emergent perspective view, adapting it to the medium of book painting.78

Piri Reis’s book is almost contemporaneous with a major historical project conceived in the 1520s and partially realised through the 1540s, namely Matrakçı Nasuh’s multi-volume history of the Ottoman house, planned as part of a world history and straddling the intertwined genres of history, conquest narrative, geography and itinerary.79 The illustrations of Matrakçı’s


ambitious enterprise are exclusively topographic (Figure 13.19). Most notably, these are images of cities but also of the routes followed by the Ottoman armed forces during campaigns and the major landmarks they encountered. The most celebrated of these manuscripts, the Beyan-i Menazil-i Sefer-i Irakeyn or Mecmua-i Menazil, narrating Süleyman’s Iraqi campaign of 1535–7, marks
the emergence of a specifically Ottoman mode of topographic representation. The images respond to fifteenth-century Italian city views, but their conventions merge with those of a largely Persianate mode of spatial representation. Hence the draftsmen render urban boundaries in plan, while individual monuments and lesser buildings appear in elevation or bird’s eye view. The established Persianate convention of utilising multiple points of view in architectural depictions is thus adapted to the representation of urban space. As opposed to a cartographer’s limited colour spectrum, Matrakçı’s images often depict towns surrounded by a paradise-like garden. Images of holy sites and shrine complexes allude to the conventions of medieval pilgrimage itineraries. Matrakçı’s work was possibly the result of a royal commission; his exact role in the execution of the paintings is unclear. In all, this body of images and their more practical counterparts, namely a set of siege plans, render topographic representation one of the constitutive elements of the Ottoman pictorial repertory. Topographic imagery in turn formed one of the strands that fed into historical narrative painting, the dominant genre of Ottoman pictorial representation through the later 1500s.
Once again, the political conjuncture of the 1550s brought issues of dynastic strife and succession to the fore, and with tragic outcomes. Possibly this situation induced the Ottoman court to launch a new project, a royal commission involving the creation of an official court historiographer (ṣehnameci or “shahname writer”). Allotted an office within the palace grounds, the ṣehnameci was to collaborate with a team of scribes and painter-illustrators in the production of a work covering imperial history. Arıfī, a poet of Azeri origin and thus from the Persian-speaking world, received the commission to write a multi-volume world history, with an entire volume dedicated to Süleyman’s reign. In Persian, the Süleymanname was conceptually and formally modelled after Firdausi’s Shahnama. In previous decades, Ottoman translations of this epic, whose illustrations subtly highlighted aspects of Istanbul’s courtly culture, had paved the way for local interpretations of this major literary work.80

Through the later sixteenth century, the office and the atelier of the ṣehnameci would create a series of Ottoman dynastic histories whose illustration played a major role in shaping Ottoman narrative painting.81

Illustrated and illuminated by a diverse group of artists, including masters from Timurid-Turkmen or Safavid centres but also the empire’s Balkan provinces, the Süleymanname followed its Persian model only in part. In this longest and most lavishly and extensively illustrated manuscript among the extant volumes of Arıfī’s series, representations of courtly conduct and military prowess take pride of place, mediating Ottoman assertions of legitimate rule. Its paintings include receptions, battle and siege scenes and the royal hunt, in addition to images of meetings and entertainment in palatial interiors. While a number of the paintings follow Persianate visual norms and iconographic conventions closely, others, notably those illustrating episodes of particular symbolic significance, attest to explorations of novel iconographic formulations and compositional devices. In the double-folio image representing the accession of Süleyman, an event taking place under the portico of the Topkapi’s third gate but involving the palace’s first two courtyards


The visual arts

as well, a topographic image founded on multiple juxtapositions of plan and elevation provides the setting to the narrative representation of this tightly choreographed event. The depiction of a Balkan village during the recruitment of Christian boys (*devşirme*) adroitly captures the importance of this institution in its representation of the levied children, dressed in bright red, in transition between their former and future lives.

Ottoman painters translated the strictly coded conduct and ceremonial of the sultan’s court, shaped by notions of the ruler’s divine and absolute authority, into stasis, compartmentalisation and hierarchically ordered pictorial space (Figure 13.20). The iconic figures of the Ottoman ruler, dignitaries and attendants rarely venture out of the elongated frames that correspond to their symbolic loci within stringent – and constraining – court protocols. Only their gestures and gazes suggest links and confirm hierarchies across the frames. Their frozen rigidity imparts an iconic presence to figures, and particularly that of the sultan, echoing the godlike image of Süleyman reflected in the solemn ceremonial of the court but also in contemporary letters. Attentive to sartorial and some architectural detail, and to visual distinctions across the wide geographic expanse of the narrative, the painter-illustrators’ decorative style remains a defining aspect of most paintings.

Outside the framework of historical painting, which was one of the sites where officials and artists fashioned an imperial Ottoman image, portraiture remained a private affair. The sense of intimacy and spontaneity conveyed in single- or double-page royal portraits of the aged Süleyman in contemplation or of Prince Selim in the company of his boon companions are in striking contrast with the royal imagery in histories and chronicles. These paintings may be the work of Nigari (Haydar Reis), a courtier who practised his art outside the *ehl-i hıref* organisation and who may have also produced a series of royal portraits inspired by later fifteenth-century Ottoman experiments in this genre. The remaining evidence for this latter current, a half-length portrait of Hayreddin Barbarossa, and printed copies preserved among Paolo Giovio’s portrait collection, suggest that these images were highly formal, unlike the portraits by Nigari preserved in Ottoman collections. Initially intended for European collectors, this set of “official” images would ultimately inform another series of royal portraits, produced by Ottoman painters beginning in the late 1570s.82

Architecture during the early years of Süleyman focused on the private world of palatial constructions, in contrast to the explosion in public works that would mark the middle and later 1500s. After his accession in 1520, Süleyman ordered a number of changes to the Topkapı Palace. Several sections were rebuilt in a more monumental manner and refurbished; polychrome tiles
and Mamluk-style marble revetments dressed a number of buildings in a more lavish idiom. In the 1530s, the women’s quarters of the palace were renovated and expanded in preparation for the move of Süleyman’s consort Hürrem into the Topkapı Palace along with her children. Numerous pavilions replaced the multiple towers which once had marked the enclosure wall of the private courtyard, underlining an overall departure from the medieval palatial norms that had informed the Topkapı’s original plan. The creation of suburban palaces and gardens for the Ottoman dynasty and elite along the Bosphorus, particularly on the Asian side, was a new trend in the capital, which would continue into later periods. For the most part, these were informally organised gardens with multiple enclosures. Within them, asymmetrically grouped kiosks, pavilions and belvedere towers, surrounded by a variety of trees and flowers, served as settings for banquets and royal receptions and for hunts and private retreats.

Within the realm of the palace, as in public places, the structures of Süleyman’s early years stand out through their decorative programmes rather than through innovations in architectural design. In this field, as in the ornamentation of books and other objects, the cultural impact of Ottoman conquests in the east and south was determinant. Thus Mamluk-style marble revetments decorated the Çoban Mustafa Paşa complex in Gebze, and the polychrome tile revetments of Selim I’s mosque and mausoleum were in all probability the work of the Tabrizi masters who had arrived in Istanbul in the wake of the Safavid wars; within the same years, these artists also created the celebrated Sünnet Odası tiles for a Topkapı kiosk. The chief architect, Acem Alisi, or Alaüddin, was the person mainly responsible for this focus on colourful surface revetments. However, in his architectural designs he was more conservative: the works attributed to him closely follow earlier models with regard to planning, the spatial configurations of individual structures and compounds, and building materials and techniques.

Acem Alisi’s successor was Sinan, whose appointment as chief architect in the late 1530s coincided with a multivalent transformation in Ottoman political structures and culture. Bureaucratisation and the creation of further

83 Necipoğlu, Architecture, Ceremonial and Power, pp. 184–97 and passim.
hierarchical administrative structures accompanied the consolidation of a corporate elite identity; transformations in imperial ideology and iconography paralleled the growing centrality of Sunni orthodoxy in imperial institutions and discourse. Parallel to the tighter organisation of the ehl-i hıref artisans, Sinan’s tenure as head of court architects in turn brought further bureaucratisation to the corps, closer connections to and control of building crafts, and an expansion of the functions of the royal architectural office at large. The main provider of architectural services to the sultan and his expanded household at a time when institutional patronage became increasingly central to elite identity and conduct, the corps of architects and its chief often had to negotiate the various and at times conflicting demands of their patrons. Apart from being a site of architectural education, the corps of architects was now a central office of public works. Its responsibilities ranged from the building of waterways and military structures to the supervision of the expansive building industry and related crafts, but also to municipal duties such as the upkeep of streets and the enforcement of building codes regarding the public and private buildings of the city’s inhabitants. Practical considerations apart, codes regulating architecture served to maintain and render visible societal distinctions and ethno-religious hierarchies. The visual configuration of non-Muslim houses of worship was tightly monitored; by contrast, given the largely shared vernacular idiom of various communities in the centre and the provinces, official efforts to impose visual distinctions often focused on the location, size and colour of residences. The regulations by the corps reflected deeply entrenched visual codes of hierarchy and propriety envisioned by the elite at this time, which sought to order the material environment down to the interior arrangement and furnishings of urban dwellings, as reflected in Mustafa Ali’s detailed prescriptions for housing and


fittings proper to a given person’s class and status. The corps also appointed and supervised “city architects” (şehir mimarlar), who had similar responsibilities in provincial capitals.

Bureaucratization was in turn intimately connected to the new architectural ventures of the Ottoman court. An outstanding focus on public building projects within and outside of the capital responded to the articulation of new representational agendas on the one hand and on the other to the rapid increase in urban population, particularly in Istanbul. A new architectural image was formulated to correspond to the new imperial image. It is not coincidental that Sinan’s architectural masterpieces are congregational mosques built for Ottoman sultans, members of the dynasty and the political elite. These buildings broke away completely from the multi-functional convent-mosque, an architectural marker of the earlier era of close rapport between centre and frontiers, and a more inclusive notion of religious practice. Endowing Istanbul with a stronger Islamic identity and conveying an image of the Ottoman centre to the provinces, these constructions simultaneously articulated a hegemonic visual regime predicated upon a stratified system of architectural representation. Hence Sinan and his co-workers articulated an iconography of mosques, highly specific to the period between the 1540s and the 1570s, which visually distinguished sultanic and dynastic structures through a set of architectural markers such as multiple minarets, marble-paved forecourts, half-domes and tympana arches referring to the architecture of the Hagia Sophia. Current socio-political hierarchies determined the locations where individual members of the elite might build their charities, whether in the capital city or across the imperial territories at large. Never before the Süleymanic age or anytime afterwards would such strictly defined codes dictate the forms and limits of architectural patronage with such crystalline clarity (Figures 13.21, 13.22, and 13.23).

Urban, suburban and inter-city complexes sponsored by members of the ruling elite reflected changing dispositions and new agendas of Ottoman rule and the growing funds that patrons were willing to allocate to architectural self-representation. Süleyman’s Istanbul complex (1548–59), built on a site

91 Ibid.
carved out of the Old Palace grounds, responded to and surpassed that of Mehmed II in scale and range of institutions. With the magnified and elaborately designed volumes and facades of its mosque and the expansive composition of its dependencies on the Golden Horn slopes, the Süleymaniye announced its primacy among a host of projects that altered the image of the Ottoman capital in the later 1500s. Its construction coinciding with Ottoman re-formulations of Sunni orthodoxy that marked the middle decades of the 1500s, the Süleymaniye announced this new emphasis on religion through its layout, decoration and epigraphic programme.92

The ruling elite remained major sponsors of urban institutions, continuing patronage patterns that had been established in the 1460s and 1470s. However, the institutions that these personages founded changed, congregational mosques replacing the convent-mosques of earlier periods and medreses gaining precedence over the public kitchens and prominently located bath-houses earlier patrons had chosen to construct. Among the grand vezirs of these

decades, Rüstem Paşa (1544–53) and Sokollu Mehmed Paşa (1565–79) emerged as highly visible patrons of charities and infrastructural projects throughout the imperial territories, particularly along major trade and pilgrimage routes.93

The architectural patronage of dynastic women in the capital city was a novelty concurrent with a set of transformations in their political roles. Dynastic women’s works became part and parcel of the visual hierarchies articulated in Istanbul through the later sixteenth century. Beginning with Hürrrem, the beloved and powerful consort and later wife of Süleyman, women of the dynastic family assumed increasingly salient roles as patrons of urban institutions and architecture. Hürrrem’s complex (1537–40, hospital added in 1551) is still situated in a somewhat remote spot, to the north of the Byzantine

Figure 13.21c. Süleymaniye mosque and mausoleum, Istanbul, 1550–7, architect Sinan: plan. (Boğaziçi University Aptullah Kuran Archive)

Figure 13.22. The mausoleum of Süleyman I: (a) interior, (b) section. (Boğaziçi University Aptullah Kuran Archive; Ali Saim Ülgen, *Mimar Sinan Yapıları*, detail from Plate 34)
Forum of Arcadius (Ottoman Avratpazarı), on the southern branch of the Mese. It bespeaks the gendered nature of choices Hürrem made regarding her foundation and her prospects as a patroness of architecture. The more prominent buildings were a public kitchen and a hospital alongside a medrese, in addition to a small, single-domed mosque. In the following years, such relatively marginal siting options would give way to increasingly prominent buildings sponsored by women. In the 1550s, Hürrem was to commission

a double bath designed by the architect Sinan at the very heart of the city, across from the Hagia Sophia (Figure 13.23). The daughter of Süleyman and Hürrem, Mihrimah, was able to place her two projects at major points of entry into Istanbul, first in Üsküdar (ca. 1544–8) and then in Edirnekapı (ca. 1563–70); the prominence of these sites once again highlights the growing visibility of women’s works in the Ottoman capital. Both women undertook expansive charities on sites of religious significance in the empire’s Arab-speaking provinces, Hürrem in Jerusalem and Mihrimah in Mecca. Yet in construction they undertook jointly with their husbands, royal women were often overshadowed by their prominent spouses, a case in point being the foundation of Selim II’s daughter İsmihan Sultan and Sokollu Mehmed Paşa near the Kadırga port in Istanbul.

Drawing upon standardised formal vocabularies and typologies that characterised the uniform and static architectural designs of the earlier sixteenth century, Sinan and the atelier he directed focused on a number of formal problems with brilliant effect. The centrally planned sanctuary covered by a

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system of domes and vaults was a constant theme throughout Sinan’s long career. Modes of massing and architectonic expression, the spatial articulation and lighting of the domed sanctuary, and the manner of relating buildings to urban or suburban environments, on the other hand, changed in the context of particular projects and in response to the altering tastes, demands and means of the patrons at issue (Figure 13.24).  

Figure 13.24b. (b) İsmihan Sultan and Sokollu Mehmed Paşa mosque, Istanbul, 1571–2, architect Sinan, interior view towards the south. (Photograph Boğaziçi University Aptullah Kuran Archive)

“In proportion to the abundance or paucity of piers, columns, and buttresses, [the architect] should close up the domes and half-domes, and bind the arches together in an agreeable manner, without carelessness”, wrote Sinan, when he was defining the difficult art of architecture. Following a note on the importance of sound foundations, this brief remark nevertheless highlights the primacy of domed construction and the relationship between the roof and the support system in his designs. Sinan explored means of transmuting the simple geometries of earlier designs into intricately articulated volumes of a structurally integrated roof system and load-bearing masonry structure. The pyramidal masses of his earlier sultanic mosques and the heavily buttressed, strongly grounded smaller sanctuaries all possessed an evident sculptural quality. As for the major royal commissions of these decades, the Şehzade and the Süleymaniye mosques each featured a complex of domes, half-domes, turrets and weight towers, their pyramidal composition reflected also in rhythmic façade compositions. These designs bespoke a radical breakaway from the additive nature of earlier domed construction, where an abrupt transition from the wall system of the prayer hall to the roof created a linear break between the prismatic mass of the sanctuary and the domical superstructure. A composite mass of domes and half-domes, and the load-bearing structure composed of walls and free-standing elements now encircled a unified interior where space seemed to be in continuous flow.

The primary monument Sinan designed for Selim II, the Selimiye in Edirne (1568–74), announced a re-formulation of the architectural configurations of the chief architect’s earlier sultanic mosques. A new emphasis on the verticality of the singular dome and on façade articulations informed the design of the mosque, whose structural system based on an octagonal baldachin uncompromisingly centralised interior space, and bold volumetric massing were tightly interlocked. Through the 1570s and 1580s, possibly in response to the increasingly dense urban fabric of Istanbul, Sinan and the architects of the corps he directed continued to explore accents on verticality. The singular dome on a high drum, surrounded now with vaults or smaller domes at a lower level, created a roof system that was once more clearly separated from...
the prismatic mass of the load-bearing structure. Façade designs that became increasingly planar and increasingly transparent, with uniform tiers of windows, further accentuated the dynamic and vertical visual effect of these later mosques. The composition of the façade was now divorced from the domed baldachin inside.99

A continuous, highly creative dialogue with monumental architecture across time and space accounts for a number of visual constants as well as a set of specific references in Sinan’s design and highlights the historical-mindedness that shaped his work and, at the very end of his career, his autobiographies as well. A lifelong engagement with the Hagia Sofia shapes his major sultanic monuments in the form of re-interpretations, as in the Süleymaniye, competitive response, as in the Selimiye, or direct quotations, as in the Kılıç Ali Paşa mosque near the imperial gun foundry. The double-domed mausoleums of Süleyman I and Selim II refer back to the late antique building tradition, with spatial configurations and roof structures that hark back to martyria. Süleyman’s octagonal, double-domed and porticoed mausoleum refers to the Dome of the Rock. Selim II’s funerary monument, perhaps in response to the Hagia Sofia, in whose enclosure it stands, invokes late Roman building traditions not only in its double-shell structure and deep exedrae, expanding the octagonal space under the dome, but also in its marble-faced walls with highly pronounced mouldings.100

Creative engagement with the past and allusions to monuments or forms that responded to the status or demands of Sinan’s patrons informed buildings in other ways as well. It has been suggested that the Uljaytu mausoleum in Sultanîyya near Tabriz resonated in the tower-marked octagonal base of the Selimiye dome; courtyard fountains of the Şehzade and the Rüstem Paşa medreses formally alluded to medieval tomb towers of Anatolia. Sinan revisited late fifteenth-century experiments with octagonal enclosures in Haseki Hürrem’s hospital, built in the 1550s, and again in the Rüstem Paşa medrese of the 1560s. A paradigmatic monument of the earlier fifteenth century, the Üç Şerefeli mosque in Edirne, informed the design of several projects. Sinan’s façade compositions of the 1570s and 1580s were increasingly elaborate and may have been responses to contemporary Italian experiments, particularly St. Peter’s in Rome.101

Decorative programmes and preferences varied according to building types and the status of the patrons: palatial structures and royal tombs were intensely decorated, and monumental mosques often bore deliberate, if subdued, decorative programs, but utilitarian structures were accorded few embellishments. The royal mausoleums of Süleyman and his immediate family featured polychrome marble floors and wall revetments, patterned and inscribed İznik tiles, densely painted and richly gilded stucco surfaces, carved wood, polychrome voussoirs, muqarnas capitals and transition zones, and marble cornices (Figure 13.22). Another ornamental layer of luxury textiles and objects of material and symbolic value further adorned these buildings. Without doubt, Sinan’s royal mausoleums were among the most lavishly decorated structures of the period.

By contrast, in Friday mosques, with the notable exception of Rüstem Paşa’s foundation, decorative features selectively accentuated structural or symbolic foci (Figure 13.24). Polychrome İznik tiles carrying designs of the new floral aesthetic on a white background harmonised with the textures and colours of the sandstone masonry and marble details of the interiors. The epigraphic programmes of these monuments, comprising Qur’anic verses, hadith and the eight revered names (Allah, Muhammad, the four caliphs, Hasan and Husayn), were deliberate textual compositions meant to communicate the intentions of the patrons. Executed in paint or on tiles, monumental cursive scripts re-interpreted by Ahmed Karahisari (d. 1556) sought to augment their visibility and legibility with bold contrasts of colour. The disparity between the surface embellishments of mosques and mausoleums suggests that restraint in decoration, often noted in the literature as a defining aspect of Sinan’s architecture, was highly contextual. The connection between structure and surface revetments, on the other hand, did remain a constant through this period, as observed in one of the earlier buildings designed by Sinan, the tomb of Şehzade Mehmed (1543–4): the sumptuously designed cuerda secca tiles follow and frame the structural and fenestration lines, foreshadowing later uses of tile decoration. As the solemn and authoritarian orthodoxy of the 1550s and 1560s gave way to a livelier religious culture, the earlier visual

Figure 13.25. (a) Köse Hüsrev Paşa mosque and mausoleum, Van, 1567–8, 1587–8, architect Sinan (photograph Boğaziçi University Aptullah Kuran Archive); (b) Khan al-Gumruk, Aleppo, interior facade of courtyard, 1560s or 1570s (photograph by the author)
restraint in monumental religious buildings gave way to a more liberal use of ornament and colour, as the rich decorative programmes of the Selimiye and other projects of these decades indicate.  

Construction in the capital focused on central arteries, city gates, and focal points on the seashore, and also on certain residential neighbourhoods. The orthogonal planning principles that had shaped many complexes beginning with Mehmed II’s foundation in Istanbul now gave way to subtler uses of geometry. Like earlier Ottoman patrons and architects, Sinan and his patrons were not engaged in integrating public squares or broad arteries into architectural design through uses of linear perspective. Sinan instead created complex and multivalent architectural compositions whereby the hilly terrain of Istanbul and its dense urban fabric became integral design components. He expertly manipulated multiple points of physical and visual access to the constructed order of the buildings, not only in the prime monument of the age, the Süleymaniye, but also in relatively minor works such as the mosque complexes founded by Princess İsmihan and Sokollu Mehmed Paşa in Kadırga (1567–71) and by Princess Şahsultan and Zal Mahmud Paşa in Eyüp (1577–90).

A similar frenzy of construction spread out over the empire as a whole, as the sultan, the dynastic family and members of the ruling elite undertook construction along the routes connecting the capital to major cities and the frontiers. Patrons also sponsored important foundations in provincial cities of symbolic, political or economic importance. Away from the capital and its vicinity, the role of the chief architect was mostly limited to the creation or approval of designs that would then be realised by lesser members of the corps or by local architects. In this regard, the architectural and urbanistic elaboration that marked Istanbul and its environs found diverse reflections in the provinces. Urban or inter-city complexes might be conceived in an expansive manner, often elaborating on orthogonal planning principles in use since the 1460s. But construction usually remained simplistic in comparison to the intricate structural and spatial displays in Istanbul.

In the vast and differentiated cultural geography of the Ottoman domains, the visual idiom of the imperial centre was filtered through a variety of lenses (Figure 13.25). Regional idioms were selectively integrated into the imperial visual order. The level of patronage, the agency of local architects, craftsmen and intermediaries and the cultural politics of the centre vis-à-vis various social

groups and provinces all played a part in determining which architectural and decorative elements of local origin might enter buildings commissioned by members of the ruling elite. In the empire’s eastern provinces, where founders of urban institutions had to reckon with extant networks of clients, the Ottoman visual order readily absorbed the earlier Islamic heritage. Balkan projects often showed fewer references to local traditions and greater adherence to the basic features of established building types.\(^\text{105}\)

Buildings sponsored by the Ottoman elite might, however, have an impact on non-Muslim religious architecture in the provinces; thus the use of a hexagonal baldachin in the Greek Orthodox church of Daou Pendili near Athens points to the appeal of a typical Istanbul mosque layout for a non-Muslim community. Since throughout this period the imperial architectural office employed considerable numbers of non-Muslim architects, the agent of this design may well have been a court-trained master.\(^\text{106}\) At the same time, such a use is indicative of the looser architectonic codes and practices of signification in at least certain provinces, for no Orthodox patron could have undertaken such a project in Istanbul. In cities, the regulations of the centre dictated the small sizes and unambitious architectural layouts of non-Muslim houses of worship where domes, if constructed, were concealed under pitched roofs. Monastic establishments of the Greek Orthodox community, on the other hand, did sponsor larger-scale domed churches through this period. In the Balkan provinces, monasteries of Mount Athos remained a source for designs that often followed medieval Byzantine prototypes, while contemporary Ottoman design and ornamentation on the one hand and itinerant workshops on the other did have an impact on several projects of this period.\(^\text{107}\)

Particularly where public structures were concerned, in the later 1500s the sheer speed and volume of work necessitated a full-fledged organisation of


design and construction, procurement of labour and building materials and a degree of modularisation through standard sizes for frequently needed construction elements. Building materials from different sources also needed to be of more or less uniform quality, and it was the job of the sultan’s bureaucrats to ensure that artisans complied. Account books documenting royal constructions and related sources reflect the complex choreography of orders, objects and peoples dispersed in distant parts of the empire but converging on a particular construction site, often in Istanbul. Orders to İznik or Uşak describe the sizes, colours and motifs of custom-made tiles or carpets that were to decorate and furnish new buildings. Account books detailing expenses for materials and workforce, wherever they exist, render tangible this feverish activity centred on a given building. Workmen collected and transported spolia from antique sites, quarried stone and felled timber, while kadıs and other officials searched for masters as well as skilled and unskilled labourers; often craftsmen came to the building site as deportees. This highly bureaucratised and centralised system often, but not always, worked smoothly. Conflicts did occur even between the sultan and his chief architect, as Sinan vividly remembered in his memoirs.108 In other cases, the various urban ateliers preferred to satisfy market demands and neglected those of the court, for as so often happened all over Eurasia the administration was a poor paymaster.109

The vague and interchangeable Ottoman vocabulary for design and the paucity of extant source material allow but partial conclusions concerning the methods of design and construction. At times, Ottoman officials attempted to clarify the malleable term resm by using the elaboration resm-i mücessem (model); karname could indicate a plan, an elevation or a model. Extant drawings and written documents suggest that builders used gridded ground plans, which deployed a range of Persianate and Italianate representational conventions of draughtsmanship, and less frequently also elevations and models. The highly uniform architectural style and typology and standardised building materials minimised pre-construction design work, particularly in less ambitious projects.

Through standard measurements, proportional systems and modules, architects could determine a building’s primary features.110 Masters used

108 Crane, Akın and Necipoğlu, Sinan’s Autobiographies, p. 125.
paper or cloth models and stencilled drawings for laying out decorative and epigraphic programmes; they might also prepare individualised designs, as well as templates for regularly repeated units. Elaborate architectural models often served for presentations and ceremonial purposes only.\textsuperscript{111}

Detailed orders and reports on finalised projects survive which may or may not have been accompanied by drawings. These documents hint at the role of verbal description in design and planning, for which a highly articulate vocabulary was available. Residues of a largely oral culture of craftsman-ship and master–apprentice relations in addition to the highly circumscribed mode of education within the corps of architects may have led to the continued relevance of verbal description alongside a range of visual devices. Cafer Efendi’s expansive tri-lingual dictionary of architectural and related terminology appended to his \textit{Risale-i Mîmârîyye}, too, indicates the wealth of verbal representation and its importance in design and construction processes.\textsuperscript{112}

Representing new configurations of power, ca. 1570–1600

Rapidly changing power dynamics at the sultan’s court through the final decades of the sixteenth century impacted Ottoman visual culture in multiple ways. Profound transformations in the workings of the administrative apparatus and economy resulted in political turbulence, internecine struggles, massive uprisings and on the whole considerable tension during these decades when patronage patterns were radically altered. Increasingly, the more sedentary lifestyle of the monarch allowed members of the inner palace organisation, including women, court officials and servants, to take on more central roles in political decision-making on the one hand and artistic patronage on the other.

Shifts in the structure of Ottoman rule, together with financial troubles, began to have a visible effect on court culture, transforming modes of elite self-fashioning and representation. These decades saw an expansion in reading and book culture in the urban milieus of the Ottoman realm which translated into courtly art and visual culture as a remarkable increase in the


The visual arts

production of illustrated and illuminated manuscripts. The range of subjects that appealed to Ottoman elite consumers of illustrated works expanded as patrons assembled larger and increasingly more prestigious book collections. During these decades, a wave of bibliophilia at the sultan’s court was concurrent with a concern for historiography: visual representations of the recent or ancient past dominated the iconographic programmes of illustrated manuscripts across a range of diverse genres.

On the other hand, by the late 1500s, architectural investments visibly shrank, not only in number but also in the scale of buildings sponsored, as patrons adjusted their aspirations to their diminishing means. It is perhaps emblematic that Mehmed III’s royal mother Safiye was unable to complete the great mosque complex that she undertook at just that time. Financial reasons were partly responsible for the – provisional – termination of the project, alongside the factional politics at the court that facilitated but at the same time circumscribed a queen mother’s architectural patronage.

Architectural: The canon reconsidered

The final decades of the sixteenth century saw a series of parallel changes in the architectural field. Novel formal choices and representational agendas emerged as patronage mechanisms changed and construction industries and the empire-wide organisation of architectural activity entered a period of critical transformation. Alterations in the power dynamics of the Ottoman court brought a new set of patrons, queen mothers, vezirs of the Imperial Council and eunuchs of the court to the fore of an increasingly diminished architectural activity in the capital. Even so, the complex founded by Murad III’s mother, Nurbanu, at the edge of Üsküdar (1571–85) was second only to Süleyman’s and Mehmed II’s foundations in the city proper. It bespoke the growing power, wealth and influence of the queen mother within the rapidly changing dynamics of the court. Nurbanu’s foundation combined the characteristics of urban and roadside complexes, with its accommodations and charities including a large caravanserai and hospice compound, a school, a dervish lodge and a mosque bearing the royal sign of twin minarets. A double bath on the Divan artery displayed Nurbanu’s patronage in the walled city. In the closing years of the century, Saiye Sultan’s unfinished project for a great congregational mosque complex at Istanbul’s Eminönü waterfront bespoke the – highly contested – reversal of patronage prerogatives, now claimed by another powerful queen mother. 113

113 Kuran, Mimar Sinan, pp. 163–81; Necipoğlu, The Age of Sinan, pp. 280–92; Lucienne Thys Şenocak, Ottoman Women Builders: The Architectural Patronage of Hadice Turhan Sultan
Sinan’s final works in the capital, built for members of the imperial council and two court eunuchs, further reflected the reversal of status hierarchies formulated in the mid-1500s. During Sinan’s last years as chief architect and the decade following his demise, sultans were no longer the major builders in Istanbul, the institutional priorities of patrons changed, and new formal trends emerged. Architects responded to the increasingly dense urban fabric of the capital city when designing public buildings. The vertical masses of mosques were articulated by façade compositions of multiple tiers of windows, stringcourse mouldings and cornices. The mosque of Nişancı Mehmed Paşa, attributed to Sinan’s successor Davud Ağa, re-interpreted the octagonal baldachin system of Sinan’s Selimiye mosque, creating a highly sculpted system of supports and screen walls surrounding the space under the central dome. Vezirs’ and eunuchs’ mosques of the following decades featured variations of the polygonal domed baldachin, while the Şehzade mosque was to provide the model for all such sultanic foundations – including the queen mother’s mosque at the Eminönü waterfront – into the middle decades of the eighteenth century.

Lack of available land and the diminished resources of the founders in an age of recurrent financial crises explain the smaller sizes and contracted functional ranges of foundations established by the Ottoman ruling elite in Istanbul. Its institutional configuration, reminiscent of the Mamluk foundations of medieval Cairo, a small complex housing a medrese, the mausoleum of the founder, and a public water dispenser (sebil), became the major form of foundation patronage. The complex of the grand vezir Sinan Paşa on the city’s ceremonial axis and that of the chief white eunuch Gazanfer Ağa abutting the Valens aqueduct represent this trend (Figure 13.26). Sinan Paşa’s tenure as the governor of Egypt, during which he sponsored an Ottoman-style congregational mosque in Cairo, may point to the mediation of elite patrons not only in transposing the imperial style to the provinces but also in introducing provincial architectural and urban practices to the capital city. Sometimes the classroom of the medrese also served as a mescit; less frequently, these relatively small complexes also possessed a dervish convent.


115 Erzen, Mimar Sinan Dönemi Cami Cepheleri; Kuban, Ortaçağ Mimarisi, pp. 381–90.
Figure 13.26. Sinan Paşa medrese, mausoleum and sebil complex, Istanbul, 1593, architect Davud Ağa: (a) view from the west, (b) plan. (Gülrü Necipoğlu, Age of Sinan, p. 509)
A new, more interactive relationship to the urban context shaped these foundations. While the circular forms of their ornate sebils jutted out into the street, their window-pierced enclosure walls, often running along a major artery, prominently displayed the mausoleum and the medrese within. Minor complexes that engaged the street in their design gave the Divan artery its contiguous architectural form.¹¹⁷

Novel dynamics of rule also changed the uses of the Topkapı Palace. An extensive rebuilding of the palace’s harem section in the 1570s and 1580s most clearly reflected the new style of rule of the increasingly sedentary sultan. Here the queen mother Nurbanu and her son inhabited newly built and furnished quarters. Turning the former privy chamber into a space for exhibiting holy relics, Murad III moved the royal residence permanently into the harem. This section of the palace acquired a new spatial organisation, with assemblages of rooms organised around several courtyards and opening into hanging gardens. Its complex, hierarchically ordered layout embodied the intricate hierarchies of the court, including the harem, where the queen mother, the sultan’s consorts and the eunuchs wielded growing power and influence.¹¹⁸

*Past looking: Picturing the golden age, negotiating the present*

The final decades of the sixteenth century are marked by an unprecedented interest in the production of luxury manuscripts on the part of the ruling elite; this trend was part of an increasingly vivacious Ottoman book culture. Presumably the love of Murad III for beautiful books helped to set the fashion for manuscript collecting among his courtiers. In fact, the bibliophile sultan ruled at a time when transformations in the structure of Ottoman rule compelled members of the ruling elite to articulate or to re-define their collective and individual self-image vis-à-vis the broader configuration of power and to insert themselves ever more boldly into the rapidly changing political landscape. While the most prestigious books were still destined for the sultan’s private treasury, patronage and ownership of lavishly produced manuscripts became a prestigious sign of membership in the elite. Manuscript patronage and collecting was one channel through which an increasingly wider circle of patrons and intermediaries could negotiate new modes of representation within a rapidly changing world.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ On late sixteenth-century transformations and historiography, see Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafâ Âli (1541–1600)*.
Multi- or single-volume histories and genealogies of the house of Osman, accounts of recent and contemporary events and world histories integrating Ottomans into a venerable ancient and Islamic past were produced in illustrated copies. Sokollu, the seasoned grand vezir of Süleyman’s later years, who remained in power through Murad III’s early sultanate, had a central role in the initiation of the late sixteenth-century historiographic project. Other prominent actors in this frenzied production were Feridun Ahmed Bey, the head of the palace chancery; Seyyid Lokman, appointed to the post of şehnameci in 1569 and active through the early 1590s; and Nakkaş Osman, a master painter at the sultan’s court by 1566 and the leading figure in palace-sponsored projects through the 1590s.120

Histories in the şehname format followed the track opened by the Süleymanname. Among them was a volume covering the last years of Süleyman’s reign (Zafername, 1579), a Şehname-i Selim Han (1581) and a Şehinsahname (1581) on the reign of Murad III up to 1580. In 1579, court artists completed a serial portrait album of Ottoman sultans, named Kiyafet’i’l Insaniye fi Şemailü’l Osmaniye ("The Human Physiognomy in the Likenesses of the Ottomans"), which included verbal descriptions of the features, demeanour and endeavours of each individual ruler.

A world history in Turkish, begun during the reign of Süleyman, was completed in 1583. Focusing on the lives of the prophets, with its final section devoted to the Ottoman dynasty, the large-sized and luxurious Zübdetü’l-Tevarîh ("The Cream of Histories") straddles the genres of historical narrative and genealogy. Its paintings include scenes from the lives of the prophets and portraits of caliphs, imams and the Ottoman sultans. Portraits in the Zübdetü’l-Tevarîh partake of the genre of serial portraiture elaborated by the contemporary atelier of Nakkaş Osman. On the other hand, the narrative images present novel interpretations of established norms of Persianate religious and literary iconography, at times transposing the norms of Ottoman historical painting into the realms of myth and ancient history. The initial volume of another dynastic history in Turkish, the Hünername ("The Book of Arts and Skills"), conceived in four volumes, was completed in 1584. Continuing, like


120 Bağcı et al., Ottoman Painting, pp. 113–20, Fetvacı, ‘Viziers to Eunuchs’, pp. 83–139.

In terms of their thematic range, illustrations belonging to the histories composed in the 1570s and early 1580s were in part closely related to earlier Ottoman historical painting: campaign and siege scenes, enthronements and receptions, and images of the royal hunt predominated. Artists adapted Sháhname imagery not only to Ottoman settings but also to Ottoman ideals, and, as in the Süleymanname, they explored new visual formulations for significant loci and events.\footnote{Bağcı, ‘Visualizing Power’.} Numerous images interpreted narrations of the death and funeral of Süleyman and his succession by Selim II, visually underlining the role of Sokollu Mehmed Paşa both as a principal actor of the period and as a patron and intermediary in the production of these illustrated chronicles.\footnote{Fetvacı, ‘Viziers to Eunuchs’, pp. 88–9.} Painters also celebrated Selim II’s restoration of the Hagia Sofia with an image of the building that conflated not only elevation and perspective renderings but also ideal and actual representations of the building’s fabric. City images drew upon models used by Piri Reis or the circle of Matrakçı, or at times translated prints into the medium of book painting. Siege and battle scenes often incorporated such topographic representations, such as the many depictions of the conquest of Szigetvar (1566) or the siege of Malta (1565) in the Şehname-i Selim Han.

While thematically following earlier Ottoman tradition, these illustrations mediated transformations of the representational idiom. Relatively more open compositions of interior scenes supplanted the rigid frames and frozen formality of the Süleymanname. Such images reflected the calculated calm of tightly choreographed events at court, where the size of a figure, its relationship to others and its spatial location still conveyed status and power. An expansive perspective that allowed compelling portrayals of massive military operations or the restrained grandeur of crowded court ceremonials replaced
the narrower frames of earlier images. Within highly detailed plan-views of the Topkapı Palace and its outer gardens, artists set scenes depicting the busy daily life in the first two courtyards and the private realm of the third court. Figures were now smaller in relation to the architectural or natural settings in which they moved. Tight groupings, multiple axes, a subdued palette of background colours and a limited use of surface ornament in architecture and landscapes created images of greater complexity while at the same time augmenting their legibility. Double-page paintings depicted battlefields, palatial courtyards or interiors, or urban plazas or streets, the breadth and comprehensiveness of their spaces often emphasised by the horizontal stacking of planes (Figure 13.27). Such arrangements appeared through the 1580s and remained a distinguishing feature, particularly of the imperial histories.²⁴

Courtly patrons collaborated with the şehnameci Lokman and the team of book artists under the direction of Nakkaş Osman in the creation of yet another novel format, namely the royal portrait album. Tightly connected to

Figure 13.27. Mehmed III returns from the Eger campaign, Ta’likizade, Egri Fetihnamesi, 1596–1600. (Turkish and Islamic Arts Museum, Istanbul, T.1965, fols. 68v–69r)
the historical deliberation of these decades in its genealogical focus and produced within the same years as the Zübdetüt’t-Tevarih, the Kıyafetti’l İnsaniye fi Şemallı’l Osmaniye (1579) derives from multiple Timurid, Ottoman and Italian sources to create an iconography of royal portraiture. The surviving documentation concerning this imagery reveals the intricate interconnectedness of a diverse range of cultural spheres, and particularly the complex webs of reciprocity between Ottoman collectors and painters on the one hand and their Italian counterparts on the other. Distinct but related formulations of the Ottoman royal image emerged in Istanbul manuscript illustrations, Venetian oil paintings and Basel prints, to name only the primary centres and media of production.125

Further additions to the historiographic corpus introduced thematic and visual novelties to courtly painting. Contemporary and recent history remained the focus of elite patrons, as the writing and illustration of dynastic history became one of the sites where new power dynamics were negotiated, and artists and patrons conveyed the image of an increasingly sedentary sultan.126 One of the most lavish productions of the palace ateliers of these decades, the Surname-i Humayun, is a narrative of the festival celebrating the circumcision of the crown prince Mehmed in 1582.127 This volume contains several hundred double-page paintings, the vast majority of which represent various performances and processions at the Istanbul Hippodrome. Artisan communities, alongside other – largely urban – professional groups, passed before the sultan and his entourage of grandees and prestigious guests, displaying their products or enacting aspects of their profession. While music, dance and theatrical performances had been common to such festivals earlier in the 1500s, the artisan processions and their representation were novelties, underlining the new prominence of craft organisations within the social landscape. Against the unchanging backdrop of the iconic sultan and his grandees, the successive images of the Surname captured an immensely colourful show. Taken together, the paintings and the text added up to an imperial self-portrait of a different kind, an ideal construction of the Ottoman social order as choreographed by the palace, at the ceremonial centre of the capital city.

Creating visual and textual portraits of Süleyman as the ideal ruler and of the empire as a sphere of just rule, the second volume of Lokman’s *Hünername* (1589) resonated with the mood for historical reflection characteristic of the late sixteenth century. This volume focused on the bravery and power of the sultan as reflected in his skills as a hunter, his military prowess and conquests, his justice, and his benevolence reflected in charitable works; significantly, the latter were situated in the eastern territories, whose institutional and visual Ottomanisation had been a concern during Süleyman’s reign. In consequence, the book, and the series to which it belonged, has been interpreted as an Ottoman version of the mirrors-for-princes, where narrative paintings visualised the abstract qualities attributed to the sultan and to Ottoman imperial ideology at large.128

When preparing the text (1592) and illustrations of the *Şehinşahname* (before 1597–8) authors and artists adjusted to the increasingly sedentary lifestyle of the sultan. While military scenes largely repeated the formal conventions devised in the 1580s, it was now not the monarch who appeared as the commander of his armies but rather one of his *vezirs* or governors.129 The court historiographer Talikizade created the last *şehnames* of the sixteenth century; their paintings have been attributed to a courtier who would rise to high administrative posts, namely Nakkaş Hasan or Hasan Paşa.130 Unlike Haydar Reis, another courtier-painter who worked independently of the palace workshops, Hasan followed, and in part transformed, the conventions of courtly painting that had taken shape, particularly during Nakkaş Osman’s tenure as master of the ateliers. His topographic representation of the princely capital of Manisa, and his image of Mehmed III’s urban procession in celebration of the victorious Eger campaign, develop representational conventions formulated by the painters that had illustrated the work of Matrakçi in the 1530s and by Nakkaş Osman in the 1580s.

At the same time as patrons and painters transformed the thematic range of the *şehname* series, they also created a new sub-genre of illustrated history, the *gazaname*, narrating in text and image mostly the military exploits of *vezir*-commanders. Mustafa Ali’s *Nusretname* (1581, presentation copy 1584), a narrative of the Persian campaign under the command of the author’s patron Lala Mustafa Paşa, featured images of military confrontations, receptions and fortress restorations. Scenes from the commander’s eastward journey

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128 Bağcı, ‘Visualizing Power’.
included a sumptuous banquet near İznik and a meeting with the sheikh of the Mevlevi dervishes at Konya.\textsuperscript{131} Lacking the spatial expansiveness and the visual economy that marked paintings in the Lokman volumes created under the direction of Nakkaş Osman, the Nusretname nevertheless shared the late sixteenth-century pictorial idiom of the sultan’s court. In the process, artists and patrons created a new image of the commander, deliberately conflated with royal iconography to imbue the vezir’s public persona with attributes of sultanic power. While the pictorial idioms of the several illustrated gazanames created in the 1580s and 1590s varied considerably, they all translated the Ottoman şehname imagery into the accounts of vezirs and their exploits.

In the changing political configuration, eunuchs of the court gained a hitherto unprecedented visibility. Vested with increasing authority and power primarily through their roles as intermediaries for sultans and dynastic women, eunuchs participated as patrons and intermediaries in artistic ventures. The chief black eunuch Mehmed Ağa was involved in ambitious projects of the court workshops, such as the Surname and the Zübdetü‘t-Tevarih, and was the main intermediary for the production of an illustrated gazaname, the Gencine-i Feth-i Gence. Gazanfer Aga, chief white eunu of the inner palace and an important figure in Ottoman cultural patronage at the turn of the seventeenth century, was likewise an intermediary in the production of Mustafa Ali’s Nusretname. He was also involved in one of the final Ottoman şehnames, the Egri Fethi Şehnamesi, which as already noted narrated Mehmed III’s conquest of the Hungarian fort of Eger, in an attempt to revive the image of the warrior sultan of earlier decades. At the same time, Gazanfer contributed to the new expansion of book culture at the court, sponsoring illustrated copies of literary and esoteric works such as the translations of Cami’s Baharistan and al-Bistami’s Miftah al-jafir al-jami. Zeyrek Ağa, another highly influential courtier, a eunuch of the harem who also served as ağa of the inner treasury, proudly announced his patronage on the gold-stamped and jewel-encrusted binding of one of the most sumptuous manuscripts of the period, the Divan of Murad III, a frame of ultimate aesthetic and material value for the sultan’s poetry.\textsuperscript{132}

Unlike the histories and conquest narratives of earlier decades, which only existed in single copies destined for the imperial treasury, after the 1580s palace

\textsuperscript{131} Bağcı et al., Ottoman Painting, pp. 167–71; Fet vacı, ‘Viziers to Eunuchs’, pp. 144–62.
workshops at times made multiple copies of particular works, underlining the growing range, number and visibility of patrons and intermediaries. Sharing a focus on Ottoman genealogy, the Zübdetü’t-Tevarih and Şemai’nâme became the property of individuals occupying the highest echelons of the Ottoman hierarchy; books of literary and esoteric subject matter, too, survive in multiple copies. Dynastic women also came to act as patrons of illustrated manuscripts: in 1582, Murad III’s two daughters, Ayşe and Fatma Sultan, each received an illustrated copy of Suudi’s book on astrology and divination, translated into Turkish as Matali’üs-Sa’ade.

Illustrated works of religious, literary, mystical and esoteric content attracted courtly attention, particularly from the 1580s onwards. Zübdetü’-Tevarih’s world historical framework already had included a life of the Prophet; an illustrated version of the six-volume Siyer-i Nebi on the same topic, designed to hold 814 paintings, was completed in 1595. It is worth noting that in the contemporary Safavid world there was an obvious interest in illustrated narratives of Muhammad’s life as well; probably in both realms religious history was appropriated for current political agendas. The most extensive iconographic programme narrating the life of the Prophet in the entire Islamic world, the Siyer-i Nebi, drew on diverse sources to create a novel religious imagery. Visualising Mustafa Darir’s late fourteenth-century Turkish text, artists placed considerable emphasis on the miracles of the prophet Muhammad and the actions of his son-in-law Ali. Flaming haloes and veiled faces underlined the sanctity of the Prophet and his immediate family. With Safavid paintings depicting scenes from Muhammad’s life, these images thus shared a degree of iconophobia; however, while in Iranian images Ali also appeared with a veil, Ottoman artists and patrons did not allow him this emblem of holiness. Taken together, these images provide a glimpse into new formulations in pictorial representation across the Shi’ite–Sunni divide.

Religious and esoteric works and the literature on wonders (acaib) favoured in courtly circles underlined the increasing preference for Turkish, whether they were original works or translations from Persian and Arabic. One such translation was Abd al-Rahman al-Bistami’s Miftah al-jafir al-jami (”The Key to Comprehensive Prognostication”), a compendium of apocalyptic and prophetic texts in wide circulation in Ottoman courtly circles already in the 1520s.

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133 Zeren Tanindı, Siyer-i Nebi: İslam Sanatında Hz. Muhammed’in Hayatı (Istanbul, 1984); Rachel Milstein, Karin Rührdanz and Barbara Schmitz, Stories of the Prophets: Illustrated Manuscripts of Qisas al-Anbiyâ’ (Costa Mesa, Calif., 1999).

and 1530s, resonant with the messianic image that Süleyman cultivated in the earlier part of his reign. Following perhaps a surge of millennial expectation at the approaching end of the tenth Muslim century, courtly patrons and artists turned once more to al-Bistami’s text, of which they commissioned a number of illustrated copies at the very end of the 1500s. Signs of the approaching end of time, wondrous creatures encountering ordinary human beings, the siege and conquest of Cairo, Aleppo, Jerusalem and Constantinople, and battles between the Mahdi and infidels constituted the overarching pictorial themes of Tercüme-i miftah-i cifrû’l-cami. Their representations often conflated aspects of Ottoman history with apocalyptic signs and the image of the Mahdi with that of Ottoman rulers. A double portrait of Süleyman with his grand vezir and confidante İbrahim Paşa, with a textual reference to the latter’s demonic character, resonated with the early years of Süleyman’s reign.

A related genre receiving considerable attention at the turn of the century was the cosmographic and geographic acaib. The well-liked “wonders” literature of the medieval Islamic world, particularly Qazwini’s Adja’ib al-makhluqat wa ghara’ib al-mawdjudat (“Wonders of Creation and Marvels of Existence”), originally in Arabic, now appeared in Persian and Turkish versions. In the 1550s, court painters had begun but not completed an illustrated copy; in the final decade of the century, their successors finished the project, adapting the rich iconography of “wonders” to the Ottoman idiom.

As already noted in the context of the Surname-i Hūmayun, urban life and settings acquired a new visibility in the courtly manuscript painting of those years. Illustrated works covering a wide range of subject matter and genres, not always historical in character, betray this new interest. One copy of the Tercüme-i miftah-i cifrû’l-cami contains an image of Cairo quite remote from the apocalyptic theme of the narrative and instead resonates with a much-favoured topic of the time: boats on the Nile carry men and a woman enjoying cups of coffee in a serene scene of leisure, surrounded by coffee-houses on the banks of the river (Figure 13.28). A double-page painting in Suudi’s Matali’üs-Saad features under each planet persons and professions (kimesne ve taifo); this series of portraits ranges from sultan to porter,

136 Bağcı et al., Ottoman Painting, p. 198.
138 İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, TY 6624, fol. 126b. See also Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, T. 439, fol. 9a, in Bağcı et al., Ottoman Painting, p. 234.
The visual arts

Figure 13.28. Cairo: coffee drinkers in boats and coffeehouses on the banks of the Nile, Şerif bin Seyyid Muhammed, Tercüme-i Miftah-ı Cifrû’l-Cami, 1595–1600. (Istanbul University Library, T.6624, fol. 126v)

builder, candlemaker, fisherman and farmer. An illustrated copy of Tercüme-i Baharistan-ı Cami (ca. 1600) contains an abundantly detailed image of a grocer’s shop. Resonant with the rise of street and genre scenes in contemporary Safavid painting, such themes also invite comparison with imagery in albums prepared in Istanbul primarily for European visitors and readers that
feature the capital’s central urban settings and portray its inhabitants across the socio-political hierarchy. We possess references to a book market at the Bayezid II complex at the edge of Istanbul’s commercial sprawl, which was one of the places where artists produced such works for sale. The increasing volume and circulation of single-page paintings and albums containing images that do not illustrate a particular text also attest to the emergence of new trends in the production and consumption of pictorial arts in the Ottoman world.  

A multiplicity of interaction networks informed pictorial representation. Numerous book production centres with diverse visual idioms reflect the vivacity of contemporary book culture and the intensity of elite patronage. Cities in the empire’s eastern provinces, such as Aleppo and particularly Baghdad, emerged as loci of luxury book production and painting. During his tenure in Aleppo, Mustafa Ali commissioned illustrated copies of two of his works, the Nusretname and the Nushatu’s-Selatin; the illumination and paintings of these works betray an affinity with the visual idiom of Ottoman court art. In Baghdad, he commissioned a third work, the Cami al-Buhur, narrating the princely circumcision ceremonies of 1582, but the work remained unfinished. This mishap notwithstanding, Baghdad, frontier city between the Ottoman and Safavid realms, with a revered political, intellectual and religious past, close to Alid sites of pilgrimage, possessed a vastly productive school of painting. Most popular were literary works of a religious nature; lives of Ali and his family, stories of martyrdom in Karbala and works on Islamic history were illustrated with lively narrative scenes. Poetry compilations, including those of Fuzuli and Baki, featured images of courtly gatherings. Baghdad’s painters also produced a set of silsilenames, genealogies of prophets, saints and monarchs starting with Adam and closing with the current Ottoman dynasts. Their portraits based on court products such as the


140 Bağcı et al., Ottoman Painting, p. 248.


542
The visual arts

Zübdetü’l-Tevarih and the Şemalname, the artists’ audiences possibly included members of the extended imperial household.¹⁴²

Given such connections between the court in Istanbul and workshops in provincial capitals, Baghdad emerged as a site of Safavid–Ottoman encounters and convergences. Partaking in the linguistic re-orientation of Ottoman court culture in the late sixteenth century, a significant portion of the illustrated manuscripts produced in Baghdad were written in Turkish, while literary works in Persian retained their popularity as well. The visual language of narrative painting, on the other hand, differed sharply from the conventions and visual choices of the court artists in Istanbul. With crowded and animated scenes of multi-focal action preferably taking place under a high horizon line, large figures, dynamic compositions that often flow into the margins, bright and saturated colours, rich surface ornament and many architectural representations, Baghdad painting in the late sixteenth century was akin to contemporary Shirazi and to a lesser extent Khurasani schools. On the other hand, some sartorial and architectural details and modes of grouping figures underline the images’ connection to the Ottoman centre. The Baghdad governor Hasan Paşa, Sokollu Mehmed’s son, sponsored at least three such manuscripts. His involvement underlines the cultural connections between that city and Istanbul and evinces the growing interest of Ottoman elites in expanding the thematic and material range of their book collections. Networks allowing the acquisition of artwork extended beyond the sultan’s domains, as exemplified by the Istanbul elite’s marked predilection for products of the Shiraz workshops through the late 1500s.¹⁴³

Created at the turn of the seventeenth century, the wall paintings of a Christian merchant’s mansion in Aleppo demonstrate the existence of yet another network of provincial painting ateliers and patronage, connecting the Ottoman centre to cities within and beyond the sultan’s realm. Here, artists transposed images of courtly assembly and portrayals of heavenly creatures from Persianate books onto the densely painted panels of an audience hall, juxtaposed them with biblical scenes, and immersed this remarkably mixed iconography into an extraordinary combination of decorative ornament of Mamluk, Persian and Ottoman derivation.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Milstein, Miniature Painting, pp. 110–11; Bağcı et al., Ottoman Painting, pp. 253–9; Uluç, Turkman Governors.
¹⁴⁴ Julia Gonnella and Jens Kröger (eds.), Angels, Peonies, and Fabulous Creatures: The Aleppo Room in Berlin (Berlin, 2002); Rührdanz, ‘The Role of the Urban Ateliers’. 
Inserting the author into picture and text: An expanding discourse on the arts

Group portraits depicting the multiple authors of illustrated manuscripts constitute a significant addition to the Ottoman iconographic repertory in the late 1500s. Prominently placed on the opening or closing pages of the book at issue, these images are at once unmistakeable assertions of authorship and signs of membership in the Ottoman elite (Figure 13.29). At the same time, such portraits in the setting of a study underline the collaborative nature of book production, where authorial roles often varied and overlapped.145

The earliest group portrait featuring a painter is the frontispiece of Şükri-i Bidlisi’s Selimname (ca. 1530); it was possibly inspired by a similar author portrait placed on the closing pages of the Divan-i Husaini, created in Herat. Not repeated by Ottoman painters of the following decades, such images became more frequent in the late 1500s.146 Another Selimname, composed by Lokman for Selim II, contains a group portrait with Lokman himself, in addition to Ahmed Feridun Bey and Şemseddin Karabaği, a bureaucrat and a scholar, influential in the conceptualisation of the work. Slightly smaller in scale and hence of lower status, there appear the painters Osman and Ali, who devised the iconographic programme in collaboration with the author. Copies of the Şehname-i Selim Han and Taşköprüzade’s Şaka’ık al-Numaniye all feature portraits of authors and artists. A portrait of the şehname writer Talikizade by Nakkaş Hasan ends the Şehname-i Humayun (1596–1600), and another work of Talikizade features a group portrait of author, painter and calligrapher. Eulogies to the art of the painters Osman and Hasan Paşa on the closing pages of imperial histories by Lokman and Talikizade attest to the growing visibility of the men responsible for these most prestigious products of the court scriptorium.147

It may not be coincidental that Mustafa Ali completed his Menakib-i Hünerveran within the same years that the painter Sai Çelebi collaborated with Sinan to create the latter’s autobiography. Menakib-i Hünerveran is a biographical dictionary of calligraphers and artists of the book modelled on Timurid and Safavid treatises and particularly the Risala-i Kutbiya of Kutb al-Din Muhammad Yazdi, whom Ali had met in Baghdad. Ali may also have

146 Şükri-i Bidlisi, Selimname, TSM H 1597–98, ca. 1530; Atıl, Süleymanname, p. 77 n. 43; Bağcı et al., Ottoman Painting, pp. 63–4, 118–19, 182–5.
drawn inspiration from Ottoman biographical dictionaries of poets, which, from the mid-1500s onwards, included short biographies of court artists such as Şahkulu and Nigari, offering commentaries on their art alongside samples of their poetry. The Menakbī closely followed the established genre of the biographical dictionary to comment on the styles of calligraphy and book arts in which the subjects had been proficient but also on the various techniques and modes of depiction that these artists had used.

Ali’s biographies positioned Ottoman calligraphers and artists, establishing their genealogical links and inter-relationships with teachers and colleagues from the Iranian and Ottoman worlds and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Ali’s work simultaneously connected certain artists of Rum to their Persian counterparts, while at the same time differentiating them; his wide geographic horizons encompassed Nishabur, Herat, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Baghdad, and of course Istanbul. His portrayal of complex webs of patronage and apprenticeship and his emphasis on familial links underline the interconnectedness of book artists across temporal and spatial boundaries. Simultaneously, his frequent remarks on regional and urban distinctions shed a strong light on his – and
his contemporaries’ – preoccupation with the shape and lineage of a Rumi identity.

The set of autobiographical texts composed by Sai in collaboration with the aged Sinan culminates in two complete works, the Tezkiretül-Ebniye and the Tezkiretül-Bünyan. Unlike Mustafa Ali, who wrote within the established genre of the biographical dictionary, Sai and Sinan straddled a variety of literary genres in portraying the chief architect.

These texts and their preparatory versions offer a biography that underlined the making of the architect’s professional persona and his relations to sultans and grandees. With comments on design and construction, and with the appended lists of works for which Sinan claimed responsibility, the autobiographies negotiate norms of authorship in a world of corporate, collaborative and largely anonymous production. While only one surviving inscription carries the name of the chief architect, Sinan’s and Sai’s focus on authorship was perhaps the response to an emerging conjuncture: Davud Ağa, Sinan’s successor, would leave his name on three public and private structures completed before and during his much shorter tenure. In the inscription he composed for Sinan’s tomb, Sai summed up the architect’s achievements enumerated and elaborated in the autobiographies, transposing their authorial exertions from the confines of the manuscripts onto the street near the Süleymaniye.

Sharing “declinist” comments on the lack of skill, talent and elite encouragement, Sinan’s autobiographies and Ali’s biographies of artists respond to changes in courtly patronage that had immediate implications for their careers. These texts at the same time reflect an increasingly vivacious world of artistic consumption and commentary. Sai and Sinan reveal their expectations for aesthetic and technical appreciation through recurrent references to discerning viewers and “possessors of skill and vision”. Comparable references to a learned and discerning public also imbue the writing of Ali, who discusses audiences and markets for calligraphies and albums, discerning connoisseurs of the book arts (ehl-i kalem, ehl-i rakam), ambitious collectors spending fortunes on albums, and stylistic innovations in calligraphy and pictorial representation. Ali also focuses on the personae of certain designers and on debates regarding the value of the works produced in the lands of Rum compared to their counterparts in the Iranian realm.

Alongside texts such

148 Gülru Necipoğlu, ‘Sources, Themes, and Cultural Implications of Sinan’s Autobiographies’, in Necipoğlu, Crane and Akın, Sinan’s Autobiographies, pp. vii–xvi.
150 Necipoğlu, Crane and Akın, Sinan’s Autobiographies; Mustafa Ali, Menakb. For parallels in the Persianate world, see David J. Roxburgh, Prefacing the Image, p. 125; Qadi Ahmad Qummi
The visual arts

as Taczađe Mehmed’s technical treatise on calligraphy and Cendereczade Mehmed’s preface to the album of Murad III, Sinan’s autobiographies and the Menakib mark the elaboration of a critical vocabulary and a set of tropes that captured Ottoman appraisals of and responses to arts and architecture.31

In place of a conclusion

Through the expanding discourse on the arts, Ottoman literati and artists participated in the broader current of reckoning, with the world and with the self, which was integral to the late sixteenth-century landscape of change and re-ordering. In the world to which Mustafa Ali, Sai and Sinan turned their nostalgic gazes, moments of refinement, equilibrium and relative closure had been reached. The 1500s created a regional visual idiom distinct from, but at the same time interconnected to various degrees with, the visual culture of the larger Islamic and Mediterranean worlds. The enduring yet flexible architectural and decorative vocabulary of this period would constitute the basis of explorations and re-interpretations by Ottoman artists and architects of the following centuries. Towards the end of the 1500s, however, the strict visual codes formulated by Sinan had begun to dissolve in the face of political rearrangements and in response to new formal predilections. Already by 1605, through the insertion of fragments drawn in perspective into otherwise flat pictorial planes and through radical contrasts in the scales of his figures and their settings, the painter Ahmed Nakşi had complicated and profoundly destabilised the established spatial order of Ottoman painting.


The literature of Rum: The making of a literary tradition (1450–1600)

SELİM S. KURU

A literary identity

Rum has pleasant water and air, and due to the extremely pleasurable water and air, the people of Rum are refined and each has everlasting excellence of character and abundant elegance of intellect. As a consequence, a poetic nature governs the people of Rum and they seek cultural attainment and knowledge. Due to this natural disposition, they have an inclination to poetry and those among them who conquer the domains of verse are countless.

In the conclusion to his biographical dictionary of poets, written around 1538, the Ottoman bureaucrat and poet Sehi Bey (1470–1549) explained the rise of a particular poetry in Anatolian Turkish by using the physical nature of its geographical location, “Rum”. Approximately 30 years later, in 1566, Aşık Çelebi (1520–72), a scholar and poet, further described Rum as “a target for Arabs and Persians and a source for Turkish and Deylamite poets”. In his introduction, he quoted many verses by bureaucrats and scholars of his time to support his claim that the climate of Rum was so conducive to poetry that even those Rum elite who lacked interest in poetry would burst into verse when faced with momentous events.

For Sehi and Aşık Çelebi, Rum stood for western Anatolia and Rumeli, with Istanbul constituting its centre.

1 Sehi Beg, Heş Bihiş: Sehi Beg Tezkiresi, ed. Gûnay Kut (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 314. Translations are mine unless otherwise stated. In this chapter, poets and scholars are cited by their pen-names instead of full names.


The literature of Rum

Similar examples abound from the sixteenth century that identify Rum as a realm of poetry. Although Rum poets who composed their poetry in Turkish are today generally called “Osmanlı” or “divan” poets, this had not been the case until the nineteenth century. Before that time, they were distinguished among other local and foreign cultures by the title “șuara-yi Rum” (poets of Rum). An understanding of what this focus on the term Rum was about, and how this identity was intrinsically related to literary production in Turkish, is essential to understanding the birth of the specific literary tradition in sixteenth-century Anatolia and Rumeli.

This chapter claims that, from the mid-fifteenth century on, a high form of literature was consciously crafted by poets of Rum, who were the products of an intricate and heterogeneous education system, which prepared intellectually elevated state officers who had an interest in challenging, reforming and transforming Islamic literary traditions with the intention of distinguishing themselves from the literary production of the dervish lodges, tasavvuf edebiyatı (mystical literature) and that of urban and non-urban forms of folk literature – halk and aşık edebiyatları, respectively – which had been produced for three hundred years in Anatolian Turkish.4

To date, the literature of Rum as the production of a particular group of poets in this period has been subjected mostly to a philological approach, as a result of which editions of many texts have been made available. These editions, however, are rarely subjected to interpretative and contextual studies that encourage multi-disciplinary perspectives in the study of literature in Rum. As there are already various general essays on Ottoman literature of this period, I shall focus in the present chapter on less remarked aspects.5

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4 However much literature of the period was intrinsically correlated with the literary works developed in dervish lodges and strictly oral urban and rural literary traditions prevalent in Anatolia during this period, this relationship was not without tension. But this falls outside the scope of this chapter. On the relationship between elite and folk literatures, see Cemal Kurnaz, Türkiye'nin Gazele – Halk ve Divan Şiirinin Müsterekleri Üzerine bir Deneme (Ankara, 1997).

In order to describe the making of a particular literary identity, the chapter begins with a general historical outline, followed by a discussion of the development of a high literary language. The review of literature of the period in the third section underscores particular developments unique to this period and to some extent neglected in general studies. The production of literary tools for poets on the path to professionalisation of their literary activities is presented in the fourth section. The fifth and final section covers biographical dictionaries and presents these as not merely sources for literary archaeology but firstly as canon-making devices and secondly as literary accomplishments. Biographical dictionaries represent a culmination point in the development of a new literary language, the making of new genres and themes, and the creation of literary tools. They came into being and were competitively produced in the period under discussion, and they also strengthened the sense of being a Rum poet, even as the individual biographical sketches in them functioned as models for their readers. Though there are specialised studies on these topics, their importance in the making of a Rum tradition has not been pointed out.

The period of 150 years from the conquest of Constantinople until 1600 is typically defined by scholars as that in which the norms for “Ottoman” arts and literature – parallel to the state institutions – were established and which is called the “classical age”. This period witnessed seven sultans, many vezirs and muftis, countless judges, scribes, accountants, soldiers, and urban dwellers from all walks of life, who contributed more than a few verses to the accumulating capital of literary production in Turkish. Composing literary works in the newly developing literary media and in a particular form of written Turkish became a significant, if not controversial, aspect of being a member of the elite. A member of the Rum elite was supposed to be well versed enough to compose poetry. A poet of Rum, however, did not simply compose verses in a particular meter and rhyme scheme but also composed letters, philosophical treatises and literary texts in rhyming prose. These litterateurs were working within the system of a strictly urban literature, which came to be known by many different names: Ottoman Turkish literature, divan literature, palace / court literature and so on. But in their own day their activity was merely called şi’r ü inşa (poetry and prose composition). Today the problem of naming this literary tradition carries ideological implications, yet it is commonly accepted that by the mid-fifteenth century a particular layer of Anatolian Turkish literary tradition had emerged that was patroned by rulers, notables and litterateurs of Rum.
The literature of Rum

*Relocating Rum, remaking literature*

The destruction of the centralised Seljukid rule in Rum in the thirteenth century was followed by a period of successive short-lived dynasties and local governors who patronised the translation of texts from Arabic and Persian into Turkish. Whatever the reasons for this, whether to compose eulogies to Turkish tribal leaders who did not know the prevalent written languages of Arabic or Persian or to compose religious chapbooks to educate Turks settled in Rum, by the mid-fifteenth century western Turkish had already evolved into a written language for religious as well as non-religious themes in Anatolia. After the interregnum (1402–13), in parallel to their centralising policies, Ottoman rulers and their “servants” had fast begun to be influential and competitive patrons of literature. The reign of Murad II (1421–44 and 1446–51) in particular can be considered a germination period, when many Turkish verse narratives and poetry collections appeared. This Anatolian literary boom in the western Turkish language laid the grounds for the evolution of a high literary medium in the following era.

It may be difficult to understand the relation between the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and another explosive phase in literary production in Rum. However, the reorganisation of the education system shortly after the conquest, along with the restructuring of palace ceremonial, land tenure, and pious endowments, clearly shifted the balance of the three major languages of the time, Persian, Arabic and Turkish, in favour of Turkish. The widespread literary activity in Turkish in Anatolian and Rumelian cities would be centralised and canonised in Istanbul, which was then the newly emerging centre of a young empire and shifted the borders of Rum farther westwards.

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6 For the development of Turkish as a written literary language, see Mecdut Mansuroğlu, “The Rise and Development of Written Turkish in Anatolia”, *Oriens* 7 (1954), 250–64, and for a description of the multi-lingualism and the distinction between literary and vernacular Turkish as it developed in fourteenth-century Anatolia, see Lars Johanson, ‘Rumi and the Birth of Turkish Poetry’, *Journal of Turkology* 1 (1993), 23–37.
7 It must be noted at this point that the literary culture of Rum was a manuscript culture, and the printing press did not have much impact on literature in Rum until the early nineteenth century. While this aspect of the subject has yet to be explored, Ismail Erünsal’s work on libraries and book producers provides a basis for research. See Ismail Erünsal, *Ottoman Libraries: A Survey of the History, Development and Organization of Ottoman Foundation Libraries* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008); Ismail Erünsal, ‘Osmanlılarda Sahhaflık ve Sahhaflar: Yeni Bazı Belge ve Bilgiler’, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 29 (2007), 99–146. An important bibliographic reference for Ottoman Turkish manuscript catalogues is Turgut Küt, ‘Türkiye Yazma Eserler Katalogları Repertuarı’, *Türk Dili Araştırmaları Yılılığı Belleten* 1972 (1989), 183–240. For a general yet important discussion of readership, see Suraiya Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (London, 2005), pp. 185–203.
That a total transformation of the literary scene had occurred is evidenced by the formation of a new written language, variation and innovation in the use of literary forms and genres, the re-evaluation of existing literary models, competition among authors and, as a consequence, an increasing number of literary works, thanks to the widening range of patronage. This was a transformation that, gradually developing until the end of the sixteenth century, provided the coming generations of litterateurs of Rum with a reference point. As the period between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was later called the golden age of the Ottoman Empire, the literary developments in the preceding periods, too, were canonised and provided a reservoir of forms, themes and authorship models for following generations. Many factors played a role in these transformations, but three major ones can be identified: political transformations as they re-configured patronage relations, formation of a particular poetics for poets of Rum and finally a particular form of authorial agency.

First, socio-economic stabilisation in the lands of Rum provided better conditions of study and better job opportunities for the educated, attracting waves of scholars from Cairo, Damascus and the cities of the Khurasan region and of eastern Anatolia, who streamed into Rum, especially Istanbul, seeking Ottoman dynastic patronage. This trend started even before the conquest of the Arab lands by Selim I in 1517 and the incorporation, or rather submission, of educational centres in Syria and Egypt. Literary patronage, on the other hand, shifted and transformed through the decades during the period 1450–1600, when the major patrons were from among the palace circles.

8 For a seminal article on Persian influence and Persian poets who came to the Ottoman Empire seeking their fortunes, see Hanna Sohrweide, 'Dichter und Gelehrte aus dem Osten im osmanischen Reich (1453–1600): Ein Beitrag zur türkisch-persischen Kulturgeschichte', Der Islam 46 (1950), 263–302. The literary scene in the other emirates in Anatolia and their claims for control of Rum until they were absorbed by the Ottomans is a field ripe for investigation. See İbrahim Hakkı Uzunçarşı, Anadolu Beylikleri ve Akkoyunlu ve Karakoyunlu Devletleri (Ankara, 1984), pp. 259–62, for a list of authors who composed high literary works under the patronage of the rulers of these emirates during the late fifteenth century.

9 For a limited list of the names of scholars who received education in Arab lands and Iran in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and Arab and Iranian scholars who traveled to Anatolia in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see İbrahim Hakkı Uzunçarşı, Osmanlı Tarihi (Ankara, 1961), vol. 1, pp. 520–1. For a statistical evaluation of the spread of higher education institutions in Anatolia, see Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, 'Osmanlı Eğitim ve Bilim Kurumları', in Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (İstanbul, 1998), pp. 242–5. There was a constant flow of scholars seeking their fortunes in different cities under different dynasties, yet it is clear that the Anatolian educational system experienced a revival as the Ottoman emirate turned into an empire in this period.
Until the mid-sixteenth century, sultans Mehmed II, Bayezid II, Selim I and Süleyman I not only awarded poets for individual works but also paid them regular salaries. Within this period of approximately 150 years, the intricate network of patronage reached its peak in the early sixteenth century, making the Ottoman dynasty the major patron of literature in Rum, if not in the larger Islamic world.

Apart from the palace patronage in Istanbul, and until the early decades of the sixteenth century, powerful patrons of literature remained in Edirne and Bursa. The frontier lords of Rumeli, such as the Evrenosoğulları, Mihaloğulları and Yahyalılar, who held court in European cities such as Vardar Yenicesi (Giannitsa) and Üsküp (Skopje), remained powerful patrons of literature until the early decades of the sixteenth century. Another centre of patronage was the Ottoman princely courts, which flourished until the late sixteenth century in thriving Anatolian cities such as Konya, Amasya and Manisa. This multi-nodal dynastic system of patronage had, until the 1580s, a dynamic impact on the formation of literature, while the political shifts and transformations of the period caused it to develop in various directions. During the final decades of the sixteenth century, as palace bureaucrats and local governors in the provinces appeared as generous patrons of arts and literature, shifts in patronage intensified and spread a Rum literary tradition all over the empire.

10 See Halil İnalcık, 'The Poet and the Patron: A Sociological Treatise upon the Patrimonial State and the Arts', trans. Arif Nat Riley, Journal of Turkish Studies 2 (2005), 9–70. Here the issue of patronage is evaluated, with a focus on sultanic patronage of poets, from a sociological perspective disregarding historical and geographical variations of different patronage networks during this period. See also pp. 52–61 of this article for an evaluation of gift registers previously published by İsmail Erünsal, which included salaries and one-time gifts by the palace for works presented by poets. In most cases, these were on top of regular salaries for state positions and/or retirement pensions.

11 However, patronage was changing, and by the mid-sixteenth century there were many complaints about the diminishing resources for poets. For example, İbrahim Paşa’s (d. 942/1536) patronage would be yearned for by Latifi (896/1491–990/1582), another biographer of poets, in a digression in his dictionary. See Latifi, Tezkiret-ı Şu’arâ ve Tabsıratı’n-Nuzamâ, ed. Rıdvan Canım (Ankara, 2000), pp. 326–7. For an edition of the separately published version of this text, see Ahmet Sevgi, Latîfî’nîn İkî Risâlesi: Enisî’l-Fusahâ ve Evsâf-î İbrahim Pâşâ (Konya, 1986), transcription, pp. 24–6, facsimile, pp. 84–7.


13 For Yenice, see Machiel Kiel, ‘Yenice Vardar (Vardar Yenicesi-Giannitsa): A Forgotten Turkish Cultural Centre in Macedonia of the 15th and 16th Century’, Studia Byzantina et Neohellenica Neerlandica 3 (1973), 300–55.


15 For a detailed picture of literary patronage in this period that is gleaned from contemporary biographical dictionaries, see Haluk İpekten, Divan Edebiyatında Edebi Muhitler (İstanbul, 1996).
Secondly, through accelerated interaction among wandering scholars and the natives of Rum and based on the changing medium of written Turkish, a particular form of poetics came into being. Re-formulated as the written language of bureaucracy, the Turkish language challenged the long-standing primacy of Arabic and especially Persian. This was without doubt a continuation of the casting of Turkish as a literary language by the Rum elite in the courtly cities of Bursa, Edirne, the Ottoman capitals before the conquest of Constantinople and Manisa, and the centres of other contemporary beyliks, Amasya and Konya.

The emerging literary written language operated through the continuing cultural contact and competition with written Persian, Chagatai and Arabic literatures as much as the emulation and adaptation of traditional, mostly oral forms of local literary traditions. By the end of the fifteenth century, major epic cycles, such as the Dede Korkut stories, the Saltukname and the Battalname, had been put into writing for interested Ottoman sultans and princes. The evaluation of classical Islamic texts and local literary forms and themes enabled poets of Rum to develop a particular form of written Turkish for poetry and prose in order to distinguish themselves from non-elite urban and folk poets in Rum and from contemporary Chagatai, Persian and Arab poets of Eastern lands. Rum poets emulated and reformed classical and contemporary Islamicate literary models as they distinguished their literary endeavours more and more from existing local practices, constantly undermining available forms and genres and re-configuring them to signify emerging new contexts.

Finally, authorship also underwent various changes throughout this period. During the earlier decades of the period, there seem to have been more bureaucrats involved in writing literary texts than learned elite (ulema); this balance shifted gradually in favour of the ulema in the later sixteenth century. The increasingly varying professional backgrounds of Rum litterateurs had an impact on the form and content of their works. Under the strengthening

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16 For a thorough examination of the earlier period of this evolution, see Tekin, ‘Fatih Devri Edebiyatı’.
17 For the recording of the Saltukname and Battalname cycle of legends, see Yorgos Dedes, Battalname: Introduction, English Translation, Turkish Transcription, Commentary and Facsimile (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), pp. 43–5.
18 For an excellent analysis of the role of poetry in a high bureaucrat’s life, see Theoharis Stavrides, The Sultan of Vezirs: The Life and Times of the Ottoman Grand Vezir Mahmud Pasha Angelović (1453–1474) (Leiden, 2001), especially pp. 294–326. After Mahmud Paşa, there were few vezirs who compiled poetry collections, at least until the end of the sixteenth century. See the discussion later in this chapter about how at least one biographical dictionary author, Sehi, perceived high-level bureaucrat poets as a distinct group in his work.
19 See Tolasa, Sehi, Lâtîfî, pp. 61–118, for the various educational and professional backgrounds of Rum poets. More prosographical studies are needed to understand the shifting dynamics
The literature of Rum

and gradually centralising rule of the Ottoman dynasty, especially during a period of conquest and expansion, while Rum was again becoming a unified land, the poets of Rum crafted a literary identity that masked the other identity markers, such as ethnic or occupational, of a given author. Under various pen-names (mahlas), poets of Rum obtained a distinct identity as “lovers” and named themselves people of love (ehl-i ’ışk). They were in love with God, prophet, patrons and finally with beautiful beloveds, and consequently they were singing, respectively, eulogies, panegyrics or lyric poems (gazel) for them. However, the descriptions by Rum poets of what love is represented another culmination point for the Islamic mystical formulations of love. The concepts of “love” and “lover” were topics for a constant literary and at times theoretical debate. The spread of literary activity through the changing and varying levels of education among a re-structured elite created a heterogeneous and layered literary identity in Rum that not only became an integral part of elite Rum identity but also underscored its unstable nature.

A matter of influence

While western Turkish rose among the many languages spoken in Rum as the dominant literary written language, it is unwarranted to neglect major “foreign” influences on the development of literature in this period. The most interesting aspect of this influence is its contemporaneity. Molla Cami, an important litterateur and mystic, and Ali Şir Nevai, a statesman and prolific author, were esteemed poets in the court of Hüseyin Baykara (1438–1506) in Herat, and they indisputably provided lasting models for the sixteenth-century Rum patrons and poets, creating the basis for the following waves of cultural transformation.

For a detailed exploration of love in the Ottoman and Western literary contexts during the mid-fifteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries, see Walter G. Andrews and Mehmet Kalpakli, The Age of Beloveds: Love and the Beloved in Early-Modern Ottoman and European Culture and Society (Durham, N.C., 2005).

The fact that early models of Rum poets for all kinds of literary works had developed in this court also testifies to this fact. In fact, “Baykara meclisi” (Baykara gathering), which was used throughout the centuries as a common term in Rum for literary gatherings, may be seen as a trace of this influence in this period. For an excellent study on the Baykara gathering as a literary centre, see Maria E. Subtelny, ‘The Poetic Circle at the Court of the Timurid, Sultan Husain Baiqara, and Its Political Significance’, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University (1979).
under the influence of works by Ali Şir Nevai in the courts of Mehmed II and his son Bayezid II.22

Fenarizade Muhyiddin Çelebi, (d. 1547), a one-time Şeyh ü lislam who used the pen-name Muhyi in his *gazels*, composed, along with responses to Persian poems of Cami and Selman, parallels to 57 of Nevai’s poems in his *divan*.23

The fad for Chagatai poetry would fade away by the second half of the sixteenth century, being undermined by localisation and an ensuing classicism that revolved around the classics of Persian literature.

Working with and on the written medium of Anatolian Turkish and constantly developing the possibilities of expression in this language, the poets of Rum were supplanting and surpassing previous poetic accomplishments in Anatolian Turkish and expanding their influence through their poetry.24

As the Ottoman sultans raised their banners over expanding territories and stamped their imperial signatures (*tuğra*) in an increasingly stylised manner on the documents they issued from the mid-fifteenth century on, the literature in Anatolian Turkish would also distinguish itself from other traditions and become stylised as it grew in the form of a refreshing new literary tradition during the period between 1450 and 1600, the most momentous period of the Ottoman dynasty. This new tradition, with all its internal conflicts and creative energies, established one of the components of Rum elite identity that was re-shaped under Ottoman dynastic patronage.

A new language for Rum

The astonishing language current in the state of Rum, composed of four languages, (western Turkish, Çagatay, Arabic and Persian), is a pure gilded tongue which, in the speech of the literati seems more difficult than any of these. If one were to

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23 Sehi, *Heşt Bihiyt*, pp. 130, 355. Here Sehi uses the term *cevab* (response) instead of *nazire* (parallel) for Muhyi’s parallels to Nevai’s lyric poems. These terms were employed in literary evaluations somewhat differently; see Tolasa, *Şehî, Lâtfî*, pp. 263–6. For a discussion of Muhyi’s parallel poems, see Mustafa Arslan, ‘XVI. Yüzyıllı Anadolu Sahasında Nevâyî’nin Önemli Bir Takipçisi: Muhyî ve Nazireleri’, *Modern Türkçük Araştırmaları Dergisi* 4, 1 (2007), 64–86.

24 As early as the mid-sixteenth century, there was a desire in the field of architecture to ”import” a Rumi style, which is identifiable in important provincial centres of the empire. See Çiğdem Kafesçioğlu, ‘In the Image of Rum: Ottoman Architectural Patronage in Sixteenth-Century Aleppo and Damascus’, *Muqarnas* 16 (1999), 70–96.
The literature of Rum

equate speaking Arabic with a religious obligation [farz], and the use of Persian with a sanctioned tradition [sünnet], then the speaking of Turkish made up of these sweetnesses becomes a meritorious act [müstahább], and, in the view of those eloquent in Turkish, the use of simple Turkish should be forbidden.25

Writing towards the end of the sixteenth century, Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali (1541–1600), a bureaucrat and prolific author, speaks confidently about a particular high literary form of Turkish that is “current in the state of Rum”. According to Mustafa Ali, by freely using Arabic and Persian vocabulary and morphological units, Turkish elevated itself to a level of high difficulty, with the result that speaking this higher register of Turkish became a meritorious act. He takes pride in the powers of a language that is really composed of four languages: Turkish, Arabic, Chagatai, or the eastern form of literary Turkish, and Persian. In contrast with the three classical languages of Islam taken singly, this language incorporates “obligation” (farz) from Arabic and the tradition (sünnet) from Persian, making its use a meritorious act (müstahább) and hence more “difficult” than the three others taken on their own.26 Unlike what Mustafa Ali calls simple Turkish, this “language current in Rum” presents a challenge for the eloquent Rum elite, who have to excel, going beyond the religious obligation and sanctioned practice represented by the rival tongues of Arabic and Persian.27 However, Mustafa Ali’s acceptance of Turkish as a meritorious act also reflects an attempt to overcome a predicament for the

26 By mentioning it without establishing a category for it, Mustafa Ali seems to accept Chagatai Turkish as a sub-category of Turkish along with western Turkish. It is interesting to note that Mustafa Ali’s description echoes Ali Şir Nevai’s defence of Chagatai Turkish against Persian almost a hundred years before in 1499; see Mir Ali Shir, Mukīkat al-Lughātāt: Introduction, Translation [from the Persian and Arabic] and Notes, ed. Robert Devereux (Leiden, 1960). According to a palace library catalogue, Chagatai, the literary eastern Turkish language, was also called “Mogoliyye” (i.e., Mongolian), in the early sixteenth century, pointing to unstable naming practices for languages. See Ismail Erünsal, ‘909/1503 Tarihi Defter-i Kütüb’, Journal of Turkish Studies 32, 1 (2008), 203–19 at p. 209.
27 From early on, the authors of this period distinguished high literary Turkish from other spoken and written forms yet differed in naming it. For example, while Mustafa Ali refrains from naming it in the earlier quotation, almost a hundred years before him the historian Kemalpaşazade (1468–1534) used “Rumi dili” (the Rum tongue) for Greek but needed to explain it further by adding “ki lisan-ı Yunanid ür” (which is the Greek language); see Kemalpaşazade (İbn-i Kemal), Tevârîh-ı Âl-i Osman: II. Defter, ed. Şerafettin Turan (Ankara, 1983), p. 176. In the late sixteenth century, on the other hand, another historian, Talikizade, would call Turkish “ilisan” or “zeban-ı Rum” (the language or tongue of Rum); see Christine Woodhead, Ta’lîkî-zade’s Şehnâme-i Hümâyûn: A History of the Ottoman Campaign into Hungary, 1593–94 (Berlin, 1981), p. 137, quoted in Hayati Develi, Osmanlı’nın Dili (İstanbul, 2006), p. 50. Develi (pp. 28–40) provides more examples and focuses on the ambivalent naming practices for languages in his short essay on Ottoman Turkish.
language of Rum, an impasse that occurs as the language of the Qur’an and the language of mystical literature cast their deep shadows over the younger written language that is fashioned by Rum poets.

A tale of three languages in Rum

Arabic was established early in the Muslim courts of Rum as the language of sciences, and Persian was defined as the language of literature; both were employed for bureaucratic purposes. Until the earlier decades of the fifteenth century, the Rum elite were ambivalent about employing Turkish in their works, claiming that it was an obligation in order to reach a Turkish-speaking audience. By the mid-fifteenth century, there was a growing interest in literary works in Turkish and the accompanying translation movement. Authors were, however, apologetic, as they saw the prevalent form of Turkish as deficient for a high literary medium, in comparison with the Persian and Arabic originals of the texts they had been translating from. However paradoxical it may seem, the development of a high literary version of written Turkish by the bureaucrats along with the reformation of educational institutions entailed the advancement of learning in Arabic and Persian during the reigns of Murad II (r. 1421–44 and 1446–51) and, especially, his son Mehmed II (r. 1444–46 and 1451–81). While early literary works already contained some Arabic and Persian loanwords, in particular technical vocabulary imparted by translations or compositions by multi-lingual litterateurs, the real flood of Arabic and Persian vocabulary and structures into written Turkish would take place during the period discussed here, when a new stress on classical knowledge of Islam and sciences appeared along with a renewed interest in rhetoric.

Prior to the mid-fifteenth century, in 1424, a judge named Devletoglu Yusuf explained the motive behind his verse translation from Arabic into Turkish of an important text of religious law, the Vikayetü’r-Rivaye fi Mesaili’l-Hidaye. He said that scholars of his time were unable to understand Arabic and that they were speaking, reading and even teaching in Turkish.

28 These works reflect a particular influence of Arabic and Persian languages in the form of loanwords rather than constructions. Kemal Yavuz has recorded in detail complaints that are found in literary works of Anatolian Turkish authors down to the fifteenth century; see, Kemal Yavuz, ‘XIII.–XVI. Asır Yadigarlarının Anadolu Sahasında Yazılış Sebepleri ve Bu Devir Müelliflerinin Türkçe Hakkındaki Görüşleri’, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları 27 (1983), 9–55.

29 The multi-lingual environment in thirteenth-century Anatolia and its impact on the development of a literary form of Turkish is explained in Johanson, ‘Rumi’. It must be noted that the development of literary prose in the mid-fifteenth century was more significant than that of poetry, which had already been following Persian models.

30 Yavuz, ‘XIII.–XVI. Asır Yadigarlarının’, p. 38. The verse translations of theological tractates would become even more popular in the sixteenth century, pointing to the mnemonic use of verse translations of basic religious texts for education.
The position of learning in Arabic and Persian during this period still needs further scrutiny, yet an anecdote about Taşköprüzade (1495–1561), a famous scholar of his time, reveals that different levels of competence in languages were assumed. His biographical dictionary of scholars and mystics who lived under Ottoman rule, Şaka’iku’n-Numanîyye (Crimson Peonies), which was written in Arabic, took the learned elite of his time by storm. As soon as it was published in 1558, several translations and continuation volumes appeared. When another scholar, the aforementioned Aşık Çelebi, translated the work into Turkish and presented it to the author, Taşköprüzade said: “O scholar, I have written it like Turkish; you bothered [to translate it] in vain.” When Taşköprüzade says that the Arabic he employed was “like Turkish” (Türki gibi), he reveals the fact that Taşköprüzade distinguished among different levels of written Arabic from easy to difficult. But several contemporary translations of the work bear witness to a need for having it in Turkish. On the other hand, some Turkish translations of the work were done in ornate prose, making them at times more difficult than the Arabic original, this being perhaps the reason for the original Arabic version having more copies than any of its expanded translations.

The categorical evaluation especially of the Persian language appeared in a period when some Turkish poets were uncomfortable with the incoming Iranian poets’ influence within the court and among elite circles. Mesih (1481–1512), an imperial scribe and poet who was a former slave, expressed this in a famous couplet:

O Mesih, there is no place for you, even if you descend from the skies
Go away and then come back from Iran or the Arab lands.

For a listing of seven translations and two expanded editions of this work that were composed in the sixteenth century, see Behcet Gönül, ‘İstanbul Kütüphanelerinde al-Şakaik al-Nu‘maniya Tercüme ve Zeyilleri’, Türkiat Mecmuası 7–8 (1945), 136–78. Even though this important work has been mined by modern scholars for studies of Ottoman intellectual history, a study of Taşköprüzade’s motives and approach to intellectual history is yet to appear. For an interesting discussion on Taşköprüzade’s perception of writing, see Ali Anooshahr, ‘Writing, Speech, and History for an Ottoman Biographer’, Journal of Near Eastern Studies 69 (2010), 43–62.

Gönül, ‘İstanbul Kütüphanelerinde’, p. 150.

On another note, Aşık Çelebi praised the knowledge of Arabic of his friend the poet Fevri, referring to one of his eulogies in Arabic as follows: “Even though Arabic and Rumi vocabulary had become similar by that time, it was confirmed that the eulogy he composed was sound in Arabic with regard to Arabic versification and clarity”; see Aşık Çelebi, Meş‘âr-ı ‘Aşık, vol. 3, p. 1224. Here Aşık Çelebi asserts that around the 1570s Arabic was an integral part of Turkish literature; however, a basic knowledge of this language was not highly regarded.

The early seventeenth-century scholar Ata’i related that one scribe, Muhammed Şerif (d. 1579), made a living by merely copying Şakâ’ık; see Gönül, ‘İstanbul Kütüphanelerinde’, p. 138.

Mesih, Mesihî Divanı, ed. Mine Mengi (Ankara, 1985), p. 315. This poem seems to be a parallel to the late fifteenth-century poet Le’ali’s couplets. Le’ali was from Tokat, but after travelling
Using his pen-name, which means “related to Christ”, in a pun, he criticised the attention paid in the land of Rum to those with an educational background in Persian or Arab lands.

Even though such complaints about the high regard shown to those educated in the eastern lands abound, most literary works were still composed in Turkish, and composing a poetry collection in Persian in Rum, supposedly the esteemed language of poetry, was uncommon. Poets generally included their Persian verses separately at the end of their poetry collections, and those were much fewer in number compared to those in Turkish. The number of verse narratives in Persian was also few, and it was not common to compose lengthy poetry in Arabic. Selim I did indeed compile his Persian poems in a collection during the first decades of the sixteenth century and, towards the end of the period, Sultan Murad III wrote Arabic verses and commissioned poets to write parallels to and interpretations of them, but these seem to have been idiosyncratic and would not be pursued by Rum poets. Literary and philosophical texts in Persian were less and less frequently produced, and Arabic was reserved for religious commentaries and scientific texts. But Turkish became the major language of literature and historical writing. The genre-related use of these three languages implies the linguistic competence and education of the scholar cum poets of Rum. They were interested in developing the high literary Turkish language rather than composing literary works in Arabic or Persian.

**Tools for language learning**

In Rum during the earlier eras, Persian classics, such as Gūlistan by Sadi (1213–92) and Attar’s (1119–90) Pendname, as well as Rumi’s (1207–73) Mesnevi, in Iran he came back to Istanbul and passed himself off as an Iranian, gaining the favour of the palace and notables. Later, when his deception was revealed, he was expelled from high literary circles and composed a poem similar to Mesihi’s quoted here. Telling Le’ali’s story, Latifi says, “Apparently, there was excessive interest in, respect and attention for Iranian people”, implying that this was not so by the mid-sixteenth century; see Latifi, Tezkiretü’ş-Şu’arâ, pp. 473–4.

36 Ahmet Kartal identifies only 23 divans in Persian written between the eleventh and the seventeenth centuries in Anatolia, some of these by poets of Persian origin. See Ahmet Kartal, “Türk Fars Edebi İlişkileri”, in Şiraz’dan İstanbul’a: Türk-Fars Kültür Coğrafyası Üzerine Araştırmalar (İstanbul, 2008), pp. 15–95.

37 For example, Ahmed Paşa’s (1426–97) poetry collection includes only 22 pieces of Arabic and 37 Persian couplets that are compiled in a separate chapter against 47 panegyrics, 353 lyric poems and other Turkish verses. See Ahmed Paşa, Ahmed Paşa Divanı, ed. Ali Nihat Tarlan (İstanbul, 1966).

38 All Ottoman rulers of this period, starting with Mehmed II, compiled collections of their poems, which is not true for the preceding and following periods. For information on Ottoman sultans who composed poetry and bibliographical references, see Günay Kut, ‘Payitaht İstanbul’un Sultan Şairleri (Seyf ve’l-Kalem Sahipleri)’, İlişkiler 9 (2000), 161–78.
The literature of Rum

which was itself a product of Rum as it was composed in Konya, seem to have been the major sources for learning Persian, while Arabic was studied through the Qur’an and a wide range of supporting literature. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, a scholarly interest in the Arabic and Persian languages became manifest in the publications of Kemalpaşazade.39 His al-Tanbih ‘ala Galat al-Cahil wa’l-Nabih (Notices on Common and Uncommon Errors) paved the way for a particular genre of dictionaries that present solecisms (galatat), including misspellings, shifts in meaning and derivations from Arabic or Persian loanwords that are commonplace in Anatolian Turkish. Galatat dictionaries would evolve into a popular genre: guides for authors in the refinement of usage.40 Tuhfe-i Şahidi (Souvenir by Şahidi), a rhymed Turkish-Persian dictionary which was composed in 1514–15 by Şahidi (d. 1550), a medrese-educated Mevlevi poet, came to serve as a primer for the learners of Persian.41 A polyglot dictionary of Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Mongolian which was composed in 1529 by İmâddîddin Hüseyinoğlu Hasan Karahisari (d. 1540) with the title Şamilü’l-Luğa (Comprehensive Vocabulary) testifies to the growing interest in eastern languages.42 Many dictionaries composed or translated in this period established the basis of Persian and Arabic language learning in Rum until the early twentieth century.

Kemalpaşazade was also responsible for the Kava‘idü’l-Fûrs (The Rules of Persian Language), for some the first-ever grammar of Persian in Arabic.43

39 For information about Kemalpaşazade, who is today appreciated as an historian, and his works, see İbn Kemal, Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman VII. Defter, ed. Şerafettin Turan (Ankara, 1957), pp. ix–xix.
41 For an excellent edition of this rhyming dictionary, see Antoinette C. Verburg, ‘The Tuhfe-i Şâhidî: A Sixteenth-Century Persian-Ottoman Dictionary in Rhyme’, Archivum Ottomanicum 15 (1997), 5–87: This edition includes a Persian and English translation of the introduction of the text (pp. 11–17), an annotated transcription of the dictionary (pp. 17–42), an annotated tri-lingual index of Turkish and Persian vocabulary with their English equivalents (pp. 43–79) and a survey of hundreds of manuscripts and later print editions (pp. 82–7). Şahidi organised his Tuhfe in order to teach Persian vocabulary “in meter”, employing a different aruz scheme in each section. For more information on Tuhfe-i Şâhidî and its influence, see Yusuf Öz, Tuhfe-i Şâhidî Şerhleri (Konya, 1999).
However, an Anatolian Turkish grammar that was also composed in 1530–1 for the vezir İbrahim Paşa (d. 1536), an influential patron of the arts, must be cited since it signifies the importance given to the systematic learning of languages.\textsuperscript{44} The author, Kadri of Bergama, about whom we do not have much biographical information, explains his purpose as follows: “This book is in and on Turkish so that its speakers will benefit from the book by comparing other tongues to their language and acquire a good knowledge of them”.\textsuperscript{45} As Kadri states here, Müyessiretü'l-Ulûm (Teacher of Knowledge) was modelled after Arabic grammar books to ease learning especially of Arabic and Persian through a grammatical understanding of Turkish.

The efforts by scholars to prepare tools for learning languages went hand-in-hand with the development of a particular written form of Turkish through practice in the scribal offices of the palace. Emulating Persian and eastern Turkic documents, scribes had been crafting a new bureaucratic language which involved a hierarchical employment of Persian and Arabic vocabulary in the appellations and technical vocabulary.\textsuperscript{46} While translations from mostly literary and historical texts introduced morphological and syntactic categories into Turkish, the new written language also became a ground for free quotations from the Qur’an and hadith in Arabic, and especially from Sadi, Attar, Hafez and Rumi’s works in Persian. This recalls Mustafa Ali’s description quoted in the epigraph to this section. While the number of dictionaries and grammar books composed in this period displayed the wide interest in and need for understanding Arabic and Persian which marked this period, the development of these linguistic tools was also related to the emergence of a new form of prose that made Mustafa Ali and his colleagues so proud.

\textit{The structure of prose}

In the introduction to his anthology of Ottoman Turkish prose texts, Fahir İz described three types of Turkish prose: plain prose, ornate prose and middle examples from Persian poetry. One copy of this text was commissioned by Ahmed (d. 1513), son of Bayezid II; see ibid., p. xli. This and other copies reveal the importance of \textit{Camii’ü'l-Fûrs} as well as the interest in such reference works in sixteenth-century Anatolia.

\textsuperscript{44} For İbrahim Paşa, who was one of the most influential patrons of arts, see Ebru Turan, “The Sultan’s Favorite: İbrahim Pasha and the Making of the Ottoman Universal Sovereignty in the Reign of Sultan Suleyman (1516–1526)”, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago (2007).

\textsuperscript{45} For a facsimile and transcribed edition of the text with indexes, see Bergamali Kadri, Müyessiretü'l-Ulûm, ed. Besim Atalay (Ankara, 1946); the quotation from p. 7 is my translation.

The literature of Rum

prose. Plain prose was a kind of written Turkish closer to the spoken language (which already included a good percentage of Arabic and Persian loanwords) bereft of Persian and Arabic-origin morphological and syntactic forms. It had made its appearance from the fourteenth century on in early compositions and translations. Ornate prose (inşâ) was composed by and for a learned group in order to display knowledge of Persian, Arabic and Turkish starting with the reign of Mehmed II. Middle prose was situated between high ornate prose and plain prose. The introductory and concluding parts of a text, panegyric sections and epitaphs came increasingly to be in ornate prose, but in anecdotal or historical parts middle or even plain prose would continue to be employed. According to İz, the middle prose, a hybrid form where authors switched from one style to another, was the most commonly employed.\(^{47}\)

The relationship between training in scribal offices and an elevated form of written Turkish is clear from the fact that the first writers to be famous in the new medium of high literary prose were from among the state cadres, such as Sinan Paşa (d. 1486), who was the vezir under the sultans Mehmed II and his son Bayezid I, and Tacizade Cafer Çelebi (1459–1515), who worked as a nişancı (imperial scribe) under Bayezid II and kadi asker (chief judge) of Anatolia under his son Selim I before his execution.\(^{48}\) Sinan Paşa’s lengthy prose hymn of God, Tazarrunâme, is a groundbreaking text in the making of ornate prose. Although it lacked the lengthy Persian constructs that took over high literary Turkish prose in the following decades, it perfected the rhyme schemes called sect‘. As his emotions rise, caused by his feelings over the baseness of human existence and his desire to reach God, Sinan Paşa’s melodic prose bursts into poetic digressions that assume a discernable meter. His style was so effective that high literary prose would be called “Sinan style” for decades to come.\(^{49}\) This style, called inşa (composition), a sub-category of nesr (prose), delivered

\(^{47}\) Fahir İz, Eski Türk Edebiyatında Nesir: XIV. Yüzyıldan XIX. Yüzyılda Kadar Yazmalarдан Seçilmiş Metinler I (İstanbul, 1964), pp. v–xxii. In his study of Mustafa Ali’s prose style, Andreas Tietze identified (a) rhyme and rhythm, (b) internal rhyme, (c) alliteration, (d) homonymy, (e) homography and near-homographs, (f) figura etymologica, (g) loose phonological association and (h) thematic association as the language-based building blocks of this author’s prose. He also analysed Mustafa Ali’s use of particular proverbs and comparisons in Andreas Tietze, ‘Mustafa ‘Ali of Gallipoli’s Prose Style’, Archivum Ottomanicum 5 (1973), 297–319. While Tietze’s analysis establishes a discourse analysis of high literary prose, it must be stressed that this style also relied on history and mythology of the Near East as a reservoir of reference, and these components established the stylistic and semantic basis for the art of poetry.

\(^{48}\) For Cafer Çelebi, see the excellent biographical essay by İsmail Erünsal in the introduction to his edition of Cafer’s poetry collection, The Life and Works of Tâci-zâde Cafer Çelebi, with a Critical Edition of His Divân (İstanbul, 1983).

\(^{49}\) On Sinan Paşa and for an edition of the text in transcription, see Sinan Paşa, Tazarru’name, ed. A. Mertol Tulum (İstanbul, 1971).
the sound of poetry not only through abounding verse digressions but also through rhyming noun or verbal phrases that mark different parts of the sentences. Embedding Persian and Arabic quotations into Turkish, coming up with fresh vocabulary drawn from Arabic and Persian, and freely employing stock images of poetry in prose texts developed in the form of a competitive game and established different codes within the realm of the written.

Even though there had been verse narrations of victories of Ottoman sultans as well as of warrior lords who served them from the early fifteenth century, writing stories of the Ottoman dynasty in this particular prose style only became popular after the conquest of Constantinople. Aşkpaşazade (d. post 1484), a learned man from a prominent family, also employed rhyming prose with poetic digressions in his Tevarih-i Ali Osman (History of the Ottoman Dynasty). Yet his prose must be evaluated under the rubric of plain prose. It is not comparable with Kemalpaşazade’s extensive history of the Ottoman dynasty commissioned by Bayezid II, in which this style was developed into a more sustained narration technique. Later, through their texts, authors such as Latifi (d. 1582), Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi and Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali would perfect the high prose, transforming it into a “path for the most eloquent”, a closed system that was exclusively for the elite. By the 1600s, even while simpler versions of written Turkish developed in parallel, a Rum style had fully incorporated two major written languages of Islam into the canvas of Turkish due to lesser knowledge and/or lack of interest in displaying Persian and Arabic competence.

The development of prose took manifold forms since Rum authors adopted different styles according to their interests, educational backgrounds and/or the genre they were writing in. Yet clearly, for ambitious writers, merely coming up with a blend of Persian phraseology to fit a spine made up of Turkish word order was not enough. It was also necessary to write on a new theme, and this is reflected by many letter collections that appeared starting in the early sixteenth century. These collections were compilations of selected letters of an author in which he created new schemes to evaluate a particular topic. Prepared with the ostensible purpose of providing epistolary models, they allowed authors to boast of their prowess in prose.


Mustafa Ali, for example, came up with a “fresh” theme for a prose composition: the fire in the Jewish district of Istanbul in 1569. He composed this work in the form of a letter about this incident addressed to his teacher Kınalızade Ali Çelebi (1510–72), where he used the occasion to praise the vezir Sokollu Mehmed Paşa for his handling of the situation; see Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, p. 56. For the transcribed text of the letter, see Gelibolulu Mustafa
debates on the value of poetry and prose continued, it had now become difficult to tell prose from poetry unless one looked at the meter.\textsuperscript{52}

**Prose versus poetry**

Prose or \textit{inşâ}, with its constant references to poetic forms, modes and styles, marked the period from the 1450s on. Consequently, comparison of poetry and prose was a popular theme. \textit{Latifi}, a prolific author and a biographer of poets, stated in the dictionary entry about himself that he had composed in his youth a poetry collection of 500 lyric poems and 33 eulogies, now lost to us. Realising that anyone who sang a few couplets could pass himself off as a poet and that “poets are like flies, each pretending to be the Phoenix”, \textit{Latifi} chose the path of prose which was “the seat of the learned”. In this lengthy manifesto in defence of prose, \textit{Latifi} also claims to have invented an “eloquence-manifesting style” by mixing proverbs, sayings and witticisms and, by comparing his style in prose to that in poetry of the leading poet of Rum, Necati (d. 1509), to have elevated prose to the level of poetry.\textsuperscript{53}

A defence of poetry appears in poet and scholar \textit{Nev'i}’s (1533–99) work \textit{Netayicü’l-Fünun} (Consequences of Sciences), on classification of sciences. When a grand \textit{vezir} claimed, “A poet can’t be a scholar”, \textit{Nev'i} developed a lengthy discourse in response, drawing on the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet to claim the superiority of poetry over prose as the convening of divine wisdom and spiritual knowledge in poetry.\textsuperscript{54} These are only two instances of the differing ideas on poetry and prose, even though poetry definitely constituted a reservoir for the new prose with respect to vocabulary, imagery and tropes. While these two styles of writing would be employed in order to express all sorts of emotional or social experience within a framework of an age-old mystical understanding of the universe, it is clearly prose which made a huge leap ahead in relation to poetry. It set up another challenge

\textsuperscript{52} The first instances of a rarely used but carefully noted form of prose poetry, \textit{bahr-ı tavıl}, also appeared during this period. For a description, examples and bibliographical references, see Ismail Hakki Aksoyak, ‘Anadolu Sahasında İlk Bahr-ı Tavıl Ahmed Paşa’nın Mıdır?’, in \textit{Klasik Türk Edebiyatı Sempozyumu}, ed. Atabey Kılıç (Kayseri, 2009), pp. 4–22.


to Rum litterateurs, forcing out those who did not have a similar educational background in Persian and Arabic.

Of course, against all the controversy around it, poetry was the core of literature, as high literary prose was perceived as its culmination. Poetry had indeed invaded almost all genres of writing, some of which today are in the realm of prose. In recent studies, the rise of ornate prose composition is overshadowed by poetry. While this may be due to the fact that poetic idiom determined the rules of the new ornate prose, it could be argued that fifteenth-century Rumi poetic expression displaced ornate prose insofar as it gained a flexibility that enabled authors to utilise verse to compose everything from didactic manuals to dictionaries, from histories to personal conduct manuals. The debates around şi’r and inşa were happening in the background of a vivid literary scene, where new kinds of literary texts were being produced. Parallel to a more conscious attitude towards language, poetry and prose, a major change that distinguished the period was an unprecedented reflexive turn that appeared in works of literature.

The development of the language and the discussions and debates around the concepts of poetry and prose reflected the evolving concept of a Rum poet. The new language, new forms and new themes gave a distinct voice to the Rum author. The emergence of autobiographical themes in literary works would alter traditional forms and contents and introduce authorial contexts into texts, an element that would be integral to the Rumi literary identity. I would like to look first into the new forms and contents of this fresh literary development in the following section and then discuss the literary tools that enabled them. The literary identity of a Rum poet was shaped by this amazing literary renewal.

**Forms and contents of a new literature**

There has been a lot of talk among the people of love
Yet not a word about the hidden states

55 The number of poetry collections composed in this period alone indicates the extent to which poetry had expanded its territory. While today we have only five or six extant poetry collections (divan) by Rum poets who lived before the mid-fifteenth century, more than 30 were published by the year 1538, the year Sehi completed the first biographical dictionary of Rum poets. More than 40 would be produced by the end of the sixteenth century. Even though the data are drawn from an inadequate source that includes only the copies of poetry collections in Istanbul libraries ([Istanbul Kitapları Türkce Divanlar Kataloğu 1](Istanbul, 1947)), it is still impressive, especially when considered along with the rise in the number of poets in the poetry compilations.

The literature of Rum

Because poetry is the fruit of the tree of love and it is the light for the mysteries of love

In these couplets, poetry and love come together. While Nev'i in the former expresses a complaint, Aşık Çelebi in the latter defines poetry as love’s fruit, as well as the key to its comprehension. Aşık Çelebi’s statement from the introduction to his biographical dictionary closes the section on the function of poetry. It is a key to understanding poetry, at times as an expression of the poet’s desire and longing, at times a discourse on the nature of love and at times a trap for hunting beauties.

In the couplet from his allegorical verse narrative Hasb-i Hal (Discourse on Current States) about the stages of mystical love, poet and scholar Nev'i, on the other hand, complains that “people of love” (ehl-i aşk) do not talk about the hidden states (vakâ’i hal), which may be simply defined as the divine nature of existence. He composes his work as the expression of love as a mystical experience that underlies the expression of love in gazel. While Nev'i developed a narrative describing the ideal lover, his work, composed towards the end of the sixteenth century, can also be read as a critique of the growing autobiographical story, a popular topic that can be traced back to the late fifteenth century.

On the surface, not much formal change appeared in comparison to the preceding era. Poetry continued to evolve around the medium of two lines, beyt, and three basic forms, gazel, kaside and mesnevi, were distinguished by rhyme schemes, composition and length. Formal limitations of these forms were manipulated by the available schemes in the intricate metric system of aruz. Kaside, praise poetry, a lengthy composition of up to or even more

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59 Aşık Çelebi names kaside, gazel, murabba, rubai, kit’a and mesnevi as the parts (aksam) of poetry; see Aşık Çelebi, Meşâ’ir-i Şu’ardâ, p. 280. However, in the organisation of a poetry collection, first kasides, then gazels and then shorter forms of poems were compiled in separate sections. Mesnevis were arranged after the kasides along with other lengthier forms, while murabbas and kitas, along with other shorter forms, were generally located in the closing section of the collected poems of a poet in this period.
Gazel, a much shorter form (generally five to seven couplets) with the same rhyme scheme, expressed the wailings and sighs of lovers who were enchanted by a symbolic world. These two forms established the basis for an author’s poetry collection called *divan*. *Mesnevi*, verse narratives with independent rhyming couplets, on the other hand, was another popular form in which to compose stories, essays, satire, praise and complaint. The system of genre was not firmly fixed, and three basic forms were employed for similar themes; that is, a gazel praising a patron or a *kaside* written in a lyric sensitivity, with *mesnevi* performing all possible functions. Basically, these forms pointed to different contexts; for example, a gazel would be performed in a gathering (*meclis*) since its brevity made for easy recitation.

**Gazel: The wails of lovers**

Lyric poetry formed the major part of literary production, and the most voluminous collections of gazels appeared in this period. Poets were employing gazel to discuss and re-evaluate poetry, referring to their predecessors and rival poets in their poems. At the end of the sixteenth century, Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, who is responsible for three *divans*, identified the masters of the form as follows:

- Hayâli, Hayreti, Ahmed, Necâtî,
- Celîli vû Mesîhi, Fazlî, Zâtî

Some have more character than fame:
- Hayreti and Celîli and Fazlî
- Some, more fame than character:
- Mesîhi and Ahmed and Zâtî

And some were famous for their character and respected as they are renowned:
- One of those is eminent Hayâli reminiscent of
- The other master Necâtî

Mustafa Ali’s list demonstrates a canon of the early sixteenth-century poets. His preference for Hayali and Necati shows his local leanings since these two

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The literature of Rum

poets are known for their use of local expressions and themes. They are also known for using plain language to mask rhetorical figures accessible only to educated Rum elite. Apparently, Necati’s and Hayali’s plain sounding intricate verses were more in fashion at the end of the sixteenth century in some quarters than Ahmed Paşa and Baki’s ornate verses.\(^{63}\)

Mustafa Ali’s poem about notable poets mirrored many gazels written in this vein.\(^{64}\) Distinct from the previous periods, gazels produced from the late fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century hosted another significant theme, the gazel form itself:

O my heart, how many gazels you sung, it is impossible
to comply with the demands of the form,
To perform a subtlety in each line
is expected by each and every one
Is it easy in the end
to satisfy all the world?

In these lines Necati, who was recognised as the master poet of Rum, expresses an awareness of the varying expectations of his readers from gazel.

One issue that polarised readers, the balance between clarity of meaning and plays on words, as discussed, was expressed by Nev’i, who clearly favoured simple verses over ornate ones:

Even if the masters of arts do not like this plain verse
Don’t worry, Nev’i, your words are a lover’s sighs\(^{65}\)

Here Nev’i claims that his words are the pure sighs of a lover, not a crafted word game. Similar couplets, where poets identified their poems with their sighs or their beloveds, abound in this period. The poem becomes a mirror image of emotion, a mirror image of the beauty of the beloved, and a

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\(^{64}\) For two examples of similar lyrics, see Emine Yeniterzi, ‘Divan Şiirinde Gazel Redifli Gazeller’, *Türkiye Araştırmalar Dergisi* 18 (2005), 1–10, especially pp. 9–10.

\(^{65}\) For a treasury of such reflexive gazels, see Cem Dilçin, ‘Divan Şiirinde Gazel’, *Türk Dili* 415–17 (1986), 78–247, especially pp. 119–34. Necati’s verse is on p. 124 and Nev’i’s is on p. 174. Nev’i’s line is suggestive of a fashion in this period called *Türkî-i Basît*, according to which Rum poets composed poems employing only spoken Turkish vocabulary. For scholarly discussions of this trend, see Hatice Aynur, ‘Rethinking the Türkî-i Basit Movement in Turkish Literature’, *Archivum Ottonanicum* 25 (2008), 79–97.
mirror image of the lover himself. While poets composed more and more gazels as symbols of their status as lovers, it is almost impossible to talk about a homogenised definition for the lover. Contesting ideas and ideals of love informed different “lover” positions. The poet’s identity as a lover had already been established in the Islamicate literary traditions. Now, however, the gazel, the basic expression of love, became not only a narration of its unfolding but also a direct representation of love in the abstract, or a representation of its object. In the latter case, a gazel became a mirror reflecting the beauty of the beloved. As the lover-poet materialised his love and his lover’s beauty in the form of the gazel and assumed a historical dimension through references to established tradition, the poet’s identity as a lover also appeared in longer autobiographical narratives of love affairs or discourses on love by poets of differing professional positions in the state machine.

As the gazel form became more and more inclusive of the poet’s ideas on poetry and reflective of the tradition, beginning in the mid-fifteenth century, the gazel became increasingly linked to Rumi identity.

Kaside: The wailings of subjects
Poets elaborated on the formal peculiarities of the form and imagery with respect to the existing models (as explored in the section on parallel poems) through their gazels; the kaside form, on the other hand, presented them with different opportunities and challenges. Most examples of the form were religiously motivated, to testify to the oneness of God (tevhid), to pray for forgiveness (münacaat) and to praise the prophet Muhammed (naat) or the four rightly guided caliphs. However, in this period the kaside as a genre evolved in parallel to the evolution of Ottoman dynastic rule. While religious kasides continued to form the initial entries in a divan, they were followed by several others dedicated to patrons, friends and beloveds.

A kaside took the compositional form of an introductory section that sets the theme of the composition, followed by praise of the patron, after which there might be a climax in the form of a gazel. The composition continued with a short section concerning a specific request of the poet from his or her patron and concluded with the poet boasting of his poetic skills. There were various occasions for composing kasides. In this period, religious holidays, seasonal changes, an enthronement, a royal death or appointment to a higher office motivated the dedication of a kaside to the court, Ottoman princes, vezirs or scholars. While kaside carried the implication of patronage relations,
The literature of Rum

it would be too restrictive to limit it to this function only. Several kasides were also prompted by a beloved, enemies, new buildings or a book by a friend, or merely by the joy of finding an interesting repeating rhyme element. Kaside also carried political messages, such as Taşlıcahi Yahya’s elegy for the execution of Süleyman I’s son Mustafa.67

While the kaside, like the gazel, established the grounds for a poet to show his skills, it also implied his network of relations. Indeed, kasides in a Rum poet’s collection of poems constituted the most telling section about his life and times. However, there is not much scholarship on how these lengthy works were composed, and more importantly how they were performed. There is an interesting short prose work titled Ser-güzüşt-i Esiri-i Malta (The Account of Slavery in Malta) by Macuncuzade Mustafa Efendi, a judge who fell captive to the Knights of Malta at the end of the sixteenth century on his way to Cyprus. In this fascinating slavery narrative, Mustafa Efendi, who is not known as a poet and about whom we do not have any biographical information apart from this text, also recorded his various verses, including the kasides that he sent to the court, explaining the context for each poem. In his kasides, Mustafa Efendi constantly pleads with his patrons, among whom was Safiye Sultan, the mother of Mehmed III, for ransom money, stressing his scholarly identity, which he uses as a mark of distinction before his non-Muslim captors as well as fellow Muslims from different social groups.68 Along with these kasides, Mustafa Efendi, using Mustafa as his pen-name, included verses in Turkish, Persian and Arabic, reflecting his skills in composing poetry in any available form for various occasions, and poems in the text are commented upon in a flowing simple prose.69 However, if Mustafa Efendi were a “poet”, he would most probably have chosen to describe his ordeal in the

67 According to an interesting interpretation by A. Atilla Şentürk, this well-known elegy, which was in terki-bi bend form, was a satire targeting Süleyman I. Şentürk’s work includes an edited, modern Turkish translation and extensive analysis of the work; see A. Atilla Şentürk, Yahya Beğ’in Şehzade Mustafa Mesriyesi Tahut Kanuni Hicviyesi (Istanbul, 1998).

68 Macuncuzade Mustafa Efendi, Malta Esirleri, ed. Cemil Çifçi (Istanbul, 1996); for the kaside dedicated to Safiye Sultan, see pp. 41–6. Interestingly, the poet Nev’i also dedicated two kasides to Safiye Sultan; see Nev’i, Nev’i Divanı, ed. M. Tulum and M. A. Tanyeri (Istanbul, 1977), pp. 22–3, 80–2. Safiye Sultan is the only woman that I have come across to whom kasides were dedicated. It was extremely rare for a kaside to be dedicated to a woman in this period. For Safiye Sultan, see Maria Pia Pedani, ‘Safiye’s Household and Venetian Diplomacy’, Turcica 32 (2000), 9–32.

69 There are 15 gazels (2 in Persian), 11 kasides (6 in the form of terci-bends and 3 müseddes), 1 murabba, 5 rubais, 12 chronograms (tarih) and several short verses throughout the text. Apparently each verse is composed not necessarily for a literary motive but rather as an expression of the pains of slavery in order to collect ransom money from patrons. The text reflects the important role of poetry in the lives of learned men of Rum.
Mesnevi form, which underwent an astonishing transformation and diversification in Rum in this period.

Mesnevi: Stories of love

The most important transformation in the literary space showed itself in a rather drastic manner in the mesnevi form. By this period, it had already developed as the basic form of narration suitable for expressing ideas, relating historical and current events and developing philosophical and religious tracts and reference works, such as dictionaries and textbooks. But now it was used to compose literary works about adventures and – more important for my argument here – love. Mesnevi had in fact been the most prevalent form of literary writing from early on in Anatolian Turkish literature, due to its formal flexibility in incorporating different poetic forms. The common elements in the initial chapters of these lengthy narratives included praises to God, the Prophet and the patrons. They were similar to the kaside form, while gazels, in which were found almost all verse romances in the Rumi style, were occasionally sung by protagonists.

At the end of the fifteenth century, verse romances became more and more popular as a high literary art, and the re-interpretations of legendary love stories became more competitive. By the end of the sixteenth century, there were many competing versions of Leyla and Mecnun or Yusuf and Züleyha stories, retold by different poets. These stories were different from popular epic stories of earlier periods that took place in distant and at times imaginary locations, such as Varka and Gülşah or Hüsrev and Şirin. Not only were these stories epic adventures, but they also presented thematic differences, for example very active and exemplary female characters, who were companions...

72 Before Şahidi’s version composed in 1478, there were no “Leyla and Mecnun” stories told in the form of a lyrical romance. Even though there were two earlier “Yusuf and Züleyha” stories, that of Hamdullah Hamdi (1449–1503), Yusuf and Züleyha, established the basis for the versions that followed and arguably was the best-loved version for decades to come. For an edition of the text, see Hamdullah Hamdi, Hamdullah Hamdi’nin Yusuf ve Züleyha Mesnevisi: Giriş, Metin, Inceleme ve Tıpkıbasım, ed. Zehra Öztürk (Cambridge, Mass., 2001).
of their male lovers in war and love. While classical Islamicate stories modelled after Nizami and/or Cami’s works were becoming popular, a remarkable body of works that combined autobiography and discussions of love appeared in the late fifteenth century. A poet from Baghdad with the pen-name Halili (1407–85) told his own love story in a verse narrative entitled Fü rkatname (The Book of Separation) (composed in 1461), in which he finds a true love of God during his trip to Rum through a worldly passion he had for a boy. In 1493, Cafer Çelebi composed his lyric romance Hevesname (The Book of Desire), which recounts his love affair with a woman. Cafer Çelebi presented his work as an innovation (ihtira), the closest term to “originality” employed by the poets of Rum. Cafer Çelebi, who, significantly, chose the same title for his work as that used by Paşa Çelebi for his rhetorical manual, Hevesname, composed his work in reference to many different genres. In the sixteenth century, Taşlîcalî Yahya (d. 1575 or 1576), probably relying on these two works, told of his love for an Istanbul boy in Şah u Geda (King and Beggar; composed ca. the 1540s). He modified the Persianate allegorical “King and Beggar” stories by using King as the nickname of his beloved and fashioning himself as the Beggar. Yahya did not mention Cafer Çelebi in his mesnevi. Yet by saying “Do not mention stories of women / Relate us stories about young boys” in the middle of his discourse on love, he expressed an indirect criticism of Hevesname, which recounted Cafer Çelebi’s

While many poets admire Şeyhi’s (d. 1431) Hüsrev i Şirin, they also complain about his choice of story. For examples by many sixteenth-century poets who criticise “Hüsrev and Şirin” as an outdated story, see Tunca Kortantamer, Nev’î-zade Atûyî ve Hamse’sî (İzmir, 1997), pp. 405–7. Also see how Ahi, an early sixteenth-century poet, decides not to complete his Hüsrev i Şirin upon the criticism of his mystical leader that the story tells the adventures of a non-Muslim king, in Aşik Çelebi, Meş’îrî’s-Ş’s’ârî, vol. 1, p. 393. For extensive information on individual mesnevis composed in Anatolian Turkish until the sixteenth century, see A. Atilla Şentürk, XVI. Asra Kadar Anadolu Sahası Mesnevilerinde Edebi Tasvîrler (İstanbul, 2002).


adulterous love affair with a woman. Yahya claimed women could only be objects of sexual desire, and he argued that the only way to experience true love in this world was through the contemplation of the beauty of a boy.

Biographical writing did exist in Anatolian Turkish before these works appeared, but autobiographical writing did not exist at all. These works preceded both the biographical notices in a variety of texts and more straightforward autobiographical verse narratives. In this way, what preceded the narration of a literary biography was in fact the narrative of a love affair. Not only did the poet’s self-fashioning as the lover (a major component of Rumi identity) in romance contribute to the development of a particular elite identity in Rum, but such poets’ realistic descriptions of particular cities of Rum in verse also introduced a distinct sense of place to literary works.

Indeed, narrative time and place reflected an unprecedented realism in the autobiographical romances by Halili, Cafer Çelebi and Yahya, unlike adventure stories or classical stories.

Cities of Anatolia, for example, appeared in poetry in connection with pleasure drawn from the sense of sight. The şehrêngiz genre suddenly became enormously popular in Istanbul with the appearance of Meshi’s Şehrêngiz-i

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77 For an edition and English translation of Yahya’s work, see Ralph Jaeckel, ‘Dukaginzade Taşlıkâlî Yahya Bey’s King and Beggar: A Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Allegorical-Mystical Love Poem’, Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles (1980), p. 169, couplet 522. Yahya’s work attracted an extraordinary number of readers for a mesnevi of this sort in its time. Jaeckel identified 103 extant manuscript copies, 35 of which were copied by the end of the sixteenth century (p. 86), a very large number for copies of a lengthy lyric romance. However, this work has to date attracted very little scholarly interest.

78 For an evaluation of similar works, titled sergüzêştname, a term which came to refer to autobiographical narratives in this period, see Özyildirim, ‘Sergüzêştnameleyer’. A chronological list of such works appears on p. 161 of that work.

79 For an example of an autobiography in verse, see Şemsî Ahmed Paşa, Silsılêname, in Şehnâmê-i Sultan Murad: Textual Analysis and Critical Edition along with Facsimile of Vaticana Barberiniani Orient No. 112, ed. Günyû Kut and Nimet Bayraktar (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), pp. 25–8. It is not clear why such short autobiographical verse narratives, reminiscent of today’s personal statements, were written.

80 It should be noted that gazavatname, descriptions of battles in verse describing heroic acts of sultans, princes and frontier lords, also experienced wide popularity in this period. And some poets depicted themselves as warriors as well. Compared to the lover, however, this was not a common literary identity unless the battles fought were in the name of love. On the gazavatname genre, see Agah Sirri Levend, Gazavât-nâmeler ve Mihaloglu Ali Bey’in Gazavât-nâmesi (Ankara, 1996).

The literature of Rum

*Edirne* during the first decades of the sixteenth century. This genre, in which beautiful boys who roam the streets were presented as the pride of a city, was concerned with comparisons of a form of worldly love, or more correctly metaphorical love (*aşk-ı mecazi*) and true love (*aşk-ı hakiki*), a much commented-on topic that was formulated in the literature of the period. Şehrengiz texts were the expressions of metaphorical love, the objects for which were the beautiful pubescent boys who were not sullied by sexual lust or the social world of adults.

Mesihi’s text was received as a genre-making work laying out a particular composition for his followers. After a supplication to God to save him from the sinful obsession of worshipping boys, Mesihi displayed his skills in the rhetorical arts by describing the beauties of 47 boys of Edirne and finished his 178-couplet work daring the other poets to imitate his text:

Mesihi managed to praise as much as he could
if you don’t like it, go ahead, give it a try

Apparently many poets took up Mesihi’s challenge, and within our period of 150 years 78 responses were composed describing the beautiful boys of major cities of the empire, mostly following the compositional pattern established by Mesihi.

What Mesihi accomplished was significant with respect to the variation and diversification of genres in the literary landscape of Rum. He invented a new genre, taking a lengthy section from Cafer Çelebi’s *Hevesname*, making use of Arabic and the Persian *tarifat* genre and drawing on the fad of using boys’ names in gazels sung in praise of their beauty. These shorter mesnevis not only reflect an inter-city rivalry among the poets of Rum through depictions of the beautiful boys of several cities but, more importantly, they also contributed to the discussions and debates emerging around a particular understanding of “love”, seemingly one major identity marker among certain groups of learned elite. Furthermore, in the form of extended lyric narratives, şehr-ıngiz were personal texts in which the poet talked about real boys

82 For an edition of this work, see Mengi, *Mesîhi Divani*, pp. 89–109.
83 Ibid., p. 109.
84 For a detailed bibliographical study of these texts, see Barış Karacasu, ‘Türk Edebiyatında Şehr-ıngızler’, *Türkçe Araştırma Dergisi* 5, 10 (2007), 259–313. For a study of Ishak Çelebi’s şehr-ıngiz of Skopje with a focus on how love is defined in the introductory sections of şehr-ıngiz texts, see Selim S. Kuru, ‘Naming the Beloved in Ottoman Turkish Gazel: The Case of Ishak Çelebi’, in *Gazel as World Literature II: From a Literary Genre to a Great Tradition, Ottoman Gazel in Context*, ed. Angelika Neuwirth, M. Hess, J. Pfeiffer and B. Sagaster (Würzburg, 2006), pp. 163–73.
he had met. They were similar to autobiographical romances in which the lover/poet extols the beauty of his beloved. Establishing crossroads between the lyric and narrative, şehrengiz texts, with their rather brief popularity and later disappearance, represent another instance of a reflexive turn in literary depictions of love that defined sixteenth-century Rum literature.

While the mesnevi form continued to host a variety of topics, the appearance of the narrator as the protagonist was the most striking feature of this period. This sort of literary autobiography paved the way for various prose narrations of the self and others that would appear from the late sixteenth century onwards.85

Prose genres

The autobiographical turn presented itself in prose literature as well. One of the first instances is Taşköprüzade’s Arabic autobiography that he added at the end of his biographical dictionary, and the first Turkish autobiography seems to be that of Latifi’s entry in his biographical dictionary of poets.86 Ornate prose, inşa, had trajectories other than autobiographical or fictional composition, and the major output of inşa is represented by various letter collections, which have not yet received the study they deserve.

In addition to letter collections, various original story collections were written in inşa. Stories are generally told in straightforward language; however, some employ a higher literary form of language. Apart from translations of large compendia of stories, local stories were put into writing in this period. For example, while scholar and poet Lamii (d. 1531) collected many stories from Arabic and Persian sources in his Letaifname (Book of Witticisms), he also added contemporary anecdotes, some about the preceding generation of poets. Similarly, when poet Gazali (d. 1538) brought together sexually explicit stories from different Arabic and Persian compilations in a mock ethical treatise, he included many local jokes and witticisms.87 These compilations classify stories under particular topics, the most common of which include anecdotes about historical personalities, the wiles of women and the unruly ways of state officials.

85 For a seminal essay on autobiographical writing in the Ottoman Empire, see Cemal Kafadar, ‘Self and Others: The Diary of a Dervish in Seventeenth Century Istanbul and First-Person Narratives in Ottoman Literature’, Studia Islamica 69 (1989), 191–218.
The literature of Rum

The writing of one story compilation, on the other hand, is reflective of the high demand for these prose works. Apparently Murad III wanted to hear original stories and commissioned poet Cinani (d. 1595) to compile previously unheard-of tales. Cinani composed the work under the title Bedayiü’l-Asar (Most Ornate Stories) and, after having a scribe transcribe it, he gave it to an artist to illuminate the pages for the presentation copy. One of the storytellers in Murad III’s court, Derviş Eğlence, being friends with the illuminator, read the copy and told the stories to the sultan before the book was ready. When Cinani presented his work, not only did he not receive any payment, but he was also shunned by the sultan for merely recording the stories already told by Eğlence instead of telling previously untold ones. This anecdote, recorded by Nevizade Atayi (1583–1635), points to the great popularity of tales in this period and the interest in “original” stories rather than commonly transmitted classical stories found in traditional story collections.88

Letters and story collections in ornate prose as well as particular historical texts were accepted as literature. Kemalpaşazade’s aforementioned history of the Ottoman dynasty was especially praised for the beauty of its language. While a detailed discussion of this is beyond the limits of this chapter, it should be noted that some of the histories were also literary in the way they described real events in ornate language with allusions and similes drawn from poetic imagery.

The forms discussed in this section represent a fraction of the prevalent forms and themes that mostly appeared in this period. A new language was being developed in new genres and forms. There were of course continuities with the preceding periods with respect to themes. As I mentioned earlier, what was accepted as literary was always under the influence of a set of texts previously adopted and studied as classics. Attar’s Pendname, a book on moral conduct, Sadi’s (d. 1291) Gülistan, a treatise on ethics mixing prose and poetry, Mevlena Celaleddin-i Rumi’s (d. 1273) Mesnevi, a lengthy verse narrative on mystical parables, and the lyric poetry collection of Hafez (d. 1390) were constantly mined for vocabulary, imagery and themes. Just as the Qur’an and the hadith established the basis for learning Arabic and formed a core of literary themes, these texts were the holy books for the Rum poets, from which

they learned a particular form of the Persian language that expressed mystical love.\textsuperscript{89}

**Literary tools for poets of Rum**

Two select and unparalleled majestic poems by our sultan have been delivered to me, and I dared to compose two parallels to one of them. However, the opening verse of this poem, like its other exquisite verses, was composed in a matchless manner, and especially the exquisite line “No wonder that the infidel’s niche is awry”, is such an innovative verse that, God knows, no parallel poems can outshine it. It has been a while that both the poets of Iran and Rum have uttered countless words related to the prayer niche, yet, I have never witnessed such pleasant refinement.\textsuperscript{90}

This quotation is from a letter by one of the most celebrated Rum poets, Baki (d. 1599 or 1600), written to Suleyman I (1520–66) about the latter’s two lyric poems (that is, gazels) which the sultan had sent to Baki.\textsuperscript{91} In a marginal note, Baki continues his praises:

> If it is questioned why I have composed two parallel poems, I would like to remind you of the famous saying, “The loser wants to play more”: trying to come up with a better verse, I kept composing more verses. But how is it possible for a base person like me to compose a parallel to such a grand poem? It naturally ends up being a mere imitation.

\textsuperscript{89} There is no systematic study on how these particular texts were deployed by the sixteenth-century litterateurs, yet it is clear from biographical accounts that most of them learned Persian from \textit{Gülistan}, which was also a basic source for learning Islamic mores; mystical principles from \textit{Mesnevi}, which brought together many topics concerning divine love; poetic imagery and topoi from Hafez; and ethics from Attar’s various works. Memorising the whole or parts of these texts and quoting freely from them was common practice. The importance of these texts was incomparable to other sources until the end of the Ottoman Empire and well into the Republican period, as numerous editions, interpretations and translations testify.


\textsuperscript{91} Like Sultan Suleyman I, other sultans of this period also asked famous poets either to write parallels to or to comment on their poetry. For example, Aşık Celebi records parallels by six contemporary poets to a Persian couplet by Bayezid II; see Aşık Çelebi, \textit{Meşâ’irî’s-Şû’arâ}, vol. 1, pp. 106–7. Also, a collection of poetry includes commentaries by Baki and other poets on Arabic and Persian poems of Murad, the pen-name of Murad III (1574–95); see Bekir Kütükoglu, ‘Murad III’, \textit{İslâm Ansklopedisi, İslâm Âlemi Coğrafya, Etnografya ve Biyografiya Lügâtî}, ed. A. Advar, R. Arat, A. Ateş, C. Baysun, B. Darkot (İstanbul, 1960), vol. 8, pp. 615–25, especially p. 625.
The literature of Rum

The eyebrow of the beloved as the niche in mosques showing the direction of prayer is one of the central images in Persianate literature, which points to a disparity between institutionalised religion and mystical configurations of it. The poet who turns his face away from the prayer niche in the mosque to the eyebrow of the beloved boy appreciates God through the beauty of His creation, neglecting religious obligations. According to Baki, by shifting this image that relates the curve above the niche of a church to the curve-shaped eyebrow and using the Turkish word eğrilik, which means both a curve and dishonesty, Süleyman I has created an unmatched re-configuration of the “eyebrow as prayer niche” image, at the same time re-working common descriptions of the beloved in poetry as an infidel because he seduces the lover away from strict religious duties.92

Baki’s commentary about the perfection of the poetic image shows how, after the mid-sixteenth century, litterateurs of Rum distinguished themselves from other prevalent oral and written literary cultures by focusing on literature as a peculiar art form defined by intricate rules, referring to a particular literary tradition, and thereby establishing a constantly developed canon. All these intentions manifested themselves in the process of producing literary tools which would also help them curb the bifurcating paths of a constantly ramifying literary development. While one requirement to accomplish this control was to set up rules for literary composition, the other was to establish a canon through a selective recording of poetry.

Behind Baki’s praise of Süleyman I’s poem lie two important aspects of the literary culture of this period: the importance of composing parallel poems and of re-configuring existing tropes in new contexts. A parallel generally followed the original poem in rhyme and meter while reorganising the images in it. Criticising the poet Cemili for his parallels to Nevai’s poems, Latifi clearly states what is expected of a good parallel: “He composed parallels rhyme-by-rhyme for each poem in Nevai’s three-volume poetry collection. Yet they are only parallels in meter and rhyme; not in style, imagination and elegance of exposition”.93 A parallel poem, then, was not only supposed to use the same rhyme element and poetic meter as the original but also improve the style, elegance and image.

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92 For a list of the basic poetic vocabulary, see Walter G. Andrews, Poetry’s Voice Society’s Song: Ottoman Lyric Poetry (Seattle, 1985), pp. 43–9. For the best available source in English for explanations of Persian, Turkish, Chagatai and Urdu poetic imagery, see Annemarie Schimmel, A Two Colored Brocade: The Imagery of Persian Poetry (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992).
93 For comments on parallel poetry by the sixteenth-century biographers of Rum poets, see Tolasa, Sehî, Lâtifi, pp. 263–6.
By the beginning of the sixteenth century, already one of the basic rules of taking part in the poetry circles of Rum was the composing of parallel poems in order to surpass poems written by previous or contemporary poets. In this way, a growing canonical corpora of poetry was established, re-configuring tropes and topoi in a manner that exhausted all possible associations. As the basic rule of the game of poetry, it was an important practice to develop poetic skills. But it also cultivated a sense of belonging to a localised tradition. Rum poets might still be combing the works of the classical or contemporary poets writing in Arabic and/or Persian looking for inspiration, but their intent was no longer to translate and adapt but to excel in and develop further a particular form of Anatolian Turkish poetry. To this end, an array of different educational tools were created. These included poetry anthologies, rhetorical manuals, and manifestos on poetry, as well as commentaries that are indicative of processes of compilation, instruction and re-evaluation, all of which provided an archive of tradition.

Parallel poetry anthologies

Poetry anthologies were among the earliest attested of these educational tools, and they appeared in the form of compilations of parallel poems. The evidence for a developing tradition of parallel poems before the mid-fifteenth century is preserved in a compilation by Ömer bin Mezid, composed in 1437 and including 397 poems by 84 poets, not all of whom were writing in Anatolian Turkish. Naming his work Mecmu’atü’n-Nezair (An Anthology of Parallel Poems), Ömer bin Mezid interestingly did not make any mention of Rum in his brief introduction, where he explained that his motive was to


95 By localisation I mean that poets were now responding to their fellow poets’ compositions in Anatolian Turkish. A parallel poem written after a Persian example was not acceptable as a parallel poem. The perception of Chagatai as a foreign language becomes problematic in this context. While there are many parallel poems for Ali Şir Nevai’s gazels before the sixteenth century, this does not seem to be true for other famous Chagatai poets. For a brief discussion of parallel poems and language relations, see Yusuf Çetindağ, Ali Şir Nevâi’nin Osmanlı Şiirine Etkisi (Ankara, 2006), pp. 26–7. In this respect, a manuscript copy of Nevai’s divan, which was presented to a boon companion of the Ottoman prince Korkud (1470–1513) and in which the orthography of Chagatai was changed into Anatolian Turkish, reveals a glimpse into various attitudes of adaptation and emulation. See Eleazar Birnbaum, ‘The Ottomans and Chagatay Literature: An Early 16th Century Manuscript of Navâi’s Divân in Ottoman Orthography’, Central Asiatic Journal 20, 4 (1976), 157–90; for three plates, see ibid., Central Asiatic Journal 21, 1 (1977), n.p.
The literature of Rum

record the dispersed poems of “poet friends and heart-fetching rulers” for posterity. His disregard for distinguishing poets according to the courts to which they belonged or the kind of written Turkish they employed suggests that patronage relations, geography and linguistic difference did not inform his anthology. On the other hand, Ömer bin Mezid’s anthology brought together themes, forms and rhyme and meter schemes which would be challenged, appropriated and gradually enhanced by the late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century poets.

Almost a century later, in 1512, Eğridirli Hacı Kemal published an anthology including parallel poems by 266 poets in his Cami‘ün-Neza’ir (A Compilation of Parallel Poems), reflecting an increase in the number of poets within less than a century. In the sixteenth century, two further major anthologies of parallel poems appeared: Mecmu‘u’n-Neza’ir (1533–4), the same title as Ömer bin Mezid’s work, by Edirneli Nazmi, containing poems by 357 poets, and Cami‘ün-Nezair (1560), titled as Hacı Kemal’s anthology, by Pervane bin Abdullah, with poems by 430 poets. These gigantic compilations presented a base poem and then listed several parallels written by different poets, establishing various connections, sometimes faulty, between them. The number of poems in these anthologies went into the thousands.

The interest in these anthologies, which clearly served as educational tools for literary practice, reflects the importance given to the writing of parallels in order to extend the realm of imagination through re-configuration of images. More importantly, unlike Ömer bin Mezid’s compilation, the sixteenth-century anthologies included only base and parallel poems by poets who wrote in Anatolian Turkish, inadvertently canonising the poets they included. This tradition would continue with differing foci and interests, perhaps not as vigorously in the following centuries as was the case in this period of fermentation, while anthologies of the sixteenth century would continue to serve as major reference works.

Manuals and commentaries

While such parallel poetry collections provided poets with models to emulate and configurations of images to examine, as a translation of a manual of Persian poetry testifies, there was also a growing interest in technical manuals of poetry. Paşa Çelebi composed Hevesname (Book of Desire) in Persian

97 For a description and analysis of poetry anthologies, see Köksal, Sana Benzer Güzels, pp. 65–90, and for a list of these with references to manuscript copies, see Agah Sirri Levend, Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi (Ankara, 1973), pp. 167–9.
in 1487, building on Persian poet Ramii’s (mid-fourteenth century) *Anis al-’Ushshaq*. Paşa Çelebi’s adaptation was a compendium of similes and terms employed to describe physical aspects of a beloved along with exemplary couplets.98 This treatise would be followed by a flurry of treatises on poetry, *aruz* meter, rhetorical devices, and catalogues of poetic imagery. Most important in this line was Sururi’s (d. 1562) *Bahrü’l-Ma’arif* (The Sea of Knowledge). Relying on his notes on sciences of meter and rhyme, Sururi published this work in 1549 upon Prince Mustafa’s request in the princely court of Amasya. A perfunctory comparison of *Hevesname* and *Bahrü’l-Ma’arif* indicates a shift of interest from poetic exemplary into poetics. Sururi’s work became one of the standard references for poets of following generations, as testified to by its many manuscript copies.99

By the mid-sixteenth century, a tradition of commentaries on poetry provided another set of tools in the professionalisation of poetry, building upon the developing reference material in the form of anthologies and manuals of poetics. These commentaries (*şerh*) were on the Persian classics cited earlier. The first available commentary on a literary text is on the introduction of *Gülistan* by Lamii. Dated 1504, Lamii’s commentary, with its attention to the vocabulary and syntax of the original along with phrasal translations and cultural explanation, seems to have set the trend for the following wave of literary commentaries that would start 50 years later.100

Literary commentaries of the mid-sixteenth century moved from translation and mystical explanation, as in Sururi’s *şerh* of Hafez’s *divan*, which is

98 References to similar works are found in İsmail Hakkı Aksoyak, ‘Manastırî Celâl’în Hüsn-i Yüsuf Adli Eseri’, in *Edebiyat ve Dil Yazıları: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Işen Armağan*, ed. Ayşenur Külahlıoğlu Islam and S. Eker (Ankara, 2007), pp. 301–17. Tropes that symbolise body parts of the beloved seem to have been categorised and re-defined in a series of texts of different genres. For a comparative list of those body parts found in different Turkish rhetorical treatises and literary texts of the period, see Aksoyak, ‘Manastırî Celâl’în Hüsn-i Yüsuf Adlı Eseri’, pp. 313–14. For this list, Aksoyak expands on an earlier one prepared in Hakan Atay, ‘Heves-nâme’de Aşık Oyunu: Tâcizâde Cafer Çelebi’nin Özgünlük İdeali’, M.A. thesis, Bilkent University (2003). Atay’s study includes more information about Ramii and Paşa Çelebi’s work; see Atay, ‘Heves-nâme’de, pp. 76–7.

99 This work was organised as an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion, the first chapter presenting the *aruz* meter, the second tropes and the third similes and metaphors used for the beloved’s characteristics. For more information on the author and his work, and a comparison of its third chapter with Ramii’s text, see Yakup Şafak, ‘Sürûrî’nin Bahrû’l-Mârîf’i ve Bu Eserdeki Teşbih ve Mecaz Unsurları’, *Türkiyeyät Araştırmaları Dergisi* 4 (1997), 217–35. For a list of the terminology included in the third chapter, see pp. 223–4 of that article.

100 Lamii prepared his commentary at the request of a friend who could not understand the fine points of the Persian original. See Hülya Canpolat, ‘Lâmi’î Çelebi’nin Şerhi Diibâce-i Gülistan’ı’, M.A. thesis, Ege University (2000), p. 83. Canpolat identifies 54 manuscript copies of the work, attesting to its wide readership.
the earliest known commentary in any language, to grammatical explanations and exploration of content, as found in the commentaries on Hafez by Sudi (d. 1598?). The earliest commentary on a whole poem is an analysis of a Turkish lyric by trend-setting poet Hayali (d. 1556), provided by the aforementioned Kadri of Bergama as a grammatical example. Commentary on Turkish poetry seems to have discontinued after this initial attempt at interpreting poetry, or rather continued in the form of parallel poems and musammamat (that is, developing the connotations in an existing poem by adding extra lines, interpreting and amplifying it). While Kadri’s intention was to analyse the poem in order to display the workings of the Turkish language, after evaluating a morphological analysis of the lines, he also pointed to the rhetorical devices employed by Hayali.

During mid-century, the commentaries of Sururi, Sudi and another learned man, called Şem’i (d. after 1603), reflect a renewed interest in the analysis of Persian classics through commentaries on their technique and inner meanings, in a manner similar to the biographical dictionaries. Their approach differed from that of Kadri, who stressed the importance of a grammatical knowledge of Turkish in order to learn Persian and Arabic. It also differed from the earlier focus on literary production in Anatolian Turkish. By the mid-sixteenth century, there was new interest in an even more refined form of literature that shifted from consideration of the local and contemporary material to a deeper re-evaluation of classical predecessors, the masters of Persian poetry. Current scholarship is generally mute about similar cases of commentary on Arabic literary works in this period.

**Discourses on poetry**

While poetry anthologies, rhetorical manuals and commentaries constituted the contents of the toolbox for the craft of poetry, more direct statements on poetry are developed in the introductions of poetry collections and in the

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introductions to biographical dictionaries of poets, both of which appeared as a novelty in this period. The first introduction to a poetry collection in Anatolian Turkish was composed in verse by Ahmed Paşa, and the most detailed one is found in the aforementioned Lamii’s collection of poems. After praises of God and the Prophet, Lamii opens his introduction with praises of speech and the Qur’an. He then identifies poetry and prose as two parts of “the magic of speech”. This lengthy text includes a defence of poetry with quotations from the Qur’an, hadith and many Persian poets who testify about it. More specifically, Lamii defends a mystical sense of poetry against verses that merely entertain and invectives that encourage low morals.

Several decades later, a similar discourse with more detailed information about the history, meaning and value of poetry was presented by Aşık Çelebi in the introduction to his biographical dictionary. Aşık Çelebi displays his excellent command of ornate prose and a detailed knowledge of the history of poetry from the Creation to the rise of the Ottoman dynasty. While Lamii presents himself in his introduction as the leading poet of Rum without mentioning any other Rum poet, Aşık Çelebi, as mentioned earlier, makes several references to the encouragement of poetry and to the abundance of poets in Rum. There are similarities in the content of these two texts, pointing to a developing historical understanding of an Islamicate account of the history of poetry. Similar to these two, many other discourses on poetry alluded to a shared legendary history of poetry, the sources of which are yet to be investigated. On the other hand, individual entries on poets in the biographical dictionaries included comments and evaluations on both the nature of poetry and the development of poetry in Rum.

The earliest commentary on Anatolian Turkish literature is found in the introductory section of the aforementioned Cafer Çelebi’s lyric romance

103 For a compilation of transcriptions and Turkish translations of divan introductions, see Tahsin Üzgör, Türkçe Divan Dibâceleri (Ankara, 1990). Fourteen out of the 39 introductions, and definitely the most detailed ones presented in this volume, were written in the period considered here.


106 Tolas, in his aforementioned Sehi, Lâtiﬁ, ve Aşık Çelebi, glean much information from the first three biographical dictionaries, those by Sehi, Latifi and Aşık Çelebi. For information on the literary character of poets, see the second part of this important study, pp. 189–370.
The literature of Rum

Hevesname (couplets 514–25). In this section, Cafer Çelebi identifies Şeyhi and Ahmed Paşa as the most famous Rum poets and criticises the former for lacking in fesahat (couplets 515–17) and the latter for lacking in belagat (couplets 518–20). He also claims that instead of inventing new meanings they excelled in translating poetry. In this brief section, Cafer Çelebi explains fesahat as not using strange vocabulary (couplet 517) and belagat as enhancing significance through the use of rhetorical devices. According to Cafer Çelebi, Ahmed Paşa’s poetry resembles icons in a church, beautiful yet without essence (couplet 520). It should be noted that even though Cafer Çelebi locates his critique in a romance, he refers to the lyric poems of two of the most famous Rum poets, one a predecessor, the other a contemporary of his, highlighting the importance for a professional poet of writing lyric poems.

A response by Ahmed Paşa is instructive in order to understand Cafer Çelebi’s short passage as an act of literary criticism. In the final section of Ahmed Paşa’s poetry collection, there is the following verse:

The images which abound in your poems may be what is desired
For me your colourful words are better than those

Whether or not this verse was written in response to Cafer Çelebi, Ahmed Paşa here clearly favours altering existing imagery through literary craft at the expense of original imagery. This exchange signifies the discussion about balancing meaning and form in poetry during the late fifteenth century.

At the end of the sixteenth century, Riyazi complained in his biographical dictionary Riyazi’s-Şu’ara (Gardens of Poets) that one result of the difficulty of composing poetry in Turkish was that meaning was sacrificed for the beauty of expression. While Riyazi defended the early poets, who despite this difficulty offered poetry in Turkish “with luster and sheen”, he criticised the

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108 Fesahat and belagat are two terms of rhetoric, which was a major part of medrese education. It is not very common in modern scholarship to build bridges between this rhetorical education and literary texts. For a recent contribution in this direction, see Ali Emre Özyıldırım, “‘Garîb” Ma’nâlar, “Acîb” Hayaller: Latîfî ve Âşık Çelebi Tezkirelerinden Hareketle Belagat Terimi Olarak “Garîb” Sifatı”, in Âşık Çelebi ve Şairler Tezkiresi Üzerine Yazılar, ed. Hatice Aynur and Aslı Niyazioglu (İstanbul, 2011), pp. 147–65. In this article, Özyıldırım relates the use of the term garîb (strange) by two major literary critics to the rhetorical textbooks assigned at the medreses of the time. For a brief discussion of the concepts of belagat and fesahat, see Andrews, An Introduction to Ottoman Poetry, pp.73–7.

109 See Ahmed Paşa, Ahmed Paşa Divanı, p. 388. I should like to thank my colleague Fatma Sabiha Kütlu for this reference.
development of poetry in his time, in which the meaning was sacrificed to the beauty of expression. These, according to Riyazi, should exist together.  

Composed mostly by scholar poets in different decades of the period, parallel poetry collections, lists of tropes and topoi, manuals of poetry and discourses on poetry often contradicted each other and challenged prevalent ideas on the nature of poetry. They were written in response to an accumulating body of literary texts in order to understand, define, classify and ultimately control a literary production which had already turned out a chaotic mass of forms, genres, themes and imagery. Literature was being defined in this period by Rum poets through literary tools, and one of the most important literary tools was the biographical dictionary. Over time, biographical dictionaries would combine a variety of forms and themes and provide models for Rum poets as their authors seized the opportunity to tell their own life stories, even while providing biographical information for other poets through gossipy accounts of love and works.

The histories of the poets of Rum

The canon of a Rumi literary tradition was first defined through a corpus of texts known as Tezkiret-i-Şu’ara (Reminiscences of Poets), which began to be composed in the early decades of the sixteenth century. These were biographical dictionaries that compiled anecdotal information on the lives of Rum poets and gave examples of their poetry. The compilers of biographical dictionaries, by relating what they had read and heard about previous generations of poets as well as what they themselves had experienced in the literary circles of Istanbul, gave these scattered items of information the shape of history, using their individual literary tastes and world views as a guide. Through these biographical dictionaries, they crafted a sense of solidarity among poets, who composed their poems for the Ottoman sultans or their “servants”. The biographers were themselves practising poets. They did not call the poets about whom they wrote “Ottoman poets” or “Palace poets” and never referred to them as “Divan poets”. They called themselves and others şu’ara-yı Rum, “poets of Rum”.

The first biographer of poets in Anatolia was the aforementioned Sehi Beg. In his biographical dictionary, called Hest Behist (Eight Gardens of Paradise), he mentions as his models Baharistan (Land of Spring) by the Persian poet Jami

110 Riyazi, ’Riyâz-üş-Şu’arâ’, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye 3724, fols. 3r–4v.
111 For more information on the making of an Ottoman literary canon through an analysis of one poet’s life and works as recorded in different tezkires, see Selim S. Kuru, ‘Sex in the Text’, pp. 158–61.
The literature of Rum

(1414–92), *Tezkire* (composed 1487) by Dawlat-shah (d. 1487) in Persian and ‘Ali Shir Nevai’s (1441–1501) *Majalis al-Nafais* (Excellent Gatherings) in Chagatai Turkish. His expressed intent was to keep a list of the names and works of poets of Rum so that these poets would be saved from the forgetfulness of time. But there was certainly another motive that directed his work: to challenge the poets of the eastern lands who wrote in Persian and/or Chagatai Turkish and whose memories were recorded in the biographical dictionaries of his predecessors, Cami, Devlet-Şah and Nevai. While he attempted to demonstrate the strength of the poetry developed in a new literary language in Rum, Sehi also started the trend of canonising Rum poets according to a set of certain criteria. His successors would occasionally shift the focus given to a poet by Sehi according to their own tastes and approaches to literary production, but they would still follow him in his goal of demonstrating the superiority of poets of Rum.

Sehi was probably a slave of Christian origin educated in the palace. The organisation of his work betrays a bureaucratic bias, probably derived from his position as a secretary in the palace offices and a tutor to the princes. Sehi placed bureaucrat poets before the scholar poets, a distinction that would not be followed by his successors. After grouping particular poets in the first four sections according to a hierarchical scheme, namely Süleyman I and other sultan poets, bureaucrat poets and scholar poets, he followed a chronological ordering in the remaining four sections of the work. By doing so, he was also
emulating the models set by his West Asian predecessors. His models were composed half a century before him, a sign of how closely the new tradition of literature in Rum was connected with the Eastern literary traditions. Rum biographers’ neglect of earlier biographical models in favour of modern ones reflects a contemporaneous approach to the literature in Rum.

Sehi’s Heş Bihişt was followed by a flurry of production in the genre of biographical dictionaries (see Table 14.1). The second known biographer, Abdüllatif Çelebi, who used the pen-name Latifi, was from the well-known Hatib-zadeler family of Kastamonu, an important centre of dervish lodges in the Black Sea region. Even though he received some education in Istanbul, he spent most of his life away from the city. He did not rise in the ranks of learned men and, like Sehi, worked as a secretary, but in Rumeli and not at the palace. Latifi’s biographical dictionary Tezkiret-i-Şu’ara ve Tabsratu’n-Nuzama (Reminiscences of Poets and Demonstration of Versifiers) was composed only eight years after Sehi’s in 1546 and arguably in reaction to his dictionary. While it covered more poets than Sehi’s work, there was another significant difference: when arranging the poets, Latifi disregarded the hierarchical ordering altogether, and, except for 13 mystic poets and poets

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Table 14.1. Biographical dictionaries of poets in the sixteenth century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biographer</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Life</th>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sehi</td>
<td>Poetry</td>
<td>d. 1548 or 1549</td>
<td>1538–9</td>
<td>14008–1538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latifi</td>
<td>Poetry</td>
<td>1491–1582</td>
<td>1546, 1574</td>
<td>1421–1546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahdi</td>
<td>Poetry</td>
<td>d. 1593 or 1594</td>
<td>1563, 1593</td>
<td>1500–15908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aşık Çelebi</td>
<td>Poetry</td>
<td>1520–1572</td>
<td>1566</td>
<td>14008–15608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kınalızade</td>
<td>Poetry</td>
<td>1540–1604</td>
<td>1586</td>
<td>14008–1586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Ali</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>1541–1600</td>
<td>1593–9</td>
<td>14008–1541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyazi</td>
<td>Poetry</td>
<td>1572–1644</td>
<td>1609</td>
<td>14008–1609</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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115 Curiously, neither Sehi nor his successors would mention older Persian models such as Lubab al-Albab (Kernel of Essences, composed in 1220) by Avfı. Since another work by Avfı, a collection of anecdotes, was very popular, and a copy of it was included in Bayezid II’s library, biographers must have been familiar with his works. For a study on Bayezid II’s library, see Miklós Maróth, ‘The Library of Sultan Bayazit II’, in Jeremiás, Irano-Turkic Cultural Contacts, pp. 111–32. Avfı’s story collection is listed on p. 123. Similarly, biographers should have known an earlier biographical work, Chahar Makala (Four Discourses, composed in 1156), by Nizami ‘Aruzi. They never, however, mentioned these texts as influential.


117 While Sehi covered 241 poets, Latifi covered 334; see İsen et al., Şu’arâ, pp. 30, 36.
The literature of Rum

who were members of the Ottoman household, he listed all poets in alphabetical order according to their pen-names.

That this was a radical step can be argued for two reasons. First, the alphabetical ordering implied a break with the *tabakat* system that was the norm for biographical compilations of the time and was emulated by the Persian biographies-of-poets tradition and followed as well by Sehi. In the biographical dictionaries of poets, the *tabakat* system appeared in the form either of a hierarchical ordering that implied the importance of the members of a particular rank or a chronological ordering according to the reigns of particular rulers. By choosing an alphabetical ordering, Latifi ignored the social position of the poets he covered in his work. Aside from breaking away from the *tabakat* system and thus modifying an Islamicate genre of biographical dictionaries and disregarding the social status of Rum poets, Latifi commented extensively on the works of the poets and discussed the role of patronage in the production of literary works.

Latifi had a strong opinion about poets and their poetry. He believed that only 13 true poets had appeared in Rum, all were mystics and all had lived before the Ottoman dynasty emerged. They were true poets because they sang the songs of true love (*aşk-ı hakiki*) rather than of metaphorical love (*aşk-ı mecazi*). We can, perhaps, deduce that Latifi was slighting, if not criticising, Ottoman dynastic patronage of his time and the poets who wrote for their patrons by underscoring the poetry of mystics who did not necessarily compose poetry for Ottoman sultans. Furthermore, Latifi places this section before the section on sultan poets. In short, Latifi displayed a new awareness of poetry and literature, not only through his critical stance manifested in his detailed interpretations of the verses he quotes and in his parallel poems composed after those he most appreciated but also by altering the existing models of biographical dictionaries.

The third biographer, Aşık Çelebi, composed the most revealing biographical dictionary, *Meşâ’irü’s-Şu’ara* (Stations of Poets), which forms the basic source not only for poets but also for the intellectual circles of Rum through

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118 According to Stewart-Robinson, biographical dictionaries as a genre were “launched by the Arabs, systematized by the Persians, and formalized by the Turks”; see Stewart-Robinson, ‘The Ottoman Biographies’, p. 65.


120 For an evaluation of Latifi’s stress on mystic poets and his distinction between poetry of true love and poetry of symbolic love, see Selim S. Kuru, ‘Latifi ‘Tezkiresinde Mutasavvıflar’’, in *Dünden Bugüne Bursa: Bursa Tıtasvuf Şempozyumu* (Bursa, 2004), vol. 3, pp. 197–202. However much he was critical of metaphorical love, Latifi praised the works by Halili and Cafer Çelebi discussed in the previous section.
an account of 427 poets. Aşık Çelebi claimed to be from an esteemed family of sayyids, a connection of which he was proud. Even though he was not successful in acquiring a position high enough for his lineage, he worked initially as the overseer of an important foundation in Bursa and later as a secretary and subsequently as a judge.121

Meşa'irü'ş-Şu'ara was published 20 years after Latifi’s work. Aşık Çelebi’s entries relate to the developing urban life in Istanbul, the gathering places of poets and gossip about them. He does not follow the tabakat system but, in order to be different from Latifi, follows the ebced system according to the numerical values of letters rather than ordering his entries alphabetically.122 These two works by Latifi and Aşık Çelebi would be major models for the continuing tradition of biographical dictionaries of poets. The other works, while at times including supporting information on poets, did not surpass the first three dictionaries, by Sehi, Latifi and Aşık Çelebi, with respect to organisation and composition.

All biographers of the sixteenth century were very democratic in including Muslim poets of different creeds. They consistently did not, however, include non-Muslim poets, of whom there must have been many. Since these were dictionaries reserved for poets who composed in Turkish, it is understandable that they contain no record of poetry in Hebrew, Armenian or Greek that eulogises an Ottoman sultan or a vezir. Yet the exclusion of Turkish-speaking Christians reveals how religious boundaries might have been stronger than ethnic ones.123

While Sehi, the first biographer, mentions the poet Basiri, who apparently stayed on in Istanbul after his arrival there as an ambassador from Iran, he

121 For his life and his other works, see V. L. Ménage, ‘Aşık Çelebi’, in Gibb et al., The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 1, pp. 698a–b.

122 In the introduction of his work, he complains about how Latifi had stolen his idea of alphabetical ordering: “Scholar Latifi of Kastamonu, saying ‘I also have an intention to compose a book on the topic of the history of poets’, intended to compile a list of poets who lived during the time of the Ottoman sultans according to the ‘order of reign’. That is to say, he also chose Sehi Bey’s manner of organization”. Apparently Latifi did not keep his word and instead stole Aşık Çelebi’s idea. Aşık Çelebi’s desire to be unlike Latifi reveals the competition among the biographers of Rum poets. See Aşık Çelebi, Meşâ’irü’ş-Şu’arâ, vol. 1, pp. 245–6.

123 Only Aşık Çelebi includes one Mesihi-i Ermeni, who was from the Diyarbakır region and a Christian. Even though Aşık Çelebi claims that the pen-name of this poet, which means ‘related to Christ’, testified to the fact that he was a Christian, there was a more famous Muslim poet with the same pen-name. Mesihi-i Ermeni knew Persian and, “migrating to Rum”, lived in Istanbul and Edirne. He then went to Venice, where he taught Christian children Turkish and Persian. Aşık Çelebi provides Turkish verses of Mesihi-i Ermeni in his Meşâ’irü’ş-Şu’arâ; see Aşık Çelebi, Meşâ’irü’ş-Şu’arâ, vol. 2, pp. 840–1. No other biographers included this poet in their works.
makes it clear that he includes Basiri because he “became a Rumi, staying in Rum” and because “he spoke the same language as most of the poets of Rum, and had conversations and contests with them, and he composed verses in Turkish.”

This quotation points to a more linguistically defined literary identity for the Rumi identity than a geographically defined one, as there were many other Iranians living in Istanbul, especially in the period in which Sehi published his work. On the other hand, the third non-Rumi biographer of poets, Ahdi, would be included in the biographical dictionary of Aşık Çelebi because “he did not despise Rum and the Rumis like other Persians did”.

Contemporary scholarship on tezkires is mostly descriptive and, as a result, fails to understand sufficiently the motives behind these texts or to treat them as critical literary works. Even though their value in evaluating literature of the period has been appreciated, they are mostly now only used as reference works. Unfortunately, modern scholarship neglects the question of why these works should have appeared in the sixteenth century and why only in this century they would overlap in their coverage rather than establishing supplements. Modern approaches also erase the authorial voices that exist between the lines of biographical entries, employing them merely as reference works.

However, as explained earlier, each biographer aimed at more than merely collecting stories of poets. First of all, even though each of them was a poet in his own right, their backgrounds were different. While they at times employed the same anecdotes about the same poets, such anecdotes appeared in different contexts, revealing the author’s individual taste and reflecting his ambition to surpass preceding works in their organisation, approach and coverage. Through additional entries, the writers constantly increased the number of poets, thus updating previous biographers’ works.

The criteria by which the biographers selected their poets enable us to draw a rudimentary portrait of the poets of Rum. Each biographical dictionary reflected a vivid literary scene and, through his particular critical stances, each biographer displayed his own tendentious picture of this scene, challenging any easy description of literature in this period. As the dictionaries describe them, the poets came from extremely heterogeneous backgrounds thus resembling the imperial officials that required their services. The poets of Rum, according to their biographers, were Muslim poets who composed in the constantly developing medium of the language of Rum, a particular

124  *Heşt Behişt*, p. 103b. For Basiri’s Turkish poems, see Ahmet Kartal, *Basirî ve Türkçe Şiirleri* (Istanbul, 2006).
form of Anatolian Turkish. It was a fresh language given voice through the pens of the poets of Rum and, from the last decades of the fifteenth century onwards, it was establishing itself as one of the most extensively used literary languages of the world. For the poets themselves, it was a source of pride and often of great material wealth.

In this period of transformation and renewal, discourses developed around the question of the significance of literature. As the rules of the new language became settled, there was a conservative process of selection from the old forms, as a Rum-centered archive began to take shape within a centuries-old cultural heritage. The qualities associated with Rum, of “Ruminess”, were never stable or fixed. On the contrary, what “Rum” meant was always an object of debate, questioning and contestation among the writers who wrote in its language. However important it was for poets and authors to describe themselves as “poets of Rum”, they did not give the term a strict definition. For many, their focus was on the subjective experience of love and desire. They took themselves as the subjects of their works, and in their exploration of subjectivity the poets of Rum constantly built up and dismantled ideas about particular identity developing in relation to the empire.

The 150-year period from 1450 to 1600 saw the creation of a distinct written language of Anatolian Turkish, the appearance of new forms, genres and themes based on this language, the development of a literary archive and literary tools that defined norms and conventions, and finally the genesis of a biographical and an autobiographical tradition that made models available for literary production. These were significant literary events which already by the end of the sixteenth century had established this period as the moment of origin of a literary tradition in Rum for centuries to come.
Glossary

acemi oğlan  a novice conscript who will later join the janissaries.
adaletname  edict addressing specific complaints by subjects against the exactions and
corruption of officials.
ağa   lord, commander.
ahidname  pledge, covenant, agreement.
akoğ  raid.
akın  raider; a corps of light cavalry used for raiding.
alatçıyan  riggers.
alaybeyi  cavalry commander.
amil  agent; collector of revenues.
arpałık  pensions or income for high officials of state.
askeri  belonging to the military; those who belonged to the military or religious elite
and who were granted tax exemption.
atike  manumitted female slave.
avarz  extra dues, becoming annual at the end of the sixteenth century.
avlık  monthly pay.
azeb (Arabic azab)  unmarried young men; seamen or pirates; in Ottoman army
apparently land foot soldiers who were enlisted from the peasants for the duration of
a campaign.
baba  elder of a dervish group; head of a Bektaşı lodge.
bailo  head of a Venetian colony; Venetian representative abroad; Venetian ambassador
to Istanbul
baruthane  gunpowder mill.
basndefendar  head of government finance department.
bastarde  bastard, a small war galley.
bender  commercial seaport.
bennak  peasant with little land, small landholder.
berat  patent of investiture, confirmed by the sultan’s special sign (tuğra).
bey  ruler of a Turkish state; commander.
beylerbeyi  top Ottoman official in provincial government, head of a beylerbeylik.
bölük  a military unit.
caba bennak  landless peasant.
cebeci  armourer.
Glossary

drover, cattle dealer.

see celep.

division of the janissary corps.

irregular enlisted warrior.

Islamic holy war.

poll tax paid by non-Muslims.

official Ottoman envoy or messenger.

a cavalry unit created from Mamluk soldiers.

landholding which could be worked by a pair of oxen; towards the end of the sixteenth century, also larger landholdings in the hands of dignitaries.

an advanced student in a medrese.

“abode of war”, non-Muslim lands not paying tribute to a Muslim ruler.

“abode of Islam”, Islamic territory.

register, inventory.

finance officer, with oversight of the sultan’s treasury.

the office of the land registry.

a summary register of revenue.

local financial director.

detailed register of revenue.

irregular army corps.

a levy of Christian boys for service in the Ottoman army or in the palace.

assignment by the state of a salary or an income from land; the assignment of a landholding such as a timar; income from a has, timar or zeamet.

the imperial council, meeting under the presidency of the grand vezir.

collection of poetry of a distinguished poet.

land of the Franks.

land of the infidels.

Venetian land.

fortress captain.

Venetian gold coin.

men of knowledge, learning.

men of the pen, clerks of government offices.

the governor and his men.

men of the sword.

stewardship.

agent, superintendent.

tax-farm shares.

province.

cavalryman.

sultanic command.

poem or treatise describing a conquest; sultanic announcement of a victory.

a legal opinion issued by a competent authority.

large galiot, a small oared warship.

a raid for plunder, later came to mean holy war fought for Islam.
Glossary

gazi  fighter in a gaza.
göke  coca, cocha, a ship high in the freeboard.
gönülű  volunteer, mercenary.
guruş  see kuruş.
hac  pilgrimage to Mecca.
hadis  see hadith.

hadith  prophetic tradition; sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammed.
haham başı  chief rabbi.
Halvetiye  order of dervishes.
harac-ı arazi  land tax.
has  crown lands.
hattıb  the leader of the community at Friday prayers; he preaches a sermon in which
he mentions the name of the legitimate ruler.

hisar eri  fortress guard.
hoca  religious scholar.
humbaracı  bombardier.
ihtisab  office of the superintendent of markets and guilds.
ilm  religious knowledge of Islam.
ilmiye  the Ottoman learned establishment, the ulema class.
imam  prayer leader.
iltizam  tax farm.
irad  income, revenue.
irsaliye  remittance to the treasury.

istimâlet  persuasion; Ottoman policy of accommodating the population in newly
conquered territory.

kâdi  judge, chief administrator of a judicial district.
kadi sicilleri  court registers.
kaduasker  chief military judge; high-ranking official in judiciary.
kadırga  oared galleys with single masts and lateen sails.
kalyata  large galiot.
kalyon  galleon.
kanun  Ottoman secular law as distinct from the shari‘a.
kanunname  law code.

kapti halkları  entourages of bodyguards, slaves and domestic servants of local elites
and grandees.
kapudan  naval commander.
kapudan-ı derya  admiral of the Ottoman navy.
kapudan pasha  admiral of the Ottoman navy.
kapudan pashalık  the office of grand admiral.

kaşif  agent of government.
kaza  district under the jurisdiction of a kâdi.
kethûda  Ottoman government official or agent.
kile  a measure of weight used for grain, a bushel.
kisve  cloth covering the Kaaba at Mecca.
kılıç  the central, indivisible core of each timar; sword.
köke  see göke.
Glossary

kul slave; non-ulema member of the Ottoman ruling group.
kurş silver coin, piaster.
lâğimci sapper.
levend corsair; mercenary soldier.
liva a sancaq, sub-division of a province.
mahfeci soldier who placed a frame-like device on army camels for sick and wounded soldiers.
mahmil palanquin, camel litter.
mahone see mavna.
malikane lifetime tax farm.
martolos/martoloz Ottoman military group operating in the Balkans.
mavna barge, lighter.
medrese school, Muslim theological college.
menakibname text describing the vitas and miracles of famous dervish şeyhs.
menzilhane posting station.
mera grazing lands.
merd-i kale fortress defender.
mevâci̇ salary, pay.
mevlana religious scholar.
mezhep religious denomination; school of thought.
mihri meccel deferred dower, to be paid to a wife if divorced or widowed.
miri belonging to the ruler or the state.
mudd/müd a dry measure, varying according to location, used for grain.
muhasebe defteri account register.
mukataa tax farm; a source of revenue.
mustahfiz fortress guard.
mücerred bachelor.
müderris teacher in a medrese.
müezzin the person who gives the call to prayer.
müftü or müfti jurisconsult.
mühimme defteri register of orders issued by government.
mülk freehold ownership.
mülazim candidate for government post.
mültezim tax farmer.
müneccim astrologer.
mürid novice in a dervish order; follower of a religious leader.
müsellem member of a corps of militia performing military service in return for tax exemption.
nahiye administrative region or district.
nâbib deputy, representative.
nâr officially fixed price.
navlun/navlun bedelleri freight charges on shipped goods.
nazîr superintendent, particularly of a pious foundation/vakif.
nişan the sultan’s cipher.
nişancı chancellor, responsible for the drafting of documents and oversight of the sultan’s chancellery.
Glossary

ocak infantry corps.
ocaklık revenue source earmarked for the pay of a military corps; imperial enterprise.
oda barracks.
padişah sovereign; the sultan.
para coin, currency.
reaya tax-paying population, who were not members of the askeri elite.
reis head; ship’s captain.
reisülküttab the chief clerk in the imperial administration.
riba usury, interest.
rüznamçe daily register of financial transactions.
rüsum dues, taxes.
salyane annual salary, allowance.
sancak sub-province.
sancakbeyi governor of a sub-province.
sarca irregular militia.
sekbân military unit.
sersasker commander of the army.
serdar military commander.
sipahi mounted soldier holding a timar; a member of the sultan’s cavalry.
subaşı commander; a government agent.
sürsat contributions for the army on campaign.
sürgün deportation.
sürre annual gifts sent by the sultan to Mecca.
şeihnameci official court poet who wrote pieces glorifying the dynasty.
şehzade son of the sultan.
şeriât (shari’a) Islamic religious law.
şeriyye sicilleri court registers.
şeyh sheikh, head; popular religious leader; head of a tribe.
şeyhülislâm the head of the religious establishment.
tahrir survey of land, population and sources of revenue.
tahrir defteri written survey of a province.
taht kadılkânâr judges of the courts in Istanbul.
tapu title deed.
tapu defteri see tahrir defteri.
tankat Sufi order.
telhis short summary report.
tereke defteri inventory of the estate of a deceased person.
tersane dockyard.
tevki the sultan’s cipher.
tezkere memorandum; official certificate.
tezkerci official employed to prepare memoranda.
timar revenue allotment in return for military service. A Persian term meaning care, forethought, solicitude.
top arabacı gun carriage driver.
topçu artillery corps.
topçu başı chief gunner.
Glossary

tüfenkçi     gunner unit.
ulema       religious and legal scholars.
ulufeciyan-i süvari     cavalrymen.
öşr/öşür     tithe.
vakif        pious foundation.
vakfiye      deed of trust of a vakif.
vakifname    deed of trust.
vezir        a minister of the sultan.
vilayet      province.
waqf         see vakif
yaya         footman, infantry.
yayla        summer pasture.
yeniçeri     janissaries, literally the new army.
zaim         holder of zeamet.
zaviye       dervish lodge.
zeamet       land held in return for military service, larger than a timar.
zungi (Arabic dhimmi)     non-Muslim living under Islamic ruler.
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Bibliography


632


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Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


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658
Bibliography


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Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Index

Abbasid caliphate, 415–16
‘Abbas I (Safavid shah), 41–2, 53–4, 138–9
Abdüllatif Çelebi. See Latifié
Abdüvhehab Efendi, 193–5
Abdüssamed Diyarbekri, 29
absolutism
architecture as reflection of, 465
central European dynasties’ adoption of, 251–2
domestic borrowing rejected by Ottoman, 256–8
Ottoman expansion and role of, 248–52
Abu Bakir Darani, 147–8
Abu Hansfa, 339–40
Abül-Fidâ al-Hamawi, 422
Acem Alisi (Alaüddin), 511
Acem, 494
action radius, military strategy and importance of, 279
adaletnames (justice edicts), 334–7
Addi Quarro, battle of, 184
Aden, Ottoman control of, 177–9
Adja’ib al-makhluqat wa ghara’ib al-mawdjudat (Wonders of creation and marvels of existence), 540–2
administrative structure in Ottoman Empire
beylerbeylik of Egypt and Hijaz and, 186–90
capital formation in Ottoman polity and, 262–7
economic policies and ideology and, 258–62
financial administrative shortcomings and collection cost increases, 254–6
governance in Ottoman Empire and, 205–40
institutions of government and, 222–32
in post-conquest Ottoman regions, 63–4
private profit limitations and, 267–9
sultan’s authority and, 207–18
timar system and, 293–6. See also bureaucracy in Ottoman Empire
Aegean Islands
Ottoman raids on, 141–8
Ottoman western Mediterranean expansion and domination of, 155–70
Venetian attacks on, 152
ağa bölükleri, janissary restructuring as, 282–4
ağas, architectural projects by, 472
age data, population demographics based on, 363
agriculture
harvest cycle and, 416
nomad involvement in, 398–401
Ahbar ad-dawal wa atar, 449–50
ahi confraternities, 466–70
ahidname
Ottoman economic policy and granting of, 261
trade policies and, 6–7
Ahlâk-ı Alâî (Kınalızade), 435–8
Ahmad b. Majid, 425, 426–7
Ahmed (son of Bayezid II), 30–2, 103–4, 105, 207–8
Ahmed Bey (nazîrı emval), 193–5
Ahmed I (1603–17), 454–5
judiciary corruption and, 334–7
Ahmedi, 446
Ahmed Karâhisari Qur’an, 498–501
Ahmed Paşa, 32, 114–15, 184
guzel poetry and, 568–70
poetic discourses of, 583–6
Ahval-i kiyamet, 454–5
Aja’ib al-makhluqat, 412–15
Akbar (1542–1605), 348–9
Akdağ, Mustafa, 116, 384, 385–6
Akhlaq-i Jalâli (Dawwani), 435
Akhlaq-i Nasîri (Nasiruddin Tusi), 435
Index

Akkerman
Bayezid II and, 27–8, 50–1
Ottoman occupation of, 9

Akkoyunlu, Turkoman confederation
architecture of, 474
decorative aesthetic of, 474–86, 490–1
expansion in Anatolia of, 276–7
Mamluks and, 86–91
Ottoman expansion in, 10, 26, 79–81, 85–91

Ak Semseddin, 324, 343

Alanya, Ottoman capture of, 144

Ala ü ddevle, 28–9, 30–2, 89–90, 92, 94
Selim I/Isma’il war and, 108, 110–13

Al-' Aylam az-zahir fi ahwa ‘il wa l’awahir (Cenabi), 449–50

Albâ Iulia, treaty of, 37–8

Albania
migration from, 394–5
Ottoman expansion into, 25, 28
Skanderbeg uprising in, 9–10

Aleppo
Selim I’s conquest of, 475
urbanization and population growth in, 379–82

Alexander VI (Pope), 27–30, 69–70

al faraj ba’d al-shidda (relief after distress), 427

Alfonso, D., 199

Ali Dede Sıgêvari, 342–3
Ali Ekber, 425–6
Ali Kuşçu, 415–16
Alkas Mirza, 36–7, 123–5
Al-Malik al-Ashraf Inal, 347–8

Al-manhaj al-sawi wa l’manhal al-rawi il-tibb al-nabawi (Suyuti), 432

Al-miftah al-jafr al-jamai (Bistami text), 491–2
alum mines, 142–3

Amasya
calligraphy and book arts in, 478–9
palace complex in, 462, 466, 469
poetry in court of, 581–3
treaty of (1555), 38–9, 41, 126–32, 340

America, Ottoman knowledge of, 425–6
Amr ibn Davud, 179–80
Amir Khusrav Dehlavi, 488–90

Anatolia
architecture in, 474
auxiliary forces in, 296–7
bandit armies in, 386–7
Bayezid II’s incursions into, 28–9
carpet production and export in, 484–5
grain harvests in, 383
internal disorder in 1526–9 in, 228
Islam’s roots in, 320–1
judiciary system in, 328–9
Mediterranean coastline seized, 144
Mehmed II’s administration of, 74–91
nomad migration from, 398–401
Ottoman expansion and control in, 74–96
in poetry, 574–5
population demographics in, 375–9, 385–6
post-conquest rebellion in, 211–12
provincial government in, 225–6
revolt in 1520 in, 115–17
Selim I and, 30–2, 107
Süleyman and, 32–3, 34, 44
See also Rum

Ancona, 261–2, 270–1

Angelović, Mihail, 23–4

Angioletto, Giovan Maria, 144n23, 146n40, 149n68, 152–3

Anis al-Ushshaq (Ramî), 581–3

Antalya, Venetian attack on, 144
antinomian beliefs, 343
of idemas, syncretism with Islam, 320–1

Arabic
influence on Rum literary tradition of, 552–5, 558n29, 558–60, 559n54
learning tools for, 560–2
in Ottoman historical sources, 4
prose structure and, 562–5
d’Aramon, Gabriel (French ambassador), 161, 162–3, 163n179
archaeometry, Ottoman historical sources and, 15–16
archeology, Ottoman historical sources and, 15–16
architecture
in Bayezid II’s reign, 8–9
elites’ patronage and advancement of, 466–70, 472–4, 491–528
imperial aesthetic in, 510–28
monumental cursive scripts and, 480
Ottoman religious architecture, 407–8
political transformation and imperial ethos reflected in, 459–74
representations of power in, 529–32
in Rum, 556n25

Armenians
under Mehmed II, 322–5
population data on, 369–70
army judges. See kadıaskers
Index

army of the Ottoman Empire
auxiliary forces in, 296–7
deployments in 1453 campaign and, 303
fortress garrisons in, 297–302
historiography concerning, 280–2
janissaries as land force of, 282–4
salaried horsemen in, 284–6
sipahi in, 286–96
artisan production
costs of war and conquest and drafting of, 14
decorative aesthetic and, 474–86
longevity of Ottoman political economy and,
272–4
ornament aesthetic and, 493–504
profit limitations on, 267
regional trading and, 6–7
sürgün migrations and, 391–2

Arts
in Bayezid II’s reign, 8–9
imperial image articulated in, 491–528
Ottoman literary discourse on, 544–7
visual arts, 457–60
See also architecture; literary production and
tradition; visual arts
aruz metric form, poetry in, 567, 581–3
Asafname (Lüti Paşa), 434–5
ashlar masonry, in Ottoman architecture, 469
Asian Mode of Production, imperial revenues and expenditures and, 246
Aşık Çelebi, 445–6, 548, 559–60, 567
biographical dictionary of, 589–91
discourses on poetry by, 559n34, 584, 590n123
Aşıkpaşazade, Ottoman chronicler, 409
on Bayezid II, 113
historical narratives of, 3–4, 447–8
on Mehemd II, 74–5, 7515, 77–8, 80, 81, 92–3
prose style of, 562–5
askeri. See military administrative class (askeri)
Assmann, Jan, 439
astrology, Ottoman interest in, 416–18
prognostications and end of time predictions and, 435–3
astronomy, Ottoman knowledge of, 415–20
Astucatar, 322–5
Atayi, Nevizade, 332, 342, 576–8
Athar al-bilad, 412–13
Atjeh, Sultan of, 243–4
atlases, Ottoman production of, 421–3
Attar (scholar and writer), 560–2, 576–8
attraction (mahabbet), Ottoman principle of, 435–8
Aulic War Council, 316–17
autobiography
in poetry, 572–6
in prose, 576–8, 578n90
auxiliary military forces in Ottoman Empire, 303
avariz registers
costs of war and conquest and, 13–15
population data from, 363–5
Ayalon, David 117
Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia) church/mosque, 324, 378–9, 415–16, 469–6
artistic images of, 534–43
Ayas Paşa, 452
Aydnöğulları, history of, 449
Ayşe Sultan, 539
azeb (azab), 307–8
Baba İlyas-ı Horasani, 321
Baba Nakkaş ceramics, 476–80
Baba Zul-Nun, 340
Babai uprising, 321, 346–7
bābās (spiritual leaders), 321
Baghdad, as cultural center, 542–3
al-Baghdadi, 325–6
Baharistan (Land of Spring) (Jami), 538, 586–9
Bahjatu t-tawarikh (Şükrrullah), 449
Bahri‘l-Ma’arif (The Sea of Knowledge), 581–3
Baki (poet), 218–19, 432, 568–70, 578–9
Baykara meclisi (literary gathering), 555n22
Balastero, Andrea, 151
Balbi, Nicolò, 166
Balbi da Correggio, 164n192, 164–5
Balgan Sultan, 346–7
Balkans
Catholic population in, 370–2
cizeye payments in, 363–5
forced migrations from, 390–3
gazi architectural projects in, 473
Islamization in, 374–5
nomad migration from Anatolia to, 398–401
in official illustrated histories, 508–9
Ottoman expansion into, 249–52, 256–8
population data for, 370, 372
timar system in, 287
See also Albania; Bosnia; Hungary
bandit armies, integration of, 386–7
Barakat II b. Muhammad b. Barakat (Şerif of Mecca), 349–50
Barbaro, Giosafatte, 84
Barbarossa/Barbaros. See Hayreddin
Barbera, Benedicto, 150
Barbosa, Duarte, 189–90
Barkey, Karen, 386–7
Bayezid I (1389–1402), 2, 9, 347–8
Bayezid II (1481–1512)
administrative legacy of, 239–40
anonymous texts concerning, 2–3
architecture in reign of, 8–9, 466, 472, 477–69
art in reign of, 8–9, 487–90
astronomers in court of, 417
calligraphy and book arts under, 478–9
collections of art and manuscript in reign of, 476
colleges founded by, 333–4
Halvetiye religious order and, 342
Hanefi school of Islamic law and, 234–6
historical writing in reign of, 439
history of reign of, 27–30, 45, 173–5
janissaries under, 216–17
land and tax laws under, 237
leadership style of, 219–20
legal system under, 225–6
library of, 409
literary patronage in reign of, 552–6, 562–5
Mamluks and, 91–6
Mediterranean expansion under, 148–53
Mehmed II and, 22
as Mehmed II’s successor, 148
naval forces under, 304
periodization in regime of, 50–2
population growth under, 375–9
Quaytbay and, 94–6
religious institutions in reign of, 339–40, 346–7
rivalry with Cem (brother), 27–30, 50–2, 91–6,
148–9, 149n68, 207–8
scholarly and literary activities sponsored by, 3
Selim’s rebellion against, 444
Shah Isma’il, 102–4, 105–6
standing army under, 282–4
state expansion under, 19–20
Sunni Islam under, 11
Bayindr (Emir), 474
Baykara, Hüseyin, 555–6
Bayrami dervish order, 321, 324, 343
illicit branches of, 343–7
Baysungur, 86
Belayü’il-Asar (Most Ornate Stories), 576–8
belagat poetic technique, 584–5
Bergama, carpet production in, 484–5
Bayin-i Menazil-i Sefer-i Irakeyn (Menazil), 505–7
beýlerbeylik
of Egypt and the Hijaz, 186–90
establishment in Basra of, 181–2
establishment in Yemen of, 179–80, 181, 191–3
of Ethiopia, 193–5
provincial government structure, 225–6
beýlerbeys
architectural projects of, 472–3
governmental duties of, 226–32
judiciary as check on, 232–3
biographical dictionaries
development in Rum of, 548–51, 559–60
histories of Rum poets as, 586–92
table of, 588–92
Bistami, Abd al-Rahman al-, 343–7
Black Sea
Mehmed II’s expansion in, 79, 144–5
Ottoman expansion in, 25–6, 52, 57–9
piracy in, 74–5
Blount, Henry, 171–2
Bosnian kingdom
fortress garrisons in, 300
Islamization in, 374–5
Bodrum, 154
body and health, Ottoman knowledge of, 430–3
book arts
manuscript culture in Rum and, 551n8
See also calligraphy and book arts
Book of Forty Questions, 414–15
border agreements, Ottoman terms for, 13
border regions in Ottoman Empire
geographic knowledge and, 421–3
migration patterns in, 396–8
Bosnian kingdom
fortress garrisons in, 300
Bodrum, 154
body and health, Ottoman knowledge of, 430–3
book arts
manuscript culture in Rum and, 551n8
See also calligraphy and book arts
Book of Forty Questions, 414–15
border agreements, Ottoman terms for, 13
border regions in Ottoman Empire
g eographic knowledge and, 421–3
migration patterns in, 396–8
Bosnian kingdom
fortress garrisons in, 300
Islamization in, 374–5

Index

Ottoman expansion into, 9–10, 22–3, 49–50
as Ottoman province, 225–6
Botero, Giovanni, 248–9
Boxer, C. R., 195–6, 198
Brade, Tycho, 419
Branković, George, 22, 23–4
Branković, Lazar, 23–4
Braudel, Fernand, 174–5, 195–6, 197–8, 361
Brummett, Palmira, 21, 44–73
Buonrizzo, Alvise, 166–7
Burak Reis, 149–50, 151
bureaucratization in Ottoman Empire
architectural influence of, 511–13, 527–8
as historical source, 5
impact of war on, 55–7
institutions of government and, 222–32
integration of military and, 65–8
Ottoman capital formation and servile status
Ottoman Red Sea expansion and importance
of, 185–6
post-conquest administration, 63–4
prose structure development and, 562–5
state stability linked to, 20
structural reforms in, 100
See also beylerbeylik
Bursa
caravansarys in, 472
economic productivity in, 273
historical sources on, 5
kâdi hierarchy in, 328, 332–4
population estimates for, 376
private profit limitations in, 268
slave population in, 370
textile production in, 481
Busbecq, Ogier Ghislain de (Habsburg ambassador), 121–2, 126–7, 163–4, 248
on plague outbreaks, 365–6
Byzantine Empire
decline of, 276–7
migration patterns in, 395
Ottoman identification with, 241–2
Cafar Paşa, 170–1
Caffa (Kefe), Ottoman capture of, 144–5
Cairo
cultural influence of, 475
fortress garrisons in, 301–2
kâdi hierarchy in, 332–4
Mamluk presence in, 174–5
Ottoman development of, 45
urbanization and population growth in,
379–82
Çaldıran, battle of (1514), 19–20, 30–2, 109–10
caliphate
decaying status of, 350
Ottoman legal theory and, 325–6
social order and position of, 437–8
calligraphy and book arts, 476–80
ornament aesthetic and, 493–504
Cami’iin-Neza’ir (A Compilation of Parallel Poems), 580–1
Campanella, Tommaso, 396
canal construction, Selim II’s initiatives for, 39–40
Canale, Nicolò da, 25, 144n23
Canatar, Mehmet, 366–7
Çandarlı dynasty, 212–13, 321, 337–8
Çandarlı Halil, 212–13
Çandarlı Ibrahim, 212–13
cannon foundries, Ottoman armaments
technology and, 309–10
Caoursin, 148
capital formation, Ottoman economic policies
and, 262–7
Capsali, Moses, 322–5
captives of Ottoman soldiers, forced migration
of, 387–90
Caraldo, Pero, 177–9
caravansarys, pilgrimages to Mecca and, 352–4
Carlos V (King of Spain), 177–9
carpet production, 484–5, 501
Castaldo, Giovanna Battista, 37–8
castles, fortress garrisons in, 297–302
Cateau-Cambrésis, peace of, 38–9, 121–2
Catholics in Ottoman Empire
Orthodox Christians’ dispute with, 374
population data for, 370–1
Cavalli, Marino, 156–7
cavalry in Ottoman army, 284–6
câbe hicis in Ottoman army, 285–6
câbe his, timar system and, 293–6
Celâleddin-i Rumi, 343, 376–8
çelal, 43, 55, 386–7
Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi
administrative legacy of, 239–40
dynastic rivalries and, 209–10, 223–4
as historical source, 4, 70–3, 100
histories written by, 444–5, 452
prose works by, 562–5
Çelebi Paşa, 572–6, 581–3
Index

celık appointments  
military provisioning system and, 310  
Ottoman capital formation and, 264–5, 269–72, 273, 274–5  
Celvetiye dervishes, 343  
cemaat (artisan communities), 493–504  
cemaat (janissary corps), 400  
cemaat-i nakkaşan, 493, 494

Cem Sultan, 9–10, 45  
Bayezid II rivalry with, 27–30, 50–2, 91–6, 148–9, 149n68, 207–8, 472  
calligraphy and book arts in court of, 476–80  
execution of sons of, 221  
in Italy, 425  
literature commissioned by, 434  
pilgrimage to Mecca of, 351–2  
Cemli (poet), 579–80

Cemil (poet), 580n96

Cenderecizade Mehmed, 546–7

ceramics  
ceramic tile, architectural incorporation of, 470–2, 511  
decorative aesthetic of, 480–1, 496, 501–4  
faience pottery, 8–9  
Çeşme, 152  
Chagatai language, poetry in, 555–6, 557n27, 580n96

Charles V (King of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor), 12, 32–3, 35–6, 159–64  
domestic borrowing under, 252–3  
power aspirations of, 277  
Süleyman I’s campaign against, 51–2, 67–8, 241–2

Charles VIII (King of France), 27–30

China  
knowledge of astronomy in, 415–16  
Ottoman travel narratives on, 425–6

Chios island, Ottoman capture of, 142n59–148, 142–3, 165–6

Christianity  
in Ottoman Europe, 65–8  
Ottoman expansion and, 11  
in Ottoman paintings, 543  
Ottoman Red Sea operations and, 173–5  
Ottoman tolerance of, 248–50  
Red Sea expansion by Ottoman Empire and, 176–7  
rhetoric of Ottoman expansion and, 69–70  
tolerance in Istanbul of, 322–5  
Uzun Hasan’s relations with, 84

warfare justified as defense against, 277–80  
See also Orthodox Christianity; Protestants

Chronology of Ottoman history, xvii–xxi  
ciff, Ottoman laws relating to, 236–7  
Çiğalazade Sinan Paşa, 137, 170–1, 215–16  
Çihannüma (Katip Çelebi), 423  
Çihannüma (Neşri), 449  
Cini (poet), 576–8

Cividale, 163–4  
cizye registers, population data from, 363–5  
‘classical age’, Ottoman history in context of, 2  
classicism, Ottoman visual arts and, 457–8  
climes (iqlim), Ottoman system of, 420–1, 422  
coffee trading, Ottoman Red Sea expansion and, 185  
collective homage, in Ottoman conquests, 48–9  
college system in Ottoman empire, 326–32  
ulema career path through, 332–4  
‘command economy’, interregional/inter-empire trading and, 6–7  
commentaries (şerh) on poetry, 581–3  
communication systems in Ottoman Empire, intermediaries in trans-imperial zone and, 61–2  
conquest  
historical definitions of, 48–9  
rhetoric for proclamation of, 70–3  
territorial incorporation following, 211–12  
Constantine XI, Mehmed II’s alliance with, 22  
Constantinople. See Istanbul  
Constitution Livornina, 261–2  
Contarini, Paolo, 168–9  
Conti, Sigismondo de’, 145–6  
Cook, Michael A., 385–6  
Copernicus, 419–20  
Coptic Christians, 369–70  
Corfu, Ottoman attack on, 149–50, 159–60  
Corinth, Venetian-Ottoman conflict over, 143–4  
Coron (Korone), 150–3, 155  
Correia, Gaspar, 181  
Correr, Giovanni, 131–2  
corsairs  
Ottoman Mediterranean expansion and, 146–7, 149–50, 155–70  
protection in Mediterranean from, 171–2  
raids by, 153  
See also levends in naval fighting force

Corsaro, Zuan Monaco, 146–7
Index

**corvée (feudal obligation), Ottoman abolishment of**, 250

**Corvinus, Matthias (King of Hungary)**, 23–4, 28

**cosmography**
- as encyclopedia, 412–15
- geographic knowledge and, 422
- in illustrated manuscripts, 540–2
- Ottoman historiography and, 440
- timekeeping and, 416

**Cossack raids**, 398

**costs of war and conquest in Ottoman Empire**, 13–15

**Counterreformation**, 249, 370–2

**court culture and politics**
- decorative aesthetic and, 474–86
- ornament aesthetic and, 493–504
- ‘courtyard of the eight’ (*sahn-i seman/semaniye*), 324

**Couto, Dejanirah**, 196–7, 198

**Crépy, treaty of**, 161

**Crete**
- Mehmed IV’s occupation of, 172
- Ottoman attack on, 166–70

**Crimea**
- khanate of, 9, 52, 77–8

**criminal justice**, Ottoman law concerning, 235

**criminals**, in naval fighting forces, 307–8

**cultural tradition**
- geography and, 422
- gift exchange in, 474–86
- ornament aesthetic and, 493–504
- representations of power in, 528–43
- visual arts and, 458–9

**Cüneyd**, 97–8, 100–1

**cursus honorum (legal education)**, 332–4, 348–9, 354. See also legal infrastructure in Ottoman Empire

**customs duties**, in Ethiopian beylerbeylik, 194–5

**Cyprus**
- judicial consultations on proposed conquest of, 330–1
- Ottoman occupation of, 39–40, 57–9, 166–70, 352–4
- sūrgūn resettlements in, 391–2

**Dahlak**, Ottoman occupation of, 182–3

**Damascus**
- textile production in, 481
- urbanization and population growth in, 379–82
- ‘Damascus wares’, 501–4

**al-Damiri**, 429

**Danismendname**, 441–2

**Danube river**, as Ottoman zone of operation, 57–9

**Darir, Mustafa**, 539–40

**d’Aubusson, Pierre**, 93–4

**Dávid, Géza**, 19–20

**David of Trabzon**, 75–7

**Davud Ağa**, 330, 546–7

**Davud Paşa**, 28–30, 93–4

**Dawlat-shah (poet)**, 586–9

**decorative aesthetic**
- defined, 493–504
- Ottoman artisan production and,
  474–86

**defter** (register, inventory)
- pepper and spice trade figures in, 200–1
- in Yemen beylerbeylik, 191–3

**defterdar**s (finance officers)
- governmental duties of, 222–32
- as provincial governors, 226–7

**Defterdar Sani Mehmed Paşa**, 434–5

**Deli Hasan**, 43

**delis** (army auxiliary forces), 206–7

**Delle Navigationi e Viaggi**, 423–9

**Demetrios Palaiologos**, 22–3, 24, 212

**Demirci, Süleyman**, 364–5

**Derviş Eğlence, (storyteller)**, 576–8

**dervishes**
- convents of (*zaviye*), 462–6
- illicit orders of, 343–7
- literature of, 54935
- permitted orders of, 341–3
- *ulema* as, 320–1

See also Mevlevi (whirling dervishes)

**Derviş Paşa**, 381

**Despina Hatun**, 76, 79, 98

**De Venetis, Jacobo**, 150

**devlet el-ebed muddet** (perpetual state)
- ideology, 274

**Devletoğlu Yusuf**, 558–9

**devirme** (state levy on non-Muslim boys), 46

**cultural and artistic influence of elites drafted from**, 459–60, 472

**Islamization in Ottoman Europe through**, 65–8, 373–4

**in Mehmed II regime**, 323–4

**in official illustrated histories**, 508–9

**physiognomy and recruitment practices**
- for, 433

**upward mobility through**, 216–18, 251

671
Index

disease, population demographics and data on, 365–6
Diu campaign, 179–80, 191–3, 196–7, 198
divan (poetry collection)
commentaries on, 582–3
gazel poetry, 567–70
as historical source, 3, 566n56
illuminated manuscripts, 490–1, 538, 544
kaside (praise poetry) in, 570–2
poetic form and content of, 568
Divan-i Hümayun Mühimme Defterleri, 187–8
Divan-i Hümayun (Imperial Council), 222–32, 248–9, 328
judicial decisions by, 329
Divan-i Husaini, 544
Divnić, Juraj, 69–70
Diyarbakir, provincial government structure, 225–6
Djinggis, Khan, 415–16
domestic borrowing system
Ottoman delay in adoption of, 256–8
Ottoman revenue administration impacted by, 252–3
Donini, 158
Don Juan of Austria, 167–8, 169–70
Doria, Andrea, 35–6, 155, 161, 162–3, 169
Doria, Antonio, 159
Doukas, 75–6
dry-field agriculture, yield fluctuations in, 5–6
Dukakinzade Ahmed Paşa, 212–13
Dulgardir, 87–8, 90–1
post-conquest revolt in, 211–12
Selim I’s campaign against, 110–13
Dulkadir dynasty, 473–4
Durrës, 152
Dürr-i Meknun, 413–15, 432–3, 454
Düsturname (Enveri), 449
Dutch, coffee trade and, 185
dynastic families
authority of sultans and, 207–18
history of, 445–9
kaside (praise poetry) and rise of, 570–2
literary patronage by, 552–5, 553n12
marriage negotiations and, 210–11
cbcel numerical system, 589–91
Ebul Fazl Mehmed Çelebi, 337–8
Ebul-Hayri Rumi, 434
Ebu-Muslimname, 441–2
Ebussuud Efendi, 132, 166–7, 221–2, 325–6, 329–30
administrative legacy of, 221, 239–40
Cyprus conquest and advice of, 330–1
heresy trials under, 340–1
as kadıskar of Rumeli, 233, 237–8
Süleyman’s elevation of, 330
ulama rules established by, 332
economic policies in Ottoman Empire
capital formation and, 262–7
expansion and, 41–2, 185–6, 241–6
financial administration and changing conditions in, 254–6
historical legacy of, 274–5
imperial revenues and expenditures and, 246–8
longevity of Ottoman political economy and, 272–4
loss of Ottoman supremacy and, 238–9
migrations in search of income and, 393–5
Ottoman campaigns and, 21
population increase, food shortages and migration, 382–7
private profit accumulation limitations in, 267–9
provisionism, fiscalism and traditionalism in Ottoman administration, 258–62
in Yemen beylerbeyilik, 191–3
Edirne
economic productivity in, 273
kadı hierarchy in, 328
mosque in, 465–6
palace complex in, 452, 462, 469, 472
educational institutions
language learning tools and, 560–2
Rum literary tradition and, 554n20–555, 558n31, 558–60
See also medreses
Eğirdirli Haci Kemal, 580–1
Eğri fethi Şehnamesi, 538
Egypt
beylerbeylik of, 186–90
fortress garrisons in, 301–2
Ottoman conquest of, 32, 45, 173, 174–5, 322, 348–9
political, economic and military importance to Ottomans of, 185–6
Selim I and conquest of, 113, 276–7
tax registers and population estimates for, 361
See also Cairo
cbel-i hirf (artisans working for the palace), 493–504
cbel-i kalem (men of the pen), 337–8
elites
absolutist regimes and control of, 248
Index

architectural patronage and construction by, 472–4, 491–528
charities sponsored by, 472
courtly paintings and portraits commissioned by, 535–6
decorative aesthetic influenced by, 476
elite vs. folk literatures and, 549n5
fiscal inefficiencies in policies of, 456–8
gift exchange among, 474–86
government role of, 221–2
illustrated manuscript patronage by, 532–43
influence on architecture of, 459–60
interregional/inter-empire trading and, 6–7
knowledge production and, 407–8, 415–20
military recruitment of, 389–90
Ottoman capital formation and, 262–7
Ottoman legal structure and, 325–6
post-conquest co-optation of, 402
Rum literature and poetry and patronage of, 532–5, 533n12
See also ulema (scholar-officials)
encyclopaedias, cosmography and production of, 412–15
Enez
Ottoman possession of, 142–3
Venetian-Ottoman conflict over, 143–4, 144n23
England
coffee trade and, 185
domestic borrowing in, 256–8
economic policy and foreign trade in, 260–1
emerging commercial power of, 44, 172, 241, 242–3
Ottoman trading and, 6–7
revenues and expenditures in, 247
Enveri, 449
Eremita Çelebi, 369–70
Erünsal, Ismail, 409
csham (tax farm shares), 255, 256–8
Eskandar Beg Monshi, 121, 130, 214–15
Ethiopia, Ottoman presence in, 174–5, 181, 182–3, 184
beylerbeylik of, 193–5
Euboea (Negroponte), 142–3
Venetian loss of, 9, 25
Venetian-Ottoman conflict over, 143–4
eunuchs, illustrated histories commissioned by, 538
Europe
domestic borrowing system in, 252–3
Islamization and, 65–8
military revolution in, 315–19
Ottoman economic policy and protectionism in, 260
Ottoman expansion in, 44–73
post-conquest Ottoman administration in, 63–4
Evliya Çelebi, 413–15
Evrenosoglu family, 212–14, 226–32, 473
executions
dynastic security and practice of, 207–8, 209–10
sultan’s role in, 221
expansion of Ottoman Empire
characteristics of, 62–8
conquest and administration patterns in, 63–4
definitions and terminology, 46–9
Eastern expansion and consolidation, 104–25
political factors in, 248–52
in Red Sea, 173–201
rhetoric of, 68–73
trans-imperial zones and frontiers in, 59–60
zones, stages and context of, 57–62
expenses. See revenues and expenditures
explosive devices, military development of, 285–6
exports, Ottoman economic policy and role of, 259
eyalet system (provinces), 185–6
Fadullah b Ruzbihan Khunji, 98
faience pottery, 8–9
Farah, Caesar, 191
Fatih socio-religious complex, 462–6
Fatima Sultan, 539
Fenarizade Muhyiddin Çelebi, 555–6
Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, 32–4, 35–6, 37–8
Holy League and, 159–60
Suleyman’s campaign against, 51–2
Ferdinand I, Duke of Tuscany, 261–2
Ferhad Paşa, 41, 137, 221–2
Feridun Ahmed Bey, 4, 533, 544
fermans (sultanic commands), 187–8
Ferrante (King of Naples), 144
Ferrara, Constantza da, 486–7
fesahat poetic technique, 584–5
fetvas (legal opinions)
against astronomy and astrology, 415
legal authority of, 234–5, 330
Figueira, Luiz, 181–2
Filarete (Florentine architect), 465
Fil Yakup Paşa, 118–19

673
Index

financial policies of Ottoman regimes
capital formation in Ottoman polity and,
  262–7
collection cost increases and administrative shortcomings, 254–6
economics and, 258–62, 269–72, 274–5
‘financial revolution’ in Europe and, 252–3
imperial revenues and expenditures and, 246–8
inefficiencies in, 256–8
longevity of Ottoman political economy and, 272–4
private profit limitations in, 267–9
ulama involvement in, 337–8
Firdevsi, 488–90
firearms, Ottoman use of, 173, 174–5
armaments technology development and, 309–10
army restructuring based on, 284
artillery units in Ottoman army and, 284–6
Firuz Ağa, 476–80
Flanders, domestic borrowing system in, 252–3, 256–8
Fleet, Kate, 19–43
Fleischer, Cornell, 450
Flemming, Barbara, 64–5
folkloric practices
elite vs. folk literatures, 549n5
Ottoman medical practices and, 432
vilayetname folk legends and, 441–2, 443
food supplies
migration due to shortages in, 395–5
population demographics and, 382–7
fortresses
army garrisons in, 297–302
living conditions for soldiers in, 313–15
Ottoman expansion and role of, 60–1
Foscolo, Andrea, 153
Fourth Crusade, 9
Fra Bernardino (corsair), 153
France
armaments technology in, 309–10
domestic borrowing system in, 292–3
emerging commercial power of, 242–3
Ottoman alliances with, 32–3, 38–9, 159–64
Ottoman trading and, 6–7
public debt in, 252–3
revenues and expenditures in, 247
François I, 35–6, 159–64
fratricide, dynastic disputes and practices of, 207–8
free market conditions
longevity of Ottoman political economy and, 272–4
Ottoman economic policy and role of, 260
frontier narratives, Ottoman historiography and, 441–2
Fürratname (Halili), 572–6
Fuzuli, 440–1
galatat dictionaries, 560–2
Galateo, Antonio De Ferrariis, 146, 148
Garcia de Noronha, D., 180
Garzoni, Costantino, 168–9
Gattilusio, Dorino, 147
Gattilusio, Nicolò, 147–8
Gazali (poet), 576–8
Gazanfer Ağa, 538
gazavatname histories, 537–8, 539, 574n81
gazel poetry
form and content of, 567–70
by Süleyman I, 578–86
Gazi Umur Bey, 146–7
Gedik Ahmed Paşa, 85
execution of, 209–10, 221
Mehmed II and, 22, 145–8
mosque of, 466–70
Ottoman expansion and, 26, 149
gedikli zeamets, 292
Gelibolu (Gallipoli), shipyards in, 305
Gelibolulu, Mustafa Ali, 4, 168, 350, 417, 421
gazel poetry by, 568–70
on Iran-Ottoman relations, 139–40
Künhûl-ahbar (world history) by, 450–1
Menakib-i Hürnervan of, 494, 544–6
Nüretname of, 537–8, 542
Ottoman Mediterranean expansion and, 172
painting and, 544
prose by, 562–5, 563n48, 564n52–65
statecraft manual by, 434–5
on Turkish language in Rum, 556–8, 557n27
Genç, Mehmet, 246, 258–62, 267, 269–72
Gencine-i Feth-i Gence, 538
Genoa, public debt in, 252–3
geography
in illustrated manuscripts, 504–9, 540–2
of Ottoman expansion, configurations and zones of, 57–9
in Ottoman historical sources, 5
Ottoman knowledge, 420–3
spheres of operation and, 70–3
Index

travel and Western culture and expanded knowledge of, 423–9
Georgia, Ottoman occupation of, 41, 105
Gerber, Haim, 268
Gerlach, Stephan, 142n59–148, 170
al-Ghazâlî, 434
gift exchange, artisan production and influence of, 474–86
Giray dynasty, 399–400
girih (decorative interlace), 475–6
Giustiniani, Gieronimo, 165–6
Göde Ahmed Bey, 85–6
Godhino, Vitorino Magalhães, 177–9, 195–6, 197
Golden Horn aesthetic style in faience, 496
hâdim al-karamayn (servitor of the two holy sanctuaries), sultans as, 349–52
Hadim Ali Paşa, 30
Hadim Süleyman Paşa, 177–9, 191
Hadîs-i nev, 425–6
Hafez (poet), 582–3
Hagia Sophia. See Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia) church/mosque
hagiographies
Ottoman historiography and, 434
of poets, 445–6
Hakim Ishak, 340–1
Halife, Hasan, 103–4
Halife Çelebi, 472–4
Halil, Çandarlı, 22–3, 97–8, 321
Halili (penname), 572–6
Halvetiye order of dervishes, 342, 443
persecution of, 345
Sunni ‘right belief’ defended by, 342–3
Hamdallah Mustawfi, 422
Hamon, Moses, 432
Hamza Bali, 342–3, 344–5
Hamza Saru Görez, Müftü, 107, 142–3, 221–2
Hanbalis, 348–9
Hanefi school of Islamic law, 234–6, 238, 320–1, 325–6, 348–9
Haniwaldanus, anonymous author, 94–6
Haremeyn, beylerbeys’ duties regarding, 187–8
Hasan Bey, 75–6
Hasan Paşa, 43, 542–3
Hash-i Hal (Nev‘i), 567
hass, tax and population data and, 358–60
Hass Murad Paşa, 212–13
katayi decorative aesthetic, 475–6, 495, 501–4
Hayali (poet), 568–70, 582–3
Hayat al-hayawan (al-Damiri), 429
Haydar (son of Tahmasp), 132–3
Haydar the Geomancer, 454–5
Hayreddin Bey, 178
Hayreddin Reis (Hayreddin Paşa), 12, 153, 225–6, 509
Charles V and, 12, 35–6
as naval commander, 306
western Mediterranean expansion and, 155–70
hazine (treasury), cultural production and, 493
health, Ottoman knowledge of, 430–3
Heberer von Bretten, Johann Michael, 171–2, 387
Heinen, Anton, 412–13
heliocentric systems, Ottoman disinterest in, 419–20
Hemden Paşa, 108
Henri II (King of France), 38–9, 161–2
heroic stories, as historical source, 3–4
Hersekzade Ahmed Paşa, 28–9, 210–11, 212–13, 239–40
Heş Behiş (Amir Khusrav Dehlavi), 488–90
Heş Bihiş (Bidlisı), 448
Heş Bihiş (Eight Gardens of Paradise) (Şehi Bey), 445–6, 586
heterodoxy, in Sunni Islam, 338–47
Hevesname (Book of Desire) (Cafer Çelebi), 572–6, 584–5
Hevesname (Book of Desire) (Paşa Çelebi), 572–6, 581–3
Hidaya (al-Marghinani), 327–8
Hijaz beylerbeylik of, 186–90
Ottoman relations with, 173–5, 185–6
pilgrimages to, 347–8
Hijra (627–28), 330–1
hilat (honour robes), 474–86
historical overview of Ottoman Empire from 1451 to 1603, 19–43
1451 to mid-sixteenth century, 22–36
mid-sixteenth century to 1603, 36–43
historiography of Ottoman Empire
archaeometry and, 15–16
army structure and history, 280–2
coverage of international trade and, 195–201
definitions of conquest in, 48–9
definitions of Europe and expansion in, 46–9
dynastic history and, 445–9
in illustrated manuscripts, 504–9, 529–43
imperial revenues and expenditures, data on, 246–8
official court historiographers and, 508–9
Ottoman concepts of time and, 439–45
pepper and spice trade data and, 199–201
rhetoric of expansion and, 68–73
stereotyping of Ottoman Empire and, 449–53
zones, stages, and contexts of, 57–62
Hızır Bey, 76, 193–5
Hoca Sadeddin, 81–2, 101, 112, 419, 448–9, 452
Holy Apostles, Byzantine Church, Ottoman complex on site of, 462–6
Holy League including Venice, 35–6, 39–40, 53–4, 159–60, 167–8, 169
Holy Roman Empire
governance in, 248–9
Ottoman Empire ambitions and, 241–2
holy war doctrine, Ottoman warfare and role of, 277–80
House of Osman, historical narratives of, 451–2
Hud (Arabian prophet), 440
Hülagü (son of Chingiss Han), 415–16
humouralism
Kınalızade’s discussion of, 435–7
in Ottoman knowledge of body and health, 430–3
Hundi Hatun, 210–11
Hünername (Book of Arts and Skills), 72–3, 533–4, 537
Hungary
Catholic population in, 370–2
cizye payments in, 363–5
economic importance of, 67–8
European military revolution and, 315–19
fortress garrisons in, 297–302
janissary participation in campaign for, 283
Mehmed II’s focus on, 144–5, 276–7
naval river flotillas in, 308
Ottoman expansion in, 23–4, 28, 32–3, 38–9, 42–3, 51–2
Ottoman military strategy concerning, 279
population estimates for, 376
serfdom in, 250
timar system in, 288–96
Hunyadi, John, 22
Hürrem Sultan/Roxelana (wife of Süleyman I), 37–8, 125, 210–11, 388–9
architectural projects influenced by, 511, 516–19
Hürufis, 321, 346–7
Husayn Bayqara, 490–1
İbn el-Hac Hasan, 333–4
İbn Iyas, 30–2, 112
İbn Kemal. See Kemapaşazade
İbn Khaldun, 450–1
İbn Taymiyya, 241–3
İbn ‘Ulayyan, 39–40, 214–15
Ibrahim (ruler of Karaman), 22–3, 79–81
Ibrahim Cevri, 417
Index

İbrahim Gülsenî, 345–6, 443
İbrahim Müteferrika, 423, 434–5
administrative legacy of, 239–40, 504–5
execution of, 209–10
geographic knowledge under, 424–5
imperial imagery in artistic projects of, 491–2
as military commander, 218–19, 278–9
post-conquest rebellions and, 211–12
İdrîs Bîdlîsî, 214–15, 448
ignorance, Ottoman concepts of, 407–8
Ilkhanid dynasty, 352–4
illustrated manuscripts, 476–80, 488–90
geography and history in, 504–9, 540–2
multiple copies of, 539
ornament aesthetic and, 493, 494
paintings and biographies of authors of, 544–7
representation of power in, 528–9, 532–43
ilmîye hierarchy, 331–2
knowledge production and, 409–11, 418–19
İmâddîddîn Hüseyînîoğlu Hasan, 560–2
İmber, Colin, 21, 158n148
İmброс, Venetian-Ottoman conflict over, 143–4
imperial ethos
architecture influenced by, 459–74
artistic articulation of images of, 491–528
Ottoman European expansion and, 50–1
protection of Muslim sanctuaries and, 349–52
in Topkapı Palace design, 459–60
trans-imperial zone and, 59–60
ulema (scholar-officials) and, 322–5
in visual arts, 457–8
warfare as tool of, 279–80
imports, Ottoman economic policy and role of, 259
İnalck, Halîl, 195–6, 198
administrative structure and, 63–4
conquest of Constantinople and, 241–2
fiscal policies and, 55, 260
on longevity of Ottoman political economy, 272–3
on Ottoman Balkan expansion, 251
on Ottoman capital formation and wealth accumulation, 263, 264
on population demographics, 361–2
Red Sea expansion and, 174–5
on ulema, 337–8
income levels
historical trends in, 259
migration patterns and changes to, 393–5
tîmâr system and, 288–96
India
Moghuls of, 348–9
Ottoman knowledge of, 426–8
pepper and spice trade and, 199–201
Portuguese expansion into, 196
textile production in, 481
Indian Ocean region
Ottoman expansion in, 12, 173, 243–4
Ottoman Red Sea protective operations in, 175–85
Portuguese ambitions in, 243–4
industrial arts, 476–80, 493
inheritance rights
grave registrations and, 334–7
Ottoman capital formation and infringement of, 263
Innocent VIII (Pope), 27–30
Inquisition, Islamic inquisitions and, 372–3
inşâ literary prose, 576–8
inter-imperial zone and, 61–2
international trade
Ottoman economic policy and, 258–62, 275
Ottoman expansion and, 195–201
Iran
fortress garrisons on frontier with, 301
geography of, 422
Ottoman confrontations with, 11, 41–2, 44, 53–4, 139–40
Ottoman trading with, 6–7
Selim’s ban on trade with, 114
Süleyman’s relations with, 34–5, 38–9, 113–25
treaty of Amasya and, 126–32
Iraq
Jacobites and Nestorians in, 369–70
Ottoman provinces in, 225–6, 276–7, 352–4
Selim II and, 39–40
Isabella of Hungary, Süleyman and, 33–4, 37–8
İsa Bey, foundation in Skopje of, 472–3
İsfendiyaroğullan
Meşhed II’s conquest of, 75–6
Uzun Hasan’s alliance with, 79
Ishak (Karaman ruler), 26, 80–1, 87–8
İskender Bey-Scanderbeg, 213–14
İskender Celebi, 209–10
İskendername (Ahmedi), 446, 487–8
İskender Pasha, 36–7, 125
Islam
Christian-Islam confrontations, Ottoman
European expansion and, 65–8
conversions to, 323, 369–75
data on women’s conversion to, 366–9
dominance in post-conquest Constantinople of, 322–5
Hanefi school of Islamic law and, 234
in illustrated manuscripts, 539–40
institutional polity in Ottoman empire of, 317
Iranian-Ottoman conflict and, 11
kaside (praise poetry) and, 570–2
Ottoman embrace of, 45
Ottoman legal system and influence of, 232
Ottoman warfare and role of, 277–80
padişah of, 348–9
slavery and conversion to, 372–3
voluntary conversions to, 323–4
See also Shi’a Islam; Sunni Islam
Islamic holy cities
beylerbeyis’ duties regarding, 187–8
kadi hierarchy in, 328
Mamluk presence in, 174–5
Ottoman control of, 45, 113
Ottoman Red Sea expansion and, 173–5
sultans as servitors of, 349–52
treaty of Amasya and protection of, 126–7
İsmail (son of Tahmasp), 132–9
İsmail Abu Taqiyya, 273, 379–80
İsmail Bey (İsfendiaryoğulları ruler), 75–6, 80
İsma’il Safavid (Shah), 10, 29–30, 34–5, 44, 97
ascends Iranian throne, 322
Ottoman Eastern expansion and
consolidation and, 104–25
posthumous power of, 116
religious beliefs of, 339–40
Safavid ascendency and, 97–104
Selim I’s war with, 50–2, 70–3, 106–13, 276–7
İsmihan (daughter of Selim II), 525
isolarii (maps and sailing handbooks), 423–5
as illustrated history, 504–5
İssawi, Charles, 380
İstanbul
Albanian migration to, 394–5
architecture in, 459–74
Catholic population in, 370–2
conquest of, 9, 21, 44, 241–2
economic and trade importance of, 142–3
empire consolidation and, 45
European influences in, 46–9
Ottoman sources on history of, 2
population growth in, 6–7, 377–9
religious tolerance in, 322–5
shipyards in, 305
symbolism in Islam of, 347–8
under Mehmed II, 22–3
İstinalet (accommodation/persuasion)
in Balkan provinces, 251
decline of, 251–2
Ottoman expansion and role of, 249–50
Italy
domestic borrowing system in, 256–8
Mehmed II’s campaign in, 145–8
migrations to Ottoman Empire from, 396
Muslim slaves in, 14–15
Ottoman western Mediterranean expansion
and attacks on, 159–64
Ottoman withdrawal from, 27–30
textile production in, 481
trading restrictions in ports of, 261–2
İvan IV (Russian Tsar) (1547–84), 53–4
İyas, Ibn, 112
İz, Fahir, 562–5
İznil (Nicaea) pottery, 8–9
Jalalndin Dawani, 435
Jalayrid dynasty, 352–4
janissaries
as army land forces, 282–4
Bayezid II and, 27–30
conversion to Islam among, 373–4
corsair capture of, 153
devşirmec as route to service in, 215–16, 282–3
garrisons in beylerbeyliks of, 179–80, 185–6, 189–90
living conditions in military garrisons for,
313–15
in naval forces, 307–8
raiding parties organized by, 397
revolt of, 41
Safavid war and, 108, 126
Selim I supported by, 27–30
support of sultan by, 216–18
timars received by, 229–30
Index

training and selection process for, 216–18
Jeddah, Ottoman protection of, 175
Jerba, 161
Jewish population in Ottoman Empire data on women in, 369
in imperial Istanbul, 322–5
tax farming by, 262–7, 270–1
restrictions on tax farming, 261–2
John IV (Byzantine rule of Trebizond/Trabzon), 76
judiciary system in Ottoman Empire, consultations on conquest and war and, 330–1
cadı hierarchy and, 328
ulema hierarchy and, 328–32
venality and unemployment in, 334–7
Julius III (Pope), 162–3, 163n179
juros (Castilian annuities), 252–3
Kadı zadeli movement, 341–3
Kadı zade Rumi, 415–16
Kadri of Bergama, 560–2, 582–3
Kafescioğlu, Çiğdem, 20–1
Kanizsa, as Ottoman province, 225–6
Kanunname (law code), 186–90, 237
Ottoman legal practices and, 325–6
See also legal infrastructure in Ottoman Empire
Kanunname-i Mısır, 114–15
Kapi Ağası medrese, architecture of, 469
Karagöz Paşa, 28–9, 92–3
Karaköyünlu dynasty
architectural influences of, 474
decorative aesthetic of, 474–86
Karaman
Ottoman incorporation of Karaman, 2–3,
26, 79–81
provincial government in Karaman, 225–6
Karaman dynasty
Bayezid II and, 28–9
decorative aesthetic of, 475
Mamluk involvement in, 86–91
Mehmed II’s campaign against, 22–3, 82–3
rebellion in, 212–14
Karamanlı Nişancı Mehmed Paşa, 144–5
Kara Memi, 496–7
Kara Yazıcı, 43
kasıde (praise poetry), 567–8, 570–2
Kasım (brother of Pir Ahmed), 82
Kasım Paşa, 114–15
Kasaf (Seyyid el-Şerif), 333–4
Kastrioti, George, 25, 394–5. See also Skanderbeg uprising
Katib Celebi, 157, 165–6, 168, 170
Cihannâma of, 423, 455–6
on Mehmed II, 145
statecraft manual by, 434–5
Kitab-i Bahriye (Piri Reis), 427
Kava’i’d-İ-Fürs, 560–2, 561n44–562
Kaykavus Ibn Iskandar, 434
Kazimierz IV (King of Poland), 27–8, 29–30
Kemalpaşazade (Ibn Kemal), 72–3, 88–9, 92,
277–8, 340–1, 344
on Bayezid II regime, 50–1
on Bayezid II’s Mediterranean expansion, 152–3
historical narrative of, 448–9
on Mehmed II, 81
prose work of, 376–8
publications of, 560–2
on Selim-Ismal’s war, 107, 111
on Venetian-Ottoman conflict, 143–4
Kemal Reis, 149–50, 159–60
explorations by, 424, 427
naval forces reorganization by, 304
Kemalüddin Mehmed, 409–10
Kepler, Johannes, 419–20
Khamsa manuscript, 488–90
Kharaç muwassaf/kharaj muqasama taxes, 235–8
Khartat al-‘aja’ib, 412–13, 421–2
Khayrbak (Egyptian governor), 32, 114–15
Khitâyn-name (Book of China), 425–6
Khusraw va Shirin manuscript, 488–90
kidnappings by pirates, 389, 397–8
Kilia
Bayezid II and, 27–8, 50–1
Ottoman occupation of, 9
kilç (revenue element), timar system and, 288–9
Kılıç Ali Paşa, 167–70
Kinalzade Ali, 433–4, 435–8
Kısaş (Ramazançade Mehmed Paşa), 449
kısve (Ka’aba covering), 349–50, 352–4

679
Kitab al-Talwih, 333–4
Kitab-ı Bahriye (Piri Reis), 424–5, 504–5
Kızıl Ahmed Bey, 75–6, 79
Kızılbaş tribesmen
Ottoman persecution of, 345, 346–7
Shah Isma’il and, 339–40
Knights Hospitallers, 141–2
Anatolia attacked by, 144
Bayezid II and, 27–30, 221
Cem and, 27–30, 50–1, 207–8
corsairs and, 149–50
on Malta, 164–5
Mehmed II’s Mediterranean campaign and, 147–8
prisoners of, 14–15
protection in Mediterranean from, 171–2
Süleyman and, 32–3, 51–2, 155
westward Mediterranean move by Ottomans and, 161–2
knowledge and knowledge production
of astronomy, 415–20
of cosmography, 412–15
dynastic history and, 445–9
of human body, 430–3
importance of, in Ottoman society, 407–8, 455–6
of maritime geography, 423–9
of natural history, 429–30
Ottoman historiography and, 439–45
production and dissemination in Ottoman Empire of, 20–1
prognostications and end of time and, 453–5
of social order and politics, 433–8
systematization of, 409–12
of universal geography, 420–3
world history and, 449–53
Koca Sinan Paşa, 42, 221–2
Koç Bey, 434–5
Komnenos dynasty, 75
Konya
battle of, 207–8
carpentry production in, 484–5
list of foundations in, 2–3
Köprülü, Fuat, 3–4
Korkud (son of Bayezid II), 29, 30–2, 147–8, 155–6
execution of, 207–8
Kos island (İstanbul), 142–3, 154
Krause, Keith, 317
Kritoboulos, 69–70, 75–6, 77
Kruji, 144–5
Küçük Kaynarca, treaty of, 350
kul (sultan’s servitors), 248
career mobility for, 337–8
standing army and, 282–4
See also slavery
Künkül’-Abhar (Gelibolu Mustafa Ali), 450–1
Kuran, Timur, 265–6
Kurdoğlu, Fevzi, 156–7
Kuru, Selim, 20–1
Kütükoglu, Muhahat, 269–72
Lajos II (King of Hungary and Bohemia), 32–3, 225–6
Lala Mustafa Paşa, 12–13, 39–40, 41, 42–3, 135–7, 221–2, 537–8
Lamii (poet and scholar), 576–8, 583–6
land system
land surveys in Anatolia and, 116
Ottoman property rights law concerning, 235–8
post-conquest annexation practices and, 212
sipahi’s duties in maintenance of, 286–96
Lane, F. C., 195–6
language
learning tools for, 560–2
multilingualism in Rum and, 558n30, 558–60
in Ottoman historical sources, 4
Rum literary tradition and evolution of, 531, 552–5, 556–8
See also specific languages
Łaski, Hieronymus, 278–9
Latifi, 562–5, 576–8, 579–80, 588–90, 590n123
‘Latin campaign’ of 1204, 9
Latin-Greek divisions, Mehmed II’s exploitation of, 147–8
la Vigne, Jean de, 163
‘Law Book of Mehmed II’, 208–9, 224
Le’ali (poet), 559n36–560
Lefkas islands, 145–6, 152
corsair attacks on, 156–7
legal infrastructure in Ottoman Empire, 232–8
heresy accusations and, 340–1
Islamic schools of law and, 348–9
Ottoman warfare and role of, 277–80
şeri’at and kanun and, 325–6
sultan’s authority and, 207–18, 221, 437–8
See also cursus honorum (legal education); kannunname (law code)
Le Historie de Europa (Ulloa), 67–8
Lemnos, 142–3, 147–8
Venetian-Ottoman conflict over, 143–4
Index

Lepanto
  battle of, 44, 53–4
  Bayezid’s siege of, 150–3
  Mehmed II’s siege of, 144–5
  Ottoman attack of 1571 on, 167–70
Lesbos, Venetian-Ottoman conflict over, 143–4
Letaifname (Book of Witticisms), 576–8
  See also corsairs
Levni, 8–9
Leyla and Mecnun, 572–6
life-time tax-farm (malikane), 255
literary production and tradition
  cosmography in, 413–15
  discourse on poetry and, 583–6
  discourse on the arts in, 544–7
  dynastic history and, 445–9
  elite vs. folk literatures, 549n5
  histories of Rum poets and, 586–92
  literary tools for poetry in Rum and, 578–86
  manuals and commentaries and, 581–3
  new forms of, 566–78
  in Ottoman Empire, 20–1
  Ottoman historiography and, 439–45
  Ottoman travel narratives in, 423–9
  parallel poetry anthologies, 580–1
  poetic form and content and, 566–78
  prose structure and, 562–5
  prose vs. poetry and, 565–6
  rare book collections and, 476–80
  of Rum, 548–92
  statecraft manuals and, 433–8
  on wonders (acatib), 519–40
  See also illustrated manuscripts
livu kanunnameleri (tax regulations), food supply estimates and, 382–7
Livorno, trade with Ottoman merchants in, 261–2
Lokman ibn Seyyid Hüseyn, 72–3
Lokman, 433, 449–50, 533, 535–6, 537, 544
long war between Ottomans and Habsburgs (1593–1606), 44, 53–4, 241
  European military revolution and, 315–19
  military capabilities and, 276
  Lopes de Castanheda, Fernão, 177–9
  Lopes de Sequeira, Diogo, 176
  Louis, William (Willem Lodewijk), 284
  Louis XIV (King of France), 245–6, 248–9
  love poetry
    form and content of, 572–6
    history of, 589
  Lowry, Heath, 360
Lubenaun, Reinhold, 249–50
Lucano, Giovanni Albino, 148n64
Ludovisi, Danielle de’, 149–50
Lütfi Paşa, 111, 118–19, 122, 159–60
  on conquest of Rhodes, 154–5
  on execution of Ibrahim Paşa, 209–10
  history by, 452
  marriage to Şahi Hatun, 210–11
  military provision system under, 310
  statecraft manual by, 434–5
Luther, Martin, 248–50
Lybyer, A. H., 195–6
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 207, 248–9
Macuncuzade Mustafa Efendi, 171–2, 571
magic, Ottoman study of, 430
Mahdia, 161
mahmal, mehmel (palanquin sent to Mecca), 351–2
Mahmud (son of Mehmed III), execution of, 209–10
Mahmud Paşa
  appointment of, 190, 212–13
  commercial centre built by, 472
  execution of, 212–13
  hagiography of, 434
  Mehmed II and, 23–4, 82
  mosque of, 466–70
  naval skills of, 146–7
  Ottoman expansion and, 75–6, 183–4
  Majalis al-Nafais (Excellent Gatherings) (Nevai), 586–9
Maksud Ali Bey, 123–5
Malamatiyya/Melamettiyye mysticism, of ulama, syncretism with Islam, 320–1
Malikis, 348–9
Malkoçoğlu Bali Bey, 27–8
Malkoçoğlu family, 473
Malta, Ottoman attack on, 21, 164–5
Mamluks
  Bayezid II’s war with, 27–30, 91–6, 148–9
  cultural influence on Ottoman art and architecture, 459, 469, 511
  Egyptian role of, 349–52
Karaman and, 80–1
  military superiority of Ottomans over, 276–7
  Ottoman expansion and, 11, 26, 50–2, 86–91, 185–6
Ottoman Red Sea expansion and, 173–5, 185
Portuguese naval blockade and, 175–85, 243–4
religious ideology as justification for war against, 277–80
Selim I and, 10, 30–2, 110–13, 348–9
Ma’mun (caliph), 415–16
Manisa palace complex, 462
manuals and commentaries on poetry and literature, 581–3
mapping
  maritime geography and, 423–4, 426–8
  Ottoman universal geography and, 421–3
Maragha observatory, 415–16
al-Marghinani, 327–8
maritime trade, 142n9
Bayezid II’s Mediterranean consolidation and, 148–55
customs taxes in Ethiopian beylerbeylik on, 194–5
geographic configurations and zones of operation and, 57–9
impact on geographic knowledge of, 423–9
Ottoman eastern Mediterranean expansion and, 141–8
Ottoman expansion and, 11, 45
Ottoman Red Sea expansion and, 195–201
protection, in Mediterranean, of, 171–2
Red Sea as strategic location in, 175–85
Maronite Christians, population data on, 370–1
Marranos (reconverted Jews), 261–2, 270–1
marriage
  as dynastic tool, 210–11
  of Ottoman soldiers, 313–15
Marsi, Luigi Ferdinando, 285–6
Martinuzzi, George, 33–4, 37–8
Martolos (Christian fighting unit in Ottoman service), 397
martyrology, 440–1
Marxist ideology
  Ottoman capital formation and, 262–7
  Ottoman imperial revenues and expenditures in context of, 246
masjid
  elite architectural patronage and construction of, 466–70
  in socio-religious complexes, 462–6
Massawa, 152
Mass, Ismail, 344
Masum Sultan Safavi, 130–1
Matâ‘î-î’s-Sâ‘îde, 539, 540–2
mathematics, Ottoman knowledge of, 415–20
Matrakçı Nasuh, 428–9, 505–7
Matthias Corvinus (King of Hungary), 276–7
mausoleums, architectural design and construction of, 459–74, 522
al-Mawardi, 325
Maximilian II (Holy Roman Emperor), 38–9
Mazzaoui, Michael M. 106–7
Mecca
  Ottoman reconstruction of Great Mosque in, 351
  pilgrimages to, Ottomans as protectors of, 10, 352–4
Mecmu‘ât-nezâir (An Anthology of Parallel Poems), 580–1
medical knowledge, Ottoman study of, 430–3
medical services for Ottoman military, 313–15
Mediterranean region, Ottoman expansion in, 12, 29–30
eastern consolidation from 1481 to 1533, 148–55
eastern expansion, 1451–81, 141–8
fortress garrisons in, 300–1
post-1574 strategies, 170–2
western expansion, 1533–74, 155–70
medreses
  astronomy and mathematics in, 415–20
code of conduct for, 409–10
  heresy trials and network of, 340–1
  hierarchy and categories of, 327–8
  medical training and, 431
  muvakkithane in, 416
  palace schools and, 216–18
  post-conquest system of, 326–32
  ulama career path through, 332–4
  unemployment problems and enrollment in, 384
Meğri, 152
Mehmed I (1413–21), 321
Mehmed II (1451–81)
  architectural projects under, 459–60, 472
  art and pictorial representation in reign of, 487–8
  artisan production in reign of, 476–80
  colleges founded by, 324, 333–4
  conquest of Constantinople and, 241–2; 347–8
  cosmography and knowledge in reign of, 413–15
Crimea khanate and, 9
death of, 148
decline of Venice and, 9
dynastic rivalry in reign of, 207–8, 209–10
educational institutions in reign of, 358–60
Eight Medreses of, 233–4, 327–8, 333–4
epidemics in reign of, 365–6
executions by, 321, 395

682
expansion and control of Anatolia under, 74–91
forced settlements under, 401–2
Hanei school of Islamic law and, 234–6
historical narratives concerning, 69–70, 447–8, 537
Italian campaign of, 9–10
judiciary system under, 328–9
Karaman campaign of, 2–3, 79–81
as Kayser-i Rum (Caesar of the Romans), 241–2
land annexation by, 212
land and tax laws under, 237
leadership style of, 224
legal system under, 325–6
library of, 409
literary patronage in reign of, 552–6, 562–5
Mediterranean expansion under, 141–8, 144n23
as military commander, 218–19, 221
military superiority of, 276–7
Ottoman historical sources concerning, 3–4
palace schools established by, 217
pictorial representation and painting in, 8–9, 486–91
poetry by, 560n39
population growth under, 375–9
prognostications and apocalyptic thought in reign of, 454–5
reign of, historical overview, 22–6, 44
religious tolerance in regime fo, 322–5
romanticized image of, 1
scholarly and literary activities sponsored by, 3
Skanderbeg uprising against, 9–10, 394–5
state expansion under, 19–20
territorial expansion under, 276
ilmâ structure under, 326–32, 337–8
Uzun Hasan’s rivalry with, 78–86
Mehmed III (1595–1603)
dearth of, 241
European expansion under, 53–4
fratricide committed by, 208–9
illustrated history of, 537, 538
leadership style of, 219–20
military campaigns of, 283–4, 318–19
prognostication in reign of, 454–5
reign of, 42–3
son’s execution ordered by, 209–10
Mehmed IV (1648–87), 172, 267
Mehmed Ağa, 538
Mehmed Aşık
on body and health, 430–1
on cosmography, 413–16, 440, 455–6
on geography, 420–3, 428–9
on natural history, 429–30
Mehmed, Kemâl al-Dîn, 409–10
Mehmed Paşa, 27–30
Mehmed Reis ibn Menemenli, 427
Meşâqir-i Şâ’ara (Stations of Poets) (Âşık Çelebi), 445–6, 589–91
Meşale, battle of, 137
Mesih (poet), 559n36–560, 574–6
Mesih Divâni, 559n36–560
Mesih-i Ermeni, 590n124
Mesih Paşa, 26, 29–30, 145, 212–13
Mesnevi (Celâledîn-i Rumi), 576–8, 578n90
mesnevi poetry, 560–2
form and content of, 568, 572–6
Metinsoy, Murat, 259
mewli offices, 330
mevlâs, 320–1
Mevlevis (whirling dervishes), 343, 345
Mevzuatu’l-Ulum (Mehmed, Kemâl al-Dîn), 409–10
Mezôkeresztus, battle of, 283–4, 318–19
Michael of Wallachia, 42
Michel, Nicolas, 375–6
Mişfâh al-jâfr al-jîmî, 538, 539–40
Mişfâh al-sâ’ada wa misbah al-siyâda (Taşköprüzade), 409–11
Index

Mişāḥ al-ʻulum, 327

migration
in border regions, 396–8
income and security as factors in, 393–5
of Ottoman captives and slaves, 387–90
population demographics and “push” factors in, 382–7
sūrgūn and service to sultans and, 390–3
Mihailoğu Bey, 94
Mihalolu family, 212–14, 226–32, 473
Mihrimah (Süleyman I’s daughter), 8–9, 37–8, 519
marriage to Rüstem Paşâ, 210–11
military administrative class (askeri), 65–8
beylerbeylik of Egypt and the Hijaz and, 186–90
beylerbeylik of Yemen and, 191–3
Ottoman capital formation and, 262–7, 269–72
standing army and, 282–4
ülema structure and, 326–32
military histories (gazavatnames, fethnames), 444–5
military structure
advances after 1453, 49–50
armaments technology and, 309–10
border guards in, 397
enforced enrollment of slaves in, 387–90
equipment and tactics in, 318
in Ethiopian beylerbeylik, 195
European military revolution, Ottoman military and, 315–19
increased costs and difficulties of, 19–20
living conditions of soldiers in, 313–15
Ottoman Empire consolidation and, 45, 185–6
Ottoman sources on, 9–13
provisioning systems in, 310–12
sixteenth-century Ottoman superiority and, 241–6
spying systems in, 312
strategic importance of Suez to, 187
sultan’s leadership role in, 218–22
technological changes to, 238–9
warfare from 1453 to 1603 and, 276–319.
See also army of the Ottoman Empire; janissaries; navy of the Ottoman Empire
Miller Atlas, 424
millet regime, 323
Mimar Sinan, 8, 492, 519–22, 530
artisan production and, 391–2
autobiography of, 546–7
public architecture and, 525
Süleymaniye complex and, 325, 511–13
miniature painting, in Ottoman era, 8–9
Mirando, António de, 177–9
Mir’atü’l-Menalik (Seydi Ali Reis), 425, 426–7
miri land, Ottoman laws relating to, 235–8
Mirim Çelebi, 415–16
Mizrahi, Elijah, 322–5
mnemohistory, 439
Mocenigo, Piero, 144
Modon, Ottoman attack on, 150–3
Mohács, battle of, 51–2, 277
Moldavia
Ottoman expansion into, 33–4, 52, 53–4, 144–5
Russian presence in, 53–4
Molla Cami, 555–6, 586–9
Molla Kabiz, 340–1
Mongols, astronomic knowledge of, 415–16
Moriscos (Muslims of Granada), 160
Morosini, Giovanni Francesco, 169
mortality data, population demographics and, 365–6
mosques
architectural design and construction of, 459–74, 514–21, 523–5
elite architectural patronage and construction of, 466–70
Mozaffar Han, 137–8
Müeyyedzade, 409
Müezzinzade Ali Paşa (Ali Paşa at Lepanto), 306
mufassal registers, tax and population data from, 359
miftû, in Ottoman legal system, 234, 330
Muhammad Hudabanda, 133
Muhammad Shaybani Han, 103
muhasebe defteri (account register), 298
Mutahhar, 184
Muhi al-Din ibn Arabi. See Muhieddin ibn Arabi
Muhiddin Karamanî, 345–6
Muhieddin ibn Arabi, 2–3
Muhiyi-yi Gǔşenî, 443
Münir Belgradî, 342–3, 344–5
Murad (son of Ahmed, grandson of Bayezid II), 105, 105n258, 207–8
Murad I, Ottoman ruler (1362–89), 2, 97–8, 105
kadiaskers under, 328–9
Murad II (1421–51), 79–81, 87–8
architectural projects in reign of, 462, 465–6
educational institutions in reign of, 558–60
literature and poetry in reign of, 551
religious persecutions by, 321
Murad III (1574–95)
architecture in reign of, 529–32
artisan production in reign of, 498–501
European expansion under, 53–4
firearms used during reign of, 284
fratricide committed by, 208–9
Halvetiye religious order and, 342
illustrated manuscripts in reign of, 528–9, 532–43
Iranian wars and, 132–9
knowledge production in reign of, 425–6
land and tax registers in reign of, 359
leadership style of, 219
literature in reign of, 576–8
naval redevelopment under, 306–7
observatory established by, 418–19
poetry of, 559–60
prognostication in reign of, 454–5
reign of, historical overview, 8–9, 41–2, 44
social order under, 437
sirgin recruitments by, 391
treaty of Amasya and, 131–2
Murad IV (1623–40),
Murad Paşa, 183–4
Murad Reis, 181–2
Murphey, Rhoads, 67–8
musammat (poetic interpretation), 582–3
musical therapy, Ottoman use of, 431–2
Müteferrika, İbrahim, 423, 434–5
müvakkıthe, 416
Müeyyidreddü'l-Ulum, 560–2
mysticism
in poetry, 583–6, 589
Sufism and, 341–3
mythical time, in Ottoman historiography, 441–2

Nafplio (Nauplia, Napoli di Romania), 151

Nagyszombat, pact of, 33–4
Nahuda Ahmed, 179–80
Naima, 260
Nakkas Hasan, 537, 544
Nakkas Osman, 494, 533–4, 544
nakşband (textile designers), 494–5
Naples, Ottoman attack on, 162–3
Nāṣīḥat al-Mulûk, 434
Nasirreddin Tusi, 435
national debt, European adoption of, 252–3
natural history, Ottoman knowledge of, 429–30
Navarino, 152
navy of Ottoman Empire
captures enrolled in, 388
chronology of Red Sea operations by, 175–85
Europeans’ enrollment in, 157–8, 58n448
illustrated history of, 504–5
improvement of, under Hayreddin, 155–70
Mediterranean expansion and, 141–8, 155
post-1574 strategy of, 170–2
relative independence of, 185–6
structure of, 304–8
Necati (poet), 568–70
Neşri, 68, 81, 83–4, 85, 209–10
historical narratives of, 448, 449
Netâyicîl-Fünnun (Nev‘i), 411, 565–6
Netherlands
emerging commercial power of, 172, 241, 242–3
firearm technology developed by, 284
Nevâri, 555–6, 579–80, 586–9
Nev‘i, 411, 565–6, 567, 569–70
Nigari (Haydar Reis), 509
nişancı, governmental duties of, 222–32
‘Nishaburi album’, 498–501
Nizam al-Mulk, 269–72, 434, 488–90
nobility formation, sultanates and prevention of, 263–4
Nogay confederacy, 399–400
nomads
migration patterns of, 398–401
taxation of, 5–6
non-Muslims (zimmis), tolerance in Istanbul of, 322–5
North Africa
fortress garrisons in, 301–2
Ottoman expansion in, 12, 45, 160–1, 165, 169–70, 173, 322
Ottoman Red Sea operations and, 182–3
urbanization and population growth in, 381–2
Index

Notaras, Lucas, 395
Nur Ali Rumlû, 105, 108
Nurbanu (mother of Murad III), 8–9, 388–9, 529–32
Nureddinzade Musliheddin, 342, 344–5
Nushatu’s-Selatin (Gelibolu Mustafa Ali), 350, 434–5, 542
Nusretname, 537–8, 542
Nuzhatu’l-qulub (Mustawfi), 422
observatories, Ottoman construction of, 417–20
ocaklık-revenue source, timar system and, 288–9
ocaks (infantry corps), 398–401
Olbracht, Jan, 27–8
omens, books of, 454–5
Ömer bin Mezid, 580–1
Ömer Rüsendi, 345–6
oneiroiomy, 453–4
Orhan, Ottoman historical sources concerning, 3–4
Orhonlu Cengiz, 182–3, 195–6
ornament aesthetic, Ottoman development of, 493–504
Orthodox Christianity
acceptance of Islam in, 241–2
in, Aegean Islands, Latin-Greek rivalry and, 152
architecture in churches for, 525–6
Catholic disputes with, 374
data on women in, 369
fear of Catholic domination in, 249–50
hierarchy of, 248
in Mehmed II’s reign, 322–5
Ottoman legal system and, 232
population data and, 369–75
timar revenue and institutions of, 251
See also Christianity
Oruç, chronicles of, 102, 448
Osman I (?–ca. 1324)
iliteracy of, 409
illustrated histories of, 533
Ottoman historical sources concerning, 3–4
Osman II (1618–22), 351–2
Osmanşah, 207–8
Otlukbeli, battle of, 26, 84, 85–91
Otranto, 148
Ottoman capture of, 145–8, 146n40, 148n64
Ottoman Empire
historical overview, 1451 to mid-sixteenth century, 22–36
military and political successes in, 9–13
Ottoman sources on, 2–5
periodization in history of, 21, 55–7
sixteenth-century global dominance of, 241–6
treaty of Amasya and, 126–32
Ottoman-Venetian war of 1537–40, 117
Özal government, modern capitalism and, 274–5
Özdemir Paşa, 181–2, 193–5
Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa, 41, 137, 184
Özel, Oktay, 385–6
ÖZvar, Erol, 246
Pacheco, Pietro, 162–3
painting
in illustrated histories, 534–43
Ottoman aesthetic in, 486–91, 509
wall paintings, 543
palace schools, 216–18. See also medreses
palatial paradigm, in Topkapı Palace architecture, 459–60
Pamuk, Şevket, 46, 259, 270
Panaite, Viorel, 48–9
parallel poems
anthologies of, 580n96, 580–1
composition of, 579–80
paşa elites
as beylerbeyis, 186–90
capital formation and, 263
Patras, Venetian-Ottoman conflict over, 143–4
patrilineal descent, authority of sultans and, 207–18
Paul III (Pope), 35–6, 159–60
Paul IV (Pope), 162–3, 261–2
peasants
migration patterns of, 393–5
taxation of, 5–6
Peçevi, Ibrahim, 42, 135, 219–20
Peloponnesse
Ottoman expansion into, 22–3, 24, 25, 143–4
Venetian loss of, 9
Pendname (Attar), 560–2, 576–8
pepper trade, Ottoman Red Sea expansion and, 195–201
periodization, in Ottoman history, 21, 55–7
Perjés, Gëza, 279, 303
perpetual almanacs, 417
perpetual annuities, European nations’ sale of, 252–3
Persian culture and language
decorative aesthetic of, 475
historical narratives in, 448
Index

histories of poets of, 586–9
learning tools for, 560–2
Ottoman historical sources and, 4
prose structure and, 562–5, 576–8
in Rum literary tradition, 552–5, 558n29, 558–60
statecraft manuals, 434
Pertev Paşa, 167–8
Pervane bin Abdullah, 580–1
Pesaro, 261–2
Petrović, Peter, 37–8
Philip II (King of Spain), 38–9, 162–3, 163n179, 277
Philip of Burgundy, 80
Philip the Good, 84
Phokaea, 142–3
physicians in Ottoman Empire, 430–3
physiognomy, Ottoman study of, 433
Pickthall, Marmaduke, 333–4
pictorial representation, Ottoman east/west horizons in, 486–91
piracy
in Black Sea region, 74–5
in eastern Mediterranean, 141–2
kidnapping and, 389, 397–8
Ottoman expansion and, 14–15, 57–9, 153, 166–70
protection in Mediterranean from, 171–2
Pir Ahmed, 26, 81–6, 87–8, 89
Pires, Lourenço, 199
Piri Paşa, 218–19, 337–8
Piri Reis, 156–7
Basra occupation and, 181–2
as geographer, 5, 424–5, 426–8, 504–5
illustrated manuscripts and, 491–2, 504–5
Mediterranean expansion and, 149–50
piracy and, 153, 156–7
Pir Sultan Abdal, 139–40
Pius II (Pope), 23–4, 84
Piyalet Paşa, 157
Mediterranean expansion and, 163–4, 165–6
military expertise of, 164–5
provincial governments and, 225–6
Selim II and, 39–40, 221–2
plague epidemics, population demographics and, 365–6
poetry
discourses on, 583–6
divan poetry, 3, 568
elite patronage of, 552–5
form and content in, 566–78, 567n60
histories of Rum poets and, 586–92
literary tools for, 578–86
manuals and commentaries on, 581–3
multilingualism in, 558n10, 559–60
parallel poetry anthologies, 580–1
prose vs., 365–6
Rum’s identification with, 548–51
See also specific poetic forms, e.g., gazel
politics
architecture influenced by, 459–74
capital formation and, 262–7
governance, administration and legal infrastructure and, 205–40
kaside (praise poetry) and, 570–2
longevity of Ottoman political economy and, 272–4
Ottoman sources on, 9–13, 433–8
overview from 1451 to 1603, 19–43
ulema involvement in, 337–8
population demographics
in Arab provinces, 379–82
cizye and avaz registers and, 363–5
data sources on, 360–3
food supplies and rural flight and, 382–7
ilness and death data and, 365–6
nomads and settled populations, 398–401
non-Muslim population data and, 369–75
scarcity of data on women and, 366–9
shifts in post-conquest European regions, 64–5
tahrir as sources for, 358–60
tax registers as source for, 375–9
transformation in Ottoman Empire of, 20, 356–7
urbanization and, 375–9
See also population demographics
Porte army
Ottoman expansion and, 50–1
sipahi rebellion in, 41
porti franchi trade ports, 261–2
portolan maps, 423–9
portrait medals, production of, 486–91
Portugal
chronology of Red Sea operations of, 175–85
dominance in Indian Ocean of, 243–4
impact of pepper and spice trade on, 199–201
Mamluk sultanate threatened by, 11, 29
naval incursions against, 304
Ottoman Red Sea expansion and, 173–201, 352–4
postal service (menzilhane), establishment of, 310
power
absolutist regimes, Ottoman expansion and, 248–52
cultural representations of, 528–43
rhetoric of Ottoman expansion and projection of, 69–70
Prester John, 176
Prevesa, battle of, 35–6
warships at, 306
price controls, private profit limitations and, 267–9
Prioli, Francesco di, 149
Priuli, Girolamo, 197
private profit, Ottoman limitations on, 267–9
prognostications, Ottoman interest in, 453–5
practical application of, 455–6
progressive conquest, Mehmed II’s policy of, 147
property rights
Ottoman capital formation and infringement of, 263
Ottoman law concerning, 234
prophetic chronology, Ottoman historiography and, 440–1
prophetic medicine, Ottoman practice of, 432
prose
form and content of, 576–8, 578n90
poetry vs., 565–6
structure of, 562–5
Protestants
Ottoman tolerance of, 249–50
population data in Ottoman Empire on, 370–2
See also Christianity
proto-pseudo-socialist political economy model
legacy of Ottoman economic policy and, 274–5
longevity of Ottoman political economy and, 272–4
Ottoman capital formation and, 262–7, 269–72
provisioning systems, in Ottoman military, 310–12
provisionism, in Ottoman economic policy, 258–62, 269–72, 274–5
Ptolemy, Almagest of, 415–16, 420–1, 422
public architecture, in Mehmed II’s reign, 462–6, 525, 527–8
public baths, architecture and design of, 463
public finance
European domestic borrowing system as, 252–3
Ottoman financial administration difficulties with, 254–6
Ottoman late adoption of domestic borrowing, 256–8, 270–1
Qansuh al-Ghawri, 30–2, 111–13
al-Qaramānī, 449–50
al-Qastallani, 432
Quaytbay, 89, 94–6
Mehmed II and, 26, 98
Quayer, Portuguese destruction of, 180
Qutbaddin al-Makki, 428–9
Radu Drakul, 22–3
Ramazanoğlu family, 473–4
Ramazanzade Mehmed Paşa, 449
Ramī (Persian poet), 581–3
rare book collections, of Ottoman elites, 476–80
Rares, Petru, 33–4
Rasid ibn Makamis, 119–21
reyā’u (non-askeri taxpayers)
Amasya treaty and, 127–8
Cüneyd supported by, 101
exclusion from public finance of, 262–7
land holdings of, 116
resistance to Ottomans from, 135, 138–9
Safavid alliances among, 98–9, 101–2
Red Sea
chronology of Ottoman operations in, 175–85
international trade and Ottoman expansion in, 195–201
Ottoman expansion in, 173–201
Ottoman naval presence in, 306
political, economic and military importance to Ottomans of, 185–6
Reformation, Islamization of Ottoman Europe and, 65–8
resūľküttab (chief clerk), 223–4
religion
architecture as reflection of, 462–6
astrology and, 416–17
astronomy and, 416
freedoms in post-conquest Constantinople, 322–5
heresy charges and repression of, 340–1
in illustrated manuscripts, 539–40
istimalet (accommodation) policy of Ottomans concerning, 249–50
Ottoman legal system and protection of, 232
Ottoman warfare and role of, 277–80
Red Sea expansion of Ottomans and impact on, 173
role in Ottoman expansion of, 65–8, 354–5
Selim-İsma’îl war and role of, 106–7
şeri’at and kanun principles and, 327
of sixteenth-century sultans, 347–8
Sunni ‘right belief’, heterodoxy and, 338–47
syncretism in ulema beliefs and practices, 320–1
ulema (scholar-officials) and, 320–32, 354
usury prohibitions and, 256–8
See also specific religions
Renaissance, Ottoman architecture and influence of, 465, 469
revenue producing units (mukataa), 186–90
revenues and expenditures
administrative shortcomings in management of, 252–3
Balkan expansion and, 248–52
impact of revenue system on naval development, 306–7
imperial budgets and, 246–8
timar system as revenue source, 288–96
See also specific taxes, e.g., timar and zeamet revenue system
rhetoric of expansion, Ottoman utilization of, 68–73
Rhodes
Mehmed II’s failed campaign in, 145
Ottoman attack on, 153–5
riba
Islamic definitions of, 256–8
See also interest rates; usury
Rudvan Paşa, 183–4, 193–5
‘right belief’ heterodoxy, sultans’ religious policies and, 338–47
Risala-i Kutbiya (Kutb al-Din Muhammad Yazdi), 544–6
river flotillas, in naval fighting forces, 308
Riyazi (poet and scholar), 585–6
Riyazı’-s-Şu’ara (Gardens of Poets), 585–6
Roman Empire
Ottoman architecture influenced by, 459–74
Ottoman identification with, 241–2
royal portrait albums, commissioning of, 535–6
Rum
architectural patronage in, 556–25
‘Baykara meclisi’ (literary gatherings) in, 555–22
decorative aesthetic in, 475–6, 484–5, 501–4
discourses on poetry in, 583–6
elite patronage of literature in, 552–3, 553n12
foreign influences on literature in, 555–6
gazel poetry identified with, 568–70
histories of poets of, 586–92
kaside poetry in, 571
literary tools for poetry in, 578–86
literature of, 548–92
manuals and commentaries on poetry in, 581–3
manuscript culture in, 551n8
mecevi poetry in, 568, 572–6
multilingualism in, 558n10, 558–60
new forms of literature in, 566–78
parallel poem composition in, 579–80
poetry identified with, 548–51
prose structure in literature of, 562–3
prose vs. poetry in, 565–6
provincial government in, 225–6
Turkish language and literature of, 551, 557n28
Rumeli
delis (army auxiliary forces) in, 296–7
European influences in, 46–9, 52
fortress garrisons in, 300
judiciary system in, 328–9
population estimates for, 375–9
post-conquest families’ influence in, 212–14
prophetic vision and conquest of, 69–70
provincial government in, 225–6
Safavid threat in, 105–6
timar system in, 286, 288–96
See also Balkans
Rumi identity, 174–5, 177–9
Rumiyya, 494
Rumlu Dev Ali, 105
Rumlu Hasan, 86, 108
Rum Mehmed Paşa, 30–2, 42–3, 82, 83–4, 212–13
Russia
expansion initiatives of, 53–4
Ottoman expansion and, 134–5, 352–4
as threat to Ottomans, 277
Rüstem Paşa, 36–8, 86, 125, 163, 210–11, 225–6
administrative legacy of, 239–40
architectural patronage of, 514–21
history by, 452
Rüstem Paşa, 248
rüsun (tax), 194–5
sacred history, Arabic and Turkish literature on, 440–1
Sadi, 560–2
### Index

Sadreddin-i Konevi, library of, 2–3

Safavids
- Bayezid II and, 29–30
- cultural influence on Ottoman art and architecture, 459, 469
- decline of, 41–2
- holy war ideology as justification for Ottoman warfare with, 277–80
- Iranian wars and, 132–9
- Islam and, 11
- Mamluks alliance with, 173–5
- military superiority of Ottomans over, 276–7
- Murad III and, 132–9
- Ottoman conflict with, 11, 19–20, 21, 44, 339–40
- religious ideology and Ottoman conflict with, 339–40
- rise of, 97–104
- Selim I’s campaign against, 10, 30–2
- Shi'i religious practices of, 106–7
- Süleyman and, 34–5, 113–25
- treaty of Amasya and, 126–32

Safiyе Sultan (mother of Mehmed III), 529, 571, 571n69

Şahbudak, 28–9, 87–8, 94

Şah Cihan, 97–8

Şahi Hatun (daughter of Selim I), 210–11

Şahi Hatun (daughter of Selim I), 210–11

Şahi Hatun (daughter of Selim I), 210–11

Şahi Hatun (daughter of Selim I), 210–11

Şahi Kalender, 340

Şahkulu, 488, 493, 494


Şahname-i Melik Ummi (chronicle), 487–8

Şahsultan, 525

Şah u Geda, 573–4

Şah Veli bin Celal, 115–17

Sai Celebi, 544–6

saints, legends of, Ottoman historiography and, 441–2

Şakaik al-Numaniyye, 544, 559–60

Salahuddin Yazici, 417

Saldanha, António de, 178

Şalih (Arabian prophet), 440

salt mines, 142n9, 142–3

saltpetre pits, Ottoman armaments technology and, 309–10

Saltukname, 552–5

Şamil-i Luğha, 560–2

Şamseddin III, 118–19

sancak (sub-province)
- duties of sancak governors, 226–32
- in Egypt, 186–90

in Ethiopian beylerbeylik, 193–5

geographic configurations and zones of operation, 57–9

judiciary as check on sancak governors, 232–3

post-conquest administration and, 63–4

in Yemen, 191–2

sanitary conditions for Ottoman military, 313–15

Sanudo, Marino, 102, 177–9, 195–6, 197

sappers (miners), in Ottoman army, 285–6

Sara Hatun (mother of Uzun Hasan), 83–4

Satırç Mehmed Paşa, 209–10

‘saz’ ornamental aesthetic, 495, 501–4

Scholarios, Georgios (Gennadios II), 322–5

Schweigger, Solomon, 106–7, 139–40

science in Ottoman Empire
- astronomy, 415–20
- cosmography, 412–15
- maritime geography, 423–9
- natural history, 429–30
- universal geography, 420–3

security concerns, migration patterns linked to, 393–5

Sefer Reis, 181–2

Sehi Bey, 445–6, 548, 584–5, 586–9, 590–1

Şehinşahname, 533, 537

şehname histories, 451–2, 533, 537

Şehname-i Selim Han, 533, 534, 544

Şehrengiz-i Edirne (Meshi), 574–6

şehrengiz poetry genre, 574–6

Şehsuvar, 88–9, 110, 111–13

Şehsuvaroğlu Ali, 30–2, 110, 112–13, 117

Selaniki, 41–2, 132–3, 157, 170–1

Selim (son of Bayezid II), 103–4

Selim I (1512–20)
- accession of, 10
- artistic images of, 491–2
- calligraphy and illuminated manuscripts in reign of, 490–1
- conquest of Syria and Egypt by, 276–7, 322, 325, 348–9, 552–5
- cultural influences in reign of, 475
- death in 1520 of, 154
- defeat of Isma’il by, 339–40
- deposition of Bayezid II by, 207–8
- Eastern expansion and consolidation under, 104–25
- as Hadımül-Haremcı-i Şerifcin (servitor of the two holy sanctuaries), 349–52

Hayreddin and, 12

historical narrative concerning reign of, 70–3

history of reign of, 30–2
illustrated history of, 504–5
janissaries under, 216–17
Kurdish tribes’ allegiance to, 214–15
leadership style of, 221–2
library of, 409
literary patronage in reign of, 552–5
Mamluks and, 173–5
Mediterranean expansion under, 153–4
as military commander, 218–19
periodization in regime of, 50–2
poetry in court of, 559–60, 587n113
provincial governments created by, 225–6
religious persecutions under, 346–7
standing army under, 282–4
state expansion under, 19–20
ṣirgīn recruitments by, 391
territorial expansion under, 276
trade interruptions of, 6–7
ulema structure under, 326–32, 337–8
war with Shah Isma’il and, 106–13
Selim II (1566–74)
art and architecture in reign of, 8–9, 521–2
artistic images of, 534–43
biography of, 444
dynastic disputes under, 207–8
European expansion under, 53–4
governing style of, 221
Iranian wars and, 132–9
janissaries under, 216–17
leadership style of, 219
North African campaigns of, 322
Ottoman expansion under, 50–2
pilgrimages to Islamic Holy Cities and, 352–4
protection of Muslim sanctuaries by, 350–1
reign of, 39–40
Russian threat to, 277
succession intrigues of, 38–9
ṣirgīn resettlements by, 391–2
treaty of Amasya and, 409–10
Selimnames (illustrated histories of Selim’s regime), 444–5, 504–5, 544
Seljuks, Babai revolt against, 321
Selman Reis, 174–5, 177–9
Şemâlnâme, 539
 Şemi’, 583
 Şemseddin Karabağ, 544
 Şemsi dervishes, 343
 Şensiye (Melhemè), 417
Serbia, Ottoman incursion into, 23–4
Şeref Han (IV), 118–19
Şerefname, 118–19
serfdom, Ottoman Empire as escape from, 250
Şer-güzeş-i Estri-i Malta, 571
şeri’at (shari’a), 323
Ottoman legal practices and, 325–6
Ottoman warfare and role of, 277–80
şerîflık, Ottoman influence over, 173
Şerîfs of Mecca, surrender to Selim I of, 348–9
Serjeant, R. B., 195–6
Setton, Kenneth, 162–3, 163n179
“seven modes” (haft asl) design vocabulary, 475–6
Seydî Ali Reis, 181–2, 421, 425, 426–7, 428
Şeyfi Çelebi, 101, 425–6
Şeyh Ahmed, 109–10
Şeyh Bali Efendi, 123–5
Şeyh Bedreddin, 321, 344, 345–6
Şeyh Cafer, 97–8
Şeyh Edebali, 321
Şeyh Hamdullah, 478–9
Şeyh Haydar, 98–9, 100–1, 103–4
şeyhî-i islâm
in Ottoman legal system, 234–5, 330
political inflightung and, 419
protocol concerning, 331–2
religious persecutions by, 345–6
Seyyid Ali Sultan, 434
Seyyid el-Şerif, 333–4
Seyyid Gazi, 473
Shafîs, 348–9
Shaḥnāma, 445, 448, 451–2, 488–90, 508–9
Al-Shaqa’iq al-nu-manîyya fi ‘ulumâ’ al-dawlat al’Uthmaniyya’ (Taşköprüzade), 445–6
Shaw, Stanford, 186–90
Shefer, Miri, 432–3
Shi’ism
Ottoman unease concerning, 277–80, 322
pilgrimages to Mecca and, 352–4
sacred history in, 440–1
Sunni clash with, 106–7
syncretism of ulema religious practices with, 320–1
shipbuilding
Ottoman Mediterranean expansion and importance of, 150
Ottoman naval forces development and, 305
Ottoman Red Sea expansion and importance of, 177
strategic importance of Suez shipyard and, 187
Venetian skills in, 157–8
Şiblizade Ahmed, 486–7
Silifke, Ottoman capture of, 144
silk trade
   Iran as source of, 6–7
textile production and, 481
silsilat al-mukarrabin wa manakib al-muttakin
   (Münniri Belgradî), 342–3
Silsîlenames (genealogies), 542–3
Sinan (architect), 511, 512, 513, 514, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 527, 530, 546, 547
Sinan Bey (painter), 486, 511–14, 521–5, 527, 530, 546, 547
Sinan Paşa (the author; d. 1485), writings by, 562–5
Sinan Paşa (grand vizier under Selim I), 30–2, 112
Sinan Paşa (grand vizier under Murad III), 40, 161–2, 184, 191
Sinan Paşa (admiral in 1551; brother of Rüstem Paşa), 226
sipâhis
   administrative reforms and, 100
   army structure and duties of, 286–96
   in Ottoman cavalry, 284–6
   Porte rebellion of, 41
   suspicion of new military technology among, 317–18
tax and population data on, 358–60
timar awarded to, 229–30, 247–8
Sitti Hatun, 87–8
Siyasatname, 434
Siyer-i Nebi, 539–40
Skanderbeg uprising, 9–10, 394–5
slavery
   forced migration due to, 387–90, 402–3
   Islamic conversion of slaves, 372–3
   Istanbul population growth due to, 377–9
   Mediterranean expansion and, 142n9
   narrative of, 571
   in naval fighting forces, 307–8
   of Ottoman subjects, 14–15, 390
   physiognomy and, 433
   in post-conquest European expansion, 64–5
   Tatar trafficking in, 399
   See also kul (sultan’s servitors)
Smith, Adam, 268–9
Soarez, Lopo, 175
social conditions and society
   evolution of Rum literature and, 352–5
Ottoman knowledge of, 433–8
socio-religious complexes, architectural design of, 462–6
Sokollu Mehmed Paşa
   administrative legacy of, 239–40
   architectural patronage of, 514–21, 525
   artistic images of, 534–43
   historiography projects of, 533
   marriage and family of, 210–11, 374
   Murad III and, 135
   murder of, 225
   Ottoman expansion and, 37–8, 165–6, 167–8
   pilgrimages to Islamic Holy Cities and, 352–4
   Selim II and, 39–40, 221
   Süleyman and, 36–7, 207–8
   as vezîr, 225
soothsaying, 454
Soranzo, Giacomo, 135, 138–9
Sorrento, Ottoman attack on, 163–4
South-east Asia, Ottoman alliances in, 12, 243–4
sovereign identity in Ottoman Empire,
   European identity and, 46–9
Spain
   African expansion of, 12, 35–6, 177–9
   European enemies of, 241
   migrations to Ottoman Empire from, 396
   Ottoman conflict with, 14–15, 159–64
   revenues and expenditures in, 247
   spheres of operation in Ottoman trading relations, 45
   rhetoric of Ottoman expansion and, 70–3
spice trade
   Ottoman Red Sea expansion and, 195–201
taxes on, 194–5
   spying in Ottoman military system, 312
   statecraft in Ottoman Empire
      bureaucracy and, 20
      Ottoman knowledge of, 433–8
      trade, military and political consolidation and, 45
Steensgaard, Niels, 199
Stefan III (ruler of Moldavia), 27–8
stereotypes in Ottoman historical research, 1
Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 196–7
Şüçâ (Şeyh), 342
Sudi (poet), 581–3
social conditions and society
   evolution of Rum literature and, 352–5
Suez, strategic importance to Ottomans of, 189–90, 352–4
Index

Sufism
  cosmography and, 414
dream analysis in, 453–4
hagiographies in, 443
permitted orders of, 341–3
Şükri-i Bidlisi, 448, 486–91, 544
Şükullah, 449
Sulaiman al-Mahri, 425, 426–7
Süleyman Bey (Dulgadiroğlu ruler), 87–8
Süleyman Çelebi (son of Bayezid I), 91
Süleyman I (1520–66)
  absolutist regime of, 248
  artistic images of, 491–528, 534–43
  Baghdad occupied by, 348–9, 352–4
  Baki’s elegy to, 218–19
  biography of, 444
  colleges founded by, 327–8
  dreams and prognostications of, 454–5
  dynastic disputes under, 207–8
  eastern Mediterranean expansion under, 154–5
  eastern expansion under, 113–25
  European expansion under, 67–8
  execution of son by, 209–11, 570–2
  foundation complex of, 8–9
  governing style of, 220, 221
  as Hadımü’l-Haremeyn-i Şerifeyn (servitor of the two holy sanctuaries), 352–4
  Halvetiye religious order and, 342
  Hayreddin and, 12
  heresy trials under, 340–1
  historical overview of, 32–40, 44
  illustrated history of, 505–7
  Irakeyn campaign, 339–40
  janissary corps under, 283–4
  judiciary system under, 330
  legal system under, 325–6
  literary patronage in reign of, 352–5
  as military commander, 218–19
  military successes and failures of, 20–1, 276–7
  naval forces under, 304
  North African campaigns of, 322
  nostalgia for reign of, 1, 238–9
  Ottoman historical sources on, 3, 4
  periodization in regime of, 50–2
  poetry by, 578–86, 587–8
  population growth under, 375–9
  provincial governments created by, 225–6
  religious institutions in reign of, 339–40, 345–7
  Spanish expansion in Africa and, 35–6
  state expansion under, 19–20
territorial expansion under, 276
  treaty of Amasya and, 126–32
  ulama structure under, 337–8
  western Mediterranean expansion and, 155–70
Süleymaniye complex
  architectural design of, 477–69, 511–13
  construction and organization of, 325, 327–8, 388, 393
  Süleymanname, 444–5, 488–90, 494, 508–9, 534
  ‘Süleyman’s offer’, Ottoman Hungarian expansion and, 279–80
sultans
  absolutist rule of, 248–52
  architecture as monuments to, 462–6
  astronomers hired by, 417–20
  governance processes and role of, 218–22
  histories of, 444, 445–9
  legal authority of, 207–18, 221, 437–8
  poetry by, 560n39
Sunni Islam
  architectural influence of, 466–70
  in Mamluk Empire, 10
  Ottoman expansion of, 11, 13–15
  Ottoman warfare as defense of, 277–80
  pilgrimages to Mecca and, 352–4
  ‘right belief’ in, 338–47
  Shii clash with, 106–7
  sultans as champions of, 322
  ulamas and syncretism with other beliefs and practices, 320–1
sürgün (deportation)
  migration patterns due to, 390–3, 401–2
  nomads in, 398–401
Surname-i Hümayun, 536, 538, 539, 540–2
sürr, 173–5
sürr-i hümâyûn (alms), 349–50
sürsat supply arrangement, 245–6
Süurü (translator and scholar), 413–15, 581–3
Su’udi, 539
  ‘sympathetic qualities’, Ottoman concept of, 430
Syria
  Jacobites and Nestorians in, 369–70
  Ottoman conquest of, 32, 173, 211–12, 276–7, 322, 348–9
  See also Aleppo
Szápolvay, John (János), 32–4, 122, 225–6, 278–9
Szápolvai, John Sigismund (János Zigmond), 33–4, 37–9
Szijetvár, conquest of, 53–4, 342
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tabakat biographical compilations</td>
<td>589–91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacizade Cafer Celebi</td>
<td>562–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacli Hanum</td>
<td>109–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacit’-Tevahir (Hoca Sadeddin)</td>
<td>448–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacizade Mehmed</td>
<td>546–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taşakkur and tad hakkur (contemplation and retelling)</td>
<td>412–13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahmasp (Safavid Shah) (1524–76)</td>
<td>34–5, 36–7, 38–9, 41–2, 117, 118–22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alkas Mirza’s revolt against</td>
<td>123–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleyman I’s defeat of</td>
<td>339–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treaty of Amasya and</td>
<td>126–32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tahrir (tapu tahrir) food supply estimates and</td>
<td>382–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limitations of data from</td>
<td>360–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population data from</td>
<td>358–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sheep registrations and</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urbanization and population growth in Arab provinces and</td>
<td>379–82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taht kadılıklar (judgeships of the throne)</td>
<td>328, 332–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takiyuddin</td>
<td>418–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talikizade</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>portrait of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Tanbih ’ala Galat al-Cahil wa’l-Nabih</td>
<td>560–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tansel, Selahattin</td>
<td>145–6, 152–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzimat reforms</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Târgovişte, battle of</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarifat (Persian poetic genre)</td>
<td>574–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarhi-i Ebu’l-Feth (Tursun Bey)</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarhi-i Hind-i Garbi</td>
<td>425–6, 427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tarırat (religious orders)</td>
<td>341–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarikh al-Shirî</td>
<td>177–9, 181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Tariqa al-Muhammadiya (Birgivi Mehmed)</td>
<td>422–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartaglia, Nicolò Fontana</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarşöprüzade, 320–1, 333–4, 409–11, 544</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on astronomy and astrology</td>
<td>416–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autobiographical prose of</td>
<td>576–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on cosmography</td>
<td>412–13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dynamic history by</td>
<td>445–6, 455–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language competency of</td>
<td>559–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taşcalı Yahya</td>
<td>570–2, 573–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars, nomadic migrations by</td>
<td>399–400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taxes and taxation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative difficulties in costs and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collection of, 254–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab provinces population data and</td>
<td>379–82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comparative analysis of, 247–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>costs of war and conquest and</td>
<td>13–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Ethiopian beylerbeylik, 193–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>food supply estimates and,</td>
<td>382–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governing structure for collection of, 230–1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as historical source, 2–3, 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judicial corruption concerning, 335–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maritime trading and, 142–3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for naval redevelopment, 306–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman law concerning, 235–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Red Sea operations and, 182–3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peasants and nomads as taxpayers, 5–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population estimates based on, 375–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private profit limits and, 268–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>progressive conquest and use of, 147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tahrir registers and, 358–60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Yemen beylerbeylik, 191–3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen occupation by Ottomans and, 183–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tax farming (iltizam)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative difficulties in costs and collection of, 254–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capital formation and, 266, 269–72, 275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judicial corruption concerning, 336</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>life-time tax-farm (malikâne), 255</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman elites’ dislike of, 256–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Ottoman Empire, 185–6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman revenues and expenditures and,</td>
<td>247–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sale of shares in (esham), 235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tazarrurname</td>
<td>562–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tekel tribe</td>
<td>118–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>telhis (summaries, reports)</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tercüme-i Miftah-i Cifrî ‘l-Cami, 454–5, 539–42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tevarih-i Al-i Osman narratives, 446–7, 448–9, 451, 562–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>textiles, decorative aesthetic of, 481, 494–5, 501</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tezkire (Dawlat-Shah), 586–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tezkiretî’l-Bûnyun, 546–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tezkiretî’l-Ebniye, 546–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tezkiretî’y-Şu’ara (Reminiscences of Poets), 586–92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tezkiretî’y-Şu’ara ve Tabrusatü’-Nuzama (Reminiscences of Poets and Demonstrations of Versifiers), 588–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 423–9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thessaloniki</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Palaiologos, 22–3, 24, 212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomaz, Luis Felipe, 199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tietze, Andreas, 563n48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tiles. See ceramics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index

timar revenue system, 55, 99–100, 116, 185–90
absence of treasury data on, 247–8
administrative reforms and, 100
Balkan Christian nobility and, 251
Christian participation in, 286
food shortage data and, 383–4
governing structures for, 226–32
population data from, 358–60
sipahis as part of, 286–96

time and timekeeping
dynastic history and, 445–9
importance of, 416
Ottoman concept of history and, 439–45
Ottoman geographic system and, 420–1
prognostications and end of time and, 453–5
Timur, 395, 415–16
attacks in Anatolia by, 365–6
Timurid culture
decorative aesthetic and, 474–86
historical narratives in, 448
influence on art and architecture of, 458–9, 470, 473–4
omen books and, 454–5
ornament aesthetic and, 493–504
Ottoman poetry and, 3
pictorial representation in, 486–91
rare book collections and, 476–80
Tokmak Han, 132–3
Tomašević, Stefan, 22–4
Topçular Katibi, 315
topçus in Ottoman army, 285–6
Topkapı Palace
design and construction of, 450–60
renovation and rebuilding in, 532
Süleyman’s changes to, 510–28
Trabzon
Mehmed II’s siege of, 7535, 75–7
timar revenue system in, 286
trading relationships
artisan production and, 6–7
between Mamluks and Ottomans, 174–5
European expansion and, 55–7
Mediterranean expansion and, 141–8
Ottoman economic policy and, 258–62, 275
Ottoman Mediterranean expansion and, 141–8
Red Sea expansion and, 175–85, 195–201
spheres of dominance in, 45
traditionalism, in Ottoman economic policy, 258–62, 269–72, 274–5
Tragurio, Georgio de, 146–7
trans-imperial zone
intermediaries in, 61–2
Ottoman frontiers and, 59–60
post-conquest Ottoman administration in, 63–4
role of fortresses in, 60–1
Transylvania
Counterreformation effort in, 249–50
Ottoman expansion into, 53–4
Trapezuntios, Georgios, 241–2
Triplex Confinium (Triple Border) region, 59–60
Tripoli, Ottoman attack on, 161–2
Tahfe-i Şahidi, 560–2
Tumanbay, 30–2, 112–13
Turahan, 22–3
Turahanoğlu family, 212–14, 226–32
Turcomans
Beyazid II’s conflicts with, 28–9
decorative aesthetic of, 474–86
Mehmed II and, 82, 89
migrations by, 122
ornament aesthetic and, 493–504
Ottoman Red Sea expansion and, 174–5
pictorial representation in culture of, 486–91
religious beliefs of, 106–7
revolts in Anatolia by, 29–30, 34, 99–100, 116
Selim I and, 109–10
Shah Isma’il and, 98–9, 100–1, 109–10
in Syria, 92–3
Uzun Hasan and, 78, 115–17
Turgud Reis, 157, 161, 164n92, 164–5
Turkish language
ascendancy in Rum of, 552–5, 556–8, 557n28, 559–60
creation of, 20–1
discourses on poetry in, 583–6
histories of poets of, 586–9
learning tools for, 560–2
manuals and commentaries on poetry in, 581–3
in Ottoman historical sources, 4
parallel poetry in, 580n96, 580–1
prose in, 562–5
Rum literature and, 551
Türki-i Basit (Turkish poems) and, 569n66
Tursun Bey, 91
chronicles of, 81, 444–5, 448, 452
on Mehmed II, 145, 451–2
on Ottoman architecture, 465–6
Index

Tursun Bey (cont.) on sultanate leadership and authority, 219–20, 221, 437–8

Tuscany
  domestic borrowing system in, 252–3
  Ottoman trade relations with, 261–2

Üç Şerefeli Cami mosque, 465–6
Uğurlu Mehmed, 85–6
Ulama Han, 118–19
ulema (scholar-officials), 248
career path for, 332–4
fiscal inefficiencies in policies of, 256–8
in imperial capital, 322–5
importation from outside the Empire, 320–1
literary patronage by, 552–5
Ottoman capital formation and, 263
Ottoman legal system and, 348–9
political involvement of, 337–8, 354
religious institutions and, 320–38
şeri‘at and kanun principles and, 327
venality and unemployment issues for, 334–7
See also elites

Ulloa, Alfonso, 67–8
Ulūğ Bey, 415–16
Umur Paşa, 434
unemployment
  migrations due to, 393–5
  in Ottoman judiciary, 334–7
universalist iconography, imperial artistic images and, 491–528
urban ateliers, 474–86, 493–504
urbanization
  in Arab provinces, 379–82
  architectural projects and, 525
decorative aesthetic and expansion of, 474–86
population demographics and, 375–9
Uruç (brother of Hayreddin), 155–6
Uşak, carpet production in, 484–5
Uşkoks, 14–15, 57–9, 166–70, 171–2, 397–8
Üsküdar, growth and development of, 8–9
Ustajalu Muhammad Han, 108
usury
  domestic borrowing as alternative to, 252–3
  Islamic prohibition against, 256–8
Uzun Hasan, 26, 34
Cüneyd and, 97–8
marriage to Katherine (Despina Hatun), 76
Mehmed II’s expansion in Anatolia and, 75–6, 78–86
rebellion in Karaman and, 212–14

vâkıf (pious foundation)
  absence of treasury data on, 247
  capital accumulation and, 265–6
data on women connected with, 366–9
  libraries of, 409
  revenues from, 187–8, 205, 246–7
tax and population data and, 358–60, 366–9
Varka and Gûlâşh, 572–6
Vasco da Gama, 196
Vatin, Nicolas, 149–50
Veinstein, Gilles, 20
Veledi dervishes, 343
venality in Ottoman judiciary, 334–7

Venice
  Albanian migration to, 395
  Bayezid II’s war with, 149–53
  Cyprus as possession of, 166–70, 330–1
  Mehmed II’s war with, 143–5
  Ottoman Red Sea expansion and, 177–9, 196
  Ottoman threat to, 9, 12–13, 25, 29–30, 39–40, 49–50
  public debt in, 252–3
  revenues and expenditures in, 247
  trade with Ottoman merchants in, 261–2
  Uzun Hasan’s relations with, 84
vezirs (ministers)
adминистратив reforms and, 100
individuals from conquered elites appointed as, 212–13, 215
constraints on sultans’ appointment of, 211–12
executions of, 209–10
governing activities of, 221–2, 239–40
Imperial Council and, 222–32
marriages to sultans’ daughters of, 210–11
military advice from, 153–5, 164–5, 167, 219–20
sultans’ relations with, 221
Vikayet-i-Rivaye fi Mesâlî-i-Hidaye, 558–9
Vilayetname, 441–2, 443
visual arts, 457–60
calligraphy and book arts, 476–80
decorative aesthetic in, 474–86
imperial image articulated in, 491–528
literary discourse on, 544–7
multicultural influences on, 458–9
pictorial representation in, 486–91

696
Index

Timurid-Turcoman decorative aesthetic, 474–86
Vlad III Drakul, 22–3
Vladislas II (King of Bohemia and Hungary), 29–30
volleys, firing of, military development of, 284
Wake, C. H., 196–7
Wallachia, Ottoman expansion into, 22–3, 52, 53–4
warfare, Ottoman military structure from 1453 to 1603 and, 276–319
warrior-sultan, Ottoman concept of, 218–22
wealth accumulation data on women and, 366–9
Ottoman capital formation patterns and, 262–7
weapons technology, Ottoman military structure and, 309–10
Wild, Hans, 372, 387
Winter, Michael, 186–90
women architectural patronage of, 516–19, 525, 529
data from vakıf (pious foundations) on, 366–9
in military garrisons, 313–15
in Ottoman dynasties, authority of sultans and ineligibility of, 207–18
as palace slaves and concubines, 388–9
as patrons of illuminated manuscripts, 539
religious and charitable efforts of dynastic women, 8–9
scarcity of population data on, 366–9
world histories, Ottoman production of, 449–53, 533–4
Yakub (son of Uzun Hasan), 86, 98
Yakub Şah bin Sultan Şah, 466
Yani (shipbuilder), 150
Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bican, 432–3, 454
Yemen beylerbeyilik established in, 179–80, 181, 183–4, 191–3
fortress garrisons in, 301–2
Ottoman presence in, 173
Ottoman Red Sea operations and, 173–85
Selim II and, 39–40
Yunus (commander under Mehmed II), 142–3
yürük (nomads), 398–401
Yusuf and Züleyha stories, 572n73, 572–6
Yusuf b. Abi Bakr al-Sakkâki, 327
Zabid, 179–80
Ottoman control of, 177–9
Zafıname, 533
Zaganos Paşa, 22–4
Zakariyâ al-Qazwini, 412–15, 427, 540–2
zarar-ı kassabiye (tax), 264–5
Zaydis (Yemen), revolt by, 39–40, 183–4, 352–4
Zayla, Portuguese protection of, 177–9
zeamets (land held in return for military service), 230
gedikli zeamets, 292
tax and population data on, 358–60
timariot compared with, 291–2
Zen, Pietro, 166–7
Zenbilli Ali, 221–2
Zeynel Mirza, 474
Zeynîyye order, 342
Zeyrek Ağâ, 538
zones of operation, Ottoman expansion and, 57–9
Zrînyi, Miklós, romanticized image of, 1
Zsitvatorok, treaty of, 21, 42–3, 53–4
Zâhidet-i-Tevârîh, 449–50, 533–4, 536, 538, 539, 542–3
Zülfî kar, 118