THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

by

ŚRĪ SUREŚVĀRA

Translated by

A. J. ALSTON
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

THE "NAIŠKARYA SIDDHI" OF ŚRI SUREŚVARA

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$73 \times 616$
Most reverently
dedicated to my Teacher
Hari Prasad Shastri.
INTRODUCTION

The Realization of the Absolute (Naiṣkarmya Siddhi) is a work of Sureśvara Ācārya, a direct pupil of Śaṃkara Ācārya, the founder of the Advaita Vedānta tradition in the form we know it today. By “naiṣkarmya”, literally “actionlessness”, Sureśvara means the Self in its pure nature, “void of the world-process consisting in the whole system of acts, their component factors and results” (II.108, prose). And by “siddhi” he means the practical realization of one’s identity with this metaphysical principle. The work, which must be presumed to have been written in or about the first half of the eighth century A.D., deals with the method of Advaitic Self-realization. Of its four books, the first refutes the views of those who maintain that Self-realization or release is to be obtained by works alone or by works combined with knowledge; the second illustrates the mode of reflecting on the implications of experience which takes the aspirant to a theoretical understanding of the inner meaning of the mystic texts of Upanishadic revelation; the third explains the meaning of the cardinal text “that thou art”; and the fourth recapitulates and shows by means of quotations that the doctrines now being taught agree with those of earlier Ācāryas such as Gauḍapāda and Śaṃkara. Each of the books consists of about one hundred stanzas interconnected by a prose commentary, which latter looks not backward to the verse just over but forward to the verse to come.
Broadly speaking, the doctrine of *Realization of the Absolute* follows that of the *Thousand Teachings* of Śaṅkara fairly closely, while expressing some of it in simpler terms. First the aspirant must perform rituals and unselfish actions as an offering to God for the purification of his mind. Then he must reflect on the instability of every element in experience except the witnessing-consciousness which views all else as object. Having thus distinguished between the ultimate principle of consciousness and the triad of knower, knowledge and known which it illumines, that is to say, between the Self and the not-self, he must next see that the Self alone is real and eternal and that all else is different from it and is inert, transient and unreal. In the light of this conviction obtained from reasoning and experience, he must analyse the grammatical and logical structure of the texts "I am Brahman" and "that thou art". When he has performed this discipline and has observed the rules of purity laid down by Patañjali in addition, he is ready to receive the ultimate experience of reality as the compassionate gift of his Teacher. The final experience arises, and can only arise, as a result of hearing the texts from the lips of a Teacher when the preparatory discipline has been previously performed.

The present translation represents a thorough revision of an earlier version that appeared in typescript form in 1959. For convenience of reference the text has now been added in romanized form, following Hiriyanna’s edition with occasional deviations recorded in footnotes. Extracts and observations from Jñānottama’s excellent Sanskrit commentary (of uncertain date) have been included in the notes and marked ‘J’. Page references to Professor P. Hacker’s *Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaita Vāda*, I, (Wiesbaden, 1951),
which contains an extremely useful analysis of the doctrines and terminology of the *Realization of the Absolute*, have been given under the abbreviation “Texte”. Some help has been taken in places from S. S. Raghavachar’s rather heavy English translation of the work (University of Mysore, 1965), which includes notes and Devanagari text. A general account of Sureśvara’s doctrines is found in Dr. Viramaṇi Upādhy- aya’s *Lights on the Vedānta* (Banaras, 1959), but a more profound and critical treatment has appeared in a recent Sanskrit work, Saccidānandendra Svāmin’s *Vedānta Prakriyā Pratyabhijñā* (Holenarsipur, 1964), pp. 210–276.

A number of friends and colleagues have been good enough to help me in various ways at different stages of the production of the present work, and to all of them my thanks are due.
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NAIŚKARMA-YA-SIDDHIH

prathamo 'dhyāyah

Because all living beings from the Creator (Brahmā) to a clump of grass naturally desire to avoid every kind of pain, it is equally natural and inevitable that they should take active steps to suppress it. Now, the sole cause of pain is the association with the body; and the body cannot be done away with, since it is rooted in previously amassed good and evil karma¹; and the latter cannot be averted either, since it arises inevitably from prescribed and prohibited deeds previously performed. Now action, in its turn, rests on desire (rāga) and aversion (dveṣa): and rāga and dveṣa are caused by a false superimposition of the notions of good and bad; and false superimposition is caused by our uncritical acceptance of duality as it is presented to our view. And the whole uncritically accepted world of duality is per se endless in that it rests on bare ignorance of the self-established non-dual Self, as the fancied silver rests on ignorance of the mother of pearl. Hence it is ignorance of the Self which is ultimately the cause of every evil, and which also, on the negative side, denies us that waveless and unconditional bliss which is the very nature of the Self. Total eradication of ignorance of the Self amounts, therefore, to the achievement of every good available to man.

Now as eradication of ignorance can only be achieved through spiritual knowledge, the latter is its essential condition; and spiritual knowledge arises only from the scriptures of Vedānta, since the Self of man, being

¹ According to the Mimāmsakas, every act generates an unseen force (apūrva) which inevitably produces “fruit” in the form of some bodily experience or other in future time.
obscured by that ignorance which we have seen to be the cause of all evil, cannot be known through perception and the other secular means of knowledge. Hence the present treatise is being written to stand as a compendium containing the essence of the entire Upanishadic teaching. And now follows the first verse, which has been composed as a benedictory stanza to secure the fructification of the work through transmission from teacher to pupil in the traditional way, and also as an epitome of the teaching of the treatise as a whole.

\[
\text{khānīlāgny-ab-dharitry-antām srak-phanīvodgataṃ yataḥ}
\]

\[
dhvānta-cchide namas tasmai haraye buddhisākṣīne
\]

[1] Reverence to that Hari, the destroyer of darkness and witness of the intellect, from whom the world consisting of ether, air, fire, water and earth has come forth in mere appearance—like the snake which appears to exist in a garland.

\[
\text{sva-sampradāyasya codita-pramāṇa-pūrvakatva-
jñāpanāya viśiṣṭa-guṇa-saṃbandha-saṃkīrtana-
pūrvikā guror namaskāra-kriyā}
\]

Next, in order to show that his tradition has the requisite authority, the author offers reverence to his guru,¹ mentioning also his rare qualities.

¹ "A teacher (who has realized the Self) is himself the authority." J

\[
alabhvātiśayāṃ yasmād vyāvṛttās tamab-ādayah 
gariyase namas tasmā avidyā-granthi-bhedine
\]
Reverence to that supreme guru who cut the knot of ignorance, in describing whom all superlatives fall short.

\[ \text{namaskāra-nimitta-svāsayaṇīśkaraṇārthaḥ} \]

Now he explains his purpose (in writing the book), doing so in such a way as to include a (further) obeisance (to his guru).

\[ \text{vedāntodara-saṃgūḍhaṃ saṃsārotsāri vastu-gam} \]
\[ jñānam vṛkṣtam apy anyair vakṣye gurv-anuśikṣayā \]

It is in obedience to the command of my guru that I expound the secret doctrine hidden in the heart of the Upanishads which ends transmigration and takes one to reality. I am aware it has also been explained by others.

\[ \text{kim viṣayāṃ prakaraṇam iti cet tad-upanyāsah} \]

Next, in case anyone should wonder “What is the subject-matter of the treatise?”, he states it.

\[ \text{yat-siddhāv idamaḥ siddhir yad-asiddhau na kimcana} \]
\[ \text{pratyag-dharmaika-niṣṭhasya yāthātmyam vakṣyate} \]
\[ \text{spṛṣṭam} \]

Here is a clear statement of the true nature of the inner reality whose sole function is to exist as the witness and support of all. The existence and manifestation of all this world depends on its existence. If it did not exist, nothing would.
vivakṣita-prakaraṇārtha-prarocanāyānukta-
duruktāprāmāṇya-kāraṇa-śaṅkā-vyudāsena sva-guroḥ
prāmāṇyopavarṇanam

In order to promote interest in the matters treated of
in the present work he affirms the authority of his guru.
It is not because anything essential was left unsaid or
was badly said by the guru that the present work has
come into existence.

gurūkto veda-rāddhāntas tatra no vaṃcy asaktitaḥ
sahasra-kirāṇa-vyāpte khadyotah kim prakāśayet

[5] The authoritative exposition of the wisdom of the
Veda has already been made by my guru. Indeed, weak
creature that I am, I have nothing to add. Can a fire-fly
illumine the sky when it is already filled with the rays of
the all-glorious sun?

guruṇaiva vedārthasya parisamāpitavāt prakaraṇoktau
khyāty-ādy aprāmāṇya-kāraṇāsāṅketai cet tad
vyudāsārtham āha

Next he rebuts the suspicion that if the entire meaning
of the Veda has already been brought out by the guru¹
the present work should be disregarded, since its author
can only be out for personal fame or the like.

¹ "In the Upadeśa Sāhasrī and other independent treatises." J
The Upadeśa Sāhasrī is probably the only independent treatise (i.e. as
opposed to the commentaries) of Śaṅkara whose authenticity is alto-
gether secure today. J must have lived after the middle of the tenth
century, but his testimony to a plurality of independent treatises is
interesting.

na khyāti-lābha-pūjārtham grantho ’smābhir udīryate
sva-bodha-pariśuddhy-arthaṁ brahma-vin-nikaśāśmasu
[6] This book is written neither to gain fame, nor wealth, nor deferential treatment, but in order to test (the metal of) my own knowledge at the touch-stone of the God-realized sages.  

1 If he remained silent, the sages would be unable to test and therefore unable to correct his knowledge. J

anarthāna-rtha-hetu-puruṣārtha-tadd-hetu-
prakaraṇārtha-samgraha-ñāpanāyopanyāsaḥ

Next he shows further that the essential subject-matter of the treatise is the nature of what is harmful to man and its cause, and the nature of man's highest good and its cause.

aikātmyāpratipattir yā svātmānubhava-samśrayā
sā 'vidyā samśṛter bijam tan-nāśo muktir ātmanaḥ

[7] Failure to realize that one's own Self (ātman) is the sole reality is called nescience (avidyā). Its locus1 is the Self as immediate experience (anubhava). It is the seed (bija) of transmigration (saṃsāra).2 Its destruction constitutes the liberation of the soul.

1 The locus (saṃsraya for āśraya) of nescience is the consciousness which is aware of nescience. The object (viṣaya) of nescience is that which it conceals. For Śureśvara, both the locus and the object of nescience are the pure Self. Cp. III.1 (prose) below.

For Śureśvara, nescience proper is the initial “failure to apprehend the Self”. Positive false cognitions are its effects, as also are the world of duality (II.44, 46, 112, 114), its component factors (II.51, 99), the ego which experiences the world (II.116, III.77) and his empirical knowledge (I.38, II.98, 106). The influence of the doctrine of the non-difference of the effect from its material cause is evident in places where Śureśvara speaks of nescience as constituting the essence (svarūpa, svabhāva) of one of its effects (III.1, prose: III.29). See Texte, pp. 61–66.

2 Cp. IV.16 and 77 below.
puruṣārtha-hetor avāśiṣṭatvāt tad-abhivyāhāraḥ

Since (of the four elements of the subject-matter mentioned in the prose introduction to verse 7 above) the cause of man's highest good has been left out, he states it now.

vedāvasāna-vākyottha-samyag-jñānāsūsūkṣanīh
dandahity ātmano moham na karmāpratikūlataḥ

[8] The fire of right knowledge arising from the great sentences of the Upanishads burns up utterly the delusion (moha) of the soul. But ritualistic action does not destroy ignorance, since the two are not incompatibly opposed.

pratijñātārtha-saṃśuddhy-artham pūrva-pakṣoktiḥ.
tatra jñānam abhyupagamyā tāvad upanyāsāḥ

With a view to develop his doctrine, thus briefly stated, (that liberation arises only from knowledge attained through the Upanishadic texts) he states (the rival ritualistic argument as) a prima facie view (pūrva pakṣa). He begins with that form of the ritualist's doctrine which admits (the possibility of) Self-knowledge (but denies that it is any part of the direct means to liberation).\(^1\)

\(^1\) The reference is to the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila’s doctrine of liberation as expounded in the Śloka Vārttika, especially the Sambandhākāśa Parihāra Section, verses 103–110. Kumārila there (verse 103) concedes that knowledge of the Self is enjoined in the Upanishads (“the Self is to be seen”, Brhad. Upan. II.iv.5, IV.v.6), but maintains (very implausibly) that the injunction is to do with rituals and not with liberation. Only if a man knows that his self (ātman), conceived by the Mīmāṃsakas as a separate individual soul, is distinct from the body and immortal will he engage in ritualistic action for the sake of results which will only occur after death. His commentator Pārthasārathi
Miśra, however, credits him at verse 108 with the view that knowledge is a remote auxiliary helping towards liberation, just as action is regarded as a remote auxiliary to liberation by the Advaitin (I.45–52 below). "When a man knows that the soul (ātman) is distinct from the body, all-pervasive, not subject to death and free from pain, he loses attachment for the uses of the body", and from then on avoids any actions which will create conditions for rebirth and resorts to various ritualistic expedients for exhausting the effects of his past actions as quickly as possible. But it is the practice of these abstentions and these expedients, and not knowledge in any form, that actually brings about liberation.

The Advaitin holds that because liberation must be eternal it can only occur through knowledge, viz. the once-and-for-all cancellation of an illusion. If it were produced through any action it would inevitably be transient. But Kumārila's school hold that it can be achieved through action and yet be eternal because its nature is essentially negative. It consists in achieving the "non-existence" of embodied experience and hence the "non-existence" of pain, and not, as the Advaitins hold, in realization of positive Existence-Knowledge-Bliss. It is because it is a mere "non-existence" that it can be produced and yet eternal. Whatever is produced positively is transient. But the "non-existence" of a pot, resulting from its destruction at a single blow with a stick, lasts for ever. It is not that the soul is destroyed in liberation as conceived by the Mīmāṃsakas. What is destroyed is the soul's embodied experience. A succinct statement and refutation of this doctrine is found in Śaṅkara's Taittirīya Bāṣya I, 1, Eng. tr. Gambhirānanda, Eight Upanishads, Vol. I, p. 232 ff.

mukteḥ kriyābhīḥ siddhatvāj jñānam tatra karoti kim
kathāṃ cec chṛṇu tat sarvaṃ prāṇidhāya mano yathā

[9] (Mīmāṃsaka of the school of Kumārila): "Since liberation arises through ritualistic action (alone), what is the use of knowledge? If you want to know how (liberation comes about), compose your mind and listen.¹

¹ According to the Mīmāṃsakas, rituals are of three kinds—daily, occasional and self-interested. Self-interested rituals carry a specific "fruit" in the form of some future embodied experience. This "fruit" is stated in the Veda in conjunction with the statement of the ritual, and it is for the sake of it that the ritual is performed. The daily and occasional rituals, on the other hand, do not carry any specific fruit and their performance does not bring on any new embodied experiences. According to Kumārila and his school, they destroy the demerit contracted by previous sins. According to Prabhākara and his school, they have no effects, and are performed merely to avoid the sin of omitting deeds that have been enjoined in the Veda as obligatory. The typical daily
(nitya) obligatory ritual is the Agnihotra. Professor Renou, L’Inde Classique, Tome I, Para 713, describes it as follows: “The Agnihotra, the ‘offering in the fire’, is the simplest of the solemn rituals and in a sense the most important: it is the sacrifice that every Brahmin or Vaiśya head of a family should offer morning and evening his whole life. It takes place just before or after sunrise and at the time of the appearance of the first star. It is an offering to Agni consisting of milk, sometimes accompanied by vegetable substances. The hearths are cleaned and kindled, and then a cow is brought in which must be milked by an ‘Aryan’. The bowl in which the milk has been poured is warmed, several small ladlefuls are transferred to a large ladle and from this to the fire in two separate libations. Finally the sacrificer boils the remainder of the milk and offers libations of water to various divinities”. Obligatory rituals that do not have to be performed every day but only on special occasions are called “occasional” (naimittika). See Kṛṣṇa Yajvan, Mimāṃsā Paribhāṣā, Eng. tr. Swami Mādhavananda, p. 43f.

\[ \text{akurvataḥ kriyāḥ kāmyā niśiddhās tyajatas tathā} \\
\text{nitya-naimittikāṁ karma vidhivac cañutiṣṭhataḥ} \]

(10) “Liberation comes to him who avoids self-interested rituals and gives up forbidden acts entirely, and who performs the daily and occasional prescribed rituals according to rule.

\[ \text{kim ato bhavati} \]

What results from this?

\[ \text{kāmya-karma-phalam tasmād devādimaṁ na dhaukate} \\
\text{niśiddhasya nirastatvān nārakīṁ nāity adho-janim} \]

[11] “In this way he avoids the fruit of self-interested rituals, such as the acquisition of the status of a god etc., and at the same time, through renouncing forbidden acts, avoids lower births in hell.
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dehārambhakayoś ca dharmādharmayor jñāninā saha karminiḥ samānau codya-parihārau

And in regard to the merit and demerit (arising from actions in previous lives) that cause the present embodiment (i.e. the prārabdha karma), the advocates of rituals (Mīmāṃsakas) raise the same objection and give the same answer as the advocates of (liberation through) knowledge.

vartamānam idam yābhyaṁ śarirāṁ sukha-duḥkha-dam
ārabdhāṁ punya-pāpābhyaṁ bhogād eva tayoḥ kṣayaḥ

[12] “The stock of merit and demerit by which the present body with its appointed store of pleasure and pain has been set in motion (i.e. the prārabdha karma of the present body) can be exhausted only through experience.

kāmya-pratīṣiddha-karma-phalatvāt saṁsārasya tan-nirāsenaiväśeśānarthā-nirāsasya siddhatvāt kim nityānuṣṭhāneti cet, tan na. tad-akaranād apy anartha-prasakteḥ

(In the next verse the ritualist argues as follows): If anyone says that since transmigration is the result of self-interested rituals and forbidden deeds all evil can be uprooted merely by avoiding them, and that the performance of the prescribed daily rituals is therefore useless, he is wrong. For evil arises even from the very neglect of them.
nityānuṣṭhānataś cainām pratyavāyo na saṃśprṣet
anādṛtyātma-vijñānam atah karmāṇi saṃśrayet

[13] “And because he performs the daily prescribed rituals he is not visited with the impediments that assail those who neglect them. Let a man therefore place trust in ritualistic action and pay no attention to Self-knowledge at all.”

abyupetyaivam ucyate na tu yathāvasthitātma-
vastu-viṣayām jñānam asti. tat-pratipādaka-
pramāṇābhāvāt

The above has been said on the supposition (of Kumārila that such a thing as Self-knowledge exists); but (Prabhākara and his followers hold that) no adequate knowledge of the Self exists, since there is no valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) to establish it.

yāvantyaś ceha vidyante śrutayas smṛtibhis saha
vidadhaty urya-yatnena karmāto bhūri-sādhanam

[14] (Mīmāṁsaka of the school of Prabhākara): “All the Vedic (śruti) and traditional (smṛti) texts that exist enjoin action with all the emphasis at their command. Action is therefore the great means to release.

syāt pramāṇāsambhavo bhavad-aparādhād iti cet, tan
na. yataḥ

Next the opponent denies that the failure to discover any valid means of knowledge authorizing the possibility of Self-knowledge might be due to any error of his own.
yatnato viṣamāṇo ’pi vidhiṁ jñānasya na kvacit
śrutaṁ smṛtau vā paśyāmi viśvāso nānyato ’sti naḥ

[15] “Though I have looked carefully, I can find no injunction to know anywhere, either in the Veda or in the traditional texts. We have no faith in any other sources but these two.¹

¹ Hiriyanna notes that this restriction of the Mīmāṃsakas’ faith to the Vedic or traditional texts applies only to matters relating to existence after this life. In empirical matters, the Mīmāṃsaka recognizes other authoritative sources of knowledge, such as perception and inference, etc.

syāt pravṛttir antareṇāpi vidhiṁ loka-vad iti cet, tan
na. yataḥ

“Nor will it avail for you (the Advaitin) to say that though there may be no injunction to know in the traditional sources, yet there exists a natural inclination (towards Self-knowledge which prompts people to engage in the pursuit of it even without any Vedic injunction, just as men are naturally prompted to eat). For:

antareṇa vidhiṁ mohād yah kuryāt sāṃparāyikam
na tat syād upakārāya bhasmanīva hutaṁ haviḥ

[16] “If someone through sheer stupidity engages in some pursuit not enjoined by the Veda but designed to bring about results in the after-life, it is as useless as if he were to pour oblations into extinct ashes instead of into a fire.¹

¹ On the illustration, cp. Chāndogya Upan. V.xxiv.1.
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

abhuyapagata-prāmāṇya-vedārtha-vij-jaiminy-
anuśāsanāca

"Moreover, our doctrine derives from Jaimini, a Vedic scholar of accepted authority.

"āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyaṃ" ito 'nyathā
iti sātopam āhoccair veda-vij jaiminīḥ svayam

[17] "The authority on Vedic matters, Jaimini himself, says with very great emphasis ‘since the ultimate pur-
port of the Veda is to enjoin actions, the passages not enjoining actions are (in themselves) purportless’.1

1 Mīmāṃsaka Śūtra I.ii.1. Jaimini’s statement was interpreted by the
followers of Prabhākara to mean that all statements of fact in the Veda
must be taken as subordinate elements in some injunction. On this view
there is no inherent certainty that statements of fact found in the Veda
are true: they may well be, and often are, fanciful statements inserted
to encourage the hearer to perform a particular rite. It might have been
better for the Mīmāṃsaka if he had not dragged Jaimini into the
argument. See e.g. verses I.92 ff. below.

mantra-varṇāca

"And it derives also from a Vedic verse.

"kurvann evēha karmāṇi jījīviṣec chataṃ samāḥ"
iti mantra 'pi niṣṭēṣam karmāṇy āyur avāṣ似的

[18] "And even a Vedic verse (Īṣa Upan. 2) itself en-
joins life-long performance of rituals in the words ‘Let
a man desire to live a hundred years here below per-
forming rituals’. 
“And there is another difficulty that faces the advocate of (liberation through bare) knowledge. He believes that it is the texts (of the Upanishads) that are the authority for knowledge of the (already existing) reality. But because sentences depend for their meaning on verbs denoting action, knowledge of the Self as he interprets it does not exist.  

1 Hiriyanna observes in his Notes: “Some schools... state that a collocation of words or a sentence, to serve as an independent means of testimony, should contain a verbal form (whether finite or not) denoting a command etc., so that the final import of a proposition is always an action. The argument here is based on this latter view.” If authoritative texts in the Veda necessarily proclaim action, they cannot yield information about any eternal changeless reality, such as the Self is claimed to be by the Advaitins.

\[
\text{virahayya kriyāṁ naiva saṁhanyante padāny api} \\
\text{na samasty apadam ūkyaṁ yat syāj jñāna-} \\
\text{vidhāyakam}
\]

[19] “Separate words cannot become syntactically united except by means of a verb implying something to be done. And no sentence, such as could convey knowledge, can exist without words.

\[
\text{jñānābhyupagame 'pi na doṣah. yataḥ}
\]

“And in any case, our position\(^1\) is not jeopardized even if knowledge be admitted (as a factor in release). For:  

\(^1\) i.e., that liberation arises through ritualistic action, verse 1.9 above.

\[
\text{karmano 'ṅgāgi-bhāvena sva-pradhānatayā 'thava} \\
\text{saṁbandhasyeha saṁsiddher jñāne saty apy adoṣataḥ}
\]
[20] "Even if knowledge has a function in release, our position is not jeopardized, since knowledge may reasonably be combined with ritualistic action, either as the subordinate or principal factor, or as an equal partner.

yasmāj jñānābhyyupagamānabhyyupagame 'pi na jñānān muktih

"Thus we see that whether the existence of spiritual knowledge be admitted or not, in any case it cannot (of itself) lead to liberation.

atah sarvāśramānām hi vān-manaḥ-kāya-karmabhiḥ sv-anuṣṭhitair yathā-śakti muktih syān nānya-sādhanāt

[21] "Therefore men of all stations of life (āśrama) acquire liberation through ritualistic action performed through speech, mind and body to the height of their powers—and in no other way."

asad-artha-pralāpo 'yam iti duṣaṇa-saṁbhāvanāyāha

And now, as a prelude to its refutation, the author declares that all this is idle chatter.

iti hrṣṭa-dhiyāṁ vācaḥ sva-prajñā "dhmāta-cetasāṁ ghusyante yajña-sālāsu dhūmānaddha-dhiyāṁ kila

[22] These are the words spoken by the complacent denizens of the sacrificial temples, wise in their own conceit. It is the sacrificial smoke, perhaps, that has clouded their vision.¹
Saṁkara expresses a similar solicitude for the condition of the Mimāmsaka's eyes when commenting on Brhadāranyaka Upan. I.iv.7. The joke is in fact an old one, found at Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa III.x.xi.1.

duṣan nopakramāvadhi-jñāpanāyāha

Now we define the method and scope of the refutation to follow:

atrābhidadhmahe dośān kramaśo nyāya-brmhitaiḥ
vacobhiḥ pūrva-paśokti-ghātibhir nāti-saṁbhramāt

[23] Now we shall show the errors in these views one by one by solid arguments destructive of their content and not by quibbling.

catur-vidhasyaḥ karma-kāryasya muktāv asaṁbhavan
na mukteḥ karma-kāryatvam

Since liberation is not subject to any of the four processes involved in action it cannot be attained through action.

1 The four processes involved in action are producing, attaining, preparing and transforming; see verse I.53 below.

ajñāna-hāna-mātratvān mukteḥ karma na sādhanam
karmāpamārṣṭi nājñānam tamasaivottithaṁ tamah

[24] Since liberation arises only from the destruction of ignorance, action is not the means to it. Action cannot remove ignorance any more than darkness arising from darkness (can remove darkness).

1 Action is an effect of ignorance and hence cannot destroy it. The two are not incompatible either in respect of their nature or of their field of operation.
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

karma-kāryatvābhhyapagame 'pi doṣa eva

But even if it were granted that liberation were subject to any of the processes involved in action, further difficulties would remain:

ekena vā bhaven muktir yadi vā sarva-karmabhiḥ
pratyekam ced vṛthānyāni sarvebhyo 'py eka- karmatā

[25] Is liberation the fruit of one ritualistic action or of all together? If it were the fruit of one, then all the remaining injunctions of the Veda would have to be supposed useless: and if it were the fruit of all together, then the fruit of every ordained ritual would be the same, and the specific fruits mentioned in the Veda must be supposed false (which is absurd).¹

¹ As regards the first point, if any single ritual brought liberation as its fruit, then all other rituals would be superfluous, since an immeasurably greater fruit could be attained by the mere performance of the liberation ritual. Any piece of Vedic interpretation that could be shown to involve the uselessness or falsity of any part of the Veda should be regarded as condemned. The Advaitic view is not open to these strictures as it maintains that liberation comes through the destruction of ignorance and that all Vedic ritual has its validity within the realm of ignorance before liberation arises.

sarva-prakārasyāpi karmaṇa utpattita eva viśiṣṭa-
sādhyābhisambandhān na pāriśeṣya-nyāya-siddhiḥ

Every kind of ritualistic action (without exception) is (on the Mimāṃsaka’s principles) enjoined as productive of some specific result through the “originating injunction” itself.¹ If no specific result is mentioned in the case of a particular ritualistic act, it cannot be argued that its result must be liberation “for lack of any other alternative”.²
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1 For the technical distinction between “originating injunctions” (utpatti-vidhi) and “injunctions of application” (vinyoga-vidhi), see A. B. Keith, The Karma Mimāṃsa, p. 86 f.

2 This is impossible because each ritual has its specific fruit laid down in the Veda.

\[ \text{durita-kṣapaṇārthvatvān na nityaṁ syād vimuktaye} \]
\[ \text{svargādi-phala-saṁbandhāt kāmyaṁ karma tathaiva} \]

[26] The obligatory daily rites do not produce liberation since their declared purpose is to consume the effects of our previous sins.\(^1\) Neither can the rituals prescribed for particular self-interested ends produce liberation, since each is associated with some other specific fruit of its own.

\[ \text{na} \]

\[ \text{pramāṇāsaṁbhavāc ca} \]

And because there can be no authority for the doctrine:

\[ \text{sādhyā-sādhana-bhāvo ’yaṁ vakanaś pāralaukikāḥ} \]
\[ \text{nāśrauṣaṁ mokṣa-daṁ karma śruter vaktrāt} \]
\[ \text{ Kathaṁcana} \]

[27] Moreover, all knowledge of ends and means in regard to the after-life comes from Vedic revelation. I have never heard from the mouth of the Veda (śruti) that ritualistic action yielded liberation in any sense whatever.

\[ \text{abhyupagatābhuyupagamāc ca śvaśrū-nirgacchokti-vad} \]
\[ \text{bhavato niśprayojanaḥ pralāpah} \]
And since you admit our whole basic position, your arguments are just idle talk like the mother-in-law saying “Go away” (in the story).\footnote{The story of the mother-in-law is that a certain daughter-in-law, when living with her mother-in-law, turned away a beggar with the words “We’ve nothing for you here in the house.” The mother-in-law heard her and shouted “What right have you to tell beggars that there is nothing in the house?” Then she turned to the beggar herself and said “Go away, there’s nothing for you here in the house.” J}

\[niṣiddha-kāmyayos tāyāgas tvayāpiṣto yathā mayā nityasyāphalavattvāc ca na mokṣaḥ karma-sādanah\]

[28] The avoidance of prohibited acts and self-interested rituals is preached by you as well as by me. And since we also agree that the obligatory daily rituals produce no positive fruit, it follows that liberation is not to be achieved through rituals.\footnote{The argument is that all actions of ritualistic significance can be classified under one or other of the three headings “forbidden deeds”, “selfish rituals”, or “obligatory daily rituals”. Since the ritualist holds that the first two classes have to be avoided for liberation, and holds, further, that the third class (obligatory daily rituals) produces no positive fruit, it follows on his own principles that liberation cannot arise as the fruit of any ritualistic action.}

\[evam tāvat “mukteḥ kriyābhīḥ siddhatvāḥ” iti nirastro ‘yam pakṣaḥ. athādhunā sarva-karma-pravṛtti-hetunirūpanena yathāvasthitātma-vastu-visaya-kevala-jñāna-mātrād eva sakala-saṁsārānarthā-nivṛttir itimāṃ pakṣaṁ dradvhayitu-kāma āha. iha cedam parikṣyate. kim yathā pratiṣiddheṣu yādṛcchikeṣu ca karmasu svābhāvika-svāsavyotthama-nimitta-vasād evedam hitam idam ahitam iti viśeṣān parikalpya mṛgatṛṣṇikodaka-pipāsur iva laukika-pramāna-prasiddhāny eva sādhanāny upādāya hita-prāptaye\]
Having now thoroughly refuted the view embodied in the maxim "Liberation is achieved through ritualistic action alone", we proceed to advance arguments in support of the proposition "The cessation of all the evils of transmigration (sāṃsāra) arises only through bare knowledge of the real Self," and we shall accompany these arguments with an enquiry into the causes that prompt activity (in the widest sense of the word).

And here the question being considered is the following. It is admitted in regard to acts specifically forbidden in the Veda, and to that host of casual acts (such as eating, lying down, etc.) to which man is prompted by natural inclination, that man acts according to his imagination. Like a thirsty person desirous of drinking the water of a mirage he makes imaginary distinctions, such as "this would be pleasant, that would be unpleasant", and engages in action or restraint to acquire pleasant things and avoid unpleasant ones, resorting to means determined by secular sources of knowledge.
only. Now the question is, in regard to self-interested ritualistic acts, charged with unseen future fruits, and also in regard to the daily obligatory rituals, does he proceed in the same (unthinking) way, or is there something else which prompts him to engage in action?

Well, what is at stake here? Listen. If it be said that the cause for engaging in action is authoritative right knowledge, either secular or derived from the Veda, and the section of the Veda that teaches renunciation is rejected, then we (Advaitins) who have renounced action are lost. For our course will have been prompted merely by erroneous knowledge. And our renunciation of ritualistic action will be in conflict with the supernatural (alaukika) authority of certain revealed texts. But if prompting to all action (whether secular or Vedic) arises from ignorance of the real, like the motives which prompt the thirsty man to drink at the mirage, then it is we (Advaitins and renunciates) who are in the ascendant and you (Mimāṃsakas or ritualists) who are lost.

1 This is the principal point at issue between the Mimāṃsaka and the Advaitin.
2 i.e. since right knowledge would have prompted us to a life of action.
3 J quotes the text “He should offer the Agnihotra (daily) as long as he lives”, which has not been traced. Cp. the Upanishadic text quoted by the opponent at 1.18 above.

hitam samprepsatam mohad ahitam ca jihasatam
upayin prapti-hanarthan sastraṁ bhasyate 'rkavat

[29] The Veda (sāstra) is like the sun, illuminating the means to acquiring and avoiding for the benefit of those who from sheer ignorance desire the pleasant and shun the unpleasant.
The notions of pleasant and unpleasant arise from nescience, cp. the introductory paragraph to the present work, I.1 (prose) above. See also Śaṅkara, Upadeśa Sāhasri, prose section, para. 42.

It is especially in regard to ritualistic actions that will affect our future lives that the Veda sheds its illumination, for this is a sphere to which other means of knowledge give no access. The image of the sun, which illuminates the road impartially for the sinner and saint, is perhaps chosen deliberately to illustrate the indifference of the Veda to our actions. Śuresvara's point is that all actions, even those laid down in the Veda, are resorted to through desire and aversion, and thus rest ultimately on ignorance of the nature of the Self as bliss. Hence also the image of the man trying to drink from a mirage.

\[
evaṁ tāvat pratyaksānumānāgama-
pramāṇāvanāstambhād ātmano niraśaya-sukha-
hitāvyaśireka-siddher ahitasya ca śaṣṭha-gocara-vat
svata evānabhisāṁbandhād evam
svābhāvyātmānavabodha-mātrād eva hitam me syād
ahitam me mā bhūd iti mithyā-jñānam tūṣara-
śuktikānavabodhotthâ-mithyā-jñāna-vat pravṛtti-
imittam iti nirdhāritam. śāstraṁ ca na padārtha-
śakty-ādhaṇa-kṛd iti. athaitasyaivottaratra prapaṇca
ārabhyate
\]

Thus it has been shown on the authority of perception, inference and revelation that the Self is never separate from “the pleasant” in the form of supreme bliss, and that “the unpleasant” enters into no relation with it at all, and is like something non-existent. And from this it follows that all action whatever is prompted by false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna) of the form “may I have the pleasant, may I not have the unpleasant” arising from bare natural unawareness of the Self (svābhāvyā-ātma anavabodha-mātra), like the notion of mirage and silver which arise from unawareness of the desert and of the mother-of-pearl. Moreover, the function of the Veda
is not to introduce new properties into anything. An explanation of this subject is begun next.

1 Literally, "as if an object of the sixth means of knowledge", viz. of anupalabdhi which bears on non-existence.

2 Sureśvara usually, as here, distinguishes positive false cognition (mithyā-jñāna) from "bare non-awareness" (anavabodha-mātra), its cause. The two conceptions correspond roughly to the "non-perception" and "wrong perception" of Gauḍapāda's Kārikā I.15, quoted at IV.42 below.

3 It should be noted that the śāstra does not confer agency and the power to experience on the individual soul, nor does it convert heaven into an attainable goal or enable the sacrifice to function effectively as a means to an end. All it does is to throw light. Cf. Introduction Comm. to III.93 below.

na paripsām jihāsāṁ vā pūmsah śāstrāṁ karoti hi
nije eva tu te yasmāt paśv-ādāv api darśanāt

[30] For it is not the Veda (śāstra) which generates in man desires to acquire and avoid. They are natural, as we know from the fact that they are also found in beasts (who have no access to the Veda).¹

¹ On the desire to acquire and avoid as common to man and beast, cp. Śaṅkara, Vedānta Sūtra Commentary I.i.1, introductory portion, trans. Thibaut, p. 7 f.

uktam tāvad anavabuddha-vastu-yāthātmya eva
vidhi-pratiṣedha-śāstreṣv adhikriyata iti. athādhunā
viṣaya-svabhāvānurodhena pravṛtty-asambhavanā
vaktu-kāma āha

So far it has been said that it is only the man who does not know reality who is affected by the part of the Veda (śāstra) containing injunctions and prohibitions. Now, wishing to show that engaging in action is impossible in the very nature of the case,¹ he proceeds.

¹ Because no action can acquire the Self which is already attained.
lipsate 'jñānato 'labdham kaṇṭhe cāmikaram yathā varjitam ca svato bhrāntyā chāyāyām ātmano yathā bhayaṃ mohāvanaddhātmā rakṣāḥ parijihīrṣati yac cāparihṛtam vastu tathā labdham ca lipsate

[31 and 32] It is through ignorance that one desires what one already has, such as a golden necklace hanging (forgotten) on one’s neck; again, it is through ignorance that, afflicted with delusion, one fears and tries to remove a goblin which seems to be in one’s shadow but which does not really exist. But (all this is quite distinct from cases where) one tries to avert unpleasant things (such as tigers and snakes that are real and present) or to attain (wealth and other empirically real and desirable) things one does not possess.

tatraiteṣu caturṣu viṣayeṣu prāptaye parihārāya ca vibhajya nyāyah pradarśyate

Next he shows how these four cases should be grouped in order to explain the facts of acquiring and avoiding:

prāptayya-parihāryesu jñātvopāyāṁ chruteḥ prthak kṛtvātha prāpnuyāt prāpyam tathā 'niṣṭām jahāty api

[33] In regard to things that exist empirically and can genuinely be obtained or avoided, a man may learn from the Veda the correct means to obtain what is good and avoid what is evil, and having applied those means he may obtain or avoid them.¹

¹ Good and evil as affecting whole successions of future lives are more potent than good and evil as affecting this life only. Hence it is especially with regard to deeds which promote either svarga (heaven) or narahaka (hell) that the Veda gives information.
In the two remaining cases,\(^1\) the things stand "acquired" or "avoided" already by their very nature:

\(^1\) i.e. in the case of desires to have what one already has or to avoid what is not really afflicting one, cp. verse 31 above.

\textit{varjitāvāptayor} bodhādd hāna-prāptī na karmaṇā moha-mātrāntarāyatvāt kriyāyā te na sidhyataḥ

\(^1\) Reading adopted from a manuscript cited by Hiriyanna, in place of his own parihrūvāptayoh, which as he himself points out, yields an extra syllable which spoils the metre.

[34] In regard to things that one already has (but, being unaware of the fact, also wants to have) or has not (but supposes oneself to have and wishes to be rid of) "getting" and "avoiding" do not come through action. Since it is ignorance alone that is the obstacle (to realizing that one already has or has not got them), the "getting" or "avoiding" of them is to be achieved by knowledge.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Since ignorance is the only obstacle to one's "possession" of the necklace or "being rid of" the goblin, one "gets" the necklace or "gets rid of" the goblin only through knowledge and not through action of any kind, since it is knowledge alone and not action that destroys ignorance. It was shown above that the Self always has pleasure (bliss) and is ever free from pain. Thus although one obtains objects of the world through action, one "obtains" the Self through knowledge. Similar points are made by Padmapāda, Pancapādikā, Eng. Trans. Venkataramiah, p. 293 f., and by Śuresvara himself at Saṃbandha Vārttika 884–889, Ed. and trans. Mahadevan, p. 475 ff.

\begin{quote}
\textit{kasmāt punar ātma-vastu-vāthātmyāvabodha-mātrād evābhilaśita-niratīṣaya-sukhāvāpti-niṣīṣesa-duḥkha-nivṛttī bhavato na tu karmaṇeti. ucyate}
\end{quote}
But, it may be asked, why is it that the acquisition of incomparable bliss and the cessation of every pain are to be obtained only through knowledge of the Self, the ultimate reality, in its true nature, and not through action? We reply:

\[ karmājñāna-samutthatvān nālaṁ mohāpanuttaye \]
\[ samyag-jñānam virodhy asya tāmīrasyāṁśumān iva \]

[35] Action itself arises from nescience, hence it cannot destroy it. But right knowledge can destroy nescience for it is the opposite of it, as the sun is the opposite of darkness.

\[ nany ātma-jñānam api avidyopādānam. na hi śāstra- \]
\[ śiṣyācāryādy anupādāyātma-jñānam ātmānam labhata \]
\[ iti. naiśa doṣah. yata ātma-jñānam hi svatas-siddha- \]
\[ paramārthātma-vastu-svarūpa-mātrāsrayād evāvidyā- \]
\[ tad-utpanna-kāraṇa-grāma-pradhvamśi svātmotpatāv \]
\[ eva śāstrādy apeekśate notpannam avidyā-nivrūttau. \]
\[ karma punah svātmotpatāv utpannam ca. na hi \]
\[ kriyā kāraṇa-nisprḥā kalpa-koṭi-vyavahita-phala- \]
\[ dānāya svātmānam bibharti sādhyamāna-mātra- \]
\[ rūpayāt tasyāḥ. na ca kriyātma-jñāna-vat svātma- \]
\[ pratilambha-kāla eva svargādi-phaalenā kartāraṃ \]
\[ sambadhnāti. ātma-jñānam punah puruṣārthā- \]
\[ siddhau notpadyamāna-svarūpa-vyatirekenānyad \]
\[ rūpāntaraṃ sādhanāntaraṃ vāpeksate. kuta etat. yataḥ. \]

Now, an objector might say, “Is not nescience presupposed\(^1\) even in Self-knowledge? For unless texts, pupil and teacher etc. (all effects of nescience) are first supplied (upādāya), no one acquires Self-knowledge.”

26
The objection does not stand. For Self-knowledge is based on the self-revealed reality alone, and its nature is to destroy nescience and the whole complex of factors of action that arise from it as effects. It depends on the Vedic texts, etc., only for its rise. Once risen, it does not depend on them for destroying nescience. But action depends on nescience both for its rise and (for the production of its effects) after it has arisen. For action is but a means resorted to by some agent. It does not maintain itself independently after its own component factors (agent, instrument, object etc.) have all disappeared until, millions of world-epochs later, the time comes for it to yield its fruit. Nor does action supply its fruit, such as sojourn in heaven, to the agent simultaneously with its own rise, as Self-knowledge does (to the knower). But knowledge of the Self guarantees the realization of the highest end of man through its mere rise, without needing to assume any new form or to depend on any external factor (e.g. action). Why is this? Because:

1 Here we have to take the term upādāna to mean "presupposition" to comply with Śureśvara's own etymological explanation of it in the following sentence. Texte, p. 64.

2 Such as meditation, according to the doctrine mentioned at 1.66 (prose) below, which maintains that knowledge of the Self, to become effective, must be supplemented by meditation. J

\[
\text{bala-vaddhi pramāṇotthamāṃ samyag-jñānamāṁ bādhyate ākāṅkṣate na cāpy anyad bādhanaṁ prati sādhanam}
\]

[36] Right-knowledge (of the Self) can never be contradicted since it is the highest canon of knowledge (pramāṇa). It depends on no other means for defence against itself being contradicted in the future.
In saying right-knowledge of the Self is the highest pramāṇa, Suresvara means that it is higher than and supersedes all the ordinarily accepted pramāṇas. See śloka 1.89 below, with note.

The verse opposes the idea that right-knowledge, once acquired, depends for its continuance on spiritual practices to ward off the latent effects of ignorance resulting from innumerable previous births. Śaṅkara likewise insists that once perfect spiritual knowledge is acquired it is constant and perpetual. It never has to be regained by application to yogic concentration (samādhi) or other means involving external activity. See Śaṅkara’s Commentary to Gauḍapāda’s Kārikās II.38 and IV.89.

sva-pakṣasya hetv-avaṣṭambhena samarthisatvān
nirāśaṅkam upasaṃhriyate

Because he (the author) has fully supported his position by reasoning, he sums up confidently:

tasmād duḥkhodadhher hetor ajñānasyāpanuttaye
samyag-jñānam suparyāptam kriyā cēn nokta-hetutah

[37] Therefore right-knowledge (samyag-jñāna) is the proper and sufficient means to get rid of nescience, which is the cause of the whole ocean of sorrow. If you say, “Action is the right means”, we say, “No,” and have given our reasons.

nanu balavad api samyag-jñānam sad
apramāṇothenāsamyag-jñānena bādhyamānam
upalabhāmahe yata utpanna-paramārtha-bodhasyāpi
kartṛtvā-bhokṛtvā-rāgā-dveśādy-anavabodhotthā-
pratyayā āvīrbhavanti. na hy abādhite samyag-jñāne
tad-viruddhānām pratyayānāṃ saṁbhavo ’sti. naitad
evam. kutaḥ
Objection: Even though right-knowledge is the highest canon of knowledge, yet we see that in fact it is sometimes effectively contradicted by wrong knowledge, even though the latter is not a canon of knowledge at all. For even in the case of one who has known the highest reality, notions due to ignorance, such as the sense of being an agent and an experiencer, and feelings of desire and aversion, do actually appear. Notions opposed to right-knowledge could not arise unless right-knowledge had first been effectively suppressed.

This objection does not stand, for:

ḥādhītatvād avidyāyā vidyām sā naiva bādhate
tad-vāsanā nimittatvam yānti vidyā-smṛter dhruvam

[38] Since nescience itself has been overcome and suppressed, it cannot suppress knowledge. Such latent psychological tendencies (vāsanā) as arise from it infallibly prompt the sage (jñāṇī) to remember the spiritual truth.

"karmājñāna-samutthatvāt" ity ukto hetus tasya ca
samarthanam pūrvam evābhihitam "hitam
samprepsatām" ity ādīnā. tad-abhyuccayārtham
avidyānvayena ca saṃsārānvayitvam
pradarśāyisyāṁity ata āha

We have said (in verse 35 above) “action itself arises from nescience”, and the grounds for this had already been declared earlier in verses such as (verse 29) “for the benefit of those who from sheer ignorance desire the pleasant” etc. We now proceed further to
substantiate this argument and also to show that whoever is subject to nescience is necessarily subject to transmigration also.

\[ brāhmāny-ādy-ātmake dehe lātvā nātmeti bhāvanām śruteḥ kiṅkaratām eti vān-manaḥ-kāya-karmasu \]

[39] Thinking that the body endued with Brahminhood etc. is the Self, a man becomes a slave to the Veda in thought, word and deed.

\[ yasmāt karmājñāna-samuttham eva tasmāt tad-\]
\[ vyāvṛttau nivartata ity ucyate \]

Since action arises from nescience, it ceases with the destruction of nescience. This is the principle now stated:

\[ dagdhākhilādhihkāraḥ ced brahma-jñānāgnaṁ muniḥ \]
\[ vartamānāḥ śruter mūrdhni naiva syād veda-kiṅkaraḥ \]

[40] When all qualification for action has been burnt up in the sage by the fire of knowledge,\(^1\) then he is no longer a slave of the Veda. Verily he stands above the Veda.

\(^1\) i.e. when he ceases to identify his true Self with the body and so is no longer qualified for action.

\[ athetaro ghanatarāvidyā-paṭala-saṃvītāntahkaraṇo \]
\[ ˈnigikṛta-karṣṭvādy-aśeṣa-karmādhikāra-kāraṇo \]
\[ vidhi-pratiśedha-codanā-saṃdāṃśopadaṣṭaḥ karmasu \]
\[ pravartamānāḥ \]
But consider another man, not enlightened. His mind steeped in thick clouds of nescience, he accepts the idea of agency and all the other conditions making for competence for ritualistic action and then engages in such action, pinched in the grip of the two pincers of the Vedic prohibitions and commands.

śubhaiḥ pṛāṇotī devatvaṁ nīṣiddhair nāraṇīṁ gatim
ubhābhyaṁ puṇya-pāpābhyaṁ mānuṣyaṁ labhate

'vaśah

[41] By good acts he gradually rises to the status of a god; by crimes he sinks to hell. Practising both good and evil, he is reborn helplessly as a man.

ābrahma-stamba-paryante ghore duḥkhodadhau
ghatī-yantra-vad ārohāvaroḥa-nyāyenādhama-
madhyamottama-sukha-duḥkha-moha-vidyuc-capala-
sampāta-dāyinir vicitra-yoniścandotpīṭjalaka-
śvasana-vegābhihatāmbhodhi-madhya-varti-śūkālābu-
vac chubāśubha-vyāmiśra-karma-vāyu-samīritaḥ

Descending into the terrible ocean of pain called transmigration (samsāra) which comprehends all from Brahmā to a blade of grass, pushed upwards and downwards like a bucket at a well, and entering higher and lower wombs yielding experiences of pleasure, pain and delusion which appear and vanish like lightning in the sky, verily he floats hither and thither tossed by the winds of his good, evil and intermediate deeds like a dried pumpkin buffeted this way and that by tumultuous winds upon the sea.
Thus the man of desire perpetually revolves in a circle. He is born bound tight by the bonds of nescience, desire and his past actions. And he dies immersed in miseries.

We cite authorities to compel respect for the doctrine stated above:

The Vedic text also has declared this in order to demolish pleasure-desire. All transmigratory experience has pleasure-desire for its root. The destruction of pleasure-desire arises from the destruction of ignorance.

You ask which is that Vedic text?

“When all the desires that lie in a man’s heart are resolved,” (then the mortal becomes immortal and attains Brahman): “thus (does the man who desires transmigrate; but the man who does not desire never transmigrates)”. So says the Brhadârañyaka Upanishad. Vyâsa also spoke of this, as in “this our bondage is verily bondage through desire”.¹
eṣa samsāra-panthā vyākhyātaḥ. athedānīṃ tad-
vṛttaye karmāṇy ārād-upakārakatvena yathā
mokṣa-hetutām pratipadyante tathābhidhiyate

Here we conclude our description of the process of transmigration, and, with a view to do away with it, proceed to declare how it is taught that ritualistic actions do serve as a remote preparation for liberation, and hence in a sense are a cause of it.¹

¹ Cp. Śaṅkara’s Commentary to Vedānta Sūtra IV.i.16.

tasyai vām duhkha-taptasya kathamcit punya-śilanāt
nitye hāksālita-dhiyo vairāgyam jāyate hṛdi

[45] Somehow, by very great good fortune, dispassion (vairāgya) sometimes arises in the heart of the transmigrating soul afflicted with pain, if he has amassed much merit and if his mind has been purified by the performance of the obligatory rites.

kidṛg vairāgyam uto pādyata iti. ucyate

You may ask, “What is meant by dispassion?” The answer is:

narakād bhīr yathāsyaśbhūt tathā kāmya-phalād api
yathārtha-darśanāt tasmān nityaṃ karma cikīrṣati

[46] Through a glimpse of the truth he becomes as terrified of the results of ritual performed for individual ends as he formerly was of hell; hence he wishes only to perform the obligatory rites.¹
Thus through application to the daily and occasional rituals: ¹

¹ Cp. verse 1.9 above and note.

When his mind has been purified through the performance of actions dedicated to the Lord, pure indifference to all enjoyments from the heaven of Brahmā downwards is generated in his heart.

When the mind is clogged by passion and delusion it is easily attracted by the bait of prospective pleasure and it finds itself thrown into the slaughterhouse of the world of sense-objects, escape from which is no easy matter. But by the dedicated performance of action the
dirt of passion and delusion may be rubbed away from the mind till it becomes like a clear well-polished crystal. It is then no longer attracted by the all-consuming bait of desire and aversion generated by sense-objects. All the stains then melt away, and the mind becomes like a clear mirror, naturally turning towards the pure inner Self (and reflecting its light).\footnote{Cp. the following from Maṇḍana's Brahma Siddhi, p. 121: "Because the Self as Consciousness is of the very nature of the Absolute (Brahman), realization of the Absolute consists in the manifestation of one's own Self that results from the rubbing away of impurities as if from a crystal."}

\textit{vyutthitāśesa-kāmebhyo yadā dhir avatisthate tadaiva pratyag-ātmānam svayam evāvivikṣati}

[48] When the mind has risen clear of all desires, then of its own accord it desires to dissolve in the inner Self.

\textit{ataḥ param avasītādhikārāṇi karmāṇi pratyak-praṇāṇatva-sūnau kṛta-saṁprattikāni caritārthāni santi}

From that point onwards there is no further scope for prescribed action. But the prescribed actions die with their affairs in good order as they have arranged with their son called “Intentness on Turning Within” that he should attend to their business after they have gone!

\textit{pratyak-praṇāṇatāṁ buddheḥ karmāṇy utpādyā suddhitaḥ kṛtārthāny astamāyānti prāvṛd-ante ghanā iva}

[49] The actions, having given birth in the mind to “Intentness on Turning Within” by purifying it, die with their duties performed, like clouds at the end of the rainy season.
yato nitya-karmānuṣṭhānasyaīsa mahimā

For the performance of rituals has the following great quality:

tasmān mumukṣubhiḥ kāryam ātma-jñānābhilāṣibhiḥ
nityam naimittikam karma sadaivātma-viśuddhayeva

[50] Therefore seekers of liberation (mumukṣu) who desire Self-knowledge should always perform the daily and occasional rituals for the purification of the mind.

yathokte 'rthe sarvajña-vacanam pramāṇam

The words of the Omniscient One (i.e. Lord Kṛṣṇa) are the authority for the truth of this matter being as we have described it:

“ārurukṣor muner yogam karma kāraṇam ucyate
yogārūḍhasya tasyaiva śama” eveti ca smṛtiḥ

[51] As the traditional literature (smṛti) puts it, “Action (karma) is the means for the ascetic who wishes to attain the heights of yoga: restraint (śama) is the means when once he has attained them”.

1 The term smṛti is defined in contrast to śruti. The latter term means the Veda (Cp. Manu Smṛti II.10) and has been translated as such regularly in the present work. By the term Veda the Indians understood all the texts of all four Vedas, including the Upanishads. The term smṛti embraced all authoritative traditional literature other than this. In Advaita Vedānta, smṛti is regarded as a more powerful authority than reason but as less powerful than śruti. Included in smṛti are the epics (the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, including the Gitā), the Purāṇas, the Law Books, the basic texts (Sūtras) of the Six Orthodox Systems (darśana). Thus in here quoting the Gitā, Sureśvara is quoting a smṛti text.

2 Bhagavad Gitā VI.3.
nitya-karmanuṣṭhānād dharmotpattir dharmotpattah
pāpa-hānis tataś citta-suddhis tataḥ saṃsāra-
yāthātmyāvabodhas tato vairāgyam tato
mumukṣutvam tatas tad-upāya-paryesaṇam tataḥ
sarva-karma-tat-sādhana-samnyāsas tato yogābhīṣas
tataś cittasya pratyak-pravānaṇā tatas tat-tvam-asy-
ādi-vākyārtha-parijñānam tato 'vidyocchedas tatas ca
svātmany evāvasthānam "brahmaiva san
brahmāpyeti" "vimuktaś ca vimucyate" iti

From performance of the daily rituals comes merit
(dharma), from merit comes destruction of sin, from
this comes purity of mind, from this comes a correct
evaluation of transmigratory life, from this comes
indifference to it, from this comes desire for liberation,
from this comes a search for the means to the latter,
from this comes the renunciation of all ritualistic action
and its accessories,¹ from this comes practice of yoga,
from this the focusing of the mind within, from this a
knowledge of the meaning of texts like "That thou art",
from this the eradication of nescience, from this
establishment in the Self alone, according to the texts
"Verily, being the Absolute (Brahman), he attains the
Absolute" and "Released, he is released".²

¹ E.g. a house, sacrificial fire, etc., but particularly the sacred thread.
Cp. Śaṅkara, Upadeśa Sāhasri (prose) Section 30.
² Brhadāraṇyaka Upan. IV.iv.6 and Kaṭha Upan. V.1 or (according
to another system of numbering) II.ii.1.

pāramparyena karmaivaṁ syād avidyā-nivṛttaye
jñāna-van nävirodhitvāt karmāvidyāṁ nirasyati

[52] Only as the result of a series of effects does action
contribute to the overthrow of nescience. It does not
destroy nescience directly, like knowledge, because it is
not in contradiction with it.
na ca karmaṇaḥ kāryam any api muktau sambhāvyate
nāpi muktau yat sambhavati tat karmapekṣate. tad
ucyate.

What he now proceeds to explain is that nothing what-
ever that can be achieved by action is consistent with
release and that what obtains in release is not dependent
on action.¹

¹What obtains in release”—principally, being established in one’s
own true nature. J

upādyam āpyam samaskāryam vikāryam ca kriyā-
phalam
naivam muktir yatas tasmāt karma tasyā na sādhanam

[53] The result of action is something produced,
attained (reached), prepared or transformed.¹ But liber-
ation is something other than all this. Hence action is
not a means to it.

¹The word “saṃskāryam” is here translated “prepared” after
Edgerton, Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa p. 296. The “saṃskāra” is a
preparatory act designed to fit something for use in a rite, e.g. the
husking of rice in rituals where husked rice has to be used. The doctrine
expressed in the present verse is also found at Śaṅkara’s Upadeśa
Sāhasri (verse) XVII.50, and verse 1.25 of the Mānasollāsa Commentary
on the Dakṣinā Mūrti Hymn, a Commentary attributed to Śuresvara.

evaṁ tāvat kevalam karma sāksād avidyāpanuttaye
na paryāptam iti prapañcitam. muktau ca mumuksu-
jñāna-tad-viṣaya-svābhāvyānurodhena sarva-
prakārasyāpi karmaṇo ‘saṃbhava ukto “hitam
samprepsatām” ity ādinā. yādṛśaś cārād-
upakārakatvena jñānotpattau karmaṇāṁ samuccayah
saṃbhavati tathā pratipāditam. avidyocchittau tu
labdhātma-svabhāvasyātma-jñānasyaivaśādhāraṇaṁ

38
Thus it has been shown that action alone cannot directly destroy nescience: and in regard to liberation the passage beginning “for the benefit of those who from sheer ignorance desire the pleasant . . .”, (verses 1.29 ff. above) has stated the impossibility of any kind of action consistent with the real nature of the one seeking liberation, his knowledge and its object, the Self. And it has been explained how a remote participation of action in the production of knowledge could be admitted. Now it has to be shown how in the eradication of nescience it is fully matured spiritual knowledge that is the sole (direct) means. Nothing else can function in conjunction with it, whether as dominant or subordinate partner. And we begin by explaining how knowledge could not be a cause (of the destruction of nescience) if it were a subordinate partner.

$sadmipatiya na ca jnanam karmajnanam nirasyati$
$sadhyasaadhana-bhavatvad eka-kalanavasthitel$

[54] Knowledge cannot suppress nescience when combined with action as a subordinate partner. For since action and knowledge are respectively of the nature of means and end, they cannot exist simultaneously.  

1 Action is the means to knowledge through purification of the mind. As long as action is present functioning as a means, the goal (knowledge) is not yet reached. When knowledge is “achieved”, the means to it (action for purification of the mind) is no longer needed, and in fact it cannot exist. At a certain point actions and duties “die” (verse 1.49 above).
sama-pradhānayor apy asaṁbhava eva

Nor can knowledge and action coexist as equal partners.

bādhyā-bādhaka-bhāvāc ca pañcāsyoraṁayor iva
eka-deśānavasthānān na samuccayatā tayoḥ

[55] And again, there can be no conjunction of knowledge and action (as equals), since the two stand to one another as contradictor and contradicted; (they are destroyer and victim) like the lion and the sheep. They cannot coexist in the same place.

kuto bādhyā-bādhaka-bhāvaḥ. yasmāt

Why are they respectively contradictor and contradicted? Because:

ayathā-vastv-avidyā syād vidyā tasyā virodhīni
samuccayas tayor evam ravi-sārvarayor iva

[56] The sphere of nescience is the unreal; the sphere of knowledge is the highest reality: conjunction between the two is like conjunction between the sun and the night.

tasmād akāraka-brahmātmani
parisamāptāvabodhāvyāśeṣa-karma-codanānāṁ
acodya-svābhāvyāt kuññhatā. katham tat. abhidhiyate

Thus in the case of one who has secured knowledge of the Absolute (Brahman) or Self (Atman), which is undivided into the factors of action, all injunctions to action become pointless, because he is no longer subject to injunctions. How is that? We tell you:
[57] The man of the warrior caste (kṣatriya) does not indulge in the Brhaspatisava (ceremony for Brahmins only), nor does the man who identifies himself with Brahmminhood perform rituals (karma) laid down for men of the warrior caste (alone).

\[ \text{yathāyaṃ drśṭānta evaṃ dārśāntiko 'pity etad āha} \]

We now explain how this illustration applies to the thing to be illustrated.

\[ \text{vīdeho vīta-sāṃdeho neti-nety-avaśeṣitaḥ} \]
\[ \text{dehādy-anātma-dṛk tad-vat tat-kriyāṃ vikṣate 'pi na} \]

[58] The one who becomes free from the body (videha) and loses his doubts (vīta-sāṃdeha) completely through the practice of “not thus, not thus” (neti neti), sees the body (and senses) etc. as not-self and pays no attention to their activity.

\[ \text{tasyārthasyāviśkaraṇārtham udāharaṇam} \]

An example to explain this:

\[ \text{mṛtsnebhake yathēbhātvam śiśur adhyasya valgati} \]
\[ \text{adhyasyātmāni dehādīn mūḍhas tad-vad viceṣṭate} \]

[59] Just as a child imagines that his clay elephant is a real elephant and proceeds to play with it, so do the deluded people of the world superimpose the body etc. onto the Self and proceed to behave in various ways.
We do not deny the conjunction of knowledge and action in all cases. Where they stand in the relation of prompter (knowledge) to thing prompted to be done (action) even one’s own father could not succeed in disproving the conjunction.¹ In this connection we give an example to show how this distinction should be made.

¹ The examples to be given will show that knowledge functions as a prompter to action only when it is erroneous.

sthāṇum coradhiyālāya bhito yad-vat palāyate
buddy-ādibhis tathātmānaṁ bhrānto ’dhyāropya
cеštate

[60] When a man takes the stump of a tree for a thief, he becomes frightened and runs away. In the same way, a deluded person wrongly identifies the Self with the intellect (and body) etc. and proceeds to act.

evaṁ yatra-yatra jñāna-karmaṇoh prayojya-
prayojaka-bhāvās tatra sarvatrāyam nyāyah. yatra tu
na sama-kālam nāpi kramenopapadyate samuccayah
sa viśaya ucyate

And whenever knowledge and action stand as prompter and prompted this is the principle at work.¹ Now we proceed to consider the case where neither a simultaneous nor a successive conjunction of knowledge and action applies.²
THREE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

[61] But just as correct knowledge of the stump cannot be a factor prompting to flight, so correct knowledge of the Self can never be a subordinate factor in an injunction to action.

\textit{yasmād gūṇasyaitat svābhāvyam}

Because the following is the nature of a subordinate partner:

\textit{yadd hi yasyānurodhena svabhāvam anuvartate}
\textit{tat tasya gūṇa-bhūtam syān na pradhānād gūṇo yatāḥ}

[62] That is known as a subordinate partner which conforms to and follows the dominant partner. The subordinate partner cannot be such as to destroy the predominant one.\footnote{Pradhānād = pradhana + ad = (lit.) predominant-eating.}

\textit{yasmāt}

Therefore:

\textit{karma-prakaraṇākāṅkṣi jñānaṁ karma-guṇo bhavet}
\textit{yadd hi prakaraṇe yasya tat tad-aṅgaṁ pracakṣate}
\textit{svarūpa-lābha-mātreṇa yat tv avidyāṁ nihanti nah}
\textit{na tad aṅgaṁ pradhānāṁ vā jñānaṁ syāt karmanāḥ kvacit}
[63] The kind of knowledge (i.e. erroneous) which leads to action may be regarded as a subordinate partner in action, since that which contributes to the work of anything is a subordinate partner of that thing.

[64] But that knowledge (which we Advaitins speak of), which by its mere manifestation destroys nescience, can neither be a subordinate nor a dominant partner with action in any circumstances whatever.¹

¹ Verse 54 showed that right-knowledge and action could never be conjoined with knowledge as a dominant factor. Verses 55–58 further showed that right knowledge and action cannot be conjoined as equal partners, while verses 59–64 showed that erroneous knowledge and action can be conjoined with knowledge as a subordinate factor. But right-knowledge cannot be a subordinate partner of action since it destroys it (cp. śloka 1.62 above).

\[\text{samuccaya-pakṣa-vādināpy avaśyam etad}
\text{abhypagantavyam. yasmāt}\]

Even the advocates of (liberation through) a conjunction of knowledge and action will necessarily have to admit this. For:

\[\text{ajñānam anirākurva jñānam eva na sidhyati}
\text{vipanna-kāraka-grāmaṁ jñānam karma na ṃhāukate}\]

[65] Knowledge cannot establish itself without suppressing nescience. The factors of action (which proceed from nescience) being thus suppressed, knowledge and action cannot be conjoined.
idam cāparam kāraṇam jñāna-karmanoḥ samuccaya-nībarhi

The following is another ground for rejecting the doctrine of a conjunction of knowledge and action:

hetu-svarūpa-kāryaṇi prakāśa-tamasor iva
virodhini tato nāsti sāṅgatyām jñāna-karmanoḥ

[66] Knowledge and action are mutually contradictory both as to their causes, nature and effects, like darkness and light. There can be no association between them.1

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1 The cause of knowledge is an authoritative means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Its nature is the light of the Self or Supreme Reality. Its effect is destruction of nescience. The cause of action, on the other hand, is nescience in the form of attachment etc. Its nature (unlike that of knowledge) is non-luminous. Its effect is producing and acquiring. Thus, in their causes, natures and effects equally, knowledge and action are mutually contradictory. Hence knowledge and action cannot simultaneously coexist, hence they cannot co-operate and hence they cannot give rise to liberation by operating “in conjunction”. J
Having thus summed up, we proceed. Some Vedāntins, relying on their own (one-sided) tradition, say: That knowledge, ‘I am the Absolute’, which arises from the Upanishadic sentences, does not dispose of nescience by its mere rise. Nescience entirely abandons only him who practises meditation daily for a long time and thereby accumulates mental conviction (bhāvanā). ‘Having become a god, he joins the gods’, says the Veda.

And another school maintains that the knowledge ‘I am the Absolute’ generated by the Upanishadic texts is relational and hence does not penetrate to the real nature of the Self. But they say that in the case of one who meditates on the meaning conveyed by the sentences as continuously as the Ganges flows, another cognition arises which is (not relational because it is) not the meaning of any sentence (avākyārtha). It is this latter knowledge alone which eradicates all the darkness of nescience. And they quote the Veda, “Having first understood (the teaching), the Brahmin should proceed to meditate on it”. To refute these two views he says:

1 The general topic is the incorrectness of theories which maintain that liberation is achieved through a conjunction of knowledge and action, and it is not now changed. But Śureśvara proceeds now to consider some particular applications of the view.

2 In Śureśvara’s day, the term Vedāntin meant those followers of Vedic tradition who regarded the Upanishads (Vedānta) as containing the essence of the Vedic teaching. In this they may be contrasted with the Māṃsakas who, as ritualists, regarded the ritualistic sections of the Veda as of prime importance, and not the Upanishads, which deal chiefly with mystical knowledge. Śureśvara’s mention of Vedāntins in the present passage is the first in the work. Up to now he has been concerned with the views of the Māṃsakas. Now he takes up criticism of the incomplete Vedāntic views. And since, as Vedāntins, they regard liberation as coming primarily through knowledge, we find him criticizing their theories of the nature of the liberating knowledge and of its relation with action. A commentator identifies the first of the views mentioned in the present verse as belonging to Brahmadatta, and the second has been identified by Hiriyanna, no doubt rightly, as
belonging to Maṇḍana Miśra. It will be seen from the introductory prose to I.68 below that Suresvara regarded both these views as expressions of strict Advaita, that is, of the view that only the undifferentiated Absolute exists, the world of differentiation being an illusion. He deals with these views again later at III.9–10, 89–93, and 119–126 below.

3 Brhadāranyaka Upan. IV.i.2. Their doctrine is that, having meditated again and again on a particular god, he joins him after death through the accumulation of mental conviction.

4 It is difficult to be sure of Suresvara’s exact conception of the difference between the view now mentioned and its predecessor. But it is at least clear that the present view involves a new theory of meaning, according to which the Absolute cannot be known directly through verbal knowledge because words convey their meanings through being united in sentences, and the meanings necessarily involve some element of internal differentiation, some structural pattern corresponding to the grammatical structure of the sentence. Thus the Absolute beyond all differentiation cannot be known directly from hearing a text but only through meditating on that text continuously. It seems evident that Maṇḍana taught a doctrine of this kind, see Brahma Siddhi, ed. Kuppuswami Sastri, Madras, 1937, pages 33, 134.

5 Brahma Siddhi, p. 33, line 15. It is relational because it arises from words, being generated by the Upanishadic texts.

6 That the Absolute is “avākyārtha”, not the meaning of any sentence, is pointed out at Brahma Siddhi, p. 156. Later in the present work, Suresvara adopts the term himself, and develops in his own peculiar way the paradox that the Absolute can only be known through verbal revelation even though it is “not the meaning of any sentence”. See Hiriyanna’s notes to verse III.2 of the Naiṣkarmya Siddhi and Texte, p. 79.

7 Brhadāranyaka Upan. IV.iv.21, quoted Brahma Siddhi, p. 154.

\[ sakṛt-pravṛtttyā mṛdnāti kriyā-kāraka-rūpa-bhṛt \]
\[ ajñānam āgama-jñānam sāṅgatyāṁ nāsty ato 'nayoḥ \]

[67] The knowledge derived from Vedic revelation demolishes nescience in its form as modified into the factors necessary for action at a single stroke.\(^1\) Hence there can be no association between the two.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Cp. verses 65–66 above.

\(^2\) I.e. between knowledge and action as required by the disciplines proposed by the two schools under discussion. Suresvara’s point against both views is that the discipline they propose is impossible. In regard to the first view, if the student once comes to know the meaning of the Vedic texts proclaiming identity with the Absolute he cannot any longer practise daily meditation in obedience to any Vedic injunction, since he no longer identifies himself with mind or body. The doctrine peculiar to the second view, that knowledge conveyed by the Vedic
texts must be relational since it is conveyed by words, is refuted later by the doctrine of lakṣaṇa, see III.9 below. According to Suresvara, the meditations which these two views regard as final are in fact preliminary.

evaṁ tāvad anānātve brahmaṇi jñāna-karmanoḥ
samuccayo nirākṛtaḥ. athādhunā
pakṣāntarābhhyupagamenāpi pratyavasthāne pūrva-vad
anāśvāso yathā tathābhidhiyate

So far we have refuted the doctrine that the non-differentiated Absolute (Brahman) can be known through a conjunction of knowledge and action. We now show, even accepting another theory (viz. that the Absolute is one but characterized by identity in diversity), the rejected view (i.e. knowledge and action as combined) is still unacceptable.¹

¹ Hiriyanna refers this doctrine, no doubt rightly, to Śaṅkara’s predecessor Bhārtṛprapañca. See his Introduction to his edition of the Naśkarma Siddhi, pp. xxvii–xxx, also his paper entitled “Bhārtṛprapañca: an old Vedantin” reprinted in his Indian Philosophical Studies I, pp. 79 ff. An independent attempt to reconstruct Bhārtṛprapañca’s doctrine in detail (in Sanskrit) is that of Śrī Saccidānandendra Svāmin in his Vedānta Prakriyā Pratyabhijñā, pp. 148–182. The doctrine is known as Bhedābheda Vāda or “the doctrine of difference in identity”, and is a monism in which the one Absolute is held to undergo real differentiation to form individual souls and the world.

While Bhārtṛprapañca’s doctrine is referred to without doubt at I.78 below, it seems far from certain that Suresvara is directly concerned with it in the intervening verses. He speaks in a more general way of those who maintain that the Absolute undergoes differentiation, and then shows how such theorists may regard the Absolute so conceived as either identical with or different from the aspirant, but that there cannot in either case be liberation through a conjunction of knowledge and action.

anutsārita-nānātvam brahma yasyāpi vādinaḥ
tan-matenāpi dus-sādhyo jñāna-karma-samuccayaḥ

48
[68] The doctrine that the Absolute is known through a conjunction of knowledge and action is difficult to maintain even in the case of those whose Absolute is not devoid of differentiation.

\[ tasya vibhāgoktir dūṣaṇa-vibhāga-prajñaptaye \]

Next he states two forms of the doctrine (of difference in identity) in order to prepare the way for the two forms of the refutation.

\[ brahmātma vā bhavet tasya yadi vānātma-rūpakaṁ ātmānāptīḥ bhaven mohād itarasyāpy anātmanaḥ \]

[69] In the case of the exponent (of difference in identity) who takes the Absolute as identical with the Self\(^1\) (even during the time of transmigration) non-realization of the Self can be due to nescience only. In the case of the other exponent (who takes the Absolute as different from the Self during transmigration) the Absolute must be (and remain) not-Self.\(^2\)

\(^1\) According to J, one school of the Bhedābheda Vādins taught that even in the period of transmigration the embodied Self is not different from the Absolute. Another school maintained that in transmigration the embodied Self and the Absolute were different, but that in liberation they became identical.

\(^2\) A real difference is not subject to cancellation. See I.71 below.

\[ tatra yadi tāvad vāstavanaiva vr̥ttena brahma prāptam ātma-svābhāvyat kevalam āśura-mohāpidhāna-mātram evānāpti-nimittāṁ tasmin pakṣe \]
In this connection, if the Absolute is ever-achieved (as the first view supposes), since it is the true nature of one's own Self, it can only be the veil of demoniac (Asuric) ignorance that causes (the appearance of) its not being attained. In regard to this view we say:

\[ \text{mohāpidhāna-bhaṅgāya naiva karmāṇi kāraṇam} \]
\[ jñānenaiva phalāv āptes tatra karma nirarthakam \]

[70] Actions are not the means to destroy ignorance. Since this is achieved by knowledge and knowledge only, actions are useless in this regard.

\[ \text{anātma-rūpake tu brahmaṇi na karma sādhana-} \]
\[ \text{bhāvaṁ pratipadyate nāpi jñānam karma-} \]
\[ \text{samuccitam asamuccitam vā yasmād anyasya svata} \]
\[ \text{eva sādhakasya brahmaṇo 'py anyatvāṁ svata eva} \]
\[ \text{siddham. tatraivaṁ} \]

And on the (other) view that the Absolute is different from the embodied Self, action cannot be the means to attaining it—nor can knowledge, either conjoined or not conjoined with action. For if the aspirant is inherently other than the Absolute, this otherness stands (ever) established in the very nature of things. Here likewise (we proceed):

\[ \text{anyasyānyātmatā-prāptau na kvacidd hetu-saṁbhavah} \]
\[ \text{tasmin saty api nānaṣṭāḥ parātmānāṁ prapadyate} \]

[71] When two things are essentially different, there is nothing that can cause them to become identical. Even supposing there were some cause that could make them identical, one could not attain the nature of the other without undergoing destruction.¹
aparasmiṁs tu pakṣe vidhiḥ

On this last view (that the aspirant is other than the Absolute but can attain it after death) there is scope for an injunction.

paramātmānukūlena jñānābhyāsena duḥkhinaḥ
dwaitino 'pi pramucyeran na parātma-virodhinā

[72] Through the practice of knowledge in conformity with the highest Self even the miserable dualists could become liberated (after death) but not through anything contradictory to the highest Self (such as action).

itarasmiṁs tu pakṣe vidher evānakāśatvam. katham

But on the other view (that the aspirant is identical with the Absolute) there is no scope for an injunction. Why?

samasta-vyasta-bhūtasya brahmasya evāvatiṣṭhataḥ
brūta karmaṇi ko hetuḥ sarvāṇanyatva-darśinaḥ

[73] And tell me, what possible cause could there be for action on the part of one who is established in the Absolute and has become everything, both individually and collectively, not seeing anything as other than himself?
Moreover (if he sees himself as one with all) total confusion of actions results, because the performance of all rituals by one man would be both possible and impossible; for

\[ sarva-jāty-ādi-mattve 'syā nitarām hetv-asamabhavaḥ \]
\[ viśeṣaṃ hy anupādāya karma naiva pravartate \]

Such a man would belong to all castes and stages of life (and therefore to no particular caste), so that a cause enabling him to perform ritualistic action would be even more of an impossibility. For ritualistic action never proceeds except on the basis of some specification (as to caste etc.).

\[ syād vidhir adhyātmābhimānād iti cen naivam. \]
\[ yasmāt \]

If it be said, “Injunctions can have force even for the individual who knows his identity with the Absolute, since he may continue to identify himself with his physical body,” we reply “Not so”: for

\[ na cādhyātmābhimāno 'pi viduṣo 'sty āsuratvataḥ \]
\[ viduṣo 'py āsuraḥ cet syān nisphalaṃ brahma- \]
\[ darśanam \]

The Self-realized man cannot identify himself with the individual body and mind, since such identification is due to demoniac (Asuric) nescience. If the latter had power to afflict even the man of Self-realization, knowledge of the Absolute would be useless.
The opponent has now been thoroughly refuted, since we have shown that action is an effect of nescience, and that therefore there can be no association, either simultaneous or even successive, between knowledge and action, based on the real and the unreal respectively as they are. Still, he may go on clutching at straws and arguing further.

atha'dhyātmaṁ punar yāyād āśrito mūḍhatāṁ bhavet
sa karoty eva karmāṇi ko hy ajñaṁ vinivārayet

[76] If the man of Self-realization should once again identify himself with the individual body and mind he would be a victim of delusion. Then he certainly performs action—who can restrain the ignorant?

siddhatvāc ca na sādhyam. yataḥ

Moreover, since (in the case of the man of Self-realization) all action is already achieved, action cannot be pursued. For:

sāmānyetara-rūpāḥ karmātmāvaśya yogināṁ
niśvāsacchvāsa-vat tasmān na niyogam apekṣate

[77] Action in both its particular and universal aspects is the very Self of such a yogin (as the doctrine under discussion has in mind). It can no more be the subject of an injunction than breathing.¹

¹ The Bhedabheda Vādin affirms that the man of Self-realization must obey certain injunctions, while his theory of the nature of the man of Self-realization is such that this would be impossible. See Hiriyanna's Introduction to his edition of the present text, p. xxviii f.
Well, let us suppose that the Absolute were both differentiated and undifferentiated. A conjunction of knowledge and action would then (perhaps) be possible, the knowledge having reference to the undifferentiated, the action to the differentiated aspect of the Absolute.

But this view will not stand either. For the notion of difference cannot arise in relation to any object without contradicting the previous notion that it was not different. Unless this be admitted, neither identical nor different things could be experienced in the world.

If the opponent persists in maintaining his defenceless position, then, since his position accepts both difference and non-difference from the world as characteristic of the Absolute, he admits that the Absolute experiences pain (which is absurd).

bhinnābhinnāṃ višeṣāiś ced duḥkhi syād brahma te
dhruvam

āśeṣa-duḥkhītā ca syād aho prajñātma-vādinām

[78] If the Absolute be both identical with and different from all particular things, then (in its aspect as identical with them) the Absolute would certainly be
subject to pain. Indeed, all the pain that exists anywhere would fall to its lot. Such is the wisdom of these exalted metaphysicians!\(^1\)

\(^1\) Their wisdom consists in supposing that the Absolute is infinitely more miserable than any worldling—the sort of doctrine that is held by the Jains. J

\begin{align*}
tasmāt samyag evābhīhitam na jñāna-karmaṇoḥ \\
\textit{samuccaya ity upasāṁhriyate}
\end{align*}

Therefore we now sum up to the effect that our contention that knowledge and action cannot be conjoined was evidently right.

\begin{align*}
tamo 'ṅatvam yathā bhānor agneṣ śītāṅgatā yathā \\
vāriṇāṣa coṣṇatā yad-vaj jñānasyaivaṁ kriyāṅgatā
\end{align*}

[79] To say that knowledge can coalesce with action is like saying that darkness can coalesce with the sun, coolness with fire or heat with water.\(^1\)

\(^1\) According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the current physics of the time, coolness was a property of water.

\begin{align*}
yathoktopapatti-balenaiva pūrva-pakṣasyotsāritatvād \\
vaktavyam nāvaśeṣitam ity atah pratipatti-karma-vat \\
pūrva-pakṣa-parihārāya yat-kiṅcid vaktavyam ity ata \\
idam abhidhiyate
\end{align*}

The \textit{prima facie} (pūrva-pakṣa) view (that liberation has anything to do with action) has now been refuted by the arguments given, and nothing further needs to be said. Still, with the idea that a few incidental arguments might be added by way of a tail-piece,\(^1\) we proceed as follows:

\(^1\) pratipatti-karman: literally, "a concluding rite or ceremony", see Monier Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary s.v.
“mukteḥ kriyābhiḥ siddhatvāt” ity ādy anucitam bahu yad abhāṇī tad anyāyaṁ yathā tad adhunocyate

[80] It is now proposed to demonstrate (again) how many things said (by the opponent) beginning with “since liberation arises through ritualistic action” are unreasonable.¹

¹ Verses 80–84 offer a further attack on the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine that liberation is achieved through action alone.

yo 'yaṁ kāmyānāṁ pratiṣiddhānāṁ ca tyāgaḥ pratiṣṭhāyate sā pratiṣṭhā tāvan na śakyate 'nuṣṭhātum. kiṃ kāraṇam. karmāṇo hi nirvṛttatmano dvābhyaṁ prakāra-bhyyāṁ nivṛttiḥ saṁbhavaty ārabdha-phalaśyopabhogenānārabdha-phalaśyaśubhasya prāyaścittair iti. tṛtiyo 'pi tyāga-prakāro 'kartrātmāvabodhāt sa tv ātma-jñānānabhyupagamād bhavatā nābhvyupagamyate. tatra yāny anupabhukta-phalāny anārabdha-phalaṇi tāniśvareṇāpi kenacid api na śakyante parthyaktum. athārabdha-phalaṇi tyajyante tāny api na śakyante tyaktum. kiṃ kāraṇam. anivṛtṛteḥ. anivṛttam hi cikirṣitaṁ karma śakyate tyaktum pravritti-nivṛtti prati kartuḥ svātantryāt. nirvṛtte tu karmāṇi tad-asambhavād duranuṣṭheyah pratiṣṭhātārthah. aśakyā-pratiṣṭhānāc ca. na ca śakyate pratiṣṭhātum yāvaj-jīvāṁ kāmyāṇi pratiṣiddhāni ca karmāni na karisyāmīti sunipuṇānām api sūkṣmāparādha-darṣanāt. pramāṇābhāvāc ca. na ca pramāṇam asti mokṣa-kāmo nitya-naimittike karmāṇi kuryāt kāmya-pratiṣṭhānhe ca varjayed ārabdha-phale copabhogena kṣapayed iti. ānantaḥ ca. na
Now, the renunciation of self-interested rituals and forbidden acts which the ritualist prescribed is impossible to carry out. For there are only two ways in which the effects of action,¹ once generated, can be destroyed. That portion of them which is in manifestation in the present birth (prārabdha karma) can be exhausted by experiencing it; and those effects of bad (forbidden) action which are not in the course of fructification in the present birth can be destroyed through certain prescribed penances. There is indeed a third method, that of cognition of the supreme Self, not an agent, but this is ruled out by you, since you do not admit Self-knowledge.

Now, the fact is that not even a god could renounce the fruits of action that is not in the course of fructification. “Well,” you may say, “at least the fruits of that action which has begun to fructify could be renounced.” But the fact is that even these cannot be renounced. Why not? Because nothing can suppress them.² An action which is contemplated and which has not yet been performed can be renounced, since here the agent is free to act or abstain. But abstention is not possible with regard to acts already performed.

Moreover, the course you propose involves a promise that is impossible of fulfilment. For no one in his life can undertake never to perform self-interested rituals or forbidden deeds, since we know that even the cleverest people make small mistakes occasionally. Nor is the course based on any authority. There is no authoritative
statement declaring, “Whosoever desires liberation should perform the obligatory daily and occasional rituals, should avoid self-interested rituals and forbidden acts, and should consume that portion of the effects of his past deeds which has begun to fructify in his present life (prārabdha karma) by experiencing it.”

And, moreover, one’s past action is limitless in extent. Nor can any limit be assigned to the accumulated effects of our deeds, since transmigration is beginningless. Nor can the effects of one’s past actions be eradicated either by self-interested rituals or forbidden deeds.3 For since the latter are on a par with the accumulated effects of one’s deeds as regards purity and impurity, there is no contradiction between the two (whereby the performance of the self-interested rituals and forbidden acts could eradicate the effects of one’s past deeds).

1 The Sanskrit word “karma” can mean, inter alia, either “action” or “the effects of action in the form of seeds of future experiences.” It is evident from the context that the word has the second meaning here.

2 They must either be exhausted through enjoyment or counteracted through penance. J

3 The other alternative that would (theoretically) remain over to the Mīmāṃsāka now that it has been shown that they cannot be eradicated through the performance of the “obligatory daily and occasional rites.”

na kṛṣṇa-kāmya-samtyāgo 'nantatvaṁ kartum iṣyate
niśiddha-karmanāścehā vyatītānanta-janmasu

[81]  And one cannot get rid of all the effects of the self-interested rituals and forbidden deeds1 performed in one’s earlier lives, which are infinite in number, since these, too, are infinite.

1 Reading niśiddha-karmanāśceha from Hiriyanā’s footnote ad loc.
syān matam vyatītānanta-janmopāttānāṁ karmanāṁ

The following view might also be advanced in regard to the effects of actions accumulated in infinite previous births:

kṣayo nityena teṣāṁ cet prāyaścittair yathainasah
nisphalatvān na nityena kāmyāder vinivāraṇām

[82] And if you say they can be eradicated by performance of the obligatory rituals, as sins are eradicated by prescribed penances, we reply “No, for (on your own view) the obligatory rituals are without fruit”.¹

¹ Compare verse 28 above.

pramāṇābhāvāc ca. katham

Nor is there any authority for the position. You ask why not?

pāpāpanuttaye vākyāt prāyaścittam yathā tathā
gamyate kāmya-hānārtham nityam karma na
vākyataḥ

[83] There is Vedic authority declaring that the prescribed penances ward off the effects of forbidden deeds. But performance of the obligatory rituals does not destroy the effect of self-interested rituals in the same way, since there is no Vedic authority for such a view.¹

¹ This is to rebut the opinion of the Mīmāṃsaka, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, and his followers, who held that the performance of the daily obligatory rituals was not fruitless but had the fruit of consuming the effects of past self-interested ritualistic action. The refutation is that there is no Vedic authority for the view.

59
It might also be claimed that the effects of self-interested rituals in previous births might be exhausted through the performance of self-interested rituals in the present one:

\[\text{pāpmanāṁ pāpmabhīr nāsti yathaiveha nirākriyā kāmyair api tathaivāstu kāmyānāṁ avirodhataḥ}\]

[84] The self-interested rituals performed in this life do not eradicate those performed in previous lives, any more than the sins of this life eradicate previous sins, for there is no contradiction (between sins and sins or self-interested rituals and self-interested rituals).\(^1\)

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\(^1\) This verse completes the case. Since verse 80 we have been discussing the specifically Mimāmsaka doctrine that liberation comes through action alone, and no longer the unacceptable Vedantic theories of liberation through a conjunction of knowledge and action. Previously, verses 82 and 83, it was shown that obligatory rituals cannot ward off the effects of past action and hence cannot produce liberation. Liberation, on the Mimāmsaka views now under discussion, consists in the eradication of the effects of past action, so that transmigration no longer proceeds. Knowledge, as such, has on this view nothing to do with liberation. Now it is shown that self-interested rituals and sins cannot ward off the effects of past actions either. But obligatory rituals, self-interested rituals and sins are the only three classes of action recognized by the Mimāmsaka as significant for the after-life. Hence it has now been shown that no type of action recognized by the Mimāmsaka as significant can ward off the effects of past action and hence produce liberation.

\[\text{evam tāvat "mukteḥ kriyābhīḥ siddhatvāt" iti nirākṛtam. athātma-jñānasya sad-bhāve pramāṇāsambhava uktas tat-parihārayāḥ}\]
So much (verses 80–84) by way of refutation of "since liberation arises through actions". It has been said (by the opponent) that there is no possibility of an authority to establish the existence of Self-knowledge. To refute this contention, we proceed:

śrutayās smṛtibhis sākam ānantyāt kāminām iha
vidadhāty uru-yatnena karmāto bahu-kāma-dam

[85] Since the number of men afflicted with the desire for pleasure is infinite, the Veda (śruti) and traditional literature (smṛti) laboriously lay down the ritualistic action which leads to the many different types of it.

na ca bāhulyaṁ prāmāṇye kārāṇa-bhāvam
pratipadyate. ata āha

Now, numerical preponderance is nowhere said to be a cause of authoritativeness. Hence we say:

prāmāṇyāya na bāhulyaṁ na hy ekatra pramāṇatām
vastuny aṭanti mānāni tv ekatraikasya mānatā

[86] Numerical preponderance does not make for authoritativeness. For the different texts do not attain authority in relation to one and the same object. But each is authoritative in one place only.¹

¹ The charge which Sureśvara is here rebutting is that whereas the passages in the Veda that speak of Self-knowledge are few and far between, those that enjoin action are legion, and that, therefore, the view that the Veda ultimately teaches action has more authority to support it than the view that it ultimately teaches Self-knowledge. Sureśvara’s reply is that every text is authoritative in regard to its own subject-matter only. The Self being one, texts about it are few. Desires for pleasure being legion, texts showing how to obtain it are many, but each enjoins action for a different object. The competence of one text in its own sphere does not affect the competence of any other. And it is the texts proclaiming Self-knowledge, though few and far between, which alone deal with the nature of reality.
Moreover, the statement at verse 15 above “though I have looked carefully I can find no injunction to know either in the Veda or in the traditional literature” rests on an error of your own. Why? Because:

“parikṣya lokān” ity ādyā ātma-jñāna-vidhāyiniḥ
naiśkarmya-pravasas sādhvih śṛutih kim na śṛṇoṣi tāḥ

[87] Have you never heard the excellent texts like “Having surveyed the worlds”¹ which inculcate Self-knowledge and promote a desire for the actionless state?

¹ Munḍaka Upan. I.ii.12. According to J, “inculcate Self-knowledge” means “inculcate the preliminary steps towards it”, such as the approach to a teacher etc., since in the final view of Advaita Vedānta it is not admitted that knowledge can be the subject of a command.

nanu “ātmety evopāṣita” “ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ”
ity apūrva-vidhi-śruteḥ puruṣasyātma-darśana-
kriyāyāṁ niyogo ‘vasiyata iti. naivam. apuruṣa-
tantratvād vastu-yāthātmya-jñānasya sakalānartha-
bījātmānavabodhotsāriṇo mukti-hetor iti. vidhy
abhyupagame ’pi nāpūrva-vidhir ayam. ata āha

An objector might say: In the texts “he should meditate only on the Self”¹ and “the Self, indeed, is to be seen”² we have “novel” injunctions from the Veda which prompt a man to engage in the activity of acquiring Self-knowledge through meditation. But he would be wrong, for right-knowledge of the nature of the Self, which eradicates ignorance of the Self, the seed of all
evil, is conditioned by the nature of reality and not fashioned by the will of man.\(^3\) (Being outside the range of action, it cannot be the subject of a novel injunction.) And even if the existence of an injunction be admitted, it cannot be a novel one.\(^4\) So we proceed:

\(^1\) Brhadāranyaka Upan. I.iv.7.
\(^2\) Ibid., II.iv.5.
\(^3\) Knowledge is not created by action, but depends on the nature of the object known.
\(^4\) Vedic injunctions are of three kinds—novel (apūrvavidhi), restrictive (niyamavidhi) and negative (parisaṅkhyāvidhi). Only novel injunctions are injunctions properly so called. The restrictive injunctions are simply injunctions specifying how a given novel injunction must be carried out, e.g. if the novel injunction involves the husking of rice, there may be restrictive injunctions specifying whether this is to be done by gouging out the kernel with the nails or beating it out with a pestle.

The negative injunction (parisaṅkhyāvidhi) has no injunctive force at all, and amounts to a prohibition (niṣedha). If the injunction “He should eat fish on Fridays” were interpreted as a parisaṅkhyāvidhi it would mean “We do not prescribe eating on Fridays at all, but if a man must eat then let him eat fish only, as to eat anything else would be definitely sinful.” On the distinction between novel, restrictive and exclusive injunctions, see Nyāya Mimāṃsā Prakāśa, Ed. and Tr. F. Edgerton, p. 134 f.

\(\text{niyamah parisaṅkhyā vā vidhy-artho 'pi bhaved yataḥ anātmādarsanenaiva parātmānam upāsmahe}\)

[88] There can be an injunction (to meditate on the Self) of either the restrictive or exclusive type. For we meditate on the supreme Self only by withdrawing our gaze from the not-Self.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Suresvara here denies flatly what the objector (see introductory comm. immediately above) wishes to maintain—namely that meditation on the Self leading to Self-knowledge can be the subject of a positive command to action such as is embodied in a novel injunction. The Self, he says, can only be meditated upon if it is already known. Hence if phrases occur in the Veda having the grammatical form of injunctions to meditate on the Self with a view to know it, they must be interpreted as negative injunctions not conveying a command to do anything fresh.
And that other remark (verse 15 above) “we place our faith in nothing else (but the Veda)” you babbled in a dream with your mind half-asleep. Why? We do not base our doctrine of the Self on any of the authoritative means of empirical knowledge (pramāṇa), since the Self by its very nature is bare immediate awareness. So we will show later (II.1 ff.) that no means of empirical knowledge apply to it. The means of empirical knowledge themselves rest in and depend on pure awareness.¹

¹ The pramāṇas (canons of correct knowledge) accepted in Vedānta are pratyakṣa (perception), anumāṇa (inference), upamāṇa (comparison), arthāpatti (presumption), śabda (speech), and anupalabdhi (apprehension of non-existence). There is a brief account in A. Mahadeva Shastri “Minor Upanishads” Vol. II, p. 33. For a detailed treatment of the subject see either “Vedānta Paribhāṣā” (tr. ŚrīmānMādhavānanda), or D. M. Datta “The Six Ways of Knowing”. In the time of Śaṅkara and Śureśvara elaborate discussion of the pramāṇas was not regarded as so important. The three most important ones are perception, inference, and verbal testimony (including śruti).

vākyai-kāmyaṁ yad vastu nānyasmāt tatra viśvase
nā 'prameye svata-siddhē 'viśvāsāḥ katham ātmani

[89] In regard to matters known only from the Veda (e.g. the results of rituals in the after-life) it is right that he (i.e. the Mīmāṁsaka) should place faith in the Veda alone. But why has he no faith in the Self which is self-revealed and depends on none of the empirical means of knowledge?
yad api uktam “antareṇa vidhīm” iti tad api abuddhi-pūrvakam iva naḥ pratibhāti. yasmāt kālāntara-phala-dāyisu karmasv etad ghatate. ātma-lābha-kāla eva phala-dāyini tv ātma-jñāne naitat samaṇjasam ity āha

And the remark (verse 16) that if someone engages in a pursuit not laid down in the Veda for a result in a life to come he is wasting his time, also strikes us as somewhat lacking in intelligence. For it is true only of acts and rituals which produce their fruit at a later time, but not of Self-knowledge, which brings its fruits immediately it is acquired.

jñānāt phale hy avāpte ’smin pratyakṣe bhava- ghātini upakārāya tan neti na nyāyyaṁ bhāti no vacaḥ

[90] Since the fruit of knowledge is immediately experienced and destroys phenomenal existence for ever, your statement (implied in verse 16) that it is useless appears to us wide of the mark.

And as for the quotation from Jaimini (verse 17), that, too, was based on ignorance of that writer’s real intention. For Jaimini did not mean that all Vedic texts are concerned with injunctions to act or prohibitions from acting. If so, he would never have composed the Vedānta Sūtras beginning with “Now, therefore, the enquiry into the Absolute (Brahman)” and “He from whom all this came forth”, which are intent solely on proclaiming the true nature of the Absolute as the real, and which amount to a critical exposition of the meaning of the Upanishads when taken in their entirety, backed by profound reasoning. But as a matter of fact he did compose them. Therefore we conclude that Jaimini’s real belief was that just as the injunctions are authoritative within their own sphere only, so the passages proclaiming the one Self are equally authoritative in theirs. the two classes of passages having both an equal claim to authority in that they deal with matters not previously knowable from any other source. So we proceed as follows:

1 The modern scholar, S. K. Belvalkar, held that the core of the Vedānta Sūtras consisted in exegesis of texts from the Chāndogya Upanishad deriving in the first instance from Jaimini. Śaṅkara ascribes them to Bādarāyana, and Upadeśa Sāhasri XVI.67 suggests he may have identified Bādarāyana with Vyāsa. From the point of view of modern scholarship they are a collection of aphorisms that were frequently altered, added to and re-moulded in the course of time, and are not assignable to any one specific author. Above all, they were probably originally part of the Mimāmsaka Sūtras, and Śrī Śaṅkara may well have been the first man to have treated them separately. The previous commentator to whom he refers (Bhagavān Upavarṣa) seems to have treated the two sets of aphorisms as one connected work. Perhaps Sureśvara is here referring back to that tradition. However Hiriyanna points out (Notes to his edition of “Naiśkarmya Siddhi”, pp. 229 ff.) that Śaṅkara, too, sometimes speaks of the Mimāmsaka Sūtras and Vedānta Sūtras as if they were one connected work, e.g. Vedānta Sūtra Commentary, III.iii.53.
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

adhicodanam ya āmnāyas tasyaiva syāt kriyārthatā
tat-tvam-asy-ādi-vākyānāṁ brūta karmārthatā
katham

[91] It is only the Vedic texts related to commands that bear on action. Just tell me how indicative sentences like “that thou art” could have the meaning of a command.

api ca. aikātmya-pakṣa ivādrṣṭārtha-karmasu
bhavat-pakṣe ’pi pravṛttir durlakṣyā. yataḥ

Moreover, it is just as difficult to establish the possibility of performance of ritualistic action with unseen results in the future on your principles as it is for those who adhere to the doctrine of the one Self:¹

¹ The Mīmāṃsakas believed in a persistent soul, capable of transmigration, but itself without motion and totally distinct in nature from the body, senses and cognitions. It was supposed to superintend and direct the activities of the body and mind, although it was itself motionless. But (Sureśvara argues) such a soul would actually be incapable of becoming an agent, because this depends on motion. Therefore, not being an agent, it cannot enjoy the fruits of action.

svargam yiyāsur juhuyād agnihotraṁ yathā-vidhi
dehād vyutthāpitasyaivaṁ kartṛtvam jaimineḥ katham

[92] Jaimini says, “Whosoever desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra according to rule.” But how can Jaimini perform anything, seeing that (on his own principles) he is essentially distinct from the body?

na ca pratyākhyātāsēṣa-śarīrādi-karma-sādhana-
vabhāvasyātmā-mātrasya karmasv adhikāraḥ.
yasmāt.
Nor is the Self alone, whose nature is such as to exclude all means to action such as a body, etc., able to engage in actions. For

\[\text{sarva-pramāṇāsambhāvyo hy ahamvṛttyaika-sādhanah} \]
\[\text{yusmad artham anāditsur jaiminīḥ preryate katham} \]

[93] How can even Jaimini himself be impelled to action by a command, seeing that (on his own view of the soul) he is beyond all the empirical means of knowledge, is void of every objective category\(^1\) and is known only through the I-notion?

\(^1\) More literally, “cannot accept a ‘thou-meaning’.”

\[\text{pravr̥tti-kāraṇābhāvāc ca. yasmāt} \]

Again, there could be no cause able to promote action. For

\[\text{sukha-duḥkhādibhir yoga ātmano nāhamekṣyate} \]
\[\text{parāktvāt pratyag-ātmatvāj jaiminīḥ preryate katham} \]

[94] The union of the soul with pleasure and pain, etc., is not perceived by the ‘I’ because they are external (while the soul is the internal overseer quite distinct in nature from them). Seeing that he is the inmost Self, how can Jaimini be motivated (to act)?

\[\text{κिंचा} \]

Moreover,

\[\text{na tāvad yoga evāsti śāriṇeṇātmanāḥ sadā} \]
\[\text{viṣayair dūrato nāsti svargādau syāt katham sukham} \]
Indeed, there is never any real contact between the Self and the body, far less between the Self and objects. How then can even heaven be a source of bliss?

\[ \textit{yasmād anyathā nopapadyate} \]

As the matter cannot be explained otherwise, it follows that:

\[ \textit{narahimānīnam tasmāt kārakādy-ātma-darśinam mantra āhorarikṛtya “kurvan” iti na nirdvayam} \]

Thus the Vedic verse “Let a man desire to live a hundred years here below performing rituals”\(^1\) was addressed to the one supposing himself to be an individual man and possessed of the means to action (a body etc.). It was not addressed to the non-dual (supreme Self).

\(^1\) \textit{Īśa Upanishad, verse 2.}

\[ \textit{yac coktaṁ “virahayya” iti tadapi na samyag eva. tathāpi tu na yā kācit kriyā yatra kva cādhyāharaṇiṇīyā kim tu yā yatrabhipreta-saṁbandham ghaṭayitum śaknoty ākāṅkṣām ca vākyasya pūrayati saivādhyāharaṇiṇīyā. evaṁ-visiṣṭa ca kriyāśmābhīr abhyupagataiva. sā tūpāditsita-vākyārthāvirodhīva eva nābhūtārtha-prādurbhāva-phaleti. saḥ-bhāva-vikāra-rahitātma-vastuno nirdhūtāśeṣa-dvaitānarthasya-parādhīna-prakāśasya vijijñāpayisitatvād asy-asmityā-di-kriyā-padam sva-mahima-siddhārtha-pratipādana-samartham abhyupagantavyām na viparītārtha-pratipādana-param iti} \]
And what was said in verse 19 about “except by means of a verb” (implying that we must relate all non-imperative factual sentences to some verb implying command to make them significant) is also incorrect. For we cannot construe verbs here, there and everywhere just to bring out our own view of the meaning of sentences. We can only construe verbs in those places where they bring out the connections originally intended, and even this only where the structure of the original sentence demands them. When verbs are construed in accordance with these principles, we (Advaitins) ourselves accept them. But we insist that they must not contradict the meaning that the original text was intended to convey nor result in a meaning that was not originally there.¹ The verbal forms “am” and “art” (in “I am Brahman” and “that thou art”) are intended to convey information about the real Self devoid of the six modes of change² (and hence not subject to attainment through action), which is free from all the evils of duality and reveals itself by its own independent power. They should be accepted as having the power to convey the self-existent and self-revealing reality as their meaning, and accepted as not being concerned with any meaning contradictory to that:

¹ As they do in the Mimāṃsaka interpretation, according to which every verb in the indicative mood has to be artificially construed as subordinate to some command to act.
² The six modes of change are enumerated by Śrī Śaṅkara at Upadeśa Sāhasrī (prose section) para. 113. They are birth, existence, growth, maturity, decay and death. It is an ancient conception, found in the Vedic commentator Yāska.

dhāved iti na dānārthe padām yad-vat prayujyate edhity-ādi tathā necchet svataḥ siddhārtha-vācini
[97] Just as the word “run” is not used to mean “give”, so should one not try to read the (imperative) meaning “be thou” into words (like “am” and “art”) which proclaim self-evident facts.

\[ \textit{na ca yathokta-vastu-vrtta-pratipādana-vyatirekeṇa tat-tvam-asy-ādi-vākyam vākyārthāntaram vakti} \]
\[ \textit{ti sakyam adhyavasātum ity āha} \]

In order to show that one cannot make out that texts like “that thou art” are really concerned with the meaning of some other text (implying a command to action, such as the imperative “he should meditate”), rather than with proclaiming true matters of fact about existing things, we proceed:

\[ \textit{tat-tvam-asy-ādi-vākyānāṃ svatás-siddhārtha-} \]
\[ \textit{bodhanāt arthāntaram na saṃdraṣṭum śakyate tridaśair api} \]

[98] Since the sentences like “that thou art” teach the existence of a reality that is revealed as self-evident, not even the gods could introduce a new meaning into them other than the one they already possess.

\[ \textit{yasmād evam} \]

Because this is so:

\[ \textit{ataḥ sarvāśramānāṃ tu vān-manaḥ-kāya-karmabhiḥ sv-anuṣṭhitair na muktiḥ syāj jñānād eva hi sā yataḥ} \]
Therefore liberation does not arise for men of different stations of life through the diligent performance of their duties in thought, word and deed—but through knowledge alone.\(^1\)

\(^1\) This summarizes the case against the doctrine that liberation can be achieved through action alone and explicitly contradicts the case of the ritualist summarized in verse 21 above. The next verse echoes the beginning of the reply given in verse 22.

\[
tasmāc ca kāraṇād etad apy upapannam
\]

And therefore the following also was reasonable:

\[
sva-mano-ratha-saṁkṛpta-prajñādhmāta-dhiyām ataḥ 
śrotriyeṣī eva vācas tāḥ śobhante nātma-vediṣu
\]

[100] “These, therefore, are words that come from a mind puffed up by its own fondly imagined wisdom.”\(^1\)

They may become those learned in the letter of the Vedas, but they do not become those who know the Self.

\(^1\)The reference is to verse 22 above. Compare Bhagavad Gitā II.42–44.
dvitiyo 'dhyāyah

pratyakṣadāṁ aneṇaṁviṣayatvāt teṣāṁ svārāmbhaka-
viṣayopanipātitvād ātmanaś cāseṣa-prameya-
vailakaṣanyāt sarvānarthaiṣa-hetv-ajñānāpanodi-jñāna-
divākarodaya-hetutvaṁ vastu-mātra-yāthātmya-
prakāśana-paṭiyasas tat-tvam-asy-āder vacasa eveti
bahvibhir upapattibhiḥ pradarśitam. atas tad-arthā-
pratipattau yat-kāraṇam tad apanayanāya dvitiyo
`dhyāya ārabhyate

BOOK II

Now, each of the senses is limited in its sphere to that material element of which it is itself composed\(^1\) and hence none of them can have the Self for its object; and since the Self is also totally different from anything that can be known objectively through the authoritative means of knowledge, we have shown by many arguments that the cause of the rise of that sun of knowledge which dispels nescience—the one cause of every evil—lies in the great sentences of the Veda such as “that thou art” alone, sentences whose sole scope is to proclaim the nature of ultimate reality. Now in this chapter we proceed to remove certain causes of failure to understand their meaning.

\(^1\) For the senses as limited each to its own element, compare verse IV.12 below, and the references to Śaṅkara there given in the note.
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

śrāvito vetti vākyārthaṁ na cet tat-tvam-asity ataḥ
 tvam-padārthānabhijñatvād atas tat-prakriyocaye

[1] If the man who has heard the sentence “that thou art” in the traditional way does not understand the meaning of it, it will be because he does not understand the meaning of “thou”.¹ We will explain, therefore, the sense in which it is used.

¹ See Śaṅkara’s Upadeśa Sāhasri (verse part) XVIII.181–182. This chapter in fact proceeds to discover the meaning of the word “thou” by the method of reasoning through agreement and difference in just the way prescribed in Śaṅkara’s work.

Yo 'tvam aham brahmēti vākyārthas tat-pratipattir
vākyād eveti pratyakṣādinām anevaṁviśayatvād ity
avādiṣam tasya viśuddhy-artham anaikāntikatvaṁ
pūrva-pakṣatvenopasthāpyate

It was remarked just now, with a view to show that realization of the meaning of the text “verily I am Brahman” is conveyed by the text alone, that the senses and other means of empirical knowledge did not have the Self for their object. With a view ultimately to clarify the main doctrine that the highest knowledge is conveyed by the actual Upanishadic text proclaiming it alone, some primam facie exceptions to the view will be cited, as they might be put forward by an objector.¹

¹ The objector says that examples show that there are various ways in which men come to understand “I am the Absolute”, (verse 2). Sometimes it just occurs naturally (verse 2), sometimes through continuous pondering on a text proclaiming this truth, sometimes through being prompted to ponder on such a text by a teacher, sometimes through merely hearing a text once accidentally (verse 3). Of these four ways, the only sure one is that in which a pupil is prompted to ponder on a text, so that it is this pondering over the text rather than the text itself that is the decisive factor (verse 3).
Against this, Sureśvara maintains that it is only the text itself that produces the holy knowledge, for it is an authoritative means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and the function of the authoritative means of knowledge is to produce knowledge of its own accord (verse 5 introduction). It is the activity of the pupil in regard to the text that is the accidental factor. Enlightenment does not come through action. Even where enlightenment appears to be due to natural causes, the hidden functioning of the text heard on some previous occasion must be assumed. Cp. Texte, p. 96.

\[ \text{kṛtyānātma-nivṛttau ca kaścid āpasti nivṛtīm} \\
\text{śruta-vākya-smṛtaś cānyāḥ smāryate ca vaco 'parah} \]

[2] (Objection, verses 2–3): One man attains the highest good through the mere sudden disappearance of the entire not-Self, another through pondering over the text which he formerly heard, another through being made to ponder over it.¹

¹ The present brief account by the opponent of the different types of successful aspirant requires to be supplemented from the parallel account at III.64 (prose) below. In the present verse and its successor four ways of becoming enlightened are mentioned by the objector and evaluated by him so as to exclude Sureśvara’s doctrine that enlightenment arises through destruction of nescience following immediately upon the hearing and understanding of the supreme texts. J cites from the Veda instances of Self-knowledge arising in each of the three ways mentioned in the present verse. At Brhadāranyaka Upanishad I.iv.2 Prajāpati cries “Since there is nothing other than me, why am I afraid?” Here he awoke to the nature of the pure Self apparently without the aid of a text at all. Bṛhgu was taught by his father (in Taṭṭürīya Upanishad III.1) that Brahman is that from which all these beings come forth, and after voluntarily undergoing ascetic discipline (tapas) he suddenly came to realize that Brahman is bliss, for it is from this bliss that all beings are born. Here we have realization of the Self through pondering on the spoken word, where the pondering is undertaken voluntarily and without clear direction of aim. Thirdly, as an example of being made to ponder over the text, J cites the case of Śvetaketu, to whom the formula “that thou art” had to be repeated nine times by the teacher (Chāndogya Upanishad, Chapter VI).

\[ \text{etat-prasaṅgena śrotarantaropanyāsam ubhayatāpi} \\
\text{sambhāvanāyāha} \]

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In this connection\(^1\) he cites the case of another hearer, to show that both things are possible.\(^2\)

\(^1\) i.e. in connection with the question whether or not immediate comprehension of the text is the cause of liberation.

\(^2\) i.e. to show that liberation may also arise from mere hearing of the text—so that it is impossible to lay down any fixed laws on this subject whatever.

\[vākya-śravanamātrāc ca piśācaka-vad āpnyayāt \\
\text{trīṣu yādṛcchikī siddhiḥ smāryamāne tu niścītā}\]

[3] And again, Self-realization may be obtained through mere hearing of the words of the text (once accidentally), as in the case of the goblin.\(^1\) Three of these four ways of acquiring Self-knowledge are due to chance; only in the case of the one who is made to ponder (on the text which he has previously heard) does Self-knowledge arise with certainty.

\(^1\) A certain goblin (piśāca) overheard the conversation between Krṣṇa and Arjuna and it aroused certain latent dispositions (saṁskāra) acquired in previous lives and he attained illumination then and there. Vijñāna Bhikṣu refers to this tradition at his Pravacana Bhāṣya to the Sāṅkhya Sūtras, IV.2 to prove that Śūdras and women can acquire illumination from hearing texts originally intended for the ears of Brahmins.

Here end the remarks of the objector. He claims that it is being prompted to ponder over the text that is the royal road to liberation. Wherever success has been found in other ways, it has been due to special and unusual circumstances.

\[nāyam anaikāntiko hetuḥ. yataḥ\]

This (pondering) is not the invariable cause (of Self-realization), as

\[sarvo 'yam mahimā jñeyo vākyasyaiva yathoditaḥ \\
vākyārtham na hy rte vākyāt kaścij jānāti tattvataḥ\]
[4] (Answer to the Objection): All this is to be attributed to the miraculous power of the holy texts, as we have said. Indeed, no one can know the nature of the ultimate reality conveyed by the texts except through the texts themselves.\footnote{According to J, this implies that it was through some text that Prajāpati acquired knowledge, following the disappearance of the entire not-self. See verse 2, note 1 above.}

\begin{quote}
vākyam ca pratipādanāya pravṛttam sat
pratipādayaty eva sarva-pramāṇanām apy
evaṃvṛttatvāt
\end{quote}

Those texts whose purpose is to make truths known do in fact make them known themselves (unaided), for this is the function of all authoritative means of knowledge (i.e. to make their subject-matter known unaided).\footnote{J explains that whereas the prose affirms that the text, being an authoritative means of knowledge, requires and indeed admits of no corroboration from other sources of knowledge, the verse that follows shows that it cannot be contradicted by other sources of knowledge (such as perception).}

\begin{quote}
nāhāṃ-grāhye na taddhīne na pratyai nāpi duḥkhini
virodhaḥ sad asīty asmād vākyābhijñasya jāyate
\end{quote}

[5] For the one who knows the real meaning of the text “thou art the real”,\footnote{Perhaps refers to “that thou art”. Chand. Up. VI.viii.7 sqq.} it conflicts neither with what is knowable as “I”,\footnote{The complex of body and soul. In saying “thou art the real”, the text does not conflict with what is knowable as “I” and is not the real because it makes no assertion about it. Its concern is with the ultimate Self, different from what is revealed by the ego-notion, cp. II.100 below.} nor with what is not knowable as “I”,\footnote{nor with the inmost Self} nor with the sufferer.\footnote{nor with the sufferer.}
According to J, the senses are meant. They are experienced not as “I” but as instruments of the “I”. One feels, “I see with the eye”, not “I, the eye, see”. The reports of the senses cannot conflict with the supreme texts because they bear on a different subject, the not-self. Cp. III.45, III.48, III.88 below.

Because it really is the real, the Absolute.

The transmigrant, the one supposing himself to be undergoing empirical experience. The text, being concerned with the supreme Self, is not in conflict with “the sufferer” either. It makes no assertion about him, since he is different from the supreme Self, cp. II.100 below.

nāviraktasya saṃsārān nivirṛtsā tato bhavet
na cāniṃvṛtta-trṣṇasya puṛuṣasya mumukṣutā

[6] No one who does not feel indifference (vairāgya) towards worldly experience (saṃsāra) can desire the cessation of it. Nor can the man whose thirst for pleasure is not extinct become a seeker of liberation (mumukṣu).

na cānumukṣor astiha guru-pādopasarpaṇam
na vinā guru-saṃbandham vākyasya śravaṇāṁ bhavet

[7] And without desire for liberation no one resorts to the feet of a teacher (guru); and without association with a guru there can be no hearing (śravaṇa) of the holy texts.

tathā pada-padārthau ca na sto vākyam rte kvacit
anvaya-vyatirekau ca tāv rte stāṁ kim-āśrayau

[8] And without the hearing of the holy texts one does not come into possession of the necessary words and their meanings; and unless one is in possession of these, how can one find a proper basis for the practice of reasoning according to the method of agreement and difference?11
Reasoning according to the method of agreement and difference ( anvaya and vyatireka) consists in noting from one's experience what things are constantly found in association and what things are variable. Spiritually applied, it leads to a critical examination of one's own psychological experiences to try and find the permanent factor in them; and hence to the first approximation towards discrimination of the permanent from the impermanent.

\[ anvaya-vyatirekābhyaṁ vinā vākyārtha-bodhanam na syāt tena vinājñāna-prahānaṁ nopapadyate \]

[9] Without reasoning by agreement and difference there is no understanding of the meaning of the holy texts, and without this nescience cannot be destroyed.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Cf. Upadeśa Sāhasrī XVIII.96.

\[ vinājñāna-prahānena puruṣārthah su-durlabhaḥ tasmād yathokta-siddhy-arthaṁ paro grantho 'vatāryate \]

[10] Without destruction of nescience the final aim of human life is hard to attain; hence we proceed to a new section of the book devoted to the elucidation of the term "thou" on the basis of reasoning by agreement and difference.

\[ varcaskāṁ tv anna-kāryatvād yathā nātmeti gamyate tad-bhāgaṁ sendriyo dehas tad-vat kim iti nekṣyate \]

[11] We infer that excreta are not the Self since they are derived from food. Why do you not see that the body and senses are not the Self either, since they too are composed of food?
ādy-antayor anātmatve prasiddhe madhye ’pi kaḥ pratibandhaḥ

Since food is evidently not-self before and after consumption, what could alter this in the interval?

prāg anātmaiva jagdham sad ātmatām ety avidyayā srag-ālepana-vad deham tasmāt paśyed vivikta-dhiḥ

[12] Food is first manifestly not-self; being eaten, it seems to become assimilated to the Self, but only through delusion (avidyā). Therefore the man of discriminating intellect should likewise regard his body as something different from himself, as if it were ointment or a garland.

athaivam api mad-vacanam nādriyase svayam evaitasmāc charirād aśuci-rāśer nirāśo bhaviṣyasi

You do not listen to my words. Well, but the time will come when this heap of impurities called the body will drive you desperate.

manyase tāvad asmīti yāvad asmān na niyase śvabhiḥ kroḍi-kṛte dehe naivāṃ tvam abhimāṃsyase

[13] You think “I am (this body)” as long as you are not severed from it. When the dogs are quarrelling over this corpse you will no longer be identified with it.

śira ākramaṇa pādena bhartsayaty aparān śunahṛ
dṛṣṭvā sādhāraṇaṃ deham kasmāt sakto ’si tatra bhoh

[14] See! One of the dogs has secured it! With his paw on the head he is snarling defiance at the others. Seeing what a contemptible object the body is, why do you remain attached to it?
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE 2:16

śruti-pariprāpito 'yam artho 'nātmā buddhy-ādi-
dehānta itidam āha

To show that the whole complex from intellect to physical body is declared to be not-self by the Veda, he proceeds:

busa-vrihi-palālāṁsair bijam ekaṁ tridhā yathā
buddhi-māṁsa-puriśāṁsair annam tad-vad avasthitam

[15] Just as the one seed differentiates threesfold into chaff, grain and straw, so eaten food becomes intellect, flesh and excreta.¹

¹ The reference is to Chāndogya Upanishad VI.v.1. This is Vedic support for the contention (made at verse 11 above) that the body is made of food, and hence is not the Self. The same applies to mind, which was regarded as a product of food.

yathoktārtha-pratipattau satyāṁ na rāga-dveṣābhyāṁ
vikriyate vipaścid ity asyārthasya pratipattaye
dṛṣṭāntaḥ

An example is now cited to show how, once the matter we are propounding is really grasped, the sage is no longer assailed by desire and aversion.

varcaske sampravartyakte doṣatas cāvadhārite
yadi doṣaṁ vadet tasmai kim tatroccaritur bhavet

[16] If a man has voided excrement and regards it as impure, what will he care if others point out its impurity?

tad-vat sūkṣme tathā sthūle dehe tyakte vivekataḥ
yadi doṣaṁ vadet tābhyāṁ kim tatra vidūṣo bhavet

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Similarly, if a man has rejected his gross and subtle bodies through discrimination, what will such an enlightened man (vidvān) care if others criticize these?

\begin{quote}
etāvad eva hy aham brahmāsmīti vākyārthāpratipattaṁ kāraṇaṁ yad uta buddhy-ādau dehānte hy aham mameti nissandhi-bandhano grahaḥ. tad-vyatireke hi na kutaścid vibhajyata ekala eva pratyag-ātmany avatiṣṭhata ity āha
\end{quote}

So much, then, for the continuous and obstinate bondage which causes the notions of “I” and “mine” with regard to the complex of the human personality from the intellect to the body, and which is the main cause of failure to understand the true import of the words “I am Brahman”. When a man once escapes from this he does not feel separate from anything, but rests uniform and all-pervading in the inner Self. To illustrate this we say:

\begin{quote}
ripaṁ bandhau sva-dehe ca samaikātmyam \hspace{1cm} prapaśyataḥ
vivekināh kutaḥ kopaḥ sva-dehāvayaṁevaṁ īva
\end{quote}

[18] How can the man of discrimination, who sees the same one Self in the friend, in the enemy and in his own body, feel anger, any more than he could do so against the limbs of his own body?

\begin{quote}
itāś caṁātmā dehādiḥ
\end{quote}

And for the following reason also the body, etc., is not-self.
ghaṭādi-vac ca dṛṣṭavat tair eva karaṇair dṛṣṭeḥ
svapne cāṇanvayaḥ jñeyo deho 'nātmeti sūribhiḥ

[19] Further, the wise know that the body is not the Self, for, like a pot, it is an object to those very senses which perceive external objects, while in dream the continuity (of the body consciousness) is broken.¹

¹ Continuity—anvaya. The reasoning is by agreement and difference, anvaya and vyatireka. In the human personality the seer is constant and hence real; but by comparison we know that the body is unreal for it sometimes vanishes and we get a new one in dreams.

dehādi-kārya-karana-saṃghāta-vyatirekāvyatirekā-
darśinaḥ pratyakṣata eva viruddham kāryam
upalabhya-te

Whoso notes that the Self is sometimes identified with and sometimes distinguished from the individual personality, with all its effects and instruments from the body up, perceives directly that the latter is an effect credited with contradictory properties (i.e. consciousness and inertness) in the two cases.

caturbhir uhyate yat tat sarva-śaktyā śarīrakam
tūlāyate tad evāham-dhiyāghrātam acetasaṁ

[20] That same body, which is only just lifted by four pall-bearers with all their efforts, becomes light as a flock of cotton when adopted by the ego of a fool.

prasiddhatvāt prakaraṇārthopasamhārāyāha

Because the truth of this matter is widely recognized, we proceed (at once and without further argument) to summarize the topic under discussion:
2:21 THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

sthūlaṁ yuktyā nirasyaivaṁ nabhaso nilatāṁ iva
dehaṁ suksmaṁ nirākuryād ato yuktibhir ātmanaḥ

[21] Having discovered through reasoning that the physical body no more belongs to the Self than blueness to the sky, one should proceed to realize that the Self has no connection with the subtle body either, and this also through reasoning.

kathāṁ dehaṁ suksmaṁ nirākuryād iti. ucyate

How should one refute (the sense of identity with) the subtle body? We reply:

ahām-mamatva yatnecchā nātma-dharmāḥ kṛṣatva-vat
karmatvenopalabhyatvād apāyitvāc ca vastra-vat

[22] The notions of “I” and “mine”, effort and desire, etc., (which are factors making up the subtle body) are no more properties of the Self than leanness is, for they are perceived as objects and are as transitory as a garment.

vaidharmye drśtāntaḥ

An example to illustrate this distinction:

noṣṇimānaṁ dahaty agniḥ svarūpatvād yathā jvalan
tathaivaṁtātmano vidyād ahaṁ naivāviśeṣaṁ na
t

[23] Blazing fire does not burn up its own heat, since the latter is of its own nature (and not a different object). And, in the same way, if the ego were the Self or belonged to the Self, the Self could not know the ego as an object, since the two would not be distinct.¹

¹ But the Self does know the ego as an object, so the two must be distinct. Cp. Upadeśa Śāhasri XVI.13 ff.
ekasyātmanāḥ karma-kartṛ-bhāvaḥ sarvathā
nopapadyata iti śrutvā mīmāṁsakaḥ pratyavatīśṭhate
ahaṁ-pratyaya-grāhyatvād grāhya-grāhaka ātmeti
tan-nivṛtty-artham āha

On hearing our statement that the one Self cannot in any way function as subject and object simultaneously, the Mīmāṁsaka (of Kumārila’s school) interposes with an objection. The self, he says, is both subject and object because it is the object of the ego-notion.¹ To refute this, we say:

¹ Taking the reading grāhya-grāhaka, not found in Hiriyanna, from the footnotes of the Acyuta Grantha Mālā Edition.

yat-karmako hi yo bhāvo nāsau tat-kartṛko yataḥ
ghaṭa-pratyaya-vat tasmān nāham syād draṣṭr-
karmakah

[24] That which is functioning as the object of a knowing subject, as for example, the idea of a pot (ghaṭa-pratyaṇa),¹ cannot have that knower as its own object. Hence the ego (which is witnessed as an object by the Self) cannot have the Self for its object.²

¹ The idea of a pot is witnessed as an object by the Self and hence cannot at the same time be a knowing subject.
² This argument is directed against the Mīmāṁsaka of Kumārila’s school, who regards the self as “object of the ego-notion”.

atrāha pratyakṣeṇātmanāḥ karma-
kartṛtvābhhyupagame tat-pādopajivinānumānena
pratyakṣotsāraṇam ayuktam iti codyām tan-
nirākaraṇāya pratyakṣopanyāsaḥ

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Here the opponent says: “The self is directly perceived as both subject and object in perception, and it is idle to use inference to refute perception when inference itself rests on perception.” To refute this objection, the following statement about perception is made:¹

¹ All the Hindu schools held that, since inference depends upon perception and cannot proceed without it, it is inferior to perception and must always be disregarded where it contradicts it. It can act merely as a supplement to perception.

\[ yatra \ yo \ drṣyate \ draśtrā \ tasyaivāsauss guṇo \ na \ tu \ draśtr-siham \ drṣyatām \ yasmān \ naiveyād \ draśtr-bodha-vat \]

[25] When anything (A) is perceived in another thing (B) by a perceiving subject, then A is a quality of B and not of the perceiving subject; for if it belonged to the subject it could not become an object of knowledge. Example—the perceiver’s knowledge, (which is known by him as an object and therefore cannot belong to him).¹

¹ On this verse, Professor Hacker writes, Texte, p. 48 f.:

“At... verse 25 it is not only that the opponent’s objection is answered: the discussion, as so often with Suresvara, also shifts round into a somewhat new direction: whereas it had previously been shown that the ego is not of the nature of the Self, that is, not identical with it, and that it cannot know the Self, what is now shown is that it is not an attribute of the Absolute (Self), that it does not belong to it. In each case here the concept “ego” is to be taken as “ego-notion”. Notions, indeed, are qualities of the Self for the Mīmāṃsaka and Naiyāyika, and so belong to it; whereas for the Vedānta and Śāṅkhya they are modifications of form assumed by the inner-sense (antahkarana)”. The perceiver of the empirical ego is the Witness (sākṣin), i.e. the Seer himself. J. Suresvara admits (with the Mīmāṃsaka) that an ego is given objectively in perception, but denies that it can be the real Self, since (unlike the Mīmāṃsaka) he identifies the Self with knowledge, on the basis of Vedic revelation backed by reason. The Mīmāṃsakas thought of the Self as something inert that was revealed as an object by knowledge in every cognition, knowledge being something sui generis and different from the Self—something that arose in the Self as a result of a collocation of certain causal factors—object, sense-organ, mind, self etc. For Suresvara (on grounds of revelation and reason based on
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE 2:26

revelation and personal experience) the real Self is knowledge, and consequently the ego that it illumines in self-perception (or introspection as we should call it today) is not the real Self but is a modification of the mind, i.e. a part of the not-self.


\[
\text{pratyakṣenaiva bhavad-abhimatasya} \\
\text{pratyakṣasyābhāsikṛtatvāt su-stham} \\
\text{evānumānam. atas tad eva prakriyate tatra} \\
\text{ca vikalpa-dūṣanābhidhānam}
\]

Perception itself reveals the falsity of your view that the Self is subject to perception, so that our inference (of verse 24) stands. We therefore now apply the argument further to refute alternative forms of the opposed position.

\[
\text{nātmanā na tad-amśena guṇah sva-stho 'vagamyate} \\
\text{abhimatlavāt samatvāc ca niramśatvād akarmataḥ}
\]

[26] (Now, the ego is known as an object by the Self: but if it were a quality of the Self this would be impossible. For) a quality inhering in the Self cannot be known either by the Self or a part of the Self. For such a quality would not be different from the Self, and the Self, moreover, is homogeneous, partless and not an object.¹

¹ If the perceptible ego were a quality of the Self, it could not be known by the Self as an object unless the Self could know itself as an object, which has been seen to be impossible (verses 23-24 above). Here Suresvara adds a further reason why the Self cannot know itself or any quality of itself as an object—namely, because it is undifferentiated.
All the difficulties attaching to the view that the Self as a whole can know itself as an object attach equally to the view that part of the Self can know the Self as an object—with the added difficulty that the Self is partless! Hence we conclude that, since the Self cannot know itself as an object, the ego that is revealed objectively in introspection must be not-self.

\[ \text{na yugapan nāpi kramenobhayathā caikasya dharmino grāhya-grāhakatvam upapadyata iti pratipādanāyāha} \]

To explain how one substance cannot function as subject and object either simultaneously or successively or both, we say:

\[ \text{draṣṭṛtvenopayuktatvāt tadaiva syān na dṛṣyatā kālāntare ced dṛṣyatvām na hy adraṣṭṛkam iṣyate} \]

[27] When the seer is functioning as such it cannot at the same time function as a seen object. If you ask if it can function as a seen object at another time the answer is “No”, for a seen object without a seer is not admissible.\(^1\)

\(^1\) The argument is: The Self is the sole knower. Should it at any time function as an object, then it could not be known, as there would be no knower to know it. Texte, p. 48.

\[ \text{santu kāmam anātma-dharmā mamatvādayo yathokta-nyāya-balād anātmatayaiva ca teṣu vyavahārād aḥam-rūpasya tu pratyag-ātma-sambandhitayaiva prasiddher ahaṁ brahmāsmīti śruteś cānātma-dharmatvam ayuktam iti cet tan na} \]
Let us suppose that the opponent admits that “the sense of possession” and other modifications\(^1\) of the ego-notion are not-self for the reasons given, and also because they are perceived as such in ordinary empirical experience. Yet he might contend that the “I” itself, since it is experienced in direct relation to the inner Self, and since the Veda expressly declares it to be the Absolute in the phrase “I am Brahman”, should not be regarded as an element pertaining to the not-self. To this we reply, “No.”

\(^1\) J specifies “wish” and “effort”.

\begin{align*}
\text{ahām-dharmas tv abhinnaś ced aham brahmaṇ}
\text{vākyataḥ}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
gauro 'ham ity anaikānto vākyam tad-vyapanetṛ tat
\end{align*}

[28] If it be said that the ego-nature must be non-different from the highest Self on account of the text “I am Brahman”,\(^1\) which must be understood on the analogy of “I am fair” (which predicates “fair” of the self), we reply that this analogy does not invariably hold. In fact, the text in question denies that the ego pertains to the Absolute.

\(^1\) Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad, i.iv.10.

\begin{align*}
kāthāṃ vākyam tad-vyapanetṛ tad iti. ucyate
\end{align*}

How does the text “I am Brahman” deny that the ego pertains to the Absolute? We reply:

\begin{align*}
yo 'yam sthānuḥ pumān eṣa puṃ-dhiyā sthānu-dhīr iva
\text{brahmāsmīti dhiyā 'śeṣā hy aham-buddhir nivartyate}
\end{align*}
As, in the judgement “this post is a man”, the notion “man” cancels the notion “post”, so all notion of ego is cancelled by the conviction “I am the Absolute (Brahman)”.  

This verse has been quoted and discussed by Vidyāranya Svāmin in his Pañcadasī VIII.42 f. and by Appaya Dikṣita at Siddhānta Leśa Saṅgraha I.34. The logical structure of the sentences “thou art that” and (especially) “I am Brahman” was a theme of discussion among the Advaitins. Were they affirmative identity propositions like “This is that Devadatta”, or were they affirmative propositions involving concealed negations, like “this post is a man”, which really means “this post is not a post but a man”? Here Suresvara decides that they are propositions involving negations. If ego and Brahman were identical, Brahman would suffer. But elsewhere in this work (III.2 sqq.) he interprets the mahāvākyas as propositions affirming identity, a course which has the support of “Vākya Vṛitti” (verse 37). Perhaps the only real difference between the two courses is that in interpreting these sentences as identity propositions “lakṣaṇā” (see śloka II.54 below) is applied to the word in the text meaning “soul”, whereas in the interpretation as negation the word is taken in its ordinary empirical sense.

\[\text{ahāṁ-pariccheda-vyāvṛttau na kimcid avyāvṛttam} \\
\text{dvaita-jātam avaśiṣyate dvitiya-saṁbandhasya tan-} \\
\text{mūlatvāt. ata āha}\]

When the ego-limitation is removed, nothing in the whole range of duality is left standing, since that is the sole root of our relation with duality. So we proceed:

\[\text{nivṛttāyām aḥaṁ-buddhau mama-dhiḥ pravilīyate} \\
\text{ahāṁ-bijā hi sā sidhyet tamo ’bhāve kutak phaṇi}\]

When the ego-sense ceases, the sense of possession, too, departs; for the ego-sense is its only cause. Can there be (the appearance of) a false snake except when it is dark?
Further explanation of the example to bring out what is meant by it (in the context):

tamo-'bhibhūta-citto hi rajjvām paśyati roṣaṇam 
bhrāntyā bhrāntyā vinā tasmān noragam sraji vikṣate

[31] It is only he whose mind is afflicted by darkness who sees a snake in a rope through error. Therefore no one sees a snake in a garland except through error.

ananvayāc ca nātma-dharmo 'haṃkāraḥ

The ego-sense is not a property of the Self, as it is not invariably associated with it:

ātmanaś ced aham-dharmo yāyān mukti-suṣuptayoh 
yato nānveti tenāyam anyadiyo bhaved aham

[32] If the ego-sense were really a property of the Self it would continue after liberation and in deep sleep. Since it does not do so, we conclude that it is a property of something else.

ātma-dharmatvābhvyupagame 'parihārya-doṣa-
prasaktiś ca

Moreover, insurmountable difficulties arise on the view that it is a property of the Self:

yady ātma-dharmo 'haṃkāro nityatvaṁ tasya bodha-
vat

nityatve mokṣa-sāstrāṇāṁ vaiyarthyaṁ prāpnuyād dhruvaṁ
[33] Again, if the ego-sense were really a property of the Self it would be eternal, like Consciousness. But if it were eternal, the traditional treatises (śāstra) treating of liberation would have been composed in vain (which is absurd).

syāt parihāraḥ svābhāvika-dharmatvābhyupagame
′py āmrādi-phala-vad iti cet tan na

If you say that even on the assumption that the ego-sense is a natural property of the Self the difficulties can be overcome by pointing to the example of a mango, that is wrong:

āmrādeḥ parināmitvād guṇa-hānir guṇāntaraṇah
avikāri tu tad brahma “na hi draṣṭur” iti śruteḥ

[34] Physical objects like a mango-fruit are subject to modification and can acquire properties and lose them. But the Absolute is changeless. The Veda says,¹ “there is no break in the sight of the Seer”.

¹ Bhādarānyaka Upanishad IV.iii.23. The mango-fruit acquires successively the colours green and yellow and loses them. Yet these colours are at least as real as the mango, which therefore changes with them. Brahmaṇ does not have properties in this sense.

ahāmkārasya cāgamāpāyitvāt tad-dharmiṇaḥ
cānityatvam prāpnoti

Moreover, since the ego-sense comes and goes, the substance in which it inhered (as a real quality) would be changeable:
āgamāpāyi-niṣṭhatvād anityatvam iyād dṛśiḥ
upayann apayan dharmaṃ vikaroti hi dharminām

[35] Change is the very nature of the ego-sense, since it comes and goes. But essential properties that change imply necessary change in the substance to which they belong.

astv anityatvam kam upālabhemahi
pramāṇopapannatvād iti cet tan na

If you say: “The Self must in fact be changeable, as it is proved to be such by authentic means of knowledge and we can find no fault here”—that is wrong.

sadā ’vilupta-sākṣitvam svatas-siddham na pāryate
apahnotum ghaṭasyeva kuśāgriya-dhiyātmanah

[36] Not even a man of knife-sharp intellect can abolish the fact that the self-evident Self is the ever unbroken Witness. It is not like a pot (which comes and goes).

etasmāc ca hetor ahamkārasyānātma-dharmatvam
avasiyatām

And here is another reason for concluding that the ego-sense is a property of the not-self:

pramāṇaṅaiścāvagamyatvād ghaṭādi-vad aham-dṛśeḥ
yato rāddhiḥ pramāṇānām sa katham tāiḥ prasidhyati
[37] Again, the ego-sense is subject to being known (as an object) through the authoritative means of cognition, like a pot. But that Self which enables the means of knowledge to function at all (by illuminining them)—how can it be known by them and how can it require them for a proof?

\[ \text{dhārma-dharmīṇoś cetaretara-viruddhātmakatvād asāṅgatiḥ} \]

Moreover, a substance and attribute of contradictory nature are impossible to combine:

\[ \text{dhārminaśca viruddhatvān na drṣya-guṇa-saṅgatiḥ mārutāndolita-jvālam śaityam nāgniṃ sisṛpsati} \]

[38] A totally contradictory property never comes to inhere in a substance. Coolness does not insinuate itself into a blazing fire fanned by the wind.

\[ \text{tasmād visrabdham upagamyatām} \]

Therefore it is safe to conclude:

\[ \text{draṣṭṛtvam drṣyatā caiva naikasminn ekadā kvacit drṣya-drṣyo na ca draṣṭā draṣṭur darṣi drśir na ca} \]

[39] One thing cannot at the same time be both seer and seen; the seer cannot be seen by the object that is itself the seen; nor can sight see the seer.

\[ \text{sarva-saṁvyavahāra-lopāśca prāpnoti. yasmāt} \]
And (on the opponent’s assumptions) an end to all empirical experience would follow, because:

\[ \text{dṛṣṭāpi yadi dṛṣyāyā ātmeyāt karmatāṁ dhiyāḥ} \]
\[ \text{yaugapadyam adṛṣyatvam vaiyarthyam cāpnuyāc} \]
\[ \text{chrutīḥ} \]

[40] If the Self, which is the seer, could become the object of the intellect, which is already an object for the Self, neither could really be an object (because there would then be no subject). And the statement in the Veda “there is no break in the sight of the Seer”\(^1\) would be rendered vain.  

\(^1\) Brhadarāṇyaka Upanishad IV.iii.23.

\[ \text{kutaḥ. yasmāt} \]

Why? Because:

\[ \text{nālupta-dṛṣṭer dṛṣyatvam dṛṣyatve draṣṭriā kutaḥ} \]
\[ \text{syāc ced dṛg ekaṁ nirdṛṣyaṁ jagad vā syād} \]
\[ \text{asākṣikam} \]

[41] The one of uninterrupted vision cannot ever be an object; if it were an object, how could it be the Seer? If it were (to become an object) then the Seer would be the one seen or else the world would be devoid of a Witness.

\[ \text{ukta-yuktiṁ dṛdhikartum āgamodāharaṇopanyāsaḥ} \]

Quotation from the Veda to support the afore-mentioned reasoning:
ārtam anyad drṣeh sarvaṁ neti netiti cāsakṛt
vadanti nirguṇaṁ brahma kathāṁ śrutir upekṣyate

[42] How can one overlook the Veda which more than once denies the existence of what is other than the Seer with phrases like “Neti, neti” (“not thus, not thus”), and declares that the Absolute (Brahman) is void of qualities (nirguṇa).

“mahābhūtāny ahamkāra” ity etat kṣetram ucyate
na drṣer dvaita-yogo ’sti viśveśvara-matād api

[43] “The ego-sense and the great elements”—these belong to the “field”.¹ The Seer is not associated with duality. Such was the opinion of the Lord of the Universe.²

¹ The “field” means the entire realm of duality. The “realm of duality” in Advaita is the realm of all that is different from undifferentiated Spirit. It has only apparent existence.
³ Bhagavad Gītā XIII 5 and 6.

adhunā prakṛtārthopasamāhraḥ

Now the concluding summary of the subject under discussion:

evam etadd hirug jñeyam mithyā-siddham anātmakam
moha-mūlaṁ sudurbodham dvaitaṁ yuktibhir ātmanaḥ

[44] Thus we have shown (by reason, as well as by Vedic and traditional authority) that this duality is different from the Self—this duality which is false, which has no definable essence, whose cause is ignorance and whose nature is hard to understand by mere reasoning.
If you ask, "How is duality shown to be false?" we reply:

na prthaṁ nātmānā siddhir ātmāno 'nyasya vastunaḥ ātma-vat kalpitās tasmād ahamkārādīr ātmani

[45] It is impossible to establish the existence of any real entity other than the Self, whether we take such entity to be essentially identical with the Self or essentially different. Therefore the ego-sense and the rest of duality are imagined in the Self as if they were the Self.

tasmād ajñāna-vijṛmbhitam etat

Therefore all this (world-appearance) comes forth from ignorance (ajñāna):

drśyāḥ sabdādayah klptā draṣṭr ca brahma nirguṇam aham tad ubhayāṁ bibhrad bhrāntim ātmani yacchati

[46] The objects, which are the elements beginning with sound, are imaginary. The subject is the qualityless Absolute. The ego, embracing both (subject and object), affects the Self and introduces an illusion.¹

¹ Cp. II.53 below.

tata evyam abhinnasyātmano bheda-buddhiḥ

That is the very source for this notion of distinctions we have in the distinctionless Absolute (Self):

drg ekā sarva-bhūteṣu bhāti drśyair aneka-vat jala-bhājana-bheneda mayūkha-srag-vibheda-vat
[47] The Seer in all creatures is one. It is only through the objects (in which He is reflected) that He appears to be many, as the one sun with his garland of rays becomes apparently multiple when reflected in the multiple vessels of water.\(^1\)

\(^1\) J writes: "It is not only the Self's relationship with the not-self that is produced by the ego. The Self's apparent plurality as associated with different bodies is produced by it also." It is, however, with the intellect rather than with the physical body that Sureśvara is primarily concerned here—see the next two verses.

\textit{yathoktārthasya pratipattaye drśtāntaḥ}

An example to bring home the doctrine as propounded:

\textit{mitrodāsina-śatrutvam yathaikasyānya-kalpanāt abhinnaśya cītes tad-vad bhedo 'ntāhkarānāśrayaḥ}

[48] Just as one and the same man is at the same time friend, enemy and neutral—but only through the imagination of other people—so all distinctions in the one undifferentiated pure consciousness are due to the intellect of man.

\textit{apahāro yathā bhānoḥ sarvato jala-pātrakaiḥ tat-kriyākṛti-deśāptis tathā buddhibhir ātmanāḥ}

[49] Just as the sun is kidnapped by the waterpots and made to share their action, shape and position, so is the Self appropriated by the multiple intellects of men.

\textit{na ca viruddha-dharmānām ekatrāṇupapattih. kim kāraṇam}

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Nor is it true that the co-presence of contradictory attributes is (always) impossible. Why? Because:

kalpitānāṁ avastuvāt syād ekatrāpi saṁbhavah
kamaniyā 'suciḥ svādvity ekasyāṁ iva yoṣiti

[50] A plurality of contradictory attributes may co-exist if they are imaginary. Thus the body of one and the same woman is respectively “desirable”, “impure” and “a tasty morsel”, to a gallant, a monk and a dog.¹

¹ The image derives from Buddhist writers, cp. Śloka Vārttika, Sūtra 5, Śūnya Vāda Section, verse 59. Compare a (characteristically) somewhat milder version of it at Pañcadasī IV.23. The Self wears all the characteristics of everyone, but none affects it. All are imputed merely. It is qua corpse that the body is a “tasty morsel” to a dog, cp. verses II.13 and 14 above. On the relevant Buddhist texts, see L. de la Vallée Poussin, Le Bouddhisme d’après les sources brahmaniques, p. 27 f.

na cāyāṁ kriyā-kāraka-phalātmaka ābhāsa iṣad api
paramārtha-vastu sprāsati tasya moham-
mātropādānatvāt

Nor does this whole illusory display (ābhāsa), consisting in action, its factors and results, touch the supreme reality in any way, since it is founded in mere delusion.

abhūtābhiniyeśena svātmānāṁ vañcayaty ayam
asaty api dvitiye 'rthe soma-śarma-pitā yathā

[51] Although no second thing exists apart from his own Self, man deceives himself with desires for what does not exist. He is like the father of Somaśarma in the story.¹

¹ There was once a beggar who received more grains than he expected in his begging-bowl. Betaking himself to the shade of a tree, he lay down and began to daydream about how he would sell them and buy cows, propagate oxen with the cows, and sell the oxen and acquire
wealth. The daydream continued to develop until he had become a wealthy householder, much devoted to his son Somaśarma. Then Somaśarma came running out of the house crying, with his mother in pursuit, and the beggar struck at his wife in anger, thereby shattering the bowl of grain (which was unfortunately still in his hand) so that the contents were scattered to the wind.

The story comes in the Pañcatantra, the charming collection of humorous moral tales, mainly about animals, which for centuries has been used as a primary reader by learners of Sanskrit. Perhaps it was so used by Śaṅkara and Suresvara, for both of them appear to have been familiar with it. Both refer to the “story of the elephant” which occurs in it—the story of how different blind men gave different accounts of an elephant which they felt with their hands. Cp. verse II.93 below, and Śaṅkara, Chāndogya Upanishad Commentary V.xviii.1. The story also occurs in Jalālūddin Rūmī’s Mathnawī III.1259 ff.

\[\text{vasītu-yāthātmikānavabodha-patāla-vanaddhākṣaḥ san} \]

He whose eyes are covered by the bandage of not-being-awake-to-the-true-nature-of-reality:

\[\text{subhrūḥ sunāsā sumukhi sunetrā cāru-hāsini kalpanā-mātra-sammohād rāmety āliṅgate ’sucim} \]

[52] He (such a one) embraces an impure body thinking, through sheer imagination born of infatuation, “Her eyebrows are lovely, her nose charming, her face and eyes are beautiful. How sweetly she smiles! Oh, she is delightful!”

1 Infatuation for woman is taken as a symbol of that infatuation which alone gives reality to the world.

\[\text{sarvasyānartha-jātasya jihāsitasya mūlam ahaṃkāra eva tasyātmānātmoparāgāt. na tu paramārtha tabātmano ’vidyayā tat-kāryena vā sambandho ’bhūdasti bhaviṣyati vā tasyāparilupta-drṣṭi-svābhāvyāt} \]
Verily it is the ego-sense (ahāṃkāra) alone which is the root of all the evil which men desire to avoid, since it is coloured both by the Self and the not-self. Nevertheless, there neither was, is, nor will be any real contact between the Self and ignorance and its effects, since the Self is by nature the unbroken Witness.

\[ \text{drṣyānuraktam tad-draṣṭr drṣyaṃ draṣṭr-anurañjitam} \\
\text{ahāṃ-vṛttyobhayam raktam tan-nāše ’dvaitatātmanah} \]

[53] The perceiver of an object is coloured by that object; and the object is coloured by the perceiver. Both are intermingled through the ego-sense. When that is destroyed the Self remains non-dual.¹

¹ I follow Sureśvara in using the term antahkarana, literally inner organ and so what we would call mind, to stand for the ego-sense. He writes: “The antahkarana, in intimate contact with the objects such as sound and the other elements, becomes a subject in relation to them owing to the presence in itself of a reflection (abhāsa) of the pure light of consciousness. And yet, though dyed in the light of consciousness or Self, it remains in some sense an object illumined by the latter’s light. In this way, both the empirical perceiver and perceived exist by virtue of the ego-sense. When we have the experience “I know this”, the ego-sense is dyed with the nature of the object and the pure subject, both. Therefore it is the ego-sense alone which causes the connection between the pure subject and the object, these two being otherwise totally distinct in nature. Hence it is reasonable to suppose that when the ego-sense is destroyed the Self will shine in pure non-duality”.

\[ \text{iha kecic codayanti yo ’yam anvaya-vyatirekābhyaṃ} \\
\text{anātmatayotsārito ’hamkāro vākyārtha-pratipattaye} \\
\text{so ’yam viparitārthah saṃvṛtto yasmād aham} \\
\text{brahmāsmīti brahmāhaṃ-padārthhayoh} \\
\text{sāmānādhikaranyā-śravaṇād anātmārthena} \\
\text{sāmānādhikaranyāṃ prāpnoti. vaktavyā ca pratyag-} \\
\text{ātmani tasya vṛttir iti socyate prasiddha-lakṣaṇā-} \\
\text{guṇa-vṛttibhiḥ} \]
Here some object as follows: "The ego has been dismissed as not-self through reasoning by the method of agreement and difference pursued with a view to understanding the meaning of the supreme texts. But here (i.e. in the authoritative texts) the word "I" is used in a contradictory sense. For we have the text "I am the Absolute (Brahman)" in which "I" and "the Absolute (Brahman)" are set in apposition. And from this would result the setting in apposition of something which means not-self (with the Self). You must therefore explain in what sense (the word "I") is applied to the inmost Self (in the text "I am the Absolute")'. (In reply) we proceed to explain the (different) senses (of the word "I") viz. the familiar meaning (prasiddha), the indirect meaning (lakṣaṇā) and the figurative meaning (guṇa).\(^1\)

\(^1\) Where the indirect usage (lakṣaṇā vṛtti) and the figurative usage (guṇa vṛtti) are distinguished, indirect usage is based on the constant concomitance or proximity of what the word means in its primary sense with what it is used to indicate, whereas figurative usage is based on a common quality belonging to both the primary and figurative meanings. Cp. Saṃkṣeṇa Śāriṇaka, I.172.

On this classification, when we say "A village on the Ganges" to mean "A village on the bank of the Ganges" we have indirect usage, because there is no common quality (but only proximity) between the Ganges and its bank. But when we say "Devadatta is a lion" we have figurative usage, because the metaphor is based on common qualities belonging to Devadatta and a lion.

In the verses to follow, verse II.54 illustrates how the term "I" may be applied to the Absolute or supreme Self by indirect usage, verse II.55 (cp. III.100, 102) illustrates how it can be applied by figurative usage, and verse II.56 shows how it can be applied to the supreme Self in its primary or usual meaning (of "ego")—though in the last case it can be applied to the supreme Self only in so far as the latter is itself "qualified, limited and individualized by the mind or ego-sense". In itself, the supreme Self cannot be designated by any word in its direct meaning, cp. verses III.102, 103. It will be remembered that Suresvara has already (verse II.29 above) explained the text "I am the Absolute" with the word taken in its primary sense of "ego". But there the text, affirmative in form, was explained in a special way as involving a concealed negation. In the present verses he is exercising his ingenuity to
show that in whatever sense you choose to take the word "I" in that
text, whether primary, indirect or figurative, the text is in any case
intelligible as teaching strict non-duality. On the meaning of the present
verse and its immediate successors, see, especially, Texte, pp. 54 ff.

nājñāsiṣam iti prāha suṣuptād utthito 'pi hi
ayo-dāhādi-vat tena lakṣāṇam paramātmanah

[54] "I knew nothing", said the one who rose from
sleep. In this we have (the word 'I' used as) an indirect
indication (lakṣāṇa) of the supreme Self, as (when one
speaks of) the burning iron, etc.¹

¹ Professor Hacker writes: "When one wakes from dreamless sleep,
one is conscious 'I was aware of nothing (as I slept)'. The 'I' that was
aware of nothing in deep sleep cannot be the ego-sense, for in deep
sleep the ego-sense does not exist. It must be the Ātman (supreme Self),
which is here called 'I'. We have thus an inexact, derivative, approxi-
mative designation (lakṣāṇā) of the Self. A similar inexact or trans-
posed designation occurs when one says 'the iron burns'. If the word
'burn' were used in its primary sense, the sentence would have to run,
'the fire burns'. But the word can also be used to stand for a thing
which stands in some relation or other to its proper object. In the same
way, the word 'I' can be related to the inmost Self (pratyagātman),
because the ego ever stands in relation with the Self". (Texte, p.54 f.
The distinction between lakṣāṇa and lakṣāṇā (for lakṣāṇā-vṛtti) must
be noted. Suresvara speaks here of lakṣana or indirect designation.
But the context (especially the use of the word vṛtti in the next verse)
shows that he is comparing different kinds of meaning or word-
usage (vṛtti). Hence he is in this verse describing indirect word-usage
(lakṣāṇā) as against the figurative usage (guṇa-vṛtti) and direct usage
(mukhyā-vṛtti) to follow.

pratyaktvād ati-sūkṣmatvād ātma-drṣty-anuśilanaṁ
ato vṛttir vihāyānyā hy aham-vṛttyopalakṣyate

[55] On account of the interiority of the ego-sense to
everything else but the pure Self, on account of its
subtlety, and because it behaves as if it were the per-
ceiving Self—for these reasons all other notions (vṛtti)
are discarded and the ego-notion (i.e. the word "I") is
chosen to represent figuratively the pure Self.¹
This explains how the text "I am the Absolute (Brahman)" can be interpreted as a case of the figurative (guna-vṛtti) usage of the term "I", where the basis for the figurative usage is the presence of common qualities in the ego and in the Absolute. The hearer recognizes that figurative usage is in play because the identification of the limited ego (the direct meaning of the word "I") with the infinite Absolute is impossible.

\[
\text{ātmanā cāvinā-bhāvam atha vā vilayam vrajet}
\]
\[
\text{na tu pakṣāntaram yāyād atas cāham-dhiyocytate}
\]

[56] And again, the ego-notion cannot exist without the Self or else it dissolves completely. It has no other possibility. For this reason, also, the Self may be referred to by the I-notion.

\[
\text{kidṛk punar vastu lakṣyam}
\]

What then is the nature of the principle which is indirectly indicated by the word "I"?

\[
\text{nāmādibhyah para bhūmā niṣkalo 'kārako 'kriyah}
\]
\[
\text{sa evātmavatām ātmā svatas siddhaḥ sa eva nah}
\]

[57] The Infinite (bhūman),\(^1\) the partless, that which is actionless and not the factor of any action, the one that is beyond names and other categories—that self-revealed Self is the Self known by the Self-realized sages. That is the Self we teach.

\(^1\) See Chāndogya Upanishad VII.23.1.
We have shown already that the ego-sense, consisting of such feelings as "I am happy" and "I am sad," like other (elements of the empirical personality) is a property of the not-self. And in order to do so we took for consideration the Self as associated with the apparent limiting condition (upādhi) of agency, which is itself but a notion arising from ignorance. For had we taken the pure Self it would have been impossible to apply to it the process of reasoning called anvaya and vyatireka, and, indeed, to have done so would have been pointless. In a similar spirit we now concentrate on the nature of the Self as Witness (sākṣin)—even though witnesshood itself is merely imagined through nescience—and deny of the Self, even in this condition, all forms of modification such as agency.

\[\textit{eṣa sarva-dhiyām nṛttam aviluptaika-darśanah} \]
\[\textit{vikṣate 'vikṣamāṇo 'pi nimiṣat tad dhruvo 'dhruvam} \]

[58] This (Self) is the one unbroken witness of the dance of every intellect. Verily, itself eternal, it views the passing without the act of looking—as if through half-closed eyes.\(^1\)

\(^1\) The image of the Self as Witness of the dance of the intellect is developed in Pañcadasā Chapter X. For the Witness as one in all bodies, see Upadeśa Sāhasri, verse part, VII.2 ff. For the Witness as actionless and without modifications, \textit{ibid.} XVIII.159. Much of the Naiśkarmya Siddhi is a development of themes stated in the Upadeśa Sāhasri, just as Sarvajñātma Muni’s Saṃkṣepa Sārīraka develops the
doctrines of the Naishkarmya Siddhi. The three works form a loosely connected trilogy. All three take as their central theme the explanation of the text “That Thou Art”.

\[nanu \text{sarva-siddhāntānām api sva-sva-ḍṛṣṭy-apekṣayopapanntvād itaretara-ḍṛṣṭy-apekṣayā dusṣṭhita-siddhikatvān naikatrāpi viśvāsaṁ paśyāmo na ca sarva-tārākikair adūṣitaṁ samarthitam sarva-tārṇikopadraṇāpaṇāya vartma sambhāvayāmah. ucyate. visrabdhaiḥ sambhāvyatāṁ amabhava-mātra-śaṇātavyāt sarva-tārkika-prasthānānām. tad abhidhiyate\]

Objection: Since every philosophical doctrine is right from its own standpoint yet demonstrably untenable if viewed from the standpoint of another doctrine, we do not find a single point on which there is general agreement, and consequently we cannot establish any path which is accepted by all disputants and not vulnerable to criticism, so that it could be safe from all attack. To this we reply: Such a path can be established, for all philosophical schools take their stand on bare experience. This is the point being made.

\[imāṁ prāśnikam uddīśya tarka-jvara-bhṛśāturāh tvāc-chiraka-vaco-jālair mohayantitaretaram\]

[59] The logicians bemuse each other with a web of wherefores and therefore, heavily afflicted with the fever of debate. But it is to this experience that they make their final appeal.
Here it is objected: Suppose we admit that the reality of experience is accepted by all, and that experience is the Self. In that case we are wrong if we admit that the Self changes, and wrong again if we do not. Hence, (quoting two Buddhist texts), we say:

"varṣātapābhyaṃ kim vyomnaś carmaṇy eva tayoḥ phalam
carmopamaś cet so 'nityah kha-tulyaś ced asat-samaḥ"

[60] What can rain and sun do to the sky? They exert their power on things like the human skin. If the Self is like the skin it is mortal. If it is like the sky it is useless.¹

¹ "Useless", i.e. it cannot serve as the experiencer. J. This and the next verse are both quotations from Buddhist sources, writings concerned, precisely, to ridicule the notion of any permanent or transcendent Self.

buddhi-janmani puṃsaś ca vikṛtir yady anityatā
athāvikṛtir evāyaṃ pramāteti na yuṣyate

[61] "If the Self of man changes with the rise of every new idea in his intellect, that Self is non-eternal; but if the Self does not change, it cannot be the knower of that cognition."¹

¹ It will be seen that the opponent includes in the idea of experience the extra (and unjustified) idea of an active knower of experience. Cp. verse II.63 below.
Refutation of the above objection:

\[ \text{urdhvam gacchati dhume kham bhidyate svin na bhidyate na bhidyate cet sthāsnutvan bhidyate ced bhidā 'syā kā} \]

[62] When smoke is rising, is the sky (into which it rises) divided or not? If not, the smoke is not rising. If it is divided, then kindly tell us by what.\(^1\)

\(^1\) This is apparently a counter-dilemma, the object of which would be to remind the opponent that extremely subtle things (like the ether of the sky and the Self) are beyond the range of action and change and even of differentiation. “Therefore the ether can only be apprehended in itself as ether, without reference to modifications and differentiations apparently introduced into it from without.” J

\[ \text{ity etat-pratipatty-artham āha} \]

To explain this further we add:

\[ \text{avikriyasya bhokṛtvam syād aham-buddhi-vibhramāt nau-yāna-vibhramād yad-van nageṣu gati-kalpanam} \]

[63] The notion that the changeless Self can be an experiencer is due to an error set up by the ego-sense; it is like the notion that mountains are moving due to the error set up by the motion of a boat.\(^1\)

\(^1\) The boat image is found at Śaṅkara’s Upadeśa Sāhasri, verse part, V.3.

\[ \text{yathoktārthāvīṣkaraṇāya drṣṭāntāntaropādānam} \]

Statement of another example to bring out the nature of the view being put forward:
yathā jātya-maṇeḥ śubhrā jvalantī niścalā śikhā
saṃnidhy-asaṃnidhāneṣu ghaṭādinām avikriyā

[64] The Self is like the radiant motionless light of a splendid jewel, which remains unchanged whether objects are placed in its ambit or not.¹

¹ It is, of course, here assumed that objects placed near the jewel become illumined by its light.

ayam atrāṁśo vivakṣita iti jñāpānāyāha

To bring out the exact point in question we add:

yad-avasthā vyanaaktīti tad-avasthāiva sā punah
bhāṇyate na vyanaaktīti ghaṭādinām asaṃnidhau

[65] The condition of the jewel is one and the same whether, because of the proximity of objects, one says “it illumines”, or, because of the absence of objects, one says “it does not illumine (anything)”.

tatra ca

And in this connection:

sarva-dhī-vyaṇjakas tad-vat paramātmā pradīpakaḥ
saṃnidhy-asaṃnidhāneṣu dhī-vṛttinām avikriyāḥ

[66] In the same way, the highest Self is a light which illumines all intellects; it stands unaltered amid the presence and absence of mental modifications.

na prakāśa-kriyā kācid asya svātmanī vidyate
upacārāt kriyā sā ’syā yaḥ prakāśyasya saṃnidhiḥ

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[67] No activity of "illumination" is to be found in it. When we credit it figuratively with the act of illumination, what we mean is that an object has come within its light.

maivaṃ saṁkīṣṭhāḥ sāṁkhya-rāddhānto 'yam iti. yataḥ

Do not suppose that this is the position of the Sāṅkhya (school of philosophers): for

yathā viśuddha ākāse sahasaivābhra-maṇḍalam bhūtvā viliyate tad-vad ātmanihākhilaṃ jagat

[68] Just as a heap of clouds collects and then suddenly dissolves in the pure (uncontaminated ether of the) sky, so does the whole universe collect and dissolve in the Self.¹

¹ The previous verses have stressed the separateness of the Self from the mind and the world of objects. The Sāṅkhya philosophers also made this separation. But they accepted the not-self as real and eternal. The Advaitin holds to the Upanishadic view that only the Self exists, one without a second. The not-self is unreal and subject to dissolution.

tasmād eṣa kūṭastho na dvaitaṁ manāg api sprśati. yataḥ

Thus this pure consciousness, "firm as a mountain peak" (kūṭastha), has no contact with duality whatever; wherefore

śabdādy-ākāra-nirbhāsāḥ kṣaṇa-pradhvamsinīr drśā nityo 'krama-dṛg ātmaiko vyāpnotiva dhiyo 'niśam
[69] The one motionless Self, not subject to sequence or succession in time, the eternal Seer, constantly pervades, as it were, the flickering modifications of the mind, which in turn illumine the forms of material objects.

\textit{evam ca sati buddhe\text{ḥ} pari\text{ṇ}\text{ā}mitva\text{ṃ} yuktam}

And it is permissible to think of the intellect as undergoing modification: for

\textit{atitānāgatehatyān yugapat sarva-gocarān}  
\textit{vetty ātma-van na dhīr yasmāt teneyam pariṇāmini}

[70] Unlike the Self, the intellect does not simultaneously know all things, past, present and future. Hence, since its knowledge comes piecemeal, we know it is subject to modification (pariṇāmin).\(^1\)

\(^1\) Two factors are involved in empirical knowledge—a moving element and a fixed one. The Self being motionless and unlimited, we infer that it is the mind that is limited and subject to motion and change. Hence we infer that the knowledge of the Self is different in kind from the ordinary empirical knowledge of the intellect. Cp. Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.158, and Ātmajñānopadeśa Vidhi II.6.

\textit{tataś caitat siddham}

And through this the following points stand proved:

\textit{apaśyan pasyatim buddhim aśṛṇvan śṛṇvatim tathā}  
\textit{niryatno 'vikriyo 'nicchann icchantim cāpy alupta-dṛk}

[71] The unbroken Witness neither sees nor hears nor desires—it is the intellect that does so. The Seer is actionless and puts forth no effort.
The Witness feels neither pain nor pleasure nor hatred nor anger; these are properties of the mind.

The Witness indulges neither in delusion, imagination, memory nor sleep. These are properties of the mind.

The intellect assumes all forms, the Self is formless; the intellect exists for the sake of another, the Self exists for itself; the intellect is subject to past, present and future and is destroyed momentally; the Self is beyond time, motionless, and firm as a mountain peak (kūṭastha).

The intellect is dependent on others, extroverted and limited in size. The Self is independent of any other thing, the inmost non-dual reality, limitless in extent, and the subtle Seer located in the body of everyone.
etasmāc ca kāraṇād ayam artho vyavasīyatām

And for this reason the following also is true:

duḥkhī yadi bhaved ātmā kāsākṣī duḥkhino bhavet
duḥkhināḥ sākṣītā 'yuktā sākṣīno duḥkhitā tathā

[76] If the Self were ever in pain, who would be left as the Witness of the sufferer? A sufferer can never be the Witness, nor can the Witness be a sufferer.¹

¹ "The sufferer" (duḥkhin) is Sureśvara’s characteristic name for the individual soul. The term “jīva” does not occur in the Naiṣkarmya Siddhi.

pūrvasyaiva vyākhyaṁnārthan āha

To explain further what he has already stated we proceed:

narte syād vikriyāṁ duḥkhī sākṣītā kā vikārināḥ
dhī-vikriyā-sahasrānāṁ sākṣy ato ’ham avikriyāḥ

[77] No sufferer can exist except he be subject to change and modification. How can such a one be the Witness? Therefore I am in reality the motionless Witness of the myriad modifications of the mind.

evam sarvasmin vyabhicārinīy ātma-vastv
evāvyabhicārity anubhavato vyavasthāpanāyāha

And so, in order to establish from direct experience that the Self as the real is the invariable factor in all the variable, we say:

pramāṇa-tan-nibheṣv asyā nocchittir mama saṁvidāh
matto ’nyad rūpam ābhāti yat tat syāt kṣaṇa-bhaṅgi hi
[78] There is no break in this my consciousness (saṃvita) amid the (flux of) right cognitions or cognitions masquerading as such. All that manifests apart from my Self is transitory.¹

¹ Here Sureśvara appeals to the personal experience of the jñāni. J.

**utpatti-sṭhiti-bhaṅgeṣu kumbhasya viyato yathā**  
**notpatti-sṭhiti-nāśās syur buddher evaṃ mamāpi ca**

[79] It is the pot that comes into existence, endures for a time, and is finally destroyed—and not the ether that it apparently encloses. Similarly, birth, life and destruction pertain to the intellect and not to me.

**sukha-duḥkha-tat-saṃbandhānāṃ ca pratyakṣatvān**  
**na śraddhā-mātra-grāhyam etat**

This is not a matter that has to be accepted on mere faith, as pleasures and pains and our relation with them are a matter of direct experience:

**sukha-duḥkhādi-sambaddhāṃ yathā daṇḍena daṇḍinam**  
**rādhako viṣate buddhīṃ sākṣī tad-vad asaṃhataḥ**

[80] The Witness perceives the intellect, attached as the latter is to pleasure and pain, itself remaining unaffected—just as an ascetic tranquilly observes his fellow ascetic who is burdened with a staff.¹

¹ The weight of the staff causes no trouble to him. Similarly, the Witness is aloof from, and not troubled by, the pains and pleasures that belong to the intellect. The man who carries the stick to some extent identifies himself with it, and in the same way the mind identifies itself with its own pleasures and pains. The appearance of this curious and somewhat unusual image at Mānasollasa Vārttika to the Dakṣināmūrti Hymn (verse VII.11, trans. Mahādeva Śāstrin, Minor Upanishads Vol. II, p. 136) is worth remarking.
etasmāc ca hetor dhiyāḥ parināmitvam yuktam

And for this reason, also, it is right to hold that the intellect is subject to modification (parināma):

yenaivāsyā bhaved yogah sukha-kumbhādinā dhiyāḥ
tam vidanti tadaivānyanā vetti nāto vikāriṇī

[81] The intellect knows only that with which it happens to be in contact—say a mood of happiness or a particular pot. At that time it knows nothing else. Hence we may be sure it is subject to modification.¹

¹ Because it is a characteristic of the intellect that it can only know one thing at a time, the fact that it can know many things proves that it must be subject to modification.

asyāś ca kṣaṇa-bhaṅguratve svayam evātmā sākṣi.
na hi kūṭasthāvabodham antarena buddher
evāvirbhāva-tirobhāvādi-siddhir asti

And since the intellect is changing momently, it must be the Self itself that is the Witness. For the manifestation and disappearance etc. of the intellect (in waking and deep sleep) could not be established without the presence of a fixed immutable consciousness (to witness them):

parināmi-dhiyāṁ vṛttam nityākrama-dr̥gātmanā
śaḍ-bhāva-vikriyāṁ eti vyāptaṁ khenāṅkuro yathā

[82] The six changing states¹ of all intellects rise, mature and fall in the medium of the eternal, actionless Seer, the Self—just as the seed goes through the cycle of reproduction bathed in the medium of the physical ether.

¹ The six changing states—see Note to 1.97 above.
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

sata ātmanas cāvikāritve yuktih

And here is the reasoning to show that the real, as the Self, is without modifications:

smṛti-svapna-prabodheṣu na kaścit pratyayo dhiyāh
dṛśāvyāpto 'sty ato nityam avikāri svayāṃ drśih

[83] There is not a single cognition of the mind, whether of the waking state, dream or memory, which is not pervaded by the light of the Seer. Hence the self-revealed Seer is eternal and not subject to modification.

evaṃ tāvat parābhvyupagata-prakriyā-prasthānena
nirastāśeṣa-vikāraikātmyaṃ pratipāditam
upapattibhiḥ. athādhunā śrautiṃ prakriyāṃ
avalambyocyate

This completes the exposition of the unity of the Self, devoid of all modification, according to logical argumentation as accepted by other schools. We now proceed to the method of exposition according to the Veda (śruti) and say:

astu vā pariṇāmo 'sya dṛśeḥ kūṭastha-rūpataḥ
kalpito 'pi mṛṣaivāsau daṇḍasyevāpsu vakrataḥ

[84] Even supposing the rock-firm (kūṭastha) Seer were capable of modification, such modification would be imaginary and false, like the imaginary crookedness of a stick seen half protruding from water.
ṣaṭsu bhāva-vikāreṣu niṣiddheṣv evam ātmani
dōṣah kaścid ihāsaktum na śakyas tārkika-śvabhiḥ

[85] Since the six states of change\(^1\) have already been effectively negated of the Self, we are not vulnerable to the criticisms of those dogs of logicians.\(^2\)

\(^1\) See Note to I.97 above, cp. II.82 above.
\(^2\) The logicians held that pleasure and pain and certain other qualities ascribed by Advaitins to the mind arose and fell away as qualities (guṇa) of the self (Ātman). Advaita shows logically that the Self as changeless must be simple and partless and not possessed of qualities.

prakṛtam evopādāya buddheḥ pariṇāmitvam ātmanaḥ
cā kūṭasthatvam yuktibhir ucyate

Proceeding further with the same subject, we explain how the intellect is subject to modification and the Self is rock-firm and immutable, giving reasons:

praty artham tu vibhidyante buddhayo viṣayonmukhāḥ
na bhidā 'vagates tadvat sarvās tāś cin-nibhā yataḥ

[86] Each mental cognition of the external world is different according to its object. But the light which illumines these different cognitions is not thus differentiated, since all alike have the common form of consciousness.\(^1\)

\(^1\) This argument for the existence of a Self as Witness behind the mind and different from it in nature is reproduced in the opening verses of Pañcadaśi, Chapter I.

sva-sambaddhārtha eva

But the intellect knows only that with which it stands in relation (at any time):

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sāvaśeṣa-paricchediny ata eva na kṛtsna-vit
no cet pariṇamed buddhiḥ sarvajñā svātma-vad bhavet

[87] The intellect has determinate and limited knowledge only and is hence not omniscient. If the intellect did not undergo modifications it would be omniscient like the Self.

ato 'vagater ekatvāt

Therefore, as immediate awareness (avagati) is one, (it follows that):

canḍāla-buddher yad draṣṭṛ tad eva brahma-buddhi-
dṛk

ekāṁ tad ubhayor jyotir bhāsyā-bhedād anekavat

[88] The Seer in the Canḍāla¹ is one and the same as the Seer in Brahmā. The one light that exists in the two beings appears as many due to differentiations in the objects it illumines.²

¹ Canḍāla = meat-eating outcaste. Brahmā = the Creator.
² This has special reference to the many intellects which it illumines as objects.

kasmāt

Why?

avasthā-deśa-kālādi-bheda nāsty anayor yataḥ
tasmāj jagad-dhiyāṁ vṛttām jyotir ekaṁ sadeklṣate
[89] The light in the Čaṇḍāla and the light in Brahmā is one and the same; differentiations due to time and space do not affect it. Hence the one light, the only reality, witnesses the life of every intellect in the universe.

\[\text{sarva-deheśv ātmaikatve pratibuddha-paramārtha-tattvasāpy apratibuddha-deha-saṁbandhād aśeṣa-duḥkha-saṁbandha iti cet tan na}\]

It is not right to maintain that, if the Self is one in all bodies, he who has become awake to the supreme reality will be related with all pain through being related to all unenlightened intellects:

\[\text{bodhāḥ prāg api duḥkhitvam nānya-dehottham asti naḥ bodhād ārdhvaṁ kutas tat syād yatra svagatam apy asat}\]

[90] The pain experienced before illumination arises from one’s own body and from no one else’s. How can the pain arising from the bodies of others affect one after illumination, seeing that even the pain arising from one’s own is then known to have been an illusion?

\[\text{na ceyam sva-manīṣiketi grāhyam. kutah. śruty-avaśṭambhāt}\]

Nor should you think, “He’s just thought it all up himself.” Why not? Because it is based on the Veda (śrutī):

\[\text{śabdādy-ākāra-nirbhāsaḥ hānopādāna-dharminī bhāsyety āha śrutir dṛṣṭir ātmano 'pariṇāminah}\]

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That (empirical) seeing, which illumines other external objects (while conforming to their shape), which is subject to increase and decrease, has to be itself illumined by the unchanging (aparīṇāmin) Self. So says the Veda (śruti).

1 Quoted in the following verse.

kā tv asau śrutih

What, then, is that Vedic text?

dṛṣṭer draṣṭāram ātmānam na paśyer dṛṣyamānayaṁ 
vijñātāram are kena vijñāniyād dhiyāṁ patim

“Thou canst not see the Seer of seeing” by means of what is itself the seen. “With what, indeed, can one know the Knower of knowing”, the Lord of all minds?

1 Expanded versions of Brahmārṇava Upanishad III. iv. 2 and II. iv. 14 respectively.

yasmāt sarva-pramānopapanno ’yam arthas tasmād
ato ’nyathā-vādino jāty-andhā ivānukampanīyā ity āha

Since this point has already been established by all the recognized means of knowledge (pramāṇa), those who argue otherwise are to be pitied, like the blind:

tad etad advayam brahma nirvikāram ku-buddhibhih 
jāty-andha-gaja-dṛṣṭyeva koṭiśah parikalpyate

This formless non-dual Absolute (Brahman) is conceived in millions of ways by those of weak intellect, like the blind men guessing at the nature of the elephant.

1 Elephant—cp. note to verse II.51 above.
They are pitiable because they cannot believe what has been guaranteed by recognized means of knowledge:

\[ \text{yad-yad viśeṣaṇaṁ drṣṭam nātmanas tad ananvayāt}
\]
\[ \text{khasya kumbhādi-vat ātmā ātmā syān nirviśeṣaṇaḥ} \]

[94] No qualification seen anywhere belongs to the Self, for it conforms to no limitations, just as the ether is not touched by the limitations apparently imposed upon it by the shape of the pot. That is what is meant by saying, “the Self is without qualifications (nirviśeṣaṇa)”.\(^1\)

\(^1\) From the empirical point of view, the ether was regarded by the classical Advaitic philosophers as a subtle imperceptible stuff from which the world arose and in which it existed. Lower a pot into the water and pull it up, and a real qualification has been introduced into the volume of water enclosed by the pot. The water is made to conform to the shape of the pot and to move from place to place with the pot. Similarly with the air in the pot, when the latter happens to be empty of water. But not so the ether. The pot did not enclose any ether. Move the empty pot, and you certainly move the air in the pot, but not the ether. There is no ether actually enclosed in the pot, though our minds always automatically suggest to us that there is. In regard to the water or air actually enclosed in the pot, the pot is a viśeṣaṇa. In regard to the ether apparently enclosed in the pot, the pot is an upādhi. Commenting on Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad IV.iii.30, Śaṅkara says that it is inaccurate to say that ether pervades all things, since it never assumes their forms. The qualification (viśeṣaṇa) is that which actually conditions a thing, as blue colour conditions a blue pot. Different from the qualification in nature is the adjunct, the upādhi, which stands in spatial relation to a thing and is taken as conditioning it, though in fact it does not do so—e.g. as when a crystal looks red due to the proximity of a red flower, although it has not in fact actually become red in any way. The upādhi in the form of the red flower appears to condition the crystal while in fact leaving it completely unaffected.

Here Suresvara is affirming that the Self is “without qualifications” (nirviśeṣaṇa). Just as the gross objects of the physical world all stand in spatial relation to the ether in which they exist, yet are unable to affect or condition the ether in any way, so the whole universe stands in apparent relation to the Self, but can introduce no distinctions or differentiations into it of any kind. Cp. Upadeśa Sāhasrī (verse section), VI.1 ff.
atāś cātmāno bhedaśaṃsparśo bhedasya mithyā-
vābhāvyād ata āha

Therefore the Self is not touched by distinction, for
distinction is false (mithyā) by nature. Hence we
proceed:

avagaty-ātmāno yasmād āgamāpāyi kumbha-vat
sāhaṁkāram idam viśvaṁ tasmāt tat syāt kacādi-vat

[95] Since this whole universe including the ego-
notion appears and subsequently disappears in con-
sciousness, and is thus as transitory as a pot, it follows
that it is as unreal as the lights that appear when the
eyes are closed and the eyeballs are pressed with the
fingers.¹

¹ The argument for the unreality of the world here is based on the
principle laid down by Gauḍapāda (Kārikā II.6 on the Māṇḍūkya
Upanishad)—“whatever is non-existent at the beginning and non-
existent at the end is necessarily non-existent also in between”. The
stock example is a mirage.

The idea expressed at the end of the verse is that if you close your
eyes and press the eyeballs with the fingers hard enough, you see
patterns of light, which purport to be outside of you and in front of
you, and which, if taken as such, are manifestly delusive. There is no
light in front of the eyes, it just seems as if there were.

sarvasyaivānumāna-vyāpārasya phalam iyad eva yad
viveka-grahaṇam. tad ucyate

The net result of all reasoning is an (indirect) awareness
based on discrimination (but not direct perception).¹ So
we say:

¹ The reference is to the “viveka-khyāti” or “knowledge through
discrimination” claimed by the Sāṅkhya philosophers. Cp. prose
introduction to verse II.97 below.
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

buddher anātma-dharmatvam anumānāt prasiddhyati
dvam ațmano ’py advitiyatvam ațmatvād eva siddhyati

[96] Inference can show that the intellect is not a
property of the Self. But the non-duality of the Self can
be known only through becoming the Self.

yadyapy ayam grahitr-grahaṇa-grāhya-grhīti-taṭ-
phalātmaka ā-brahma-stamba-parvantah saṃsāro
’nvaya-vyatirekābhyaṃ anātmatayā nirmālya-vad
apaviddhah. tathāpi tu naivāsau svatas-siddhāṭma-
vyatirikatānātma-prakṛti-padārtha-vyapāśrayah
sāmkhyānām iva. kiṃ tarhi. svatas-
siddhānuditānastamita-kūṭasthāṭma-prajñāna-mātra-
śarira-pratibimbitāvicārita-siddhāṭmānavaṃbodhāśraya
eva tad-upādānatvāt tasyetīmam artham nirvaktu-
kāma āha

We may grant that this whole world of transmigration
(sāṃsāra) from the Creator (Brahmā) to the meanest
clump of grass, which consists of the empirical subject
and object, together with the subject’s cognitions as
they emerge into the light of consciousness (phala)\(^1\)—
this whole world of transmigration, we admit, can be
shown by reasoning through the method of agreement
and difference (anvaya and vyatireka)\(^2\) to be not-self
and by this means be rejected like a worn-out garland.
Nevertheless, we do not admit with the Sāṅkhya that
its ultimate substratum is the “Nature” (prakṛti) they
speak of, which is not-self and utterly separate from the
Self that is self-revealed. We say that its ultimate sub-
stratum is that non-awareness-of-the-Self, which is
accepted only for lack of due enquiry (vicāra), and which

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only exists as reflected in (i.e. as illumined by) the self-revealed pure Self, which is a mass of pure consciousness that neither rises nor sets, and which is firm and immovable as a mountain peak. For that is its necessary precondition. To explain this we say:

1 phala for pramāṇa-phala = the flash of consciousness that results (phala = fruit) from the application of a means of cognition such as perception or inference.
2 See Note to verse II.8 above.
3 Intellectual analysis is an incomplete discipline for Self-knowledge; it will show you that the Self and the world are different, but in knowing their difference one is committed to knowing two real things, the position of the Śaṅkhyas. Reason alone is not enough. Hearing and assimilating the Upanishadic texts is also required. Cp. verses III.6, III.33, IV.16 below.

ṛte jñānam na santy arthā asti jñānam ṛte 'pi tān
evaṁ dhiyo hirug-jyotir vivicyād anumānataḥ

[97] The light (of the Self) can be known as different from the intellect through such inferences as, “objects do not exist except in the presence of knowledge: knowledge exists even when they are absent”.

yasmāt pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra
ātmānavabodhāśraya eva tasmāt siddham ātmano
'prameyatvam. naiva hi kāryam sva-kāraṇam
ātilaṅghyānyatrākāraka āspadam upanibadhnāti.
atā āha

Because the whole play of empirical cognition with its objects rests on not-being-aware-to-the-Self, it follows that the Self can never be an object of empirical cognition. An effect cannot “go beyond” its (material) cause and acquire a basis in something to which it is in no way related. So we say:
vyavadhīyanta evāmi buddhi-deha-ghaṭādayah
ātmatvād ātmanah kena vyavadhānam manāg api

[98]  Intellect, body, and external object such as pot—all these are known mediately (through empirical cognition). But since the Self is already the Self, through what could (knowledge of) it be mediated in any way?¹

¹ In order to be known as an object, a thing must be separate from the knower, cp. verse II.23 above. Hence the Self can never be known as an object.

svayam anavagamātmakatvād anavagamātmakatvam
ca moha-mātropādānātavyāt

For they (intellect, body, and external objects) are not themselves of the nature of consciousness, and that which is not itself of the nature of consciousness is conditioned (upādāna) by mere delusion (moha-mātra):

pramāṇam antareṇaisāṁ buddhy-ādīnāṁ asiddhatā
anubhūti-phalārthitvād ātmā jñāḥ kim apekṣate

[99]  The existence of the intellect, body and external objects cannot be established except through empirical means of knowledge and proof, since they require to be illumined by consciousness in cognitions resulting from such means. But what (proof) does the pure Self as knower require for its existence, seeing that it constitutes all effective knowledge itself?

vakṣyamāṇetaretarādhyāsa-siddhyartham ukta-
vyatirekānuvādah
We repeat the distinction (between Self and not-self) once again in order to demonstrate the existence of the mutual superimposition which we are going on to speak of.

\[ \text{ghaṭa-buddher ghaṭāc cārthād draṣṭur yad-vad} \]
\[ \text{vibhinnaṁ} \]
\[ \text{ahaṁ-buddher ahaṁ-gamyād duḥkhinaś ca tathā} \]
\[ \text{drśeḥ} \]

[100] Just as the seeing subject (draṣṭṛ) is different from both the objective pot and the mental notion of the pot, so also is the pure Self different from "the sufferer" (i.e. the individual soul) which it witnesses as an object, and from the ego-notion by which the sufferer is revealed.

\[ \text{evam etayor ātmānātmanoḥ svataḥ parataḥ siddhayer} \]
\[ \text{laukika-rajju-sarpādhyāropa-vad avidyopāśraya} \]
\[ \text{evetaretarādhyāropa ity etad āha} \]

The Self is self-established, and the not-self is established by another: what we now say is that these two are mutually superimposed on the basis (āśraya) of nescience, just as the rope and the snake are superimposed in the example taken from the empirical world.

\[ \text{abhra-yāṇam yathā mohāc chaśa-bhṛty adhyavasyati} \]
\[ \text{sukhitvādīn dhiyo dharmāṁs tad-vad ātmani manyate} \]

[101] Just as a man through sheer delusion attributes the motion of the clouds to the moon, so is it through sheer delusion that a man attributes happiness and other qualities of the intellect to the pure Self.
dagdhṛtvam ca yathā vahner ayaso manyate ku-dhiḥ caitanyām tad-vad ātmīyam mohāt kartari manyate

[102] And just as a stupid man thinks that the fire’s power of burning belongs to the (red-hot) iron, so through sheer delusion the consciousness pertaining to the pure Self is attributed to the agent.

sarva evāyam ātmānātma-vibhāgaḥ pratyakṣādi-pramāṇa-vartmany anupatito ’vidyotsaṅga-varty eva na paramātma-vyapāśrayah. asyāś cāvidyāyāḥ sarvānartho-hetoḥ kuto nivṛttir iti cet tad āha

Hence this distinction between the Self and the not-self exists only within the realm of perception and the other empirical means of knowledge. It is based on nescience (avidyā) and not on the highest Self. If you ask, “How may this nescience, source of all evil, be brought to an end?” we reply:

duḥkha-rāśer vicitrasya seyam bhrāntiś cirantani mūlam saṁsāra-vṛkṣasya tad-bādhas tattva-darśanāt

[103] This primeval nescience is the root of the tree of worldly transmigration (saṁsāra), which is itself but a mass of variegated evils. It is destroyed through knowledge of the reality.

tad-bādhas tattva-darśanād iti kutah saṁbhāvyata iti ced ata āhāgopālāvipāla-panḍitam iyam eva prasiddhiḥ
How do you support your statement that nescience can be negated through knowledge of reality? Answer: Everyone from learned scholars to cowherds and shepherds is quite certain of the following:

\[ apramottham pramotthena j\ddot{n}\ddot{a}na\dot{m} j\ddot{n}\ddot{a}nena b\ddot{a}dhyate \]
\[ ahi-rajjv-\ddot{a}di-\ddot{vad} b\ddot{a}dho deh\ddot{a}dy-\ddot{a}tma-mates tath\ddot{a} \]

[104] Notions that are not based on properly tested knowledge are negated by (contradictory) notions that are, as in the case of the cancellation of the illusion of a snake seen in a rope, etc. The notion that the pure Self is the body is (finally) negated in just the same way.

\[ laukika-prameya-vailaksany\ddot{a}d \ddot{a}tmano \]
\[ neh\ddot{a}nadhipat\ddot{a}dhigamah pram\ddot{a}na-phalam \]

Since the pure Self is different from objects of empirical knowledge, the result of correct knowledge of the Self is not, as in the case of correct empirical knowledge, knowledge of what was not known before:

\[ avidy\ddot{a}-n\ddot{a}sa-m\ddot{a}tram \ddot{a}tu phalam ity upacaryate \]
\[ n\ddot{a}j\ddot{n}\ddot{a}ta-j\ddot{n}\ddot{a}panam ny\ddot{a}yyam avagaty-eka-r\ddot{u}patah \]

[105] The “result” of proper knowledge of the Self is mere destruction of nescience, and (though nothing positive has happened) this is indeed figuratively spoken of as a “result”. To say that the result was knowledge of what was previously unknown would be wrong, for the Self is pure awareness\(^1\) by nature.

\(^1\) “Pure awareness”. For example it is beyond time (see II.69 and II.89 above). Nothing therefore can “happen” in it. We cannot suddenly come to know it as if it were unknown before. We know it now, but the knowledge is obstructed, just as the father heard his son’s voice in the schoolboy chorus but could not pick it out owing to the obstruction of the voices of the other boys. \textit{Pa\text{\textacute{a}}\text{\textacute{a}}cadas\text{\textacute{a}}}, I.12.
yasmād ātmānavabodha-mātropādānāḥ pramātrādayas 
tasmāt

Because the empirical knower (pramātrā), knowledge 
and known are dependent on mere not-being-awake-to-
the-Self, it follows that:

na vidanty ātmanah sattām draṣṭr-darśana-gocaraḥ 
na cānyonyam ato ’miṣām jñeyatvam bhinna-sādhanam

[106] (The three factors of empirical experience) 
knower, knowledge and known cannot each establish 
their own existence, nor can they establish one another’s 
existence mutually. Hence they are all objects known by 
something other than themselves.¹

¹ Cp. verse II.109 below.

draṣṭrāder asādhāraṇa-rūpa-jñāpanāyāha

In order to explain the distinctive nature of each of the 
three factors, knower, knowledge and known, we 
proceed:

bāhya ākāra-vān grāhyo grahaṇam niścayādi-mat 
anvayy aham iti jñeyah sākṣi tv ātmā dhruvaḥ sadā

[107] (Of the three factors of empirical cognition), the 
"known" is the external object having visible form, 
"knowledge" is the succession of modifications in the 
mind (doubt, memory, certainty etc.), and the "knower" 
is the "I" which constantly accompanies these two; but 
the Witness is the Self which is constant and eternal.¹

¹ "Constant and eternal": "that which manifests the presence or 
absence of the other three and which is constant even in deep sleep and 
the state of release". J. Note that the "I" of ordinary experience 
constantly accompanies the stream of mental ideas and their objects. 
But it is not constant in the absolute sense because it disappears in 
swoon, deep sleep, and samādhi.
sarva-kāraka-kriyā-phala-vibhāgātmaka-saṃsāra-
sūnya ātmeti kāraka-kriyā-phala-vibhāga-sākṣītvād
ātmānas tad āha

We now state how the Self is void of the world-process (saṃsāra) consisting of the whole system of actions, their factors and results, because it is the Witness of that system:

grāhaka-grahaṇa-grāhy-avibhāge yo 'vibhāga-vān
hānopādānayos sākṣi hānopādāna-varjitaḥ

[108] He (the Self) stands undivided amidst the division into perceiver, perception and perceived, the Witness of loss and gain. Himself without loss or gain.

grāhakādi-niṣṭhaiva grāhakādi-bhāvabhāva-vibhāga-
siddhih kasmān neti cet tad āha

Why cannot the perceiver, perception and perceived determine their own existence or non-existence? In order to answer this question we proceed:

sva-sādhanaṃ svayam naṣṭo na nāṣam vetty abhāvataḥ
ata eva na cānyesām ato 'sau bhinna-sākṣikāḥ

[109] What has been destroyed is not aware of its destruction as it no longer exists; nor could it (then) know its own (prior) origin, nor the origin or destruction of other things. Therefore it must be witnessed by another.¹

¹ The fact that we know that the stream of our empirical experience contains breaks (sleep, swoon, etc.) is enough to prove that it must be witnessed by a Witness which is itself transcendent and exempt from the stream. Cp. verse III.21 below.
Objection: The theory of a Witness leaves us in infinite regress, for any given Witness requires a further Witness to witness its existence. Answer: No. (Unlike the instruments of empirical knowledge, which are subject to modification and transient), the Witness requires no external support to establish its existence.

\[
dhi-van \text{näpekṣate siddhim ātmāny asmād avikriyāḥ nirapekṣam apeekṣyaiva siddhyanty anye na tu svayam}
\]

[110] The unchangeable Self does not require to be established from outside as the intellect does. All else is established through reference to that independent One. But He Himself requires no proof.\(^1\)

\(^1\) J points out that since everything else is known as an object by the Self, nothing can know the Self as an object, and hence nothing can prove its existence. It must be self-revealed and self-luminous, judging from the mere fact it is manifest at all.

\[
yato grāhakādiṣy ātma-bhāvo 'vidyā-nibandhana eva tasmād anvaya-vyatirekābhyāṁ vibhajyānaṁ atmanah svayam
\]

The notion of “self” in relation to the perceiver, perceiving and perceived is due to nescience only. Therefore, having distinguished yourself from the not-self through reasoning by the method of agreement and difference (know that):

\[
upatti-sthiti-nāseṣu yo 'vagatyai va vartate jagato 'vikārayā 'vehi tam asmīti na naśvaram
\]
[111] He who remains as motionless consciousness throughout the successive creations and destructions of the universe—know Him as "I am that", and not as what is perishable.

svatas-siddhātma-caitanya-pratibimbitāvicārita-
siddhikātmānavabodhotthetaretara-svabhāvāpekṣa-
siddhatvāt svataś cāsiddher anātmano dvaitendra-
jālasya

Because the not-self, the magic display of duality, is not self-established, but is established only in mutual dependence as something arising from ignorance of the Self, and also because it is something merely reflected (pratibimbita) in the self-established Self of the nature of consciousness, and is accepted at all only for lack of due investigation—for all these reasons it follows that:

na svayam svasya nānātvam nāvagaty-ātmanā yataḥ
nobhābhyaṁ apy atas siddham advaitaṁ dvaita-
bādhayā

[112] The (display of) plurality cannot be established as real by the plurality itself, nor by the Self (as avagati), nor by the plurality and the Self taken together. Hence the reality of non-duality is proved, since duality negates itself.¹

¹ The plurality cannot establish its own reality since it is non-conscious; nor can it be established through the reality of the Self, since the identity of the conscious and non-conscious is impossible; nor can the Self and duality co-operate to establish the reality of duality, since none of the types of relation recognized by the logicians (sambandha, samavaya, etc.) can hold between them. J. Hiriyanna points out that this verse is close to Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya Kārikā II.34.
yathoktārtha-pratipatti-draḍhimne śruti-
udāharanopanyāṣaḥ

Quotation of Vedic texts in support of the point just made:

nityāvagati-rūpatvāt kārakādir na cātmānaḥ
asthūlaṁ neti netīti na jāyata iti śṛutiḥ

[113] The Self is changeless consciousness, and therefore does not contain the factors of action. Hence the Veda said of it, “Not gross”, and “Not this, not this”, and “It is not born”.¹

¹ Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad III.viii.8, II.iii.6, and Kaṭha Upanishad I.ii.18 (or II.18).

sarvasyāsyā grāhakāder dvaita-
prapañcasayātmānavabodha-mātropādānasya svayam
seddhum aśakyatvād ātma-siddheś cānupādeyatvāt

Because all this duality consisting of knower, knowledge and known, which is dependent on mere ignorance of the Self, cannot establish itself and cannot be established through the Self either, it follows that:

ātmānaś cen nivāryyante buddhi-deha-ghaṭādayaḥ
ṣaṣṭha-gocara-kalpās te vijñeyāḥ paramārthataḥ

[114] If the intellect, body and external objects like pots are rejected by the Self they must be known from the highest point of view as fit subjects for the sixth means of knowledge.¹

¹ “Fit subjects for the sixth means of knowledge”. The sixth means of knowledge is anupalabdhi which apprehends non-existence! For the pramāṇas, see note to śloka 1.89 above.
kuto nyāya-balād evaṁ niścitām pratiyate. yasmāt

How do you prove strictly that they are non-existent? As follows:

nityāṁ samvidam āśritya svatas siddhāṁ avikriyāṁ
siddhāyante dhiyo bodhās tāṁś cāśritya ghaṭādayah

[115] The cognitions of the intellect (which come and go) establish themselves as real only by (false) self-identification with the eternal, changeless, self-revealed pure consciousness (saṁvīt). The body and the pot depend for their reality on them.¹

¹ The intellect depends for its claims to reality on its supposed identification with consciousness. But this identification must be false, because the intellect is changeable whereas consciousness is fixed. The body and external objects depend for their supposed reality on the cognitions of the intellect, already seen to be false. Hence it is clear, from data derived from immediate experience, that intellect, body and external objects are all unreal. J

yasmān na kayācid api yuktyātmanah kārakatvaṁ
kriyātvaṁ phalatvam copapadyate tasmād ātma-vastu-
yāthātmyānavabodha-mātropādānattvān nabhasīva
rajo-dhūma-tuṣāra-nihāra-nilatvādy-adhyāso
yathoktātmani sarvo 'yaṁ kriyā-kāraka-phalātmaka-
saṁsāro 'ham-mamatva-yatnecchādi-mithyādhyāsā
eveti siddham imam artham āha

It is impossible by any reasoning to show that the Self is either an agent or an action or the result of an action. Hence all this transmigration (saṁsāra) consisting of actions, agents and results and of “I” and “mine” and striving and desire, since it is dependent on mere ignorance of the true nature of the Self as the real,
must all be a false superimposition on the pure Self, just as blueness, mist, fog, smoke and dust are falsely superimposed on the sky. To express this, we say:

\[
\text{āham-mithyābhiśāpena duṣkhya ātmā tad-bubhutsayā itaḥ śrutīṁ tayā netīty-uktāḥ kaivalyam āsthitāḥ}
\]

[116] The pure Self suffers from the calumny of being thought to be the individual ego. Desirous of knowing his real nature he betakes himself to the Veda, which instructs him “Not this, not this”. Thus instructed, he applies himself to the Alone (kaivalya).

\[
tasyāsyā mumukṣoḥ śrautāḥ vacasaḥ svapna-nimittotsārita-nidrasyeyeyāṁ niścitārthā pramā jāyate
\]

Such an earnest spiritual enquirer (mumukṣu) derives from the Vedic text the following definite conviction, even like one awoken from sleep by a sight seen in a dream:¹

¹ A sleeping man may begin to dream and may see a lion which so frightens him that he wakes up. Similarly, the Vedic text, though itself unreal, has power to wake the earnest spiritual enquirer up from the sleep of ignorance.

\[
nāḥam na ca mamātmatyāt sarvadānātma-varjitāḥ bhānāv iva tamodhyāso 'pahnavaś ca tathā mayi
\]

[117] There is no “I” or “mine”—for I am the pure Self, ever free from the not-self. Just as (the notion of) darkness in the sun is a superimposition, so is (the notion of) ignorance in me—and so, likewise, is (the notion of) its removal.
so 'yam evam-pratipanna-svabhāvam ātmānāṁ
pratipanno 'nukroṣati

When he comes to know the Self of the nature here
expounded, he utters the following cry:

yatra tv asyeti sātopaṁ kṛtsna-dvaita-niṣedhinīṁ
protsārayantīṁ saṁsāram apya śrauṣṭam na kim śrutīṁ

[118] Why did I not long ago hear the thundering roar
of the text “But where all this has become the Self
alone . . .”?1 that text which does away with worldly
reincarnation and cancels the whole of duality once and
for all?

1 Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad IV.v.15.

ity om ity avabuddhātmā nīskalo 'kārako 'kriyāḥ
virakta iva buddhyāder ekākitvam upeyivān

[119] So saying, he pronounces “OM” and becomes
awake to the partless Self, beyond action and the factors
of action. He acquires the solitary state, estranged as it
were from the intellect, the body and the external
objects.1

1 Estranged as it were: As if he had gone to live away from them as
an ascetic leaves his family. J
tṛṭiyo 'dhyāyaḥ
3: 1 THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

ajñānānapeksasya cātmanāh svata eva svarūpa-
siddher yuktam ātmana evājñätvam. kim visayam
punas tad ātmano 'jñānam. ātma-visayam iti brūmah.
nanv ātmano 'pi jñāna-svarūpatvād ananyatvāc ca
jñāna-prakṛtita-dibhyāś ca hetubhyo naivājñānām
ghatate. ghaṭata eva. katham. ajñāna-mātra-
nimittatvāt tad-vibhāgasya sarpātmateva rajjvāh.
tasmāt tad-apanuttau dvaitānarthābhāvah. tad-
apanodaś ca vākyād eva tat-pada-padārthābhijñāsya.
ato vākyā-vyākhyānāyādhyāya ārabhyate. tatra
yathoktena prakāreṇa tat-tvam-asy-ādi-
vākyopaniviṣṭa-pada-padārthhayoh kṛtānvaya-
vyatirekah.

BOOK III

We have shown at some length that all this (world)
from the Creator (Brahmā) to a clump of grass, con-
sisting of the empirical knower, his instruments of
knowledge, his knowledge and its objects, is but a false
superimposition. And it has been made clear that the
Self is the changeless rock-firm Consciousness, void of
the six states of phenomenal existence beginning with
birth¹—and is that alone. And between the world (as
false superimposition) and the rock-firm Self there is
no connection except ignorance (ajñāna), and wherever
(in the Veda) a positive identity or connection is
affirmed between the two, that is to be interpreted as
forming part of an injunction to perform symbolic
meditation, just like the fanciful meditation prescribed
in the passage “This earth is verily (to be meditated on
as) the Rg Veda, fire as the Sāma Veda”.²
Now, ignorance cannot exist in the void. It must always be ignorance of something about something. Further, we have already established that two categories (padārtha) exist, and two only, the Self and the not-self. From this it follows that the locus (āśraya) of ignorance (i.e. the conscious being in which the ignorance exists) cannot be the not-self. For the very nature of the not-self is ignorance, and ignorance cannot experience ignorance on its own (since the existence of ignorance implies a knower or at least knowledge). Even if it could, what difference would the rise of ignorance in ignorance bring about (that we could say it was an event at all)? Nor is the attainment of knowledge possible in the not-self, that one could argue there must have been some contradictory ignorance in the not-self (for it to negate). Further, the not-self is born of ignorance. It is absurd to suppose that that which is logically and causally prior can only exist supported by and dependent on its own effect. Nor, again, has the not-self any form independent of and different from ignorance whereby it could serve as its locus and support. These arguments (which refute the possibility of the not-self serving as the locus of ignorance) also show it cannot be the object concealed by ignorance either. Therefore the not-self is neither the locus of ignorance (āśraya of avidyā) nor the object concealed by ignorance (viṣaya of avidyā).

Hence we conclude, as the only remaining alternative, that it is the Self alone which is both the locus (āśraya) of and the object (viṣaya) concealed by ignorance. All of us have the experience “I do not know”, and in the Veda we hear “I am only a knower of the mantras, my lord; I do not know the Self”. (Nor do the arguments
which tell against the not-self as locus of ignorance apply to the Self). The Self, indeed, is not identical with ignorance, since its nature is pure Consciousness. Moreover, (the rise of) ignorance in the Self produces a difference in the form of an obscuration of knowledge. And attainment of knowledge is possible because the Self is the source of knowledge. Nor has the Self the characteristic of being an effect of ignorance, since it is the rock-firm changeless Self by nature. And, finally, the conscious Self has a form and existence independent of those of ignorance whereby it can serve as the latter’s locus. Hence we conclude that it is the Self alone which is ignorant (ajña).

What, then, is the object concealed by this ignorance pertaining to the Self? The Self is that object. Well, then, is it not a fact that ignorance is incompatible with the Self, since the latter is of the very nature of knowledge, is without differentiation and is that which produces knowledge, and is contradictory to ignorance in other ways too?

To this objection we reply that ignorance is compatible with the Self. For in reality the Self remains undifferentiated. It becomes differentiated into knower, knowledge and known through mere ignorance alone, just as it is through mere ignorance that the rope becomes a snake—the Self and the rope remaining in reality quite unaffected. Hence when ignorance is shaken off there is complete absence of all the evils of duality. And the escape from ignorance occurs only through the holy texts when heard by a man already conversant with their words and the meanings of those words. Now, therefore, we begin a new chapter devoted to the explanation of the meaning of the holy sentences
(vākyā), including a critical analysis of the words and their meanings\(^9\) by the method of agreement and difference (anvāya and vyatireka) applied to “That thou art” and other Vedic texts.\(^{10}\)

1 The six states of phenomenal existence—see note to I.97 (comm.) above.
2 Chāndogya Upanishad I.vi.1.
3 That is, it must have a conscious “locus” or “support” (āśraya) in which it exists and an object (viṣaya) which it conceals.
4 Chāndogya Upanishad VII.1.3.
5 The not-self, being an effect of ignorance, cannot function as its locus or support. See above.
6 The objector supposes that because the Self is undifferentiated it cannot serve as the locus of ignorance since this function presupposes a distinction between locus and thing in the locus. J
7 And hence could not be the locus of ignorance, any more than the sun could be the support of darkness. J
8 For example, it is said in the Veda to be associationless. J
9 Cp. Śaṅkara Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.177–183.
10 The question here raised by Suresvara as to the nature of the āśraya and viṣaya of avidyā (or ajñāna) was often discussed by the Advaitic writers. Śrī Śaṅkara does not discuss the question polemically, but it is evident that he held that Brahman-Ātman was both the āśraya and viṣaya of ajñāna, although from another point of view he would sometimes refuse to return an answer to the question “whose is avidyā?” on the ground that to do so would imply that avidyā was real (“Upadeśa Sāhasri” XVIII.44 sqq. and Gitā Bhāṣya XIII.2).

The formal polemical discussions of the “question” of the āśraya and viṣaya of avidyā were first introduced by Śrī Śaṅkara’s pupil Suresvara with special reference to the views of the freelance Advaitin, Maṇḍana Miśra. Maṇḍana Miśra held that jiva is the locus of avidyā, since it is absurd to suppose that Brahman-Ātman as pure consciousness can be associated with ignorance in any way. If it were objected that jiva cannot be the locus or support of avidyā since the very conception of jiva presupposes avidyā, he answered that the whole situation was due to māyā and if it were logically explicable it would not be māyā! Maṇḍana Miśra’s theory involves a multiplicity of jivas with a separate avidyā and universe for each jiva. Each jiva carries its own universe and is a “windowless monad” somewhat in Leibniz’s sense. No two people see the same pot; they each see their own pot which resembles the other person’s pot. Since the (relative) reality of other jivas is admitted, the position is not solipsism, though this position too was finally reached in the eka-jīvāvāda (doctrine of the existence of only one soul) of Prakāśānanda in his “Vedānta Siddhānta Muktāvali”. All, including Maṇḍana Miśra, agreed that Brahman-Ātman was the object concealed by avidyā (viṣaya).
The realization of the Absolute

What kept the controversy alive was the fact that in his “Bhāmati” commentary on Śaṅkara’s “Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya” the great scholar Vācaspati Miśra tried to reconcile Śaṅkara’s views with some of the main tenets of Maṇḍana Miśra’s “Brahma Siddhi”, on which latter work he also wrote a commentary, now unfortunately lost. The doctrine that jīva and not Brahman is the locus (āśraya) of avidyā, the doctrine that a plurality of avidyās exists, one for each jīva, and the doctrine that there is no one “public” avidyā (mūlāvidyā) all appear in the “Bhāmati”, together with many other of Maṇḍana Miśra’s characteristic views. (The term mūlāvidyā occurs, indeed, but the word is used in a special sense to mean the causal body of the individual jīva). Vācaspati’s theory of the rise of the “Brahmākāra vṛtti” in God-realization accords with the theory of Maṇḍana Miśra propounded in the introductory commentary to “Naiskarmya Siddhi” I.67 above and not with the refutation of it in the sloka I.67 itself, as may be seen from “The Bhāmati of Vācaspati”, Ed. and English Trans. of Catussuri portion by S. S. Sastri and C. K. Raja, Theosophical Publishing House Madras, 1933—Introduction pp. xxxix-xli. Compare note to III.123 below. The classical Advaitic tradition is that of Prakāśātman’s “Vivaraṇa”, a commentary on Padmapāda’s “Pañcapādikā”, itself a commentary on the first four sūtras of Śrī Śaṅkara’s “Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya”. Vidyāranya Svāmin belongs to this tradition, though he modifies the doctrine. Prakāśātman refutes many of the theories that derive from Maṇḍana Miśra, just as Sureśvara attacks Maṇḍana Miśra directly both here and in his Brahmāranyaka Vārttika (sub-commentary). Some of the later scholars such as Appaya Dikṣita and Sādhu Niścalā Dāsa (author of “Vicāra Sāgara” and “Vṛtti Prabhākara”, in Hindi) held that the various views were merely alternative ways of expressing the same doctrine, though even they express a preference. The preference of Niścalā Dāsa was for the solipsism of the “Vedānta Siddhānta Muktaivali”, which, he said, agreed with the ajātavāda of Gauḍapāda. All Advaitins accept that the ajātavāda of Gauḍapāda is both the first and last word of the system, but few regard the “Vedānta Siddhānta Muktaivali” as the most reliable guide to the real implications of it. Both Sureśvara and Padmapāda attack views of Maṇḍana Miśra which Vācaspati Miśra was later to adopt. But even so, there is a difference in emphasis between the two writers. Padmapāda, and the classical “Vivaraṇa” school which followed him, are concerned with cosmology and with giving some reputable philosophical account of the external world as grounded in Brahman. Hence they stress mūlāvidyā—causal avidyā as a kind of stuff or substance grounded in Brahman whose modifications form the external world. Sureśvara, by comparison, is less concerned with the external world and more concerned with Brahman. There is hardly a sentence on cosmology in the “Naiskarmya Siddhi” (contrast “Pañcadasī”), though its author claims it handles all essential topics. Avidyā is not so much a substance which transforms itself into the world as an inexplicable force which hides Brahman. In harmony with this we find Sureśvara stressing the total non-existence of the world in the consciousness of the jñāni (in contrast

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3: 1

to “Pañcadaśī”, for example). And again in harmony with the view that refuses to waste time examining avidyā but is in a hurry to do away with it, we find Sarvajñātma Muni (early 10th century A.D.) denouncing the theory of the Vivarana school that pure Brahma (being actionless) depends on Māyā for its power of causality in relation to the world. These two writers appear to keep closer to Śaṅkara’s own standpoint than any of the other Advaitins.

yadā nā tat-tvam-asy āder brahmāsmity avagacchati
pradhvastāham mamo naiti tadā gir-manasoh sṛtim

[1] When a man understands texts like “That thou art” in the proper sense as “I am the Absolute (Brahman)”, his sense of egoity and his sense of possession are destroyed and he goes beyond the sphere of words and the mind.

yadaiva tad-arthaṁ tvam-arthe ’vaiti
tadaivāvākyārthatāṁ pratipadyate gir-manasoh sṛtim
na pratipadyata iti. kuta etad adhyavasīyate. yasmāt

The very moment he understands that the entity denoted by the words “that” and “thou” is one and the same, he comprehends that which is not the meaning of any sentence, being beyond the range of speech and mind.¹ Why is this so? The reason is as follows:

¹ It is a peculiarity of Sureśvara that he likes to emphasize the paradox that the final knowledge taught in Advaita arises from a sentence (text) and yet what is conveyed cannot in fact be the meaning of any sentence. We have seen (verse 1.67 above) how the idea derived from Maṇḍana. Maṇḍana had taught that the final truth was conveyed by words in a distorted form and that a new knowledge had to be distilled out of the knowledge thus conveyed through meditation, and that this new knowledge was knowledge of that which was not the meaning of any sentence. Sureśvara teaches that, once the meanings of the words are understood through reasoning by the method of agreement and difference, the sentence immediately awakens the hearer to a truth that is not the meaning of any sentence, by its own inherent supernatural power and without the need for any intermediary such as meditation.

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tat-padāṁ prakṛtārtham syāt tvam-padāṁ prayāgar-
ātmani

nilotpala-vad etābhyaṁ duḥkhya-anātmatvā-vāraṇē

[2] The meaning of the word “that” is the topic under
discussion: the word “thou” means the innermost Self.
When this is known, the direct meanings of “that” and
“thou”, namely “not-being-the-Self” and “suffering”
as the limited individual soul or jīva), are excluded
immediately. The operation is as in the sentence “the
lotus is blue”.1

1 J writes: “Through the statement ‘the lotus is blue’, non-blueness
and non-lotushood are excluded immediately”, i.e. non-blueness is
excluded from lotus, non-lotushood from blue. Similarly, through the
sentence “that thou art” non-Absolute is excluded from individual soul
and not-being-the-Self (i.e. otherness) from the Absolute. But at once
this takes us to a meaning that transcends mind and speech.

At III.75 f. below, we shall learn how, from a different point of
view, the interpretation of “that thou art” is not like that of “the lotus
is blue”.

evam kṛtānvaya-vyatireko vākyād evāvākyārthaṁ
pratipadyata ity uktam atas tad-vyākhyaṁāya
sūtropanyāsah

It has thus been taught that one who has performed
reasoning (on the meaning of the words) by the method
of agreement and difference understands from the very
sentence itself that which is not the meaning of any
sentence. To explain this further, an aphorism (sūtra)
is now added.

sāmānādhikaranyam ca viśeṣaṁ-viśeṣyatā
lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-sambandhaḥ padārtha-pratyag-
ātmanāṁ

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[3] (In the case of the words “that” and “thou” in the text “that thou art”), the grammatical relation between the words is apposition, the relation between the meanings (of these two words) is qualifier (višeṣana) to qualified (višeṣya), and the relation between the meaning of the whole sentence (arising from the word-meanings as thus mutually qualifying each other) and the supreme Self is that of indirect indicator (lakṣaṇa) to indirectly indicated (lakṣya).


At this point an objector intervenes in our argument and asks: “That rule you laid down in the previous chapter, that in order to understand the meaning of the holy texts a man must first give up all ritualistic activity and then study them and apply anvaya and vyatireka before he can aspire to hearing them (śravaṇa)—is it to be obeyed as a Vedic injunction, or is it something to which a man is prompted by natural inclination? You
say, "Well, what then?" Listen. If he does all this preparatory discipline for the sake of direct knowledge of the Self as the real, then he will for this purpose necessarily have to turn away from all good and evil actions and behold the Self with one-pointed mind through reasoning by the method of agreement and difference as described. And if he is unable to attain the vision of the Self he will fall and become one who has suffered a relapse. But if he takes up the life from natural inclination, no such harm can result". To this we reply, "It is at the behest of an injunction that he takes up the preparatory discipline for knowledge."

1 i.e. having embraced the life of a Parivrājaka and neglected his daily obligatory ritual. J says that in the following sentence the phrase "from natural inclination" is inserted to exclude the notion of rāga—self-interested action prompted by feelings of attachment. Cp. Introductory commentary to I.29.

One important reason why the preliminary discipline must be taken as resting on an injunction emerges at verse III.126 below. Note that the injunction is to perform the preparatory discipline for knowledge. An injunction to know, though accepted for argument's sake at verse I.88 above, is firmly rejected at I.91.

\[ \text{\textit{śamādi-sādhanāḥ pāsyed ātmānām aṁjasā anvaya-vyatirekābhyaṁ tyaktvā yuṣmad aṁsataḥ}} \]

[4] (The Veda gives an injunction when it says that) the man possessed of inner control (śama) and the other qualities\(^1\) should see the Self in the Self,\(^2\) having given up the whole sphere of the you (yuṣmad)\(^3\) as unreal, by reasoning through the method of agreement and difference (anvaya and vyatireka).

\(^1\) Broadly speaking, the qualities in question are: śama = restraint of the mind; dama = restraint of the senses; uparati = turning away from outer objects; titikṣā = braving discomforts and difficulties; śraddhā = faith in teacher and doctrine; samādhāna = power to keep the mind concentrated on the holy Truth.

\(^2\) i.e. let him perform the final discipline before seeing the Self in the Self, \textit{viz.} hearing, reflection and prolonged meditation. J

\(^3\) Sphere of the you—the not-self.
yuṣmad-arthe parityakte pūrvoktair hetubhiḥ śrutiḥ
vikṣapannasya ko 'smiṇi tat tvam ity āha sauhrdāt

[5] To the man who has given up the sphere of the you completely for the reasons given above, and who falls into bewilderment and asks "Who am I?", the Veda compassionately replies "That thou art".¹

¹ Through reasoning one may determine what one is not, one then falls into bewilderment and requires the compassionate voice of revelation to be told what one is, cp. verse III.53 and IV.18 below. The implication is that the objector (III.4, prose introduction, above) was wrong to speak of the possibility of a relapse. If the preliminary conditions are fulfilled, logical reflection and revelation between them lead infallibly to success. Cp. Texte, p. 107.

atrāpi codayanti sāṃkhyāḥ. śarīrendriya-mano-
buddhiṣv anātmasv ātmieti nissamdhī-bandhanam
mithyā-jñānam ajñānam tan-nibandhano hy ātmano
'nekanartha-sāṃbandhas tasya cānvaya-
vyatirekābhyaṃ eva nirastatvān nirviṣayāṃ tat-tvam-
asy-ādi-vākyam prāptam. tasmād vākyasya caīṣa
mahimā yo 'yam ātmānātmanor vibhāga iti. tan-
nirākaraṇāyedam ucyate

Here again the Sāṅkhya interpose and say: "Ignorance (ajñāna) is that positive erroneous knowledge (mithyā-
jñāna) which consists in connecting what are not con-
ected and attributing Selfhood to the body, senses, lower mind (manas) and higher intellect (buddhi). It is the cause of the Self coming into contact with many evils. It can be overcome through the method of reasoning through agreement and difference alone, and hence sentences like "that thou art" are useless. The most that any text can ever do is to bring about know-
ledge of the separateness of the Self and the not-self". To refute this we continue:\n
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It will be seen that the Sāṅkhya conception of ignorance differs from that of Suresvara. For the Sāṅkhya, ignorance (ajñāna) is itself false-knowledge (mithyā-ajñāna), whereas for Suresvara it is the cause of false-knowledge. For the Sāṅkhya, Self and not-self, puruṣa and prakṛti, are both equally real. Duality is not the product of nescience. It is real. The sole function of nescience is to cause the notion that separate puruṣa is inseparable from the world of nature (prakṛti). This nescience, which unifies what are really separate, can be overcome by discrimination (viveka-khyāti as the Sāṅkhya as call it), based on anvaya and vyatireka alone. All that is required is to know that two separate things are in fact separate, and for this reason is adequate. The Vedic texts are not needed.

Thus for the Sāṅkhya, ignorance is a mere erroneous cognition which can be cancelled by a correct logical inference. For Suresvara, a correct logical inference is itself but a special case of erroneous cognition. For him, ignorance is what lies behind all empirical cognition as its pre-condition.

For the Sāṅkhya conception of ajñāna, see Sāṅkhya Kārikās 46 and Patañjali's Yoga Sūtras II.5.

bheda-samvid idaṁ jñānam bhedābhavaś ca sākṣiṇī kāryam etad avidyāyā jñātmanā tyājayed vacaḥ

[6] This knowledge is consciousness of difference (bheda), and there is no difference in the Witness-consciousness. This is an effect of ignorance.¹ One should give up the words through (awakening to) the Self as knowledge.

¹ "Such knowledge is an effect of ignorance"—compare introductory commentary to verse II.103 above.

jñātmanā tyājayed vaca ity upaśrutyaḥkaścit.
mithyā-ajñāna-vyatirekenātmānavabodhābhāvāt kim vākyena nivartyate. ajñānam hi nāma jñānābhāvas tasya cāvastu-svābhāvyāt kutaḥ samsāra-kāraṇatvam na hy asataḥ saj-janmeṣyate “kutas tu khalu somyaivaṃ syāt” iti “katham asataḥ saj jāyeta” iti śruter iti. atrocyate
Hearing that “One should give up the words through (awakening to) the Self as knowledge”, someone objects: “Since there is no ignorance of the Self apart from false knowledge, what is it that is destroyed by the holy texts?1 (Ignorance cannot be regarded as the cause of positive false knowledge), for ignorance is nothing but absence of knowledge, and since the latter is a non-entity (avastu) by nature, it cannot stand as the cause of transmigratory experience (samsāra). For the existent cannot spring from the non-existent, since the Veda says, ‘How could it be so, indeed, my dear one, how could the existent spring from the non-existent?’.”2 To this it is replied:

1 Sureśvara’s own doctrine is that ignorance is what lies behind positive erroneous cognition as its pre-condition or cause.
2 Chāndogya Upanishad VI.ii.2.

ajñāta eva sarvo ‘rthah prāg yato buddhi-janmanah
ekenaīva satā samś ca sann ajñāto bhavet tataḥ

[7] Since every object is unknown (ajñāta) before the idea of it first arises in our minds, and since (even as unknown) it exists by the power of the one reality (sat) it is that reality which is (ultimately) the thing that is unknown.1

1 Professor Hacker explains: A thing is unknown and yet it exists. What is unknown in a thing is, precisely, its existence. But in so far as a thing exists it is identical with existence-in-itself, since the existent is only one and never falls into differentiation. It is therefore not exactly the individual object which is unknown in ignorance, but universal Being itself. Ignorance hides the primaeval principle of knowing and being (cp. introductory prose commentary to verse III.113 below). Being-and-knowledge in itself, however, is the Self... Thus the combating of the thesis that ignorance is a mere negation of knowledge leads over into an answer to the question as to what is the object of nescience. Sureśvara does not explicitly state the logical conclusion of this line of thought, and we do not yet know whether the conclusion had already been drawn in his day. But later—and already by Sureśvara’s commentator Jñānottama—it was drawn and expressed by the
term “bhāva-rūpa”, which says that ignorance is not a negation but something positively existent. Texte, p. 59 f. Light is thrown on Suresvara’s meaning here by verses II.178-179 of his Taittiriya Vārṣṭikā. He says there that ignorance properly-so-called has no other form or nature (rūpa) than non-comprehension of the Self. The whole of the not-self, however, manifests as a result of it, and for this reason is itself loosely called ignorance (avidyā). It is intelligible that ignorance may be a cause in this sense since it is only formally negative, as we speak of an enemy as a not-friend. On the last point, cp. Vyāsa’s Commentary to Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra II.5.

sann ajñāto bhavet tata ity uktam adhastanena ślokena. ko ’sau sann ajñāta ity apeekṣāyān tat-svarūpa-pratipādanāyāha

It has been said in the previous verse, “It is that reality which is the thing that is unknown”. As if expecting the question “What is the nature of that unknown reality?” we proceed to explain it by saying:

pramītsāyām ya ābhāti svayaṁ mātr-pramāṇayoh
sva-mahimnā ca yas siddhāḥ so ’jñātārtho ’vasiyatām

[8] The Self, which is the reality manifesting itself in both knower and instrument of cognition (pramāṇa) at the time when an empirical cognition is being striven for, and which is revealed by its own power—that is the thing which is unknown.

atra kecid āhuh. yat-kimcid iha vākyas laukikam
vaidikam vā tat sarvam samsargātmakam eva
vākyārtham gamayati. atas tat-tvam-asy-ādi-vākyebhyāḥ samsargātmakam aham brāhmaṇi
vijñāya tāvan nididhyāsita yāvad avākyārthātmakaḥ
pratyagātma-viṣayasya ’vabodho ’ham brāhmaṇi
samabhijāyate. tasmād eva vijnānāt kaivalyam
āpnotiti tan-nirākaraṇāyedam ucyate

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Some say\(^1\) that all sentences, whether secular or Vedic, convey a synthetic meaning only.\(^2\) Hence a man derives from such texts as “that thou art” synthetic knowledge of the form “I am the Absolute (Brahman)”, and, having done so, he must practise sustained meditation on them until awareness of the inmost Self dawns in its (direct) form, inexpressible by any sentence. The state of final liberation (kaivalya) is achieved only by this knowledge. To refute this idea, we say:

1 i.e. Maṇḍana Miśra. References to his Brahma Siddhi have been given in the notes to I.67 above.
2 That is to say, they maintain that the function of the sentence is to convey a unitary sentence-meaning which consists in a synthesis of the diverse meanings of the individual words. So conceived, the sentence-meaning is not a pure or homogeneous unity, and contains only that degree of unity proper to a synthesis of diverse elements.

\[ sāmānādhikaranyāder ghaṭetara-khayor iva \]
\[ vyāvṛtteḥ syād avākyārthah sāksān nas tat-tvam- \]
\[ arthayoh \]

[9] On our view, that which is not the meaning of any sentence (viz. the Self or Absolute) is immediately apprehended as the meaning of “that” and “thou” through the exclusion (vyāvṛtti) of meanings arising from the grammatical apposition of the words etc.,\(^1\) as in the case of the pot-ether and the other ether.\(^2\)

1 “Etc.” i.e. from the grammatical apposition of the words, the relation of qualifier to qualified of the word-meanings, and the relation of indicator to indicated connecting the sentence-meaning with the Absolute. All this has been referred to at verse III.3 above. It is the same doctrine, almost word for word, that we find in the Mānasollāsa Vārttika attributed to Suresvara on the Dakṣināmūrti Hymn, Chapter III, verses 15–16, trans. Mahādeva Śāstri “The Minor Upanishads”, Vol. II, p. 61 f.
2 The sentence “Verily the ether in the pot is the ether in the sky” is unintelligible except as referring to the ether without any qualifications. For the ether as limited by the pot is plainly \textit{not} identical with the ether in the sky. Before the pot-ether and the sky-ether can be identical, the pot-ether must be shorn of its character of “specially limited”, and the

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sky-ether shorn of its character of “great-ether-different-from-other-forms-of-ether”. Thus it is seen that the words must refer indirectly (by lakṣaṇa) to bare ether in its pure essence. J. The reference to ether at Mānasollāsa Vārttika III.21, taken in conjunction with the present verse, might be thought a piece of evidence in favour of the authenticity of that work.

\[kuto \ 'vākyārtho \ 'vasiyata \ iti \ cet \ tat-pratipatty-arthaṃ \ višeṣaṇa-višeṣyayoḥ \ sāmarthyoktiḥ\]

How could anyone comprehend what is not the meaning of a sentence? To help towards an understanding of this he explains the meaning of the qualifier and qualified (in the text under discussion):

\[nirdūḥkhitvān \ tvam-arthasya \ tad-arthena \ višeṣaṇāt \ pratyaktā \ ca \ tad-arthasya \ tvam-padenāsyā \ saṃnīdheḥ\]

[10] The fact that the “thou” is not the sufferer (individual soul) is conveyed by its being qualified as the Absolute through the word “that”; and the fact that the “that” (i.e. the Absolute) is the innermost Self is conveyed by the presence of the word “thou” next to it.\(^1\)

\(^1\) The reasoning is negative. “That thou art” affirms “that” of “thou” and “thou” of “that”. Now, by the law of contradiction, nothing can at the same time both be and not be the same thing. Hence, even if we take the sentence at its face value as affirming that “thou” is qualified by “that” and “that” by “thou”, it still points to a meaning beyond what is directly expressible in a sentence. For if “that” is in some sense “thou”, then all the not-thou is negated of “that”—in other words, all the not-self is negated of the Absolute. And, likewise, all that is not the Absolute is negated of the inmost Self. Hence the sentence “that thou art” points to a meaning beyond anything expressible directly in words. A plurality of words is necessary to indicate a meaning that in itself has no relation with plurality because the direct meaning of all words, false in the present context, has to be excluded by the presence of other words. J
uktam sāmānādhikaranyam viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvaś
cia samkṣepato 'tha lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-vyākhyānāyāha

The nature of grammatical apposition\(^1\) and of being in qualified-qualifier relation has been stated briefly. So we now proceed with the following to explain the indicator–indicated relation:\(^2\)

\(^1\) He has so far merely referred to the fact that the relation between the words “that” and “thou” is that of grammatical apposition, without defining the term further, cp. Texte, p. 77. The term is defined at Mānasollāsa III.18–19 as follows: “Words are said to be used in apposition when they refer to one and the same entity but for different grammatical reasons (nimitta) and with different grammatical functions (vṛtti)”. Cp. the very similar definition given in the Kāśikā Commentary to Pāṇini’s Grammar, II.i.49.

\(^2\) Even the indicator-indicated relation, subsisting between the sentence-meaning and the Absolute, is not really given till verse III.26 below, and then only laconically. In the meantime Suresvara starts a completely new theme, the thesis, namely, that a word can be used to indicate the Absolute, the word “I”, and from this he passes over into a discussion of the relation between the Self and the ego. Cp. Texte, p. 77.

\[ kūṭastha-bodha-pratyaktvam animittam sad-ātmanah \]
\[ boddhṛtāhāṃtayor hetus tābhyaṃ tenopalakṣyate \]

[11] The consciousness and interiority of the Self firm as a mountain peak are (natural to it, and) not accidental characteristics (introduced from without). The Self is the cause of the consciousness of the intellect and the interiority of the ego-sense. Hence it is referred to figuratively as “the knower” and as “I”.

\[ buddheḥ kūṭastha-bodha-pratyaktvam-nimitte \]
\[ boddhṛtā-pratyaktve ye tv asādhārane tayor \]
\[ viśeṣa-vacanam \]
We now state the distinguishing features of the particular knowership (boddhṛtā) and interiority\(^1\) pertaining to the intellect (and ego), which are dependent on the consciousness and interiority of (the Absolute) firm as a mountain peak:

\(^1\) The particular kind of interiority pertaining to the intellect is that of “functioning as the ego”.

*boddhṛtā kartṛtā buddheḥ karmatā syād ahaṃtayā
tayor aikyam yathā buddhau pūrvayor evam ātmani*

[12] The “knowership” (boddhṛtā) of the intellect is (a kind of) agency.\(^1\) As ego, the intellect is an object.\(^2\) Just as these two\(^3\) are one in the intellect, so are their prototypes (consciousness and interiority) one in the Self.

\(^1\) It consists in modification into cognitions of the various objects known, and not in pure consciousness like that of the Absolute. J

\(^2\) An object witnessed by pure consciousness. J

\(^3\) i.e. knowership and ego. Consciousness and interiority are one and the same thing: they only appear to be sundered when the intellect is viewed objectively, as in introspection. But even here they are only conceived as different through their opposites—inertness and exteriority. In themselves they are one and the same. J

\[\text{yathā buddhau pūrvayor evam ātmanity atideśena}
\text{buddhi-sādharmya-vidhānān nānātva-prasaktau}
tad-apavādārtham āha]\n
It might be thought that the Self had been too far likened to the intellect in the phrase “just as these two are united in the intellect, so are their prototypes in the Self”, so that consciousness and interiority would be distinct in the Self. To avert this suspicion we proceed:

\[\text{dharma-dharmitva-bheda 'syāḥ so 'pi naivātmano yataḥ}
\text{pratyag-jyotir ato 'bhinnam bheda-hetor asaṃbhavat}\

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[13] The intellect, indeed, contains internal distinctions, since it consists of a substance and its attributes. Not so the Self, for it is the inmost light, itself undifferentiated. For there can be nothing to cause distinctions in it.¹

¹ J explains that, considered in relation to the intellect as substance, consciousness and interiority (as knowership and ego-sense) are qualities in it along with others. But consciousness and interiority are not to be conceived as mere inherent qualities in the case of the Self. For, unlike the intellect, the Self is not knowable as an object: and as it is in itself the undifferentiated inner light, there is no means of knowing it as associated with distinctions of any kind.

bheda-hetv-asaṁbhavaṁ darśayann āha

To explain further how there can be nothing to cause distinctions, we say:

na kasyāmcid avasthāyāṁ bodha-pratyaktvayor bhidā vyabhicāro 'thavā drṣṭo yathā 'ham-tad-vidos sadā

[14] Consciousness and interiority are never found to be different or found without each other in any state of consciousness whatever. But the ego and the knower of the ego are always experienced as different, and the knower is found without the ego.¹

¹ For example, in deep sleep.

yasmād ajñānopādānāyā eva buddher bheda
nātmanas tasmād etat siddham

Because the distinction pertains only to the intellect, born of ignorance, and not to the Self, the following stands proved:

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kūṭastha-bodhato’dvaitaṃsākṣāt tvāṃpratyagātmanah
kūṭastha-bodhād bodhri dhiḥ svato hiyaṃ vinaśvari

[15] It is because the inmost Self is of the nature of changeless consciousness that it is immediately evident and without a second. It is by the power of this same changeless consciousness that the transient intellect functions as a knower (in the empirical sense).

athādhunā prakṛtasyaiva pariṇāminah kūṭasthasya ca
lakṣaṇam ucyate

Now the definitions of “changing” (pariṇāmin) and “changeless” (kūṭastha) as understood in the present context are given:

viṣeṣam kamcid āśritya yat svarūpaṃ pratiyate
pratyabhijñā-pramāṇena pariṇāmi sa deha-vat

[16] That (i.e. the empirical ego) which is known, now as this, now as that (e.g. now as happy, now as sad), and whose unity is determined by the faculty of recognition (pratyabhijñā)—that ego-sense is subject to transformation like the body.¹

¹“Whose unity is determined by the faculty of recognition”: J writes: “Though the cognitions ‘I know the pot’, ‘I know the cloth’, ‘I am happy’, ‘I am sad’ etc. are different, yet through the power of recognition we have the knowledge ‘it is that very same I who was formerly sad that am now happy’.”

sāmānyāc ca viṣeṣāc ca sva-mahimnaiva yo bhavet
vyutthāyāpy avikāri syāt kumbhākāśādi-vat tu saḥ

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[17] But that which exists in its own incomparable majesty beyond the particular and general alike—that, the changeless rock-firm principle (kūṭastha), is unaffected, like the ether among pots.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Cp. verse II.94 above.

\begin{quote}
ātmano buddheś ca bodha-pratyagātmatvam
abhūhitam tayor asādhāraṇa-lakṣaṇābhidhāna-nārtham
āha
\end{quote}

It has been said that consciousness (bodha) and “being-an-inmost-Self” (pratyagātmatva) pertain to both the Self and the intellect. To give their particular definitions (in the two cases) we say:

\begin{quote}
buddher yat pratyagātmatvam tat syād dehādy-
upāśrayāt
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
ātmanas tu svarūpaṁ tan nabhasaḥ suṣitā yathā
\end{quote}

[18] The “being-an-inmost-Self” of the intellect is relative to the body etc. only. But the “being-an-inmost-Self” of the Self is its very nature (svarūpa), as hollowness is of the sky.

\begin{quote}
boddhrtvam tad-vad evāsyaḥ pratayotpatti-hetutaḥ
ātmanas tu svarūpaṁ tat tiṣṭhantiva mahībhṛtaḥ
\end{quote}

[19] Again, the knowership of the intellect is dependent on its happening (momentarily) to be the cause of the rise of a cognition; but that of the Self is its essential nature, as it is the essential nature of mountains to stand still.\(^1\)

\(^1\)
1 When we say of a horse, for instance, "it is standing still", what we mean is "it happens to be standing still": i.e. we are not asserting something which is necessarily bound up with the nature of the horse (essential property) but something which happens to be true of it due to particular circumstances (accidental property). But when we affirm "mountains stand still", we are asserting something about their very essence. In this sense, knowledge is but an accidental property of the mind, while it is the essential nature of the Self. The same analogy is used by Śaṃkara at Upadeśa Sāhasri (prose) 103 and elsewhere.

$\text{tayoh kūṭastha-parināminor ātmānavaḥodha eva}$
$sāṁbandha-hetur na punar vāstavah kaścid api$
$sāṁbandha upapadyata ity āha$

The only cause of (apparent) relation between these two, the changeless and the changing, is not-being.awake-to-the-Self. There can be no real relation. To express this idea we say:

$samyak-saṁśaya-mithyātvair ddhīr eveyam vibhajyate$
$hānopādānatā 'miśān mohād adhyasyate Ṛśau$

[20] This intellect is differentiated into a series of correct, doubtful and false cognitions. The rise and fall of these cognitions is falsely attributed (adhyāsa) to the Seer through delusion.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Upadeśa Sāhasri (verse section) XVIII.121.

$kutah kūṭasthātma-siddhir iti ced yatah$

If you ask how the changeless Self is proved, it is because:

$\text{na hānam hāna-mātrena nodayo 'piyatā yatah}$
$\text{tat-siddhiḥ syāt tu tadd-hine hānādāna-vidharmake}$

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[21] The loss of a cognition cannot be cognized by that lost cognition, nor can the rise of a cognition be cognized by that cognition as it rises. The rise and fall of cognitions is established owing to the existence of a Principle that is itself incapable of increase and diminution.

\[\text{evam}\]

Thus:

\[\text{āgamāpāyi-hetubhyāṁ dhūtvā sarvān anātmanah}\]
\[\text{tatas tat-tvam-asity etadd hanty asmadi nijam tamah}\]

[22] After first rejecting all his false selves through the two kinds of reasoning, those, namely, on the (false) nature of what comes into being and the (false) nature of what passes away, a man then destroys the ignorance in his Self through hearing the text “That thou art”.¹

¹ Reasoning does not suffice for liberation, it tells only what one is not. Then the Veda tells one “That thou art”, cp. verses III.5, III.53 and IV.18.

\[\text{ityādi punah punar ucyate grantha-lāghavād}\]
\[\text{buddhi-lāghavam prayojakam iti. tatra yadyapi}\]
\[\text{tat-tvam-asy-ādi-vākyād upāditsitādvitiyātmārtha-vat}\]
\[\text{pārokṣya-sadvitiyārthaḥ pratīyate. tathāpi tu}\]
\[\text{naivāsāv arthaḥ śrutiḥ tātparyena pratipipādayiṣitaḥ}\]
\[\text{prāg apy etasya pratitātvād itīnam artham āha}\]

And so forth. We go over the same ground repeatedly because by thus making the book easier to understand, the subject becomes easier to understand.¹ Now, it
must be admitted that from texts like “that thou art” the unwanted ideas “not-directly-known”\(^2\) and “having-a-second” are conveyed along with the intended meaning, viz. the non-dual Self. Still, they do not form part of the meaning that the Vedic text is intended to convey, as they are already known before (the text is heard).\(^3\) This is the point we now make:

1 The presence of repetitive stanzas, and loose organization generally, are distinctive features of the work, to which the author here himself refers. They are partly due to the ardent temperament of the writer, which left him with little patience for lengthy or coolly reasoned disquisitions, and partly to his deliberate effort to impress the same few truths on the mind of the reader by repetitions in slightly different language. This is another characteristic feature of many of the independent treatises (prakarana grantha) of Advaita, including those attributed to Śaṅkara. They are not philosophical disquisitions so much as exemplifications of the spiritual mode of reasoning about the real. They repeat again and again the same few themes from Upanishadic tradition and add incidental reasons here and there. Repetition (abhyaśa) and spiritual practice (sādhanā) are closely related terms. The repetitions, defective from the point of view of exposition of a philosophical system, are deliberate, and are inserted because the final aim of the treatises is spiritual therapy and not mere intellectual analysis. In his Introduction to his Edition of the text of the present work, Hiriyanna points out that Suresvara also apologizes for self-repetition in his Brhadāraṇyaka Vārttika (III.ii.45, p. 1155). It is of some interest for the authenticity question of the Mānasollāsa Vārttika on the Dakṣinā Mūrti Hymn attributed to Suresvara that it also contains a similar verse—VIII.4.

2 See the following verse, III.23.

3 The text is an authoritative means of knowledge (pramāṇa). But an authoritative means of knowledge is only such when it conveys some piece of knowledge not already known.

\[ \text{tad ity etat padam loke bahv-artha-pratipādakam} \]
\[ \text{aparityajya pārokiṣyam abhidhānottam eva tat} \]

[23] In ordinary worldly usage, the word “that” is used with many different meanings. But it always brings with it the notion of “not-directly-known”, so that is the basic meaning arising directly from the word.
On the other hand the word “thou” can refer directly (vāci) only to someone immediately present, and, moreover, someone enmeshed in transmigration, for that is the meaning arising (directly) from the word.\footnote{The word “thou” cannot directly mean the supreme Self, which is beyond the universe of discourse. In its direct meaning, it can only refer to an empirical personality knowable as an object. But when the word “thou” is placed in a sentence in a particular context, the sentence-meaning can indicate the supreme Self indirectly without expressing it directly, cp. verses III.3 and III.10 above.}

And (in the sentence “that thou art”) the ideas “not-directly-known” and “the transmigrant”\footnote{Lit. the sufferer.} are not part of the meaning to be conveyed, because these direct meanings are here contradictory. To show this we say:

\textit{uddhisyaṃānam vākya-sthāṃ noddeśana-guṇānvitam ākāṅkṣita-padārthena saṃsargaṃ pratipadyate}

In the text (“that thou art”), the subject\footnote{i.e. the grammatical and logical subject; according to this verse, the text has to be taken as “thou (subject) art that (predicate)”.} considered as possessing qualities denoted by the direct meaning of the word used to indicate it\footnote{i.e. the term “thou”, of which the direct meaning has just been shown to have been the transmigrant, present and immediately known.} cannot be united with the predicate\footnote{Because the predicate (“that”) has just been shown to have for its direct meaning “that which is not immediately known”. Thus, if the sentence is taken in its \textit{prima facie} meaning, a contradiction results through the identification of a subject which is “immediately known” with a predicate which is “not immediately known”.} (considered in its direct meaning).
Conclusion and summary of the topic: because this is so, the direct meanings of "that" and "thou" are not what the text intends to be understood. Their presence as qualifier and qualified is for the purpose of indicating something which stands beyond either synthesis or exclusion, and so is not the meaning of any sentence (avākyārtha).

1 The words "that" and "thou" are predicate and subject respectively; their meanings are qualifier and qualified respectively. Words in isolation stand for universals, according to Mimāṃsā and Vedānta theory. The meanings become narrowed down to particulars through mutual qualification. Here Suresvāra says that it is the meaning of "that" which qualifies the meaning of "thou". Cp. verse III.10 above and Śāmkara’s Upadeśa Śāhasri XVIII.173.

2 Synthesis and exclusion are the two ways in which a sentence can derive a single meaning from the diverse meanings of the words of which it is made up. These are exemplified in two linguistic theories which were developed well before Suresvāra’s time. According to one theory, similar to that adopted by the Advaitins from the Mimāṃsakas, the isolated word stands for a universal. The sentence-meaning consists in a synthesis of the meanings of the isolated words in which the universal meanings the words would have had in isolation become narrowed down to particulars through mutual qualification. In the phrase "the white cow", the function of "white" is to associate the idea of white with cow, and this narrows down the meaning from cow in general to white cow. "White" is also a universal, and "cow", by becoming associated with white, narrows down its meaning also. The idea at the back of this theory is that the hearer must have prior knowledge of the meaning of the word if it is to be intelligible, and the word must, therefore, in its isolated state, mean the universal, since the hearer cannot have prior knowledge of all the particulars comprehended within the universal.

The other theory, championed by the old grammarian Vyādi and a prototype of the later Buddhist apoha vāda, finds the universal itself unintelligible. The isolated word can refer to innumerable particulars, and does so not by conveying positive knowledge of any universal but simply through excluding from the mind of the hearer the meanings of
all other words. Thus “cow” does not mean the universal “cowness”, a
quite imaginary entity, but may be used to refer to any particular cow
through its power to exclude from the hearer’s mind the idea of any-
thing else. And “white” does not associate a universal with “cow”, but
simply excludes the idea of any particular cow that is not white.
The first theory is called the theory of synthesis (saṃsarga) because
the sentence-meaning is regarded as a synthetic unity arising from inter-
related universals. The second theory is called the theory of exclusion
(bhedā) because it maintains that the sole function of a word is to ex-
clude the hearer’s mind from something. Whatever the precise
meaning of the phrase “synthesis or exclusion”, it seems clear that
Suresvara is here saying that the meaning of “that thou art” is some-
thing beyond the range of words in their normal function.
For a discussion of this topic, see K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories
of Meaning, p. 191 ff.

tado viṣeṣaṇārthatvam viṣeṣyatvam tvamas tathā
lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-saṃbandhas tayoḥ syāt pratyagātmanā

[26] “That” has for its meaning the qualifier, “thou”
has for its meaning the qualified. The relation of these
to the inmost Self is that of indicator to indicated.

kathāṁ punar avivakṣita-viruddha-nirasyamānasya
lakṣaṇārthatvam
But how can that which is contradictory and rejected
and not intended as the meaning serve as an indication?

lakṣaṇam sarpa-vad rajjvāḥ pratīcaḥ syād aham tathā
tad-bādhenaiva vākyārtham vetti so ’pi tad-āśrayāt

[27] The “I” is something which indicates the inmost
Self, as the false snake indicates the rope.¹ When the
“I” is negated, the meaning of the sentence is known,
for that which it indicates is the substratum of the “I”.²

¹ In the case of the rope mistaken for a snake in the dark. The rope
is then said to be the “substratum” of the snake-illusion.
² Cp. verses II.28 ff. above.

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Only he who understands the method of reasoning by agreement and difference can understand the (indicated) meaning that is not the meaning of any sentence:

\[ \text{yāvad yāvan nirasyāyam dehādin pratyagañcati} \\
\text{tāvat tāvat tad-arthaḥ 'pi tvam-arthaṁ pravivikṣati} \]

[28] The more a man turns inward and negates the body etc., so much the more does the meaning of the word "that" tend to enter into the meaning of the word "thou" (for him).¹

¹ Cp. verse III.75 below. J explains that this verse refers to the process of reasoning by the method of agreement and difference that must take place before the texts are finally "heard" (śrāvana) in the full sense. It is not that the holy texts, if properly understood, yield a kind of knowledge that admits of degrees.

\[ \text{kasmāt punah kāraṇād dehādy-anātmatva-} \\
\text{pratipattāv evātmā tad-arthaṁ ātmatvenābhiliṁgate} \\
\text{na viparyaya iti. ucyate.} \]

\[ \text{pratyagātmānavabodhasyānātma-svābhāvyāt tad-} \\
\text{abhinirvṛttaḥ cāyam buddhy-ādi-dehāntas tasminn} \\
\text{ātmatvam avidyā-krtaṁ evātmatvam ivānātmatvam} \\
\text{api sāvidyasyaiva, yato niravidyo vidvān avākyārthā-} \\
\text{rūpa eva kevalo 'vaśisyate tasmād ucyate} \]

But why is it that the Self only becomes identified with¹ the meaning of the word "that" when the body etc.² have been seen to be not-self, and not otherwise? We reply: Because not-being-awake-to-the-Self is not-self by nature (svābhāvyāt). And all this, from the intellect to the body, has come out from not-being-awake-to-the-
Self. The view that this (whole complex of objectively knowable factors in the personality) is the Self is only the result of ignorance. And just as the notion that it is the Self is only possible for one associated with ignorance, so equally is the notion that it is not-self.\footnote{\textit{ātmatvena abhiliṅgate—lit. “embraces as its own self”}.} \footnote{i.e. all elements in the psycho-physical organism that are knowable as objects from the ego down.} For the man of enlightenment, shorn of ignorance, himself subsists as the transcendent reality that is not the meaning of any sentence. Therefore we proceed:

\begin{quote}
\begin{flushright}
dehādi vyavadhānatvāt tad-artham svayam apy atah pārokṣyeṇaiva jānāti sākṣāttvam tad-anātmanah
\end{flushright}
\end{quote}

[29] Because the body etc. are a veil, one (at first) accepts the meaning of “that” as something not immediately evident, even though it is really one’s own Self, and one takes as immediately evident what is (in fact) not of the nature of that Self, (i.e. the ego, mind and body etc.).

\begin{quote}
\textit{yathoktārtha-pratipatti-saukaryāya dṛṣṭāntopādānam}
\end{quote}

We give a simile to make the point as stated clearer to understand:

\begin{quote}
\begin{flushright}
pratyag udbhūta-pittasya yathā bāhyārtha-pītatā caitanyaṁ pratyagātmīyam bahir vad dṛṣyate tathā
\end{flushright}
\end{quote}

[30] Just as in jaundice bile in the eye appears as yellow colour in an object perceived externally (such as a white conch), so (by a similar superimposition) the consciousness constituting the inmost Self seems as if it were external.
yasmād evam ato viśuddham avasyatām

This being so,¹ one should determine the true² meaning:

¹ J says this refers to the general argument of the last few verses that “that” and “thou” refer indirectly to the supreme Self.
² viśuddha—lit. pure, purified, emended.

padāṇy uddhṛtya vākyebhyo hy anvaya-vyatirekataḥ
padārthāṁ llokato buddhā vetti vākyārtham añjasā

[31] It is by isolating single words from their sentences and noting what is and is not regularly associated with them that one learns their meanings in the course of worldly experience. Having learnt them, one is in a position to understand the meaning of a sentence (which uses them).¹

¹ The standard example in Advaita works of how words are learned has been given by Sarvajñatma Muni. A small boy who does not know the meaning of the word “faggots” hears the statement “Pūnnikā is in the kitchen, cooking rice with the help of the faggots”. What he then sees gives him his first idea of the meaning of the word “faggots”, and later he learns the meaning of the word thoroughly by finding that in all the different contexts in which it is used it is invariably associated with small bundles of wood used for cooking. See Saṃkṣepa Śāriraka 1.362.

kutah punah sāmānya-mātra-vṛtteḥ padasya
vākyārtha-pratipatti-hetutvam iti. bāḍham

You ask, “How can a word, which stands only for a universal,¹ function in conveying the meaning of a sentence (which is often concerned with the particular)?” All right, (we’ll show you):

¹ Cp. note 2 to III.26 (prose introduction) above.

sāmānyam hi padam brūte viśeṣo vākya-kartrkaḥ
śruti-ādi-pratibaddham sad viśeṣārtham bhāvet padam
[32] A word expresses a universal; a particular is expressed through a sentence; a word comes to stand for a particular when its meaning is restricted through interpretation according to the (Mimamsaka) criteria laid down for ascertaining subject and context.¹

¹ The term “sūtya-ādi” in the text refers to sūti, liṅga etc. which are the criteria laid down by the Mimamsakas for determining where a subject begins and ends, and so, in the last analysis, for interpreting the meaning of any Vedic passage. They are described at length in Mimamsa Nyāya Prakāsa, trans. Edgerton, pp. 64–110.

anvaya-vyatireka-purassaraṁ vākyam eva
sāmānādhi karanyādināvidyā-paṭala-pradhvamsa-
dvāreṇa mumukṣum svārājye ‘bhiṣecayati na tv
anvaya-vyatireka-mātra-sādhyo ‘yam artha ity āha

What we now proceed to say is that it is the holy text itself, analysed logically through the method of agreement and difference, that destroys the ignorance of the seeker of liberation through the relations of apposition etc. which it expresses¹ and anoints him in the realm of spiritual sovereignty, and that mere logical reason (practised in isolation from the holy text) cannot fulfil this function.

¹ That is, through the grammatical relation of apposition which conveys a qualified sentence-meaning, which in turn indicates a meaning beyond all sentence-meanings, cp. verse III.3 above.

buddhi-ādinām anātmatvam liṅgād api ca sidhyati
nivṛttis tāvatā netity ato vākyam samāśrayet

[33] The knowledge that the intellect, etc., are not-self may be attained through reasoning (liṅga). But reasoning does not suffice to annihilate ignorance. Hence one must resort to the holy texts.
Moreover, resort to reason alone does not merely fail to carry one to the desired goal. It also produces positive evil:

\[\text{anāḍṛtya śrutim mohād ato bauddhās tamasvinah āpedire nirātmavam anumānika-cakṣuṣaḥ}\]

[34] Neglecting the Upanishadic doctrines from pure delusion, the benighted Buddhists landed themselves in the doctrine of the non-existence of the Self, through adhering to inference as their only criterion of truth.

\[\text{na cānādare kāraṇam asti. yasmāt sarvatraivānāda-nimittam pramāṇasya pramāṇāntara-pratipanna-pratipādanam vā viparīta-pratipādanam vā saṃśayita-pratipādanam vā na vā pratipādanam iti—na caiteśām anyatatmad api kāraṇam asti. yata āha}\]

Nor is there any ground for (this) neglect of the Veda (śrutī). For the only occasions for disregarding an authoritative source of knowledge are when it “reveals” something already revealed from another authoritative source of knowledge, when it “reveals” something contradictory (to known truths), where it “reveals” (only) a doubt or where it “reveals” nothing. And none of these grounds are present (in the case of the Veda). Hence we say:

\[\text{mānāntarānavaśṭabdham nirduhkhya-ātmānam aṅjasaḥ bodhayanti śrutīḥ kena na pramāṇam itiryate}\]
[35] Who would not accept the authority of the Veda which teaches with simplicity and directness the nature of the Self beyond pain, which is not knowable through any other authoritative means of knowledge (pramāṇa)?

\[\text{na ca saṃśayitavyam avagamayati. yataḥ}\]

Nor does it convey anything open to doubt: for

\[\text{sarva-saṃśaya-hetu hi niraste katham ātmani} \]
\[\text{jāyeta saṃśayo vākyād anumāṇena yuṣmadi}\]

[36] When (the not-self with the ego etc. which is) the only cause of doubts has been rejected by reasoning, how can doubts about the Self be raised by the holy texts?

\[\text{api ca}\]

Moreover:

\[\text{yatra syāt saṃśayo nāsau jñeya ātmeti paṇḍitaiḥ} \]
\[\text{na yataḥ saṃśaya-prāptir ātmano 'vagatitvataḥ}\]

[37] Wheresoever there is doubt, there, the wise should know, the Self is not. For no doubts can rise in relation to the Self, since its nature is pure immediate consciousness.

\[\text{anavabodhakatvam tu duḥrotsāritam eva. yata āha}\]

And the notion that the Veda reveals nothing is altogether preposterous. Hence we say:
bodhye 'py anubhavo yasya na kathaṃcana jāyate
taṃ kathaṃ bodhayec chaśtram lośtaṃ nara-
samākr̥tim

[38] He in whom enlightenment does not arise even though all the conditions for it are present—how could the Veda (śāstra) enlighten such a one, clod of earth as he is in human form?¹

¹ Quoted with a variant reading by Vidyāraṇya Svāmin at Pañcadaśi III.19.

anvaya-व्यतिरेक-पुरास्यातः वाक्यम
evāvākyārtha-rūpam ātmānaṃ pratipādayatity asya
pakṣasya draḍhimne śruti-udāharaṇam upanasyati

Now we quote a Vedic text in support of our view, “only the holy text, as supported through reasoning by the method of agreement and difference, conveys knowledge of that Self which is not the meaning of any sentence”:

jíghrāṇīmam aham gandham iti yo vetti avikriyāḥ
sa ātmā tat param jyotiḥ širasidaṃ vacah śruteḥ

[39] That changeless one who has experiences such as (the desire) “Let me smell this smell”¹ is the Self, as is declared in “He is the Self”² and “that is the highest Light”³. These texts form the crown of the Veda.

¹ Chāṇḍogya Upanishad VIII.xii.4.
² Ibid.
³ Chāṇḍogya Upanishad VIII.xii.2.
yathā "tat satyāṃ sa ātmā tat tvam asi" ity asya 
śesatvenānvaya-vyatireka-śrutir yathā "ya eso 
kṣiṇi puruṣo dṛṣyate" ity ādyā "atha yo vededam 
jigṛṇi" ity antā. tathā "ahaṁ brahmāsmi" ity asya 
śeṣāḥ

There exist passages like the one beginning "This 
spirit (puruṣa) in the eye"1 and ending "He then who 
experiences the desire ‘let me smell (this smell)’,"2 
which are subordinate to texts like “That is real, 
that is the Self, that thou art”3 and are, in fact, 
illustrations of their meaning through agreement and 
difference (anvaya-vyatireka-śrutis). Similarly, the fol-
lowing is subordinate to the text “I am the Absolute 
(Brahman)”.4

1 Chāndogya Upanishad VIII.vii.4.  
2 Chāndogya Upanishad VIII.xii.4.  
3 Chāndogya Upanishad VI.viii.7 etc.  
4 Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad I.iv.10.

ahamah pratyagātmārtho nirastāśeṣa-yaṣmadaḥ  
bambhaṇīti śrutir nyāyyā yo ’yam ity ādinā ’ sakṛt

[40] When the word “I” has been divested of all asso-
ciation with the not-self1 it means the inmost Self  
(pratyag-ātman). The Veda (śrutis) regularly and re-
peatedly declares this in such texts as “(Verily) he (is the 
great unborn Soul) who is this (Person consisting of 
knowledge among the senses)”.2

1 With duality.  
2 Brhadāraṇyaka Upanishad IV.iii.7.

kathāṃ punar ayam artho ’vasiyate aham-
vīyājenātrātmārtho bubodhayiṣṭa iti. yataḥ
But how is it determined for certain that it is for pro-
claiming the Self that the device of the “I” is resorted
to? In this way:

\[ \text{esa ātmā svayam-jyotir-ravi-somāgni-vākṣu saḥ}
\text{iteśv astam dṛg evāste bhāsayamś citta-ceṣṭitam} \]

[41] This is the Self, the self-luminous Light. When the
sun, moon, fire and speech have set,\(^1\) He remains alone
as the Seer, illumining all the activities of the mind.\(^2\)

\(^1\) i.e. in dream.
\(^2\) This verse is based on Brhadāranyaka Upanishad, IV.iii.6.

\[ \text{nirṇenekti ca prṣto muniḥ} \]

And the sage (Yājñavalkya), being asked, gave a ruling:

\[ \text{ātmanaivety upaśrutyā ko 'yam ātmety udīrite}
\text{buddheḥ paraṁ svato muktam ātmānam munir}
\text{abhyadhāt} \]

[42] Having heard the words “By the Self alone”,
Janaka asked, “Who is this Self?”\(^1\). And the sage
(Yājñavalkya) told him of the Self beyond the intellect,
free by nature.

\(^1\) Brhadāranyaka Upanishad IV.iii.7.

\[ \text{yasmāc cātmātrāham-vyājena pratyāh-mātro}
\text{jigrāhayiṣitas tasmād aham-vṛttih svarūpasya}
\text{vilayenaiva vākyārthāvagamāya kāraṇatvāṁ}
\text{pratipadyata itimam artham āha} \]
The point that we now propound is the following: because the aim is to convey a knowledge of the inmost (Self) alone through the device of the "I", taken as the bare Self, it follows that the ego-notion (aham-vrtti) plays its part in conveying the meaning of the sentence by mere self-dissolution:

\[
aham-vrttyaiva tad brahma yasm\ddot{a}d e\ddot{a}s \ 'vagacchati
tat-svarupa-layanatah k\ddot{a}ra\ddot{n}a\ddot{m} sy\ddot{a}d ahamkr\ddot{t}ih
\]

[43] It is true that it is through the ego-notion (aham-vrtti) that the seeker of liberation (mumuk\ddot{su}) comes to know the Absolute in the form "I am the Absolute (Brahman)". But it is through dissolving itself (to make way for the supreme Reality) that the ego-notion serves as an instrument in this matter.

\[
ata eva ca ya\ddot{h} pratijn\ddot{a}to 'rtho "naha\ddot{m}-gr\ddot{a}hye na
tadd-h\ddot{a}ne" ity\ddot{a}di\ddot{h} sa yuktibhir upap\ddot{a}dita iti
k\ddot{r}tvopasa\ddot{m}hr\ddot{i}yat\ddot{e}
\]

Thinking, therefore, that the doctrine proposed at verse II.5 above in the words "it conflicts neither with the object of the I-notion nor with that which is not the object of the I-notion" has been well substantiated by arguments, we sum the matter up:

\[
grhit\ddot{a}ham-pad\ddot{a}rtha\ddot{s} cet kasm\ddot{a}j j\ddot{a}nna prapadyate
pratyak\ddot{s}\ddot{a}di-virodha\ddot{c} cet praticy uktir na yu\ddot{\ddot{a}}sm\ddot{a}d\ddot{a}
\]

[44] Suppose it is asked "When the ego-sense is known, why is the Seer not known forthwith?", it might be replied "Because of the conflict with perception".
But the knowledge conveyed by the holy texts is not in conflict with perception since they refer to the inmost Self and not to the world of duality.¹

¹ Lit. “the sphere of the you”.

pūrvasyaiva ślokārthasya vispaṭārtham āha

To clarify further the meaning of the above verse, we proceed:

parāṇcy eva tu sarvāṇi pratyakṣādini nātmanī praticy eva pravṛttam tat sad asīti vaco ’niṣjasā

[45] All the empirical means of knowledge bear outwards; they do not bear on the Self. But texts like “Thou art that reality” (tat sad asi)¹ bear upon the inmost Self.²

² The deliverances of revelation and sense-perception cannot contradict one another since they bear on a different subject-matter. Cp. verses II.5 and II.81–83 above.

tasmāt pramāṭr-pramāṇa-prameyebhyo
hiyamānapādiyamānebhyo ’nvaya-vyatirekābhhyām
muñjeśikā-vad aśeṣa-buddhi-vikriyā-sākṣitayātmānaṃ
niśkṛṣya tat-tvam-asy-ādi-vākyebhyo ’pūrvādi-
lakṣaṇam ātmānaṃ vijāniyāt. tad etad āha

Therefore, as one extracts a piece of muñja grass from its stalk, so should one extract the Self from its fancied connection with the triad of the empirical knower, knowledge and known, subject as these are to destruction and production, and should realize that the Self is the Witness of all the changes undergone by the intellect.
This is the work of reasoning by the method of agreement and difference (anvaya and vyatireka). Then one should come to know the Self with its various characteristics such as “not to be known in any other way”.

This, then, is what we say:

\[ \text{aham duhkhi sukhi ceti yenayaṃ pratyayo 'dhruvalḥ avagaty-anta ābhāti sa ma ātmeti vākyā-dhiḥ} \]

[46] Cognitions such as “I am in pain”, “I am happy”, are transient. The spirit of the texts is, “That through which these transient cognitions shine and come to manifestation (avagati) is my Self”.

We have more than once declared that the holy texts like “That thou art”, “I am the Absolute (Brahman)”, etc., yield knowledge of the Self as reality-knowledge-bliss¹ that is as direct as that of a mango held in the palm of the hand. It is knowledge of that Self which is not knowable from any other source and whose very nature consists in the negation of the whole universe of duality differentiated into causes and effects. It ends wrong knowledge and doubt for ever.

To this, some (a certain school of Mīmāṃsakas) reply as follows. The Self under discussion cannot be taught by texts such as “That thou art”, etc., which are formally concerned with matters of fact, since these texts, being concerned with information, must be interpreted as subordinate to some command, and are hence not authoritative in their own right. In ordinary usage in the world, a mere vague claim such as “there are fruits on the river-bank”, etc., is not significant unless subsequently confirmed by some other authoritative means of knowledge. Hence only such Vedic statements as convey information relative to some command have independent authority as a means to true knowledge, since the commands of the Veda (śrutis) have authority independently of all other means of knowledge.

In order to refute this idea we point out that the texts of the Veda (śrutis) conveying information about the Self do have authority independently of any other means of knowledge. Their subject-matter is something beyond the senses, which can be known only through negating the notion that perception and the other means of empirical cognition have any validity whatever (as means of knowledge about the Self). They have the
same authority as a sentence (vākya) used to awaken a sleeping man.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} satya-jñāna-ānanda: This phrase is practically equivalent to sac-cid-ānanda—a phrase that is very common in the Advaitic literature of post-Śaṅkara times but which is not to be found in the authentic commentaries of Śaṅkara or in the Upadeśa Śāhasri, his most certainly authentic independent treatise.

\textsuperscript{2} The words with which we waken a sleeper are not (for him) authoritative means of cognition of any object in the empirical world, yet they are authoritative in waking him up to a new state of consciousness. The same is true of the words “That thou art”.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
nityāvagati-rūpatvād anya-mānānapeksaṇāt \\
śabdādi-guṇa-hīnātvāt saṃśayānavaītārataḥ
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

[47] Because the Self is of the form of constant awareness, it requires no second means of knowledge to reveal it; because it is without sound or other attributes it is beyond the sphere of doubt.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
trṣṭā-niṣṭhīvanair nātmā pratyakṣādyaiḥ pramīyate \\
pratyagātmatva-hetoś ca svārthatvād aprameyataḥ
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

[48] The Self cannot be known through the empirical means of knowledge such as perception, etc., which are but phlegm coughed up by the thirst for life (trṣṭā). Indeed, it is not a possible object of empirical cognition, since it is the innermost Self and since it exists for its own sake.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1} Whatever is compounded exists for another and is accessible to the senses. But the Self, which exists for its own sake, is partless and not accessible to the senses.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
śrutir apimam arthaṁ nirvadati
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

The Veda also makes the same point:
didṛksita-paricchinna-parāgrūpādi samśrayāt
vīparītam ato drṣṭyā svato buddhaṁ na paśyati

[49] One cannot see with sight that which is self-revealed. The visible is limited, external and has a form, but the self-revealed is infinite, internal and formless.

nyāya-siddham ato vakti drṣṭer draṣṭāram ātmanah
na paśyet pratyagātmānaṁ pramānaṁ śrutir ādarāt

[50] Rightly, therefore, does the Veda say with respect to the inmost Self “thou canst not see the seer of seeing”. It is a solemn utterance, and the Veda is the final authority in the matter.  

1 Brhadāranyaka Upanishad III.iv.2.  
2 The Veda is the final authority because perception and inference cannot rise to a knowledge of the Self.

anumānāviṣayatve ’nyad api kāraṇam ucyate

We now mention another reason why it cannot be an object of inference:

pratyakṣasya parāktvān na saṁbandha-grahaṇaṁ yataḥ
ātmano ’to ’numityāsyānubhavo na kathāṁcana

[51] Since sense-perception bears outwards it cannot establish contact with the Self. All the less can the Self be known through inference.  

1 Which depends on perception. All secular reasoning is based on perception in the sense that it depends on the perception of an object associated with a liṅga (or hetu), viz. a second object that, as known
from previous perception, is in constant concomitance (vyāpti) with a third object not at present perceptible. E.g., "This hill has smoke, but I have always perceived smoke in association with fire, therefore this hill has fire". But since the Absolute is never perceived we can never derive from perception its constant concomitance (vyāpti) with anything else, so that nothing can serve as a ground (liṅga or hetu) to prove its existence. The liṅga or hetu may be translated "ground", though the literal meaning of the term liṅga is "mark".

In Advaita, reason is regarded as metaphysically fruitful only when applied to the data of revelation and of mystical experience. A limited scope for metaphysical inferences is admitted at verse III.56 below. See also Note to introductory commentary to II.25 above.

\[
evat\ am\ pramātr-pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāraḥ
sarva eva parācina-viṣaya eva na pratīcīnām
ātmānam avagāhāyatum alam. evam ca saty anenaiva
yathokto 'rtho 'vasātuṁ śakyata ity āha
\]

Therefore all the empirically accepted knower-knowledge-known relates to the external and cannot comprehend the Self which is by nature internal. This being so, the point now at issue can be solved only as follows:

\[
pramāṇa-vyavahāro 'yam sarva eva parāg yataḥ
suvicārayāpy ato 'nena yuṣmady eva didṛksate
\]

[52] Because all this empirically accepted play of the means of knowledge bears only on the external, one will, after thinking about it hard, only apply them to the sphere of duality.¹

¹ Kant called the inveterate tendency to speak of the transcendent in terms of the categories of empirical experience the "transcendental illusion".

\[
yasmāl laukika pratyakṣādi-pramāṇānadhigamyo
'ham brahmāsmīti vākyārthas tasmāt
\]
Because the meaning of the text "I am the Absolute (Brahman)" cannot be comprehended by the secular means of knowledge, such as perception, it therefore follows that:

anvaya-vyatirekāḥḥyāṁ nirasyāprāņato yateḥ
vikṣāpannyao ko 'smīti tad asīti śrutir jagau

[53] To the ascetic who has negated everything up to his very life-breath by the practice of reasoning by the method of agreement and difference, who has reached bewilderment and who asks "Who am I?", the Veda replies "thou art that".¹

¹ Compare verse III.5 above.

so 'yam anvaya-vyatireka-nyāya etavān eva yad-
avasāno vākyārthas tad-abhijñasyāham brahmāsmity
āvirbhavati. draṣṭr-dṛśya-vibhāgenāgamāpāyi-sākṣi-
vibhāgena ca śruty-abhyupagamataḥ samkṣipcyate

This process of reasoning by agreement and difference takes one as far as (an understanding of) the meaning of the holy text: to him who has this understanding, (the truth) "I am the Absolute (Brahman)" becomes manifest.¹ We now expound the subject briefly according to the two distinctions "subject and object" and "the transient and its (non-transient) Witness", both of which are accepted in the Veda (śruti).

¹ The knowledge yielded by rational analysis of the text remains within the realm of speech; but it is the vantage ground from which the final mystical intuition takes place, which is beyond the realm of speech.

dṛśyatvād ghaṭa-vad deho deha-vac cendriyāny api
manas cendriya-vaj jñeyam mano-van niścayādi-mat
[54] Because the body is an object of perception, it is not-self, like a pot. The senses are in the same case as the body, and the mind (manas) in the same case as the senses. The intellect, which has the power of decision and other faculties,\(^1\) is in the same case as the mind.

\(^1\) Here the intellect (buddhi) is the faculty of determinate cognition and fixed decision, as opposed to the mind (manas), the faculty of preliminary conceptions and wavering of the will.

\[ \text{tathā sakala-kārya-kāraṇāgamāpāyī-vibhāga-sākṣitvenāpi} \]

The same thing (is now expounded) from the standpoint of the distinction between all transient causes and effects and their (non-transient) Witness:

\[ \text{prāg asad yāti paścāt sat sac ca yāyād asat tathā anātmābhijanaṁ tat syād viparītaḥ svayam dṛśiḥ} \]

[55] That which, (originally) non-existent, becomes existent, and which, having become existent, (again) becomes non-existent; that is of the nature of the not-self. But the self-evident Witness (of all this coming-to-be and passing-away) is of opposite nature (constant).

\[ \text{tatra ghaṭādināṁ dṛśyānāṁ anātmatvam draṣṭrātma-pūrvakaṁ pratyakṣenaiva pramāṇenopalabhyanātmanas cāsādhāraṇān dharmān avadhārya tair dṛṣṭvāgamāpāyādibhir dharmaṁ śarirendriya-mano-niścayādi-vṛttir anātmatayā vyudasyāham-vṛttimato 'pi dṛṣṭvāvāiviśeṣād draṣṭr-pūrvakatvam avasiyate. tad etad āha} \]
It is clear from mere perception that pots and other perceptible objects are not-self and that they require a conscious Self in the perceiver in order to be perceived. When one has realized this and has likewise determined the peculiar qualities of the not-self, and has rejected as not-self the body, the senses, the mind and the faculty of determinate knowledge (buddhi) because they have these qualities, such as being subject to perception and coming into being and passing away—one then proceeds finally to determine that the ego-notion (ahaṁ-vṛtti) also, being an object like the others, presupposes a subject (i.e. the Witness). This is what we are now saying.

\[ \text{ṛta dādayo yathā liṅgam syuh paramparayā 'hamah} \]
\[ \text{dṛṣyayād aham apy evaṁ liṅgam syād draṣṭur} \]
\[ \text{ātmanah} \]

[56] Just as the whole hierarchy of objects from the pot to the intellect supply a ground (liṅga) for the inference of the existence of an “I” perceiving them—so this same “I”, because it is objectively known, is a ground for inferring the existence of the Self as Witness.\(^1\)

\(^1\) The “I” (ahaṁ) here is the subject of empirical experience. It is the innermost and most superior thing in the empirical personality because it is that which views the mind and intellect as objects from within, for example in introspection. Nevertheless, it is not the real subject. The latter can never be known as an object, as we saw at sloka II.27 above. (Cp. the pure ego of Kant, though the latter is a formal principle only, and not to be confused with the Atman of Advaita, which is existence absolute). The “I” is itself the product of a superimposition (adhyāsa), the first and most primordial superimposition of all.

\[ \text{nanu draṣṭṛ-darśana-dṛṣyānāṁ jāgrat-svapna-} \]
\[ \text{suṣupteṣv āgamāpāya-darśanād yat-sākṣikau teśām} \]
\[ \text{āgamāpāyau sa āgamāpāya-vibhāga-rahita ātmā} \]
yathā yan-nibandhanau jagataḥ prakāśāprakāśa-sau sa
prakāśāprakāśa-vibhāga-rahitah sūrya iti. yadā
cāivam tatā vākyāvagyamasyārthasyānuditānastamita-
vijñāna-mātra-svabhāvasyānumānenaiva
pratipannatvāt punar api vākyasya nirviṣayatva-
prasaṅgaḥ. naiṣa doṣah. liṅga-vyavadhānena tat-
pratipatteḥ. nanu sāksād-aparokṣād-ātma-
svabhāvenānātmano hānopādānayoh sambandha-
graṇāt kam atiśayam vākyam kuryāt. maivām
vocah. liṅgādhistavāt tat-pratipatteḥ. na hi liṅgā-
vyavadhānenaśāma-pratipattir sāksāt-pratipattir
bhavati “yam evaisa viṇute tena labhyah” iti śruteḥ.
ata āha

Objection: We see that the empirical knower, his
knowledge and its objects are things that come and go
in succession during the successive experiences of waking,
dream and deep sleep. The Witness, therefore, of their
coming and going, is the Self, which does not participate
in the coming and going, as the sun is the cause of day
and night on the earth, while being itself free from alter-
nate conditions like day and night. This being so, the
pure consciousness that never rises or sets, and which
is taught in the Vedic texts, is perfectly accessible to
inference, and the Vedic texts teaching it are redundant.

Answer: No, because inference yields only mediate
knowledge of the subject of the inference through the
ground (liṅga) that it directly perceives.¹

Objection: We are directly and immediately aware of
the Self and of its relationship with the comings and
goings of the not-self as Witness thereof. What could
the text add?
\textit{Answer:} Do not speak thus. For that is (mediate and) dependent on a ground (liṅga).\textsuperscript{2} Perception of the Self through the medium of a ground cannot amount to direct awareness. Remember the Upanishadic passage “He whom this Self chooses, he only obtains the knowledge”\textsuperscript{3}. So we proceed:

\textsuperscript{1} Sūreśvara means that inference can at best tell us that the Self as pure consciousness exists, but cannot put us into immediate touch with it. When we see the smoke on the hill we infer the existence of fire, but this is but an indirect acquaintance with it. Cp. verse III.51, note 1 above.

\textsuperscript{2} At the time of making the inference that the Self must be the Witness of the not-self we are still identified with the not-self in the form of the mind etc. and are not aware of the Self in its true nature. On liṅga, cp. note to verse III.51 above.

\textsuperscript{3} Kaṭha Upanishad I.ii.23 (or II.23).

\textit{liṅgam astitva-niṣṭhatvān na syād vākyārtha-bodhakam sad-asad-vyutthitātmā 'yam ato vākyāt pratiyate}

[57] An inferential ground (liṅga) proves only the existence of that of which it is the ground, so it cannot convey fully the meaning of the highest texts.\textsuperscript{1} This Self is by nature beyond existence and non-existence, so it can be known only from the holy texts.

\textsuperscript{1} Inference, as we have seen, yields but indirect knowledge. Smoke rising from behind a hill proves the existence of fire but does not yield a direct apprehension of fire. The text, therefore, adds something more in that it throws the qualified hearer into immediate awareness of his own true nature as the Self of all. Cp. Verse II.117 above.


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bijusyātmānabodhasya suṣupte saṁbhavāt. yadi hi
suṣupte 'jñānam nābhaviṣyad antareṇāpi vedānta-
vākyya-śravāṇa-manana-nīdīhyāsanāny ahaṃ
brahmāsmity adhyavasāyāt sarva-prāṇa-bhṛtām api
svarasata eva suṣupta-pratipatteḥ sakalas-
saṃsārocchitti-prasaṅgah. na ca kaivalyāt punar-
uttānām nyāyyam anirmokṣa-prasaṅgāt. na cānya
eva suṣupto 'nya evotthita iti śakyam vaktum
nādrākṣam ahaṃ suṣupte 'nyat kiṃcid api t
utthitasya pratyabhijñā-darsanāt. tasmād avaśyaṃ
suṣupte 'jñānam abhyupagantavyam. nanu yadi
tatrājñānam abhaviṣyad rāga-dvesa-ghatājñānādi-vat
pratyakṣam abhaviṣyad yatheha loke ghatām na
jānāmity ajñānam avyavahitam pratyakṣam.
atrocyate. na. abhivyāñjakābhāvāt. kathām
abhivyāñjakābhāva iti cecchṛṇu

Objection: If all that were taught by your texts were
reality as divorced from the whole complex of alter-
native human notions such as “real” and “unreal” etc.,
then all interest in those texts would be at an end. For
even without them reality as divorced from all human
notions is attained by everyone from cowmen and
shepherds to great scholars merely by falling asleep.

Answer: Not so, for in sleep there is present that
very ignorance of the Self which is the seed of all evil.
And if this ignorance were not present in dreamless
sleep, then it would be a fact that all living creatures
would realize the complete destruction of transmigra-
tory life (samsāra) merely by falling asleep and without
the discipline of hearing, cogitation and sustained
meditation on “I am the Absolute (Brahman)” and
other Upanishadic texts. Nor can it be admitted that
there is such a thing as liberation from which one subsequently returns, for in that case the possibility of all liberation being but temporary would arise. Nor can you say: One man went to sleep (and was thereby liberated), and the man who awoke was a different one—for we see people recognizing their identity with themselves as sleepers, as when they say “when I was asleep, I saw nothing”. Hence for all these reasons the existence of ignorance in deep sleep must certainly be admitted.

Objection: If ignorance were present in deep sleep then we ought to have direct awareness of the fact during the time of sleep, just as we are aware of our ignorance in reference to particular emotional states and external objects in the waking state. For in waking experience we know through direct perception (at the time) “I cannot see the pot”. But in deep sleep we are not immediately aware of such ignorance. Hence there is no ignorance in deep sleep.

Answer: You are wrong. The ignorance is there. It is merely that there is nothing to reveal it. If you ask, “What do you mean by saying there is nothing to reveal it?”, then listen:

1 Sleep cannot be equated with liberation for the reason, among others, that sleep is a state from which one returns to ignorant waking experience, whereas liberation is not.
2 i.e. the theory is to be rejected because it would undermine the doctrine of eternal liberation, the very thing the Vedānta exists to proclaim.
3 e.g. the feelings “I do not know what is impelling me in this direction” and “I cannot see the pot which you say is by the cloth”.

bāhyāṁ vṛttim anutpādyā vyaktih syān nāhamo yathā narte ’ntañkaṇaṁ tad-vad dhvāntasya vyaktir āñjasī
[58] Just as there is no manifestation of the “I” without a modification of the mind directed to the external, so there is no clear manifestation of ignorance unless the mind (antaḥkaraṇa)\(^1\) is itself manifest.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Lit. “inner organ”.
\(^2\) According to Advaita doctrine, the mind undergoes absorption in deep sleep.

Someone suddenly remembering what was said before, complains: “When you said (verse III.56 above), ‘so this same “I”, because it is objectively known, is a ground for knowing the existence of the Self as Witness’, that was impossible. Why? Because it is impossible to establish a distinction between the “I” and the Witness of it. In the ordinary empirical experience of objects the difference between the knower and the known, between Devadatta and the pot, is perfectly obvious. But in the case of the “I” and its knower this manifest difference does not obtain. So what you said was wrong”. To this we reply:

\[ \text{dāhya-dāhakataikatra yathā syād vahni-dāruṇoḥ} \]
\[ \text{jñeya-jñātrkataivam syād aham-jñātroḥ parasparam} \]
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[59] Just as fire and wood are burner and burnt respectively, though appearing as one blazing indistinguishable mass, even so the “I” and the knower of the “I”, though indistinguishable in empirical experience, are respectively known and knower.

\[
evām tāvad avidyotthasyāntahkaraṇasya bāhya-
viṣaya-nimitta-rūpāvacchedāyāhaṁ-vṛttir vyāpriyate.
\text{tayāvacchinnam sat kūṭastha-}
pratyaṅgātmopādānāvabodha-rūpasyāvyavahānatayā
viṣaya-bhāvaṁ pratipadyata iti. tatra tayor jñātr-
ahantu-rūpayor avabhāsakāvabhāsyatva-saṁbandha-
vyatirekena nānyat saṁbandhāntaram upapadyate.
ahantu-rūpaṁ tv ātmasātktvā ḫam-kañcukanī
paridhāyopakāryatvopakārakatva-ksamaḥ san
bāhya-viṣayenopakārīnāpakārīnā vātmātmīyam
saṁbandham praṁtyāyate. tad abhidhiyate
\]

The function of the ego-notion (aham-vṛtti) is to delimit (and act as a focus for) the forms assumed (under the impress of external objects) by the mind (antaḥkaraṇa), itself a product of nescience. As delimited by the ego-notion, the mind becomes the direct object of an intuition arising from\(^1\) the inmost Self, firm as a mountain-peak. In this situation, no other relation can be supposed to obtain between the Witness and the “I” than that of illumining subject and illumined object. But the ego goes further and assumes the very mask\(^2\) of the ego and thus becomes able to enter into commerce with the external world. Hence its ability to come into contact with helpful and harmful objects with the feeling “they are mine”.

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The Seer knows objects as “this”, the “I” (ego) knows them as “mine”. The notion “this” arises through the adjunct (upādhi) of ignorance (ajñāna). “Mine” is thus a modification of the “I” (aham).\footnote{The notions “this” and “mine” are touched on by Śaṅkara at Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.93.}

It has been said that two different kinds of knowledge as “this” and “mine” arise in the one Witness with reference to one object according to differences in the instrument (nimitta) through which knowledge arises. How do we know that the Witness as associated with the ego-notion (and hence involved in advantages and disadvantages) sees things as “mine”, and that the same Witness not associated with the ego-notion sees them as “this”? We know through reasoning by agreement and difference. To explain how that is so, we proceed:
anupakriyamāṇatvān na jñātuḥ syād ahaṁ mama
gaḥaḍī-vad idaṁ tu syān moha-mātra-vyapāśrayāt

[61] Because nothing can make any contribution to
the Witness, the “I” is not adopted by it with the
feeling “mine”. On the contrary, it is a “this”, just like a
pot (or any other object), because its basis is just
ignorance.

moha-tat-kāryāśrayatvāj jñātṛtvā-vikriyayoḥ
pūrvatredaṁ-mama-jñānānvayaḥ pradarśitah.
athādhunā tad-vyatrekeṇa vyatrekapradarśanārtham
āha

It has been said above that Witnesshood and empirical
knowership, associated with knowledge as “this” and
knowledge as “mine”, accrue to the Self (not really but)
through ignorance and its effects alone. We now com-
plete the argument negatively by showing that in the
absence of ignorance neither of these two kinds of
knowledge arises.

vikriyā-jñāna-sūnyatvān nedam na ca mamātmanah
utthitasya sato 'jñānam nāham ajñāsiṣaṁ yataḥ

[62] In itself the Self is free from ignorance and
modification,¹ and hence feels neither “this” nor
“mine”. For it is only the one who has woken up from
sleep (i.e. the empirical knower) who experiences
ignorance and feels “I did not know (anything then)”.²

¹ Cp. III.60 above.
² At the prose introduction to verse III.58 above, Sureśvara argued
that because deep sleep did not produce liberation, ignorance must be
present in deep sleep, at least in the sense of not-being-awake-to-the-
Self, cp. verse IV.40 below. In the present verse Sureśvara is arguing
that the Self is free from ignorance and from modifications, the necessary preconditions for knowing a "that" or a "mine". Deep sleep is a proof of this because it is only when a person wakes up that he has the conception of ignorance in the form "I knew nothing when I slept". There is no consciousness of ignorance and no relation with an ego in deep sleep, but the Self is nevertheless present. Cp. Texte, p. 53.

ātmānātma-vivekasyeyattā-pradarśanārtham āha

To bring out the limitations of purely intellectual discrimination between the Self and the not-self, we now say:

vākya-pratyakṣa-mānābhyyām iyān arthāḥ pratiyate
anartha-kṛt-tamo-hānir vākyād eva sad-ātmanāḥ

[63] From perception and inference based on the holy texts one understands only so much. But the permanent destruction of the ignorance of the Self, the source of (all) evil, proceeds only from the authoritative sentence itself.

1 One knows the Self as distinct from the not-self. J

dvitiyādhyāyādau śrutī-catuṣṭayam upanyastam.
tatra kṛṣṇānātma-nivṛttau satyāṁ yah
pratyagātmany avākyārthatāṁ pratipadyate sa
kṣapitāśeśāntarāya-hetur iti na tam prati vaktavyāṃ
kimcid apy avaśiṣyate. yo 'pi vākya-śravaṇā-mātrād
eva pratipadyate tasyāpy atindriya-śaktimattvān na
kimcid apy apekṣitavyam asti. yaś ca śrāvita-tat-
tvam-asy-ādi-vākyāh svayam evānvaya-vyatirekau
kṛtvā tad-vasāna eva vākyārthāṃ pratipadyate 'sāv
api yathārtham pratipanna iti pūrva-vad
evopekṣitavyah. yaḥ punar anvaya-vyatirekau

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At the beginning of the second chapter there was mention of four kinds of hearers.\(^1\) Of these, one knows “that which is not the meaning of any sentence” in his own inmost Self. For him, all the not-self has come to an end (nivṛtta). As all his impediments have been destroyed, there is in his case nothing more to be said. Nor is there anything further to be said about the one who acquired realization merely from hearing the text (i.e. without having to reason on it at all). He, also, is in possession of some supernatural power. Then there is the one who had “that thou art” and other texts repeated to him, and who then performed reasoning on them on his own and came to know the meaning of the texts at the end of it. He also can be left out of account like the two before, as he has attained right knowledge.

The fourth one, even though he had been made to reason on the texts, also had to have them repeated to him again with a view to his getting a correct knowledge of their meaning. In his case, it might be asked why he had to have the texts repeated to him, since he was already performing reasoning on them. To this we reply:

\(^1\) Verses 11.2-3 above.

\textit{nava-saṁkhyā-hṛta-jñāno daśamo vibhramād yathā na vetti daśamo ’smīti viksamāno ’pi tān nava}

[64] Just as the tenth man, whose wits were confused by the task of counting nine, did not know that he was the tenth even though engaged in looking at the other nine —
atha drṣṭānta-gatam arthaṁ dārṣṭāntikārthe samarpayiśyannāha

Now we show how the illustration relates to the thing to be illustrated by saying:

apavidha-dvayo 'py evaṁ tat-tvam-asy-ādinā vinā vetti naikalam ātmānaṁ nānveṣyaṁ cātra kāraṇam

[65] Even so the man who is penetrated by the spirit of duality does not know the one Self that is all in all unless he is told “that thou art”, etc. It is no use enquiring into the reasons for his delusion.¹

¹ The story of the tenth man is the story of the member of a party of ten who was deputed to count their number after they had crossed a river and forgot to count himself. The more he counted the others the more he only reached nine and thought that one of them was lost. But when a respected man said “thou art the tenth” he knew the truth at once with immediate certainty—there was no question of further counting, etc. The illustration is often used by Śaṅkara—Bṛhadāraṇyaka Commentary I.iv.7: Taittirīya Commentary II.1: references in Upadeśa Sāhasrī at XVIII.174, 189, 202 etc. Cp. Pañcadaśī VII.57 ff. and VII.247 ff.

The story can be used to emphasize several different points. The point that Sureśvara wishes to emphasize here is that a man may go on and on practising reasoning (equivalent to counting nine) and he will for that very reason remain in the sphere of intellect and of mediate knowledge, hence of ignorance. He requires to be somehow thrown into a different kind of direct knowledge by the spoken word; but the spoken word will only be effective if the previous discipline of reasoning has been performed—just as the words “thou art the tenth” are only effective in introducing a new and immediate kind of knowledge if the mind has been brought to the brink of this realization by continually counting up to nine.

nānveṣyaṁ cātra kāraṇam ity uktam tat kasmād iti codite pratyāhānveṣaṇāśaṁṣahṣṇatuḥ. tat katham ity aḥa

Why not enquire into the reasons for the man’s delusion? Because ignorance is something that will not brook enquiry. How so? We answer:
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

seyam bhrāntir nirālambā sarva-nyāya-virodhini
sahate na vicāraṃ sā tamo yad-vad divākaram

[66] This ignorance is without a cause and violates all rules and reasons. It no more brooks investigation than darkness brooks the light of the sun.

tasyāḥ khalv asyā avidyāyā bhrānteḥ samyag-
jñānotpatti-dvāreṇa nivrhitīḥ

This error of ignorance is destroyed by the rise of right knowledge:

bubhutsocchedini cāsyā sad asity-ādinā dṛṣṭham
pratīci pratipattih syān nāsau mānāntarād bhavet

[67] The knowledge of the inmost Self which removes all need for further investigation arises with certainty from the texts like “that thou art”. It does not arise from any other means of knowledge (pramāṇa).

katham punar vākyam pratipādayaty eveti ced
drśṭāntoktiḥ

Offering of an example to meet the question, “But how could knowledge arise from the text?”

jijnāsor daśamam yad-van navātikramya tāmyataḥ
tvam eva daśamo ’siti kuryād evam pramāṃ vacaḥ

[68] Just as the words “thou art the tenth” enlighten the suffering enquirer (jijnāsu) who is looking for the tenth beyond the other nine (among those who have crossed the river), so does the holy text (“that thou art” enlighten the suffering enquirer into the nature of the Self).¹
1 Enlighten—lit. give right knowledge (pramā) to. Hence it is implied that the texts are a means of correct knowledge (pramāṇa), since they produce right knowledge (pramā)—a special sort of pramāṇa, differing from those obtaining in ordinary empirical experience.

\[
\text{sā ca tat-tvam-asy-ādi-vākyā-śravaṇa-jā}
\]
\[
\text{pramotpannattvād eva. na ca naivam iti}
\]
\[
\text{pratyayāntaram jāyate. tad etad dṛṣṭāntena}
\]
\[
\text{pratipādayati}
\]

And this right knowledge (pramā) generated by hearing the holy texts like “that thou art” stands established merely through coming into being. No other ideas in the form “this is not so” can arise. We explain this through the example (already given of the tenth man):

\[
\text{daśamo 'sīti vākyotthā na dhīrasya vihanyate}
\]
\[
\text{ādi-madhyaśasya śāneṣu na navasy asya samśayaḥ}
\]

[69] The conviction arising from the sentence “thou art the tenth” is never shaken. No doubts arise from (his perception of only) the (other) nine, before, during, or after (the rise of the knowledge “I am the tenth”).

1 The verse is reproduced at Pañcadaśi VII.60 with two variant readings which modify the sense.

\[
\text{evaṁ tat tvam asity asmād dvaita-nut pratyagātmapi}
\]
\[
\text{samyag-jñātatvam arhasya jāyetaiva pramā dṛḍhā}
\]

[70] In the same way, from the sentence “that thou art”, in the case of one who has rightly understood the meaning of the word “thou”, there arises firm knowledge of the inmost Self which excludes duality.
pratyagātmani pramopajāyata ity uktam tatra codyate. kim yathāghaṭādi-prameya-viṣayā pramā
kartrādi-kāraka-bhedā ’napahnavena jāyate
tathaivotāsēsa-kāraka-grāmopamardena kartuḥ
pratyagātmaniti. ucyate

It has been said that right knowledge (pramā) (of the Self) arises. In this connection a question is raised. Does it arise without prejudice to the distinctions between agent etc., (i.e. agent, act and instrument in the act of cognition), just as in the case of right cognition of a pot or other object? Or does it rise in the inmost Self of the agent of cognition through the lapse of all the factors of action in their entirety? To this we answer:

pratyaktā ’sya svato rūpaṁ niṣkriyākāraka-phalam
advitiyaṁ tad-iddhā dhiḥ pratyagātmeva lakṣye
tate

[71] Interiority is the very nature of the Self. (In the matter of cognition) it is without action, its factors and results; it is without a second (advaita). The intellect lit by its presence is taken loosely for the inmost Self.

yasmād evam

Hence it follows:

vipaścito ’py atas tasyāṁ ātma-bhāvaṁ vitanvate
daviyassv indriyarthetaśu kṣīyate hy uttarottaram

[72] Even the wise suppose the intellect to be the Self (in the course of empirical activity), though they have gradually withdrawn their sense of identity from the external sense-objects.

196
āha. yadi vākyam eva yathā-bhūtārthāvabodhakam
atha kasya hetor avidyotthāpitasya kartṛtvāder
upadeśa ity ukte pratividhiyate

One might ask—if it is only the texts of the Upanishads
that reveal reality as it is, why do we find therein
teaching about the agency (and knowerhood etc.) of the
Self, notions that all arise from ignorance? We counter
this as follows:

bhṛānti-prasiddhyā ’nūdyārthama tat tattvam bhṛānti-
bādhayā
ayaṃ nety upadiśyeta tathaivaṃ tat tvam ityapi

[73] When a man wishes to dispel the erroneous no-
tion of another, he first conforms his speech to that
erroneous notion as if it were a fact, and then he says
“it is not so”. The same is the case with “that” and
“thou”.

imam arthaṃ drṣṭāntena buddhāv ārohayati

We implant this doctrine more deeply in the mind
through an example:

sthānuḥ sthānur itivoktir na nṛ-buddhiṃ nirasyati
vyanuvādāt tathaivoktir bhṛāntim puṃso na bādhate

[74] The mere repetition of the word “post, post”,
without adding other words conforming to the hearer’s
illusion,¹ will not serve to dispel the illusion that a post
is a man. In the same way, the statement of the real
nature of man would not cancel the hearer’s wrong
notion of it unless (as is the case with “that thou art”) it
conformed (initially) to that wrong notion.

¹ Whatever the logical objections that might be raised, one has to
say, “that man is not a man but a post”.

197
yasmāc chrotr-prasiddhānuvādy eva tvam iti padaṁ
tasmād uddīśyamāna-sthātvād duḥkhhitvāder
avivakṣitatvam eva. vidhiyamānate hi sati virodha-
prasāṅgo na tu vidhiyamānānūdyamānayor iti.
sva-pradhānayor hi padayor virodhāśaṅkā
sāmānyāliṅgītatvāt tayor na viparyaye

Because the word “thou” merely restates something
already known to the hearer, qualities such as “being
the sufferer” etc. belong merely to (the description of)
the subject of the sentence and are not the meaning it
is intended to convey. If they had belonged to the
predicate, there might have been a contradiction. But
there cannot be a contradiction between what is merely
restated and what is predicated. Only if the two words
(“that” and “thou”) had been used to convey the
meanings they hold in isolation could they fall into
mutual contradiction, for they would then retain their
(full) meanings as universals. They cannot do so when
this is not the case.

1 In a proposition of subject-copula-predicate form (such as “that
thou art” = “thou art that”), the subject must already be known to the
hearer or the proposition would not be intelligible. We must assume,
however, that the proposition is intended to convey something to the
hearer that he did not already know, or otherwise it would have been
useless. Its meaning, therefore, lies not directly in the subject, but more
in the predicate, and, above all, in the connection of the predicate with
the subject. In order for the sentence to be intelligible at all, however,
the bare subject must already be known to the hearer, and, as such, is
not the meaning to be conveyed. It is said technically to be “repeated”
or “restated”.

2 Because what is only restated and not predicated is not “meant”
and there must be two meanings before there can be a contradiction
between them.

3 Cp. verse III.32 above.

4 i.e. when they enter into a sentence such that their meanings be-
come qualified and they lose that part of the universal meaning which
is incompatible with other words in the sentence. Cp. verse III.2
above, with note.
anālingita-sāmānyau na jihāsita-vādīnau
vyutthitau tat-tvamau tasmād anyonyābhisamikṣānau

[75] The "that" and the "thou" no longer retain their universal meanings. They do not express that part of their meaning which (owing to incompatibility with other words in the sentence) has to be given up. Thus emancipated (from the incompatible elements in their meanings), they are able to coalesce (in an identity statement).

apāsta-sāmānyārthatvād anuvāda-sthatvād
vidhiyamānena ca saha virodhād duḥkhītvāder astu
kāmam jihāsitārthayor asaṃsargō yathopanyasta-
doṣa-virahāt tat-tvam-arthayoh saṃsargō 'stu
nilotpala-vad iti cen naivam apy upapadyate. yasmāt

1 Reading yasmāt for tasmāt with Professor Hacker, Texte p. 80.

Objection: Let us admit that the words ("that" and "thou") have given up their universal meanings. And let us admit that qualities such as "being the sufferer" belong to the subject and (have to be given up because they) are in contradiction with the predicate. In that case the meanings that have to be given up cannot be synthesized into a sentence-meaning.1 But the (resultant purified) meanings of "that" and "thou", being free from defects as shown above, can very well be synthesized into a sentence-meaning, as in the case of "the blue lotus."

1 It will be recalled that Sureśvara maintains the paradox that the meaning conveyed by "that thou art" is that which is not the meaning of any sentence, cp. above III.2 and prose introduction to III.9.

Answer: This explanation is not right either. For:
tad-arthayos tu niṣṭhātmā dvaya-pāroksya-varjitaḥ
nādvitiyaṁ vinātmānaṁ nātmā nitya-drśā vinā

[76] The meaning of both terms is the same Self, void of duality and not-other-than-immediately-evident. There is no non-dual reality except the Self; there is no Self except the eternal Witness (nitya-drś).¹

¹ Thus the meanings of the two words cannot strictly be synthesized, as they are already eternally identical.

atrāha. kim iha jihāsitaṁ kim vopāditsitam iti. ucyate. pratyagātmārthābhiddhāyinas tvam-padād ubhayam pratiyate ’ham duḥkkhi pratyagātmā ca. tatra ca pratyagātmano ’ham duḥkhity anenābhīsambandha ātma-yāthātmyānabodhahetuka eva. ato ’ham-artha ’narthoparṣṭatvād ajñānotthatvāc ca heya iti pratyaksato ’vasiyate. tad-arthe kim heyam kim vopādeyam iti nāvadhriyate. tata idam abhidhiyate

Here the opponent asks “What (part of the meanings) has to be given up here, and what retained?” Reply: The word “thou”, which is used to indicate the inmost Self, conveys both the sense of the sufferer (the individual soul) and the sense of the inmost Self. The relation of the inmost Self with this notion of “I am the sufferer” is caused by not-being-aware-to-the Self only. Hence, in the case of the word “thou”, it is quite obvious that the meaning “ego” must be given up, because the latter is afflicted with evil and arises from ignorance. But it is not yet determined what part of the meaning of the word “that” has to be given up and what retained. Hence the following is advanced:
pārokṣyaṁ yat tad-arthe syāt tadd heyam aham-artha-vat

pratīcevāhamo 'bhedāḥ pārokṣyeṇātmano 'pi me

[77] The notion of “not-being-immediately-evident” conveyed by the word “that” must be rejected, as the notion “sufferer” is rejected (in the case of the word “thou”). The identification of the Self with the “not-immediately-evident” is as much due to ignorance as the identification of the ego with the inmost Self.

kathāṁ punas tad-artho ‘dvitiya-lakṣaṇaḥ
pratyagātmopāśrayaṁ sa-dvitiyatvaṁ duḥkhhitvaṁ
niranvayam apanudatīti. ucyate. na caitayor
nivartaka-nivartya-bhāvaṁ vayaṁ brūmaḥ. kathaṁ
tarhi. tvam-arthe pratyagātmani
prāganavabuddhādvitiyataḥ sānenāvabodhyate. ato
‘navabodha-nirāsena tad-utthasya sa-dvitiyatasya
tvam-artha-sthasya parokṣatvasya ca tad-artha-
sthasya nirasanān na vaiyadhikaranyādi-
codyasyāvasaro 'stīti. tad idam abhidhiyate

But again, how can the non-dual reality indicated by the word “that” cancel once and for all the notions of pain and of duality associated with the inmost Self? We reply: We do not say that the non-dual reality indicated by the word “that” directly destroys the notions of suffering and duality. What we say is that the word “that” causes a waking up to the fact of non-duality to take place in regard to the inmost Self, denoted by “thou”, where previously there was ignorance in regard to it. It is through this destruction of ignorance that
(for the enlightened man) the meaning “not-immediately-known” stands rejected in the case of the word “that”, and the meaning “associated with duality” stands rejected in the case of the word “thou”. Hence it cannot be objected that the two words “that” and “thou” ought not to be put in apposition on the ground that they each refer to something quite different. This is what is being said.

\[ \text{tat tvam-arthaṇaṃ sampṛkto nānātvam vinivartayet} \]
\[ \text{nāparityakta-pāroksyaṇaṃ tvam tad-arthaṇaṃ sisṛpsati} \]

[78] “That” when completely identified\(^1\) with the meaning of “thou” negates all plurality: “thou” cannot mingle with the meaning of “that” unless the latter has been shorn of its meaning of “not-immediately-evident”.\(^2\)

\(^1\) On the meaning of the word sampṛkta, see K. V. Abhyankar, A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, s.v. He quotes Patañjali ad Pāṇini Sūtra I.i.i.32.

\(^2\) When the pupil is properly prepared and on the brink of Self-realization he understands through the statement “thou art that” that “that” does not mean anything other than his own Self. This brings final destruction of all his erroneous notions about the Self and consequently illumination. And then, and not until then, does a situation arise in which all the objections raised about the actual grammatical structure of the sentence can be answered. Only when illumination has come do the two words refer to one undifferentiated entity. At the time they are actually pronounced the objection that they do not refer to one undifferentiated entity but affirm a predicate of a subject holds. But if the real meaning of the words is once grasped, it is seen that they can be placed in apposition only if they refer to one and the same undifferentiated entity (Cp. śloka III.2 and note above). Hence in the end the holy texts are tautologous propositions and the grammatical objections that they cannot be such are rebutted. The process as a whole is summed up by Sarvajñatma Muni at “Saṃkṣeṣaṇa Śāriraka” I.196 as follows: “First the group of words is taken as standing in apposition, and this is interpreted as pointing to the unity of a substance having qualities. Then a contradiction is seen here, and there follows interpretation of the words through secondary implication to mean the partless, seamless reality. This is the method of interpretation of the holy sentences practised by the wise.”

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In the sphere of empirical knowledge, tautologous propositions tell us nothing about the world, they are merely used by the speaker to define the sense in which he proposes to use certain words. Definitions are tautologous propositions par excellence e.g. “man is a reasoning animal.” But in the sphere of the Absolute, it is only tautologous propositions that can possibly be true. As Śri Vidyāranya expresses it (Pañcadaśī II.21) there are no internal differentiations in the Absolute, it cannot be a substance qualified by attributes. It can be shown logically that if it is not partless and simple and homogeneous it is not eternal and hence not the Absolute. Hence ordinary sentences affirming predicates of subjects do not apply to it, and, as Sureśvara frequently insists, it is “that which is not the meaning of any sentence” (it is avākyārtha). We have to search for the implied meaning—which is necessarily tautologous.

\[
\text{kasmāt punah kāraṇāt tad-artha 'dvitiya-lakṣaṇas}
v tva-m-arthena pratya-gatmanā 'prthag-arthaḥ}^1 \text{ sann avidyoṭthamaḥ sa-dvitiyatvaṁ nihantiti. ucyate. virodhāt. tad ucyate}
\]

^1 Accepting the reading of the Sārārtha Commentary in place of the “prthag-arthaḥ” of J.

How is it, then, that the meaning of “that”, which is the non-dual reality and in no way different from the meaning of “thou”, which is the inmost Self, destroys the notion of duality which arises from ignorance? We say, “Because of a contradiction”. Hence the reply is given:

\[
\text{saṁsāritādvitiyena pārokṣyaṁ cātmanā saha}
prāsaṅgikaṁ viruddhatvāt tat-tvambhyāṁ bādhanām tayoḥ
\]

[79] “Being the transmigrant” and “not-being-immediately-evident” are only accidental characteristics of the Self, since they are in mutual contradiction. They are therefore both negated, (the first) by “that”, and (the second) by “thou”.

203
The realization of the absolute

tat-tvam-arthatvam tu badhakatve 'nyad api karanaṁ ucyate

A further reason why the meanings of "that" and "thou" have the function of negation is added:

ajnata-puruṣarthatvam chrautatvam tat-tvam-arthatvam svam artham aparyajya badhakau stāṇi viruddhayah

[80] Because they concern Vedic doctrine and reveal a human good not to be known from any other source, it follows that "that" and "thou" retain their meanings but with the mutually contradictory elements negated.¹

¹ From the purely logical point of view, there is no reason why it should not be held that in "that thou art" the "not-immediately-evident" character of "that" cancels the "thou" (which is immediately evident) outright, and that the "immediacy" of "thou" cancels the "that" outright which by nature is "not immediately evident". There would then be no meaning left in the sentence at all. But it cannot be right to interpret the text so. For it occurs in the Veda and hence must reveal a human good not knowable from any other source. The text can only be interpreted as befits a Vedic text if it be assumed that the "that" and the "thou" each retains that part of its meaning (should we call it "affirmation of pure Being"?) which is not contradicted by the other. Thus the text has at least partly a negating function. By bringing "that" and "thou" together in apposition, it negates the two ideas that the Absolute is altogether transcendent and unknowable and that the inmost Self of man is subject to duality and suffering.

evam tāvad yathopakrāntena prakriyā-vartmanā na pratyaksādi-pramāṇāntara-rna virodha-gandho 'pi saṃbhāvyate. yadā punah sarva-prakāreṇāpi yatamāṇaḥ naivemaḥ vākyārtham saṃbhāvayāmaḥ pratyaksādi-pramāṇāntara-virodhata eva tasminn api pakṣa ucyate
Thus, following the way we have explained above, not even a suggestion of contradiction with perception or any of the other accredited means of knowledge is possible. When, however, anyone says “Despite every kind of effort, we cannot find any meaning for such and such a text because it stands in contradiction with perception and other means of knowledge”, then, from that point of view, we say:

\[ pratyakṣādi-viruddhaṃ ced vākyam arthaṃ vadet \]
\[ kvacit \]
\[ syāt tu tad dṛṣṭi-vidhy-arthaṃ yośāgni-vad asamśayam \]

[81] And if anyone should say that the meaning of a particular text was contradictory to perception and other means of cognition, that text would undoubtedly be for the sake of enjoining an imaginative meditation, like the text “the woman is fire”.

Texts in the Veda which bear on matters accessible to perception and contradict it must be interpreted so as not to contradict it. The example “the woman is fire” is found at Chāndogya Upanishad V.viii.1 and Brhadāranyaka Upanishad VI.ii.13.

\[ yadā tu tat-tvam-asy-ādi-vākyam sarva-prakārenāpi \]
\[ vicāryamāṇaṃ na kriyāṃ kāṭākṣenāpi viṅkṣate tadā \]
\[ prasamkhyānādi-vyāpāro dussaṃbhāvya iti. tad \]
\[ ucyate \]

But as, in whatever way they are considered, texts like “that thou art” do not envisage action even indirectly, it is difficult to show that they imply activity like continuous meditation (prasaṅkhyāna).
Nevertheless, if the sentence refers only to the final reality it cannot at the same time have action (of any kind) as its meaning. For reality is one, and admits of no alternatives.¹

¹ Alternatives such as "it is either to be regarded as ever-present or else to be regarded as obtainable through meditation". J

bhinna-visayatvāc ca na pramāṇāntara-virodhaḥ.
katham. ucyate

And one means of cognition cannot contradict another. For each means of cognition has its own special sphere.¹

How is that? We are telling you:

¹ According to the Mīmāṃsā principle that an authoritative means of cognition is only such in relation to what cannot be known from any other source. It appears to have been held, in this connection, that what was known through an immediate source of knowledge could not at the same time be known through a more remote one. The presence of a fire, if already perceived, could not be inferred, say, from the presence of its smoke.

apūrvādhigamam kurvat pramāṇam syān na cen na tat na virodhas tato yukto vibhinna-rthāvabodhinoḥ

[83] An authoritative means of knowledge (pramāṇa) is one which conveys knowledge of a kind not obtainable from any other source. Otherwise it is not a pramāṇa. Hence there can be no contradiction between the deliverances of the Veda and perception. For both are accepted as pramāṇas and hence both deal with their own specific subjects.
ya evam api bhīnna-viṣayāṇām virodhāṃ vakti so 
'trāpi virodhāṃ brūyāt

Of course, if anyone is prepared to admit that a contra-
diction can arise between two entirely separate spheres, 
he can very well speak of a contradiction here.

nāyam śabdāḥ kuto yasmād rūpaṁ pāsyāmi caksuṣā 
iti yad-vat tathaivāyaṁ virodho 'kṣa-ja-vākyayoḥ

[84] “That is not a noise.” “Why not?” “Because I 
can see a colour with my eye.” It is contradictions of 
this sort that subsist between sense-perception and 
Vedic revelation.¹

¹ Cp. prose introduction to verse II.1 above, opening sentence. 
“Each of the senses is limited in its sphere to that material element of 
which it is composed”.

pramāṇānāṁ satāṁ na virodhāḥ śrotādīnāṁ iva 
bhīnna-viṣayatvāt. yayōś cābhīnna-viṣayatvam tayor 
ākhu-nakulayor iva pratiniyata eva bādhya-bādhaka-
bhāvaḥ syāt. atas tad ucyate

There can be no contradiction between pramāṇas 
whose sphere of operation is different, any more than 
there can be contradiction between the bare reports of 
the eyes and ears. But whenever two cognitions give 
conflicting reports about the same thing, one must be 
right and the other wrong.¹ One must lose inevitably, 
as in a fight between a rat and a mongoose. To this we 
reply:

¹ So that only one can be a pramāṇa, the other being a mere sem-
blance of a pramāṇa.
pratyakṣaṁ cen na śābdamḥ syāc chābdamḥ ced aksa- Śa janī katham
aprtyakṣabhotasaḥ pratyakṣe hy āgamābhāsa āgame

[85] If a thing is perceived by the senses it cannot be revealed by the Veda; if a thing is genuinely revealed by the Veda it cannot be an object of sense-perception. A perception (purporting to bear on a revealed subject is only) a semblance of a perception; and a revealed text (bearing on what is subject to perception is only) a mere semblance of a revelation.

na ca pratiṣṭhā-hetu-drṣṭānta-nyāya iha sambhavati śabdādināṁ pratyekamḥ pramāṇaṁ atā atā

Nor is it correct to suppose that the various means of knowledge must needs co-operate to produce authentic knowledge, as the various terms of the syllogism—the proposition, the ground, the example—have to co-operate in order to produce an inference. Each means of knowledge is authoritative within its own sphere.¹

¹ It is irrelevant, for example, to raise the question of how far our knowledge of a Vedic text depends on perception (in the form of hearing the words) and whether it is infected by defects inherent in the latter. If the Veda is a pramāna at all, it is a pramāna in its own right.

sva-mahimnā pramāṇāni kurvanti arthāvabodhanam itaretara-sācivye prāmāṇyaṁ neṣyate svataḥ

[86] Each individual means of knowledge produces knowledge by its own power. If they were able to co-operate with one another, it would not be possible to maintain the doctrine of intrinsic validity.¹

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In Advaita, every means of cognition and every particular cognition is presumed correct until disproved, somewhat like the prisoner at the bar in English law. This principle was first formulated by the Mimamsakas in their efforts to provide a better defence against Buddhist scepticism than the logicians had done, but it was greatly developed by the Advaitins. Unless this principle is accepted, the philosopher is at the mercy of the "relativist". If a cognition is only true if it satisfies some test (i.e. if its validity is not intrinsic but requires to be proved by some extrinsic reference), then it is only true in reference to that test, and the test is only true in reference to some further test and so on. True knowledge turns out to be unattainable. The Advaitins were keenly aware of the unique and sui generis character of knowledge, quite different from the objects which it illumines, and their speculations on svatah pramanya (intrinsic validity of cognition) and on the related theme of the self-luminosity of pure consciousness (especially in the opening pages of the Tattva Pradipika of Citsukha) are regarded as being amongst the most philosophically interesting writings produced by the school.

na ca sukha-duhkha-di-sambandho 'vagaty-ātmanah
pratyaksādi-pramāṇair grhyate yena virodhaḥ
pratyaksādi-pramāṇair udbhāvyate,1 katham. śṛṇu

1 Accepting the reading udbhāvyate (for udghātyate) from Hiriyanna's footnote to his edition of the text ad loc.

And perception and other means of knowledge do not, in fact, reveal any connection between pleasure and pain etc. and the Self as pure consciousness (avagati), so that no conflict between perception etc. (and the revelations about the Self) can arise. You ask why? Listen:

duḥkhitāvagatau1 cet syān na pramīyeta sātma-vat
karmāṇy eva pramā nyāyyā na tu kartary api kvacit

1 Adopting the reading avagatau for avagatiś on Hiriyanna's recommendation.

[87] If there really were pain in pure consciousness, it could no more be subject to an authoritative empirical cognition (pramā) than the Self is. For an authoritative empirical cognition bears necessarily on its object only and not on the subject (agent) of the cognition.
abhyaṃgaṃe ’pi ca prasāṅkhyaṇa-śatenāpi naiva
tvāṃ saṃbhāvita-doṣān mucyase. ata āha

And even if it were admitted (that the Self was really
known to be connected with pain), then not even by a
hundred acts of symbolic meditation (prasaṅkhyaṇa)
could you escape from the defect that would arise.¹

¹ The protagonist of symbolic meditation claims that the Self is
knowable now as afflicted with pain and that it is through meditating
on it as if it were free from pain (although it is in fact not yet free from
pain) that it does actually become free from pain.

pramāṇa-baddha-mūlatvād duḥkhitvaṃ kena vāryate
agny-usṣaṇa-van nivṛttiś cen nairāmyaṃ hy eti saugatam

[88] If the fact that the Self was “the sufferer” were
really guaranteed by any competent means of know-
ledge, its nature as “the sufferer” could not be removed,
for the two would be like fire and heat. Or if it could be
removed, this would imply the no-self doctrine of the
Buddhists.

atha matam

But it might be argued:

nirākuryāt prasāṅkhyaṇaṃ duḥkhitvaṃ cet
svanuṣṭhitam

pratyakṣādi-viruddhatvāt katham utpādayet pramāṃ

[89] And if it be maintained that symbolic meditations,
well performed, do away with the limited, suffering
nature of the Self, yet, even so, we ask, how could they
produce right knowledge, since the knowledge they
produce would be in conflict with perception and the
other means of right knowledge.¹

¹ In this and the following four verses we return to a criticism of
Brahmadatta and Maṇḍana Miśra, cp. verse I.67 above and the
references there given in the notes.

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Objection: Meditation (prasaṅkhyāna) consists in the repeated application of the mind to the ideas evolved by a reasoning through agreement and difference on the meaning of “that thou art” and other holy sentences. When properly performed it generates perfect knowledge (pramiti = pramā) and does so by improving on such knowledge as already exists, and not through merely improving the mind’s powers of concentration. It is not to be compared with the purely imaginary notion, arising through subjective mental activity, that the body of a woman, that receptacle of every impurity, is a charming object of desire. Answer: This objection is wrong, because:

\[
\text{abhyaśopacayād buddher yat syād aikāgryam eva tat na hi pramāṇany abhyaśāt kurvanṭy arthāvabodhanam}
\]

[90] All that pondering can produce is the power of habitually concentrating the mind. It is not as a result of our pondering that the means of knowledge yield knowledge of their objects; (they do so directly).
[91] If you say “through the spiritual conviction (bhāvanā) amassed through repeated meditation one brings all transmigration to an end”, we reply, “in this case the cessation of transmigration would not be complete, for it would be a result arising from the creation of a spiritual conviction”.¹

¹ Liberation is not a result brought about. If it were, it would infallibly have a beginning and no less infallibly an end.

\[ api \, cāha \]

And moreover:

\[ duḥkhy \, asmity \, api \, ced \, dhvastā \, kalpa-koty-upabṛmhita \, svalpiyo \, 'bhyaśa-jā \, sthāsnvi \, bhāvanety \, atra \, kā \, pramā \]

[92] You suppose that the conviction “I am the sufferer”, amassed during millions of aeons, will be broken. What is the proof that your spiritual conviction based on a little meditation (in one life) will be inviolable?

\[ nanu \, śāstrāt \, sthāsnutvaṃ \, bhaviṣyati. \, naivam. \, yathā-vasthita-vastu-yāthātmyāvabodha-mātra-kāritvāc \, chāstrasya. \, na \, hi \, padārtha-śakty-ādhāna-\, kṛc \, chāstram. \, prasiddham \, ca \, loke \]

**Objection:** Well, the spiritual conviction will derive stability from (the support given to it in) the Veda. **Answer:** Not so. All the Veda does is to reveal the nature of things as they really are. It has no transformative power over objects.¹ And it is a well-known fact in the world that:

¹ Cp. introductory commentary to verse 1.30 above.
bhāvanā-jaṁ phalam yat syād yac ca syāt karmanāḥ phalam
na tat sthāsnv iti mantavyam draviḍēśv iva saṅgatam

[93] Neither the results of pondering nor those of direct action are to be regarded as stable. Both are as short-lived as friendship with a man of the South.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Whatever is produced is perishable. It has been thought that the uncomplimentary reference to Southerners in this verse supplies evidence that Suresvara was a Northerner. See S. S. Raghavachar’s English Translation of the Naiṣkarmya Siddhi, Introduction, p. XIII.

yady api pratyakṣādi-pramāṇopāttam ātmano
duḥkhītvam. tathāpi tat-tvam-asy-ādi-vākyotthaa-
pratyaya eva baliyān iti niścayo ’vyabhicāri-
prāmāṇya-vākyopāttatvāt prameyasya ca svata eva
nirduḥkhītva-siddheh. pratyakṣādes tu sa-
vyaḥbhicāritvāt sambhāvanāyāś ca puruṣa-
parikalpanā-mātrāvāṣṭambhavatvāc ceti.

Now, the notion that the Self is the suffering individual soul admittedly rests on the deliverances of sense-perception and the other authoritative means of empirical cognition. Nevertheless, the conviction arising from “that thou art” and other Vedic texts is to be regarded as overweighing it, since the knowledge arising from the texts has eternal validity, and since the Self which they reveal demonstrates its freedom from pain and limitation by its own inherent power.\(^1\) On the other hand, the deliverances of sense-perception and the other authoritative means of empirical cognition are (not eternally valid but) subject to exceptions and errors; their conclusions are tentative and rest on mere subjective interpretation.

\(^1\) E.g., in deep sleep.
nirduḥkhitvaṁ svatas-siddhaṁ prayakṣādes ca
duḥkhitā
go ṣya ātmānam anādṛtya viśvased bāhya-mānataḥ

[94] The fact that one is free from pain is made manifest by the very power of the Self. The notion that one is the sufferer (individual soul) is due to perception and the others means of knowledge. Who would reject the testimony of his own Self and place confidence in suggestions coming from without?

sambandhārtha eva

Continuing in the same vein:

api prayakṣa-bādhena pravṛttiḥ prayagātmāni
"parāṇci khāni" ṣty etasmād vacaso gamyate śruteḥ

[95] We know from the Veda itself in the passage “the senses are directed outwards”¹ that it is only through overcoming the grip of sense-perception that we turn to the Self within.

¹ Kaṭha Upanishad, IV.1 (or II.i.1).

abhypagamyavim ucyaate na tu pramāṇam sat-
pramāṇāntareṇa virudhyata ity asakṛd avocāma.
yatrāpi vākya-pratyakṣayor virodhāśaṅkā tatrāpi
puruṣa-mohatvaḥ-vasād eva sā jāyate na tu paramārthata
iti. ati āha

We speak thus¹ (of the possibility of a conflict between Vedic revelation and perception) on the basis of a deliberate concession; otherwise we have more than

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once remarked\textsuperscript{2} that one means of cognition cannot be contradicted by another.\textsuperscript{3} Whenever the notion that there is a contradiction between the holy texts and perception arises, that is due to the power of human ignorance. There is no contradiction in reality. So we say:

\begin{itemize}
\item From the prose introduction to verse III.94 above.
\item E.g. at verse III.83 above.
\item Because each means of cognition is valid in its own sphere and in that only. The authority of sense-perception is confined to empirical experience: the authority of the Veda is confined to matters that transcend empirical experience.
\end{itemize}

\begin{quote}
pramāṇaṁ cej janayed vākyāṁ pratyakṣādi-virodhinīṁ
gairiṁ pratyakṣatāṁ brūyāṁ mukhyārthāsambhavād
budhaḥ
\end{quote}

[96] If the holy text produces correct knowledge which contradicts sense-perception and the other authoritative means of cognition, the enlightened man will declare that his sense-perception must be interpreted in an implied sense, since the direct meaning is impossible.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1} Suresvara here applies the rules of Vedic exegesis to sense-perception. In interpreting the Veda, the direct meaning of a given text has to be given up and an implied meaning sought for if it is deemed, after due consideration, that the direct meaning does not make sense. Strictly speaking, of course, it is only words and not experiences or cognitions that can have direct and implied meanings. Here Suresvara half-humorously says that the direct meaning of the deliverances of perception must be given up if they conflict with the holy texts, and we must look for some implied or secondary meaning behind them.

\begin{quote}
tasyārthasya sukha-pratipatty-artham udāharaṇam
\end{quote}

Examples are given to make this matter easier to understand:
agnis samyag adhīte 'sau jahāsoccaiś ca maṅcakah
yathā tad-vad aham-vṛttyā lakṣyate 'narhayāpi saḥ

[97] “Fire is reciting correctly” and “the gallery laughed at the top of its voice”.¹ In some such way as this the ego-sense is made to indicate the Self, though imperfectly.²

¹ A keen and pure Vedic student (brahmacārin) would sometimes be called “Agni” (fire) because he was like fire. “Fire is reciting” would have to be taken as meaning “the little boy who is like fire is reciting”. Similarly, “the galleries shouted” means “the people in the galleries shouted”.

² Cp. verse III.11 above. “Imperfectly”—because the ego-sense is in itself inert, cp. the following verses. Sureśvara is here saying that all the time in our own ignorant empirical experience we all do, as a matter of hard fact, interpret our sense-experience in a secondary sense, and we do so illegitimately. Just as, in the illustrations, the words for “fire” and the “gallery”, which are inanimate objects, are made to do duty as representing conscious human beings, so the word for the inert ego-sense (i.e. “I”) is continuously to do duty for the conscious Self. But whereas the metaphorical usage of “fire” and “gallery” for conscious human beings is deliberate and no one is taken in by it, the equally metaphorical use of the “I” (individual ego-sense) for the Self is unconscious and the fruit of false identification. In other words the Self is not the “I”. Statements such as “I am the suffering jīva” are false if they are referred to the Self, as they usually are.

kasmāt punaḥ kāraṇāt sāksād evātmā nābhidhiyate
kim anayā kalpanayeti tatrāha

Why is the Self not directly named? What is the purpose of this hypothesis (about the need for indicating it indirectly)? To answer this question we say:

tvam ity etad vihāyānyan na vartmātmāvabodhane
samastiḥa tvam-arthe 'pi guṇa-lēseṇa vartate
[98] Except for the word “thou”\(^1\) there is no other way of conveying knowledge of the Self. Even this word operates only indirectly on the basis of a mere suggestion of a common quality.\(^2\)

\(^1\) And “I”, cp. verses III.11 and III.97 above.


\[\text{kasmāt punar hetor hy aham ity etad api guṇa-leśena vartate na punah sāksād eveti. vidhūta-sarva-kalpanā-kāraṇa-svābhāvyād ātmānaḥ. ata āha}\]

But why is it that the word “I” only indicates the Self on the basis of a mere suggestion of a common quality? Because the Self is by its very nature bereft of all grounds for conceptual representation.\(^1\) So we say:

\(^1\) These grounds are enumerated at verse III.103 below.

\[\text{vyomni dhūma-tuṣārābhra-malinānīva dur-dhiyāḥ kalpayeyus tathā mūḍhāḥ saṃsāram prayāgātmanī}\]

[99] Just as dull-witted persons suppose that smoke, mist, clouds and other impurities actually affect the sky, so do the deluded suppose that transmigratory life affects the inmost Self.

\[\text{nanu sarva-kalpanānāṁ apy ātmany atyantāsambhave samāne 'ham-vṛttau kah pakṣapāte hetur yena vṛtty-antarāṇi vidhūyāham-vṛttyaivātmopalakṣyata iti. ucyate}\]
But if all conceptual representation of the Self is equally impossible, what is the reason for this preference for the ego-sense, in that other concepts are rejected and it is said that the Self can be indicated by the ego-sense only?

\[ \text{cin-nibheyam aham-} \text{vr} \text{ttih praticiv} \text{atmano } \text{nyatah} \]
\[ \text{purvoktebyasa } \text{ca hetubhyas tasmad atmanayoc} \text{yate} \]

[100] The ego-sense is like pure consciousness; it also resembles the Self in being more inward than anything else; for these reasons and others already mentioned\(^1\) the Self is indicated by the ego-sense.

\(^1\) Cp. verses II.56 and 57 above.

\[ \text{vrttibhir yusmad-artha} \text{bhair lak} \text{syate ced d} \text{risih parah} \]
\[ \text{an} \text{atmatvam bhavet tasya vitath} \text{am ca vacah sru} \text{teh} \]

[101] If the transcendent Witness could be indicated through secondary implication by things that belong to the sphere of objectivity it would be not-self, and all the teachings of the Veda (sru)ti) would be in vain.\(^1\)

\(^1\) The "sphere of objectivity"—literally "the sphere of the you", where "you" means "object". The usage is derived from the opening sentence of Śaṅkara's Brahma Sūtra (or Vedānta Sūtra) Commentary. In this famous opening sentence the term "you" is used to mean the not-self, and the realm of the not-self is identified with objectivity. Here Śrīva is suggesting that in a certain sense the ego is privileged in the realm of the not-self in that, as belonging to the sphere of "I", it does not belong to the sphere of the "you" and is not an object in quite the crass sense of other objects of the world. Hence it can be used to indicate the Self in such texts as "I am the Absolute (Brahman)".

\[ \text{yathoktena} \]

As has already been said:
anena guṇa-leśena hy aty-ahaṁkarṛ-karmayā
lakṣyate 'sāv ahaṁ-vṛttyā nāṉjasātrābhidhiyate

[102] Thus the Self is indirectly indicated but not strictly denoted by the ego-notation (ahaṁ-vṛtti), which has the ego (ahaṁ-karṛ) for its true object.

nāṉjasātrābhidhiyata iti ko hetur iti cet
If the question be raised, “Why do you say that the ego-notation cannot strictly denote the Self?”, then we reply:

ṣaṣṭhi-guṇa-kriyā-jāti-rūdhayaḥ śabda-hetayah
nātmany anyatamo ’miśāṁ tenātmā nābhidhiyate

[103] Words can apply to things that have characteristics—such as relations, qualities or active powers—or else to things that can be subsumed under universal concepts (jāti), or else that can be named through generally accepted convention. Not one of these conditions is fulfilled by the Self. Therefore it cannot strictly be denoted.¹

¹ Cp. Upadeśa Sāhasrī (verse section) XVIII.28. Suresvara here refers to a doctrine several times stated by Śaṅkara in rather more detail. See, for instance, the latter’s famous passage in his Commentary on Taittiriya Upan. II.1.2 (tr. Mahadeva Shastri, pp. 294 and 308–9) or his introductory commentary to the 7th section of the Māṇḍūkya Upani- shad (which comes immediately after the commentary of the ninth Kārikā of Gauḍapāda). Suresvara modifies Śaṅkara’s doctrine a little. “Things that can be named through accepted convention”: Jñānottama gives as example three words which mean “the sky”—the sky, being subtle and motionless, is without relations, qualities or active powers; and being sui generis it cannot be subsumed under any universal. The introduction of the condition “common convention” suggests that the term “Self” was not regarded by the people at large as signifying the Absolute. It was a purely technical usage amongst “enquirers into Brahman” who studied Upanishadic or other texts, and hence not a genuine name.
yadi sabdo 'bhidhānābhidheyatva-
saṁbandhāṅgikāreṇa nātmanī vartate katham
śabdād aham brahmāsmīti samyag-bodhotpattih.
ucyate

If no word can apply to the Self by way of the denoter-
denoted relation, how can the right-knowledge “I am
the Absolute (Brahman)” arise from verbal revelation?
To this we reply:

asatyey vartmani sthitvā nirupāyam upseyate
ātmatva-kāraṇād vidmo guṇa-vṛttyā vibodhitāḥ

[104] A means is found to attain that to which no
means apply through a false route.1 It is because it is
the inmost Self that we can be awakened to it by a mere
suggestion of a common quality (guṇa-vṛtta).

1 “False route”, e.g. as when someone says “Arcturus is at the tip
of that branch”. The statement is false, but it results in the man
coming to know Arcturus for the first time. Similarly the holy texts like
“That thou art” are themselves “false” in the sense that they purport
to “apply to” what cannot be applied to by any other second thing.
Still, if the remaining conditions are right, they communicate real
The last sentence in the verse wards off the suspicion that if the Self
is beyond the range of words in their direct meanings it is unknowable
and hence cannot be even indicated indirectly (Jñānottama).

katham punar abhidhānam
abhidheyenānabhisambaddham sad anabhidheyeye 'ṛthe
pramāṇam janayatiti. śrṇu yathānabhisambaddham apy
anabhidheyeye 'ṛthe 'vidyā-nirākaraṇa-mukhena
bodhayatīty āha

Still, we ask again, how can a name which is not in any
relation with the thing named produce right knowledge
in respect of that thing? We reply: “Listen to how a
name, not related to anything, can awaken someone to something not itself nameable by removing ignorance in regard to it”:

śayānāḥ prāyaśo loke bodhiyamānāḥ sva-nāmabhīḥ sahasaiva prabudhyante yathāivaṃ pratyagātmani

[105] It is a fact of common experience that sleepers can usually be awakened by pronouncing their names. They wake up immediately! And the same is true of (awakening to) the inmost Self.¹


na hi nāmnāsti saṃbandho vyutthitasya śarīrataḥ
tathāpi budhyate tene yathāivaṃ tat tvam ity ataḥ

[106] There is no direct connection between the name and the sleeper who has escaped from his body. Yet he is woken up by it. The same thing occurs in the case of the sentence “that thou art”.¹

¹ The problem is, how can a word generate knowledge about something with which it has no direct connection? Holding that it does so in the case of “thou” in “That thou art”, Sūrēsvara supports his view by showing that the same phenomenon occurs frequently in daily life. When John is asleep he is not aware of himself as John and indeed he is not John, since he has lost his individuality. Still, the word “John” has power to reach him in his de-individualized state, and, what is more, to wake him up to his nature as John. Similarly, the word “thou”, in suitable circumstances, can reach the inner Self and wake it up to its own real nature. We should not be surprised at this, since a similar phenomenon is occurring daily when sleepers are woken by calling their names. Neither the word “John” nor the word “thou” has any direct connection with the thing it refers to, yet they both destroy ignorance and hence generate knowledge in regard to it. In each case, however, the power of the word is negative. The thing was already known, and yet for the time being had become unknown through ignorance. The only power of the word in this function is to destroy ignorance. It cannot convey fresh knowledge.
yathā ca

Moreover:

bodhābodhau nabho ‘sprṣṭvā kṛṣṇa-dhi-nīḍa-gau yathā bādhayetarātmakau syātāṃ tathehātmani gamyatām

[107] Just as the incorrect and the correct notions arise about the ether of the sky, to the effect that it is and is not blue respectively, and stand to each other as negated and negator, without affecting the ether itself in any way; so do the incorrect and the correct notions arise about the Self, standing to each other as negated and negator, but not affecting the Self in any way.

“asatye vartmani sthītvā” ity upaśrutītvātivismito mahatā saṃbhramena kaścic codayati

Someone overhears us saying “a means is found by a false route”¹ and in very great surprise rushes in to object as follows:

¹ Verse III.104 above.

nāsann upāyo loke ‘sti paramārtha-viniścaye
nāsal-liṅgādd hi bāspadeḥ kaścid agniḥ prapadayate

[108] In ordinary experience the false is not a valid means for attaining the real. Inferences arising from haze (taken for smoke) do not yield correct knowledge as to the presence of fire.¹


ity evam codayed yo ’pi joṣayet tam ghaṭādinā
sad-asadbhyāṃ vibhakto ’sau paryāyaś ca na cānayoḥ
If anyone speaks thus, one should remind him of the nature of every object. It is neither real nor unreal, nor yet real and unreal successively.\footnote{1}

\footnote{1 The statement of the present problem given above at verse 108 seems to follow Maṇḍana’s Brahma Siddhi p. 13 f., the same example of haze being taken for smoke being given. Maṇḍana then proceeds to argue that there is no rule that the false is not practically efficient in its own realm, the view attributed to Sureśvara here in the Sārārtha Commentary, quoted by Hiriyanna in his notes. Maṇḍana held that the false was “indeterminable as either real or unreal”, and Sureśvara appears to be admitting this doctrine here. But it is probable that he never used the “indeterminable as real or unreal” formula on his own account, as Dr. V. Upadhyaya, who attributes the doctrine to him, is quite unable to produce an example of it from his works, “Lights on the Vedanta” p. 98. It is found in the doubtfully authentic work Mānasollāsa Vārttika (on the Dakṣiṇā Mūrti Hymn), verse VIII.13, translated Mahādeva Śāstrin, Minor Upanishads Vol. II, p. 154.}

\begin{quote}
evāṁ ku-codyam unmūlyāthedānīṁ prakṛtam
abhidhiyate. prakṛtam cānabhidheyevatham
abhidhā-śrutir avidyā-dhvaṃsy ātmani jñānaṁ
jana-yatitite. tatraiva kāraṇāntaram ucyate
\end{quote}

Having thus disposed of a silly objection we return to the subject in hand. And the subject in hand is—how can a Vedic text bearing on something that is (in principle) unnameable destroy ignorance and produce knowledge of the Self? And in this connection a further reason (why it can do so) is adduced:

\begin{quote}
atidusstho ‘prabodho ‘tra hy ātmaivāsyaprabuddhatā
nimitta-matrād vyety eśā nāsāgre badaram yathā
\end{quote}

[110] Ignorance has got a precarious seat. Its power to manifest is due entirely to the Self. Anything will serve to dislodge it, it is like a badari fruit\footnote{1 A kind of plum.} balanced on the nose.
Objection: Since the Self is the pure consciousness that neither rises nor sets, firm and changeless as a mountain peak, the very existence of ignorance is hard to justify. 

Answer: No; its existence is proved by our very familiarity with it.\(^1\) It is like the case of the owl finding darkness in the daylight.

\(^1\) i.e. it may not be possible to justify it logically, but it asserts itself in experience all the same.

**ahō dhārśtyaṃ avidyāya na kaścid ativartate pramāṇaṃ vastv anādṛtya paramātmeva tiṣṭhati**

[111] Oh! Who could outdo ignorance for sheer impudence? Paying not the slightest attention to reality or to authoritative canons of knowledge, it just stands there as if it were the supreme Self.

**yasmād avidyā-prasiddhyaivāvidyā-sad-bhāva-siddhir ata ātma-vastu-ṝrttānurodhena na kathamcaṇāpi tat-saṁbhāvanāpy asti yata āha**

Because the existence of ignorance rests only on our familiarity with it, it follows that it is in no way logically justifiable from the standpoint of the Self as reality. Wherefore we say:

**jñānam yasya nijam rūpam kriyā-kāraka-varjitam saṁbhāvanāpy avidyāyās tatra syāt kena hetunā**
[112] When the Self is pure knowledge by nature, void of the factors of knower, knowing and known, how could there be the faintest possibility of the existence of ignorance therein?

so 'yam evam anuditānastamitāvagati-mātra-śarīra ātmāpi sann avicārita-prasiddhāvidyā-mātra-vyavahita evātathaìvekṣyate yato 'taḥ

Because it is the Self as pure unbroken¹ awareness which is concealed by bare ignorance, established on the basis of uncritically accepted familiarity, and which then appears as other than it is—it follows that:

¹ Literally, not rising and not setting.

anumānād ayam bhāvād vyāvṛtto 'bhāvam āśritaḥ
tato 'py asya nivṛttih syād vākyād eva bubhutsataḥ

[113] Through inference the Self is conceived as different from the (empirically) existent—and hence as non-existent. The cessation of even this (false) conception of the Self arises from the holy texts alone in the case of the serious enquirer.

bhāva-vad abhāvād api nivṛttir anumānād eva kim iti na bhavatiti cec chṛṇu

Objection: But why is there any need for revelation? Reason can terminate the sense of non-existence in regard to the (transcendent) Self, just as it terminated the notion of its identity with the empirically existent.

Answer: No. Listen:
na vyāvṛttir yathā bhāvād bhāvenaivāviśeṣataḥ
abhāvād apy abhāvatvād vyāvṛttir na tathēṣyate

[114] The Self cannot be distinguished from what exists empirically (such as the body, etc.) by virtue of its being existent, because both would equally exist. And in the same way it cannot be distinguished from the non-existent by virtue of its being other than the existent.¹

¹ Hence it cannot be known through reason, the function of which is to distinguish, but only through the holy text.

yato nānumānena vyāviddhaśeṣa-kriyā-kāraka-
phalātmani svārājye 'bhisektum śakyate tasmāt

Since one cannot through the mere exercise of reason be anointed king upon the throne of the Self that lies beyond action and the factors of action—therefore:

avidyā-nidrayā so 'yaṁ prasupto durvivekayā
bhāvābhāva-vyudāsinyā śrutyaiva pratibodhyate

[115] He who is sunk in the profound sleep of ignorance, which is immune to rational discrimination, is awoken from it by the Veda alone, which excludes both being and non-being.¹

¹ Because it is concerned with the Self which is "beyond being and non-being", verse III.57 above.

atrāhānuditānastamita-vijñānātmā-mātra-svarūputvād
dussambhāvyā vidyeti. naitad evam. kutāḥ. yata āha

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It might be said here, “Since reality is by nature the Self as bare consciousness that neither rises nor sets, the whole concept of ignorance is indefensible”. But this is not so. Why not? To show why not, we say:

\[ \text{kuto 'vidyeti codyaṁ syān naiva prāgg hetv-} \]
\[ \text{asambhavāt} \]
\[ \text{kāla-trayāparicchitter na cordhvaṁ codya-saṁbhavaḥ} \]

[116] The objection “How can ignorance exist (in face of the Self)” is illegitimate both before and after (spiritual realization). Before spiritual realization its presence cannot be contested, and after spiritual realization it stands destroyed for past, present or future.

\[ \text{yasmāt tat-tvam-asy-ādi-vākyam evātmano 'śeṣām} \]
\[ \text{avidyāṁ niranvayām apanudati tasmāt} \]

Because it is only the holy texts like “that thou art” which can throw off all ignorance without remainder, it follows that:

\[ \text{addāhātamam anādṛtya pramāṇam sad asīti ye} \]
\[ \text{bubhutsante 'nyataḥ kuryus te 'kṣṇāpi rasa-vedanam} \]

[117] Those who ignore the most direct means of knowledge, which is the holy text “that thou art”, and seek knowledge by other means, are verily in the position of a man trying to taste food with his eyes.

\[ \text{evam apratihatāṁ ahaṁ brahmeti pramāṁ tat-tvam-} \]
\[ \text{asy-ādi-vākyam kurvad api na pratipādayatīti ced} \]
\[ \text{abhimataṁ na kutāścanāpi pratipattiḥ syād ata āha} \]
Now, if it be thought that the holy texts like “that thou art” carry uncontradicted right knowledge in the form “I am the Absolute (Brahman)” and yet are incapable of communicating it to anyone, then communication (of this) could not come from anywhere. So we say:

\[
\text{idam ced antam bruyat satyam avagatav api} \\
\text{na canyatrapi visvaso hy avagaty-aviseshatah}
\]

[118] If someone achieves knowledge by means of the holy texts and then proceeds to say “It is untrue”, then no other source of knowledge is of avail to him. For the most it could do would be to promote knowledge.\(^1\)

The text promotes knowledge (avagati). If this is achieved and then rejected, then whatever knowledge comes from any other source will be liable to be similarly rejected. Maṇḍana’s view (see prose introduction to 1.67 above) that the knowledge “I am the Absolute (Brahman)” generated by the holy texts does not penetrate to the real nature of the Self because it is relational, being based on words, and requires to be converted into another form of non-relational true knowledge arising from meditation, appears to be under fire here. See also the next verse.

\[
\text{na copaditsitaad vakyarthad vakyarthantaram} \\
\text{kalpayitum yuktam. yasmat}
\]

Nor is it right to pass from the true meaning of the sentence, supremely desirable in itself, to a quite different meaning. Wherefore:

\[
\text{na ced anubhavo 'ta'h syat padarthavagatav api} \\
\text{kalpyam vidhy-antaram tatra na hy anyo 'rtho} \\
\text{'vagamyate}
\]

[119] And if the meanings of the words are understood but the spiritual experience does not arise, it will not help to invoke purely imaginary injunctions to meditate. For there is no other meaning to be understood but that conveyed by the text itself.
na ca yathābhimato 'rtho yathoktena nyāyena
nāvasiyate. ko 'sau nyāya ity āha

Nor is it true to say that the meaning as we have proclaimed it cannot be made out by reasoning as we have described it. What is that method? To answer we say:

nāmādibhyo nirākṛtya tvam-artham niṣparigrahaḥ
niśpopho yuṣmad-arthebhyaḥ śamādi-vidhi-coditaḥ

[120] When a person has separated the meaning of the word “thou” from “name” etc.¹ and has become possessionless and without desire for anything in the objective field or subject to the injunctions as to restraint etc. . . .

¹ Chāndogya Upanishad VII.i.5.

bhaṅktvā cānna-mayādiṁs tān pañcānātmatayā
'rgalān
ahāṁ brahmaṁ vākyārthaṁ vetti ceno nārtha āhayā

[121] . . . And has destroyed the five sheaths beginning with the one composed of food,¹ for the reason that, as not-self, they are obstacles (to the realization of Self), and then finally knows the meaning of the text “I am the Absolute (Brahman)” — then for him any further striving is meaningless.

¹ Taittirīya Upanishad II.ii.1–II.v.1.

na ced evam upagamyate vākyasya pramāṇasya sato
'prāmāṇyāṃ prāpnoti. tad āha

If this were not admitted, the holy text, which is an authority, would become a non-authority.¹ So we say:
Advaita is not an independent rational enquiry but an interpretation of texts already received as authoritative. Any explanation of those texts which would make them non-authoritative is thus self-contradictory and must be rejected.

\[
yad-arthaṃ ca pravṛttanī yad vākyam tatra na cec \\
\text{chrutam pramām} \text{ utpādayet tasya prāmānyam} \text{ kena hetunā}
\]

[122] If the Vedic texts do not promote correct knowledge of the subject they refer to immediately they are heard, how can the Veda be regarded as authoritative at all?\(^1\)

\(^1\) The advocate of liberation through meditation on the texts, the Prasaṅkhyaṇa Vādin, holds that the information conveyed by the holy texts about the Absolute is false or at least seriously inadequate by its very nature, because it depends on words in a sentence and therefore proclaims not complete non-duality without even internal distinctions but an entity having a structural pattern corresponding to the pattern of the meanings of the words of the sentence. It has to be converted into right knowledge of non-duality by the exertions of the meditator in meditation. But Śrīvīra maintains, with Śaṅkara, that if the holy texts are to be regarded as authoritative they must convey the liberating knowledge directly and correctly themselves. Otherwise we have the self-stultifying view that liberation cannot arise except in contradiction with the meaning of the holy text. Cp. Rāma Tirtha's Commentary to Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.106.

\[\text{atha manyase}\]

Well, perhaps you will think:

\[
jāniyāc cet prasaṅkhyaṇāc chabdas satya-vacāḥ katham \\
pārokṣyaṃ śabdo naḥ prāha prasaṅkhyaṇāt tv asaṃśayam
\]

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[123] If an objector says, “Man comes to know reality through meditation (prasaṅkhyāna)—then how can revelation be teaching the truth? The objector replies: “We hold that knowledge derived from words is mediate and indirect (parokṣa), but that it becomes intuitive conviction of reality through meditation (prasaṅkhyāna)”.

1 This doctrine is maintained and expounded by Maṇḍana Miśra at Brahma Siddhi, p. 134.

na ca yukti-śabdāvṛtti-lakṣaṇāt prasaṅkhyānād
yathā-vat pratipattir bhaviṣyatītī sāmbhāvayāmahi
yasmāt

We cannot accept as logical the view that knowledge of reality can arise from Prasaṅkhyāna conceived as repeated hearing and reasoning. Wherefore:

yukti-śabdaḥ purā ḫy asya na ced akurutāṁ pramāṁ
sākṣād āvartanāt tābhyāṁ kim apūrvam phalisyati

[124] If the revealed texts as interpreted through reason do not produce correct and immediate (aparokṣa) knowledge in the first place, how can they produce new right knowledge later through a mere repetition of the process?1

1 In the Advaita of Śaṅkara’s school, knowledge is said to be conditioned by the nature of the object (vastu-tantra) and not by the will of the knower. Consequently, if imperfect knowledge or wrong knowledge is conveyed by the holy texts, no amount of activity on the part of the hearer, regarded as an agent, in the form of contemplation, etc., can convert the previous inadequate knowledge into adequate knowledge. He requires fresh contact with reality. On Sureśvara’s view, the holy texts give him just this, somewhat as the name “John” puts the sleeper into contact with his individual waking personality.
athaivaṃ api prasaṃkhyānam antarena prāñān
dhārayitaṃ na śaknoṣīti cec chravaṇādāv eva
saṃpādayiṣyāmaḥ. katham

If you feel that your whole life depends on Prasaṅkhyāna, all right. we will find a place for it in the preliminary discipline of hearing, cogitation and meditation. How?

prasaṃkhyānam[1] śrutāv asya nyāyo ’stv
āmṛedanātmakaḥ
iṣac-chrutam sāmi-śrutam samyak śrutvāvagacchati

[125] Prasaṅkhyāna (in the sense of repetition) can be accepted as part of the (preliminary) discipline of hearing.[1] A man comes to understand that which was partially heard or half heard (only) after hearing it properly.[2]

[2] The essential point to which Śureśvara adheres is that ultimately knowledge has to be conveyed in the final hearing from the Teacher. Even if, on the basis of the Brahma Sūtra texts, we accept that pondering and meditation play a role, still, that role is purely preliminary and subordinate. Such activity can do no more than qualify the pupil to hear properly what he is being taught.

nanu prasaṃkhyāna-vidhīm anabhyupagacchataḥ
pāramahāmsi caryā bauddhādi-caryā-vad aśāstra-
pūrvikā prāpnoti tatas cārūḍha-patitattvaṃ[1] syād
aśeṣa-karmanāṃ ca nivṛttir na prāpnotīti. ucyate

[1] Omitting “na” on MS authority quoted by Hiriyanna.
Objection: Well then, if you do not admit that there exist injunctions in the Veda to perform Prasaṅkhyāna, then the discipline of the supreme renunciates (paramahamsa samnyāsin) stands outside the pale of Vedic teaching, just as the discipline of the Buddhists does. In that case they would be liable to a fall from grace, and the bringing to an end of action and its results would be impossible. Answer: To this we say:

\[
\text{tvam-arthasyāvabodhāya vidhir apy āśrito yataḥ}
\]
\[
\text{tam antareṇa ye doṣās te 'pi nāyānty ahetavaḥ}
\]

[126] Since we accept the doctrine that there exists in the Veda an injunction to investigate the great sentences by hearing, cogitation and sustained meditation (śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana), our position is not open to the objections attaching to those courses of spiritual discipline for which there is no Vedic warrant.
caturtho 'dhyāyah

om pūrvādhyāyesu yad vastu vistareṇoditam sphutaṃ sanākṣepato 'dhunā vakṣye tad-eva-sukha-vittaye

BOOK IV

[1] OM! Now we shall repeat in summary form the same material that has been dealt with at length in the previous books, that it may be the more easily understood.

sanākṣepa-vistarābhyaṃ hi mandottama-dhiyāṃ nṛṇāṃ vastucyamānaṃ ety antāh-karanaṃ tena bhānyate

[2] For if one wishes a subject to be understood both by clever people and by less clever ones, one must first expound it at length and then append a summary.¹

¹ It would appear from J. that it is the weaker brethren who put their faith in summaries.

ātmānātmā ca loke 'smin pratyakṣādi-pramāṇatah siddhas tayor anātmā tu sarvatraivātma-pūrvakaḥ

[3] In this world both the Self and the not-self are known through the authoritative means of knowledge (pramāṇa) such as perception, etc. But wherever the not-self is known, it is known as accompanied by the Self.¹
"An object is never known in the absence of a subject". This does not mean that we know the subject in the same sense that we know the object (as the Mīmāṃsaka Prabhākara and his school held), nor even that the subject supplies a "felt background" as some European idealists of the nineteenth century claimed. It is a general truth that once first becomes aware of through critical reflection on the implications of experience, by the method of agreement and difference. It is demonstrated brilliantly by Śaṅkara in a passage of his commentary to Praśna Upanishad VI.2. The implications of that passage are discussed in the light of the present verse of Sūreśvara by A. C. Mukerji in The Nature of the Self, pp. 121-128 and p. 366.

\[
anātmavam svatas siddham dehād bhinnasya vastunah jñātur apy ātmata tad-van madhye saṃśaya-darśanam
\]

[4] The non-selfhood of objects external to the body is evident, as also is the Selfhood of the Witness. But in regard to what lies between (body, mind and senses) we find doubt.

\[
\text{asādhāraṇāms tayor dharmaṁ jñātvā dhūmāgni-vad budhah}^1 \\
anātmano 'tha buddhy-antān jāniyād anumānataḥ
\]

\(^1\) A metrically irregular line, having an extra syllable.

[5] The wise should note the characteristics that are peculiar to the Self (consciousness, permanence etc.) and those that are peculiar to the not-self (unconsciousness, perceptibility etc.). Having done so, he would realize by inference that all objects up to and including the intellect must be not-self.

\[
idam ity eva bāhye 'rthe hy aham ity eva boddhari dvayaṁ drṣṭaṁ yato dehe tenāyaṁ muhyate janaḥ
\]

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[6] We think “this” in relation to external objects and “I” (aham) in relation to the knower within. But in relation to the body etc. we have both notions (i.e. “this” and “me”). Hereby men are bewildered.

kena punar nyāyenātmānātmānor aśva-mahiṣayor iva vibhāgaḥ kriyata iti. ucyate

Objection: Well, but just tell us the method whereby the Self and the not-self may be clearly separated like horse and buffalo. Answer: To this we say:

nyāyah purodito ’smābhir ātmānātma-vibhāga-kṛt
tenadam-artham utsārya hy aham ity atra yo bhavet

[7] We have already described the method for separating the Self and the not-self (viz. reasoning by the method of agreement and difference). When the “this” has been eliminated by it (as not-self) the “I” remains.

vidyāt tat tvam asity asmād bhāvābhāva-dṛśam sadā anantaram abāhyārtham pratyak-stham munir añjasā

[8] Let the sage (muni) become clearly aware of the eternal inmost reality, the Witness of both existence and non-existence, in relation to which there is nothing within and nothing without. The means is the holy text “that thou art”.

ucyatāṁ tarhi kayā tu paripāṭhyā vākyārtham vettiti. ucyate. anvaya-vyatirekābhyām
You must tell us, then, by what method the meaning of the holy text is to be understood. We reply: through reasoning by the method of agreement and difference.¹

¹ If the passage comprising verses 9–18 is viewed as a whole it is seen that the reply is a tentative one. Reasoning by the method of agreement and difference is an incomplete discipline in itself and requires to be completed by hearing the great Vedic texts.

\[ \text{tyakta-kṛtsnedam arthatvāt tyakto 'ham iti manyate nāvagacchāmy ahaṁ yasmān nijātmānam anātmanāḥ} \]

[9] A man will think, “because I have rejected all that I represent as ‘this’ I stand rejected myself. For I cannot comprehend my own Self shorn of the not-self”.¹

¹ This is the net result of reasoning by the method of agreement and difference. Hence the seeker for liberation must resort to the holy texts as well. Cp. verses III.113–115 above.

\[ \text{atha śarirādi-buddhi-paryantāḥ sa sarvo 'nātmaiveti pramāṇād viniścitya kim iti bubhutsāto noparamate. śṛṇu} \]

Having determined through correct cognition that all from the body to the intellect is not-self, why does not this enquiry end? Listen:

\[ \text{anucchinna-bubhutsaś ca pratyagg hetor anātmanāḥ dolāyamāna-citto 'yam muhyate bhauta-van naraḥ} \]

[10] The mind of such a man lurches to and fro. His desire to know the inmost (Self) as distinct from the not-self remains unsatisfied and he remains deluded, like one possessed.
Since his Self is the Self of unbroken knowledge, ever present, why does a man not realize the fact? Because:

\[ yāir adrākṣit purātmānam yam anātmeti vikṣate \]
\[ dṛṣṭer draṣṭāram ātmānam tait prasiddhāh pramītsati \]

Formerly he apprehended the body as the Self by means of the senses and mind, but now he knows it to be not-self. And he wishes to use those self-same instruments to discover “the Seer (Witness) of sight”!\(^1\)

\(^1\) Suresvara graphically describes the plight of the seeker of knowledge of the Self who relies on intellectual analysis alone. He knows that the senses formerly deceived him when they suggested that the body was the Self. But he remains absolutely dependent on them for knowledge. Knowing that the senses are incompetent to tell him the truth even about the nature of the physical body, he finds that he has no other instruments wherewith to gather material for a knowledge of the highest Self, that which the Upanishads call the Seer of seeing!

\[ kasmāt punar hetoh parācintābhih śabdādy- \]
\[ avalehinībhīr buddhibhir ātmānam anātmavān na vikṣata iti. ucyate \]

But why can he not perceive the Self as he perceives the not-self, through the externally orientated cognitions which apprehend sound and other objects? We reply:

\[ caṣṭur na vikṣate śabdam atad-ātmavā-kāraṇāt \]
\[ yathaivaṁ bhautikī dṛṣṭir nātmānaṁ paripaśyati \]

The eye does not see sounds since it is not made up of the quality of sound. Similarly, gross material perception cannot perceive the Self.\(^1\)
Each sense-organ perceives only that part of matter that is made up of the same element as itself. E.g. the eye sees only the fire element, the ear hears only vibrations in the ether, the nose only perceives the quality of smell inhering in earth etc. See Upadesa Sāhasri (verse part) XVI.2 and Śaṃkara’s Commentary on Bṛhadāranyaka Upanishad II.iv.11. Compare also the opening sentence of the introductory prose commentary to verse II.1 of the present work above. All honour to perception in its own sphere, say Śaṃkara and Sureśvara, but that sphere is not the Self.

pratyakṣādi-pramāṇa-svābhāvyānurodhena tāvat
tad-adarśana-kāraṇam uktam. atha prameya-
svābhāvyānurodhena pratiṣedha ucyate

The reason for the non-perception of the Self has been shown through an enquiry into the nature of the means of cognition like perception, etc. Now the possibility of perceiving the Self is negated through an enquiry into the nature of the (proposed) object of such a perception (viz. the inmost Self).

dhi-vikriyā-sahasrāṇām hānopādāna-dharminām
sadā sākṣiṇam ātmānaṁ pratyaktvān nāham ikṣate

[13] The ego (aham) cannot see the eternal Self on account of its interiority. The Self is the witness of the myriad contortions of the intellect, which bring profit and loss.

kva punar iyaṁ viveka-buddhiḥ kim ātmany
utānātmaniti. kimcātāḥ. yady ātmāni kūṭasthatva-
vyāghāto 'nātma-darśitvāt. athānātmanī tasyāpy
acaitanyān na viveka-sambandha iti. ucyate.
“dāhya-dāhakataikatra" ity ukta-parihārāt
Objection: Well, but this perception of distinctness (viveka)—does it belong to the Self or the not-self?
Answer: What does it matter? Objection: If it belonged to the Self, then the Self could not be the changeless consciousness, firm as a mountain peak, because it would perceive the not-self (and so be subject to motion). So it must be the not-self. But the latter is inert and hence can have nothing to do with discrimination.
Answer: We have already dealt with this at verse III.59 above. “Just as fire and wood are burner and burnt respectively...”

buddhāv eva viveko ’yam yad-anātmatayā bhidā
buddhim evopamṛdnāti kadaliṁ tat-phalam yathā

[14] Discrimination belongs to the intellect alone, for it is only because the intellect is not-self that distinctions arise at all. Finally discrimination destroys the intellect as the plantain-fruit destroys the parent tree.¹

¹ Distinction (viveka) is itself a modification of the mind and is attributed to the Self only through superimposition. Hence the changelessness of the Self is not affected by an act of discrimination. But the bare inert intellect itself is not the seat of discrimination. The intellect becomes a knower at all only through false identification with the Self. J.

so ’yam atattve tattva-dṛk

Such a one sees the reality in what is not the reality:

anumāna-pradīpena hitvā sarvān anātmanah
sāṃsāraikāvalambinyā tad-abhāvaṁ dhiyepsati

[15] Having disposed of all not-selves through the light of inference, he hopes to do away with transmigratory life through that very intellect which is its sole support!

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This discrimination arising through reasoning through
the method of agreement and difference, which separates
the Self and the not-self, resembles doubt, such as the
doubt whether a distant object is a post or a man. Even
if taken as yielding clear knowledge, such “knowledge”
is false like the “knowledge” of water in a mirage.\(^1\) So
we say:

\(^1\) And hence, J adds, you cannot rely on reason alone for knowledge
of the Self, but must resort to the holy texts.

\[\text{samsāra-bija-samstho 'yam tad-dhiyā muktim icchati}
\text{śaśo nimilaneneva mṛtyum pariśhīrśati}\]

[16] He remains firmly based in the seed of trans-
migratory life (ignorance) and at the same time wishes
to obtain liberation through that very discriminatory
intellect which brings transmigratory life about! He is
like a hare trying to save itself from death by shutting
its eyes.

\[\text{asyārthasya draḍhime śruti-udāharaṇam}\]

Veda-quotation to support this point:

\[\text{imam artham puraskṛtya śrutyā samyag udāhṛtam}
\text{“yac caकṣुषे” ti visrabdhaṃ “na अर्थे” riti ca}
\text{sphuṭam}\]
4:17  THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

[17] With this truth in mind, the Veda says, “That which the eye cannot see”¹ and “thou canst not see the Seer of seeing”.²

¹ Kena Upanishad I.7.
² Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad, III.iv.2.

buddhy-antam apaviddhyaiyaṁ ko nvaham syām
itikṣituḥ
śrutis tat tvam asity āha sarva-mānātigāmini

[18] To the one who has realized the unreality of everything, up to and including the intellect, and who still asks, “Well, then, who am I?”, the Veda, itself beyond the realm of empirical questioning and proof, replies “that thou art”.¹

¹ Both Śaṅkara and Sureśvara personify the Veda (śruti) as a compassionate mother. “Kinder than a thousand parents”, says Śaṅkara, commenting on Kathā Upanishad II.i.15.

eśa saṁkṣepataḥ pūrvādhyāya-trayasyārtha uktaḥ.
sō 'yam nyāyyo 'pi vedāntārthaḥ śāstrācārya-
prasāda-labhyo 'py anapekṣita-śāstrācārya-prasādo
'nanyāpekṣa-siddha-svabhāvatvāt kaiśic
chraddadhānair na pratiyate. teṣāṁ saṁgrahārtham
abhimata-prāmāṇyodāharanaṁ

So we conclude our summary of the teachings of the three previous books. Now this well-known Vedānta doctrine we have expounded, though it has to be learned from the authoritative texts with the help and grace of a spiritual Teacher, by no means depends on the presence of the texts and the grace of a Teacher, but
exists and asserts itself as true in its own right. Nevertheless there exist some pious people who cannot accept anything unless it is made dependent on some authority or other, and as a concession to them we subjoin some quotations from a recognized authority.¹

¹ Viz. Śaṅkara. Sureśvara seems to have regarded his Teacher Śaṅkara as having become an authority on Advaita doctrine already in his own lifetime. At Tatāniti Śaṅkara 1.2 and Brhadāraṇyaka Vārttika VI.v.25 he stresses his far-reaching fame. Cp. Texte, p. 13.

bhagavat-pūjya-pādaiś cāpy¹ udāhāryeyam eva tu
suvīspaṣṭo 'smad-ukto 'rthāḥ sarva-bhūta-hitaiśibhiḥ

¹ Adopting the reading of the Sārārtha Commentary to avoid a break in the sandhi.

[19] What we are saying has all been clearly stated by the holy (Teacher) of Worshipful Feet (Śaṅkara), the one who was devoted to the welfare of every living creature.¹

¹ Sureśvara’s references to his master Śaṅkara show that, while he did not regard him as an avatar either of Śiva or of any other deity, he did regard him as a Teacher of quite exceptional magnitude. Both Sureśvara and Padmapada refer to him usually as Bhagavān Pūjyapāda—the holy one whose feet are worthy of worship.

kim paramātmanā upadeśa utāparamātmanā iti.
kim cātāḥ. yadi paramātmanas tasyopadeśam
antareṇaiva muktatvān nirarthaka upadeśaḥ.
athāparamātmanas tasyāpi svata eva saṃsāra-
svabhāvatvān niṣphala upadeśaḥ. evam ubhayatṛāpi
doṣa-vattvād atā āha

Objection: Is the teaching for the highest Self or for the lower self? Answer: What are you driving at?
Objection: If the teaching is for the highest Self, then because it is already liberated anyway without the teaching, the teaching is useless. But if the teaching is for the lower self, then, the lower self being irrevocably transmigrant by nature, the teaching has no chance of success. So both views are faulty. Answer: With this objection in mind, we proceed:

“avivicyobhayam vakti śrutiś cet syād grahas tathā”
iti pakṣam upādāya pūrva-pakṣam niśātya ca

[20] The statement of the Veda becomes intelligible if it be assumed that it is made in accordance with the standpoint of one not discriminating (the ego, the Self and the reflection of consciousness).¹ This is the view that the holy Teacher accepted, having refuted the other.²

¹ This is the first half of Upadeśa Sāhasri (verse part) XVIII.78.
² It is thus the lower self for whom the teaching is made, but the latter is not “irrevocably a transmigrant” because its very existence depends on erroneous knowledge which is subject to cancellation by right knowledge.

tac cedam avivekāt svato viviktātmame tat tvam aṣīty upadiṣṭam

The teaching of “that thou art”, however, has to be directed to one who through lack of deep discrimination has made only superficial intellectual discrimination between Self and not-self.

yuṣmad-asmad-vibhāga-jīne syād artha-vad idam vacaḥ
yato ’nabhijñe vākyaṁ syād badhireṣv iva gāyanam
[21] The holy texts are meaningful to those who know the difference between the Self and the not-self. When the difference between the Self and the not-self is not known, pronouncing the holy text is about as useful as singing songs before an assembly of the deaf.¹

¹ The first half of this verse is a quotation of Upadeśa Sāhasrī XVIII.90, and the remainder is Sureśvara's comment.

tasya ca yuṣmad-asmad-vibhāga-vijñānasya kā yuktir upāya-bhāvaṁ pratipadyate. śṛṇu

But what is the reasoning that serves as a means to the knowledge of the distinction between the Self and the not-self? Listen:

“anvaya-vyatirekau hi padārthasya padasya ca syād etad aham ity atra yuktir evāvadhāraṇe”

[22] For it is only by reasoning through considering examples of agreement and difference in the case of both words and the things denoted by words that one can determine the meaning of “I” in the present context (i.e. not from the standpoint of uncritical commonsense).¹

¹ This verse is a quotation of Upadeśa Sāhasrī XVIII.96.

kathāṁ tau yuktir ity atrāha

How does reasoning by agreement and difference amount to the “reasoning (which serves as a means to this knowledge)”? To answer this question, we say:
“nāḍrākṣam aham ity asmin suṣupte 'nyan manāg api
na vārayati dṛṣṭiṁ svāṁ pratyayaṁ tu niṣedhati”

[23] The feeling “I did not see anything else whatever
in this (my recent) sleep” does not deny one’s own
consciousness (in that state), but does deny all mental
representation (pratyaya) in it.¹

¹ Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.97.

“evam vijñāta-vācyārthe śruti-loka-prasiddhitah
śrūtis tat tvam asīty āha śrotur mohāpanuttaye”

[24] When the primary meaning of the text has once
been understood on the basis of ordinary scriptural and
secular usage, the Veda (śruti) says “that thou art” for
the removal of the hearer’s delusion (moha).¹

¹ Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.99, with the reading vācyārthe = primary
meaning.

\[
tatra tvam iti padam yatra lakṣaṇayā vartate so
'rtha ucyate
\]

We explain the meaning of the word “thou” when it is
used in an indirect sense (lakṣaṇa):

“aham-śabdasya yā niṣṭhā jyotīṣa pratyagātmani
saivoktā sad asīty evam phalam tatra vimuktatā”

[25] It is in this way (i.e. without any further work
requiring to be done) that the word “I”¹ reveals the
light (jyotiḥ), the inmost Self. That same revelation is
given in the text “that thou art”.² The fruit here is
liberation.³

² The fruit here is liberation.
THE REALIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE 4:27

1 In “I am the Absolute (Brahman)”, Brhadāranyaka Upanishad I.iv.10.
2 Literally, “thou art the real”, but it seems that Śaṅkara and Suresvara used this phrase to stand for “that thou art”.
3 This verse is a quotation of Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.101. According to the commentator on that work, Rāma Tirtha, the verse refers back to the preceding one and its meaning is that the operation of the sentences “I am the Absolute (Brahman)” and “that thou art” is as effortless and immediate as that of Brahmā’s sentence to Rāma, “O Rāma, thou art Viṣṇu and not just the son of Daśaratha”.

anyaccānva-yatyirekodāharaṇam. tathā

Another example of reasoning by agreement and difference, thus:

“chittvā tyaktena hastena svayam nātmā viśeṣyate
tathā śiṣṭena sarveṇa yena yena viśeṣyate

[26] When a hand has been cut off, the Self is not affected by the lost hand. It is the same with all else by which the Self is qualified and which is (later) rejected.¹

¹ Upadeśa Sāhasri VI.1.

viśeṣaṇam idam sarvam sādhv-aluṃkaraṇaṃ yathā
avidyādhyastam atah sarvam jñāta ātmany asad
bhavet

[27] All this array of qualities is like an external adornment.¹ They have been superimposed on the Self through ignorance. Therefore, when the Self is known, they prove to be unreal.²

¹ That can be donned or removed without the wearer being affected.
² Upadeśa Sāhasri VI.3.
tasmāt tyaktena hastena tulyaṁ sarvaṁ viśeṣaṇam
anātmatvena tasmāj jīno muktah sarva-viśeṣaṇaiḥ

[28] Every qualifying characteristic (of the Self) is, as not-self, comparable to the lost hand. Therefore the Self is free from all qualifying characteristics.¹

¹ Upadeśa Śāhasri VI.2.

jñātaivātmā sadā grāhyo jñeyam utsṛjya kevalaṁ
aham ity api yad grāhyam vyapetāṅga-saṁaṁ hi tat

[29] The Self should be ever realized as the knower to the exclusion of the knowable. Even that which is known objectively as “I” must be rejected. It is like a discarded limb.¹

¹ Upadeśa Śāhasri VI.4. Compare verses II.16–17 above.

dṛṣyatvād aham ity eṣa nātma-dharmo ghaṭādi-vat
tathānve pratyaya jñeyā doṣāś cātmā ’malo hy atāḥ”

[30] The ego-notion is not itself a property of the Self since it is perceived as an object like a pot. This applies equally to all other mental notions (pratyaya) and defects. For the Self is taintless.¹

¹ This is Upadeśa Śāhasri XV.16.

sarva-nyāyopasamgrahah

Summary of the whole argument:

“nitya-muktatva-vijñānaṁ vākyād bhavati nānyataḥ
vākyārthaśyāpi vijñānaṁ padartha-smṛti-pūrvakam
[31] The knowledge that one is (really) ever liberated comes from the holy texts and from no other source. And knowledge of the meaning of a text is not possible without first calling to mind the meanings of its (component) words.¹

¹ Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.190, cp. verse III.31 above.

\[\textit{anvaya-vyatirekābhyaṁ padārthas smaryate dhruvam evaṁ nirdūḥkham ātmānam akriyāṁ pratipadyate}\]

[32] Everyone agrees that the meaning of a word is recalled through reasoning on it by the method of agreement and difference.¹ In this way, one comes to know oneself as the actionless Self, free from pain.

¹ This verse is a reproduction of Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.191. Commenting on the present verse, J explains that the agreements and differences referred to are those noted in “the speech usages of our elders”.

\[\textit{sad evety-ādi-vākyebhyah pramā śphuṭatarā bhavet daśamas tvam asīty asmād yathaivaṁ pratyagātmani}”\]

[33] The clearest (form of) authoritative knowledge is that of the inmost Self¹ which arises from such texts as “that thou art”, just in the same way that it does from “thou art the tenth”.²

¹ i.e. the immediate awareness based on identity-feeling.
² Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.192. For a collection of other references to “thou art the tenth”, see note to verse III.65 above.

\[\textit{vikṣāpannasyodāharaṇam}\]

An example to illustrate the condition of the enquirer:
“nava-buddhy-apahārādd hi svātmānaṁ daśa-pūraṇam
apaśyan jñātum evecchet svam ātmānaṁ janas tathā

[34] The man whose mind has been led away by the
notion of nine, and is not aware of himself as complet-
ing the ten, requires only to know his own self.¹

¹ No further action of any kind, such as meditation or rites, is re-
quired. This is Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.174.

avidyā-baddha ca kṣuṣṭyāt kāmāpahṛta-dhiḥ sadā
viviktaṁ dṛṣīm ātmānaṁ nekṣate daśamaṁ yathā”

[35] And the one whose intellect is led away by desire
because his eyes have been bandaged by ignorance, fails
to see that his Self is pure Consciousness, ever distinct
from all else, just as (the other man failed to perceive
that he himself was) the tenth.¹

¹ Upadeśa Sāhari XVIII.175.

so 'yam evam avidyā-paṭalāvagunṭhita-dṛṣṭih san
katham utthāpyata ity āha

How is the one whose vision has been covered over by
the veil of ignorance to be aroused? To answer this
question we say:

yathā svāpa-nimittena svapna-dṛk-pratibodhitah
karaṇam karma kartāraṁ svāpnaṁ naivekṣate svataḥ

[36] When one has awoken from sleep owing to the
effect of a frightening object seen in a dream, one no
longer sees the agent, means of action and objects of
action that were visible in the dream.¹

¹ Here Sūrēśvara himself takes up the argument which he has been
quoting from Śaṅkara.
anātma-jñas tathaivāyaṁ samyak śrutiśavadhitah
gurum śāstraṁ tathā mūḍham svātmāno 'nyam na
paśyati

[37] In the same way, one who was ignorant of the Self and who is awakened from this ignorance by the Vedic text (śrutī) sees nothing other than his own Self. The Teacher (guru), the texts and he himself as deluded individual soul have all disappeared.

sa kim sakala-saṁsāra-praviviktam ātmānaṁ
vākyāt pratipadyata uta netiṁ. atra brūmah.
kūṭasthāvagati-šeṣa-māтратvāt pratipatter uta āha

Does the knowledge of the Self distinct from all the world of transmigratory existence arise from the text, or does it not? To this we answer, “It does arise (from the text), because such knowledge is nothing other than the changeless consciousness which remains (when all else is negated)”. Hence we say:

danḍāvasāna-niśthas syād danḍa-sarpō yathā tathā
nityāvagati-niśtham syād vākyāj jagad asaṁśayam

[38] As the snake imagined in a stick was really nothing other than the stick, so the universe turns out to be nothing other than the eternal pure consciousness, as we discover through the holy texts.¹

¹ This is an answer to the dilemma “Is the Absolute different from the universe or the same? If different, we have duality; if the same, we have pantheism (i.e. the Absolute is characterized by the limitations of the world)”. The verse answers the dilemma by stating that the world is neither the same as the Absolute nor different, since it is itself nothing real and is simply imagined in pure consciousness as a snake is imagined in a stick. When the stick is known, it is seen that there never was a snake.
kuta etat. yasmāt

Why is this? Because:

paśyann iti yadāhoccaiḥ pratyaktvam ajam avyayam
apūrvānaparānantam tvamā tad upalakṣyate

[39] That innermost essence, partless and unborn, which the Veda teaches in emphatic tones in the passage “that which in deep sleep (although not seeing), sees”,¹ is the indicated meaning of the word “thou”. It is infinite. Nothing existed before it, nothing will exist after.

¹ Brhadāranyaka Upanishad IV.iii.23.

yasmāt

(Duality) is cancelled only by the knowledge rising from such texts as “that thou art”. Wherefore:

asmād yad aparāṇ rūpaṁ nāstity eva nirūpyate
anyathā-grahaṇābhāvād bijam tat svapna-bodhayoh

[40] Deep sleep is described in the Veda as “having no second”¹ because there is only lack of comprehension and no (positive) false vision. Nevertheless, the state of deep sleep is the seed of waking and dream and must be destroyed.

¹ Brhadāranyaka Upanishad IV.iii.23.

asyārthasya drāḍhimna udāharanam

A quotation in support of this idea:
"kārya-kāraṇa-baddhau tāv īṣyete viśva-taijasau prājñāḥ kāraṇa-baddhas tu dvau ταυ τυρυε na sidhyataḥ"

[41] Viśva and Taijasa are conditioned as both cause and effect. Prājñā is conditioned as cause only. Neither of them is conceivable in Turya.¹

¹ This is Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā I.11 on the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad. Viśva is pure consciousness associated with the external world. Taijasa is pure consciousness associated with the dreams and mental experiences. Prājñā is pure consciousness associated with undifferentiated ignorance in deep sleep. Turya is pure consciousness as it really is, different from Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājñā. It is to be realized through the process of God-realization as laid down in the Advaitic classics.

"anyathā-grhṇataḥ svapno niḍrā tattvam ajānataḥ viparyāśe tayoh kṣīne turiyam padam aśnute

[42] Dream is the state of one whose vision is false. Sleep is the state of one who does not know reality. When the wrong knowledge characterized by these two states is destroyed, the plane of Turiya is reached.¹

¹ Gauḍapāda Kārikā I.15. The "plane of Turiya" (turiya-pāda) means "sense of identity with the universal pure consciousness". Sleep is the "āvaraṇa", dream the "vikṣepa" of later writers. Gauḍapāda terms them agrahaṇa and anyathāgrahaṇa respectively, i.e. non-comprehension and false-comprehension.

tathā bhagavat-pādiyam udāharaṇam

So also says the text of the Bhagavatpāda:¹

¹ i.e. “of the holy one”, Sureśvara’s teacher Śaṅkara.

"susuptākhyam tamo ’jñānam bijaṃ svapna-prabodhayoh
ātma-bodha-pradagdham syād bijaṃ dagdham yathā ’bhavam"

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[43] When what is called sleep—darkness (tamas), ignorance (ajña), the seed of waking and dream—is burnt up by awakening to the nature of the Self, then it becomes void of progeny, like a seed that has been burnt.  

1 Upadeśa Sāhasri, XVII.26. In the previous verse Sureśvara quoted a special conception of Gauḍapāda’s. In the present one he shows that it is found in Śaṅkara too.

evaṁ gauḍair drāvidair naḥ pūjyair ayaṁ arthaḥ
   prabhāṣitaḥ
ajña-mātropādhīs sann aham-ādi-dṛg iśvaraḥ

1 Col. Jacob recommended dropping “ayam” to correct the metre.

[44] Thus this doctrine has been proclaimed by the venerable ones of our school, the Gauḍa and the Drāviḍa. 1 The Lord Himself, with only ignorance for His adjunct (upādhi), is the Witness of the ego, etc. 2

1 The Gauḍa, or Northerner, means Gauḍapāda; the Drāviḍa, or Southerner, means Śaṅkara.
2 In Gauḍapāda’s Kārikās the term prājña means the subject who experiences deep sleep. In Māṇḍukya 6, it is said of Prājña: “This One is the Lord of all . . .”. Throughout Śaṅkara’s writings also it regularly means the Highest Lord (parameśvara or iśvara).

tatrānyathā-graṇa-vaḍ anyathā-graṇa-bijam
agraṇaṇam anātma-dharma evety āha

Next we explain how, just like false comprehension, non-comprehension also, the seed of false comprehension, is a property of the not-self:

idam jñānam aham jñātā jñeyam etad iti trayam
yo ’vikāro vijñāṇī parāg evāṣya tat tamah
[45] That darkness which is threefold in the form “This is my knowledge: I am the knower: and this is the object of my knowledge” is external to the changeless Self which witnesses it.

\[
yata \text{ etad evam atas tasyaiva bijātmanas tamasaś}
\text{citta-dharma-} \text{viśiṣṭasya sva-kārya-}
\text{dvitiyābhisāṃbandho}
\text{na tv avikāriṇa ātmana ity āha drṣṭāntena}
\]

We explain through an illustration how, this being so, it is this darkness (tamas), of seed-like nature, invested with the qualities of the mind (citta-dharma), that is related to duality, its own effect, and not the immutable Self.

\[
rūpa-prakāśayor yad-vat saṃgatir vikriyāvataḥ
\text{sukha-duḥkhādi-saṃbandhaś cittasyaivaṃ vikāriṇaḥ}
\]

[46] Just as commerce between light and colours is possible only because both are changeable, so pleasure and pain and other qualities can only belong to something changeable like the mind (and not to the highest Self).

\[
tad \text{ etad anvaya-vyatirekābhyaṃ darśayisyān āha}
\]

With a view to demonstrate the same thing on the basis of argument by agreement and difference we say:

\[
\text{samprasāde } \text{vikāritvād astaṃ yāte vikāriṇi}
\text{paśyato nātmanāḥ kimcid dvitiyam sprśate } \text{ṇv api}
\]
[47] The state of deep sleep is changeless, and the changing has disappeared. Here the Self remains as pure luminosity, but is not in contact with any second thing.

so 'yaṁ kūṭastha-jñāṇa-mūrtir ātmā

This Self of the form of immutable knowledge—

yathā prājñē tathaivāyāṁ svapna-jāgaritāntayoḥ
paśyann apy avikāritvād dvitiyam naiva paśyati

[48] Just as in deep sleep, so also in dream and waking, the Self, though (in these two latter states apparently) seeing, in fact sees no second thing, because it is immutable.

evaṁ jñānavato nāsti mamāhaṁ-mati-saṁśrayaḥ
bhāsvat-pradīpa-hastasya hy andhakāra ivāgrataḥ

[49] For him who knows the Self thus there is no more “I” and “mine”, any more than there is darkness in front of one who carries in his hand a lighted lamp.

tatra drṣṭāntaḥ

In this connection, an example:

ā prabodhād yathā 'siddhir1 dvaitād anyasya vastunāḥ
bodhād evam asiddhatvam buddhy-ādeḥ

pratyagātmanāḥ

1 Reading 'siddhir with Professor Hacker, Texte p. 102, note 1.
[50] Just as before enlightenment the existence of anything other than the world of duality was impossible to establish, so, after enlightenment, nothing can show that the intellect (and body) etc. belong to the inmost Self.

sa esa vidvān hānopāddāna-śūnyam ātmānam ātmani paśyan

This enlightened man, seeing the Self, not subject to gain or loss, in the Self . . .

sarvam evānujānāti sarvam eva niṣedhati
bhedātma-lābho 'nujñā syān niṣedho 'tat-svabhāvatah

[51] The enlightened man accepts everything and also negates it. The (apparent) rise of distinctions constitutes his acceptance: the fact that they are by nature not-self constitutes his negation of them.

sarvasyoktatvād upasam̄hāraḥ

Because everything (we had to say) has now been said, we proceed to the concluding summary:

paramārthātma-niṣṭham yat sarva-vedānta-niścitam
tamopanud dhiyāṁ jñānam tad etat kathitam mayā

[52] I have declared that knowledge of the highest reality, the Self, which is the import of the Upanishads in their entirety, and which destroys the darkness of the mind.
What has been said here culminates in:

\[ \text{nehātma-vin mad-anyo 'sti na matto 'jño 'sti kaścana ity ajānan vijānāti yas sa brahma-vid uttamaḥ} \]

[53] "There is no other Self-knower but I, and no other ignorant one but myself"—he who has this feeling is the highest knower of the Absolute (Brahman), though (in the worldly sense) he is not a "knower" at all.\(^1\)

\(^1\) He is not identified with his mind (antaḥkaraṇa).

\[ \text{evam ātmānam jñātvā kim pravartitavyam uta nivartitavyam āhosvin mukta-pragrahateti. ucyate} \]

When the Self has thus been known, should one (continue to) obey the Vedic injunctions, or should one abstain from all action, or are the reins just let loose?

\[ \text{jñeyābhinnam idam yasmāj jñeya-vasty-anusāryataḥ na pravr̥ttim nivr̥ttim vā kaṭākṣenāpi vikṣate} \]

[54] Because this knowledge conforms to its object, the real, it is non-different from its object. It does not even recognize the existence of (the two paths of) action or renunciation.\(^1\)

\(^1\) So that it makes no sense to ask in regard to the jñāṇī "should he live as a householder or a monk, should he live in the world or be a renunciate?"

The jñāṇī has vidvatsāṁnyāsa as opposed to vidiśāsāṁnyāsa. The latter is formal renunciation performed as part of the discipline for God-realization. The vidvatsāṁnyāsa of the jñāṇī is simply his natural state. Whatever happens to his body and mental faculties he is no longer identified with them. He is a total renunciate whether he be living in a lonely cave by the Ganges or in the midst of a hail of missiles on the battlefield.
Why is this knowledge non-different from its object? Because:

prāgātma-bodhād bodho 'yaṁ bāhya-vastūpasarjanaḥ
pradhvastākhila-saṁsāra ātmaikālambanam śruteḥ

[55] Before Self-knowledge, knowledge is directed towards external objects. When all transmigratory experience has been destroyed through recourse to the Vedic texts, only the Self remains as the object (or support) of knowledge.

evam avagata-paramārtha-tattvasya na śeṣa-śeṣi-
bhāvas tat-kāraṇasyotsāritatvād ity āha

We explain how he who has thus known the highest reality has gone beyond the realm where anything remains to be done, for all cause for such a situation has been uprooted.

vāstavenaiva viṛttena nirunaddhi yato bhavam
niḥṛtīṃ api mṛdnāti samyag-bodhah pravritti-vat

[56] Through knowledge of reality he brings empirical being to an end. Right-knowledge destroys the path of renunciation as surely as it destroys the path of action.

sakṛd ātma-prasūtyaiva nirunaddhy akhilam bhavam
dhvānta-mātra-nirāsena na tato 'nyānyathā-matih

[57] By merely rising once, this (knowledge) destroys all becoming, through negation of ignorance once and for all. There is no more wrong knowledge afterwards.
deśa-kālādy-asambaddhād deśāder moha-kāryataḥ
nānutpannam adagdhaṁ vā jñānam ajñānam asty atāḥ

[58] Time and space, etc., are the effects of delusion, and do not inhere in the Self. Once the Self is known, there is no more knowledge to gain and no ignorance left unconsumed.¹

¹ The following objection and answer is taken from J’s commentary on the above verse. Objection: You say, “Through merely becoming aware of the Self once”. But how could knowledge achieved once (i.e. at a particular time and place) destroy all nescience? We know from ordinary experience that correct knowledge derived from the accepted means thereof annihilates the ignorance pertaining to the time and space occupied by the object now correctly known. It does not destroy all nescience in general. Answer: Objects such as pots are limited to a particular time and space and (as the text indicates by the word “etc.”) by the presence of other objects, and they are also themselves inert. But the Self is quite untouched by conditions such as space and time, which are themselves born of nescience, and, unlike the particular objects, it is self-luminous. Hence (i.e. the Self being both unlimited and self-luminous), when the Self is known, no further ignorance exists to be annihilated, nor is any further knowledge, in the empirical sense, possible. Henceforward there is no more knowledge (to gain) and there is no ignorance (left unconsumed).

samyag-jñāna-sīkhi-pluṣṭa-moha-tat-kārya-rūpiṇāḥ
sakṛṇ nivṛtter bādhyaśya kim kāryam avaśiṣyatē
dharmaparyantam dharmah param sāmyak-cūrṇena
byāhyatam

[59] What further remains to be done for him who has once burnt up in the curling flames of spiritual knowledge that delusion, together with its effects, whose destruction is the real purpose of our lives?

vāstavenaiva vṛttenāvidyāyāḥ pradhvastatvān na
kimcid avaśiṣyata ity uktāḥ pariḥārah. athāparas
sāmpradāyikaḥ

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One answer (to the objection about the inexplicability of the condition of the enlightened man) has been given: it consists in saying that when ignorance has been destroyed by knowledge of the real, nothing further remains. Or else there is another view which is also traditional.¹

¹ The reference is almost certainly to Maṇḍana Miśra, see his Brahma Siddhi, p. 131. Cp. also Śaṅkara on Brahma Sūtra IV.1.15.

\[ \text{nivṛtta-sarpas sarpotthāṁ yathā kampan na mūncatī vidhvastākhila-moho }'pī \text{ moha-kāryaṁ tathātma-vit} \]

[60] Just as the trembling set up by fear of the snake persists for a time even after the snake has been negated, so the effects of delusion persist for a little while in the case of the Self-knower, though all delusion has been destroyed.¹

¹ The reference is to the “prārabdha karma” which maintains the activity of the body of the liberated one. J.

\[ \text{yataḥ pravṛtti-bījam ucchinnam tasmāt} \]

Because the seed of further action has been destroyed, it follows:

\[ \text{taror utkhaṭa-mūlasya sōṣeṇaiva yathā kṣayah} \]
\[ \text{tathā buddhātma-tattvasya nivṛttyaiva tanu-kṣayah} \]

[61] Just as a tree which has lost its roots withers away, so does the body of the one who has become awake to the real nature of the Self wither away through the cessation of ignorance.¹

¹ To him his body is completely illusory (prātibhāsika), though not to others. J.
athālepaka-pakṣa-nirāsārtham āha

Now, in order to refute the view that (because) he is stainless (he can therefore behave as he likes) we say:

buddhādvaita-sa-tattvasya yatheṣṭācaraṇaṁ yadi
śunāṁ tattva-dṛśāṁ caiva ko bheda 'śuci-bhakṣaṇe

[62] If the enlightened man could behave as he liked what would be the difference between a sage and a dog? Both of them would eat impure things.\(^1\)

\(^1\) This verse and also IV.69 below are quoted at the end of Sadānanda’s Vedānta Sāra, and the present verse also at Pañcadasī IV.55. At Brahma Sūtra II.iii.48 Śaṅkara remarks that though the enlightened man is not bound by any rules, still, he does not behave just as he likes, since self-indulgent action of this kind is prompted in every case by false identification with something that is not-self, which the enlightened man has overcome.

kasmān na bhavati. yasmāt

Why does he not behave as he likes? Because:

adharmāj jāyate 'jñānaṁ yatheṣṭācaraṇaṁ tataḥ
dharma-kārye kathāṁ tat syād yatra dharmo 'pi

neṣyate

[63] Ignorance results from unrighteous deeds; uncontrolled behaviour from ignorance. How can there be unrighteous deeds in the case of one who by acting righteously has already gone beyond the plane of righteousness?

pratyācaksāna āhāto yatheṣṭācaraṇaṁ hariḥ
"yasya sarve samārambhāḥ" "prakāśaṁ ce" ti

sarva-dṛk

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[64] The omniscient Hari\(^1\) forbade uncontrolled behaviour in the words “He whose undertakings” and “Light”.\(^2\)

\(^1\) i.e. Kṛṣṇa, speaking in the Bhagavad Gitā.
\(^2\) The verses are: Bhagavad Gitā IV.19 (“He whose undertakings are all free from desires and intentions, whose activity is burnt up by the fire of knowledge—he the wise call a sage”) and Bhagavad Gitā XIV.22 (“Light, activity and delusion—these, O Pāṇḍava, he hates not when present nor desires when absent”).

\[\text{tiṣṭhatu tāvat sarva-pravṛtti-bija-ghasmarāṁ} \]
\[\text{iñānāṁ mumukṣv-avasthāyāṁ api na sāmbhavati} \]
\[\text{yatheṣṭācaranam. tad āha} \]

Quite apart from (the one who has achieved) the knowledge that destroys the seeds of all activity, there cannot be self-willed activity even in the state of mere desire for release. So we say:

“\text{“yo hi yatra viraktah syān nāsaup tasmai pravartate} \]
\[\text{loka-traya-viraktatvān mumukṣuḥ kim itihate”} \]

[65] No one engages in activity in matters towards which he is indifferent. For what should the one desirous of liberation strive, seeing that he is indifferent to everything in the three worlds?\(^1\)

\(^1\) A quotation of Upadeśa Sāhasrī XVIII.231.

\[\text{tatra drṣṭāntaḥ} \]

An example in this connection:

“\text{ksudhayā pīḍyamāno ’pi na viṣaṁ hy attum icchati} \]
\[\text{miṣṭānna-dhvasta-trd jānan nāmūḍhas taj jighatsati} \]
[66] Even if he be afflicted by hunger, a man will not desire to eat poison knowingly. He, then, whose hunger has already been appeased by delightful food, will not desire to eat poison unless he be an utter lunatic.¹

¹ Upadeśa Sāhasri XVIII.232. Quoted also at Pañcadaśi VII.142.

yato 'vagata-paramārtha-tattvasya yatheṣṭācaraṇaṁ na manāg api ghaṭate mumukṣutve 'pi ca tasmāt

Because self-willed activity is not remotely possible in the case of one who has known the supreme reality, and is not even possible in the case of one who sincerely desires release, it follows that:

rāgo liṅgam abodhasya citta-vyāyāma-bhūmiṣu
kutaḥ śāḍvalatā tasya yasyāgniḥ koṭare taroḥ

[67] Attachment for the things that drain the energy of the mind is the very hallmark of ignorance. How can a tree with a fire blazing in the hollow of its trunk burgeon with green foliage?¹

¹ This is an often quoted verse, e.g. Pañcada śi VII.191.

sakala-puruṣārtha-samāpti-kāriṇo 'syātmāvabodhasya kutaḥ prasūtir iti. ucyate

When arises this awakening to the Self which comprises the attainment of all human ends? We reply:

amāṇitvādi-niṣṭho yo yaś cādveṣṭr-ādi-sādhanaḥ
iṅānam utpadyate tasya na bahir-mukha-cetasaḥ

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[68] He who is intent on "humility etc."\(^1\) and is equipped with virtues such as non-enmity,\(^2\) acquires knowledge, but not he whose mind is turned outwards.

\(^1\) For the qualities meant by "humility etc.", see Bhagavad Gitā XIII.7 ff.
\(^2\) For "non-enmity" see Bhagavad Gitā XII.13.

\textit{utpanna ātma-vijñāne kim avidyā-kāryatvāt pravrtti-van nivṛttyātmakāmānitvādayo nivartanta uta neti. neti brūmaḥ. kim kāraṇam. nivṛtti-śāstrāviruddha-svābhāvyāt paramātmano na tu niyoga-vasāt. katham tarhi. śṛṇu}

When knowledge of the Self has arisen, do the non-active virtues like "humility" cease just like the active tendencies, on account of their being (also) products of ignorance, or do they not cease? We say, "They do not cease". Why not? Not on account of any injunction to perform them, but because the supreme Self is by nature in harmony with the texts devoted to the suppression of action. How is this? Listen:

\textit{utpannātma-prabodhasya tv adveṣṭṛtvādayo guṇāḥ ayatnato bhavanty asya na tu sādhana-rūpīnaḥ}

[69] In the case of one who has achieved enlightenment, virtues like non-enmity persist naturally and without effort. They are no longer practised as a means to any end.

\textit{yata etad evam atah}

Because this is so, it follows:
imam grantham upāditsur amānityādi-sādhanaḥ
yatnataḥ syān na durvṛttaḥ pratyag-dharmānugo hy ayaṁ

[70] Those who wish to profit from the present book ought to possess themselves of humility and the other qualities which are means to spirituality, and should avoid evil practices with all their power. For it is a book which teaches Self-realization and nothing less.

na dātavyaḥ cāyaṁ granthaḥ

And this book should not be given to (those who are not qualified):

nāviraktāya sāṃsārāṇ nānirastaisanāya ca
na cāyama-vate deyaṁ vedāntārtha-praveśanam

[71] This introduction to the teachings of the Upani-shads should not be given to one who has not developed indifference to worldly experience, who has not laid aside his temporal desires, and who has not practised the discipline of yama.¹

¹ "The discipline of yama": For this, see Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra, II.30. It is a group of disciplines centering on self-control.

jñātvā yathoditaṁ samyag jñātavyaṁ nāvaśiṣyate
na cānirasta-karmedāṁ jāniyād aṁjasā tataḥ

[72] When what has been said in this book has been rightly comprehended, nothing further remains to be known. But only the renunciates from all action will rightly understand it.

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nirasta-sarva-karmāṇah pratyak-pravāna-buddhayāḥ
niśkāmā yatayah śānta jānantidam yathoditam

[73] Desireless, peaceful ascetics who have renounced all activities and whose minds are focussed within, will understand the teachings in the spirit in which they are meant.

śrimac-chaṅkara-pāda-padma-yugalāṃ
samsevya labdhvocivān
jñānāṃ pāramahāṃsyam etad amalam
svāntāndhakārāpanut
mā bhūd atra virodhini matir atah
sadbhiḥ parikṣyam budhaiḥ
sarvatraiva viśuddhayo matam idam
santaḥ paraṃ kāraṇam

[74] Having served the lotus feet of Śrī Śaṅkara I received this pure doctrine of the Paramahāṃsas,¹ and it destroyed the inner darkness of my soul. Lest my views² are regarded as controversial, I offer them to the wise for inspection. The wise, I am convinced, are the true source of the correction of our erroneous views.

¹ Wandering monks following the strict Upanishadic path of Nonduality.
² Matam idam, taken in from the seventh line and construed with parikṣyam.

subhāṣitām cārv api nāmahātmanām
divākaru nakta-drśām ivāmalaḥ
prabhāti bhāty eva viśuddha-cetasām
nidhir yathāpāsta-trṣāṃ mahā-dhanāḥ

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Noble and inspiring spiritual literature, even when attractively written, does not illumine the hearts of the small-minded, any more than the bright sun illumines the dark paths of the owl. It manifests to those who have acquired purity of mind (desirelessness), even as glorious treasures are showered on those who have renounced their desire for wealth.¹

¹ Cp. Patañjali, Yoga Sūtra II.37. J.

viṣṇoh pādānugām yām nikhila-bhava-nudām
śaṃkaro ’vāpa yogāt
sarvajñāṃ brahma-saṃstham muni-gaṅa-sahitaṃ
samyag abhyarcya bhaktyā
vidyāṃ gaṅgāṃ ivāhaṃ pravara-guṇa-nidheḥ
prāpya vedānta diptāṃ
kāruṇyāt tām avocāṃ jani-mṛti-nivaha-
dhvastaye duḥkkhitebhyaḥ

Before addressing myself to the present work I duly reverenced Śaṃkara, ever established in the Absolute (Brahman), surrounded by a host of sages. Having obtained, through the good deeds of previous births, this knowledge proclaimed by the Upanishads, which destroys the whole world of becoming, which is (purifying) like the Ganges and which leads to the abode of Viṣṇu just as she¹ proceeds from it, and which, like her¹ also, was attained by Śaṃkara through yoga—I have set it forth from motives of compassion alone, for the benefit of the suffering denizens of this world, that they may put a stop to the stream of births and deaths for ever.²

²
The Ganges.

In this verse, which is full of double meanings which are impossible to translate, Suresvara likens himself to Bhagiratha, who brought the Ganges down from the head of Śaṅkara (= God Śiva) in the Himalayas to the plains. The Ganges, too, is cool and purifying, and comes from the feet (pāda) of Viṣṇu, just as the knowledge leads to His “abode” (pāda in a different sense). Both the God Śaṅkara (i.e. Śiva) and the Teacher Śaṅkara are omniscient, ever-established in the Absolute (Brahman), and surrounded by a host of sages.

vedāntodara-varti bhāsvad amalām
 dhvānta-cchid asmad dhiyo
 divyam jñānam atīndriye 'pi viṣaye
 vyāhanyate na kvacit
 yo no nyāya-śalākayaiva nikhilam
 saṃsāra-bijam tamaḥ
 protsāryāvīrakārṣid1 guru-guruḥ
 pūjyāya tasmaī namah

1 The metre of this line is irregular, a short syllable having been omitted before the final long syllable of āvīrakārṣid.

[77] Reverence to that venerable Guru of Gurus who removed with the collyrium-stick of his reasoning the whole of that ignorance which is the seed of transmigration, and who revealed to us that divine and glorious knowledge, embedded deep in the heart of the Upani-shads, which destroys the darkness in our intellects and which is nowhere confounded, though it bears on the realm of transcendence.